Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Matteo Re. ARI 23/2021- 22/02/2021

A mediados de enero de este año 2021, en Italia empezó el macrojuicio a la mafia calabresa, la ’Ndrangheta. Pero ¿qué es la ’Ndrangheta? ¿Cómo ha ido adquiriendo el peso que tiene en el organigrama del crimen organizado global actual? ¿Cómo ha sabido explotar la crisis sanitaria del COVID-19?

Le 17 mars, les Néerlandais sont appelés à renouveler les 150 membres de la Chambre des Etats généraux, chambre basse du Parlement. En raison de la situation sanitaire qui complique l'organisation des élections législatives, le scrutin aura lieu sur trois jours (entre le 15 et le 17 mars) de façon à...

Am 3. Februar 2021 haben die USA und Russland die Gültigkeit des New-Start-Ver­trags über die Verminderung strategischer Waffen um fünf Jahre verlängert. Zwei Tage später wäre er außer Kraft getreten. Der Vertrag begrenzt Atomwaffen und strategische Trägersysteme globaler Reichweite. Wollte der damalige Präsident Donald Trump zuerst China einbinden und neue russische Waffen einbeziehen, änderte sein Nach­folger Joe Biden prompt den Kurs. Damit wurde ein quantitativer atomarer Rüstungs­wettlauf vorläufig abgewendet. Um strategische Stabilität aber auch künftig zu sichern, muss binnen fünf Jahren ein Nachfolgevertrag geschlossen werden. Es wird darum gehen, die Zahl strategischer Atomwaffen zu senken, auch neue Waffentechno­logien und substrategische Kernwaffen zu begrenzen sowie die Fähigkeiten anderer Atommächte zu berücksich­tigen. Dies wird sich auch auf regionale Abschreckungskonzepte auswirken. Deutschland und die Ver­bündeten sollten diesen Prozess nach­drücklich unterstützen und bei der Überprüfung des strategischen Konzepts der Nato die Bedeutung von Kernwaffen reduzieren.

La Cour Suprême joue un rôle essentiel dans l'interprétation des règles du fonctionnement institutionnel ainsi que le respect des libertés et droits de l’Homme aux États-Unis. C’est pourquoi elle peut être un contre-pouvoir redoutable pour les Républicains. La mort de l’icône progressiste Ruth Bader Ginsburg (RBG) et la nomination à sa place d’Amy Coney Barrett - défenseuse de l’originalisme et soutenue par la droite religieuse - ont ancré plus profondément la…

A political crisis was the last thing Italy needed during the pandemic. Yet, a personal conflict between the leader of Italia Viva, Matteo Renzi, and the previous prime minister, Giuseppe Conte, led to the collapse of the coalition in mid-January. President Sergio Mattarella then commissioned 73-year-old Mario Draghi – former head of the European Central Bank (ECB) – to form a technical government, which he will preside over as prime minister. According to Mattarella, it would have been risky to organise early elections during the pandemic. Indeed, new elections would have delayed the fight against the pandemic. In addition, the prospect of a right-wing populist government would also probably have had a negative impact on the financial markets – a risk that had to be avoided in an already challenging situation.

Difficult situation

Mario Draghi is inheriting a difficult situation: In Italy, the health, economic, and social crises triggered by the pandemic have exacerbated the country’s enormous structural problems. Italy’s “seven deadly sins” – as the Italian economist Carlo Cottarelli called them – are tax evasion, corruption, an excessive bureaucracy, an inefficient judicial system, demographic problems, the North-South divide, and difficulty in functioning within the Eurozone. As a result of the pandemic, gross domestic product (GDP) fell by almost 9 per cent in 2020, public debt rose to around 160 per cent of GDP, and more than 400,000 jobs were lost. The inability of the traditional parties to find solutions for the economic problems keeps support for the right-wing populist coalition (Lega, Fratelli d’Italia, Forza Italia) at almost 50 per cent.

