Agrégateur de flux

"Ce gouvernement mettra tout en œuvre pour que vous puissiez être protégés", a assuré le chef du gouvernement, Bernard Cazeneuve.

Saurez-vous retrouver quelles personnalités politiques sont à l'origine de ces petites phrases ?

Le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) a exhorté jeudi les bailleurs de fonds à mobiliser les ressources nécessaires pour maintenir l'assistance vitale apportée à 150.000 personnes extrêmement vulnérables déplacées par les violences en République centrafricaine (RCA).

More than half a million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since July 2016, a huge number, on a scale not seen for a decade. United Nations agencies and human rights organisations have blamed fear of harassment and oppression by the Pakistani authorities, or in the case of undocumented refugees, fear of expulsion for the mass returns. Pakistani hostility towards Afghan refugees had already been growing, but has strengthened markedly as friendship between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s old enemy, India, blossomed this year. The Afghan government, reports AAN’s Jelena Bjelica, has also been encouraging Afghans to come home (with reporting from Jalalabad by AAN’s Fazal Muzhary and input from Thomas Ruttig).

The returnee crisis: facts and consequences

By mid-December, more than half a million Afghans had crossed from Pakistan into Afghanistan – all officially called ‘returnees’ even if they were born in Pakistan. According to the UN’s humanitarian coordination agency, UNOCHA, 370,102 were ‘registered’ , ie registered as refugees with the Pakistani authorities and UNHCR, and 244,309 were ‘undocumented’. The majority (96 per cent of the undocumented and 75 per cent of the registered) had been living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province.

Most – more than 90 per cent ­– of those 614,411 people moved to Afghanistan after July 2016. Between July and early November 2016, UNOCHA reported, it was not uncommon to see as many as 4,000 people – sometimes more – pass through the border crossings at Torkham and Spin Boldak in a single day. Many returned at short notice, after receiving 48-hour and/or a week’s notice to leave the country. Many had been living in Pakistan since the Soviet invasion when millions of Afghan refugees fled the country. The younger ‘returnees’ include those who have never lived in Afghanistan. Some are even the children of those who have never lived in Afghanistan. Many of the returning Afghans now find themselves in a desperate situation in their homeland, with neither jobs or proper housing.

Returns since 2001

Pakistan has been a generous, albeit sometimes reluctant host to Afghan refugees for almost four decades. Since 2001, more than 3.9 million Afghan refugees have returned home from Pakistan. There was a huge push to bring the refugees home by UNHCR, international donors and the Afghan government after the fall of the Taleban ­– it was seen as proof that the new regime was popular and in the first years after the Taleban regime was overthrown, conditions also seemed amenable. That left, according to UNHCR estimates, about 2.6 million Afghans still residing in Pakistan (1.5 million registered and one million unregistered). (1)

In 2007, after the Pakistan authorities started providing Afghans with individualised computerised identity cards called Proof of Registration (PoR), the number of voluntary returns decreased. Although the cards were granted for a limited period (the first POR cards expired in December 2009), they did enable holders to open bank accounts, purchase mobile phone SIM cards and get driving licenses. This improved the lives of many Afghans in Pakistan. Following the second extension of PoR cards from December 2009 to June 2013, in combination with the ‘wait and see’ approach taken by refugees, themselves, during the security transition phase (ie the withdrawal of foreign troops in the period 2010 to 2014) and with insecurity growing in Afghanistan, the number of returns decreased even further (see table below).

Credit: AAN

Caption: Decrease in number of returns after the introduction of PoR cards in 2007.

*Source IOM, UNHCR and OCHA figures. The table shows combined annual figure for assisted returns of registered Afghan refugees and undocumented Afghan returnees, except for the period 2008 to 2011 for which only assisted returns are presented based on the available data.

**From 1 January to mid-December 2016

All that changed at the end of 2014 when, on 16 December 2014, the Pakistani Taleban, Tehrik-e Taleban Pakistan attacked the Army Public School in Peshawar. They killed 145 people, including 132 children. Although the attack was carried out by a Pakistani armed organisation, the authorities said its masterminds were operating from safe havens on the Afghan side of the border (in Nuristan or Kunar) and that Afghan citizens had been among the attackers (see media reporting here and here). The Afghan government rejected these statements. (2) As a result, they became more hostile towards Afghan refugees.

The hostility was manifested in many ways, resulting in both soft and hard pressure. The most obvious soft pressure was changing the PoR cards extensions policy. Since December 2015, the cards have been extended for periods of six months only (to June 2016 and then to December 2016), and then, more recently for just three months (until March 2017). (3) Even these short-term extensions were the result of international pressure on the Pakistani authorities.

