Diplomacy & Crisis News

Summary: As the pinnacle of naval power, America's aircraft carrier fleet faces increasing threats from advanced missile technology, particularly from near-peer adversaries like China or Russia. With hypersonic, cruise, and ballistic missiles capable of targeting carriers, the sheer force of numbers poses a significant challenge. However, carriers are not defenseless; equipped with formidable aircraft and supported by carrier battle groups, they create a defensive umbrella to mitigate threats. While adversaries aim to penetrate this defensive bubble, historical precedent shows the resilience of carrier battle groups. Through strategic planning and seamanship, US carriers strive to stay ahead in the ever-evolving landscape of modern warfare.

The American aircraft carrier fleet is the strongest in the world. With 11 supercarriers and hundreds of aircraft, the U.S. Navy can project power to any part of the globe and respond to contingencies as they arise.  

These aircraft carriers would be the central actors in any near-peer war with China or Russia. By containing or destroying them, an adversary would neutralize much of America’s expeditionary firepower. But how would they achieve this?

Today, missiles are the most serious danger to aircraft carriers. 

Advances in missile technology have increased the threat to carriers. Hypersonic, cruise, and even ballistic missiles now have the range, speed, and destructive capability to take out a carrier. Nor is the threat limited to a single well-placed, cutting-edge missile. Indeed, the Navy is concerned that a near-peer adversary like China could launch dozens, if not hundreds, of missiles against American supercarriers and destroy or sink them through the sheer force of numbers. The more advanced the incoming munitions, the greater the odds in favor of the attacker. 

But it isn't just about math. It is also about calculated risks. You will not find an aircraft carrier exposed unless something has gone really wrong. To begin with, a carrier’s first line of defense is its aircraft. They can fly thousands of miles away from the mothership and take out incoming threats. 

In addition, aircraft carriers don't fight alone. Supercarriers lead carrier battle groups that can include guided-missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, and support vessels. The smaller warships fan out and create a defensive umbrella around the aircraft carrier, protecting it from aerial, surface, and underwater threats.

During combat, the goal of an adversary is to penetrate that defensive bubble and get to the carrier. If he can damage or sink the leader of the battlegroup and thus restrict or stop its air operations, then the carrier battle group is neutralized. This is easier said than done. 

The last time an aircraft carrier was destroyed or sunk in major combat operations was during World War Two. Since then, the closest a military has come to sinking an enemy carrier was during the Falklands War, when the Argentine Air Force threw dozens of aircraft against a British task force in an attempt to sink two British aircraft carriers and establish air superiority over the battlefield. Although they sank several warships and support ships, the Argentines failed to penetrate the air defense umbrella completely and reach the aircraft carriers. 

The goal of the carrier battle group is to stay out of danger – or limit its exposure to danger as much as possible while it works through the enemy’s capabilities. Numbers might create an advantage, but that advantage can be countered by good seamanship and proper planning. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Last month, rumors that Russia has been developing a space-based nuclear weapon took the media by storm. The technology in question, ominously dubbed a “serious national security threat” by House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Turner, left many in Washington asking how the United States itself is planning to capitalize on the strategic significance of outer space. 

Russia, however, isn’t the most assertive actor in the space domain. That honor belongs to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has a clear plan to dominate outer space—and which is moving ahead with the full backing of the powers that be in Beijing.

China’s outer space strategy involves many things, from asteroid mining to increasing the number of PRC-fielded satellites to developing a rival to the U.S. GPS navigation system. However, its ultimate objective is clear: to bolster the country’s comprehensive national power. As the PRC itself has asserted, “To explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry, and build China into a space power is our eternal dream.”

Consequently, China’s space program has made massive strides in recent years. The PRC’s Tiangong space station, for instance, initially entered Earth’s orbit in April 2021 and has since hosted six separate astronaut crews. Last year, Zhang Qiao, a researcher from the China Academy of Space Technology, announced that the station will double in size in the future to support the over 100 scientific research projects that have or are currently taking place in orbit. In addition, China successfully collected Lunar material in 2020 with its Chang’e-5 mission, landed its Zhurong rover on Mars in 2022, and completed a record sixty-seven targeted launches in 2023.

Most recently, researchers from the Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT) in northeast China unveiled plans for a manned facility on the Moon. Newly translated video footage from the Third Annual Space Science Conference in October 2023, co-hosted by the Chinese Society of Space Research and Zhejiang Province Science and Technology Association, presents a plan for an expansive Lunar installation. The base features subterranean living quarters, research labs, a greenhouse, a fleet of unmanned vehicles, a photovoltaic system, closed-cycle life support, and more. The purported purpose of the project, led by Chief HIT Engineer Mei Hongyuan, is to study the chemical composition of the Lunar surface.

The proposal in the video draws heavily on research from a 2022 paper published in the Chinese Journal of Deep Space Exploration titled “Research on Building Plans Design for Future China Lunar Base.” The report features several different design possibilities for a Chinese Lunar facility and emphasizes the fact that “the Moon is the Earth’s only natural satellite,” and that “countries must establish Lunar bases in order to take advantage of the Moon’s natural resources.” 

Why should U.S. policymakers care about Chinese plans to build a base on the Moon? First, the plan has a considerable chance of becoming a reality. As many already know, China is no stranger to grand architectural undertakings (The Great Wall, the Grand Canal, Three Gorges Dam, etc.) and is already planning to send its first manned mission to the Moon in 2030, followed by the construction of a permanent base there by 2036. 

Meanwhile, the credentials of the architect of China’s new Lunar Base plan suggest seriousness. Mr. Mei is a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with political ties to China’s leadership and has professional experience designing facilities for the 2022 Winter Olympic Games, for the PRC State Council, and for the Harbin Institute. As such, his design plans for a Lunar base carry substantial credibility.

Second, a Chinese Moon base represents an economic challenge to U.S. interests. The Lunar surface, for one, is home to a variety of critical materials. More specifically, Helium-3—a non-radioactive isotope found in large quantities on the Moon’s surface—has a wide range of uses, most notable in the operation of nuclear fusion reactors. Aluminum and Silicone are also very abundant on the Lunar surface, meaning Chinese engineers will likely use the Moon’s soil to produce solar panels and 3D printed facilities. As Chinese Moon scientist Ouyang Ziyuan has put it, “the Moon could serve as a new and tremendous supplier of energy and resources for human beings…This is crucial to sustainable development of human beings on Earth…Whoever first conquers the Moon will benefit first.” 

Underpinning all this is a key recognition: industrializing the Moon would be a key part of what China envisions as a $10 trillion/year Moon-Earth Economic Zone. Ultimately, a Chinese Lunar base would serve as an important resource deposit and a trampoline to catapult the PRC into deep space. 

If the United States does not confront this fact, it will be edged out of both the tangible and symbolic gains that China is aiming to seize. For the moment, the United States is in danger of precisely that. America’s ambitions remain decidedly modest. For instance, the cornerstone of the country’s space plans, the NASA Artemis program, is far less ambitious than China’s proposal and lacks the proper strategic vision to make the country a space-faring nation.

All of this is liable to come at a high cost. As China has eloquently demonstrated with its Lunar plans, the clock is ticking. For America to actually take advantage of the strategic opportunities presented by Lunar development, it will need to start thinking more about how space serves the long-term national interest.  

Aedan Yohannan is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary: As Ukraine faces increased pressure from Russian forces, the arrival of F-16 Fighting Falcons offers a significant boost to Kyiv's air defense capabilities. While the process of training Ukrainian pilots on these modern aircraft has been expedited, challenges remain as they adapt to Western tactics and language requirements. Despite Russian efforts to downplay the impact of the F-16s, their deployment marks a strategic move by NATO allies to support Ukraine's defense. With the F-16's combat-proven track record and versatility, its integration into Ukraine's military arsenal could potentially shift the dynamics of the ongoing conflict.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon is already a combat-proven fighter, adopted by dozens of nations around the world. The first Fighting Falcons could also be in the skies over Ukraine as early as this summer, The New York Times reported on Monday.

A dozen pilots have been training on the U.S.-made aircraft in Denmark, the UK and the United States.

While 45 aircraft have been pledged to Kyiv, just six F-16s have been delivered. The additional jets can't come fast enough, as Ukraine is desperate for more weapons, as it runs low on artillery rounds and other ammunition while Republican lawmakers in Congress have held up additional U.S. military aid. The F-16s are expected to arrive in Ukraine armed with short- and medium-range missiles and bombs, partially making up for the shortage of ground-based munitions, the paper of record reported.

"This year, new fighter jets will be in our skies, and we have to make this year an effective one in defending ourselves against Russian guided bombs, Russian aircraft and their missiles," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said earlier this month.

The New York Times further noted that the training of Ukraine's pilots on the F-16 has proceeded at "lightning speed, compressing years of classroom learning, simulations and flight exercises into months."

Yet, the progress has been slower going than Kyiv or its allies had hoped – due to the fact that pilots trained on Soviet-era planes and tactics have had to get up to speed on the English language and Western military practices to make effective use of the Fighting Falcons.

The first Ukrainian pilots began training last August at Skrydstrup Air Base in southern Denmark, but their deficiencies in language skills and knowledge of Western flying techniques slowed the progress down considerably and it wasn't until this past January that the Ukrainian pilots were actually ready to fly.

NATO member Denmark led the European effort last spring to provide Ukraine with F-16s. The F-16s were on the list of Western-made military hardware requested by Zelensky, along with tanks, air defense systems, and artillery.

The Biden administration only reluctantly gave in to Ukraine's demands, last summer by allowing NATO allies to provide the F-16s to Kyiv. Those jets were being phased out in some European militaries in favor of the newer F-35 Lightning II.

As the paper also reported, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Belgium committed to sending around a combined 45 of the jets to Ukraine, enough for three small squadrons. Denmark is on track to send the first six in the late spring, with 13 more due to arrive over the rest of the year and into 2025.

However, American officials have cautioned that the F-16 Fighting Falcon would not be decisive in the war and that the training would take a considerable amount of time. The latter fact has already been the case, but Ukraine has benefited from downing multiple Russian A-50 reconnaissance aircraft, which could make it harder for the Kremlin's forces to monitor the skies over Ukraine.

As previously reported, Russia has downplayed the threat of the F-16, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has even dismissed claims that the F-16s will be able to flip the course of the war in Ukraine.

Putin suggested the F-16s would be as easily destroyed as the German-made Leopard 2 main battle tanks (MBTs). Moscow has even warned that if the F-16 Fighting Falcons take off from the territory of NATO member countries and are used in the Ukrainian conflict, the Kremlin could regard this as a conscious step toward escalation and "de facto direct participation in the armed confrontation."

Since it first entered service in 1979, the Fighting Falcon has engaged in more than 400,000 combat sorties and has more than a combined 19 million flight hours. Moreover, the F-16 has been adapted to complete several missions, including air-to-air fighting, ground attack, and electronic warfare. It has proven to be highly maneuverable while its combat radius exceeds that of its potential threats.

The F-16 is no longer being acquired by the U.S. Air Force, but Lockheed Martin continues to build the F-16 for foreign customers around the world. It remains the world's most successful, combat-proven multi-role jet fighter ever produced.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: The F-35A, Lockheed Martin's advanced stealth fighter, has attained operational certification to carry the B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb, marking it as the first 5th generation aircraft with nuclear capabilities. With this milestone achieved ahead of schedule, the F-35A becomes a pivotal component of the US and NATO's extended deterrence commitments. This development highlights the aircraft's versatility as a dual-capable platform, capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear payloads. As NATO-operated jets receive initial certification for the deterrence mission, the integration of the B61-12 further enhances the F-35A's combat capability, solidifying its role in modern warfare.

