Photo Credit: Theophilos Papadopoulos via Flickr
Greece’s far-left may have reached its day of reckoning far faster than anticipated.
As negotiations between Greece and the troika came to a screeching halt last week over the terms of a multibillion-euro bailout — a few days before the country is expected to vote on the troika’s terms and conditions for a bailout — the country’s already-weakened economy has come to a standstill. Just hours before the deadline for the country’s 1.6 billion euro debt payment on Tuesday, markets were relatively calm, but capital controls to prevent cash from flowing rapidly out of the country have been in full effect. Banks have been forced to close as well and will remain so until July 7, and withdrawals, if one can find a working ATM, are severely limited.
But for Alexis Tsipras and his party, Syriza — both of whom rode into Athens on a wave of popular frustration with Greece’s pro-austerity political establishment — what comes next will be the make-or-break moment for the party’s ability to lead in difficult times.
As far as leadership is concerned, Tspiras’ motives for backing such a referendum are clear. Putting the creditor’s offer to a vote takes some of the weight of his shoulders and opens up the opportunity for the party to lead the country through a time of trial without (presumably) as much backlash. In essence, it’s a way of saying: Whatever road we choose to take, we’re all in this together.
It’s no surprise, then, that Tsipras has presented the referendum not as a vote on Greece remaining in the eurozone, nor as a vote between the euro or the drachma. Rather, for Tsipras, the referendum is a democratic imperative — an exercise in sovereignty before all else.
“Greece, the birthplace of democracy, should send a resounding democratic message to the European and global community,” he said in his address on the referendum on June 27.
“I am absolutely confident that your choice will honor our country’s history and will send a message of dignity worldwide. In these critical times, we all have to remember that Europe is the common home of all of its peoples.”
Whether or not the referendum is a practical exercise has been the matter of some controversy. Those opposing the referendum, including a number of former Greek government officials, have framed the vote as “yes” or “no” to Europe. Even Former Prime Minister George Papandreou — who carried out a similar referendum in 2011, which he has since defended — has repeatedly condemned the July 5 referendum, referring to it as a “tactical ploy” and a sort of negotiating weapon.
Still others have argued much of the blowback comes from the fact that the European project wasn’t all that democratic to begin with. Writing in The Guardian, economist Joseph Stiglitz noted, “[W]hat we are seeing now, 16 years after the eurozone institutionalized those relationships, is the antithesis of democracy.” European leaders, Stiglitz continues, want Tsipras and Syriza out, and they want a Greek government in power that is willing to accept the terms and conditions of eurozone membership without a fight.
What happens on July 5 is up to the Greeks, and only the Greeks, to decide. No matter that outcome, it’s impossible to deny that this is the moment for Syriza. Tsipras’ government is young, but it’s already had its share of fights. They’ve already confronted the EU — but will they capitulate?
“More than ever we must be clear that there is no middle course between confrontation and capitulation,” wrote Stathis Kouvelakis, a member of Syriza’s central committee, after the party was elected in January 2015. “The moment of truth is at hand.”
Those words couldn’t be more relevant now.
On 30 June 2015, the Council presidency reached an agreement with the European Parliament on a draft directive establishing new improved rules on insurance distribution.
On 30 June 2015, the Council presidency reached an agreement with the European Parliament on a draft directive establishing new improved rules on insurance distribution.
Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, has once again changed the terms of the debate in the ongoing crisis by requesting a new third bailout from the eurozone’s €500bn bailout fund, known as the European Stability Mechanism, just hours before his current bailout expires.
According to a copy of the letter sent to the ESM and Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance minister who chairs the committee of his eurozone counterparts, which we’ve posted here, the loan request is for €29.1bn to cover debts maturing into 2017.
That would seem to be a pretty traditional bailout request. But it also contains some untraditional demands that may be difficult for creditors to accept. Below is an annotated version of Tsipras’ letter:
Dear Chairperson, dear President,On behalf of the Hellenic Republic (“the Republic” or “Greece”), I hereby present a request for stability support within the meaning of Articles 12 and 16 of the ESM Treaty.
The ESM treaty is the law that now governors all eurozone bailouts. It wasn’t in place for either Greece’s first or second bailouts, but it would set the terms for its third. Articles 12 and 16 simply state the purpose of a bailout programme: to “to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States.” Unfortunately for Tsipras, Article 16 also happens to mention that a new programme must include a new “MoU” – or memorandum of understanding, a phrase that is politically poisonous in Greece.
Read moreMC3 Ian Carver/U.S. Navy
Is the U.S. accidentally preparing for World War I again? In this two-part series, leading thinkers from a prior era of globalization instruct us on maritime and cyber security today.
In our constant consumption of the latest news, we risk overlooking history and missing context. Competing insights from a century ago inform debates today on Russian and Chinese naval strategies (this post) and cybersecurity (the next).
