Ideas on Europe Blog

When the European Union (EU) published its 2021 Trade Policy Review, a new buzz phrase took over policy and academia on EU trade policy: ‘open strategic autonomy’ (OSA). This was followed in 2023 by the Economic Security strategy, furthering a shift that brought Europe in line with the global trends towards the ‘geopoliticisation’ and ‘securitisation’ of trade and investment. This global trend has materialised with the spread of multiple trade defence instruments around the world, famously foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanisms. Since the Trade Policy Review, the EU has aimed to catch up and has enacted itself an array of new trade defence instruments to complement the traditional ones of anti-subsidies, anti-dumping and safeguards, that now take a key role to implement its economic security goals, as discussed in my newly published JCMS article.

The dragon in the room

These instruments – particularly the FDI screening regulation, the anti-coercion instrument, the international procurement instrument, the foreign subsidies regulation, and the 5G cybersecurity toolbox, amongst others like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism or the Trade Enforcement Regulation – have the aim of ensuring the EU’s economic security and resilience going forward, as well as its strategic autonomy, aiming to strike a new balance between security and competitiveness.

Several factors have been associated with the need for their enactment, among them the supply chain disruptions triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, and the protectionist policies adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations in the United States. Yet, in my article, I demonstrate that an analysis of the EU’s communicative strategy around those instruments, both at the political level (i.e. by EU institutions) and at the media level, indicates that these reforms are mainly associated with concerns about an assertive China. These findings are based on an software-powered text analysis of a dataset of 810 documents published between 2010 and April 2024 by the three main EU institutions – Council, Commission and Parliament –, and the five most influential outlets in Europe at least since 2020: Politico, The Economist, Financial Times, Reuters and Euractiv. The aim was to identify the main narratives used to justify the instruments and how they were linked to China.

This is not incompatible with their application being country-agnostic or horizontal. Yet, both EU institutions and the main pan-EU media outlets have employed a heterogeneous set of China-related narratives to legitimise these instruments, to shape a specific perception of China amongst the European public.

Indeed, China has been instrumentalised in both media and policy discourse, albeit in different ways by both these actors, as a means to justify the necessity and existence of these instruments. This instrumentalization of China has been more comprehensive, strategic and targeted than references to the United States or Russia, who are only mentioned in the context of great-power competition.

Overall, Chinese investment in Europe, especially in strategic sectors like 5G networks, has been framed by the three main EU institutions as a security threat, whilst trade with China in the areas of procurement and subsidies has been depicted as unfair, thereby justifying the introduction of instruments aimed at addressing these imbalances.

Interestingly, my JCMS article illustrates that the framing of China with respect to each of the instruments is targeted to adapt to the heterogeneity of the instruments and their purpose. Media, in particular, have promoted two distinct narratives regarding China: one portraying it as a threat in the context of investment, and another framing it as a source of unfairness in trade. This dual portrayal reinforces the perception of China as a competitor and political rival rather than an economic partner, fostering a vision of China as a ‘threatening other.’ This aligns with the broader trend towards the ‘securitisation’ of Chinese investment in Europe.

Moreover, since 2023, the analysis of the communicative discourse around these instruments by EU institutions shows that the TDIs have become increasingly integrated into broader strategic frameworks, moving beyond their original focus on ‘strategic autonomy’, and towards achieving broader geopolitical and economic security aims. This is coherent with the integration of those strategies with the EU’s trade policy across the board.

What might this mean going forward?

Is the Commission actually targeting China with those instruments? The short answer is that we don’t know yet. While these instruments have arguably been designed to be country-agnostic and thus apply to any country equally who violates the trade rules and standards that each of the instrument deals with, the truth is that China has been overly targeted and framed in the communicative discourse around the justification for the legitimacy and necessity of these instruments. We will need to pay attention, as the first investigations and screenings unfold, to the impact that this has on inward Chinese investment to the EU, even though much of this data is often confidential and the instruments will probably have a deterrence effect that can hardly be quantified.

Additionally, these findings raise the question of how these instruments, and the broader ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’ and Economic Security strategies will impact the EU’s identity as ‘Normative Power Europe’. This means how far the EU can continue employing selectively protectionist measures before its normative identity as a liberal, normative power is fundamentally challenged. While several scholars have argued that the EU continues to advocate for economic openness and positions itself as a defender of multilateralism, the use of unilateral trade instruments signals a significant shift towards a more assertive and less open trade policy.

Moving towards this new paradigm of selective openness and increased assertiveness to protect Europe’s interests, in this new world increasingly marked by tit-for-tat strategies and divide-and-rule tactics, the EU has, in effect, adopted more protectionist measures to prevent coercion and exploitation. This raises important questions about the EU’s evolving identity: Is the emergence of a ‘Geopolitical’ or ‘Geoeconomic Power Europe’ replacing ‘Normative Power Europe’? Or can the two coexist and potentially reinforce one another, rather than being in conflict?

Last but not least, a concern that became ever more relevant since the last European elections in June 2024, where Europe saw a sharp increase in extremist and populist forces in the European Parliament, the EU needs to acknowledge that there are concerns that the OSA instruments could be co-opted for purely protectionist purposes, or at the very least, that they might dangerously shift the EU’s focus from trade openness towards trade defence. This could lead to an increasingly bifurcated trade regime, with continued openness towards allies but heightened assertiveness and greater reliance on autonomous tools against perceived rivals.

In short, even though the current focus of the OSA instruments is to defend multilateralism and the Liberal International Order, they have broader systemic and normative implications that the European Commission still needs to wrap its head around. When it comes to China, it is clear that those instruments were aimed to address the multifaceted concerns that the EU has related to China’s international role and domestic economic policy. But as we move towards their implementation, we will see what the actual impact on an EU-China trade and investment relationship will be, as the last High Level Summit that took place in Beijing on the 24th of July demonstrated, is already fraught with misunderstanding and tensions.

 

Laia Comerma is a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance (BSoG-VUB) under the ERC project ‘Europe in US-China rivalry’ (SINATRA). She completed her PhD at the Pompeu Fabra University (UPF) and the Barcelona Institute for International Studies (IBEI). Her doctoral dissertation, “The politics of EU-China economic relations: Normative and regulatory disputes in the reconfiguration of global economic governance”, analyses the norms, rules and institutions structuring the foreign policy relation between China and the EU, and how they are being reformed due to their interaction in the fields of investment, trade, and development infrastructure. Her research fields of interest are foreign policy analysis, Chinese and EU foreign policy, and EU–China relations. She holds a MSc in International relations from the London School of Economics (LSE) and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from UPF-UAM-UC3M. 

 

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Photo courtesy of the Centre for Future Generations: https://cfg.eu/building-cern-for-ai/

Anna-Lena Rüland

For several research fields, large-scale research infrastructures play a crucial role in advancing cutting-edge research, with the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) often being referred to as a particularly successful example. Accounts of how “big science” projects like CERN get off the ground abound in the history of science as well as in popular science. Typically, individual scientists are seen to be pivotal in initiating large-scale research infrastructures (just think of the role of Isidor I. Rabi in the early phase of CERN). However, the specific strategies and tactics that scientists use to put a large-scale research infrastructure on the agenda of policymakers are rarely examined through a theoretical lens, impeding a more systematic understanding of what strategies and tactics may or may not work in advocating for big science. In my recently published article, I address this issue by drawing on the interest group and agenda-setting scholarship to study the strategies and tactics that the Confederation of Laboratories for Artificial Intelligence (AI) Research in Europe (CAIRNE) has used to advocate for the so-called CERN for AI. In this blog post, I reflect on which strategies and tactics have proven successful and which have not.[i]

 

What is CERN for AI?

There are multiple, and in part clashing, visions of CERN for AI (this blog post provides a detailed overview). I will focus on the vision of CAIRNE, possibly one of the fiercest advocates for a CERN for AI. CAIRNE promotes a CERN for AI that:

• Consists of a central hub, supported by a network of (CAIRNE) research clusters;
• Is used to conduct research on all aspects of AI;
• Has close links to industry;
• Develops AI that aligns with European norms and values; and
• Is publicly funded.

CAIRNE started to advocate for CERN for AI in 2017, based on two central arguments. First, the organization considers it vital to bring Europe’s top AI researchers together in a central place to coordinate their research efforts and to agree on a few top research priorities for the field. According to CAIRNE, this is needed to help the European AI community overcome its fragmentation. Second, CAIRNE argues that more hardware is needed to enable cutting-edge AI research in Europe and to catch up with AI frontrunners like the US and China. When CAIRNE was founded in 2018, CERN for AI became one of the central issues that the organization advocated for. However, despite CAIRNE’s continuous advocacy, CERN for AI has not (yet) materialized. This may soon change, as the initiative has made it to the highest political level: Ursula von der Leyen recently proposed to set up a “European AI Research Council where we can pool all of our resources, similar to the approach taken with CERN.”

 

Invest in a variety of strategies

Between 2017 and 2025, CAIRNE used different means to draw policymakers’ and the broader public’s attention to CERN for AI, three of which proved particularly useful. First, CAIRNE engaged with different members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to convince them of CERN for AI’s merit. This parliamentary strategy has paid off, as several MEPs have begun to back CERN for AI during the deliberations for the AI Act. Second, CAIRNE’s founding members invested a great deal of time and effort into promoting CERN for AI by writing countless opinion pieces and giving interviews for prominent media outlets across the EU. For example, their proposal featured in “der Tagesspiegel,” and “Science Business.” This media strategy drew attention to CERN for AI beyond a specialist audience. Finally, and in line with a mobilization strategy, CAIRNE drew attention to CERN for AI among the AI community, think tanks and the broader public by organizing CERN for AI-dedicated events and publishing open letters. Across all these strategies, CAIRNE credibly presented CERN for AI as an issue that needs to be addressed at the EU-level: Firstly, because the funding needed for CERN for AI would likely exceed the capacities of any one EU Member State and, secondly, because the entire European AI research community should benefit from and participate in CERN for AI.

 

Find the right label

A CAIRNE strategy that created controversy, especially within the European AI community, was the framing of the proposed AI research infrastructure as a CERN for AI. Several people that I interviewed for my article argued that, in principle, it is beneficial to use the renowned CERN “brand” to promote a large-scale, European (AI) research infrastructure. Yet, in the case of the CERN for AI initiative, this strategy backfired. There are two reasons for this. First, at about the same time as CAIRNE started to promote CERN for AI, a group of prominent AI researchers that is now known as “ELLIS” advocated for a networked AI research infrastructure modeled on the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL). Given the EU’s limited funding for AI and the enormous price tag of any AI research infrastructure, ELLIS had no interest in supporting CAIRNE’s proposal. Second, critics of CERN for AI, among them ELLIS members, argued that the CERN label did not make sense in the context of AI because, unlike to the massive colliders at CERN, the computing power necessary for AI research does not need to be centralized. (Somewhat ironically, while criticizing CAIRNE’s framing, ELLIS failed to acknowledge that back in the day, the EMBL was promoted as a Conseil Européen de la Recherche Biologique). Critics of CERN for AI have further argued that using the CERN label for a large-scale AI research infrastructure is “misleading” because the current political circumstances are not comparable to those that eventually facilitated the establishment of CERN.

 

Balance centralization with decentralization

In the future, scientists and scientific organizations like CAIRNE may therefore want to frame their proposals for large-scale science infrastructures more strategically. Historical research has shown that promoting a “big science” project as a CERN of [insert relevant scientific discipline] does not necessarily have to backfire. What seems to play an important role is that those advocating for a large-scale science project in a research field that does not strictly require big instruments choose a framing that manages to balance the best of both worlds: the unifying moment of centralization and the efficiency of decentralization. Such a framing is also likely to more strongly appeal to policymakers and thus find political backing because a central research facility supported by a network of research clusters would maximize the number of constituencies that see a return on investment from big science.

 

Dr. Anna-Lena Rüland is a research fellow with the European Research Council-funded project “Addressing Global Challenges through International Scientific Consortia” at the University College London Global Business School for Health. She graduated with a PhD in science policy from Leiden University in July 2024 and currently conducts research on science diplomacy, research security, as well as science, technology and innovation policy.

 

This blog post is based on her article that won the 2024 Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar from the ECPR Standing Group ‘Knowledge Politics and Policies’. This was the eighth time this prize was awarded. Previous winners are Cecilia Ivardi and Linda Wanklin, Anke Reinhardt, Adrienn Nyircsák, Alexander Mitterle, Justyna Bandola-Gill, Emma Sabzalieva, Olivier Provini and Que Anh Dang.

 

References

Cassata, Francesco. 2024. A ‘Heavy Hammer to Crack a Small Nut’? The Creation of the European Molecular Biology Conference (EMBC), 1963–1970. Annals of Science: 1-48. https://doi.org/10.1080/00033790.2024.2351511.

Hoos, Holger. 2023. ‘AI made in Europe’ am Wendepunkt. Der Tagesspiegel, 7 July 2023.

Kelly, Éanna. 2021. Call for a ‘CERN for AI’ as Parliament Hears Warnings on Risk of Killing the Sector with Over-Regulation. Science Business, 25 March 2021.

Kohler, Kevin. 2024. CERN for AI: An Overview. https://machinocene.substack.com/p/cern-for-ai-an-overview. Accessed 13 February 2025.

Matthews, David. 2024. Call for the EU to Build Publicly Funded Cutting-Edge Artificial Intelligence. Science Business, 4 January 2024.

Rüland, Anna-Lena. 2025. “We Need a CERN for AI”: Organized Scientific Interests and Agenda-Setting in European Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy. Minerva Online first. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-024-09568-6

Wulff Wold, Jacob. 2024. Von der Leyen Gives Nod to €100 Billion CERN for AI Proposal. Euroactiv, 25 July 2024.

 

[i] A slightly different version of this blog post has previously been published for the European Union Science Diplomacy Alliance Newsletter: https://www.science-diplomacy.eu/news/.

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by Michele Chang (Director of the Transatlantic Affairs Programme & Professor at the European Political and Governance Studies Department, College of Europe)

When Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi submitted their reports in 2024 (Much more than a market and A competitiveness strategy for Europe, respectively), they warned of the dangers of complacency and the need to tap into the possibilities of the single market for economic survival and geopolitical relevance. A year later, these warnings have greater urgency than ever. On top of the poly-crises that the EU already contends with, 2025 ushered in a trade war with the US and increased conflict in the Middle East. The EU risks being sidelined in a world of rising geopolitical tensions. Can the single market come to Europe’s rescue? In a recently published JCMS commentary, I look at the significance of these reports in the current geopolitical context.