The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II has been touted as being the most advanced multirole combat aircraft in service in the world today, and according to a new report – it is now a nuclear-capable warbird.

Breaking Defense first reported on Friday that the F-35A, the conventional takeoff and landing variant, has been operationally certified to carry the B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb.

In a statement, F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) spokesman Russ Goemaere told Breaking Defense the certification was achieved on October 12, months ahead of a pledge to NATO allies that the process would wrap by January 2024. An undisclosed number of F-35As will now be capable of carrying the B61-12, officially making the stealth fighter a "dual-capable" aircraft that can carry both conventional and nuclear weapons.

"The F-35A is the first 5th generation nuclear-capable aircraft ever, and the first new platform (fighter or bomber) to achieve this status since the early 1990s. This F-35 Nuclear Certification effort culminates 10+ years of intense effort across the nuclear enterprise, which consists of 16 different government and industry stakeholders," said Goemaere. "The F-35A achieved Nuclear Certification ahead of schedule, providing US and NATO with a critical capability that supports US extended deterrence commitments earlier than anticipated. "

As previously reported by Maya Carlin for The National Defense in December, some North Atlantic Treaty Organization-operated jets had received "initial certification for the deterrence mission."

The F-35A is only certified to carry the B61-12 variant, the latest variant of the United States military's B61 family of air-launched nuclear gravity bombs. It is a combination of new and refurbished components from earlier variants including the B61-3, B61-4, B61-7, and B61-10. Moreover, the certification additionally does not extend to the stealth jet's sister variants, the short takeoff and vertical landing F-35B and carrier-launched F-35C.

The B61-12, which is twelve feet long and weighs approximately 825 pounds, is an air-launched nuclear gravity bomb that utilized an inertial navigation system (INS) to make a precision strike on a target. It was first integrated with the U.S. Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, where it is carried externally. The weapon will also be certified to be carried on the Air Force’s B-2 Spirit strategic bomber, as well as the F-16C/D fighter.

Analysis from the Federation of American Scientists reports that as of last summer, there are approximately 100 older variants of the B61 bombs housed by NATO forces in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The first of those nations either currently or plan to operate the fifth-generation stealth fighter.

In 2021, the F-35A became the first fifth-generation platform to near certification as a nuclear-capable airframe. The improvements to the already-advanced F-35 will boost the combat capability of the stealth fighter jet. These improvements will allow it to penetrate hostile airspace without warning and possibly be a part of the United States military's nuclear triad.

Unlike with the other fighters, including the F-15 and F-16, the B61-12 will be carried internally in the F-35.

The B61-12 was first successfully flight-tested to carry the B61-12 nuclear bomb at the Sandia National Laboratories' Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, in late 2020. An F-35A carried a mock warhead, which was used in a strike from an altitude of 10,500 feet, as part of a full-weapons systems demonstration that was designed to increase confidence the bomb would “work when needed.”

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: As tensions rise between the U.S. and China, military strategists analyze the growing threat posed by China's anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) like the DF-21D and DF-26B. While the U.S. Navy has successfully countered missile strikes so far, the prospect of facing these advanced weapons in a conflict with China raises concerns about the effectiveness of aircraft carriers, long considered the backbone of U.S. naval power. With both sides possessing formidable arsenals, we must question the role of carriers in modern warfare and whether a potential conflict might escalate beyond conventional naval battles.

Military planning is about considering the numerous hypothetical scenarios – such as how and where an enemy might strike, but more importantly whether and even how a potential foe's weapons systems can be countered. No doubt America's enemies likely have considered how to hit and sink an aircraft carrier – and it is just as likely U.S. Navy officials have been kept up at night worrying about such an unthinkable event.

The sailors of the United States Navy must do everything right absolutely every time, while an enemy only has to get lucky once. That fact is no doubt understood by the sailors who have been serving in the Red Sea, facing missile and drone strikes launched by Houthi rebels operating in Yemen.

So far the United States Navy has a perfect record, countering every missile fired at its warships. Arguably the odds are stacked in favor of the U.S. military, which has the best and most advanced air defense systems in the world operated by highly trained sailors.

In a conflict against China, however, the odds could shift.

As previously reported, three decades ago, China introduced its DF-21D (Dong Feng-21, CSS-5), a medium-range, road-mobile ballistic missile. It has been described as the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) or "carrier killer." Designed to replace the obsolete Dong Feng-2 (CSS-1), it was China's first solid-fuel road-mobile missile to use solid propellant. Able to deploy a 600 kg payload with a minimum range of 500 km (311 miles) and a maximum range of 2,150 km, the DF-21D’s warhead is likely maneuverable and may have an accuracy of 20 m CEP (circular error probable).

Beijing has since developed multiple DF-21 variants, including a dual nuclear/conventional capable version (DF-21C) and another designed as an anti-ship ballistic missile (DF-21D). In 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) also revealed that it believed a new nuclear variant, the DF-21E CSS-5 Mod 6) was also being produced.

Moreover, while the DF-21D could be used near the "home waters" of China, Beijing has also developed another missile that poses a threat to warships operating throughout much of the Indo-Pacific region.

This is the DF-26B (Dong Feng-26), a road-mobile, two-stage solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile that was first unveiled during a military parade in September 2015. It has a reported range of 4,000km (2,485 miles) and it can be used in both conventional and nuclear strikes against ground as well as naval targets.

\The mobile launcher can carry a 1,200 to 1,800 kg nuclear or conventional warhead, and as it could directly strike a target such as the U.S. territory of Guam in the event of war it should be seen as a formidable weapon. More ominously, the DF-26B has been described as a carrier killer due to how it could be used to target the U.S. Navy’s fleet of Nimitz- and Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered supercarriers.

Aircraft carriers were vital during the Second World War in defeating Japan in the Pacific, and the flattops have proven vital in confronting aggression during the Cold War and throughout the Global War on Terror (GWoT). Yet, the number of carriers has actually diminished even as the United States Navy operates 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers – more than any other nation in the world.

Instead of having a large fleet of conventionally powered carriers, the United States relies on a smaller number of massive flattops. The question now is whether the United States Navy could risk such vessels in a conflict against a near-peer adversary, notably China.

Losing a single carrier would be devastating as it couldn't be quickly replaced.

Yet, a war against China wouldn't simply be a replay of World War II. Even if the conflict were to be fought in the Indo-Pacific, it wouldn't be an island-hopping campaign. More importantly, U.S. bombers can already strike any spot on the globe thanks to aerial refueling fly CONUS-to-CONUS missions.

Thus, the hypothetical is whether carriers are now the weapons needed for a war against China. It is unlikely that such a conflict would be decided by even a single decisive naval battle. Rather it would likely be one of stealth bombers, missiles and possibly even nuclear weapons should the conflict escalate to that point.

Yet, the point remains that if an enemy has enough missiles, drones, aircraft, submarines, etc. – a carrier is going to be sunk. But that goes both ways. China can ill afford to lose its capital ships any more than the U.S.

Perhaps that realization is enough that cooler heads will prevail again, and keep any potential Cold War 2.0 from turning hot.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy Flickr. 

Across the world, media outlets and non-governmental organizations are speaking about the plight of Armenian settler colonialists in Karabakh, who left their homes voluntarily.   For example, the International Crisis Group recently published a report, proclaiming: “Armenia is having problems integrating over 100,000 refugees who fled Nagorno-Karabakh when Azerbaijan took control of the enclave in September 2023. Yerevan has tried to be generous, but it lacks funds and a long-term plan, leaving the displaced people exposed and facing an uncertain future.” 

They discussed the difficulties faced by Armenian settler colonists who left their homes voluntarily upon return to Armenia, while remaining deafly silent about the plight of the West Azerbaijanis, who faced similarly difficulties and who unlike these Armenians were the indigenous inhabitants of the land and not settler colonialists, whose presence in Karabakh violated four UN Security Council resolutions.  Similarly, the European Commission just released a statement, proclaiming: “the Commission is allocating an additional €5.5 million in humanitarian aid to support the Armenians displaced from the Nagorno-Karabakh region.”

Underlining EU’s humanitarian support to Karabakh Armenians, Commissioner for Crisis Management, Janez Lenarčič, said: “This is the first winter for thousands of Karabakh Armenians who fled to Armenia last Autumn. In these challenging times, it is our humanitarian duty to provide protection and assistance to the people most in need. With this new €5.5 million funding, we will aim to further strengthen the existing EU humanitarian response to the displaced people in Armenia, by providing them with access to basic services.”

Interestingly, when Israel evacuated 9,000 Jewish settlers from 22 settlements in the Gush Katif community in the Gaza Strip, the European Union did not provide any of the Israelis who were displaced from their home with financial assistance, including in the winter months.  This remained the case, even though decades onward, not everyone who was evacuated from their homes has been able to establish a new home and a new life.  In fact, the Europeans praised Israel’s evacuation from Gaza, even though it led to this grave humanitarian disaster for the residents of Gush Katif and the brutal Hamas terror organization taking over the coastal strip.    So, why the compassion for the Karabakh Armenians and not the Israeli evacuees? Is this not hypocrisy?   Furthermore, why did the Europeans not raise a finger to help the West Azerbaijanis, whom no one ever argued were settler colonialists?   

Chairman of the Management Board of the Western Azerbaijani Community, MP Aziz Alakbarli, recently stated that today the world speaks about the plight of Karabakh Armenians, even though they are settler colonialists, but not the West Azerbaijani community, who are indigenous to the land: “the Western Azerbaijani Community does not accept the injustice committed against the western Azerbaijanis not only in the last 100 years but also in the last two centuries and rejects the consequences of this injustice. Based on the right of return established in the Convention and other important international acts, it declares as its main goal to create conditions for the return of Azerbaijanis expelled from the territory of Armenia to their homeland and to ensure their individual and collective rights after returning there.”         

Summary: The decline of America's "unipolar moment" and the rise of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems signal a critical juncture for US military strategy. These inexpensive but effective defenses challenge the utility of America's costly offensive platforms, like aircraft carriers, against near-peer adversaries. The proliferation of A2/AD capabilities to smaller states and non-state actors further complicates US power projection globally. As enemies like the Houthis potentially gain access to such technologies through backers like Iran, China, or Russia, the US Navy must innovate or face diminishing operational spheres, highlighting the urgent need for advancements in drone swarms, submarines, and hypersonic weapons to maintain strategic relevance.

It has become trite to say that America’s “unipolar moment” has ended. Sadly, it has ended. Yet, the elites who run US foreign and national security policy have yet to realize this tragic reality. The longer that they continue operating as if it is 1994 as opposed to 2024, the more likely the US military will suffer its greatest defeat since the Battle of Bladensburg during the War of 1812. Understanding the grave threat that relatively inexpensive defensive systems, such as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), pose to America’s wildly expensive—and complicated—offensive weapons platforms, such as its aircraft carriers, is an important step for US policymakers. 

The longer that US policymakers fail to consider the rise of these A2/AD systems, the more insecure America becomes.