Alfred T. Mahan and Norman Angell were prominent thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Mahan was a U.S. naval officer who literally wrote the book that shaped American naval strategy for decades. Angell warned of the futility of war for so long that ended up he winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Mahan and Angell each saw enormous consequences of the trade and technology boom of their time, with steamships, transatlantic telegraphy, radio communications and the Panama Canal. Mahan focused on the many new threats posed by the emerging technologies, while Angell saw a range of potential benefits.
Mahan understood that a surge in technology and trade could lead to more luxuries, but at heart was a realist: “All around us now is strife…. Everywhere is nation against nation.” He warned, for example, about European access through the Panama Canal to the undefended West Coast of the United States, the dangerous rise of Asian states and wars driven by economic ambition. European and U.S. navies responded with massive shipbuilding campaigns and by securing ports throughout the Caribbean.
Angell, meanwhile, concluded that the rise of trade and economic integration – “interdependence” – made war an irrational choice. The direct and indirect costs of war were greater than any possible gains. Trade became a more efficient means to wealth than accumulating geography. Moreover, the role of government had evolved: raising a country’s standard of living became more important than conquering foreign territory.
Mahan’s views seemed to be borne out by World War I, punitive postwar policies, the failure of the League of Nations, and World War II. These (and the Cold War) demonstrated a world of zero-sum, state-vs.-state conflicts less focused on democracy, human rights, and trade. But beginning with the Atlantic Charter, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the new UN Declaration of Human Rights, Angell’s ideas began to rise. By the 1980s into the 1990s, democracy, global trade and investment, non-state actors and the World Wide Web were replacing simple realism.
Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States in 2001, though, provoked a complicated response of
new, new realism – high-tech network-centric warfare with global surveillance and targeting technologies, along with special forces on horseback, to fight state and non-state actors, in order to preserve the presumed benefits of the peaceful globalization status quo.
Today’s geopolitics blend and contrast Angell’s and Mahan’s visions. Seaborne international trade fuels much of the global economy, while increasingly assertive naval strategies are changing geostrategic analysis.
China’s naval ascendance focuses for now on the South China Sea. Its claims of sovereignty are contested by Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries in the region. China uses diplomatic and military pressure, and the construction of “new islands,” to strengthen its claims. Locally, the disputes impact fishing, mineral and drilling rights. Key commercial shipping lanes, and the passage rights of foreign navies, are concerns of India, the United States and others. At the same time, the U.S. military asserts that China’s naval upgrades aim toward an “anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force — a force that can deter U.S. intervention.”
The Russian question is even more similar to Mahan’s concerns over “coaling stations” for a global navy. With a coastline extending across nearly half of the Arctic Circle, Russia is developing its Arctic infrastructure to support its naval and merchant fleets. Supported by scientific expeditions to extend it claims — an effort other countries also undertake — it is preparing for considerable increases in shipping Arctic melt is expected to allow. On its southern front, Russia has been developing Novorossiysk to house the Black Sea Fleet, and annexed Crimea, home of Russia’s naval facility in Sevastopol. Meanwhile, in 2014, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu announced negotiations for military bases and refueling sites for Russian strategic bombers in Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, the Seychelles, Singapore and other countries.
The question of American and allied policies also look back to Mahan and Angell’s time. In the decades before World War I, the United States and European powers engaged in a naval modernization arms race and secured bases across the Caribbean Sea. The U.S. then partially withdrew from European politics until World War II, after which it took a dual-track approach. Toward the Soviet Union, it waged a Mahan-informed foreign policy of strength, expansion and containment. With its allies, though, it helped build a new community of interdependence.
How is the U.S. moving today? In recent weeks, the U.S. has moved forward on two elements of its “pivot to Asia”: the Defense Department’s new Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (like Mahan) and progress in Congress on the coming Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal (like Angell, except that it excludes China). The deputy secretary of defense talked tough when he testified to Congress on Russia nuclear plans (and softer on China), while the Pentagon also announced it would move “approximately 250 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and self-propelled howitzers throughout six countries that are close to Russia” (both Mahan).
And while it is useful to understand that Mahan and Angell offer insight into current maritime security debates, it is remarkable that they also contribute significantly to understanding questions of cybersecurity – the subject of the next post.
This post and the next are drawn in part from Jim Quirk’s article in the Mediterranean Quarterly, June 2015.
On 29 June, the Latvian Minister for Environmental Protection and Regional Development, Kaspars Gerhards, went to New York (USA) to represent the Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union at the high-level event on international climate policy, convened by the President of the United Nations General Assembly.
On 29 June, the Latvian Minister for Environmental Protection and Regional Development, Kaspars Gerhards, went to New York (USA) to represent the Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union at the high-level event on international climate policy, convened by the President of the United Nations General Assembly.