At the same time, the Pakistan government’s approach to Afghan refugees has become more violent. Some 52,000 Afghans living in Peshawar returned to Afghanistan in the first three months of that year, following a series of house raids and eviction notices (see AAN reporting) and IOM’s annual report for the number of returns of undocumented Afghans in 2015; these were four times higher than in 2014).

Abuses in 2015 by the Pakistani police were well documented, including in a Human Rights Watch report in which Afghans “described repeated threats, frequent detentions, regular demands for bribes, and occasional violence by Pakistani police in the months since the Peshawar school attack.” Human Rights Watch continued: “The abuse has prompted many Afghans to return to an uncertain fate in Afghanistan; others remained in Pakistan but live in fear. Many of those we interviewed had PoR cards, but this provided little protection against police harassment and abuse.”

Police harassments, threats and extortion in Pakistan continued into 2016 (see this HRW press release from early July 2016). The result was more people crossing the border. UN agencies estimate that while in 2015, on average, 366 individuals returned per day, by August 2016 this number had risen to 476 per day. One cause was an intensification of Islamabad’s harsh policy towards Afghans living in Pakistan, prompted by wider political dynamics. It seems also that Pakistan is targeting Afghan refugees because of anger over Afghanistan’s growing ties with India.

A joint ‘Afghanistan-India front’ against Pakistan?

During President Hamed Karzai’s rule, relations between India and Afghanistan were cordial. When his successor, Ashraf Ghani, took power in 2014, he initially reached out to Pakistan with the hope that its government – especially following the Peshawar massacre – would assist in brokering an end to the Taleban insurgency. Diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to bring the Afghan Taleban to the negotiating table and drop their refusal to directly talk with the Afghan government was built up by the United States and China through the mechanism of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG). But the initiative failed in the turmoil around the leaked demise of Taleban founder Mullah Muhammad Omar and the Taleban’s withdrawal from the July 2015 Murree talks (AAN analysis of this initiative here and here).

In Kabul, this was interpreted as the continuation of Islamabad’s ‘non-constructive’ approach toward Afghanistan and the Taleban. Ghani turned increasingly to India, in order to push his development agenda. Ties have particularly been active since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi first visited Kabul on 25 December 2015 and inaugurated the new parliament building and handed over four Mi-25 attack helicopters to the Afghan air force. Then, on 25 May 2016, Modi invited Ghani to join him for a ceremony in Tehran in which he pledged 500 million USD to help develop Chabahar port in Iran, some 75 kilometres to the west of Pakistan’s Chinese-built port of Gwadar, at the end of the new ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’. Ghani was a witness to this deal which also involves the development of road and rail infrastructure from Chabahar through Iran to Afghanistan. For Afghan traders, and the government in Kabul, if all goes well, the route through Iran will not only shorten ways to the important markets at the Persian-Arabian Gulf, but also significantly lessen land-locked Afghanistan’s decades-long dependence on transit routes through Pakistan. In particular, reliance on the port of Karachi should be diminished. It currently enjoys a near monopolistic position as Afghanistan’s ‘door on the world’. The Afghan hope is that this would also significantly – but by no means fully – diminish Pakistan’s ability to use the bilateral border regime as a means to pressurise Afghanistan.

India’s largess on the aid front has also been noticeable. On 3 June 2016, Ghani and Modi inaugurated the Salma Dam, a hydro-power station in Herat province. Although it had been commissioned during the Karzai period, it was touted by some Afghans as a symbol of growing bilateral ties. Then, on 15 September 2016, Modi pledged one billion US dollars in development aid to Afghanistan at a meeting with Ghani held in New Delhi. Both countries boycotted the summit meeting of the regional organisation SAARC in November 2016, which was held in Pakistan (4) and, ahead of a meeting in Amritsar for the Heart of Asia initiative on 3 December 2016, Modi and Ghani announced a plan to create a joint air corridor to enhance bilateral trade following Pakistan’s reluctance to allow transit rights through its territory. Ahead of the meeting, there were calls in India, as one analyst from the influential daily, The Hindu, put it to “corner Pakistan” as a “state sponsor of terrorism” and blacklist Pakistan-based terrorist groups held responsible for attacks in India. In Amritsar, itself, despite some moderate language from Afghanistan and Pakistan on terrorism (5), President Ghani snubbed Islamabad’s offer of 500 million US dollars of financial assistance, telling Islamabad’s top advisor on foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz, that Pakistan had better use it to contain extremism at home. In India, there were some triumphal responses to the Amritsar meeting. (6)

For Pakistan, however, unhappiness at the flourishing India-Afghanistan friendship has translated into open hostility towards Afghan refugees and the sharp rise in returns seen in the second half of the year. Returning Afghan refugees traced the upsurge in enmity to the inauguration of the Salma Dam; after that, they said Pakistani police started to insult them, calling them “sons of Hindus” and “nieces of Narendra Modi” (more on this below). The Taleban, who are supported by Pakistan, but also have a constituency among Afghan refugees, also issued two statements on 21 and 29 July 2016 underlining that the Pakistani authorities should not treat the Afghan refugees in a political way and that ordinary Afghan refugees should not become victims of politics. (see here).