The Commission follows through

The Letta and Draghi reports urge the EU to simplify its regulatory framework, invest in technology to spur innovation, and dedicate considerable financial resources towards improving competitiveness. The Draghi report in particular became the cornerstone of the von der Leyen Commission’s second term, with the first order of business being the creation of a ‘Competitiveness Compass (that) transforms the excellent recommendations of the Draghi report into a roadmap’. To finance these objectives, the EU looks to a mix of state aid reform, progressing on developing its capital markets, and issuing more EU debt.

The Commission has begun seeking competition policy carve-outs to allow more government support to businesses without falling foul of EU rules. The 2022 Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework, adopted to deal with the Covid crisis and extended in view of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has been replaced with a new state aid framework to support the Clean Industrial Deal. The upcoming negotiations for the multiannual financial framework (MFF), the multi-year EU budget plan, are unlikely to increase resources significantly, leaving national governments as important contributors to financing the competitiveness agenda.

The reports also seek the mobilization of private sector money by reviving the EU’s capital markets union, first launched in 2014. The Letta Report proposed a Savings and Investment Union to finance ‘common objectives that would otherwise be unachievable’ (p- 28). The Commission unveiled its Savings and Investment Union strategy in March 2025 with the aim to increase funding sources for households and businesses alike.

On debt issuance, the reports are surprisingly modest in ambition. The Letta report (p. 36) proposes combining existing EU bonds issued by the Commission, the European Investment Bank, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) / European Financial Stability Facility under a single name but retaining existing credit and capital structures. The Draghi report looks to the bonds issued to finance the NGEU budget as a precedent (p65). This contrasts with the Eurobond debates during the sovereign debt crisis that considered a joint and several liability structure for the member states, whereas the NGEU budget is financed by bonds backed by the EU budget, limiting its lending capacity and risk sharing. The ESM’s lending capacity is capped at €500 billion. In contrast, US Treasury markets have outstanding $28.6 trillion of public debt as of March 2025.

The Commission estimates that without debt refinancing, the EU will spend one fifth of its budget on repayment. Nevertheless, more debt issuance cannot be taken for granted. While Denmark announced it would no longer join the other so-called ‘frugals’ (the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden) in blocking a larger EU budget and issuing common debt, countries like Germany and the Netherlands still oppose both.

But is this what they meant?

Is the Commission actually following the proposals of the Letta and Draghi reports? Not quite. While the reports emphasize harnessing the EU as a whole, continued political sensitivities indicate fragmentation in the EU’s approach.

The Draghi report notes the synergy between pursuing competitiveness and solutions to climate change but cautions ‘if we fail to coordinate our policies, there is a risk that decarbonization could run contrary to competitiveness and growth’ (Draghi report, p. 6). The Commission’s omnibus simplification package slashes red tape, but ‘could create risks for the underlying policy objectives of the European Green Deal’.

The reports propose reforming state aid rules so that they contribute to European (instead of national) initiatives. The Letta report suggests a ‘state aid contribution mechanism’ in which the member states dedicate some of their national state aid funding towards European initiatives (Letta report, p. 11). The Draghi report proposes to boost the Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) programme with a Competitiveness IPCEI funneling state aid towards cross-border projects that would enhance efficiency and reduce the fragmentation of member state industrial policy (Draghi report, p. 68). While undoubtedly more efficient than state aid going exclusively towards domestic firms, the EU member states appear reticent to pool sovereignty to this degree.

The Commission contends that reforms like ‘the SIU will also contribute to the EU’s economic competitiveness and open strategic autonomy’. But in the Draghi report, a revitalized capital markets union would include a single securities market regulator, more unified clearing and settlement, and greater alignment in the tax and insolvency rules across member states, which Draghi calls the ‘three main fault lines’ (Draghi report, p. 63). The Savings and Investment Union strategy falls short of all three, with the press release referencing only ‘efficient supervision’ with a ‘reallocation of supervisory competences between national and EU levels’, and  ‘important efforts to remove any regulatory or supervisory barriers to cross-border operations of market infrastructures’.

The EU and its member states recognize that geopolitical challenges now demand policy changes, and the Letta and Draghi reports set out a path forward to allow the EU to bolster its economic competitiveness and hold on to at least some of its geopolitical influence. But the political, institutional, and financial implications of the Letta and Draghi reports are formidable. The retreat of the US from the postwar transatlantic partnership, combined with other external pressures, could be sufficient to influence internal political dynamics and unlock the political will needed for reform. This would not mean a wholesale endorsement of all elements of both reports, and it is unclear what the implications would be for a partial implementation—would similar results emerge, or would the policies ultimately be at odds with each other? These external pressures have incentivized the EU to reject doing business as usual, but many political deals and compromises still must be made.

Michele Chang is Director of the Transatlantic Affairs programme and Professor in the Department of European Political and Governance Studies at the College of Europe. Her research interests include European economic governance, including the euro, the European Central Bank, EU fiscal policy, financial crises, and the single market.

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This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2025 (29-30 May, Panteion University, Athens, Greece).  By dr. Maaike Geuens (Assistant Professor Public Management Open Universiteit) and ms. Duygu Sahin (Tilburg University).

Constitutional identity is an increasingly contested notion within the European Union’s legal and political landscape. Codified in Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), it is intended to protect the “national identities” of Member States. Yet over the past decade, it has also served to justify legal divergence, democratic backsliding, and, in some cases, open resistance to the primacy of EU law. Courts in Germany, Poland and Hungary have relied on the identity clause to challenge the authority of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), placing constitutional pluralism under strain. These developments raise pressing questions about the legitimate scope and democratic grounding of constitutional identity in the EU. 

At the heart of the current debate lies a fundamental ambiguity: what exactly constitutes constitutional identity, and who determines it? Scholarly work has attempted to clarify the legal, historical, and philosophical contours of the concept, often pointing to its multidimensional character. Some view it as a safeguard for democratic self-determination and pluralism within an integrated legal order; others see it as a potential vehicle for nationalistic exceptionalism. The lack of a standardised or uniformly accepted definition has created space for competing interpretations, not all of which are normatively benign. 

This tension is exacerbated by a structural democratic disconnect in the EU. While the Union aims to function as a community of values, its constitutional discourse is often perceived as elite-driven and technocratic. Voter turnout in European elections remains uneven, and levels of EU-awareness vary widely between and within Member States. The idea of a European public sphere—necessary for any shared constitutional project—thus remains fragile. In this context, appeals to “identity” risk being used as rhetorical shields rather than as vehicles for inclusive constitutional development. 

Against this background, the CONTICI project (Constitutional Identity: Thick Interpretation by Citizens) seeks to reconsider the foundations of constitutional identity by asking a different question: what would it mean to understand constitutional identity not from the perspective of courts or politicians, but from the bottom up—from the people themselves? Drawing inspiration from interpretive legal theory and deliberative democracy, CONTICI aims to develop a methodology that foregrounds the lived, narrative, and symbolic dimensions of constitutional meaning. Rather than seeking to distil a universal definition, the project will explore how citizens across Europe understand, experience, and potentially contest constitutional identity. 

The conceptual starting point for this project is that constitutional identity is not merely a legal construct, but also a social and cultural one. It is embedded in historical memory, national narratives, institutional practices, and collective symbols. As such, it cannot be fully captured by doctrinal analysis alone. The project therefore proposes a thick, interpretive approach: one that combines legal analysis with empirical inquiry, informed by the methods of political sociology, discourse analysis, and focus group research. This approach is designed to capture not only what constitutional identity is said to be, but how it is lived, negotiated, and communicated among citizens. 

CONTICI’s research design will unfold in several stages. Following an initial doctrinal and comparative analysis of Belgium, the Netherlands, and the EU, the project will launch empirical focus groups in these jurisdictions to trace citizens’ interpretations of constitutional identity. The selection of Belgium and the Netherlands reflects both linguistic diversity and contrasting state structures—unitary versus federal, centralised versus decentralised. This comparative dimension will help reveal whether a bottom-up understanding of identity converges or diverges across different national contexts. A subsequent phase will expand this inquiry to other Member States, with the ultimate goal of informing a more democratic and pluralistic conception of European constitutionalism. In the final stage of the project, the dimension of reflexive leadership of EU institutions is added to the mix. 

The potential benefits of this approach are manifold. First, it may enhance the democratic legitimacy of constitutional discourse by involving citizens directly in defining the values and principles that govern them. Second, it may offer empirical grounding to a concept that is too often abstract or strategically deployed. Third, it may contribute to the development of a European constitutional identity that complements, rather than threatens, national identities—a shared identity that reflects common values without erasing diversity. 

Nevertheless, the project is also conscious of its limitations. Focus group methodology, while rich in qualitative insight, requires careful design to avoid domination by vocal participants or groupthink. There is also the risk of conceptual inflation: the more inclusive constitutional identity becomes, the less analytically useful it may be. Moreover, citizen-derived narratives—like elite ones—can be appropriated for exclusionary purposes if not critically interpreted. CONTICI will therefore adopt a reflexive, transparent, and ethically rigorous research framework to ensure that citizen voices are interpreted in context and with methodological care. 

Ultimately, the central ambition of CONTICI is not to produce a singular definition of constitutional identity, but to open a space in which multiple, overlapping identities can be explored, compared, and negotiated. If constitutional identity is to be more than a legal fiction or a political slogan, it must be rooted in democratic practice. The project thus aspires to contribute not only to legal scholarship, but also to the future of a more participatory, inclusive, and resilient European Union. 

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Alina Felder-Stindt and Martina Vukasovic

In the ever-evolving landscape of European higher education, the European Universities Initiative (EUI) stands out as a flagship project that emerged with surprising speed and ambition. But how does such a major initiative take shape in an area where the European Union (EU) has only limited formal competence and an area characterised by significant institutional autonomy?

In our article published recently in the Journal of European Integration, we utilize the strategic resource exchange perspective (Bouwen, 2004) and focus on the role of stakeholder organizations – including associations of universities – in developing the EUI, an initiative aimed at fostering deeper integration through transnational alliances of universities (Cino Pagliarello, 2022). We unpack the development of the EUI from a passing reference in a 2017 speech by French President Emmanuel Macron to the launch of the first call for proposals just a year later. Drawing on interviews, document analysis, and data from the EU Transparency Register, we trace how the European Commission navigated the constraints of limited legal authority by leveraging the legitimacy and expertise of some of the stakeholder organizations.

 

The Commission’s Strategic Selection of Stakeholders in Limited Competence Areas

Higher education is a classic example of a policy domain where EU member states retain primary control. The EU’s role is largely supportive, with no power to harmonize national systems through hard law. This makes the rapid development of the EUI rather intriguing, especially given the overall crisis of European integration, including in higher education (Corbett & Hantrais, 2023). In such a partially institutionalized decision-making arena, the rules of the game are not entirely settled. The question then becomes who does the Commission decide to invite to the table, given that it does not have to utilize a particular approach to stakeholder consultations (Binderkrantz et al., 2021).

Our point of departure is the well-established resource exchange perspective on the relationship between EU institutions and stakeholder organizations (Nørgaard et al., 2014). The Commission, which in this case is lacking (important) policy resources – legal authority and technical knowledge – will strategically give access to those stakeholder organizations that can supply these policy resources.

The core finding of the study is the active role of the European Commission in selecting which stakeholder organizations to involve in the policy process. Rather than opening the floor to all interested parties, the Commission curated two groups of actors that could provide the specific types of legitimacy and knowledge it needed to move the initiative forward: an ad-hoc stakeholder group and ad-hoc expert group. While the latter included Member State representatives (whose inclusion is important for legitimacy, given the limited EU competences in this area), the former included well-established European university associations and networks that had a track record of engaging with EU institutions. Their involvement lent credibility to the initiative and helped align it with the interests of national higher education systems. At the same time, the Commission involved actors in the ad-hoc stakeholder group that had gathered experience in similar cooperation outlets such as the ones envisioned by the EUI, e.g. border region networks. This selective engagement reflects a broader pattern in EU governance, where the Commission uses stakeholder consultations not just to gather input, but to shape the policy environment in ways that support its strategic goals.

 

Legitimacy, Knowledge, and Access

The case of the EUI illustrates how the EU can innovate and expand its influence even in areas where its formal powers are weak. By strategically engaging with stakeholder organizations, the Commission can build coalitions, generate momentum, and legitimize its actions. We identified distinct forms of legitimacy and knowledge as key resources that stakeholder organizations brought to the table. In addition to the classic representational legitimacy (speaking for a broad constituency), also procedural legitimacy (being part of established consultation mechanisms) and normative legitimacy (aligning with EU values and goals) were important. Knowledge included both technical expertise and practical insights into how higher education systems operate on the ground. In exchange for these resources, stakeholders gained access to decision-makers and the opportunity to shape a high-profile initiative. This mutual benefit helped to overcome the institutional limitations of EU in the education policy domain and enabled the Commission to act as a policy entrepreneur.

 

Conclusion and Implications for EU Policy-Making

The European Universities Initiative may be a flagship project, but its development was anything but straightforward. As we show, it was the product of careful orchestration, strategic alliances, and the subtle exercise of power through resource exchange. Our study reminds us that even in areas of limited competence, the EU is far from powerless—and that understanding how it acts requires looking beyond formal rules to the networks and negotiations that drive policy forward. Our analysis confirms that resource exchange is a valuable lens for understanding the dynamics of EU policy-making in constrained environments. It also highlights the importance of studying the micro-politics of consultation and engagement, which often shape the outcomes of major initiatives behind the scenes. However, this approach also raises important questions about transparency and inclusiveness. If only certain stakeholders are invited to the table, whose voices are left out? And how can the EU ensure that its consultation processes remain open and democratic, rather than becoming tools for technocratic steering?

 

Bibliography:

Binderkrantz, A. S., Blom-Hansen, J., & Senninger, R. (2021). Countering bias? The EU Commission’s consultation with interest groups. Journal of European Public Policy, 28(4), 469-488. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1748095

Bouwen, P. (2004). Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions. European Journal of Political Research, 43(3), 337-369. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00157.x

Cino Pagliarello, M. (2022). Higher education in the single market between (trans)national integration and supranationalisation: exploring the european universities initiative. Journal of European Integration, 44(1), 149-164. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.2011266

Corbett, A., & Hantrais, L. (2023). Higher education and research in the Brexit policy process. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2181854

Nørgaard, R. W., Nedergaard, P., & Blom-Hansen, J. (2014). Lobbying in the EU Comitology System. Journal of European Integration, 36(5), 491-507. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.889128

 

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For any nation, the procurement of weapon systems has significant economic, political, and security implications and thus involves many trade-offs. Unsurprisingly, the different figures from government, the military, and industry that are involved in defence procurement decisions can have conflicting interests. Yet, the drivers of specific weapon system decisions often remain shrouded, despite the implications for how billions worth of taxpayer funds are spent. Furthermore, considering the critical role of Germany in the EU and European security, it is important to understand what might hinder or facilitate its defence procurement.  