As Steven Stashwick of The Diplomat wrote way back in 2016, “the United States is already paying much more for a proportionally smaller increase in combat performance, a diminishing future operational return on increasing military investments.” Citing both the Ford-class aircraft carrier and the F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation warplane as examples of the diminishing operational return on increasing military investments, Stashwick suggested that US war planners abandon the concept of decisively defeating a near-peer rival in combat. Instead, Stashwick believes the Americans should simply seek to deny their rivals from winning.

Interestingly, America’s greatest rivals—notably China—have so thoroughly perfected their A2/AD capabilities that even attempting to deploy expensive systems, such as the aircraft carriers, into areas that are home to these dangerous A2/AD systems would be wasteful. 

So, if the US cannot use its greatest naval power projector against near-peer rivals due to their A2/AD capabilities, when and where could these assets be used? 

Aircraft carriers would be useful, as they have been over the last 79 years since the end of the Second World War, in regions where the enemies of the United States lack these A2/AD capabilities. However, the problem is that both China and Russia are rapidly proliferating these systems to smaller states and transnational terror organizations because they understand that A2/AD stunts the ability of the US military to project power. 

Take, for example, the situation currently plaguing global shipping around the Middle East. Iranian-backed Houthi rebels operating out of Yemen are increasingly threatening the safety of global shipping through regions, such as the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb.

Despite having been terrorizing the high seas since last October, the US Navy, which has many assets in the region, has stayed its hand in responding to the Houthi threat directly. Because of its hesitancy to respond, the Houthis have only been more encouraged to continue antagonizing the situation, believing the US Navy will not directly respond to their endless provocations. 

In fact, the Houthis have gotten so bold that they just recently launched a massive attack consisting of 21 advanced offensive drones and directed them to attack nearby US Navy warships. 

The Navy warships dispatched the Houthi drones (which were provided by the Iranians, the chief benefactor for the Houthis) with relative ease. But, as a colleague and expert in military affairs quipped to me shortly after that event, all these attacks against US Navy assets are merely data-gathering missions. 

The Houthis are escalating at every engagement with the Navy. With each engagement, they learn invaluable intelligence about the Navy’s defensive capabilities.

It would not be too difficult for this tiny terrorist organization to suddenly be handed A2/AD capabilities by their Iranian, Chinese, or Russian allies. Such systems would only allow for the Houthis to operate with even more impunity than they’ve already been operating under. And the US Navy seems willing to oblige even these tinier threats by not innovating their own effective countermeasures to the growing global A2/AD threat. 

So, until they do, the world will become smaller and smaller for US forces. Specifically, there will be fewer areas in which US carriers and other capital ships could operate with the kind of impunity they’ve become accustomed to since the end of the Cold War. 

Yes, given A2/AD capabilities being fielded by rivals, like China, US carriers will be increasingly relegated to operating in ancillary areas of interest. But China and its autocratic allies will not be content to simply keep US power projection out of their respective regions. 

Instead, they’ll seek to rollback US power everywhere. Even groups like the Houthis will suddenly become important destinations for A2/AD capabilities. 

The Navy needs to take the development of massive drone swarms, the expansion of its submarine fleet, and hypersonic weapons systems much more seriously than it has. Otherwise, even the Houthis will possess the means to sink US carriers—thereby ensuring that those systems could not be deployed to even places like Yemen.

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy Flickr. 

Summary: China's People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is rapidly expanding its aircraft carrier fleet, aiming for five to six carriers by the 2030s. Despite the global shift towards sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems that challenge naval power projection, China continues to invest heavily in carriers. This strategy underscores China's ambition to dominate the Indo-Pacific, particularly the First Island Chain, leveraging A2/AD systems to create a defensive "bubble" that enables its carriers to operate with impunity. Unlike the US, China’s carriers are not the centerpiece of its maritime power; instead, its A2/AD capabilities are, facilitating regional dominance and deterring US intervention.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been building a fleet of increasingly sophisticated aircraft carriers. What began as the butt of all jokes in the naval community—China’s Russian-built aircraft carrier called the Liaoning—has helped the PLAN develop into a robust (though untested and still limited) carrier force. Possessing three total aircraft carriers, with a fourth on the way, China is churning out their aircraft carriers like sausages (thanks to the mass production capabilities that Wall Street handed over to China during the deindustrialization craze that befell America in the middle of the last century). The fourth carrier in China’s growing fleet is rumored to be nuclear (the other three are non-nuclear).

China’s naval planners desire to have five or six aircraft carriers in their fleet by the 2030s, according to Wang Yunfei, a retired PLAN officer with knowledge about Beijing’s carrier plans. 

This begs the question, though, how many carriers does China really need? 

And that gets us to the underlying problem facing most great powers today, which is that the advent of sophisticated anti-area/access-denial (A2/AD) systems has complicated the ability of navies everywhere to project power beyond their shores. 

At least that’s the case for the US Navy. 

So, if A2/AD has seriously stunted the ability of surface fleets to move their assets within striking range of distant targets—and China’s military has led the way in this revolution—why is Beijing dumping so much money and resources into developing their own aircraft carrier capability? 

It's because, despite their awful human rights record and authoritarian regime, China is led by actual military strategists not politicians. 

For China, they have a multi-step strategy for dominating the Indo-Pacific—starting with the First Island Chain. There are three island chains, each radiating out from the previous one. The First Island Chain runs from Japan through Taiwan all the way down to the Philippines. The Second Island Chain consists of the tiny South Pacific Islands that track from the Japanese island of Okinawa all the way out to U.S.-controlled Guam. The third and final chain comprises Alaska’s Aleutian Islands and jogs down to the Hawaiian Islands. 

For China to dominate the Indo-Pacific it must ultimately come to control all three chains. Their main priority now, however, is to dominate the First Island Chain. That’s where China’s sprawling A2/AD constellation throughout the South China Sea, for instance, comes into play. From these forward-deployed positions, China’s A2/AD systems can rebuff most attempts by US Navy surface warships to come within range of Chinese forces that may be engaged in an invasion—or even a blockade—of Taiwan or some other hostile action against another US ally, such as the Philippines. 

Without the ability to reliably project power against Chinese forces in the First Island Chain, Beijing’s forces suddenly have a strategic freehand in what they view as their sphere of influence.

In essence, A2/AD systems create a nearly impenetrable “bubble” to shield Chinese military forces from American military retaliation. Underneath the protective A2/AD bubble is where Chinese carriers will operate—presumably out of range from American offensive systems. With the US Navy’s biggest power projectors, aircraft carriers, kept away, China’s carriers will have free reign to operate and intimidate. 

This, of course, is the purpose behind China’s robust arsenal of A2/AD systems. 

Unlike the US Navy, China’s aircraft carriers are not the center of gravity for their fleet. These systems are ancillary. The lynchpin of China’s offensive maritime strategy is oddly in their defensive A2/AD systems. 

These systems are specifically tailored to keep the bulk of US naval power back, giving China’s other naval assets—like their less sophisticated aircraft carriers—the room to enhance their national interest in the First Island Chain and keep US power back over-the-horizon. 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Summary: The US Navy faces significant challenges in missile defense against the complex anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems of adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Despite possessing advanced defensive systems, the sheer volume of potential missile attacks can overwhelm US warships, especially aircraft carriers, rendering them liabilities. The theft of classified defense system designs by Chinese cyber spies exacerbates this vulnerability. To counter this growing threat, experts argue for a strategic shift towards long-range warfare, including the development of offensive drones, enhanced submarine capabilities, and US hypersonic weapons, to bypass A2/AD defenses and ensure effective power projection.

The US Navy (indeed, Washington in general) seems to be averse to basic arithmetic.

Whether it be the massive deficit spending or even something as simple as protecting US warships from massive numbers of Chinese, Russian, Iranian, or North Korean missiles and hypersonic weapons associated with their increasingly complex arsenal of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems. 

For example, US Navy warships have some of the world’s most sophisticated defense systems meant to protect the ship from incoming antiship missiles. 

These systems are some of the most expensive and complex in the world. Yet, no amount of complexity can provide the kind of consistent and comprehensive shield that US warships require in the face of the growing A2/AD threat to their safety. This is especially true of US aircraft carriers which, if lost or seriously damaged, would quickly go from the Navy’s greatest power projection weapons platform to its greatest—most expensive—liability. 

Basically, it’s a simple math equation.

US warships can only defend themselves from a certain number of incoming missiles at once. American rivals, notably China, understand this fact. That’s why they’ve tailored their A2/AD systems to being able to overwhelm the Navy’s most sophisticated defensive systems.

While the Navy certainly has defenses against a certain number of incoming ballistic missiles, there are no known defensive countermeasures available to Navy warships that will protect against Chinese or Russian hypersonic weapons. 

Staying with the mundane mathematics of missile defense, the Navy does not have limitless capabilities to defend their warships against attack once within range of A2/AD systems. What’s more, in 2013, the Washington Post revealed that the Pentagon had suffered a serious breach of its cybersecurity. Chinese cyber spies hacked into the Pentagon’s supposedly secure network and stole the classified designs for more than two dozen key US weapons systems. 

Among those systems were the designs behind the Navy’s Aegis-class Destroyer’s ballistic missile defense system. This system is one of the most advanced ballistic missile defense systems in the world. Aircraft carriers operate a similar, though, different system known as the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS). China’s hacking of the schematics for the Navy’s Aegis defense system not only means that China can build their own versions of this system. It also means that they can develop capabilities to overcome the systems employed on countless American warships. China has likely already tested their A2/AD systems against the data they stole from the Pentagon on the Navy’s shipborne missile defense systems and believe that they can overcome whatever defenses US warships employ.

If the enemy can overwhelm your missile defenses by simply throwing too many missiles in one barrage, then your ship is sunk. At the very least, in the case of aircraft carriers, the flight deck is badly damaged basically making the flat top a wasting asset on the battlefield. At that point, it’d become a race to both keep the ship from getting more damaged and taking it out of the battlespace before it was sunk. 

The Navy has known for over a decade that China and its autocratic allies have had their number when it comes to stunting American power projection. Despite this fact, the Navy and the political class that oversees them have decided to continue operating as if the threat is nonexistent. Meanwhile, China and its autocratic allies have continued enhancing their ability to deny large portions of the world map to the US Navy when the inevitable great power war erupts. 

What should have been—and must now—be done is for the Navy and the rest of Washington to fundamentally rethink its force structure. Looking at China’s threat to the US Navy in places like the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, the current paradigm will not yield victory for the US Navy. It will lead only to mass carnage, humiliation, and a bitter defeat at the hands of China’s advanced antiship and hypersonic missile forces. 

If the Navy is one of the key components of America’s power projection into contested environments, and America’s enemies have developed effective ways of stunting that power projection, then the Navy and the rest of the military must invest in new technologies and capabilities that circumvent these A2/AD defenses.

Notably, the US should expand its commitment to building large swarms of offensive drones, it must enhance its submarine fleet, and it needs to develop effective hypersonic weapons systems of its own. Warfare among great powers will increasingly be fought at a distance. The Navy and other branches could develop these long-range strike capabilities that could knock out known A2/AD emplacements. 

Once those are taken care of, then more conventional power projection methods can be resorted to. 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy. 

As the Islamist military group al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat to Somalia, the United States continues to take action. In February, the administration announced its plan to build five new military bases for Somalia’s Danab brigade, an elite special operations unit of 3,000 soldiers trained and equipped by U.S. troops to fight terrorist group al-Shabaab.