Even though almost all major political forces have declared their intent to cooperate with the Draghi government, the framework of a technical government offers the right-wing populists a target. It is quite conceivable that they will accuse Draghi of lacking democratic legitimacy. It will also be a challenge for the new head of government to govern without his own parliamentary majority.

Managing the health crisis without austerity

The top priority of the new leadership will be to manage the health crisis. This includes speeding up vaccinations and supporting schools and the labour market. This means applying for – and successfully using – funds from the financial assistance plan of the European Union (EU) to mitigate the economic and social consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, Next Generation EU. The expected €200 billion or so from this fund could benefit the economic recovery as well as the planned structural reforms in public administration, taxation, and the judiciary, which will give the new government more room for manoeuvre in economic policy. Unlike the last technical government under Mario Monti (2011–2013), the fact that Draghi will not have to enact politically costly fiscal consolidation with possible negative effects on GDP growth can also be seen as an opportunity. This is mainly due to broad market confidence in Draghi and the fact that his government is operating from the outset under the protective umbrella of the ECB, which will not allow the cost for servicing public debt to rise excessively. The Eurozone’s fiscal rules have also been temporarily suspended; this makes it possible to support the economy through fiscal policy measures. Finally, it should not be forgotten that, despite the structural problems, the Italian economy has many strengths: Italy is one of the most industrialised countries in Europe and the second-largest exporter after Germany. If some obstacles to growth are removed and, for example, credit is released by the Italian banking sector, the pace of recovery could pick up significantly. Draghi’s experience from the finance ministry and in central banking could help him set a decisive course.

Who will succeed Draghi?

Nevertheless, given the major challenges facing Draghi’s technical government, one should be cautious about expectations. The next general election is less than two and a half years away, and it cannot be ruled out that it will be brought forward. That is very little time to address structural problems that have existed for decades. To avert a victory for the right-wing populists, the new head of government will do everything he can to prevent early parliamentary elections until the current moderate majority in parliament has elected President Mattarella’s successor. The latter’s term ends in February 2022, and it cannot be ruled out that Draghi himself will succeed Mattarella. He could use his authority and power as president to stabilise politics, as is the traditional role of the Italian president.

In 2012, Draghi saved the Eurozone as head of Europe’s most important financial institution. In the current crisis, even if supported by figures from across a broad political spectrum, he will act as head of one of Europe’s most politically fragile governments – an incomparably less favourable starting position. Draghi will make the best possible use of his time as head of government. That much is certain. However, given the massive level of support for the populists, the most important question is: After Draghi, will someone take the helm who will continue his reforms or reverse them? Not only Italy’s future, but also that of the entire Eurozone depends on it.

This text was also published at fairobserver.com.

The UN’s transition in Sudan started out in 2014 as a process to close the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in the face of waning international support and overwhelming pressure from an autocratic regime. But in 2019, Sudan’s revolution and ongoing political transition radically transformed how the UN engages with Sudan. UNAMID’s closure in December 2020 and the start-up of a new special political mission, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), now constitute one of the most complex reconfigurations the organization has ever attempted.

This paper examines the ongoing UN transition in Sudan, focusing on the establishment of UNITAMS and UNAMID’s exit from Darfur.The paper evaluates the transition across four themes pertinent to the transition of UN peace operations: the creation of a shared political vision for the transition, national engagement in the process, efforts to comprehensively plan the transition, and the dynamics of international financial support and partnerships.

In order to sustain the UN’s reconfiguration in Sudan while supporting Sudan’s own political transition, the UN should consider the following:

• Articulating a forward-looking political compact with Sudan to guide UN support to the political transition;
• Rapidly expanding support for urgent peacebuilding and protection priorities in Darfur;
• Continuously evaluating the UN’s operational presence and substantive impact outside of Khartoum;
• Encouraging the Sudanese government to provide regular updates on the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and its national protection of civilians plan;
• Providing frequent, detailed assessments of UNAMID’s drawdown and liquidation;
• Undertaking a nationwide campaign to raise awareness of UNITAMS; and
• Considering additional reforms to the UN’s peace and security pillar on mission planning processes.