Accordingly, my PhD project seeks to explain contemporary German defence procurement decision-making in the air domain, in terms of the process as well as specific decisions made. It focuses on the decision regarding whether Germany should procure armed drones for the first time, as well as the decision on how it should replace its multi-role combat aircraft, the Panavia 200 Tornado, which has been flying since the 1980s. Given that in both cases, the procurements under consideration were either rejected or postponed initially, but then years later approved, my research asks how and why these changes finally took place in both cases. 

German defence procurement decisions have often been studied in a more historical context. There are advantages and disadvantages to conducting research that is based on a very recent era vs. more archival historical research. One advantage to contemporary research is that the research subject may be directly adjacent to current political events and can offer some very relevant policy implications. A disadvantage is that while there are some open sources that can be utilized, such as parliamentary debates or journalistic pieces from media outlets, confidential official government documents dealing with defence procurement remain barred from public access for thirty years. Thus, when researching a contemporary topic that falls within this window of time, one can obviously not count on official documents as a source of data. Yet, given that official internal documents do not always reveal the whole picture behind a decision even when one has access to them, this need not prevent the research entirely. Elite interviews, sometimes referred to as expert interviews, with relevant stakeholders from that policy subfield, can then serve as a crucial alternative source of data. 

In this regard, the UACES Microgrant was an essential resource, as it aided my travel to conduct fieldwork during February 2025 in Germany. Thanks to the grant, I was able to interview German stakeholders involved with defence procurement decision-making. Conducting expert interviews in person was a reminder that building trust is key when dealing with sensitive topics. It would not have been possible to conduct these interviews digitally due to their sensitive nature, and the ability to meet in person facilitated a much more congenial atmosphere, where a rapport could be built. The more informal nature of meeting in-person and capitalizing on perpetually changing schedules also enabled more interviewees to participate than was even originally planned. 

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Czechia, as most countries of Central Europe, is not famous for welcoming immigrants with open arms. Czechs consider foreigners as people taking their jobs, their safety and their culture. However, since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, around 370 000 Ukrainians have come to Czechia to, at least temporarily, seek a new home here. This unprecedented influx of refugees led to the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) that has allowed for Ukrainians to live, work and access services in any EU country without going through tedious asylum processes. This was the first activation of the TPD in March 2022, so naturally it poses a question of whether this is a turning point in asylum policy. How did Czechia as a central European EU member state welcome Ukrainian immigrants? How has the integration of Ukrainians evolved? Can they be happy in Czechia, or will they be glad to go back once the war is over? 

Facts: How was immigration really handled? 

Originally, Ukrainians were only allowed to stay in Czechia for 90 days but, already in March 2022, the Czech government passed the first version of the so-called “Lex Ukrajina” which granted Ukrainians a temporary protection status. Initially, most of the Ukrainian immigrants were women and children, who therefore immediately needed financial support and housing. Half of the incoming family units had at least one child under 5 years of age, which led to many citizen-led initiatives, such as collecting clothing, buying diapers, etc. This was one of many volunteer initiatives that evolved right after the start of the war. 

After the first months, the numbers of incoming Ukrainians started to stabilize. This stabilization brought with it a necessity to revise the Lex Ukrajina, which has had 10 different versions since. These updates included housing support, healthcare access as well as the registration of Ukrainian cars. This shows that, from the initial crisis reaction, the focus has shifted towards a more detailed help of the immigrants’ specific needs.  The Czech government was not left to struggle alone, though. Czechia received over €40 million to support Ukrainian refugees and their integration. 

Although the effort to integrate Ukrainians was well funded and consistent, economic integration is not going as planned. While over 80 % of Ukrainian immigrants are economically active, most of them are well-educated women working in jobs that are not in their area of expertise or below their qualifications. Many Ukrainians are or have previously been employed without a contract, work long hours and are paid low wages, which does not make Czechia look very good at integrating them. Often, language barrier is an issue, but recognition of qualifications also plays a role. Moreover, many Ukrainians simply do not know if it is worth it to integrate or to hope to return to their homeland soon instead. 

An aspect that has been consistently funded for Ukrainian refugees in Czechia is housing. However, free state-granted accommodation ended in summer 2024 and now only financial contributions are available. A third of Ukrainian immigrants lives in non-apartment buildings, e. g. dormitories, and have issues with privacy and personal hygiene conditions. This also contributes to their lesser integration and Czech language skills; therefore, according to the PAQ research report, the focus of the Czech government should lie on getting them better accommodation as soon as possible. 

When discussion these facts, a clear comparison with the refugee crises in 2015 comes to mind. Back then, Czechia stood in strong opposition to the EU relocation quotas for asylum seekers from the Middle East together with the other members of the Visegrád Group – Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The Court of Justice of the EU even ruled in 2020 that the Visegrád Group failed to fulfil their obligations. This is a huge contrast to the swift actions of Lex Ukrajina and implementation of the TPD in 2022 – and this is where the feelings of Czechs come in. 

Feelings: Welcoming with open arms or hate?  

Prior to the influx of Ukrainian refugees, most Czechs viewed immigrants as people taking their jobs, profiting from their welfare system, and higher crime rates were perceived. One might assume that people with higher integration levels have more interactions with immigrants and hence might have a more positive view of them. However, this does not seem to be the reality. Still, the portrayal of immigrants as a security threat or people who could not be integrated into society transformed with the arrival of Ukrainians and the public opinion on Ukrainian immigrants shifted thanks to the cultural proximity. 

According to the Institute of Analytical Research, STEM, people still mostly think it was good from the Czech government to let Ukrainians stay, and the perception of Ukrainians has remained relatively similar since 2022. Data show that, while at the beginning of the war about 75% of Czechs supported accepting refugees from Ukraine, the majority of Czechs also considered this a temporary measure until the Ukrainians could return home – this has not changed. This shows that Czechia may not be the perfect safe haven for Ukrainians, as there are other EU member states that favour support of Ukraine more than Czechs do. While more data would be necessary for more conclusive findings, this is already an indicator. 

Even in the school environment, Ukrainian children who speak better Czech integrate faster and are perceived in a more positive manner than others, whose Czech is not as good. Czech may be a significant factor with adults too, as only 47% speak the language and many state they do not have the time or money to attend language classes. But there is one thing that changed significantly since the invasion of Ukraine, and that is the interest of Czechs in the Ukrainian situation – both in the war per se, as well as the Ukrainian refugees residing in Czechia. Indeed, it seems that people got tired of Ukraine. 

The question is, are Ukrainians tired of Czechia? Despite the financial aid and other substantial support, many Ukrainian refugees suffer from depression and other mental health issues – and, of course, it is extremely difficult to seek help in Ukrainian. Although Czechs do not perceive Ukrainians as overwhelmingly negative, the society’s view on their integration process is basically split in half: while 51% think Ukrainians are integrating well, 40% think they are failing to integrate. Moreover, more than 60% of Ukrainians have experienced some kind of aggression during their stay in Czechia. The positive behaviour of the state towards Ukrainians sparked complaints and protests from the Roma minority. They were offended by the fact that Czechia is willing to help Ukrainians, but not its own citizens. This is especially significant as the Roma people represent the largest ethnic minority in Czechia and have historically faced unequal treatment, leading to concerns about inconsistency in the state’s approach to different vulnerable groups. 

Future: Going home, rather than making a new one 

As always, facts and feelings are not the same thing. While Ukrainians contribute more to the state then they got on economic support, Czech perception of them has not changed substantially since the Russian invasion to Ukraine. In 2022, citizens’ initiatives were organized to buy diapers for Ukrainian mothers and, in 2025, Czechs are already tired of Ukraine. The mutual relationship is stable, but the language barrier and Czech scepticism towards immigrants does not enable it to be called a strictly positive one. 

What comes next? It is certainly possible for Ukrainians to stay in Czechia, especially if they manage to find a sustainable housing situation and a legal, qualifications appropriate job. However, more and more initiatives emerge to establish a long-term return mechanism for Ukrainian refugees back to their home country. It seems to be what many Ukrainians want (if of their own will or led by other factors of life in Czechia) and Ukraine needs them to come back to rebuild eventually. 

As for Czechia, it seems that the influx of Ukrainian refugees, whom they view more positively than other immigrants, has not had the desired impact. Surely, institutional reactions were adequate and NGOs continue working towards helping people coming from Ukraine. Alas, the Czech fear of migration is stronger than ever – maybe with the exception of the 2015 refugee crisis. It seems that this fear is deeply embedded in Czech society and just serves to create a deeper divide. 

With the recent political developments, this shows to be an EU-wide concern. While there was an extension of the TPD until March 2026, member states have already started questioning the costs and efforts going into continuous support of Ukraine, for instance when Hungary blocked the Ukraine Assistance Fund. This trend goes together with a rise of the far-right across Europe, which definitely worsens the attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees. The Czech Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD), a right-wing populist party whose members are in the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) political group in the European Parliament, is definitely not the only party rejecting the war, promoting isolationism, and painting a very negative picture of immigrants. The question remains: will the solidarity of the EU towards Ukraine hold firm despite the far-right wave, or will it falter? And will Czechia follow this European trend? Let us hope that we do not need another crisis or war to figure out the answer. 

This blog post is based on the outcomes of the course ‘EU Migration in Action’ that took place as part of EUCHALLENGES, a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence co-funded by the European Commission under grant agreement no. 101127539. 

 

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In a significant and politically charged development within the European banking sector, UniCredit, Italy’s second-largest financial institution, undertook a calculated and strategic acquisition of shares in Commerzbank, Germany’s second-largest publicly listed bank. The move, unfolding over the course of late 2024, marked a bold assertion of UniCredit’s long-standing vision for cross-border banking consolidation within the European Union—a vision consistently advocated by its Chief Executive Officer, Andrea Orcel. 

In early September 2024, UniCredit disclosed that it had acquired a 9% equity stake in Commerzbank, including a 4.5% tranche purchased directly from the German government. Berlin had retained a significant ownership interest in Commerzbank since its €18.2 billion capital injection during the 2008 global financial crisis, holding 16.49% prior to this divestment. The sale reduced the government’s stake to 12%, signalling a partial retreat from its post-crisis intervention. Just ten days later, UniCredit increased its effective ownership to 21% through complex derivative instruments and forward contracts, thereby establishing itself as Commerzbank’s largest shareholder. At the same time, the Italian lender was actively seeking regulatory clearance from the European Central Bank (ECB) to raise its stake to as much as 29.9%—a strategic ceiling designed to avoid triggering a mandatory full takeover under German securities law, which sets the threshold at 30%. 

This methodical stake-building operation was widely interpreted not as a passive financial investment, but as a deliberate precursor to a broader cross-border consolidation effort. The effort aligns with calls from European regulatory authorities for deeper financial integration to improve competitiveness, resilience, and systemic stability. Yet, the initiative quickly encountered strong political headwinds in Berlin. Former Chancellor Olaf Scholz publicly defined UniCredit’s advance as an “unfriendly attack”, framing it not merely as a business manoeuvre, but as a threat to national economic sovereignty. Bettina Orlopp, Commerzbank’s chief financial officer, claimed in an interview that a takeover would lead to Commerzbank losing customers and raised the prospect of German savers being exposed to the risk of an Italian debt crisis, given UniCredit’s large holdings of Italian bonds. German politicians from across the political spectrum have insisted that Commerzbank should remain independent and in German hands as a domestic competitor to Deutsche Bank, the country’s other large nationwide lender. Berlin has said that it no longer plans to sell any more of its shareholding, making a full takeover impossible. Besides, if Berlin were genuinely worried about the spillover risks to domestic savers from cross-border banks, it should back the creation of a pan-European bank deposit guarantee scheme. Instead, Berlin has consistently blocked this vital step to complete the banking union because it entails pooling financial risks. Although, Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel claimed for the urgent need for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). He defended Germany’s concerns over UniCredit’s growing stake in Commerzbank, citing deeper structural issues in Europe’s fragmented banking system; he underscored how banks’ exposure to domestic sovereign debt and reliance on national deposit guarantee schemes create a dangerous link between banking stability and government solvency. This bank-sovereign nexus, he warned, poses particular risks in countries like Italy, where public debt exceeds 135% of GDP—over twice Germany’s 64%. With over a third of UniCredit’s €108 billion bond holdings in Italian sovereign debt, fears of financial contagion are not unfounded. Nagel emphasized how EDIS could break this cycle but acknowledged continued resistance—especially from German institutions wary of underwriting risks tied to less fiscally disciplined member states. His call aligns with ECB President Christine Lagarde’s recent appeal to the European Parliament to revive stalled EDIS talks, which she said are “desperately missing.” 

While the German government and finance ministry expressed deep reservations about foreign control over a key financial institution, European Union institutions struck a markedly different tone. Veerle Nuyts, spokesperson for the European Commission, highlighted that mergers and acquisitions, when properly regulated, can enhance financial resilience by allowing banks to diversify asset bases, streamline operations, and invest more aggressively in digital innovation. She noted that although the Commission refrains from commenting on specific transactions such as UniCredit’s bid for Commerzbank, it generally supports the creation of larger, more integrated banking groups, provided that restrictions are justified by legitimate concerns such as financial stability or consumer protection—and that such restrictions comply with EU treaties. ECB President Christine Lagarde reinforced this supranational perspective by publicly affirming the importance of banking sector consolidation. She asserted that cross-border mergers are vital for fostering stronger and more competitive financial institutions capable of operating at scale across the Eurozone. According to Lagarde, consolidation can serve as a bulwark against external economic shocks and enhance the global competitiveness of European banks relative to their American and Chinese counterparts. However, the mandate of the ECB, and in particular of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), must ensure that all prudential requirements and legal criteria are duly met. 

Despite these institutional endorsements, the proposed UniCredit-Commerzbank consolidation continued to expose the entrenched fragmentation of Europe’s banking system. Germany’s staunch opposition—driven by apprehensions about domestic job losses, capital flight, and the dilution of national control over strategic economic infrastructure—illustrated how national political agendas frequently override broader European integrationist goals. This resistance exemplifies the tension between the EU’s stated ambition of fostering a unified financial market and the enduring reality of national protectionism. 