However, the U.S.’s continued emphasis on security over democracy in its dealings with African countries is not making the continent any safer. The data is clear on this point: Africa has seen a twenty percent uptick in fatalities from Islamist violence (with 83 percent of those fatalities occurring in the Sahel and Somalia) alongside six coups since 2021.

These issues are inextricably linked to U.S. policy. American policymakers’ efforts to combat Islamist groups via regional military assistance have inadvertently spurred military coups. Instead, the United States must alter its emphasis on military aid towards diplomacy and democracy to combat these groups’ influence effectively.

Niger offers a case study of this phenomenon. Although the United States eventually ended military aid to the country after the July 2023 coup led by Nigerien General Abdourahmane Tchiani, it continues to operate an “expensive and ineffective” drone base that houses 1,100 American troops. At least five members of Niger’s junta received military training from the United States, including Tchiani, who attended a seminar on counterterrorism at the National Defense University in Washington, DC from 2009 to 2010.

The link between military training and coups is no coincidence. While discussing their 2017 article, Jesse Dillion Savage and Jonathan Caverly noted, “By strengthening the military in states with few counterbalancing civilian institutions, U.S. foreign military training can lead to both more military-backed coup attempts, as well as a higher likelihood of a coup’s success.” According to the authors, the “professional identity” of the military gives soldiers a sense of separation and superiority in relation to their government, which could lead to a “temptation to intervene in political affairs.”

The chain of events for these coups is clear. The United States provides security assistance to the military of a state facing an insurgency, only for that military to turn against the civilian government in the name of fighting said insurgency. The leadership of the juntas in Burkina Faso and Niger both claimed that the civilian government had failed to deal with insurgent violence. Meanwhile, civilians continue to suffer under the rule of repressive regimes and face violence from insurgents and soldiers alike.

Despite these failings, the Biden administration is pursuing the same policy in Somalia. Security assistance to Somalia is not a new policy, as the United States provided $500 million in assistance to the Somali military between 2010 and 2020, notwithstanding the additional $2.5 billion it has sent to different African Union missions in the country. While President Trump withdrew all 700 U.S. troops from Somalia in 2020, President Biden later reversed this decision and returned an estimated 450 soldiers to the country. The United States has also supported the Somali military with drone strikes, launching 262 attacks since 2007.

But this aid has not led to the defeat of al-Shabaab. Although a recent offensive by the Somali National Army and its clan militia allies, along with drone strikes by the United States and Turkey, had success in taking back towns and villages in Hirshabelle and Galmudug in central Somalia, al-Shababb has proven to be a national fixture. The group gains $100 million in annual revenue from extorting taxes from Somali civilians and intimidates local businesses in Mogadishu through attacks with improvised explosive devices.

Al-Shabaab’s success is directly linked to the ineffectiveness of governing institutions in Somalia. The rule of law is nearly nonexistent—as indicated by its 0/16 score across all “Rule of Law” categories in Freedom House’s 2023 rankings. Political authority remains divided, and corruption is rampant. Grievances from these conditions assist the group’s recruitment while also allowing al-Shabaab to take on a governing role by providing essential services to local populations and implementing a Sharia-based legal system.

The Somali government’s weakness means that al-Shabaab will retain its influence for the foreseeable future. If the government remains weak as the military gets stronger through U.S. aid and training, a military takeover becomes more likely—and Somali civilians will continue to suffer.

The United States must reject its military-focused approach to Somalia to prevent this outcome and engage with its civil society. This approach requires the United States to adjust its target. “Western governments must therefore be ready to engage not only a junta and its supporting forces but also local officials, civil society groups, and religious and community leaders,” argued Joseph Sany and Kehinde A. Togun in Foreign Affairs.

Engaging with local groups and businesses through conversations and displays of mutual recognition will help promote democracy by empowering Somalia’s civil society. From this position of strength, these groups can better advocate for policies to improve the lives of Somalians—such as by improving infrastructure or implementing business-friendly policies—despite facing repression from the central government and al-Shabaab.

Another tangible step the United States could take in this regard is to increase bilateral trade between the United States and Somalia, specifically by accepting Somalia’s application to the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which provides African countries increased access to U.S. markets through the removal of import tariffs on African goods. The increased investment resulting from improved trade ties can improve Somalia’s poor economic growth, helping set the conditions for higher wages and better access to education and healthcare. Somali businesses and workers should not be punished for the democratic failure of its government, as the Biden administration decided regarding Gabon, Niger, Uganda, and the Central African Republic.

Unfortunately, none of these proposals can be effectively implemented in the throes of a civil war. This means that the Somali government must engage with al-Shabaab and local authorities to achieve some consensus on governance for Somalia. The United States ought to focus on helping leaders open lines of communication through proactive negotiations so that both sides can gain a deeper understanding of each other’s long-term objectives while also working towards a ceasefire that allows for the free flow of people and goods. Complete agreement on a proper course of action is unlikely. Still, U.S. and Somali leaders alike should focus on creating the conditions for all sides to mutually exist without conflict, whether this includes integration or another approach.

There is no magic formula for making Somalia—and Africa as a whole—generally safer for its people. But it’s clear that an emphasis on democracy, diplomacy, and economic growth will go further than the U.S.’s continued prioritization of military aid.

William Rampe is a Young Voices contributor studying Government at Hamilton College. His commentary on foreign policy has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Reason, CFR.org, and the Organization for World Peace. Follow him on Twitter @WRampe7.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Members of the U.S. military are sitting ducks in the Middle East, and in December 2023, eighty-four members of the Senate voted to keep them there because fewer U.S. troops in the Middle East could be a “gift” to Iran. In early December, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) brought forth a bill to remove 900 U.S. troops from Syria amid the barrage of drone attacks in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan by Iranian-backed militias. Roughly a month after that vote, a drone attack on Tower 22 in Jordan killed three U.S. service members and injured dozens more. After the deadly January 28 attack, the Biden administration found itself trying to balance an impossible scale. How could it satisfy political pressure without inadvertently escalating tensions into a regional conflict?

On the surface, removing U.S. troops due to rising instability seems counterintuitive, but the question of reducing the number of troops is emblematic of a larger problem. The soldiers were initially deployed to a location without congressional authorization and remained there long after their original military mission was accomplished. The U.S. presence in Syria is part of a U.S.-led coalition, Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), which began in 2014 to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Congress did not specifically approve OIR since the Obama administration relied on the 2001 and 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force as a legal justification. By bypassing Congress, the Obama administration circumvented Congressional oversight mechanisms and a framework that may have established clearer guidelines for concluding OIR.

Since the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) regained control of Al-Baghouz in 2019, the United States declared that ISIS had been defeated but made no moves to reduce troop presence. OIR is still active, but instead of fighting to regain ISIS-held territory, the mission has shifted to the broader goal of ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS. The United States already has a mechanism to prime the SDF to counter ISIS activities, the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), a program passed by Congress in 2014 to train, advise, and fund Syrian and Iraqi security forces. This perceived redundancy begs the question of whether or not troops deployed under OIR are necessary for preventing an immediate resurgence of ISIS or if a gradual reduction of troops coupled with continued CTEF support would be just as effective.

The drone strikes by militia groups and retaliatory strikes by the United States are also increasing tensions between the United States and Iraq. In response to the February 7 retaliatory drone strike that killed a senior member of Kataib Hezbollah, a spokesperson for Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani, Yahya Rasool, called the U.S. presence in Iraq “a factor for instability” which “threatens to entangle Iraq in the cycle of conflict.”  The statement indicates a shift in perspective for Iraq and other host countries. Even though the U.S. troop presence initially provided stability against the threat of ISIS, the continued presence represents an opportunity for local militia groups to target Americans. On February 14, the United Arab Emirates imposed restrictions aimed at preventing the United States from launching retaliatory airstrikes on Iranian proxies from U.S. military bases in the UAE.

With the relationship between the United States and partner countries in the Middle East under strain due to the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas and Iranian-backed militias targeting U.S. forces, it is time for the Biden administration and members of Congress to ask themselves if the existing troop presence is worth losing more American lives while also risking a broader war in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Department of Defense must reevaluate the goals and scope of ongoing troop deployments to the Middle East. Even if continued cooperation with partner security forces is essential for preventing a resurgence of ISIS, the Biden administration should consider options that avoid asking American troops to dodge rocket and drone attacks far from home.

Bree Megivern has a Master‘s degree in Security Studies from Georgetown University. Her areas of interest are U.S. foreign policy, transatlantic security cooperation, and global development.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary: On May 23, 1941, the German battleship Bismarck, a symbol of Nazi naval power, embarked on Operation Rheinübung to disrupt Allied shipping. After sinking the HMS Hood and damaging the HMS Prince of Wales, Bismarck faced relentless pursuit by the Royal Navy. Despite initial successes, Bismarck was crippled by a torpedo that jammed its rudder, leading to a concerted attack by British forces. On May 27, after sustaining heavy bombardment, Bismarck sank in the North Atlantic. This event highlighted the effectiveness of combined arms and marked a pivotal moment in naval warfare, demonstrating the Royal Navy's commitment to avenging the Hood and protecting Britain.

On May 23, 1941, the Battleship Bismarck was on a roll. The largest and most powerful ship in the German Navy, the mighty Bismarck had broken out into the Atlantic Ocean, sunk a Royal Navy battlecruiser, badly damaged a battleship and was poised to add its guns to a naval blockade that threatened to strangle Great Britain.

Ninety-six hours later, heavily damaged, the battleship was on the bottom of the North Atlantic. Bismarck’s swift reversal of fortune was the result of a heroic effort by the Royal Navy to hunt down and destroy the battlewagon, and avenge the more than 1,400 Royal Navy personnel killed in the Denmark Strait.

The German battleship Bismarck was the the pride of the Kriegsmarine, Nazi Germany’s naval service. Construction began in 1936, and the ship was commissioned in April 1940. It and its sister ship, Tirpitz, were 821 feet long and displaced fifty thousand tons, making them by far the largest warships ever built by Germany. Despite its size, twelve Wagner steam boilers made it capable of a fast thirty knots.

Like any battlewagon, Bismarck’s firepower lay in its main gun batteries. Bismarck had eight fifteen-inch guns in four large turrets, each capable of hurling a 1,800-pound armor-piercing, capped projectile 21.75 miles. This gave it the ability to penetrate 16.5 inches of armor at eleven miles.

The relatively small size of Germany’s World War II navy made it incapable of taking on the British and French navies head-on. Instead, the Kriegsmarine was given a much more limited role, of shepherding invasion fleets and cutting off the flow of commerce to Great Britain. On May 18, 1941, Bismarck and its escort, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, embarked on Operation Rheinübung, a campaign to sink Allied shipping in the North Atlantic and knock Britain out of the war.

On May 24, southwest of Iceland, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen tangled with the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the aging battlecruiser HMS Hood. Trading armored protection for speed, Hood’s designers had left it dangerously exposed to enemy fire. Hits from the German task force ignited an ammunition fire that raged out of control on Hood. Within ten minutes a titanic explosion shook the Denmark Strait as the fire reached the aft magazine. Hood broke in half and sank, taking 1,418 men with it.

Bismarck, despite its stunning victory, had not emerged from the battle unscathed. Hit three times by Prince of Wales, it lost some of its fuel supply to seawater contamination, sustained damage to its propulsion, and suffered a nine-degree list to port. Its captain, desperate to get away from the site of the battle and a slowly coalescing Royal Navy force eager for revenge, refused to slow down to allow damage control to effect repairs.