Zakhilwal’s campaign

At about the same time, the Afghan government launched, for the first time in recent history, a campaign to encourage its citizens to abandon their refugee life in Pakistan. On 17 July 2016, the Afghan Ministry of Tribal Affairs and its diplomatic mission in Peshawar jointly launched a social media campaign called Khpel Watan, Gul Watan (‘One’s own homeland, a dear (literally flower) homeland’) aimed at encouraging Afghans to return ‘home’. The video message was posted ahead of a tripartite meeting between Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR officials held in Bhurban in Pakistan on 19 July 2016.

The launch of the campaign happened to coincide with a six-month extension of the Proof of Registration cards (until the end of 2016). Despite the extension and possibly because of the campaign, there was a record high of returnees in early August 2016 – 8,500 returnees in 72 hours, according to the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation.

The Afghan government’s spin of the situation was certainly daring. Ghani’s Special Envoy and Ambassador to Pakistan, Omar Zakhelwal, in an interview with Pajhwok, published on 6 August 2016, said that the “newly launched project ‘Khpal Watan Gul Watan’ aimed at encouraging refugees to repatriate had [given] positive results,” and that, “earlier the Afghani [sic] migrants in Pakistan did not feel for the country, but now they had realised that they should live in dignity in their own country.” He added that “as many as 30 million people live in Afghanistan and that the return of two or three million more people would not have such a bad impact on the current situation in the country.” He said Afghanistan has realised its weaknesses which were “economy, transit route and refugees” and that Islamabad had been able to use them as “pressure buttons.” Kabul was working hard in these areas, he said, and would gradually rid itself of dependency on Pakistan. “We have strengthened economic relations with Central Asian states, and signed the Chabahar pact to find access to sea.” In the long term, for example, the influx of largely Pashtun returnees could have an impact on population and voter figures (the refugees abroad, who were able to vote in the first electoral cycle 2004/05, have been unable to do so in the most recent one). There is also speculation that individual politicians might be building a constituency.

Responding to the pressure: the human side of the story

After living for 35 years in the Shabqadar area of Peshawar, Najibullah left, in June 2016 within 20 hours of the police telling him to go. His family members had refugee cards which could have eventually been extended till the end of the year, but they decided to return to Afghanistan and have now settled in Kabul:

I had worked at a printing press in the village of Shabqadar. One day, the police had made a public announcement that Afghan refugees should leave and go to Torkham the following day by 8 o’clock in the morning. The police said that if the Afghans fail to leave for Torkham within the deadline, they would destroy their houses with bulldozers and force them to leave. I got a call from home… I asked around… people told me that it was the truth […] Our Pakistani neighbours wanted us to stay. Some elders from the area and I went to the police and asked the police to give us a more reasonable deadline. The police said they would respect the elders and give us a few more days, but we could not stay beyond the new deadline. After that day, I decided to go to the UNHCR office to register our family for the return to Afghanistan.

A bit apologetically, Najibullah also explained that the lack of resources and property in Afghanistan had been the main reason for his family’s long stay in Pakistan. Najibullah’s family received 350 USD per person and travel expenses to Afghanistan from UNHCR. Recalling his journey back to Afghanistan, Najibullah said the Afghan border forces had behaved well and welcomed his family at Torkham. He also said the Afghan government had promised to distribute plots to landless returnees, but that “no steps have so far been taken in this regard.” The biggest problem for Najibullah is rent. “The rents went up and it is not easy for us to find reasonable houses that we can afford,” he told AAN.

‘Sons of Hindus’

The overall atmosphere in Peshawar in summer 2016 had also fortified Najibullah’s resolve to return to Afghanistan. In his words, the ordinary people of Pakistan have changed and the usual cordial and friendly relationship has been replaced by hatred. “This was the result of the Pakistani government propaganda that Afghanistan is a great supporter of India, and the story that the fighting in Torkham [on 13 June 2016] (7) was not with the Afghan soldiers, but with the Indian soldiers who instigated the fighting against Pakistanis,” Najibullah explained to AAN.

In the past, if the police would see an Afghan they would call him refugee, but they would not call an Afghan refugee ‘the son of a Hindu.’ […] They [now] say Afghans are the servants of the Indian government. The Pakistan government has brainwashed the public and now the public sees Afghan refugees as their worst enemy […] The ordinary people in Pakistan label Afghans as Hindus and friends of Hindus. They say the Afghans have joined hands with the Indians against Pakistan.

Najibullah also pointed out that Afghanistan’s closeness to India was often used as an excuse for extortion and harassment by the Pakistani police. “When people would show the refugee card to the police, they would say there was nothing written on the card and force the men to pay money to them.”