Nonetheless, important regulatory milestones were achieved in early 2025. In March, the European Central Bank granted approval for UniCredit to raise its stake in Commerzbank to 29.9%.Indeed, under Capital Requirements Directive, any increase of a qualifying holding in a credit institution must be notified to and approved by the competent supervisory authority. Since both UniCredit and Commerzbank are supervised by the ECB under the SSM, the ECB is the authority that must assess and approve the transaction. The following month, Germany’s Federal Cartel Office likewise authorized the increase, enabling UniCredit to significantly expand its influence without breaching the 30% threshold that would trigger a mandatory takeover offer under German law. These developments represented a major procedural victory for UniCredit, offering it both strategic leverage and formal legitimacy in its efforts. Despite these regulatory wins, the path to full acquisition remains highly contentious and politically fraught.  

The UniCredit-Commerzbank episode thus stands as a salient case study in the interplay between capital markets, regulatory governance, and political sovereignty within the European Union. It reveals how domestic political imperatives can—and often do—supersede collective economic logic, hindering the development of a genuinely integrated financial infrastructure across the continent. As long as member states perceive systemically important banks as instruments of national policy rather than market actors embedded in a shared European economic project, the aspiration of a cohesive and competitive EU banking sector will remain unrealized. The UniCredit-Commerzbank case powerfully illustrates how political considerations continue to dominate economic rationale in the context of cross-border mergers—suggesting that deeper integration in the European banking sector, though necessary, remains politically fraught and institutionally constrained. 

This article is based on discussions that took place during the workshops as part of EUCHALLENGES, a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence co-funded by the European Commission under grant agreement no. 101127539. 

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The political attachment many Europeans feel towards the EU has become increasingly fragile. In the 2024 European elections, just half of eligible voters cast their ballots, and the rise of Eurosceptic parties signals a growing erosion of trust. At the same time EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen sees in contrast to Putin and Trump, a “once-in-a-generation chance to build a stronger, more secure and more prosperous Europe”. Yet this depends not only on institutional reforms but on addressing a deeper cultural and political void: A European political identity. 

I suggest a critically realistic and interpretive perspective, informed by phenomenological insights: political identity cannot be prescribed, it must evolve through lived experience, shared meaning, and resonant practices. 

No Demos on the Horizon 

While numerous theories of political identity exist, the term itself often remains vague, inconsistently defined, and conceptually overloaded. Closely tied to this is the debate over a European demos, the idea of a common political people. Yet this concept, too, is based on diverging definitions and nation-state ideal types. 

For some, the demos is simply the sum of eligible voters within a democratic system, as argued by Jochen Roose. Others, such as Gerard Delanty or Fritz Scharpf, argue that it presupposes linguistic and cultural homogeneity. By this standard, Europe falls short: it lacks a shared language, common history, religion, educational system, and unified public sphere. 

In contrast deliberative thinkers, notably Jürgen Habermas, reject the idea of the demos as a pre-political condition. Instead, they argue, it can emerge from political practice and civic participation. Daniel Innerarity goes even further, envisioning the EU as capable of developing a post-demos model: a pluralistic stakeholder structure that embraces difference not as a barrier, but as a constitutive feature. 

But regardless of theoretical leanings, a firmly rooted, common European demos, understood as a politically capable and solidaristic community, “is not even in sight”, as Dieter Grimm already stated in 1995. Three decades on, that observation still holds. 

Output Alone is not Enough  

What follows from this? Joseph Weiler is cautiously optimistic: “Although there is no demos now, the possibility for the future is not precluded a priori”. Fritz Scharpf, by contrast, draws a more sobering conclusion from the “no-demos thesis”: without a demos, there can be no input legitimacy. The EU then can only rely on its problem-solving capacity, the so-called output legitimacy. Yet while this argument is logically consistent, it is functionally limited: it does not resolve the EU’s democratic deficit but rather renders it chronically persistent. 

The demos, however, is not just a normative ideal. It is essential for the acceptance of majority decisions in pluralistic societies. Democratic processes inevitably produce political losers. Without a sense of collective belonging, there is little willingness to accept decisions that contradict one’s own interests. This, however, is the very basis for solidarity-driven action: fiscal transfers and taxation, security cooperation or the joint management of crises all require a minimal degree of shared self-location.  

Yet between the absence of a fully integrated political people and complete fragmentation lies a political space in which a shared European identity could develop as a functional substitute below the demos ideal. Interestingly the EU has once recognised this, aiming in the first article of its treaties to create “an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe”, not a singular people. As following two empirical cases show, the EU has not just failed to fill this space – it is widening the very gaps it needs to bridge. 

“We” Against the “Others” 

Fault lines also appeared with the issue of migration policies. Poland and Hungary have consistently voted against EU migration reforms addressing binding relocation quotas as affronts to their national sovereignty. What initially appeared as a moral divide with the Commission and Western states blaming Eastern obstruction, has since become a generalised trend towards national retreats. In 2025, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Sweden, Belgium, and notably Germany, reintroduced internal border controls in response to migrant flows. Germany’s move, which drew criticism from Poland, illustrates how former proponents of EU migration solidarity now prioritise domestic legitimacy and border sovereignty – A erosion of mutual trust and symbolic cohesion within the Union. 

The return of the Russia question underpins this erosion further. After the end of the cold war, East–West divisions were already palpable but rhetorically glossed over under the banner of the European idea. A telling moment came with the Second Gulf War: while millions in Western Europe marched under the slogan “Not in my name”, expressing a postnational, pacifist ethos, while Eastern European governments, shaped by recent memories of Soviet domination, actively supported the U.S.-led intervention, seeking security through transatlantic alignment. The cultural and political rift was evident, yet the EU was able to project an image of harmonious “post- and supranational civility”, as Wolfgang Streeck notes. In fact, the slogan “Not in my name” itself illustrates the early problem: lots of “I” is not the same as a “we”, however many there are. Today, the rhetoric of unity no longer masks tensions – it enforces them. The EU increasingly defines itself as a bloc of democratic forces aligned against internal adversaries. Critics of integration from East or West, are increasingly blamed as allies of an external adversary, namely Russia. When EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen calls for a “coalition of the willing”, it demonstrates that unity no longer arises through internal democratic negotiation, but through predefined output goals – and through the exclusion of those who deviate from them. 

“Us for Ourselves” 

Both cases show that what the EU emerges is not the absence of a political identity, but the emergence of a fragile, exclusionary identity, reactive rather than reflexive. A sustainable European identity, however, requires not an “us against them”, but an “us for ourselves”. 

Normatively, we might ask: Can a politically enacted European identity below the demos threshold foster democratic acceptance – not by closing the input-legitimacy gap, but by making political loss, dissent, and redistribution more bearable? Theoretically, how can identity be understood not as a fixed attribute or cultural ideal, but as something enacted through practice and shaped by the structural conditions that make collective agency possible or impossible? Empirically, where does the EU constrain such conditions, and where might potential lie for more grounded, collectively enacted forms of identification to emerge? 

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Passengers boarding planes in Europe today enjoy the benefits of deregulated and integrated air transport network – thanks to the creation of the EU single market in air services in the 1990s. But the EU aviation policy did not stop at regional borders. Having been repeatedly dismissed in the past, the European Commission now conducts a fully-fledged EU External Aviation Policy (EAP), complete with formal strategies, institutions and legal frameworks.  

This shift is striking, because, to this day, international aviation remains a system dominated by sovereign nation states. The EU lacks formal legal status within the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the main forum for discussing global air transport, and cannot sit at the table as a full member. Yet somehow, it is widely perceived as a key player in this policy domain.  

How is this possible? 

This blog post reflects on the evolving role of the European Union as a sui generis actor in global aviation governance, drawing on my doctoral research presented at the 2025 UACES Graduate Forum in Athens. It explores how the EU has created and expanded the EAP, not through treaty reform or a one-time transfer of power , but by using a mixture of legal assertiveness, technical expertise, regulatory entrepreneurship, and narrative-building to firmly anchor itself within the international aviation system.  

Achieving a foothold 

Historically, international aviation has been dominated by state-to-state arrangements under the 1944 Chicago Convention. In this Chicago-bilateral system, sovereignty is paramount, and states are reluctant to allow changes.  

Following the U.S. deregulation, the European Community established a common internal aviation policy. However, when it comes to relations with non-EU countries, Member States have successfully blocked any transfer of power to the European level.  

This began to change in 2002, when the European Court of Justice ruled on European Court of Justice decision on the “Open Skies” Agreements cases. While the ruling did not grant the Commission exclusive competence, it did provide partial recognition over certain technical areas and deemed = nationality clauses in bilateral Air Service Agreements (ASAs) to be incompatible with EU law.  

Crucially, the Commission seized this narrow legal opening and used it as a springboard for broader international engagement.  

Complex and ongoing construction  

Although 2002 is often considered as the formal beginning of the EAP, the development of this policy does not tell a story of clear legal handover or the Commission’s sudden empowerment. Rather, it is a case of strategic manoeuvring and the effective bypassing of legal constraints – a decades-long process that is yet to conclude. 

Taking a closer look reveals that it unfolds through four interconnected areas of action.  

The first and most prominent pillar is aimed at expanding legal competencies in practice. Despite Member States retaining control and only granting the Commission a negotiating mandate on a case-by-case basis, with defined guidelines, the EU has steadily built a significant portfolio of successful ASAs. It has also developed accompanying legal instruments, such as Bilateral Agreements on Civil Aviation Safety (BASAs) and various Working Arrangements covering technical matters, while also expanding the thematic scope of these agreements to include issues such as environmental protection and social standards. 

Alongside these legal actions, the Commission has invested heavily in building technical expertise. They have drawn on experience from internal market deregulation, and have established thematic directorates and staffed technical teams. The EASA also played a role here acting as specialized agency that collects data on safety (and later, environmental protection) and as a body that certifies third-country operators and oversees compliance with EU standards.  

Regulatory activity has also become a tool for establishing global presence. The Commission leveraged their legislative initiative to introduce rules that extend beyond EU borders, either through the conditionality of access to the EU market, regulatory convergence, or the broader ‘Brussels effect’. This also provided an opportunity to engage further with third countries at an operational level through audits and assistance schemes. The Commission also seeks to actively support ICAO’s regulatory efforts, thus solidifying the EU presence in the network. 

Finally, we can observe EU efforts to gain external recognition through its relationships with incumbent sectoral organizations at a regional and global levels. The strategies employed vary depending on the context.  

Regionally, the EU has gradually eclipsed the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) as the regional forum for discussing aviation issues in Europe, and vehicle for coordinating the positions among European states ahead of global negotiations. It has also positioned itself as a central player in relation to EUROCONTROL, to the point where the organisation is sometimes mistaken for an EU agency – despite being a separate body with a broader European membership of 43 states.  

Meanwhile, at a global level, unable to achieve full membership in ICAO, the EU still built a daily (hybrid) presence through its own representative office in Montréal. They play an active role at the technical and preparatory levels, providing data and expertise; and engage in technical cooperation, conducting supervision, and supporting international projects.  

Political persistence  

What this story also reveals is a sustained political determination that has endured over time, particularly within the European Commission. Despite changes in leadership, the agenda has remained quite consistent. EU officials have shown remarkable persistence, and while political resistance and legal ambiguity still exist, the Commission has succeeded in establishing a role for the EU that far exceeds its formal powers. This makes the EAP a valuable case study in how the EU exercises agency under constraints and how it shapes international governance, even without a formal seat at the table. 

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by Manuela Moschella (Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna) and Lucia Quaglia (Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna)

The European Union (EU) stands at a critical juncture. Global competition, technological disruption, and geopolitical fragmentation challenge the economic framework that has defined the EU for over three decades. Two landmark reports — Much More Than a Market by Enrico Letta and The Future of European Competitiveness by Mario Draghi — outline a bold vision for Europe’s economic future. In our article “Much More Than a Report: The Search for Europe’s New Political Identity and the Politics of Competitiveness” in the Journal of Common Market Studies, we examine these reports and show that they signal a decisive shift from internal market efficiency to external competitiveness as the bloc’s strategic priority. These shifts imply a redefinition not only of the EU’s economic priorities, but also of its political identity.

A New Economic Playbook

A central theme uniting the two reports is the call for a more assertive and state-driven economic policy. The authors advocate a departure from the EU’s long-standing emphasis on non-interventionism and free-market orthodoxy. This includes supporting “European champions”, strengthening industrial policy, and ensuring economic security through investment and regulation.

Investment emerges as a key area for transformation. Letta proposes expanding and rebranding the Capital Markets Union as a “Savings and Investments Union” to unlock private capital for long-term growth. Draghi goes further, calling for joint EU borrowing and the creation of European financial instruments to fund strategic initiatives, particularly in defence, energy, and digital infrastructure. The message is clear: Europe must scale up its financial tools to cope with contemporary challenges and match its ambitions.

The Need for Institutional Reforms

Both reports also recognize the importance of institutional reforms. They criticize slow decision-making and regulatory fragmentation in the EU, arguing that streamlined governance is essential for swift and effective action. However, the challenge is not merely institutional: it is profoundly political. Implementing this new strategy requires broad-based legitimacy not only from EU institutions and national governments, but also from the public. Increased defence spending and targeted industrial subsidies may raise concerns about diverting resources from social welfare or education. Without transparent communication to the public and political ownership, these initiatives run the risk of being met with public resistance in the member states, which, ultimately, might be reluctant to go ahead.

At stake is not merely a set of economic policies but a redefinition of the EU’s identity. The push toward economic sovereignty, industrial protectionism, and strategic autonomy raises fundamental questions: Can the EU maintain its commitment to openness, legal predictability, and multilateralism while adopting more interventionist tools? How can it balance market freedom with national interests and supranational coordination?

Letta and Draghi do not deny these tensions. Strategic autonomy may require selective protectionism. Economic security may necessitate more public spending. But ultimately, these are not technocratic but political choices that require public debate and shared vision.

The Road Ahead

The EU has often moved forward in times of crisis — from the creation of the Euro to the NGEU funding package adopted in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The current situation calls for a similar resolve. However, technocratic reports alone are not enough. Political leadership, especially at the national level, will be essential to translate vision into action and to mobilize public support.