Bismarck’s captain was correct. The Royal Navy was assembling a large force to sink it, and indeed had ordered every ship in the area to join in the search to find it. The much larger Royal Navy was able to assemble a force of six battleships and battlecruisers, two aircraft carriers, thirteen cruisers, and twenty-one destroyers to hunt Bismarck. Unfortunately, many of the larger ships were of World War I vintage, and could not catch up with the wounded, but still fast Bismarck.

Although Bismarck outclassed nearly all the heavy capital ships that chased it, naval aviation was another matter. The German task force’s location was betrayed by oil leaking from the battleship and the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious was sent to slow it down. An air strike by six Fairey Fulmar carrier-based fighters and nine Fairey Swordfish carrier torpedo bombers managed a single hit on Bismarck. The torpedo explosion did minor damage, but the evasive maneuvers conducted by Bismarck’s captain to evade the torpedo attack caused even more damage, slowing the mighty battleship to sixteen knots.

Although it was eventually able to get back up to twenty-eight knots, the temporary loss of its speed advantage allowed a Royal Navy task force, Force H, to catch up to it. Established to take the place of the surrendered French Navy in the western Mediterranean, Force H was based at Gibraltar. It consisted of the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, the battlecruiser Renown and a light cruiser.

But Force H had to find it first. British intelligence had decoded some of the Kriegsmarine’s message traffic, which stated that the Bismarck was going to Brest for repairs. Reports from the French resistance that the Luftwaffe was assembling at Brest to provide an air umbrella for the battleship corroborated the report. So did a sighting of the battleship by a U.S. Navy Catalina seaplane that put it a day away from the French port. All of this happened very quickly throughout the morning of May 26.

At 9 p.m. on the twenty-sixth, an initial air strike of Fairey Swordfish torpedo planes was aborted after the strike force mistakenly attacked the light cruiser HMS Sheffield. The bungled attack proved beneficial, however, in that the new torpedo detonators failed to work properly. Had the Swordfishes found their mark, the attack would have been for nothing. The new detonators were swapped out for the older, reliable ones, and a second attack was launched.

The second Swordfish attack correctly located Bismarck. A single torpedo found its target, jamming the ship’s rudder. The mighty battleship was reduced to sailing in circles in the North Atlantic, unable to straighten out and continue onward to Brest. To make matters worse, a combined force of Royal Navy and Polish destroyers made repeated torpedo runs on the ship, exhausting the crew.

Bismarck’s crew proved unable to repair the rudder. At twenty minutes to midnight, Bismarck’s captain radioed German forces in France: “Ship unmaneuverable. We will fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer.”

The next day, May 27, the Royal Navy moved in for the kill. At 8:47 a.m., the battleships HMS Rodney and HMS King George V opened fire on the wounded German battleship, striking it several times. Bismarck returned fire, but its inability to steer and list made accurate return fire nearly impossible. One of Bismarck’s shells landed just sixty feet from Rodney’s bridge, drenching it with water, but the German battleship was unable to damage its assailants in any meaningful way.

Eventually Rodney and King George V defanged the their German counterpart. Turrets A and B were destroyed within the first hour and twenty minutes of the battle, while Turret D was put out of action when a shell exploded inside one of the main gun barrels. The last turret, C, ceased fire ten minutes later, at 9:31 a.m. Bismarck’s main guns were totally out of action.

Still, the fifty-thousand-ton battleship refused to sink. King George V blasted away at a range of 1.5 miles with all ten guns, point-blank range for battleships. The heavy cruisers Norfolk and Dorsetshire joined in the battle. The ship’s superstructure was turned into scrap, and the ship was burning from many fires. Hundreds of crew lay dead or dying, and a pillar of black smoke followed it.

By 10 a.m., Rodney had expended 380 sixteen-inch shells on Bismarck, and King George V 339 rounds of fourteen-inch shells. The secondary 5.5- to 6-inch guns of both battleships, plus the guns of the two heavy cruisers, expended a total of 2,156 shells on the battleship, plus numerous torpedo attacks. While not every shell hit many did, especially after the Bismarck was unable to return fire.

At 10:39 a.m., after two more rounds of torpedo attacks by air and sea, Bismarck finally sank. Its list gradually increased to twenty degrees, then to the point where its port secondary guns were almost submerged. Finally, it capsized to port and sank. Although hundreds of men made it to the water, a U-boat scare sent the Royal Navy ships collecting survivors heading for safety. Of the 2,200 officers and enlisted personnel that manned Bismarck, only 116 survived.

Bismarck’s sinking was an excellent example of combined arms at sea working together to take down a more powerful opponent. No single element of the Royal Navy present at the battle was strong enough to defeat Bismarck singlehandedly, but together a force of aging aircraft carriers and torpedo bombers, twenty-to-thirty-year-old battleships, and more than a dozen scrappy cruisers and destroyers were able to ensure that the mighty German battleship would never reach refuge in France.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami. This piece was first featured in December 2016 and is being republished due to reader's interest. 

Summary: The USS Mississippi (BB-41), a New Mexico-class battleship, served the U.S. Navy with distinction from World War I into the atomic age, enduring over forty years of service. Remarkably, it witnessed two major tragedies in the same turret twenty years apart, each resulting in the loss of numerous sailors due to a "flare back" during gunnery exercises. Despite these somber events, Mississippi contributed significantly to naval operations in the Pacific during World War II and later played a crucial role in testing and developing the U.S. Navy's first surface-to-air missile, the Convair RIM-2 Terrier. Decommissioned in 1956 and sold for scrap, the legacy of the USS Mississippi continues in the Virginia-class submarine bearing its name, SSN-782.

The USS Mississippi is home to one of the most intriguing naval coincidences of all time. Built while America was a neutral party in World War I, Mississippi sailed into the atomic age and later served as a massive test platform for surface-to-air missiles. Despite her forty years of service, Mississippi was bound to tragedy, experiencing two major accidents in the same turret, in the same gun, twenty years apart.

USS Mississippi (BB-41) was the second of three ships of the New Mexico-class battleships. Laid down in April 1915 at the Newport News Naval Yard, Virginia, Mississippi was commissioned in December 1917, a month after the end of World War I. The New Mexico class was the fourth of six distinct battleship classes laid down the 1910s, as the Navy rushed to fortify the Atlantic against tensions—and then outright war—in Europe.

Mississippi was a heavily armed battleship by the standards of the day. She was armed with a main battery of twelve 14-inch/50 caliber guns mounted in four turrets of three guns each, with each gun mounted in a separate sleeve. The main battery was distributed two turrets forward and two aft. She also featured twelve 5-inch/51 caliber guns, eight 3-inch anti-aircraft guns and two submerged 21-inch torpedo tubes.

As a battleship, the Mississippi was heavily armored to slug it out with enemy ships. The New Mexico-class ships had 13.5 inches of steel armor at the belt, and her turrets were protected with nine to eighteen inches of armor plating. The deck was armored to 3.5 inches and the conning tower to sixteen inches.

The mighty warship was 624 feet long with a beam of 97.5 feet, and displaced 33,000 tons fully loaded. She was powered by nine Babcock and Wilcox boilers and her four screws were driven by four Curtis turbines producing a maximum 32,000 horsepower. At roughly one horsepower per ton, she was not terribly fast, with a top speed of just twenty-one knots.

On June 12, 1924, Mississippi found herself off the coast of California conducting gun trials. The 14-inch/50 caliber gun was plagued with technical issues, a major problem considering it was the primary armament on the majority of serving U.S. Navy battleships. On the eighth salvo, turret two, gun two suffered a rare “flare back.” The four powder bags inserted into the breech, totaling 470 pounds of explosive powder, caught fire and ignited other bags waiting to be loaded. Forty-eight sailors were killed, and only one of the sailors manning the turret survived.

Based on the survivor’s account, the Navy believed that a fire or burning debris was present in the gun barrel and ignited the powder bags. Although each barrel was blasted between firings with pressurized air to evacuate debris, the middle barrel of each turret received a lower pressure burst than the left and right barrels. This could have led to dangerous debris remaining in the breech when the gun crew assumed it was safe to load.

A bizarre accident occurred afterward while the Mississippi was anchored in San Pedro Bay. The hand of a dead crewman in the number two turret accidentally hit the firing switch for the port gun, firing it. The shell flew harmlessly out to sea.

Nearly twenty years—and a major refit later—the USS Mississippi went to war in the Pacific. In 1943, the big battleship was off the coast of Makin Island, providing naval gunfire support to a landing force preparing to secure the island. After an extensive preliminary bombardment, the Marine assault force headed towards the beach and Mississippi and the other ships increased their rate of fire.

Suddenly, in the midst of the barrage, smoke and gas erupted from the rangefinders on either side of the number two turret. Incredibly it had happened again: in their haste to lay down a rain of shells on the Japanese, the gunners of number two turret had apparently experienced yet another flare back. Debris from firing the big guns had again ignited powder bags, causing the same accident and the same damage. Forty-two sailors were killed and another sixteen wounded. The battleship’s three remaining turrets continued firing until the naval support phase of the invasion had ended.

After the war, Mississippi was effectively defanged, with three of her four main battery turrets removed. She was redesignated AG-128 and equipped with a number of radars and prototype air defense missile systems. Mississippi was instrumental in the testing and eventual fielding of the Convair RIM-2 Terrier, the U.S. Navy’s first surface-to-air missile.

The old warship was decommissioned in 1956, sold for scrap. The aging battlewagon had served longer than most ships at the time, but it had also experienced two rare tragedies, in the same place, under similar circumstances. Today her name lives on in the Virginia class nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Mississippi (SSN-782).

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. 

Summary: The VA-111 Shkval, a Soviet-era supercavitating torpedo, revolutionized underwater warfare with its unprecedented speed of up to 200 knots, thanks to a rocket engine and the phenomenon of supercavitation. By vaporizing water into steam at its nose, Shkval creates a gas bubble that drastically reduces drag, allowing for rapid movement through water.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union placed heavy reliance on its submarine fleet to negate America’s advantage in naval forces. The U.S. Navy was not only tasked to help protect the flow of reinforcements into Europe in the event of World War III, it also threatened the Soviet Union directly and would have hunted down and sunk her ballistic missile submarines. The USSR at first used sheer numbers of diesel-electric submarines, then more advanced nuclear attack submarines, to whittle down the odds.

One of the most innovative underwater weapons developed by the Soviet Union was the VA-111 Shkval (“Squall”) supercavitating torpedo. Highly classified, Shkval was virtually unknown before the end of the Cold War and only became common knowledge in the mid-1990s. Powered by a rocket engine, it was capable of astonishing speeds of up to 200 knots an hour. But in a world where physics ensured most ships and underwater weapons topped out at 50 knots, how did Russian engineers accomplish such a breakthrough in speed?

Traditionally, torpedoes use propellers or pumpjets for propulsion. Shkval, on the other hand, uses a rocket engine. That alone is enough to make it fast, but traveling through water creates major drag problems. The solution: get the water out of the path of the torpedo. But how, exactly does one get water of the path of an object in the middle of an ocean?

The solution: vaporize liquid water into a gas.

Shkval solves this problem by diverting hot rocket exhaust out of its nose, which turns the water in front of it into steam. As the torpedo moves forward, it continues vaporizing the water in front of it, creating a thin bubble of gas. Traveling through gas the torpedo encounters much less drag, allowing it to move at speeds of up 200 knots. This process is known as supercavitation.

