EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq travelled to Spain yesterday to visit the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence (C-IED CoE), a multinational organisation with which the European Defence Agency is cooperating closely.
During the visit, Jorge Domecq received briefings from commander Colonel José Zamorano González as well as other C-IED CoE staff. Together they discussed the Centre’s missions and projects as well as its current priorities in the field of information sharing, technology & development, and training.
In January 2015, a cooperation framework agreement was signed between the EDA and the C-IED CoE allowing for coherent progress in C-IED capability development initiatives and potential participation in joint projects. It will also avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts.
“The good cooperation we have in place with the C-IED CoE allows us to exchange lessons learned and enlarge the European C-IED community of interest, which ultimately benefits capability development in this crucial field with the aim of mitigating and/or preventing IED threats”, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq stressed during the visit. “I expect our cooperation to grow based on our Member States’ needs for robust capabilities to fight improvised explosive devices in operations as well as in the homeland”, he added.
There is much to give concern in the world of European politics these days. From Greece to the UK, the Mediterranean to Finland (even Austria), you don’t have to look far to find examples of ‘how it’s all going belly up’ (to quote one of my colleagues).
It would be simple to take the counsel of despair, throw our hands up and reject it all. Surely everything tells us that Nigel is right and we should just put ourselves out of our own misery now. What possible value can there be in a system that tramples on Greek democracy, demonstrates scant respect for those who have risked their lives to reach our countries and apparently couldn’t organise an economic recovery worth the name, when everyone else did it some years ago?
Eurosceptics have long made much of how the EU holds back states, either economically or politically (or both), but never have such arguments had such resonance: my Facebook and Twitter feeds are full of people decrying it all and wondering it’s worth it any more.
I have a degree of sympathy with such views: certainly the Greek crisis has been a masterclass in how to make things worse, with all sides making unreasonable assumptions and not accepting that they have to make some concession. The realisation of the profound interdependence between all the actors is there, but only partial – each knows that it has the other over the proverbial barrel, but hasn’t yet worked out that they are in the same situation too.
And yet.
All of these things highlight that we do live in an interconnected system, where the actions of one affect the lives of others. Contrast this to the dark days of 2008/9 as the great recession broke. Then the reflex was to national action, supported by global coordination: the European level of governance felt (and was) largely irrelevant. For all that people talk of being ‘ruled by Brussels’, Brussels mostly sat on its hands or followed the lead of the G20 or of member states: anyone who thinks the 6-pack resolved the situation needs to go and look again.
But now the European level is central once more. This is partly because of the issues involved: Greece’s economic situation is directly linked to its membership of the Euro, the migrant crisis is linked to the Dublin Convention and Schengen, the British Tories seem to focus on little else. But it’s also because the EU is a relevant political arena and the way in which European states treat with each other is very different from how it used to be.
And here’s the rub. as Rafael Behr rightly pointed out in a great piece yesterday, the EU isn’t here to crush democracy. I wrote something similar last autumn:
The EU is not a hegemonising monster, intent on steam-rolling everyone and everything into uniform submission, but a mechanism for accommodating differences.
That might feel somewhat unsatisfactory, but Behr asks us to consider the alternatives.
A collapse of the Union would certainly come with transition costs, whatever the ultimate outcome, particularly for states like Greece. The removal of a system of institutionalised interaction might offer succor to those who would take a more autarkic and/or nationalistic view of the world, if only because goodwill might be in short supply.
If this sounds like ‘Project Fear‘ again, then maybe reflect on this last point. Perhaps the only reason people feel they can confidently talk about stepping away from the EU model is precisely that model has made a more stable and non-conflictual way of working with each other possible. The big question then has to be whether attitudes have changed fundamentally or remain contingent.
The post Who’s in charge here? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
The Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union takes over on 1 January 2015.
“Nhiệm Vụ Tối Mật” – “Secret Mission” 2015 by Pham Huy Thong
Just when the memories of anti-Chinese protests and rioting have started to fade among the Vietnamese, the Chinese are stoking the fires again with another salami-slicing maneuver.
Last Thursday, Beijing announced the redeployment of the deepwater oil rig Haiyang Shiyou-981 to the waters near the disputed Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands. The placement of the rig this time around is in waters south of the Gulf of Tonkin and northwest of the Paracels, according to the website of the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration, and is expected to be operational up until August 20.
The website announcement also requested passing vessels to stay at least 2,000 meters away, perhaps fearing a repeat of last May’s confrontation, where several Vietnamese coast guard boats, fisheries surveillance ships, and fishing boats were rammed by Chinese naval vessels for coming too close to this same Chinese rig deployed offshore but within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.
This year, however, the Chinese have located the rig outside the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam, in a grey zone currently being negotiated between Vietnam and China. According to a Vietnamese Coast Guard source, should the Chinese oil rig violate Vietnam’s sovereignty, the Coast Guard would “make announcements.” This small, possibly incremental step by Beijing can be described as “salami-slicing”, or “Salami tactics,” a term first coined by the Hungarian Communist leader Matyas Rakosi in the late 1940s to describe the destruction of the non-Communist parties by “cutting them off like slices of salami.”
The announcement of the rig’s arrival by Vietnamese media follows a visit by Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh to Beijing on June 17 to 19 for the eighth meeting of the Vietnam-China Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation. During the meetings, both sides agreed to use negotiations to keep territorial disputes under control, avoid any actions to complicate disputes, emphasize the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (East Vietnam Sea/West Philippine Sea) and make progress toward a Code of Conduct. Given the lack of outrage here in Vietnam over the rig’s deployment, the positioning of the Chinese rig was also likely negotiated between Hanoi and Beijing, with Beijing promising to strengthen economic, trade and investment ties.