Another man, Gul Khan, who is in his late twenties and also recently returned to Afghanistan was more specific about when the insults started. He told AAN that after the inauguration of the Salma Dam in Herat on 3 June 2016, “the Pakistani police started addressing us as ‘sons of Hindus’,” and added that “even the ordinary Pakistanis would call Afghans ‘nieces of Narendra Modi’.” Gul Khan had lived in Pakistan as an undocumented migrant. He left for Afghanistan after the Pakistani police announced that undocumented refugees had to leave within four days or they would be arrested and deported to Afghanistan. He also reported that, on the way from Peshawar to Torkham, the Pakistani army asked him for bribe:

I paid 6000 rupees (50 USD) at four checkpoints on the road and an additional 1500 rupees (12 USD) to the border police at the Torkham Gate. If I did not give them the money, they would check all my belongings.

Shaista Gul in his forties, who returned to Afghanistan on 1 September 2016 because, he said, of Pakistani police and soldiers’ night raids on Afghan refugees’ houses, also reported that an exacerbation of insults directed at Afghan refugees had made him leave:

One day I was on the bus. The police stopped the bus and asked the driver if there was any Hindu on the bus. The bus driver said there was none, but the policeman took an Afghan man from the bus and said: “This is the Hindu I was looking for!” […] The locals also turned against Afghans after the fighting between Afghan border police and the Pakistani border police at Torkham [on 13 June 2016]. Everywhere in Peshawar, the ordinary people would taunt Afghans for friendship with India.

A plea and many concerns

For many refugees the issue is simple – they want more time to bring their affairs in Pakistan to an end before having to leave. On 31 August 2016, 120 elders from refugee communities in Pakistan came to Kabul for a first-of-its-kind jirga organised by the Afghan government. They pleaded with the president and with the chief executive to intervene at the highest levels of the Pakistani government. They wanted them to mitigate the current push factors which are forcing refugees out and to allow them more time to wrap up their affairs and prepare for return in safety and dignity. An UN official who was at the meeting told AAN that Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah had been willing to talk with the Pakistan government to slow down the pace of return, but the tense relations between him and Ghani at this time did not allow for the “constructive approach” needed to address this issue.

President Ghani, meanwhile, pledged to the tribal elders that he would “ensure that returning Afghans could obtain land and housing, invest in small businesses, send children to school, have access to basic services and settle in any part of the country.” He also presented an exclusive housing project which he said was to be developed in some districts of Nangrahar and Kabul province. The print-out of the housing project, seen by AAN, showed 3D-generated images of a fancy neighbourhood of two-storey buildings, even featuring some modern cars parked on the imagined streets. The project is authored by the governmental Capital Region Independent Development Authority (CRIDA), but on the agency’s website, the betterment of the lives of returnees is not mentioned among its expected outcomes. The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation website also offers no clues as to what the government is planning on this issue.

This initiative, if it goes ahead, would most probably be implemented under the Afghan government’s land distribution scheme for returnees and IDPs adopted in 2005 by Presidential Decree 104. However, the distribution of land to returnees has one of the poorest of records of any governmental programme. The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) and other anti-corruption agencies have found that the land distribution programme has been exceptionally corrupt and ineffective. (For in-depth analysis of land distribution scheme for landless returnees and IDPs, see AAN analysis here). There is no sign yet that this has changed.

Another issue for looking after the returnees is insufficient funding. UN agencies’ Flash Appeal in September 2016, a call for additional funding and a warning of the growing humanitarian crisis, resulted in pledges worth 82 million US dollars against the target of 152 million US dollars. The main issue now, however, is absorption capacity and the willingness of the Afghan government to address the needs of this particularly vulnerable population. According to UN officials working on this issue, the government understands the gravity of the situation, but they question its sincerity to act. “They caught on that this is serious and it is massive,” a senior UN official told AAN, “but it could end up in lip service”.

For now, there is a bit of a breathing space. The number of returns of documented refugees diminished in mid-December. From 11 to 17 December, UNHCR reported that no registered refugees from Pakistan had returned, as a ‘winter pause’ in its repatriation programme, through which registered refugees are returning, came into full effect. In the same period, IOM reported just 2,032 undocumented Afghans had returned or were deported from Pakistan, a relatively low number.

Despite the pledges of aid, many of those who have already returned are simply having to fend for themselves. With winter upon them, many of the poorest face a lack of housing, a lack of jobs and a lack of help.