The trick with maintaining supercavitation is keeping the torpedo enclosed in the gas bubble. This makes turning maneuvers tricky, as a change of heading will force a portion of the torpedo outside the bubble, causing sudden drag at 230 miles an hour. Early versions of Shkval apparently had a very primitive guidance system, and attacks would have been fairly straight torpedo runs.

Considering the warhead would have been nuclear, that would probably have been good enough to destroy the target. It’s clear the Soviet Union believes there were times when torpedo speed was more important than maneuverability.

Shkval was originally designed in the 1960s as a means of quickly attacking NATO nuclear missile submarines, delivering a nuclear warhead at previously unheard-of speeds. The torpedo is of standard 533-millimeter torpedo diameter and carries a 460-pound warhead. It has a maximum range of 7,500 yards. Shkval began mass production in 1978 and entered service with the Soviet Navy that year.

Like any weapon, there are drawbacks. For one, the gas bubble and the rocket engine are very noisy. Any submarine that launches a supercavitating torpedo will instantly give away its approximate position. That having been said, such a fast-moving weapon could conceivably destroy the enemy before it has time to act on the information, as the enemy suddenly has a both an enemy submarine and a 200-knot torpedo to contend with.

Another drawback to a supercavitating torpedo is the inability to use traditional guidance systems. The gas bubble and rocket engine produce enough noise to deafen the torpedo’s built-in active and passive sonar guidance systems. Early versions of the Shkval were apparently unguided, trading guidance for speed. A newer version of the torpedo employs a compromise method, using supercavitation to sprint to the target area, then slowing down to search for its target.

Is there a future for the supercavitating torpedo? The U.S. has been working on such a weapon since 1997, apparently without a deployable weapon. Indeed, the U.S. Navy is currently in the process of upgrading the venerable Mark 48 submarine torpedo for service into the foreseeable future. Then again, the Navy’s requirements were far greater than Shkval’s capabilities, including turning, identifying, and homing in on targets.

In the meantime, Russian submarines are the only subs in the world equipped with supercavitating torpedoes, modernized versions of Shval armed with a conventional warhead. Russian industry also offers an export version, Shkval E, for sales abroad. Iran claims to have a supercavitating torpedo of its own it calls Hoot, and which is assumed to be a reverse-engineered Shkval.

In 2004, German defense contractor Diehl-BGT announced the Barracuda, a technology demonstrator torpedo meant to travel up to 194 knots. Barracuda was meant to be launched from submarines and surface vessels, and test models could travel straight and curved paths. However, the program apparently never translated into a marketable weapon.

A noisy—but effective—weapon, Shkval smashes the paradigm of undersea warfare. A 200-knot torpedo is a very attractive capability, and as naval competition heats up in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, we may see even more navies adopting supercavitating designs and adjusting their undersea tactics accordingly. Undersea warfare is about to get a whole lot louder—and deadlier.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. 

Summary: The Forrestal-class carriers, monumental in the evolution of U.S. naval aviation, were a response to the advent of carrier-based jet aircraft, necessitating larger decks and more fuel and munitions storage. Introduced in the mid-1950s, these sixty-thousand-ton behemoths were informed by earlier designs and marked a significant departure with innovations like the angled flight-deck, optical landing systems, and steam-powered catapults. Serving through the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, their combat roles and operational challenges showcased the complexity of naval warfare and technological advancement. Despite their formidable presence, the Forrestal-class faced issues like catastrophic fires and became subjects of decommission and scrapping by 2017. Their legacy, however, paved the way for modern supercarriers, embodying a critical transition in naval strategy and carrier design.

As the United States prepares to deliver its second one-hundred-thousand-ton Gerald Ford-class supercarrier later in 2019, it’s easy to forget that until the mid-1950s the Navy’s carriers displaced between a third or half that much.

The Essex and larger Midway-class carriers built during World War II were designed to launch smaller, slower piston-engine warbirds. But a new generation of carrier-based jet aircraft took up more deck space, required longer decks to takeoff and land, and consumed more fuel.

In 1948, the country’s first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, ordered the USS United States, a supercarrier displacing seventy thousand tons designed to carry up to eighteen large strategic bombers off its deck. The CVA-58 attack carrier was essentially the Navy’s bid to compete with the Air Force’s plans for a large force of B-36 Peacemaker nuclear bombers. However, mere days after the United States was laid down, Forrestal’s successor Louis Johnson canceled construction, resulting in an inter-service furball detailed in a companion article.

Though the Navy’s reputation emerged battered by United States controversy, months later the Korean War broke out—and the Navy’s Essex-class carriers and their jet fighters more than proved their worth. Thus by 1951 the Navy finally had the prestige and funding to take a second crack at ordering a super carrier, which began construction the following year. By then, new carrier-based jets like the A-3 Skywarrior carrying lighter-weight nuclear weapons had rendered the carrier-strategic-bomber concept unnecessary.

Nonetheless, the sixty-thousand-ton CVA-59, fittingly named the Forrestal, was clearly informed by the canceled CVA-58—including initially attempting to incorporate smokestacks and an island superstructure that could telescope downwards for a ‘flush’ deck during flight operations. This proved too complicated to implement, so the Forrestal ended up with two islands instead, mounting multiple radars and electronic warfare systems.

Like the preceding Midway-class, Forrestal had an armored flight deck—but its deck was more robustly integrated as a load-bearing element of the hull rather than as a superstructure. As the Midway-class had proven infamously top-heavy and unstable, the Forrestal featured a deeper draught, keeping her deck drier and affording her much better handling. Three starboard side elevators served two catapults on Forrestal’s bow; and a lone port-side elevator was situated in front of two additional catapults.

Three critical innovations first developed by the Royal Navy were retrofitted in the middle of the construction of Forrestal and her sistership Saratoga in Newport News, Virginia. These included an angled flight-deck, allowing for longer takeoff distances; an optical mirror-landing system; and steam-powered catapults. Cumulatively, these greatly facilitated operations of faster and heavier jet aircraft.

These technologies were initially tested on Midway-class carriers, but the Forrestal was the first U.S. carrier to launch with them already installed.

The Forrestal’s increased length (326 meters) and displacement equated to drastically greater internal volume. Its cavernous hangar deck could accommodate eighty to one hundred jets, up from the Midway class’s sixty to seventy-five. Compared to the Essex class, the Forrestals carried three times more aviation fuel (1.3 million gallons) and 154 percent more munitions (1,650 tons) for their air wings, as well as 70 percent more fuel for cruising. By one calculation, this meant the Forrestals could remain operational 96 percent of the year, compared to 60 percent for the Essex-class.

Following the launch of Forrestal and Saratoga in 1955 and 1956, construction of the Ranger and Independence began, with an angled flight deck planned from the outset. As a result these two ships have only one island structure instead of two and a slimmer forward deck. The Independence finally launched in 1958, the only one of four vessels to be built in New York. Four more planned Forrestals were instead laid down as part of a revised Kitty Hawk-class.

The gigantic super carriers soon were routinely deployed on diplomatic missions and shows of force in response to the crise du jour. For example, the Independence participated in the blockade of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis, while Ranger cruised by North Korea following the seizure of the USS Pueblo.

However, the large vessels had their flaws. The port elevator’s location forward of two catapults meant it could not be used during landing or takeoff operations. The sponsons for the eight 5” anti-aircraft guns took on water, and were mostly removed in the 1960s. The ships also extensively incorporated asbestos, later resulting in asbestos-related illness among their crews.

Four Decades of Service

The Forrestals all deployed for at least one combat tour during Vietnam. The Saratoga’s air wing launched thousands of sorties bombarding North Vietnamese forces in 1972–1973, losing six aircraft to enemy fire and shooting down two MiGs.

The Forrestal’s Vietnam service is best known for the tragic incident on July 29, 1967, when a Zuni rocket accidentally launched from an F-4 Phantom on the flight line blasted into an A-4 Skyhawk in front of it. The resulting fire caused an unsafe M65 bomb to detonate, triggering chain reaction of explosions and fiery conflagration that nearly destroyed the carrier and killed 134 crewmembers. The Forrestal limped home and had to be extensively rebuilt.

The nightmarish accident, combined with two other cataclysmic carrier fires, forced the Navy to implement major reforms of its safety culture—but the Forrestal experienced additional damaging fires in 1972 and 1978. The Ranger, meanwhile, was sabotaged by sailors opposed to the Vietnam War, culminating in the trial of an anti-war Navy fireman who purportedly disabled one of the carrier’s reduction gears used to generate power.

During the 1970s through 1980s, the Forrestals (save for the Ranger) underwent twenty-eight-month Service-Life Extension Programs. The carriers were re-designated general-purpose CVs as they incorporated F-14 Tomcat interceptors and S-3 Viking anti-submarine aircraft into their air wings which smaller Midway-class carriers could not operate. Eight-cell Sea Sparrow missile launchers and automated twenty-millimeter Close-In Weapon Systems replaced antiquated flak guns.

The 1980s proved eventful for the aging carriers. The Independence spearheaded the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada, dispatching Navy SEAL teams and A-7 Corsair jets for close air support. F-14s from the Saratoga forced down airliner carrying terrorist hijackers in 1986 and accidentally shot down an Air Force Phantom jet in 1987. Her strike planes also destroyed a Libyan surface-to-air missile sight that had earlier opened fire on U.S. aircraft.

During the 1991 Gulf War, the Saratoga deployed to the Red Sea and Forrestal to the Persian Gulf. Between them, the two carriers dispatched hundreds of sorties, but lost one FA-18 Hornet to an Iraqi MiG-25 and two A-6s to ground fire. Saddam Hussein even specifically claimed to have sunk the Saratoga, following an attempted Scud missile attack that missed by over one hundred miles.

As they each approached forty years of service, the Forrestals were decommissioned one-by-one between 1993 and 1998—but stayed busy right until then. In 1993, Ranger deployed off of Somalia and provided photo reconnaissance, logistics and air support for Operation Restore Hope as it faced opposition from warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid.

 In 1992 the Saratoga accidentally fired a Sea Sparrow missile at the Turkish destroyer Muavenet during an exercise, killing five crew.

The Independence concluded her career with forward-deployment to Yokosuka, Japan, and participated in a 1996 cruise down the Taiwan Strait that famously ruffled Beijing’s feathers.

 The Forrestals remained mothballed through 2013 and there were multiple campaigns to transform them into museum ships which all came to naught. Finally, between 2014 and 2017, all four vessels were scrapped in Brownsville, Texas—each operation paid for with a single penny.

 The Forrestal-class marked the point at which U.S. carriers decisively evolved into larger platforms intentionally designed for jet fighter operations, pioneering technologies we now take for granted in today’s super carriers. While the art of super-carrier design would be further refined, the Forrestals marked an influential first step.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

Summary: In an innovative operation during World War II, the Soviet Air Force launched a daring raid on the Romanian city of Constanta using a unique "parasite" fighter-bomber combination, what some akin to a flying aircraft carrier. Three TB-3 bombers, carrying I-16 fighters under their wings, targeted critical infrastructure, including the King Carol I bridge over the Danube, vital to Axis supply lines. This operation, part of the Zveno ("Link") project led by designer Vladimir Vakhrimov, demonstrated an early attempt to extend the range and payload of fighter aircraft by hitching them to larger bombers. Despite achieving significant success, the Zveno-SPB program was limited by the availability of suitable aircraft and the arrival of more advanced bombers, leading to its eventual discontinuation. However, the concept of extending operational range through air-to-air refueling lives on in modern military aviation, highlighting the enduring legacy of this innovative approach to aerial warfare.