So far, the Vietnamese people appear to have accepted the deployment of the Chinese rig, as there have been no reports of anti-Chinese protests or rioting despite media coverage. However, some Ho Chi Minh resident representatives voiced their strong opposition to China’s recent actions in the East Sea on Monday to State President Truong Tan Sang and Tran Du Lich, head of the NA delegation of the city. Residents there called for a strong, official response from the National Assembly to China’s violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty, which President Sang acknowledged has not been strong enough.
The arrival of the Chinese rig also coincides with the delivery of a fourth of six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines to Vietnam, under a $2 billion deal signed in 2009. Vietnam may be able to tolerate some salami-slicing by the Chinese, but for this tactic to work most effectively, the true long-term motives should be hidden and cooperation emphasized. Given Vietnam’s long history of successfully fighting off the Chinese, the Vietnamese are traditionally skeptical of Chinese motives and cooperation, and should Beijing choose to slice too much, history tells us the Vietnamese will be ready once again.
Photo Credit: CH’7K via Flickr
A leading naval strategist asks: Could cyberattacks actually prevent war?
In this two-part series, leading thinkers from a prior era of globalization directly inform our understanding of critical issues today. Part 1 examined the lessons for current maritime security concerns from naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan and Nobel laureate Norman Angell. Part 2 considers their competing insights into a very modern challenge: cybersecurity.
Mahan’s ideas of the late 19th century set the track for U.S. naval policy for decades, including growing and strengthening the fleet and developing reliable resupply stations worldwide. Angell described in 1909 that war had become futile as a means to enhance state power and wealth, but not impossible because men sometimes act irrationally. Each saw enormous potential from the surges of trade and technology by the turn of the 20th century. Mahan saw mostly threats; Angell saw more possible benefits.
For Angell, the extent of trade and investment created an “interdependence” among European powers, so that “war, even when victorious, could no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive.” His ideas are found in international relations theories that developed nearly a century later: complex interdependence, democratic peace, and even constructivism. In each of these, states choose paths other than conflict-for-power and power-for-conflict. The Internet would have made perfect sense to Angell: Social networking, online commerce, and “Twitter revolutions” across borders and cultures increase national wealth, standards of living and human aspirations.
For Mahan, the analysis is more complex, and the policy implications more surprising. Mahan’s cybersecurity policies depend upon his views on “freedom of the seas” and on populations used to material comfort. Freedom of the seas popularized by Grotius’s 1609 Mare Liberum, which asserted that the high seas are open to all, especially for commerce. This idea has been supported by the American Continental Congress, Elizabeth I, Woodrow Wilson and the U.N. During the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR generally left alone one another’s seaborne trade.
But for Mahan, commerce produces the national wealth necessary for military power:
Ships and cargoes in transit upon the sea …are national wealth engaged in reproducing and multiplying itself, to the intensification of the national power…[commerce is] therefore a most proper object of attack.
Additionally, Mahan argued that modern populations had an “excessive sensitiveness” to their new wealth. Attacking international private (commercial) sea trade was actually a benefit to mankind, “more humane, and more conducive to the objects of war, than the slaughter of men.”
The lessons for cybersecurity are evident. Mahan’s realism would endorse state-on-state cyberattacks, like digital spying, Stuxnet, or degrading the military systems of a country you are planning to attack. But Mahan essentially validates cyberattacks on civilian and commercial interests as well. Where private property is the ultimate source of national power, he argues, it is a legitimate target. When populations are “exasperated by the delicacy of financial situations,” not used to widespread discomfort or “privation,” cyberattacks might be used to achieve the intended goals of the attacker without the extensive violence and casualties traditional warfare.
In this way, cyberattacks among great states might serve as proxy wars did during the Cold War: great power contests with minimal casualties to the principals. The risks of this approach then and now, of course, are multiple. Cyber casualties can still occur from economic, financial, industrial or infrastructure damage. Cyberattacks can begin or escalate a conflict which leads to kinetic warfare. Mistaken attribution of cyberattacks can widen the conflict to unrelated or unintended parties.
If Mahan is right, a number of implications follow. Countries are already developing offensive and defensive cyberstrategies – these need to be fully integrated into national security and economic means and ends. (As Peter Singer and Allan Friedman note, whether these questions are fully understood by the key decision makers remains a question.) Governments must work closely with other public and commercial organizations – preventing a cyberattack on finance, industry, and infrastructure as they would from a terrorist or traditional warfare. Many countries are already well into these kinds of discussions, including with each other. Too often though, security measures have proven inadequate. The recent U.S. government’s loss of millions of employees’ personal and security data is just the latest example. Internet security firms like Mandiant and Symantec have detailed intense ongoing efforts, not merely hypothetical ones.
The Internet offers “interdependence” far beyond what Angell could have imagined. But the natures of conflict, spying, industrial espionage, organized crime, and “attack” are all very different from what Mahan understood. By Mahan’s logic, withholding energy exports as diplomatic leverage, theft of commercial intellectual property, manipulating industrial controllers or breaches of financial institutions may be “more humane” alternatives to conventional war.
But Mahan’s logic helped lead the great powers into war.
This post and the previous one are drawn in part from J.Quirk’s article in the Mediterranean Quarterly, June 2015.
On 29-30 June, the second board meeting of the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) took place at the National Library of Latvia. During the meeting participants discussed issues related to organised crime and how to provide support to the European authorities in combating it.
On 29-30 June, the second board meeting of the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) took place at the National Library of Latvia. During the meeting participants discussed issues related to organised crime and how to provide support to the European authorities in combating it.