In addition, to support the efforts of the UN and the Sudanese transitional government, UN member states could consider the following:

• Increasing financial support to coherently address Sudan’s peacebuilding and development needs;
• Maintaining a close relationship between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council on Sudan; and
• Sustaining international attention on Sudan’s transition and maintaining UN support.

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Carlos Malamud y Rogelio Núñez. ARI 21/2021 - 18/2/2021

Los países de América Latina se acercan al pico de la segunda oleada de la pandemia mientras se desarrolla la vacunación, tardía, lenta, desigual y heterogénea. Al no existir ninguna coordinación regional, cada país afronta en solitario la pugna geopolítica mundial por las vacunas.

Le 13 février 2021, Donald Trump a été une seconde fois acquitté à l’issue de son procès en destitution. Si cette décision souligne l’emprise de Trump sur le parti républicain, qui en quatre ans est devenu plus extrême, complotiste et anti-démocratique, la tenue du procès a également confirmé les divisions qui règnent au sein du parti républicain. Quel avenir pour le trumpisme et le parti républicain ? Quelles implications pour l’administration Biden ? Maya…

D'abord épargné par la première vague de l'épidémie, le continent africain est aujourd’hui submergé par une seconde, plus violente : les 54 pays sont touchés et une nouvelle souche hautement préoccupante a été détectée fin décembre en Afrique du Sud. Le virus Ebola a également refait surface ces derniers jours, s’ajoutant donc à la liste des défis auxquels le continent africain est confronté. L'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) avait déclaré en mars 2020…

La Commission  européenne a publié le 15 décembre son Digital Markets Act, un nouveau texte visant à réguler l'économie numérique et à limiter le pouvoir de contrôle des grands acteurs du numérique. L'Institut Montaigne lance aujourd'hui une série d'articles pour analyser les enjeux de cette nouvelle réglementation. Dans ce premier article, Gilles Babinet, conseiller sur les questions numériques à l'Institut Montaigne, et Alina Polyakova, présidente et…

The global pandemic crisis has highlighted the inherent weaknesses of governance in countries of the Maghreb. It has underscored Morocco’s lagging human development and infrastructure amid growing authoritarianism. In Algeria, where the government is struggling with an ongoing legitimacy crisis, the pandemic has exposed the state’s weak public services. In Tunisia, the pandemic has emphasised the disarray of the coun­try’s political elites and the effects of the protracted transition on state output. Yet, the pandemic crisis has pushed some of these governments to seize opportunities, in­cluding speeding up digitalisation, allowing for citizen engagement, and even seeking some self-sufficiency in terms of medical production. As these countries pursue eco­nomic relief and support to overcome the growing economic impacts from the crisis, European partners have the opportunity to use their leverage to promote policies that reduce inequality, prioritise investment in critical infrastructure, and encourage transparent and responsive citizen–government relations.

Ein halbes Jahrzehnt nach ihrer Gründung befindet sich die Drei-Meere-Initiative in einer Phase der Festigung und der Konkretisierung. Der lose Zusammenschluss von zwölf Ländern aus Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa hat es sich zum Ziel gesetzt, die Kon­nektivität zwischen den Ländern der Region zu verbessern. Mit seinem nunmehr auf über eine Mil­liarde Euro angewachsenen Investitionsfonds und durch das finanzielle und poli­tische Engagement der USA, das vermutlich auch die Biden-Adminis­tration fort­führen wird, ist die Initiative stabiler und handlungsfähiger geworden. Allerdings leidet sie weiter an den unterschiedlichen geopolitischen Interessen der teilnehmenden Staaten. Deutschland, das kein vollumfänglicher Teilnehmer, sondern Partner der Initiative ist, sollte sich, sofern es an seinem Beitrittswunsch festhält, im Sinne einer wohlwollenden Mitwirkungsbereitschaft in die Initiative einbringen, um un­abhän­gig von deren weiterer Entwicklung Kooperationschancen auszuloten und Präsenz in der Region zu zeigen.