Early in the morning of August 10, 1941, three boxy Soviet TB-3 bombers took off from the airbase at Yevpatoria in the Crimean Peninsula, bearing a most unusual cargo under their gargantuan wings: two manned, stubby-nosed I-16 fighter planes, their Shvetsov radial engines chortling and propellers spinning to help propel the sluggish four-engine TB-3s they were attached to.

One of the aircraft-carrying motherships had to abort mission due to technical problems. The six remaining aircraft assumed an eastward course across the Black Sea towards the Romanian city of Constanta roughly 250 miles away, cruising at roughly 155 miles per hour.

Six weeks earlier, Romanian troops had joined Nazi Germany in a surprise invasion of the Soviet Union that had steamrolled unprepared border defenses. As Axis forces steadily advanced towards the critical Soviet ports of Odessa and Sevastopol, the beleaguered Soviet Air Force and Navy did their best to strike back. One key target was the King Carol I bridge spanning the River Danube, which measured over a miles long and up to seventy meters high, and also stood over a vital pipeline connected to the Ploesti oil fields.

Soviet DB-3 bomber had repeatedly attacked the bridge with high-altitude horizontal bombing runs without landing any hits. The older, slower TB-3s themselves would likely have fared little better had they tried.

But these special TB-3s, called Sveno (“Link”)-SPBs, were not carrying any bombs at all. Instead, the I-16 Type 24 fighters braced under the bomber’s wings each carried two 250-kilogram bombs.

Ordinarily, an I-16 loaded with nearly third of its weight in bombs could not have taken off, let alone have possessed the range for a round-trip mission across the Black Sea. But these I-16s were drawing on the fuel supply of the TB-3 bombers they were latched onto.

The Sveno-SPBs were the ultimate product of a decade-long research program run by designer Vladimir Vakhrimov, who experimented with numerous ways to mate ‘parasite’ fighters onto bombers to extend their range and payload, as described in a companion article.

This was the second raid undertaken by Shubikov’s Circus, as the 2nd Special Squadron of the 32nd Fighter Regiment was known. The first on July 26 had taken the Axis defenders by surprise and resulted in the destruction of an oil depot. But the Soviet raiders were unlikely to benefit from surprise a second time.

At 5:50 AM, as the TB-3 pilots flew within nine miles of the Romanian coastline, they flipped a switch and yellow light flashed next to the cockpits of the I-16s. Seconds later, the fighter pilots released the latches clamping their I-16s to their motherships.

The bomb-laden fighters surged towards the bridge and then from slightly over a mile high, nosed down at a near ninety-degree angle, causing them to accelerate to nearly four hundred miles per hour.

The bridge’s defenders were on alert, as described by I-16 pilot Boris Litvinchuk in The Angry Sky of Tauris by fellow aviator Vassily Minakov.

Squalls of fire shot up towards the heavily loaded warbirds. Automatic guns bristled with fire from both sides of the Danube, from the islands, from the special cradles suspended from the trusses of the bridge, even from the tops of the seventy-five-meter-high spans . . . Nevertheless, the I-16s broke through to fly directly above the bridge. It raced towards them . . . just four hundred meters away. Bombs came rushing down . . .

A direct hit in the central span! A gigantic steel span breaks like a giraffe’s neck, and plunges into foaming water. Burning oil gushes out of a broken pipeline under the flooring, a continuous flame raging downstream on the water . . .

All four I-16s escaped unscathed and landed and refueled at Odessa at 6:40 AM, where they were promptly redirected towards an incoming formation of Ju-88 bombers headed for the Soviet port city. The Junkers dumped most of their bombs in the sea and belted for home, and Shubikov and his comrades then rejoined their TB-3 motherships at their home base in Yevpatoria.

Three days later a strike by three Zveno-SPB’s scored five direct hits, destroying one of the bridge spans completely. On their return flight, the I-16s nosed back down to low altitude to strafe assembling Romanian infantry at Sulina.

The same day, the SPB’s designer Vladimir Vakhmistrov requested diverting additional TB-3 bombers to Shubikov’s Circus. The unit received two. However, Stalin personally ruled against further reinforcement: the TB-3 was out of production, and the Sveno used a rare, late-model variant with higher-power AM34 engines that were urgently needed for transport duties.

Shubikov’s Circus nonetheless continued launching long-range precision strikes,as detailed in Vakhmistrov’s Circus by author Mikhail Maslov. On August 17, six I-16s destroyed floating dry dock in Constanta’s harbor. Then, on August 28, four I-16s blasted a bridge crossing the Dniepr River near Zaphoroshye, Ukraine two hundred miles to the north.

Still the Axis war machine ground closer and closer to the Crimean Peninsula, and the unit specialized in long-range strikes was increasingly thrust into frontline ground support roles. Even though range became less of a problem, the unit still depended on the TB-3s to lift the bomb-laden I-16s into the air.

By September 8 the unit was hitting a bridge crossing at Berislav only one hundred miles away, covered by Yak-1 fighters when it was bounced by German fighters. A Yak and I-16 went down in flames. The following day, four I-16s of Shubikov’s circus claimed two 109s in a swirling dogfight following another raid. This was quite an achievement as the Bf 109 was much faster and more heavily armed than the I-16, though not quite as maneuverable.

Finally, on October 1, Shubikov’s luck ran out on October during a raid striking German heavy artillery at Ishun that was bombarding Soviet troops defending Perekop—one of the narrow land bridges connecting the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine. The unit leader was shot down by enemy fighters, and posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin. Odessa fell later that month.

Apparently, the 2nd Special Squadron continued flying sorties into 1942, totaling thirty combat mission altogether. The Zveno-SPBs were finally withdrawn, ostensibly due to their vulnerability to enemy fighters, as well as the fact both the TB-3 and I-16 were outdated, out-of-production airframes.

Nonetheless, unlike most experimental weapons with brief combat careers, the Zveno-SPB proved surprisingly effective—consistently inflicting significant damage to key targets deep behind enemy lines and suffering relatively light loss rates compared to most VVS units.

Vakhmistrov had invented an ingenious solution to squeezing longer range out of increasingly outdated aircraft—but his idea was decisively overtaken by the advent of more advanced airplanes. New twin-engine Pe-2 and Tu-2 bombers were faster, could carry much heavier payloads, and had longer-range than the I-16 and were sufficiently maneuverable to perform dive-bombing attacks.

After World War II, the United States experimented unsuccessfully with the XF-85 Goblin parasite escort fighter, and briefly operationally deployed RF-84K Thunderflash reconnaissance jets attached to B-36s bombers in the 1950s.

However, Vakhmistrov was farsighted in seeing the inherent potential of using larger planes to keep smaller but more agile fighters airborne over longer distances. While the parasite fighter may have amounted to a blind lead, jet fighters today routinely “dock” with airliner-like tanker planes to multiply their operational radius several times over.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

Aside from concerns that Donald Trump will want to emulate the autocrats that hold his fascination, the visit from Hungarian dictator Viktor Orban has some worried that the impressionable Trump is being manipulated by Vladimir Putin with Orban as a conduit. National Interest Editor Jacob Heilbrunn, author of "America Last: The Right's Century-long Romance with Foreign Dictators," joins MSNBC's Alex Wagner to discuss.  

Jacob Heilbrunn is editor of The National Interest and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He has written on both foreign and domestic issues for numerous publications, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Reuters, Washington Monthly, and The Weekly Standard. He has also written for German publications such as Cicero, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Der Tagesspiegel. In 2008, his book They Knew They Were Right: the Rise of the Neocons was published by Doubleday. It was named one of the one hundred notable books of the year by The New York Times. He is the author of America Last: The Right’s Century-Long Romance with Foreign Dictators.

Image: Public Domain. 

Summary: The situation in Ukraine is not merely a regional conflict; it's a litmus test for the international order post-World War II, which has largely succeeded in preventing major conflicts through a balance of power and deterrents. 

I get why MAGA Republicans don’t care about Ukrainians. Ukraine is far away; its problems are even further away; and there are tons of other things closer to home to worry about. And besides, most Ukrainians probably feel the same way about MAGA Republicans and the Midwest.

Sure, there are the moral issues. Russia is committing genocide, violating human rights, and destroying democracy—things that all Americans claim to care about. And Ukraine is fighting for its survival. But, hey, you can’t solve all the world’s problems, can you? Especially those that don’t directly affect you.

The problem with this line of reasoning is simple. Today, Ukrainians are doing all the dying. If they lose to Vladimir Putin, tomorrow Americans will do the dying. And the Americans who’ll do the dying won’t be the privileged sons and daughters of east or west coast liberals. They’ll be the underprivileged, underemployed, and embittered folks who support Donald Trump and want to make America great again. In all likelihood, they’ll succeed—but not without giving up their lives for the president who stumbled into a war with Putin’s Russia in the first place.

As the former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich recently put it, “A defeat for the West in Ukraine would send a catastrophic signal to Mr. Putin — and every aggressive dictator on the planet — that the system which has kept peace for nearly 80 years is collapsing. Overnight, predatory behavior would become the norm. Since a Russian victory would profoundly change history and lead to more global violence, we must help defeat Mr. Putin despite political challenges.”

Gingrich doesn’t speak of war, but it follows from his statement that, once the system that has kept the peace collapses, war will be the inevitable result. Nor does Gingrich say that the United States will become embroiled in war, but that conclusion also follows from his analysis. As his very first sentence states: “If Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine becomes a victory for Russian aggression, it will have disastrous consequences for America and the world.”

What can be more disastrous than war? And what can be more disastrous for American than a war or wars waged by Americans? If it comes to that, the death and destruction will make the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine look like child’s play.

Gingrich is right to emphasize that Russia wouldn’t be the only country looking to engage America in a war: “Communist China’s general secretary and president, Xi Jinping, will recalculate the risk of invading Taiwan. Kim Jong-un will question whether the United States would really intervene if he attacked South Korea. North Korea has an estimated 30 nuclear weapons — likely many more by the end of the decade.”

How many Americans would be likely to die in major wars with Russia in, say, Poland or with China and North Korea, over Taiwan or South Korea? Tens of thousands? Hundreds of thousands? A million? We have no way of knowing, but it’s clear that the numbers would be extremely high. Putin has amply demonstrated that he’s more than willing to suffer staggering casualties in order to kill a few Ukrainians. Beijing and Pyongyang are likely to be even less restrained by concern for their citizens. And keep in mind that all three countries have nuclear weapons and that Putin’s and Kim’s attitudes to first use are at best cavalier.

Would the volunteer army suffice to fight the Russians, Chinese, and North Koreans or would a draft have to be reinstituted? According to a 2018 study, “the top five for recruitment in 2018 were California, Texas, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and New York.” Next in line were Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Arizona. Except for California and New York, none of these states is or was a Democratic stronghold. A draft would spread the pain more evenly, but, unless college deferments aren’t permitted, high school graduates will likely predominate in the pool of draftees and, thus, among battlefield casualties.

Naturally, Gingrich and the many other serious analysts, on both the left and the right, could be wrong about the Russian war and the consequences of a Ukrainian defeat. It’s possible that the accused war criminal Putin is really a pussycat eager for peace and rousing choruses of Kumbaya. It’s also possible that Russia will abandon its centuries of expansion and retreat into isolationism. Just as it’s possible that Beijing will abandon Taiwan and Pyongyang will demilitarize. But the odds of such happy developments seem slim at best. Would you bet your livelihood on any of these eventualities?

And yet, that’s exactly what Donald Trump and House Speaker Mike Johnson are doing. They’re betting the lives of tens of thousands of MAGA Americans on the Pollyannaish possibility that Putin, Xi, and Kim are really great guys or, as Trump just called Hungary’s tinpot authoritarian leader, Victor Orban, “fantastic” leaders. The alternative is obvious: arm the Ukrainians and let them stop Putin’s hordes.

Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

During the early phase of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, India faced tremendous pressure from the West, particularly the United States, to align with the United States-led Western bloc and condemn Russia in unequivocal terms. However, India maintained its principled strategic neutrality, calling for an “immediate cessation of hostilities,” an “end to the violence,” and a “return to the path of diplomacy and dialogue.” India’s position is uncomfortable for many Western capitals, particularly Washington, DC.

In today’s polarized world, India’s hallmark “tightrope” balancing between rival power blocs and nations does not always sit well with the Western foreign ministries. The discomfort and unease in bilateral relations can be witnessed in the India-U.S. relationship. With an array of technological and strategic agreements like BECA, LEMOA, and COMCASA, as well as the common consensus on the emerging challenge of Chinese revisionism, there is nonetheless an acute sense of misunderstanding and lack of trust between New Delhi and Washington. This friction is visible in several instances, be it the U.S. legislators sermonizing India on so-called democratic backsliding, press freedom, minority issues, and human rights, the recent diplomatic stand-off between Canada and India over the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, an alleged Sikh-separatist terrorist, with the alleged Indian involvement, and U.S. accusations against Indian agencies for conspiring to murder Khalistani extremist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun.

The ambitious dreams of the grand U.S.-India strategic partnership and bonhomie always get punctured by Washington, DC’s discomfort with India’s independent stance on issues of critical geopolitical importance to the United States. Today, when Chinese revisionism presents a common challenge to both the United States and India, both countries do not see eye to eye on many issues. One hardly finds any steam in the India-U.S. partnership besides purely transactional technology, defense, and intelligence-sharing agreements. It seems that the United States cannot understand the nature of India’s diplomatic behavior. This lack of understanding comes from the fundamental difference in the international relations thought of India and the Western World. The expert voices in the Indian establishment feel that due to this lack of understanding on the part of the United States, it cannot accept India’s geopolitical posturing. At the same time, when the United States government is at odds with India on the issues of democracy, human rights, minorities, and the recent Canada-India row, it is perceived as a bully by Indians.

The United States must understand that India’s stance on the Ukraine issue is not a novelty; it has existed since India emerged as a sovereign nation. During the Cold War, India adopted a non-alignment policy, refusing to align with the Western and Soviet power blocks. However, by the 1970s, India came closer to the USSR because of the overt U.S. support to Pakistan over the Bangladesh issue and the resultant India-Pakistan war. India also shared socialist sentiments and a rich civilizational connection with Russia. But, despite this tilt, India reasonably maintained its strategic autonomy. 

India’s history and civilizational ethos suggest that the Indian worldview on statecraft, diplomacy, and war tends to reject rigid binaries. India’s historical and civilizational experience has not witnessed the division of the world into alliances and blocs based on ideological differences. Ideological “isms” and the “us versus them” mentality were not absent. However, they were never the dominant vectors. Likewise, a hegemon exercising an overarching influence over the weaker states based on sheer and brute power is not a characteristic feature of India’s strategic thought.

Indian strategic thought places a high premium on multipolarity in global affairs, where states retain strategic autonomy and the freedom to pursue independent foreign policy based on their geography, core national interests, and values. In such a set-up, a unipolar hegemon lording over weaker states, conquering them by force, interfering in their internal affairs, forcing humiliating treaties and alliances, and dictating values and beliefs is an aberration. This is not to say that there were no aggressive hegemons in Indian history, but such behavior was not accepted as the norm for a powerful state. 

The best example of India’s multipolar ideal comes from the sixteen Mahajanpadas of the legendary Vedic era. The sixteen Mahajanpadas were sovereign states sprawling from Afghanistan to today’s Bengal two and a half millennia ago. Among them were powerful kingdoms like Kurus, Panchalas, and Magadhas. However, the powerful kingdoms did not gobble up the smaller kingdoms as a standard practice. It was primarily symbolic even when the smaller states were defeated in wars and subjugated. In rare cases, the conquerors deposed the ruler and occupied the territory to rule. Wars were fought for specific reasons, and great importance was accorded to the idea of Dharma-yuddha (“the righteous war”). Restoring moral order, not economic gain or territorial aggrandizement, was the object of conflict. 

Bilateral diplomacy was the most preferred and effective tool for conducting foreign policy instead of over-arching and divisive military alliances. On the other hand, in the West, alliance systems and great power competition have been a fundamental part of international relations since at least the seventeenth century, culminating in the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War.

Delving deeper into the history of diplomacy, war, and statecraft in the West and India is not the key focus of this piece. However, suffice it to say that some of the fundamental tenets of India’s foreign policy, particularly the importance of strategic autonomy, aversion to military alliances, strong displeasure and resilience against the pressure tactics of global powers, and preference for bilateral diplomacy and multipolarity in the world order emanate from its strategic subconscious rooted in its collective civilizational-historical experience and ethos.

Today, India has successfully bypassed the pressure from the West. While fearlessly guarding its strategic autonomy, it has maintained an independent foreign policy based on national interests, values, history, and geography. Be it the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China-U.S. rivalry, or the Israel-Hamas war, India has taken a principled stand of neutrality. 

At the same time, India’s posture is not the pessimism of fence-sitters. New Delhi is making reasoned, pragmatic, and value-based judgments on various global conflicts, listening to its moral conscience and rationality amid the external pressure and polarization of the dominant power blocs. India’s activism on global affairs is based on enlightened self-interest, evident in its stance on various international issues.

Also, India has found an effective way of navigating the polarized geopolitical landscape through its successful bilateral diplomacy. Over the last two years, India has developed robust bilateral strategic, defense, and economic ties with Greece and Armenia. India also enjoys strong bilateral relations with Germany, France and Italy. Recently, when President Biden declined to attend India’s Republic Day ceremony as a chief guest, French President Emmanuel Macron replaced him. India enjoys an excellent relationship with Russia based on trust and mutual respect. Even with China, its archrival, despite the recent military stand-offs in Galwan and Eastern Ladakh, India has not closed the bilateral channels. India-China trade ties continue to grow more robust, and on boundary issues, New Delhi continues to engage China in negotiations to resolve long-standing disputes amicably. 

Though India and the United States are on the same page vis-à-vis China’s revisionist ambitions of world domination, and both countries do subscribe to the idea of a strong India-U.S. strategic partnership to counter China, India carefully maintains a guarded distance from the United States and does not wish for an alliance.

In another interesting example, India maintains strong bilateral ties with archrivals Iran and Israel. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has built an excellent economic and strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Bahrain in West Asia. Most recently, India’s successful bilateral diplomacy resulted in Qatar releasing eight Indian nationals facing death sentences on charges of espionage. 

Prime Minister Modi’s personal chemistry with many heads of state and government gives heft to his bilateral diplomacy. Five Arab states have bestowed their highest civilian awards to Prime Minister Modi, and the UAE has allotted land to construct a Hindu temple, which Modi recently inaugurated. For his Hindu constituency, convincing a monarch of a Muslim state to allow the building of a Hindu temple is a terrific achievement. Last but not least, India is taking its successful bilateral diplomacy experiment to the next level by investing in minilaterals in West Asia and the Indo-Pacific. India’s twentieth-century policy of non-alignment has transformed into “multi-alignment” in the twenty-first.

Most countries mentioned above have accepted and respected India’s independent foreign policy. Many of my informal conversations with New Delhi’s diplomatic community have suggested they highly regard India’s strategic autonomy. Most believe India is a powerful nation that can sustain its independent foreign policy. Also, it enjoys a unique position to do so because of its history of taking a principled and non-aligned stand on global issues. However, the United States must be more perceptive and understand India’s unique approach toward international relations. Such an approach is an effective way to prevent the world community from falling into rival military alliances and escalating to war.

Dr. Abhinav Pandya is a founder and CEO of Usanas Foundation, an India-based geopolitical and security affairs think-tank, and the author of Radicalization in India: An Exploration. His second book, Terror Financing in Kashmir, will be released soon. He has a Ph.D. from OP Jindal University and an MPA from Cornell University.

Image: Shutterstock.

Summary: The USS North Carolina, an iconic World War Two battleship and the most decorated American battleship of the conflict, now serves as a floating museum in Wilmington, North Carolina. As a testament to the sacrifices of North Carolinians in the war, it attracts approximately 250,000 visitors annually. However, the battleship faces challenges from climate change, with rising water levels threatening accessibility and, consequently, its financial sustainability and contribution to the local economy. Efforts are underway to protect and preserve this historical monument.

The USS North Carolina is the most decorated battleship to have served in World War Two. Today, it is a floating museum to the memory of the approximately 11,000 North Carolinians who fought and died in the largest war in human history. 

However, the venerable warship is facing an uncertain future as climate change and the passage of time threaten its existence. 

The USS North Carolina is berthed in Wilmington, North Carolina, and remains a very popular war monument, attracting about 250,000 visitors in 2022. However, climate change is raising the water levels in the river next to the battleship, and the parking lot has nearly flooded. Without access, tourists can’t visit the battleship. Without tourists, the warship can’t survive since it depends on the approximately $3.5 million revenue that comes from these visits to survive. The battleship also fuels the local economy, bringing close to $250 million over a decade. 

Local organizations and state officials are making efforts to protect the USS North Carolina and preserve it for the public.  

Recently, two historic battleships, the USS Texas and USS New Jersey, went back to the shipyard for important maintenance work. These venerable warships represent another era, and it is important to keep them alive so younger generations can understand what it takes to fight for freedom. 

The lead ship of the North Carolina-class battleships, the USS North Carolina, served in World War Two with distinction. The warship was laid down in 1937 and completed in April 1941, just a few months before the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor forced the United States into World War Two. 

In terms of weaponry, the USS North Carolina could carry nine 16-inch (406mm) main cannons, 20 5-inch (127mm) secondary guns, 16 1.1-inch (28mm) anti-aircraft guns, and scores of heavy and light machine guns for air defense.

When it came to defense, the USS North Carolina had 12-inch (305mm) armor in the belt of the ship, 16 inches (406mm) on the main gun turrets, and 5.5 inches (140mm) on the deck to protect against air bombs. 

Fully loaded, the USS North Carolina weighed almost 45,000 tons and was about 729 feet long. It could reach speeds of 28 nautical knots (about 32 miles per hour) and had a range of approximately 20,100 miles at moderate speeds. The battleship required 1,800 officers and men to operate. 

The USS North Carolina saw extensive service in World War Two. It began its service with a mission to counter the German battleship Tirpitz in the Atlantic Ocean but was soon thereafter transferred into the Pacific. There, the USS North Carolina fought in Guadalcanal, Eastern Solomon Islands, Gilbert and Marshall Islands, Mariana and Palau Islands, Philippine Sea, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. At one point, she was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine but survived the hit. Following the end of the war, the USS North Carolina was decommissioned, and in 1962, it became a floating museum in Wilmington, North Carolina.  

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Shutterstock.