Edited by Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig

 

 

(1) Between 1979 and 1992, over six million Afghan refugees entered Pakistan and Iran, fleeing the violence of the Soviet invasion and the ensuing civil war, UNHCR data shows. After Soviet forces withdrew from the country in 1989, two million Afghans returned to their homeland. However, beginning in the mid- 1990s, factional violence and later the Taliban’s capture of major areas of the country and widespread drought renewed the exodus. Although the US-led intervention in late 2001 initially caused further displacement, many refugees returned to Afghanistan, in part because of a massive campaign to get them home after the fall of the Taleban and increasingly difficult conditions refugees faced in Pakistan and Iran. See Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Report (SIGAR): “Afghan Refugees and Returnees: Corruption and Lack of Afghan Ministerial Capacity Have Prevented Implementation of a Long-term Refugee Strategy”, August 2015, available here.

(2) The participation of Afghan citizen, however, seems to be not fully confirmed. The information, attributed to Pakistan security sources, was only reported by a few Pakistani outlets, not including the country’s main English-language media (see here).

The alleged mastermind of the Peshawar school attack was confirmed killed by US authorities in a US airstrike on Afghan territory in July 2016. Earlier, there were also arrests of suspects in Afghanistan by the local authorities, after tip-offs by Pakistan (media report here).

(3) At the beginning, the Pakistani government issued Afghan refugees with PoR cards for a period of two years or longer. The first PoR cards issued in 2007 were valid until December 2009. The second extension was until June 2013, the third until December 2015. The PoR cards issuance policy became more ad-hoc and erratic in 2016 when the Pakistan government started extending the cards for only short periods of time – until June 2016, then December 2016 and most recently March 2017. Approximately 1.5 million Afghans are registered in Pakistan and have POR cards.

(4) In July 2016, former US ambassador to Afghanistan (the Afghan-born, Zalmay Khalilzad) in an US Congress hearing had called for sanctions against Pakistan, followed by two US senators moving such a bill in Congress. Parts of Indian and Afghan public opinion supported this (see for example here).

(5) Ghani took a multilateral approach toward combating terrorism at the opening event (part of his speech in English in this video):

We propose an Asian or international regime – whatever is acceptable to our neighbour in Pakistan – to verify cross-frontier activities and terrorist operations.

He also said he did not want to engage in a “blame game.” This was reflected in the Amritsar Declaration (full text here) in which all participants – including Pakistan –expressed their

(…) welcome and support [for] Afghanistan’s initiative in taking the lead in exploring a regional counter-terror strategy [and] strongly call for concerted regional and international cooperation to ensure elimination of terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, including dismantling of terrorist sanctuaries and safe havens in the Heart of Asia region.

The document also names a number of terrorist groups, many of them operating in Pakistan. Pakistan’s top foreign affairs adviser present at the conference, Sartaj Aziz, nevertheless described it as balanced; he also added “that the tradition of blame game should be ended”.

(6) One Indian analyst concluded that the Amritsar conference had:

fulfilled two main objectives of India i.e. isolating Pakistan at the diplomatic level and strengthening the bond with its extended neighbour Afghanistan. After boycotting the SAARC summit meeting in Pakistan, this is the second successful attempt this year by India to isolate Pakistan and corner it on the terrorism issue.

See also this opinion piece.

(7) The Afghan and Pakistani border guards at the Torkham border crossing exchanged fire on 13 June 2016. The incident erupted after the installation of a border gate by Pakistan. A commander of the Afghan Border Police in east General Ayub Hussein Khel told Khaama press that an Afghan policeman lost his life and five others were wounded during the clash, which lasted for several hours. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations, the military’s communications arm, reported that one “Pakistani soldier was injured due to Afghan firing.”

 

 

Kenyan businessmen are tapping into the honey industry with the introduction of modern methods, which local farmers say present a shift away from long-held tradition, writes the BBC's Nicola Kelly.

Raytheon Company has received a contract from the US Navy to produce National Security Agency (NSA) certified next-generation encryption devices to help protect tactical data transmissions.

Orbit International’s Electronics Group has secured a contract to provide MK 119 gun computer system cabinet (GCSC) for the US Navy.

The US Navy's USS Independence (LCS 2) has successfully completed the first selected restricted availability works at Southwest Regional Maintenance Centre (SWRMC) in San Diego, California.

Americas

• The Boeing-Saab T-X trainer offering has made its first successful flight. During the 55 minute flight, the team validated key aspects of the aircraft and demonstrated the performance of the low-risk design. Initial operating capability is planned for 2024 and could potentially replace the USAF’s fleet of T-38 trainers.

• Staff at Northrop Grumman have been getting into the Holiday spirit, with employees volunteering to help the United Service Organizations (USO) assemble more than 1,000 care packages destined for American service members stationed overseas. The drive took place on a November 9 “Salute to the Troops” event at Baltimore Washington International (BWI) airport.

Middle East & North Africa

• Raytheon has been awarded a $53 million foreign military sales contract to provide TOW missiles to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The heavy assault weapon has been integrated on several land platforms by the US Army such as the Stryker, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and ITAS High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. Work on the deal is expected to be completed by October 2017.