As the EU seeks to turn a corner in its economic development, the choice is not simply about adopting new tools. It is about affirming a coherent vision of what Europe stands for both economically and politically. Whether the Union can successfully recalibrate its economic model while maintaining cohesion and legitimacy will shape not only its competitiveness but the future of European integration itself.

Manuela Moschella is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS Europe. Her research focuses on European and global economic governance, central banking, and the politics of economic policymaking. She is one of the editors of the Review of International Political Economy.

 

 

Lucia Quaglia  is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna. She has published 9 books, 7 of which with Oxford University Press and has guest co-edited 7 special issues of academic journals. Together with Manuela Moschella and Aneta Spendzharova, she has published a textbook on European Political Economy (Oxford University Press, 2024).

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EUHealthGov were delighted to host Óscar Fernández (Maastricht) on 11 June 2025. Óscar discussed findings from his recent ENSURED report on the Intellectual Property and Public Health Regime Complex (co-authored with Mirko Heinzel), and a forthcoming report on Global Health Security after COVID-19, as well as his current work-in-progress. What follows is a summary of some of the key points from Óscar’s presentation – a recording is available here.

ENSURED is a Horizon Europe project on “Transforming and Defending Multilateralism: European Union Support for more Robust, Effective and Democratic Global Governance” coordinated by Maastricht University. This project is generating further reports on the Pandemic Agreement and on WHO reform.

Regime complexity – characterised by high institutional density – offers a distinctive perspective for examining global health. While there exists significant scholarship on the constitutive fora of regime complexes, there is considerably less on how different actors navigate these, and the EU’s role appears largely overlooked. Fernández is addressing this, inter alia, with a 2025 JCMS article, and current research question of the circumstances under which the EU has pursued an increase in regime complexity in global health.

Regime complexity in connection with global health is characterised by the trilateral cooperation between the WTO, WIPO, and WHO. The EU’s role in this has evolved from initial reluctance in the 1990s to today’s position of being a largely status quo player, highly favourable towards the WTO. This has prompted two key questions of whether the EU seeks an increase in regime complexity, and whether the EU ends up benefitting from increased regime complexity. Answers to these questions can frame the EU in various roles.

Fernández also discussed a forthcoming ENSURED report on the Pandemic Agreement, agreed in April 2025 and recently adopted by the World Health Assembly. This identifies key further challenges including its modest ambition, quick ratifications not being guaranteed, and the WHO’s financial crisis. A further consideration is that while the Pandemic Agreement might be seen as a diplomatic win for the EU (with caveats), it does not improve the EU’s image as a global actor.

A recording of the presentation is available here.

 

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Sesame project https://www.sesame.org.jo/

Marina Cino Pagliarello

Diplomacy is under pressure – from climate change and trade inequalities to military conflicts on multiple fronts. Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to test the continent’s democratic resolve. The crisis in the Middle East underscores the limits of formal diplomacy. Across regions, authoritarianism is on the rise, and even established democracies are witnessing growing constraints on academic freedom.

In this context, universities are stepping up not only as knowledge producers, but as institutional actors with growing diplomatic relevance. Yet as this role expands, so does the vocabulary surrounding it. Terms like science diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, and informal diplomacy are gaining traction, but are often used interchangeably or without clear distinctions. This piece aims to offer a more precise grammar for academic diplomacy by distinguishing between these overlapping but distinct paradigms. Greater clarity is not a semantic exercise: it is essential for enabling more effective policy, alliance-building, and strategic positioning across the higher education sector.

 

Science diplomacy: strategic reach, structural limits

Science diplomacy has long been a tool of statecraft, initially aimed at bolstering national prestige and influence through scientific collaboration to promote international understanding, prosperity, and evidence-based policymaking (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010). It has since evolved to address global challenges and support sustainable development, while reinforcing domestic research and innovation systems (The Royal Society, 2010; Ruffini & Krasnyak, 2023).

The European Union has developed a particularly ambitious model of science diplomacy. Through Horizon Europe, it aligns scientific cooperation with sustainability, equity, and foreign policy goals, while maintaining global competitiveness (Lopez de San Roman & Schunz, 2018). EU bodies such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Joint Research Centre (JRC), and the EU Satellite Centre play a key role in integrating science and foreign policy. Reflecting this, the European Commission has recently called for science diplomacy to become a core instrument in the EU’s diplomatic toolbox, identifying it as a key element in leveraging Europe’s power and partnerships for a global role. The EU also employs two central frameworks: ‘diplomacy for science,’ promoting global research collaboration, and ‘science for diplomacy,’ using science to advance EU foreign policy objectives. As a normative power, it emphasizes reciprocal access, ethical standards, and equitable partnerships (Lavenex, 2015).

Yet the traditional model of science diplomacy presents structural limitations. Its top-down, state-centric approach often fails to capture the relational and adaptive dynamics that define effective transnational collaboration. Universities, by contrast, operate through decentralised, network-based infrastructures that prioritise education, academic freedom, and long-term societal engagement. This divergence creates friction: while science diplomacy often responds to geopolitical goals, universities pursue missions that resist transactional alignment.

The SESAME project in the Middle East exemplifies these tensions. While celebrated as a scientific facility and peacebuilding initiative, some viewed its political framing as intrusive and misaligned with local realities (Rungius et al., 2022). Despite its technical success, SESAME revealed how science diplomacy can undermine trust and autonomy when co-opted by diplomatic agendas. Recognising these limits is essential if universities are to be fully recognised as autonomous diplomatic actors.

 

Knowledge diplomacy: strategic engagement through higher education

Knowledge diplomacy has emerged as a framework for understanding how higher education, research, and innovation contribute to international cooperation and the resolution of global challenges. Defined by Jane Knight as “the role of international higher education and research in building and strengthening relations between and among countries” (Knight, 2018, p. 8), it reflects a shift toward multilateralism and the growing role of non-state actors in diplomacy. Unlike science diplomacy, which often remains state-centred, knowledge diplomacy integrates academic institutions as core participants in global engagement, fostering networks of trust, cultural exchange, and shared problem-solving. This broader vision includes not only research but also teaching, training, and the formation of epistemic communities. Universities function as hubs of innovation and platforms for intercultural dialogue, extending their influence beyond knowledge production to norm-shaping. They increasingly serve as drivers of cognitive soft power, advancing values, worldviews, and institutional models across borders.

However, the promise of knowledge diplomacy is undercut by persistent limitations, with many initiatives relying on unidirectional flows of knowledge. This dynamic perpetuates intellectual hierarchies, may impose external agendas that overlook local expertise — especially in the Global South and conflict-affected areas like Ukraine — and contradicts the very principles of inclusivity and co-creation that knowledge diplomacy seeks to promote. As Anna Wojciuk’s (2018) concept of empires of knowledge highlights, powerful institutions in wealthy nations dominate the global knowledge system, marginalizing under-resourced universities and reinforcing systemic inequalities.

An additional ambiguity lies in the fine line between diplomacy and branding. In practice, efforts branded as knowledge diplomacy may serve reputational or competitive objectives rather than reciprocal engagement. This instrumentalisation risks emptying the concept of its collaborative ethos.

To be effective, knowledge diplomacy requires more than content delivery. It demands strategic vision, one that recognises the need for equitable partnerships, adaptive frameworks, and long-term capacity-building. Without this, the term risks remaining aspirational – conceptually rich, but operationally limited.

 

Informal diplomacy: relational mechanisms and the power of trust

Informal diplomacy refers to trust-based dialogue and cooperation led by non-state actors, a tradition rooted in Track II or multi-track diplomacy theory (Montville, 2006). Unlike state-driven approaches, it relies on adaptive, relational processes outside formal diplomatic frameworks. This mode of engagement is particularly well suited to addressing global challenges where flexibility, co-creation, and mutual learning are essential. Building on this tradition, universities are increasingly operating as infrastructures of informal diplomacy. Rather than serving as passive instruments of national policy, they act as autonomous actors: convening stakeholders, mediating cross-border cooperation, and fostering soft-power relationships.

Findings from HEIDI (Higher Education Informal Diplomacy) project illustrate this role. Based on a survey of 201 universities across 52 European alliances and complemented by around 30 interviews to senior university leaders, the data show that 96.49% integrate internationalisation into their institutional strategy, and 91.87% prioritise partnerships with non-EU actors. These partnerships are not confined to academia. Alliances reported active collaborations with 134 embassies, 116 NGOs, 75 UN agencies, and 66 humanitarian organisations (Cino Pagliarello, 2025). These are not coordinated by governments: rather, they reflect universities’ own diplomatic agency.

What sustains these collaborations is not regulation, but trust. Across interviews, trust consistently emerged as the key mechanism enabling continuity and speed, particularly when formal structures were absent or uncertain. This approach was especially visible in the immediate response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Within days, university alliances mobilised to support displaced students and staff. Some created dedicated platforms, others offered relocation assistance or language programmes. These actions were not symbolic. As one alliance representative observed: “These were soft power in action.”

But informality should not be mistaken for institutional weakness. On the contrary, it demands strategic clarity, long-term coordination, and autonomy from state control. Its strength lies in its adaptability — the ability to operate across governance gaps, respond to crisis, and build diplomatic ties grounded in shared purpose. For universities acting on the global stage, informal diplomacy is no longer peripheral: it is a core infrastructure of international engagement.

To clarify the conceptual distinctions outlined in this piece, the table below compares science diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, and informal diplomacy across key features: actors, objectives, modes of engagement, and limitations. While overlapping in purpose, each model reflects a different logic of international cooperation — from state-driven influence to relational trust-building — and highlights the need for a more precise grammar of academic diplomacy.

Table 1: Comparing the three diplomacy models

Feature Science diplomacy Knowledge diplomacy Informal diplomacy Main actor States, institutions Universities, research networks Universities, alliances, NGOs, etc. Objective National influence, research collaboration Knowledge exchange, academic partnerships Trust-building, adaptability, collaboration Approach Top-down, policy-driven Institutional, capacity-building Relational, flexible, transnational Limitations Lacks grassroots engagement Reinforces power imbalances Harder to institutionalise

Source: Author’s synthesis.

 

Conclusion: toward a clearer grammar of academic diplomacy

As universities step into roles once reserved for governments and multilateral bodies, the vocabulary surrounding their international engagement must evolve with precision. The proliferation of terms – science diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, informal diplomacy – reflects real transformations, but without conceptual clarity, the risk of semantic inflation is high.

A sharper grammar is not a matter of academic neatness, but of institutional effectiveness. When universities understand the affordances of each mode of diplomacy, they can calibrate strategies accordingly. But greater clarity also raises harder questions. Who legitimises academic diplomacy? What qualifies a university to act not just as a knowledge provider, but as a diplomatic actor in its own right?

Universities cannot be treated as mere facilitators of diplomacy. They are already acting as agents. The task now is to name that agency and equip it with a vocabulary that is both precise and politically consequential.

Marina Cino Pagliarello is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the Florence School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute (Italy), Visiting Fellow at the LSE European Institute, and honorary lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University College London (UK).

 

Literature

Chou, MH & Demiryol, T. (2024) Knowledge power or diplomacy? University alliances and the Belt and Road Initiative. High Educ, 87, 1693–1708.

Cino Pagliarello, M. (2025). Higher Education Informal Diplomacy (HEIDI) Survey, European University Institute. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/77751

Flink, T., & Schreiterer, U. (2010). Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs: Toward a typology of national approaches. Science and Public Policy, 37(9), 665–677.

Knight, J. (2022). Knowledge diplomacy in international relations and higher education. Springer.

Lavenex, S. (2014). The power of functionalist extension: How EU rules travel. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(6), 885–903.

López de San Román, A., & Schunz, S. (2018). Understanding European Union science diplomacy. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 56, 247–266.

Montville, J. V. (2006). Track two diplomacy: The work of healing history. Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations, 7, 15.

Rungius, C., Flink, T., & Riedel, S. (2022). SESAME – A synchrotron light source in the Middle East: An international research infrastructure in the making. Open Research Europe, 1, 51.

Ruffini, P. B., & Krasnyak, O. (2023). Science diplomacy from a nation-state’s perspective: A general framing and its application to Global South countries. Science and Public Policy, 50(4), 771–781.

Wojciuk, A. (2018). Empires of knowledge in international relations: Education and science as sources of power for the state. Abingdon: Routledge.

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by Nicolás Pose-Ferraro (Assistant Professor of International Studies at the Universidad de la República, Uruguay)

Since 2023, there have been renewed efforts to conclude the long-awaited European Union (EU)–Mercosur preferential trade agreement (PTA), including a 2024 successful renegotiation of the 2019 ‘agreement in principle’ between both parties. However, the agreement’s completion remains uncertain. What is driving these efforts? What threatens its conclusion?

In a recently published JCMS article, I explore the reasons for the latest push to conclude the agreement, as well as the reasons for the challenges it faces.

A geopolitical boost, but enough?

I show that a marked reduction in opposition from Mercosur’s expected distributional losers—namely, the manufacturing industry—combined with increased geopolitical incentives in the EU to conclude a deal, created conditions conducive to renegotiation. This, in turn, allowed the European Commission (EC) to address and reduce opposition from EU-based environmental civil society organizations (CSOs), ultimately paving the way for an understanding between the EC and Mercosur. However, the EU continues to face domestic political economy constraints, particularly due to the influence of distributional losers from the PTA—namely, agricultural producers—who retain the capacity to sway key actors within the EU’s decision-making process. This ongoing resistance continues to pose challenges to the agreement’s ratification. In this way, I highlight the current tension between a geopolitically-driven trade initiative of the EU and the EU’s domestic political economy constraints derived from the distributional effects of a PTA.

The article contributes to the literature on the EU–Mercosur negotiations in two main ways. First, it highlights the substantial reduction in Mercosur’s domestic political economy constraints to reaching an agreement. Second—and centrally—it highlights that the 2024 updated agreement ratification is still uncertain, despite the EU’s recent geopolitical push and the inclusion of stronger environmental commitments in the revised text.

At the theoretical level, the case study seeks to contribute to current debates on the increasing role of geopolitics in shaping trade agreements and flows as it adds the nuance that domestic political economy constraints may counteract geopolitically-driven initiatives.

The negotiation in three stages

My analysis is organized around three pre-specified stages: (1) the negotiation process that led to the ‘agreement in principle’ (2016 to mid-2019); (2) the paralysis within the EU (mid-2019 to 2022); and (3) the renegotiation that led to an updated agreement with an uncertain prospect (2023–2024).

During Stage 1, I found a marked reduction in the opposition of Mercosur’s distributional losers. This, coupled with the European Commission’s relative insulation from agricultural influence, low levels of politicization (in contrast to initiatives like CETA and TTIP), and high geopolitical incentives arising from the protectionist turn in U.S. trade policy under the Trump administration and the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, culminated in the 2019 agreement.

In contrast, during Stage 2, much of this changed. The agreement now had to be approved by the EU Council and ratified by the European Parliament (EP), thus opening new veto points through which opposing EU agricultural producers could exert influence. In addition, the Brazilian government’s management of the Amazon wildfires, which involved denying climate change and blaming ‘global elites’ in a narrative inspired by Trump’s position, led to greater environmental CSO opposition to the deal. The result was the formation of an opposing agrarian–environmental coalition, which secured the approval of symbolic motions against the deal in the EP and several national parliaments of EU members.

So, what changed during Stage 3? ‘Increasing geopolitical challenges,’ in the words of the EC and the High Representative of the Union, such as the consolidation of the US/EU–China systemic rivalry, rising concern about the strategic implications of economic interdependence that followed COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the longstanding crisis of the multilateral trading system, and the threat to transatlantic ties represented by an eventual return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency (confirmed in November 2024), combined to increase the geopolitical attractiveness of a deal with Mercosur.

However, as opposition within the EU remained high, the EC undertook a renegotiation with Mercosur. Its aim was to reinforce the deal’s environmental commitments, thereby appeasing opposing environmental CSOs. In exchange, the EC accepted several key demands from Mercosur. Specifically, it agreed to Brazil’s demand to exclude its health sector from the Public Procurement chapter—a point it had insisted on including in the 2019 agreement. The EC also accepted to extend the transition period for the removal of Mercosur’s tariffs on industrial goods like electric vehicles, agreeing to periods exceeding 15 years, a duration it had explicitly rejected in the past. Furthermore, it accepted the inclusion of a ‘rebalancing mechanism’ designed to compensate Mercosur countries should forthcoming European Green Deal legislation undermine their market-access gains from the PTA.

The described trade-off led to an updated agreement, which was announced in December 2024. However, ratification in the EU is far from guaranteed. While the inclusion of newer binding commitments linked to the Paris Agreement as a result of the renegotiation did appease environmental CSO opposition, agricultural producers continue to be mobilized against the deal and find in countries like France and Poland a voice to express their opposition at the EU Council. Whether these countries may be able to form a ‘blocking minority’ at the Council to prevent its approval is still an open question.

In any case, the analysis illustrates that the Mercosur agreement is in the middle of a clash between geopolitical incentives and domestic political economy constraints.

Dr. Nicolás Pose-Ferraro is Assistant Professor of International Studies at the Universidad de la República (Uruguay) and member of Uruguay’s National Researchers System. His research focuses on the political economy of trade negotiations and the processes of trade policy preference formation within business associations in Mercosur countries.

 

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In 1997, a little-known Russian political thinker, Aleksandr Dugin, published The Foundations of Geopolitics. Inside, he laid out a blunt and chilling plan.

Russia, he argued, would not rise again through tanks and bombs alone. It would use propaganda, political subversion, disinformation and destabilisation, especially across the West. One of Dugin’s most striking claims was that Russia should work to cut the United Kingdom off from the European Union.

He described Britain as “an extraterritorial floating base of the U.S.” – a piece of Europe that, in his view, needed to be severed from the EU’s institutional core. Many analysts now argue that after Vladimir Putin came to power, the Kremlin began acting on elements of Dugin’s vision.

Putin has never formally endorsed Dugin, and the two are not personally close. Even so, the pattern is difficult to ignore. Some observers caution against overstating Dugin’s influence. But the parallels between his 1997 blueprint and the Kremlin’s later actions are striking.

From the annexation of Crimea to hybrid operations across Europe, Russia’s moves have often echoed the geopolitical logic laid out in Dugin’s book: expanding Moscow’s influence, disrupting Western alliances, and weakening the EU from within.

Nearly two decades later, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union appeared, to many, to be a domestic rebellion: against elites, globalisation, or Brussels bureaucracy, depending on whom you asked. Yet beneath the headlines, growing evidence points to something more deliberate and far-reaching: signs of a Russian effort to divide and destabilise Europe by exploiting internal political fractures.

This article does not seek to blame Leave voters, who took part in the 2016 referendum in good faith. Instead, it asks deeper questions about the context that shaped the Brexit landscape: the long-running Russian strategy, the Kremlin’s evolving hybrid tactics, and the hidden networks of influence, and money that reached into British political life.

We will explore how Dugin’s ideas appear to have influenced Putin’s worldview, how Russia’s hybrid operations targeted both Britain and the wider European project, and why Brexit should be seen not just as a national rupture, but as part of a broader international strategy.

This is a story few have heard – about how a major turning point in British history may have been shaped by a geopolitical doctrine conceived in Russia in 1997.

Russia’s covert war on Europe

Aleksandr Dugin’s The Foundations of Geopolitics (1997) was not just an academic exercise. It became one of the most influential works shaping Russian geopolitical thinking in the post-Soviet era.

In it, Dugin argued that Russia’s revival as a great power would not come through military conquest alone. Instead, it would require systematically weakening the cohesion of its Western rivals, particularly the European Union and NATO. He called for Russia to disrupt Western alliances, encourage separatist movements, spread anti-Americanism and form tactical partnerships with countries hostile to the US-led international order.

One striking recommendation was to separate Britain from the European Union. Dugin saw the UK as a key bridge between the United States and the European continent, a link that, if broken, could seriously weaken both.

His prescriptions were not limited to diplomacy or trade. They included the use of psychological operations, disinformation, political influence and subversive campaigns to sow division and encourage fragmentation.

While Dugin remained a theorist, Vladimir Putin became the figure who later brought many of these ideas into practice. Rising through the ranks of the post-Soviet security services, Putin came to power in 2000, determined to restore Russia’s national pride and global standing. While Dugin himself remained outside official structures, his ideas found an audience among military strategists, foreign policy thinkers, and nationalist advisers close to Putin.

For Putin, the collapse of the Soviet Union was, as he famously put it:

“the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”

Under his leadership, the Kremlin invested heavily in state-controlled media outlets like RT (formerly Russia Today), online troll farms such as the Internet Research Agency, covert financing of populist movements and cyber capabilities designed to hack, leak and disrupt Western democracies.

While global attention often focused on Russia’s military interventions in Chechnya, Georgia and later Ukraine, much of its most damaging influence work occurred in the shadows. These efforts encouraged political division, amplified extremist voices and systematically undermined Western institutions from within.

Experts argue that this approach closely mirrors the blueprint laid out in Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics.

Chace A. Nelson, writing for The Strategy Bridge, stated:

“A single book, written in 1997, signalled every significant foreign policy move of the Russian Federation over the following two decades.

“From the annexation of Crimea to Britain’s exit from the European Union, the grand strategy laid out in Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics has unfolded beautifully in a disastrous manner for the western rules-based international order.”

Stanford University’s Europe Center has described the book as “one of the most influential works in post-Soviet Russia,” noting its significant impact on Russian military, police and foreign policy elites. The Atlantic Council warned in a 2017 report that Russia was conducting “an intensifying campaign of hybrid attacks across our allied territories, interfering directly in our democracies, sabotaging industry and committing violence.”

Bengt Jangfeldt, summarising Dugin’s strategy, noted that it includes:

“Sowing geopolitical chaos in the United States’ internal politics… and encouraging separatism, conflict, extremism, and racial division.”

Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Endowment observed that:

“the nationalist-imperialist worldview that the Putin regime is imposing on Russians is intended to feed on the past and exploit historical memories and concepts to reshape and manage the mass consciousness of the Russian people.”

Observers such as former Labour Minister for Europe Dr Denis MacShane warned in 2017 that Putin resented dealing with the EU as a bloc, and saw Brexit as a strategic opportunity to fracture Europe, not just diplomatically, but geopolitically.

As MacShane wrote at the time:

“The Russian president told Bloomberg in September 2016 that Brexit would lead to a smaller EU. Putin has always resented having to deal with the EU and insisted that only bilateral relations mattered for Russia.”

Crucially, Putin’s strategy has never been only about projecting power abroad. It is also about reshaping the geopolitical environment so that Russia can advance its interests without direct confrontation. At the centre of this effort lies a calculated push to unravel the transatlantic alliance, weaken the European Union and, critically, drive deeper wedges between Britain and its European neighbours.

And nowhere was this destabilising strategy more consequential than in the United Kingdom.

Russia’s fingerprints on Brexit

The 2016 Brexit referendum was one of the most consequential political moments in modern British history. It also became a high-profile target for Russian interference.

By mid-2016, Moscow had already tested its hybrid tactics across Europe and the United States. The US intelligence community’s January 2017 assessment concluded that Russia had interfered in the 2016 US presidential election, using cyber operations, propaganda and influence campaigns to undermine confidence in Western democratic processes.

In May 2015, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, publicly warned that Russia was employing a wide range of “hybrid tactics” to undermine Western democracies. These tactics, often referred to as hybrid warfare, include the coordinated use of military, political, economic, and information strategies to destabilise target countries.

The Brexit referendum became a prime opportunity for Moscow to apply its hybrid strategy by encouraging the UK’s separation from the European Union — a move that would weaken the Western alliance and disrupt European cohesion. One of the most visible forms of interference came online.

A 2017 investigation by the University of Edinburgh identified over 400 Twitter accounts operated by the St Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA), Russia’s so-called “troll farm,” which had actively posted about Brexit in the months leading up to the June 2016 referendum.

According to the BBC’s October 2018 report, more than 10 million tweets posted by suspected state-backed Russian and Iranian “troll farms” were shared online by Twitter in an attempt to influence public opinion. Early analysis by the BBC’s data journalism team indicated that the word “Brexit” was mentioned in 3,789 tweets linked to the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), nearly all of which were published on the day of the vote or afterwards.

In 2017, Facebook admitted for the first time that some Russia-linked accounts may have used its platform to try to interfere in the EU referendum vote in June 2016.

But Russian activity extended beyond social media.

In 2019 the UK Parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Committee concluded that Russian state media outlets such as RT and Sputnik had “spread disinformation and promoted discord” during the referendum. The committee found that this coverage disproportionately supported Leave campaigns and undermined trust in EU institutions.

Questions were also raised by the UK Parliament, the Electoral Commission, journalists and intelligence experts about possible links between prominent Brexit campaign figures and Russian interests.

Arron Banks, the co-founder of Leave.EU, was reported by The Guardian in November 2018 to have held multiple meetings with Russian diplomats before the referendum. These meetings prompted concerns about potential financial offers or influence. No evidence of crimes was found and no charges were brought.

Banks has consistently denied any improper dealings or Russian backing. In 2022 he partly won a libel case against journalist Carole Cadwalladr, with the High Court finding that her claims caused serious harm. However, the court also upheld the public interest defence for much of her reporting.

Further concerns emerged around Boris Johnson’s connections to Russian-born media mogul Evgeny Lebedev, son of former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev. In 2023 Channel 4’s Dispatches documentary Boris, the Lord & the Russian Spy reported that British intelligence had warned Johnson against elevating Lebedev to the House of Lords. Johnson proceeded regardless, overruling those concerns.

The documentary also noted that Italian intelligence had monitored Johnson’s unguarded visit to the Lebedev villa in Umbria in April 2018.

At a private diplomatic gathering after the referendum, then Russian ambassador Alexander Yakovenko is reported to have said:

“We have crushed the British to the ground. They are on their knees, and they will not rise for a very long time.”

This quote was cited by journalist Luke Harding in his book Shadow State and independently reported by others.

Senior Conservative figures also raised concerns. Dominic Grieve, former Attorney General and Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, repeatedly warned of the government’s reluctance to investigate Russian influence. Patience Wheatcroft, a Conservative peer, argued that transparency over foreign interference was essential to protect democracy.

Perhaps most troubling is the UK government’s response, or lack of one. In its 2020 Russia Report, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament stated that “the government had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes,” effectively acknowledging that no meaningful investigation had been carried out.

By contrast, the United States launched multiple high-profile inquiries into Russian interference, including the Mueller Report of March 2019.

The UK’s Russia Report concluded that the UK had “actively avoided looking for evidence.” As the committee warned:

“Protecting the UK’s democratic discourse and processes from hostile foreign interference is a central responsibility of Government, and one which it is failing to fulfil.”

At the press conference launching the Russia Report in July 2020, ISC Chair Julian Lewis emphasised the need for stronger inter-agency coordination and urged Government-wide action to safeguard UK democratic systems from foreign interference.

In 2025, new Parliamentary debates revived these concerns. MPs cited evidence that the group known as Conservative Friends of Russia had played a role in cultivating Kremlin access and influence within British politics. Despite multiple warnings, ministers continued to resist calls for a full inquiry.

As former Europe Minister Dr Denis MacShane wrote back in 2017:

“If more evidence surfaces that the narrow Brexit result was influenced by an unfriendly foreign power, it will be harder to argue that a stolen poll should be the final word on Britain’s relationship with its friendly neighbours.”

The implications are serious. If foreign actors exploited vulnerabilities in Britain’s political and media systems to influence the outcome of a constitutional referendum, it raises urgent questions about the integrity of British democracy. That concern applies not only to the events of 2016, but to all future elections and referendums.

Without proper investigation or accountability, the UK remains at risk from similar campaigns in the years to come.

 The Russia Report cover-up

In July 2020, after months of political delay, the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) finally released its much-anticipated Russia Report. The document raised serious concerns about Moscow’s interference in British political life, and, perhaps more significantly, the British government’s failure to respond.

The report concluded that no government department or agency had taken responsibility for investigating Russian interference in the Brexit referendum, or in UK democratic processes more broadly.

The ISC said it was “astonished” that ministers had not even asked the intelligence agencies whether Russia had interfered in the 2016 vote. According to the committee, this amounted to a deliberate political decision. As the report put it:

“The government had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes. We were told they had not seen any evidence, but it was not clear whether they had actively looked for it.”

Public anger intensified when the government delayed publication of the report until after the December 2019 general election. This delay fuelled widespread suspicion that damaging political information was being suppressed.

Green Party MP Caroline Lucas condemned the delay as “utterly reprehensible,” adding that the public deserves clarity on what the government knew and when, and called for full transparency to safeguard democratic integrity.

The decision to release a heavily redacted version of the report drew further criticism. Key sections were withheld from public view, prompting concern that damaging political connections were being concealed.

Despite intelligence warnings following the 2018 Salisbury poisoning, there is no public evidence that Theresa May’s government launched any serious investigation into Russian interference in Brexit.

Subsequent Conservative governments under Boris Johnson and Rishi Sunak, and the Labour government under Keir Starmer, have also declined to initiate a formal inquiry into the 2016 referendum’s vulnerability to foreign influence.

Adding to public concern is the network of political links between Russian-connected individuals and senior figures in British politics. The Russia Report raised questions about the Conservative Party’s ties to wealthy Russian donors. Many of those donors had gained UK citizenship or residency through the now-abandoned “golden visa” scheme.

One notable example was the Conservative Friends of Russia, a lobbying group later rebranded as the Westminster Russia Forum. It was established in 2012 to promote UK–Russia ties. Although the group was presented as a networking platform, critics argued that it served as a convenient backchannel for Kremlin influence, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

In 2025, Parliamentary debates revived these concerns. MPs cited evidence that the Conservative Friends of Russia had provided access and influence to Russian officials, including former ambassador Alexander Yakovenko.

The Russia Report warned that the UK had become a “top Western intelligence target” for Moscow, not only because of Britain’s global diplomatic influence but also due to its “very favourable business environment”, a diplomatic way of describing London’s reputation as a hub for dirty money, influence-buying and financial secrecy.

Despite the known risks, the ISC found no evidence that the government had taken systematic steps to defend British democracy. The refusal to investigate Russian interference in the Brexit vote is not just a matter of historical record. It raises serious questions about the present and future integrity of UK elections.

Without proper accountability, the country remains exposed to further attempts at influence and disruption, a threat that has grown since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and amid rising geopolitical tensions in 2025.

Chatham House analysts echoed the concern in a 2021 report, warning that:

“Failing to investigate foreign interference leaves the UK dangerously exposed to continuing hybrid attacks, including disinformation, cyber operations, and political influence.”

 The legal battle to expose Russian interference in Brexit

With the UK government’s refusal to investigate Russian interference in the Brexit referendum, despite warnings from the Intelligence and Security Committee, a critical legal question has emerged:

Does a government have a duty to safeguard the democratic process when credible foreign interference is alleged?

This question now sits at the heart of a landmark case before the European Court of Human Rights.

A cross-party group of British MPs, peers and campaigners, including Caroline Lucas (Green Party), Ben Bradshaw (Labour), Alyn Smith (SNP) and Molly Scott Cato (Green Party), brought the legal challenge in 2021. They argued that the government’s failure to investigate potential Russian interference in the Brexit vote violates citizens’ rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, specifically the right to free and fair elections and democratic participation.

Explaining their decision, Caroline Lucas told The Guardian in March 2022:

“As President Putin wages a war of terror on the Ukrainian people, he’s been waging another war on the very principles of democracy.”

“The Russia report is clear that there is credible evidence of Russian interference in UK electoral process – and yet our government has consistently refused to investigate these serious conclusions.”

Ben Bradshaw echoed this concern, stating:

“When a hostile foreign power interferes in our democratic processes and the government does nothing to investigate, that is a betrayal of the public trust and a breach of its legal obligations.”

Lord Ricketts, who was national security adviser from 2010 to 2012 and is supporting the legal action, commented:

“Given the importance of knowing the extent of past Russian interference in assessing the risk for future elections, I do not understand why the government would choose not to investigate.”

The seriousness of the issue was underlined in December 2023, when a junior Conservative minister, Leo Docherty, Minister for Europe, acknowledged in the House of Commons:

“The Russian Federal Security Services, the FSB, is behind a sustained effort to interfere in our democratic processes.”

Caroline Lucas, speaking again in Parliament in April 2024, added:

“There has still been no serious investigation into Russian interference in the Brexit vote. What is the Government afraid of?”

Despite these warnings and the legal action, successive UK governments — under Boris Johnson, Rishi Sunak and now Keir Starmer — have declined to launch a full investigation into the 2016 referendum or broader concerns about foreign interference in British democracy.

This legal battle has implications not only for Britain, but for Europe as a whole. Governments across the continent are wrestling with how to defend against hybrid threats and preserve the integrity of democratic elections.

From Russian interference in French and German elections to Kremlin-linked disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe, the challenge is escalating. In Romania, TikTok was reportedly used to spread pro-Russian narratives during electoral campaigns. Investigations are ongoing, and Romanian authorities have raised concerns with EU partners.

Critics argue that without effective mechanisms for accountability or redress, democratic systems remain wide open to future interference — whether from Russia, China, or other actors intent on exploiting political vulnerabilities.

At the same time, the ECHR case faces political resistance.

Brexit itself was partly driven by opposition to European institutions. In recent years, UK governments have signalled their intention to reduce reliance on rulings from the European Court of Human Rights — or even to leave the ECHR altogether. Nonetheless, the legal challenge highlights that this is not merely a political debate. It is a question of fundamental rights.

As the case progresses, it will test the limits of democratic safeguards in the age of hybrid warfare.

 Beyond Brexit: Why all Europe is now worried

While Brexit was a significant milestone in Russia’s strategy to destabilise the West, it is increasingly clear that Moscow’s ambitions extend well beyond cyberattacks and disinformation.

Across the continent, European nations are preparing for the possibility of direct military conflict with Russia.

In the United Kingdom, Defence Secretary John Healey warned in June 2025 that Russia is “attacking the UK daily” through cyber operations. He stressed the need for Britain to be “battle-ready” and announced plans to invest £6 billion over five years in munitions production and to procure up to 7,000 long-range weapons.

The UK government also released a new strategic defence review. It described the most significant overhaul since the Cold War. The review included plans to acquire up to 12 nuclear-powered submarines and to establish a new cyber command focused on Russian-linked threats.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer reinforced the urgency of the situation. Speaking in June 2025, he said:

“The threat from Russia is real, and it is growing. We must stand united with our European allies to ensure the defence of democracy and peace across the continent.”

Germany has also accelerated military preparedness. In May 2025, General Carsten Breuer, the country’s top military official, warned that NATO must be ready for conflict with Russia by 2029. He cited intelligence that Moscow is stockpiling weapons far beyond those used in Ukraine.

Poland, acutely aware of its location and its history, has responded by transforming itself into what many now call a military powerhouse. This response has been driven by growing fears about Putin’s long-term intentions. Under successive governments, and particularly under centrist and pro-European Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Poland has rapidly expanded military training, defence procurement and civil readiness.

By late 2024, analysts described Poland as having the strongest military in Europe. Its capabilities were said to surpass those of Germany, France and the United Kingdom. This transformation has been credited to record defence budgets, modernised weapon systems and a society-wide focus on deterrence.

Following national elections in June 2025, the new Polish President Karol Nawrocki, a right-wing Eurosceptic, declared:

“Russia remains the biggest threat to Poland and to peace in Europe.”

The Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have all increased defence budgets and expanded civil preparedness measures, fearful of an attack by Russia. Each country remains acutely aware of its border proximity to Russia and its own history under Soviet occupation.

Finland and Sweden, also fearful of Russian aggression, have both joined NATO, abandoning long-standing neutrality in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its broader threats.

French President Emmanuel Macron issued a similar warning in April 2024. He said:

“Europe must be prepared to defend itself. No one can pretend Russia’s ambitions will stop at Ukraine.”

Despite Moscow’s repeated denials of aggressive intent, European governments remain deeply sceptical. They recall how President Putin repeatedly claimed there were no plans to invade Ukraine, right up until Russian forces crossed the border in February 2022.

Analysts continue to debate Putin’s ultimate goal. Some argue he seeks to expand Russia’s borders and restore an imperial sphere of influence. Others believe his aim is to destabilise Europe enough to preserve his own regime and maintain geopolitical leverage.

As The Conversation noted in March 2024:

“Putin has no successor, no living rivals, and no retirement plan, and his eventual death will likely set off a vicious power struggle inside Russia.”

Whatever his long-term intentions, European leaders are no longer treating the threat as hypothetical. The UK’s experience with Brexit is now viewed as part of a broader Kremlin strategy to divide and weaken Europe. Defending democracy, national sovereignty and territorial security across the continent will require a united, coordinated and long-term approach. The stakes are no longer only political. They are existential.

This isn’t just about Brexit. It’s about Europe’s survival. This investigation does not aim to blame Leave voters. Many made their decision in good faith, motivated by sincere beliefs about sovereignty, identity and the future of Britain. But it does seek to uncover a more difficult truth.

The Brexit vote was not simply a domestic decision. It was influenced by a broader international strategy, shaped by decades of Russian planning, manipulation and interference.

Aleksandr Dugin’s The Foundations of Geopolitics, published in 1997, laid out a long-term vision. It called for the separation of Britain from Europe, the fracturing of the transatlantic alliance, and the weakening of institutions that held Western democracies together.

In the years that followed, Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin adopted and adapted many of these strategic ideas. It deployed a sophisticated arsenal of hybrid tactics: cyberattacks, disinformation, covert funding and political influence. Brexit was a significant success in that campaign. Not because it aligned ideologically with Russian goals, but because it disrupted European unity and destabilised one of NATO’s key members.

The implications go well beyond 2016. If the UK can hold a constitutional referendum without properly investigating potential foreign interference, what does that say about the resilience of its democratic systems? If external actors can amplify political divisions, spread falsehoods and build quiet relationships with influential figures, what defences are truly in place?

This challenge is not unique to Britain. Across Europe, the Kremlin has worked to destabilise democracies, embolden extremist movements and undermine international alliances. From the annexation of Crimea to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, from targeted assassinations to acts of sabotage, Russia’s ambitions have only grown more aggressive.

In 2006, former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko was murdered in London using radioactive polonium-210. The UK High Court later ruled that this was an act of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism.

In 2018, former double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned in Salisbury, and British citizen Dawn Sturgess died, after exposure to a military-grade nerve agent that was capable of killing thousands. This prompted the coordinated expulsion of Russian diplomats by Western allies.

In 2019, Georgian exile Zelimkhan Khangoshvili was shot dead in a Berlin park by an assassin linked to Russian security services.

In 2020, prominent Russian opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, was poisoned by the Novichok nerve agent while on a domestic flight over Siberia. He survived after being treated by doctors in Germany, but then went on to die, allegedly killed, in a Russian prison in 2024.

In 2021, Germany accused the Russian security services of mounting a “wholly unacceptable” cyberattack on members of the Bundestag.

In 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, despite President Putin claiming just hours before the attack that Russia had no intention of occupying Ukraine or using force.

In 2023, the UK government disclosed a Russian campaign to hack MPs, journalists and think tanks. Ministers confirmed the FSB was behind a “sustained effort to interfere in our democratic processes.”

In 2024, EU authorities warned that Kremlin-backed disinformation campaigns were targeting the European Parliament elections, promoting far-right parties and undermining public trust in EU democracy.

In 2025, Russia-linked hackers posing as journalists targeted staff at Britain’s Ministry of Defence.

These were not isolated incidents. They were part of a systematic strategy: to intimidate, to destabilise and to project Russian power across Europe.

As Russia expert Mark Galeotti wrote in We Need to Talk About Putin (2019),

“For Putin, violence is not a last resort but a tool of statecraft, a signal to the world that Russia cannot be ignored, and a warning to any who would challenge his rule.”

Human Rights Watch, in its 2021 global report, noted that:

“Russia’s government systematically uses violence, coercion and fear not only to silence domestic critics, but to project its authoritarian reach across borders.”

In May 2025, the UK government announced the construction of six new weapons factories. This marked an acknowledgement that the Russian threat is no longer merely informational or political. It is military, material and potentially existential.

By June 2025, the warnings had escalated. Fiona Hill, a former White House adviser and one of the world’s foremost experts on Russia, told The Guardian that “Russia is at war with the UK”, adding:

“We are already in a war situation, a hot war.”

Dr Hill also warned that the United States “is no longer a reliable ally”, and urged Europe to act with unity and urgency.

In June 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned in London that Russia was arming faster than the entire NATO alliance and could be ready to launch an attack within five years.

“Russia produces in three months what the whole of NATO does in a year … Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years. We are all on the eastern flank now.”

The NATO Secretary General added that without a major increase in defence spending, British people “better learn to speak Russian”.

That warning was echoed just days later in the UK government’s own security strategy. In June 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer confirmed that Britain must now prepare for the possibility of an attack on UK soil, citing Russia’s military build-up and Iran’s use of overseas operatives as direct threats to national security.

The report, as covered by The Guardian, described the UK as facing a future in which domestic war could no longer be ruled out. It comes amid growing evidence of Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics – from cyberattacks to political interference – already undermining democracies from within.

This is not a distant or hypothetical threat. The Kremlin’s interference in British democracy was part of a broader pattern. It was a warning that too many ignored.

Military readiness is important, but it is not enough. Defending democracy also requires political will, legal accountability and a firm commitment to protecting the information space. That includes public inquiries, strong electoral safeguards, stricter regulation of political finance, and a more informed and resilient public.

Above all, it requires recognition of what is truly at stake. Brexit was not just a domestic decision. It was a product of an international hybrid campaign designed to weaken the West from within. Until that is understood and confronted, the UK and Europe will remain exposed.

Brexit may have been decided in Russia in 1997 – but the defence of democracy must be decided now.

• Watch: Putin and Brexit – The interference they tried to bury

• Join the discussion about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky

• My other articles about Russian interference:
• March 2025 – Europe united against Putin and Trump
• February 2025 – How Brexit played into Putin’s hands
• February 2024 – The Russian Connection – update
• February 2023 – A vote for Brexit was a vote for Putin
• March 2022 – Putin’s fingerprints are all over Brexit
• February 2022 -Back to the USSR?
• November 2017 – European Union or a new Soviet Union?
• December 2013: Latvia From Soviet Union to European Union

Some further reading

This section lists some of the sources referenced or relevant to the investigation of Russian interference in British democracy and the Brexit referendum. 

1. Geopolitical Doctrine and Dugin’s Influence

• Aleksandr Dugin – The Foundations of Geopolitics (1997)

This 1997 book lays out a strategic vision for Russia to reassert itself by destabilising the West, not through military force but via ideological, economic, and informational subversion. Dugin called for the severance of the UK from Europe, described Britain as a U.S. outpost, and advocated for disrupting NATO and the EU. Though never officially endorsed by Putin, the book has reportedly been used in Russian military academies and closely reflects many elements of Kremlin hybrid warfare.

No official English translation exists, but two credible English-language sources provide detailed summaries:

Putin’s Playbook by Chace A Nelson

Stanford Europe Center – Dugin’s Foundations

2. Russian Hybrid Warfare Strategy

• Atlantic Council – Strategy of ‘Constrainment’

This 2017 report sets out how the West should respond to Russian hybrid threats. It outlines how Russia uses economic coercion, disinformation, political influence, and cyber operations to destabilise adversaries. It argues for a coordinated Western strategy to contain and deter Kremlin aggression without triggering di

3. Political and Financial Influence in the UK

• Catherine Belton – Putin’s People

Belton’s book investigates how Putin and former KGB operatives used state power and illicit finance to consolidate control in Russia and extend influence abroad. It documents Kremlin efforts to build financial networks in the UK and co-opt elites. The book strengthens the case that Russia’s use of money and kompromat is strategic and imperialist in aim.

Publisher’s page (HarperCollins)
The Guardian review

• The Guardian – The Westminster Whistleblower (2025)

This article recounts how a whistleblower named Sergei sought to expose a Kremlin-linked effort to influence British political decisions. It highlights both personal testimony and the wider context of UK-Russia connections. The piece underscores the risks taken by insiders trying to reveal covert foreign influence.

5. Parliamentary and Government Reports

• ISC Russia Report (2020)

The UK Intelligence and Security Committee’s report found that the British government had not properly investigated Russian interference in the Brexit referendum. It accused ministers of failing to ask intelligence a gencies to assess Kremlin influence, and concluded that the UK was a ‘top target’ for Russian political disruption. The report’s delayed release and heavy redactions prompted allegations of political suppression.

UK Parliament PDF download
Gov.uk summary page

6. Legal and Electoral Challenges

• European Court of Human Rights Case – Interference in Brexit Referendum

Filed in 2021 by British parliamentarians and campaigners, this ECHR case argues that the UK government violated citizens’ rights by failing to investigate credible evidence of foreign interference in the 2016 referendum. Applicants claim this undermined democratic integrity, breaching Articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

7. Investigative Documentaries and Original Material

• PBS Amanpour – Interview with Carole Cadwalladr

In this televised interview, journalist Carole Cadwalladr describes Russian disinformation as a form of ‘military assault’ on the West. She discusses the vulnerabilities of democratic institutions to manipulation and the lack of accountability in the UK after Brexit. Her statements support the framing of hybrid warfare as an ongoing, systemic threat.

 

The post Was Brexit decided in Russia in 1997? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Vanessa Aichstill

On 7 May 2025, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court delivered its highly anticipated ruling in Joined Cases E-1/24 TC and E-7/24 AA, offering crucial guidance on the interpretation of European Economic Area (EEA) rules on access to beneficial ownership information. The questions arose: how should this provision, originally part of the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (Directive 2015/849, AMLD IV) and now incorporated into the EEA Agreement, be interpreted under EEA law, especially considering that the CJEU had declared it invalid for breaching fundamental rights and considering that the AMLD V revision process remained stalled?

The EFTA Court, which has no jurisdiction to declare EEA provisions invalid, was now tasked with providing advisory opinions in two cases:

• In Case E-7/24 AA, the request was denied on the ground that the applicant was not typically involved in anti-money laundering efforts and thus lacked a legitimate interest.
• In Case E-1/24 TC, access was refused because the applicant named only the alleged beneficial owners, without identifying the specific legal entities concerned.

This judgment marks a significant development in the evolving relationship between fundamental rights and transparency in EEA law and raises important questions about judicial dialogue, legal coherence, and the limits of the competence of the EFTA Court.

Setting the Scene: C-37/20 and C-601/20 Luxembourg Business Registers

The AMLV IV adopted in 2015, marked a significant step in the EU’s effort to enhance financial transparency and combat the misuse of corporate structures. A key feature was the introduction of public access to registers of beneficial ownership allowing anyone to identify the natural persons ultimately owning or controlling legal entities. The aim was to strengthen the fight against money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crime by increasing corporate transparency and accountability across the internal market.

The cases centred on the interpretation of Article 30(5)(c) of AMLD IV, which allowed access to beneficial ownership information for any person or organisation demonstrating a “legitimate interest”. In its judgment in C-37/20 and C-601/20 Luxembourg Business Registers, the CJEU held that this amendment infringed upon the fundamental rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data, enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), and therefore declared it invalid. Consequently, this provision was amended by the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (Directive 2018/843, AMLD V), which significantly broadened access by granting any member of the general public the right to obtain such information.

Right of Access to Beneficial Ownership Information Legitimate interest

The first questions answered by the EFTA court concerned the notion of “legitimate interest,” which is not legally defined in this context. While it generally refers to a lawful or justified interest, its meaning in the AML framework must be interpreted in light of the directive’s transparency objective. The substantiation of a legitimate interest is both a necessary and sufficient condition for accessing information in the beneficial ownership register. EEA States may further specify this concept in national law and even introduce legal presumptions, in line with the principle of national procedural autonomy. They may also adopt or maintain stricter rules, including broader access rights for other purposes, provided these comply with EEA law, the GDPR, and fundamental rights. Accordingly, the Court held that persons whose sole link to money laundering or predicate offences is the harm suffered to their financial interests may have a legitimate interest under Article 30(5)(c) AMLD IV but are subject to a case-by-case assessment.

While such access may interfere with fundamental rights, that interference can be justified if it is appropriate, necessary, and proportionate. Proper application of national rules implementing Article 30(5)(c) AMLD IV, particularly regarding the notion of legitimate interest and evidentiary standards, helps safeguard this balance. Accordingly, the Court found that access to beneficial ownership information constitutes a proportionate interference with fundamental rights, provided the applicant can demonstrate a legitimate interest.

Identification of specific legal entities

While AMLD IV sets out the requirement to demonstrate a legitimate interest as the sole substantive condition, EEA States retain procedural discretion under the principle of national procedural autonomy (see recital 42 of the AMLD V), subject to compliance with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. However, such procedural rules must not make access to information excessively difficult. Importantly, a legitimate interest may exist even where the applicant cannot name the legal entity, especially in cases involving investigative journalism or concealed ownership structures. Requiring such identification as an absolute condition could undermine the directive’s purpose and fundamental rights. Therefore, once a legitimate interest is demonstrated, access cannot be denied solely due to the applicant’s inability to identify the relevant entity.

Finally, the Court confirms again that the AML framework does not, as such, prevent EEA States from granting broader access for other legitimate purposes, provided that data protection rules are respected. Importantly, it emphasises that access to beneficial ownership information is not merely a matter of balancing privacy rights against public interest in combating financial crime, but must also be viewed through the lens of the right to information as part of the freedom of expression (see Tandberg).

Protection of Fundamental Rights

The Liechtenstein Government argued that the request was inadmissible, as AMLD IV had not yet entered into force in the EEA at the time. The Court recalled that under Article 98 EEA Agreement, incorporation and repeal of acts require a Joint Committee decision, and that Article 102 EEA Agreement obliges the Committee to safeguard legal certainty and homogeneity. Citing the second recital and Article 1(1) EEA Agreement, the Court emphasized the special relationship between the EU and EFTA States and the goal of extending the internal market across the EEA. It also noted that a gap between the two EEA pillars has existed since 1992 and has widened over time. This gap refers to the growing backlog in incorporating EU legal acts into the EEA Agreement, which delays their application in the EEA EFTA States and challenges the principle of homogeneity that underpins the internal market.

One of the major developments in EU law is the adoption of the CFR, which, along with its case law, is also relevant for interpreting EEA law. While the EEA Agreement does not contain an explicit fundamental rights provision, its first recital affirms shared commitments to peace, democracy, and human rights. The EFTA Court has consistently held that fundamental rights form part of the general principles of EEA law and must guide its interpretation. National courts are therefore obliged to interpret and apply EEA law in a manner consistent with fundamental rights. In doing so, the Court draws on common constitutional traditions and international human rights instruments, particularly the ECHR, to which all EEA States are parties. The ECHR and ECtHR case law are key reference points, and pursuant to Article 52(3) CFR, rights under the Charter have the same scope as their ECHR counterparts, though EU law may offer higher protection. Articles 7 and 8 CFR, which protect private life and personal data, mirror and reinforce the safeguards found in Article 8(1) ECHR. As such, there are no compelling grounds under EEA law to consider that the level of fundamental rights protection diverges from that under EU law. The Court invokes fundamental rights to justify interpreting the provision as it stood before the contested amendment, effectively setting aside its legal effects within the EEA context.

Conclusion

The judgment marks a significant development for the EEA legal order. While the issue of divergent validity between EU and EEA provisions previously arose in cases such as Schrems (C-362/14) and Test-Achats (C-236/09), timely action by the EEA Joint Committee ensured that invalidated EU provisions were removed or amended within the EEA framework. This is the first time the EFTA Court has directly addressed such a mismatch, setting an important precedent, especially in the fundamental rights context.

Critically, the judgment also reflects the pragmatic nature of the relationship between the EU and EEA legal orders, shaped by the structural backlog in incorporating EU law into the EEA Agreement. As the Court acknowledged (para 51), the temporal and legal gaps between the two pillars have continued to widen. Against that backdrop, the ruling demonstrates a flexible, case-by-case approach to safeguarding the homogeneity of the EEA while recognising the practical constraints of legal alignment in real time.

 

This article is based on discussions that took place during the workshop organised at the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies on 15-16 May 2025 as part of EUCHALLENGES, a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence co-funded by the European Commission under grant agreement no. 101127539.

—

Vanessa Aichstill is a PhD Candidate/Research and Teaching Assistant at the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg.

The post Between Two Pillars: Validity Gaps and Legal Reality in the EEA appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The team of the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies (SCEUS) will bring you fresh commentaries and analyses on current challenges to European integration. We are an interdisciplinary group focusing on the economic, legal, and political developments of the European Union and currently a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence.

It is through the Centre of Excellence that we came to the idea of launching a new blog series on Ideas of Europe. While the current project focuses on economic governance, migration, and the rule of law as core challenges to European integration, our team is interested in a wider range of issues, such as foreign policy, climate, cohesion, and digital policies. Combined with our expertise in EU and domestic institutions, we aim to offer you a fresh perspective on ongoing debates related to EU policy-making, democracy, and integration.

Our aim is to use this blog as an inclusive platform to express views and commentaries from a wide range of members, from our European Union Studies students to guests, and participants of our many events.

We hope that you will be interested in our work and look forward to discussing many challenging topics with you!

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It was exactly 50 years ago, on 6 June 1975, that the UK learnt the result of its first-ever national referendum, on whether to remain in the European Community.

The result was emphatic. Over 67 percent voted to stay, a 35 percent margin in favour of remaining, a decisive outcome. All four nations of the UK voted to remain. Britain spoke with one voice, and that voice was for Europe.

Now compare that with the second referendum, held on 23 June 2016.

Out of just over 33 million valid votes, only 17.4 million were for Leave. That amounted to a margin of just 4 percent, well within the margin of error for a decision of such historic weight.

And unlike in 1975, the UK did not speak with one voice. Only England and Wales voted to leave. Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain, as did Gibraltar.

So, while the 1975 referendum was decisive and united the country, the 2016 referendum was divisive  and split it, by nation, generation, education, and worldview.

Brexit supporters often claim the issue is settled. But democracy is never a one time event. Polls now show a clear and consistent majority believe Brexit was a mistake and would vote to rejoin the EU if given the chance.

Britain was never truly united behind Brexit.

Millions directly affected were denied a vote, and half the nations of the UK rejected leaving the EU. And yet, we are told the decision cannot be revisited.

What other major national decision is treated as untouchable, no matter how much has changed? Even in our personal lives, we revisit past decisions. We change course when circumstances change.

Democracy did not stop in 1975. It did not stop in 2016. Nor should it now.

One day, the people must have the chance to review Brexit, in a new, free and fair vote.

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Three weeks before the EU referendum, Sir John Major issued a stark warning to the British people.

On 5 June 2016, the former Conservative Prime Minister appeared on the BBC’s Andrew Marr Show and accused the Leave campaign of being “fundamentally dishonest” and “verging on the squalid.”

He warned that the public was being fed “a whole galaxy of inaccurate and frankly untrue information.” He was angry. Rightly so.

John Major called out the key flaw at the heart of the Brexit campaign: it was all promise, no plan.

“What they have NOT done is to tell us what would be the position if we were to vote to leave.”

That line rings louder with each passing year.

He dismissed claims that Brexit would boost jobs and trade as pure fantasy. “We would lose a huge amount in terms of national income through trade,” he said – because UK businesses would sell less to the EU’s Single Market.

He foresaw the damage. He foresaw the deceit. And he made it clear who would suffer most:

“the everyday man and woman in the street.”

John Major wasn’t alone. Many of those who understood how the EU works tried to sound the alarm. But the truth was drowned out by slogans and misinformation – and by Brexiters who refused to say what would happen if they won.

And now? Everything he warned of has happened – and worse. There’s been no trade boom, only red tape. No £350 million a week for the NHS, just staff shortages and collapsing services. And far from taking back control, the UK is isolated, its influence diminished.

• Watch the video. Hear his words. And ask: what if we’d listened?

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• Transcript of full John Major interview

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Following the EU-UK summit last month, I’ve finally got my ducks in a row on trying to track the substance of what follows.

You’ll recall that apart from the Security & Defence Partnership, there was not a single definitive legal instrument. Instead, there was lots of language about ‘working towards’ things or ‘exploring possibilities’: all very nice, but not really enough in an era of questions about the depth of international commitments.

Hence the tracker. As I’ve noted in my Bluesky thread on this, I’m only tracking those elements that seem to produce a formal agreement between the parties: potentially the list could grow, but let’s wait and see.

Rob Francis has written that Commission mandates for SPS, ETS linkage and Youth Experience aren’t coming until the autumn of this year, so formal negotiations seem unlikely until the back end of 2025. Given that each of these could throw up a bunch of issues (such as how much the UK is prepared to accept EU rules, and how much this is going to cost in contributions), reaching an agreement on any of these by the time of next spring’s summit looks hopeful.

Hence the tracker covers the entire lifetime of this Parliament.

Of course, if polls continue to be as unclear as now, the shadow of a non-Labour government is liable to cast a shadow on any negotiations from about 2027 onwards (given the time it’ll take to conclude, ratify and implement any individual deals), so this is the best opportunity for both sides to nail things down and minimise the chance of new administrations making bold choices.

As for the rest of the list, I’ve seen nothing to indicate timelines. Even if most of it is highly technical, it’ll still need work and political attention, something that’s been in short supply so far.

So the big question is whether long-term incentives will outweigh short-term distraction.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic141

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