Chaque semaine, l’Institut Montaigne propose sa revue de presse internationale avec son chroniqueur Bernard Chappedelaine, ancien conseiller des Affaires étrangères au Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, qui scrute le traitement par les experts et les médias internationaux de l’actualité géopolitique mondiale. Cette semaine, il s’intéresse à la crise des relations UE-Russie sous l’angle russe.

Le…

Zusammenfassung:

Fast zwei Monate des zweiten harten Lockdowns haben deutliche Spuren im Leben vieler Familien in Deutschland hinterlassen. Das zeigen aktuelle Analysen auf Basis von Daten von infratest dimap zu den Sorgen und der Zufriedenheit von Eltern. Im Vergleich zum Lockdown „light“ im November ist besonders die Zufriedenheit mit der Kinderbetreuung gesunken, aber auch die Zufriedenheit mit dem Familienleben und dem Leben allgemein. Mütter weisen in dieser Situation wie schon im ersten Lockdown im Frühjahr vergangenen Jahres ein geringeres Wohlbefinden auf als Väter. Auch Faktoren wie die Bildung der Eltern und das Haushaltseinkommen machen einen Unterschied. Eltern, die sich große Sorgen um die Bildung ihrer Kinder machen, sorgen sich auch um deren Gesundheit. Während die Kita- und Schulschließungen einerseits mit Blick auf die Gesundheit eher positiv bewertet werden, sorgen sie andererseits mit Blick auf die Bildung der Kinder für eine geringere Zufriedenheit. Umso dringlicher erscheinen gut durchdachte Konzepte, die beiden Aspekten gerecht werden und somit Kinder und Eltern mit ihren Sorgen in den Fokus nehmen.

Homomorphe Verschlüsselung stellt einen nächsten Evolutionsschritt der Krypto­grafie dar. Mit dieser Technologie können Datenbanken erstmals verschlüsselt ge­nutzt werden. Auch eröffnen sich mit ihr zahlreiche neue Möglichkeiten im Bereich Multi-Cloud-Computing und Machine Learning. Zudem hat homomorphe Krypto­grafie politische Implikationen. Die Technologie ist zentral für die Sicherheitspolitik, etwa beim Datenaustausch zwischen Sicherheitsbehörden. Neue Multi-Cloud-Geschäfts­modelle könnten zudem neue Abhängigkeiten erzeugen, etwa von den USA, wo bereits an einer Standardisierung gearbeitet wird. Um nicht abgehängt zu werden, sollte die EU die Anwendungsforschung fördern und homomorphe Verschlüsselung bei den Planungen für die eigene Cloud-Initiative Gaia-X frühzeitig miteinbeziehen.

The intersection between the protection of civilians (POC) and gender has been addressed in Security Council resolutions on POC and on women, peace, and security (WPS) since the late 1990s. Nonetheless, understanding how POC and gender converge, and translating this convergence into implementable action plans, are challenging tasks for peacekeeping missions.

This paper examines how peacekeeping missions conceptualize and define gendered threats to civilians at the field level. It analyzes key policy documents that provide substantive guidance to peacekeeping missions on POC and gender and looks at the way the language in the mandates of peacekeeping missions provides a conceptual framework for understanding gendered POC threats. It also explores the way mission-level POC strategies frame the juncture of gender and POC, how missions identify and analyze gendered POC threats, and the coher­ence and sustainability of their approaches.

The paper concludes that UN peacekeeping missions could consider devel­oping “safeguarding frameworks” on the intersection of POC and gender. These frameworks could provide more detailed guidance that challenges the conflation of “gender” and “women” and the association of gender-related protection primarily with sexual violence. They could also dictate that missions need to assess the gender aspects of every threat and could help move missions from coordinating to integrating their work on POC and gender.

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