• Raytheon will also supply APG-82(V)1 AESA radars to the Israeli Air Force, to be integrated on their F-15I fleet. The sale marks the first export deal for this variant of radar, designed specifically for the Strike Eagle. Israel has been keen to keep its F-15s in top operational order while it waits for the deliveries of its new F-35Is, and are even considering further procurements of the Strike Eagle. Such a move would be good news for Boeing, as they already have the fighter’s production line increased until at least 2020 due to a recent order from Qatar.

Europe

• Ukrainian manufacturer Antonov has rolled out its first AN-132D military transport plane at its plant in Kiev. The aircraft is an evolution of the classic An-32, featuring Pratt & Whitney Canada PW150 engines and avionics supplied by Honeywell. Saudi Arabia has been a big backer in the project and are looking to procure six of the planes, and aim to eventually manufacture units in a new facility in Riyadh.

• The US State Department has cleared the potential sale of P-8A surveillance aircraft to Norway. Five aircraft and associated systems and support, valued at $1.75 billion, will be provided in a deal aimed at upgrading Norway’s maritime surveillance capabilities. The P-8 will replace Oslo’s current fleet of P-3 Orions.

• Serbia’s plans to purchase Russian air defense systems are believed to be moving ahead, according to their Prime Minister. Aleksandar Vucic announced that a favorable deal to procure Buk-M1 or Buk-M2 systems would be discussed during an official visit to Moscow next week. A plan to buy six MiG-29 fighter jets was also announced.

Asia Pacific

• India is looking overseas to procure some 5,000 sniper rifles with plans to have them manufactured at home. A request for information (RFI) was issued to Blaser Jagdwaffen GmbH of Germany; Steyr Mannlicher of Austria; SIG Sauer of Switzerland; Israel Weapon Industries of Israel; Kalashnikov Concern (Izhevsk Machinebuilding Plant) and KBP Instrument Design Bureau of Russia; Armalite and Barrett Firearms Manufacturing of the United States; and Nexter and PGM Précision of France. However New Delhi may have problems getting such a deal, with an industry official commenting that such numbers are too small an order to receive offsets such as a technology transfer.

Today’s Video

First flight of Boeing-Saab T-X trainer:

TOW family
(click to view full)

Despite modernization that has led to advanced anti-armor weapons like the Javelin and Hellfire fire and forget guided missiles, the wire-guided, operator-controlled BGM-71 TOW missile family remains a mainstay thanks to modernization, specialization, improved sighting systems, and pre-existing compatibility with a wide range of ground vehicles. TOW remains the US Army and Marine Corps’ primary heavy anti-tank/ precision assault weapon deployed on more than 4,000 TOW launch platforms including HMMWV jeeps, the Army’s M1134 Stryker ATGM variant and M2/M3 Bradley IFVs; the Marines’ LAV-AT wheeled APC and SuperCobra attack helicopters; and numerous foreign vehicles. Designation Systems notes that more than 620,000 BGM-71 missiles of all versions had been built for all customers by 2001.

Raytheon Co. in Tucson, AZ was recently awarded a pair of contracts that illustrate its continued production and maintenance work on these missiles.

TOW 2B missile
(click for cutaway)

The first contract involves engineering services for the TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-Guided) weapon system family of missiles and TOW fire control systems including: ITAS (Improved Target Acquisition System), IBAS (Improved Bradley Acquisition Subsystem), T2SS (TOW 2 Subsystem), and M220 Ground TOW. This is a one-year contract with five one-year options, and a total potential value of $122 million. See release.

The other contract is a $45 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for TOW 2A bunker-buster and TOW 2B top-attack missiles. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ and is expected to be complete by Nov. 30, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on July 15, 2002 by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-04-C-0061).

Update

December 22/16: Raytheon has been awarded a $53 million foreign military sales contract to provide TOW missiles to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The heavy assault weapon has been integrated on several land platforms by the US Army such as the Stryker, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and ITAS High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. Work on the deal is expected to be completed by October 2017.

December 12/16: Morocco has been cleared to purchase Raytheon-made TOW 2A Radio Frequency Missiles. Valued at $108 million, the sale includes 1,200 TOW 2A RF missiles and 14 TOW 2A fly-to-buy acceptance missiles. Morocco is regarded as a key US ally in maintaining stability in North Africa, following the increase in jihadist activity across the region.

Im Interview mit kas.de spricht der Vorsitzende der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung über Populisten, Europa, den Anschlag in Berlin - und das Adenauer-Jubiläum 2017.

patrouille de F-16 néerlandaise et belge dans le ciel néerlandais © NGV / B2

(B2 à Rotterdam) A partir du 1er janvier, il n’y aura plus quatre avions de permanence pour surveiller le ciel entre la Meuse, l’Escaut et le Rhin, mais une seule patrouille de F-16 de permanence assurant la surveillance aérienne des Pays-Bas et la Belgique. Le dernier acte a été signé ce mercredi (21 décembre) à Rotterdam par les généraux Dennis Luyt et Frederik Vansina, respectivement commandant de la Composante aérienne belge et commandant de la force aérienne néerlandaise, et Pierre-Louis Lorenz, l’ambassadeur luxembourgeois aux Pays-Bas, sous l’oeil attentif des ministres belge et néerlandais (Steven Vandeput et Jeannine Hennis) … et de quelques journalistes dont B2.

Un exemple à suivre

« Cet accord contre la menace aérienne est tout simplement révolutionnaire » a signalé Steven Vandeput, ministre de la Défense. « La Belgique et les Pays-Bas donnent le ton en Europe en matière de coopération défense. Il n’existe aucun autre pays s’engageant ainsi avec d’autres pour agir dans ce type de faits graves se produisant à l’intérieur des frontières de chaque pays. » Avec cet accord « nous aurons le même résultat qu’avant mais nous aurons besoin de moins de ressources pour le faire. Ce que nous économiserons, nous pourrons l’utiliser pour augmenter notre défense ailleurs. »

Un relais tous les quatre mois entre les forces belges et néerlandaises

Dès le 1er janvier, les F-16 néerlandais et belges se relaieront, tous les quatre mois, pour assurer l’alerte aérienne de réaction rapide (QRA en jargon aéronautique), à partir de leurs bases respectives. Pour les Pays-Bas, à partir des bases aériennes de Volkel et Leeuwarden et pour la Belgique à partir des bases aériennes de Kleine Brogel et Florennes (1). Ce sont les Belges qui prendront le premier l’alerte. De fait, l’espace aérien formera un seul territoire où les forces en alerte agiront sous les ordres et pour le compte de l’autre pays, sans tenir compte de leur pavillon.

Chaque État garde sa responsabilité

Les avions de chasse belges qui interceptent un appareil dans le ciel néerlandais, agiront ainsi sur l’ordre du ministre néerlandais de la Défense et de la Justice qui donnera ses instructions via l’AOCS (Air Operations Control Station) de Nieuw Milligen. A l’inverse, le ministre belge de la Défense aura autorité sur les avions néerlandais via le CRC (Control and Reporting Centrum) de Glons, si ceux-ci agissent au-dessus du territoire belge. Au Luxembourg, c’est le ministre de la Défense luxembourgeois endosse cette responsabilité. Mais le Grand Duché a exclu tout usage de la force au-dessus de son territoire, Constitution oblige.

Décollage pour des avions civils en détresse mais aussi pour des avions suspects

La QRA intervient lorsqu’un avion vole dans l’espace aérien national sans avoir soumis un plan de vol à l’avance ou sans s’identifier, ou s’il s’est détourné de son itinéraire prévu et ne répond plus aux signaux radios. Les avions décollent souvent pour accompagner des avions civils (avions de ligne ou petits avions privés) qui font face à des problèmes techniques. Mais ils peuvent également prendre l’air pour intercepter un aéronef présentant un comportement suspect (chacun pense aux attaques du 11 septembre) ou un avion militaire étranger qui frôle quelque peu l’espace aérien national. On pense notamment aux avions russes. S’il s’agit d’une mission militaire effectuée par la QRA — en cas d’interception d’avion militaire suspect étranger, la mission est alors commandée depuis le Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) de l’OTAN à Uedem, en Allemagne.

A noter : un accord de poursuite a déjà été signé avec l’Allemagne. Et un accord identique devrait être signé avec la France en février prochain en marge d’une réunion de l’OTAN des ministres de la Défense, a précisé à B2 Steven Vandeput, le ministre belge de la Défense.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

(1) Les Luxembourgeois n’ont pas de flotte d’aviation de chasse. C’est traditionnellement l’aviation belge qui effectue le travail de QRA.

Lire : Le Benelux aura une surveillance aérienne conjointe. Traité signé. Une première en Europe

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125 000 personnes, dont 2 500 journalistes, ont perdu leur emploi depuis juillet dernier dans le cadre de purges d’une ampleur inédite.L’enquête d’Ingebjørg Godskesen (Norvège, Conservateurs européens) et Marianne Mikko (Estonie, Socialistes), pour l’assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe (APCE), donne un compte-rendu (en date du 12 décembre dernier) et un calendrier des purges menées par le régime turc après la tentative de coup d’État, en juillet dernier. Des données d’une précision exceptionnelle, complétées le cas échéant par celles de la Fédération européenne des journalistes. Le texte joint en annexe mérite une lecture attentive.

Les autorités, soutenues par une large majorité de la population, ont immédiatement désigné le mouvement mené par Fethullah Gülen coupable du coup d’État raté. Les institutions d’État ont donc été purgées des éléments soi-disant loyaux au prédicateur exilé, considérés comme une organisation terroriste. Une aubaine pour un gouvernement qui tentait de se débarrasser de certains gêneurs, selon les opposants.

Rien que dans le secteur de l’éducation, 15 200 des 930 000 employés du ministère de l’Éducation ont été congédiés. Les licences de 21 000 enseignants d’écoles privées, pour la plupart gülenistes, ont également été annulées.

Durant l’état d’urgence, plusieurs « décrets à force de loi » ont été publiés, selon l’enquête. Cela a facilité le renvoi des fonctionnaires, membres du pouvoir judiciaire, du service public, de l’armée, des garde-côtes et de la police nationale. Les décrets ont également entrainé la liquidation d’associations et entreprises, ainsi que la saisie ou la confiscation de leurs actifs.

Les biens de 691 entreprises soupçonnées d’avoir un lien avec le mouvement güleniste (dont certains géants comme Boydak Holding, Kaynak Holding, Koza İpek Holding et Fi Yapı) ont ainsi été saisis par le  fonds de garantie de l’épargne et des dépôts (TMSF). Selon les médias, TMSF aurait engagé trois institutions financières pour le conseiller sur la vente de ces entreprises.

L’enquête détaille également les mesures prises contre le parti kurde HDP, et notamment l’arrestation de ses deux présidents, Selahattin Demirtaş et Figen Yüksekdağ.

En outre, le 29 septembre, dix chaînes de télévision, dont Hayatın Sesi, Azadi TV, Jiyan TV, Van TV, TV10, Denge TV et Zarok TV ont été retirées de TÜRKSAT, la plateforme satellite nationale, à cause de « menaces qu’elles posent à la sécurité nationale et à leur soutien des groupes terroristes ». Le lendemain, 12 chaînes de télévision et 11 radios ont été supprimées. Les bâtiments abritant certaines de ces organisations ont été mis sous scellés. Le 3 octobre, la société satellite basée en France Eutelsat a éliminé le signal de Med Nuçe TV, une chaîne en kurde diffusant depuis la Belgique. La chaîne a contesté cette décision et interrogé ses fondements juridiques.

Selon certaines sources au sein de la Fédération européenne des Journalistes, Eutelsat SA a subi des pressions de la part du conseil suprême de la radio et télévision turc, qui souhaitait supprimer Med Nuçe TV, considérée comme pro-PKK par le régime. Mi-novembre, le tribunal du commerce de Paris a décidé que la diffusion de Med Nûçe et une autre chaîne, Newroz TV, devait toutefois continuer. C’est en effet l’autorité de diffusion belge, et non Eutelsat, qui a le droit de choisir de suspendre certaines chaînes.

Selon l’association professionnelle de la presse, 2 500 journalistes ont perdu leur emploi depuis l’adoption des décrets. Le 6 octobre 2016, les médias ont indiqué que l’institution chargée de répartir les publicités officielles dans la presse avait décidé de ne pas diriger de publicité vers les publications ayant des propriétaires, partenaires ou cadres accusés de terrorisme. Les journaux qui ne renvoient pas les journalistes accusés de terrorisme dans les cinq jours ne bénéficieront pas non plus des recettes qu’apportent les campagnes publicitaires officielles, selon une réglementation publiée dans la Gazette officielle le 5 octobre.

Le Conseil de l’Europe en a conclu que :

• plus de 125 000 personnes ont perdu leur emploi ;
• des poursuites judiciaires ont été engagées contre 92 607 suspects, dont 39 378 ont été arrêtées, dans le cadre de l’enquête sur la tentative de coup d’État ;
• 3 673 juges et procureurs ont été démis de leurs fonctions, et 2 700 ont été suspendus ;
• 2 410 juges et procureurs ont été détenus, et 769 ont été placés sous contrôle judiciaire ;
• 177 mandats d’arrêt ont été émis contre des juges et procureurs, et 122 juges et procureurs ont été relâchés ;
• 177 médias ont été fermés, seuls 11 ont rouvert ;
• plus de 140 journalistes ont été arrêtés ;
• environ 1 800 associations/fondations ont été fermées :
• environ 2 100 écoles, internats et universités ont été fermés.

 

Pour en savoir Plus

Texte des deux rapporteures http://website-pace.net/documents/19887/2221584/AS-MON-INF-2016-14-FR.pdf/3e06bb1c-cdd9-4573-8652-b353b8508a54

 

Classé dans:Droit à la liberté et à la sûreté, DROITS FONDAMENTAUX

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AMENDMENTS 1 - 14 - Draft opinion Discharge 2015: General budget of the EU - European External Action Service
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP