Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued a decree in the early hours of March 20 withdrawing Turkey from the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention – dubbed the Istanbul Convention – on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. The treaty sets comprehensive standards for protecting women against all forms of violence. The withdrawal prompted widespread protests from women’s groups and an uproar on social media criticising that it signals a huge setback for women’s rights in a country with high rates of gender-based violence and femicides: Just in 2020, at least 300 women were murdered. Following the public outrage over the withdrawal, government representatives unconvincingly responded that women’s rights are guaranteed in national laws, and that there is no need for international laws. The Directorate of Communications defended the decision with the claim that the Convention was »hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality«, and that this is incompatible with the country’s social and family values. Turkey was the first state to ratify the Istanbul Convention and became the first to pull out. What lies behind the withdrawal?
Erdoğan’s political rationale: To remain in power at all costsIn August 2020, officials in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) signalled that Turkey was considering withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention after religious conservatives and various Muslim orders began an intense lobbying effort against the Convention, lambasting it for damaging »traditional Turkish family values«. Although they claimed that the treaty destroys families and promotes homosexuality, conservative women’s groups supporting the AKP defended it. The row even reached Erdoğan’s own family, with two of his children becoming involved in groups on either side of the debate. Due to these internal tensions within the AKP and the symbolic achievement with the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia, the debate was postponed.
Although recent opinion polls had shown that 84 per cent of the Turkish public opposed withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention and a great majority of conservative women are in favour of it, President Erdoğan decided to pull out of the treaty, thereby disregarding not only the international law anchored in the constitution but also the legislative power of the parliament. This move comes amid significantly eroding support for President Erdoğan and his informal alliance with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The withdrawal from the Convention gives Erdoğan three political advantages that will help him retain power.
First, Erdoğan and his AKP aim to re-energize their conservative voter base, which has been dissatisfied with the economic downturn – a reality that has only been exacerbated by the corona pandemic. The AKP government cannot curb the high level of inflation, and unemployment and poverty rates remain high. Leaving the Convention is a symbolic gesture to his base, but it will bring short-term relief, as did the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia.
Second, with a potential electoral defeat in mind, Erdoğan is looking for new allies. He thus made an overture in January 2021 to the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), which is in oppositional alliance with secularist, nationalist, and conservative parties. With its 2.5 per cent of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections, the SP shares the same Islamist roots as the AKP and is popular among ultraconservative voters, who enthusiastically back the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. In his meeting with the SP, Erdoğan used the withdrawal as a bargaining chip for a possible electoral alliance in the future. He is not only aiming to strengthen his own voting bloc, but also to break the oppositional alliance, which has increasingly gained confidence since its success in the 2019 local elections and been effective in challenging Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule.
Third, to bolster his image as a wilful leader, the Turkish president has intensified the level of repression by suppressing democratic civil society organisations that dare to challenge his rule. This time, he has targeted women’s rights advocates, who are constantly criticising the government for not strictly implementing the protective measures of the Istanbul Convention.
Political conditionality as a necessary European reactionWhile increasing the level of repression in domestic politics, Ankara intensified its diplomatic charm offensive to reset Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU). Against this background, Brussels should not only condemn the decision but revise its EU-Turkey agenda by imposing political conditions regarding human rights and the rule of law, which have once again been breached with Ankara’s withdrawal from the Convention. This approach is necessary for two reasons. First, Brussels can send a motivating message to democratic segments of civil society and the opposition by underlining that the Istanbul Convention is an issue of human rights, and that its sole purpose is protecting women from violence rather than undermining Turkey’s national values and traditions. Second, calling Ankara out is also in Europe’s own interest. The withdrawal can have spillover effects on other member states of the CoE. Considering the latest attempts by the Polish government to replace the Istanbul Convention with an alternative »family-based« treaty that also finds support in other Central European governments, the backlash against women’s rights in Europe is not a myth, but rather a reality.
This text was also published at fairoberserver.com.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued a decree in the early hours of March 20 withdrawing Turkey from the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention – dubbed the Istanbul Convention – on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. The treaty sets comprehensive standards for protecting women against all forms of violence. The withdrawal prompted widespread protests from women’s groups and an uproar on social media criticising that it signals a huge setback for women’s rights in a country with high rates of gender-based violence and femicides: Just in 2020, at least 300 women were murdered. Following the public outrage over the withdrawal, government representatives unconvincingly responded that women’s rights are guaranteed in national laws, and that there is no need for international laws. The Directorate of Communications defended the decision with the claim that the Convention was »hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality«, and that this is incompatible with the country’s social and family values. Turkey was the first state to ratify the Istanbul Convention and became the first to pull out. What lies behind the withdrawal?
Erdoğan’s political rationale: To remain in power at all costsIn August 2020, officials in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) signalled that Turkey was considering withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention after religious conservatives and various Muslim orders began an intense lobbying effort against the Convention, lambasting it for damaging »traditional Turkish family values«. Although they claimed that the treaty destroys families and promotes homosexuality, conservative women’s groups supporting the AKP defended it. The row even reached Erdoğan’s own family, with two of his children becoming involved in groups on either side of the debate. Due to these internal tensions within the AKP and the symbolic achievement with the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia, the debate was postponed.
Although recent opinion polls had shown that 84 per cent of the Turkish public opposed withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention and a great majority of conservative women are in favour of it, President Erdoğan decided to pull out of the treaty, thereby disregarding not only the international law anchored in the constitution but also the legislative power of the parliament. This move comes amid significantly eroding support for President Erdoğan and his informal alliance with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The withdrawal from the Convention gives Erdoğan three political advantages that will help him retain power.
First, Erdoğan and his AKP aim to re-energize their conservative voter base, which has been dissatisfied with the economic downturn – a reality that has only been exacerbated by the corona pandemic. The AKP government cannot curb the high level of inflation, and unemployment and poverty rates remain high. Leaving the Convention is a symbolic gesture to his base, but it will bring short-term relief, as did the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia.
Second, with a potential electoral defeat in mind, Erdoğan is looking for new allies. He thus made an overture in January 2021 to the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), which is in oppositional alliance with secularist, nationalist, and conservative parties. With its 2.5 per cent of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections, the SP shares the same Islamist roots as the AKP and is popular among ultraconservative voters, who enthusiastically back the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. In his meeting with the SP, Erdoğan used the withdrawal as a bargaining chip for a possible electoral alliance in the future. He is not only aiming to strengthen his own voting bloc, but also to break the oppositional alliance, which has increasingly gained confidence since its success in the 2019 local elections and been effective in challenging Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule.
Third, to bolster his image as a wilful leader, the Turkish president has intensified the level of repression by suppressing democratic civil society organisations that dare to challenge his rule. This time, he has targeted women’s rights advocates, who are constantly criticising the government for not strictly implementing the protective measures of the Istanbul Convention.
Political conditionality as a necessary European reactionWhile increasing the level of repression in domestic politics, Ankara intensified its diplomatic charm offensive to reset Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU). Against this background, Brussels should not only condemn the decision but revise its EU-Turkey agenda by imposing political conditions regarding human rights and the rule of law, which have once again been breached with Ankara’s withdrawal from the Convention. This approach is necessary for two reasons. First, Brussels can send a motivating message to democratic segments of civil society and the opposition by underlining that the Istanbul Convention is an issue of human rights, and that its sole purpose is protecting women from violence rather than undermining Turkey’s national values and traditions. Second, calling Ankara out is also in Europe’s own interest. The withdrawal can have spillover effects on other member states of the CoE. Considering the latest attempts by the Polish government to replace the Istanbul Convention with an alternative »family-based« treaty that also finds support in other Central European governments, the backlash against women’s rights in Europe is not a myth, but rather a reality.
2021 is shaping up to be a year of elections for the Palestinians, both in the Palestinian Territories and across the world. Three ballots are scheduled for the institutions of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). It is still unclear whether they will all take place as planned. The PA elections certainly have an important role to play in integrating the younger generations in the Territories, restoring political accountability and reinstating democratic checks and balances. The elections to the Palestinian National Council – the PLO’s parliament in exile – would be even more significant and a crucial step towards creating a representative organ and establishing the basis for an inclusive discussion about the liberation movement’s future strategy and the role of the PA. The EU and its member states have been calling for years for the Palestinian leadership to revive the democratic process and overcome the Fatah/Hamas split. They should therefore not only support the elections with observers but also contribute actively to their being as free, fair and competitive as possible under the difficult circumstances.
2021 is shaping up to be a year of elections for the Palestinians, both in the Palestinian Territories and across the world. Three ballots are scheduled for the institutions of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). It is still unclear whether they will all take place as planned. The PA elections certainly have an important role to play in integrating the younger generations in the Territories, restoring political accountability and reinstating democratic checks and balances. The elections to the Palestinian National Council – the PLO’s parliament in exile – would be even more significant and a crucial step towards creating a representative organ and establishing the basis for an inclusive discussion about the liberation movement’s future strategy and the role of the PA. The EU and its member states have been calling for years for the Palestinian leadership to revive the democratic process and overcome the Fatah/Hamas split. They should therefore not only support the elections with observers but also contribute actively to their being as free, fair and competitive as possible under the difficult circumstances.
Although things have been quiet in recent months and there has been no active dialogue between North Korea and the United States (US), developments in recent days suggest that Pyongyang is back on the agenda of the international community. First, it became known that the US has been reaching out to North Korea through several channels, starting in mid-February, but it has not heard back. North Korea then published two statements within as many days by two high-ranking officials. On March 16, Kim Yo Jong criticized the joint US–South Korea military exercise, warning that if Seoul dares “more provocative acts,” North Korea may abrogate the Inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement of 2018. She also cautioned the US that if “[i]t wants to sleep in peace for [the] coming four years, it had better refrain from causing a stink at its first step.” Two days later, First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui was quoted saying that North Korea sees no reason to return to nuclear talks with Washington, calling its outreach a “cheap trick.” These statements coincided with a warning issued by the head of the US military’s Northern Command that North Korea might begin flight testing an improved design of its intercontinental ballistic missiles “in the near future.” On March 23, Pyongyang tested two cruise missiles before qualitatively upping the ante with a short-range ballistic missile test on March 25, constituting a breach of UN Security Council Resolutions.
Although these developments may suggest that a further escalation on the Korean Peninsula is inevitable, North Korea has thus far been following its traditional playbook by signaling a message that leaves all options on the table, ensures maximum room for maneuver, and – at least from Pyongyang’s view – places the ball in the US’ court. North Korea is raising the stakes ahead of the conclusions of the policy review process in the US while simultaneously conveying the message that the door is open for re-engagement at some point. “In order for a dialogue to be made,” Choe states, “an atmosphere for both parties to exchange words on an equal basis must be created.”
Biden’s North Korea policy reviewFurther developments in US–North Korea relations will, to a significant extent, depend on the outcomes of the policy review process. Although this process is not yet completed, it is apparent that the policies of the Biden administration will differ significantly from those of the Trump administration.
First, we should not expect Donald Trump’s personalized diplomacy to continue under Joe Biden. Rather, Washington is trying to restore a consultative process by involving the regional actors in northeast Asia more directly in the North Korea question – and possibly trying to (once again) multilateralize the nuclear issue in the longer run. During the visits of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Japan and South Korea, Blinken stated that the Biden administration was consulting closely with the governments of South Korea, Japan, and other allied nations while also acknowledging that Beijing “has a critical role to play” in any diplomatic effort with Pyongyang. Whether more consultation leads to actual consensus remains to be seen.
Second, the US will most likely propose a processual solution to the nuclear issue. In an op-ed in the New York Times in 2018, Blinken himself argued that the best deal the US could reach with North Korea “more than likely will look like what Barack Obama achieved with Iran.” He wrote that an interim agreement “would buy time to negotiate a more comprehensive deal, including a minutely sequenced road map that will require sustained diplomacy.”
Third, the new administration seems to place a greater focus on the human rights issue in its policies on North Korea. During his visit to Seoul, Blinken made clear that the US would not only address security concerns, but also the North Korean government’s “widespread, systematic abuses” of its people.
Three lessons from the pastAct, not react: As past experiences with North Korea have shown, it is now critical for the United States to act quickly and clearly communicate its new North Korea strategy to both its allies and Pyongyang. If official communication channels are blocked, the facilitation activities of individual European Union (EU) member states and/or Track 1.5 intermediaries could be helpful. Until then, it is crucial not to get sucked into rhetorical tugs-of-war with North Korea. If the international community fails to act quickly on North Korea, Pyongyang will likely once again resort to a crisis-inducing policy, thus forcing the international community to react to its expected provocations, rather than preventing further escalation in the first place.
Separate the issues: The North Korean nuclear issue is complex. Solving the military and security components of this issue will inevitably require addressing a range of related political, diplomatic, economic, and even historical issues. As the case of the Six-Party Talks has shown, however, one individual negotiation process can quickly become overwhelmed by the multitude of challenges and issues associated with the nuclear issue. As such, it is essential to establish adequate formats with the right participants to address the respective issues and challenges.
There is a role for Europe: Although there is no doubt that the EU is only a peripheral player in Korean Peninsula security issues, the current debate on a new Indo-Pacific strategy provides an important opportunity for Brussels to critically reflect on its own approach to North Korea, as it has failed to achieve its stated goals, i.e., denuclearizing the peninsula, strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and improving the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will not be front and center of this new strategy, the EU needs to show greater political will to contribute toward solving the pending security issues in the region if it wants to strengthen its profile as a security actor in the region.
This text was also published at fairoberserver.com.
Although things have been quiet in recent months and there has been no active dialogue between North Korea and the United States (US), developments in recent days suggest that Pyongyang is back on the agenda of the international community. First, it became known that the US has been reaching out to North Korea through several channels, starting in mid-February, but it has not heard back. North Korea then published two statements within as many days by two high-ranking officials. On March 16, Kim Yo Jong criticized the joint US–South Korea military exercise, warning that if Seoul dares “more provocative acts,” North Korea may abrogate the Inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement of 2018. She also cautioned the US that if “[i]t wants to sleep in peace for [the] coming four years, it had better refrain from causing a stink at its first step.” Two days later, First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui was quoted saying that North Korea sees no reason to return to nuclear talks with Washington, calling its outreach a “cheap trick.” These statements coincided with a warning issued by the head of the US military’s Northern Command that North Korea might begin flight testing an improved design of its intercontinental ballistic missiles “in the near future.” On March 23, Pyongyang tested two cruise missiles before qualitatively upping the ante with a short-range ballistic missile test on March 25, constituting a breach of UN Security Council Resolutions.
Although these developments may suggest that a further escalation on the Korean Peninsula is inevitable, North Korea has thus far been following its traditional playbook by signaling a message that leaves all options on the table, ensures maximum room for maneuver, and – at least from Pyongyang’s view – places the ball in the US’ court. North Korea is raising the stakes ahead of the conclusions of the policy review process in the US while simultaneously conveying the message that the door is open for re-engagement at some point. “In order for a dialogue to be made,” Choe states, “an atmosphere for both parties to exchange words on an equal basis must be created.”
Biden’s North Korea policy reviewFurther developments in US–North Korea relations will, to a significant extent, depend on the outcomes of the policy review process. Although this process is not yet completed, it is apparent that the policies of the Biden administration will differ significantly from those of the Trump administration.
First, we should not expect Donald Trump’s personalized diplomacy to continue under Joe Biden. Rather, Washington is trying to restore a consultative process by involving the regional actors in northeast Asia more directly in the North Korea question – and possibly trying to (once again) multilateralize the nuclear issue in the longer run. During the visits of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Japan and South Korea, Blinken stated that the Biden administration was consulting closely with the governments of South Korea, Japan, and other allied nations while also acknowledging that Beijing “has a critical role to play” in any diplomatic effort with Pyongyang. Whether more consultation leads to actual consensus remains to be seen.
Second, the US will most likely propose a processual solution to the nuclear issue. In an op-ed in the New York Times in 2018, Blinken himself argued that the best deal the US could reach with North Korea “more than likely will look like what Barack Obama achieved with Iran.” He wrote that an interim agreement “would buy time to negotiate a more comprehensive deal, including a minutely sequenced road map that will require sustained diplomacy.”
Third, the new administration seems to place a greater focus on the human rights issue in its policies on North Korea. During his visit to Seoul, Blinken made clear that the US would not only address security concerns, but also the North Korean government’s “widespread, systematic abuses” of its people.
Three lessons from the pastAct, not react: As past experiences with North Korea have shown, it is now critical for the United States to act quickly and clearly communicate its new North Korea strategy to both its allies and Pyongyang. If official communication channels are blocked, the facilitation activities of individual European Union (EU) member states and/or Track 1.5 intermediaries could be helpful. Until then, it is crucial not to get sucked into rhetorical tugs-of-war with North Korea. If the international community fails to act quickly on North Korea, Pyongyang will likely once again resort to a crisis-inducing policy, thus forcing the international community to react to its expected provocations, rather than preventing further escalation in the first place.
Separate the issues: The North Korean nuclear issue is complex. Solving the military and security components of this issue will inevitably require addressing a range of related political, diplomatic, economic, and even historical issues. As the case of the Six-Party Talks has shown, however, one individual negotiation process can quickly become overwhelmed by the multitude of challenges and issues associated with the nuclear issue. As such, it is essential to establish adequate formats with the right participants to address the respective issues and challenges.
There is a role for Europe: Although there is no doubt that the EU is only a peripheral player in Korean Peninsula security issues, the current debate on a new Indo-Pacific strategy provides an important opportunity for Brussels to critically reflect on its own approach to North Korea, as it has failed to achieve its stated goals, i.e., denuclearizing the peninsula, strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and improving the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will not be front and center of this new strategy, the EU needs to show greater political will to contribute toward solving the pending security issues in the region if it wants to strengthen its profile as a security actor in the region.
This text was also published at fairoberserver.com.
Joe Biden entend parvenir à des consensus avec les républicains sur plusieurs grandes réformes législatives. Parviendra-t-il à surmonter des clivages idéologiques anciens, mais que les années Trump ont cristallisés ?
Joe Biden l’a dit plusieurs fois lors de sa conférence de presse du 25 mars, sa première en tant que président : l’un de ses objectifs est de mettre un terme à la politique de division à Washington. Il souhaite ardemment que les républicains le rejoignent sur ses grandes réformes à venir. Immigration, infrastructures, emploi, environnement… L’agenda de l’exécutif est chargé, sans compter les réformes dictées par l’actualité chaude : limitation des armes à feu, défense de l’accès au vote pour les minorités. Le dilemme du président et des démocrates est dès lors celui-ci : est-il préférable, politiquement, de voter de grandes lois bipartisanes ou bien de passer les réformes à tout prix, sans l’appui des républicains, puisque la base électorale démocrate les attend ? Devant les journalistes, Biden a renvoyé la balle dans le camp conservateur, qu’il a mis au défi du travail commun.
Le pari du président, c’est notamment de mettre un terme à l’obstruction partisane au Sénat. Ce n’est rien de dire que ce sera extrêmement difficile. Le récent Plan de relance de 1 900 milliards a bénéficié d’une procédure de simplification du vote (une règle nommée « budget reconciliation process ») en raison de l’urgence. Mais cela peut difficilement être le cas pour les prochains projets de loi, notamment celui relatif au projet dit « Bring Back Better » qui rassemblera des articles sur la rénovation des infrastructures (routes, ponts, aéroports, écoles, réseaux d’électricité, etc.), la sauvegarde du climat et la création de dizaines de milliers de nouveaux emplois, en partie financés par de l’argent public, qui y seront directement affectés.
Le poison du « filibuster »
Il existe en effet un dispositif imposant au Sénat de disposer de 60 voix (les trois cinquièmes), et non de 51 (sur 100), pour adopter une loi, lorsqu’au moins un sénateur ou une sénatrice refuse qu’on l’on mette fin au débat parlementaire pour procéder au vote. Peut alors se mettre en place une tentative d’obstruction de la minorité, tentative appelée « filibuster », qui se caractérise par le fait, pour un ou une élu.e, de parler pendant des heures sans qu’il soit possible de l’interrompre, jusqu’à parvenir à un accord ou bien, s’il est impossible d’obtenir les 60 voix nécessaires, la majorité jette l’éponge et abandonne le texte. Le problème est que la règle des 60 votes est de moins en moins utilisée pour négocier entre les deux camps, et de plus en plus pour bloquer purement et simplement toute réforme voulue par adversaire. Ce que Biden a volontiers reconnu lors de sa conférence de presse du 25 mars, ajoutant que le filibuster était une relique de l’époque, raciste, de Jim Crow, et qu’il prendrait au besoin les mesures qui s’imposent. Mais pour l’heure, il veut croire à des consensus possibles avec le Grand Old Party.
Ce principe de la majorité de 60 pourrait, du reste, être assoupli (il l’a beaucoup été ces dernières années déjà, notamment pour faciliter les confirmations de juges et de ministres), voire supprimé par les démocrates, aujourd’hui majoritaires d’une voix, la cinquante-et-unième, celle de la présidente du Sénat qui n’est autre que Kamala Harris. Et l’on pourrait légitimement penser que c’est dans leur intérêt. Mais ils et elles perdraient alors, si le Sénat rebasculait à droite aux Midterms de novembre 2022, une possibilité de contrer des réformes des républicains (et pourraient moins faire valoir, le cas échéant, des intérêts électoralistes pour leur circonscription auprès du parti démocrate). L’unanimité n’est donc pas de mise pour y mettre un terme, la voix des « contre » étant emmenée par Joe Manchin, le sénateur poil-à-gratté de Virginie-Occidentale, dont on n’a pas fini d’entendre parler.
La politique est désormais extrêmement partisane aux États-Unis, et en particulier au Congrès fédéral, et cela ne date pas de Trump (même si cela s’est aggravé sous sa présidence). Mais alors la conséquence est que beaucoup de réformes risquent d’être bloquées et d’occasionner la colère des électrices et des électeurs (de chaque camp).
Immigration, port d’armes, accès au vote… des divisions partisanes insurmontables
Trois sujets, en particulier, seront scrutés de près. Sur l’immigration, Biden est taxé de laxisme par les républicains qui, cependant, lorsque leur parti avait la majorité au Sénat comme à la Chambre (les deux premières années du mandat de Trump) n’ont pas réussi à se mettre d’accord sur une loi. En cause : leurs propres divisions entre les chrétien.ne.s humanistes, les libertarien.ne.s, les pragmatiques qui savent que nombre de secteurs économiques comme l’agriculture, le high-tech ou les services à la personne ne fonctionnent pas sans les immigré.e.s (y compris clandestin.e.s), et les tenant.e.s d’une ligne identitaro-sécuritaire. Or il faudra bien, un jour, combler le vide juridique concernant les onze ou douze millions de clandestin.e.s qui vivent et souvent travaillent aux États-Unis, et notamment les 700 000 « Dreamers », qui sont arrivé.e.s mineur.e.s avec leurs parents sur le sol américain, y ont fait des études pour certain.e.s et y occupent parfois un emploi. Autant de gens sans véritable statut.
Autre sujet chaud : le libre port d’armes. Même après les massacres, ces derniers jours, d’Atlanta et de Boulder (Colorado), et alors que l’opinion publique est majoritairement en faveur d’une régulation fédérale (contrôle des antécédents psychiatriques et/ou judiciaires, interdiction des fusils d’assaut) que souhaitent Biden et Harris, les élu.e.s républicain.e.s du Congrès ne voteront probablement jamais avec les démocrates en ce sens.
Et, last but not least, le projet de loi voulu par Biden pour garantir l’accès au vote de tous et de toutes, alors que dans plus de quarante États fédérés, les républicains veulent réduire, par de nouvelles législations, le vote anticipé, le vote par correspondance ou encore contraindre l’électorat à disposer de papiers d’identité avec photo – tout cela, afin de limiter le vote des minorités ethniques. « From Jim Crow to Jim Eagle », pour paraphraser le président, furieux de telles initiatives (qu’il a qualifiées de « malades » et d’« anti-américaines » le 25 mars).
Pour l’heure, Joe Biden mise sur son expérience passée de négociateur en chef quand il était sénateur et sur le savoir-faire de ses collaborateurs et collaboratrices. Mais il y a longtemps que les couloirs du Capitole ne craignent plus le pouvoir d’un Josh Lyman.
The last time Glastonbury took place, in pre-pandemic 2019, a highlight of the music festival was the appearance of British rapper Dave on the ‘Other Stage’. During his performance, he beckoned a fifteen-year old onto the stage to join him in a rendition of what remains Dave’s best-known track – ‘Thiago Silva’.
At that time, Brazilian international footballer Silva was a stalwart centre-back, the main stay of Paris Saint Germain’s ‘le défenseur’ during its ascent to the top of French professional football. As the teenager clambered upon the stage, it became clear that he was wearing a now iconic PSG shirt replete with the logos of sponsors such as Ooredoo and QNB.
The Glastonbury PSG fest seemed inevitable; the video to accompany the track’s original launch in 2016, in which fellow British rapper A.J. Tracey appeared, was an homage to all things PSG including the club logo, its stadium and the suburbs of Paris from which the club traditionally draws its support.
It is not the first time that PSG, football and diverse urban communities have appeared together on-stage or in music videos. Other rap track videos in which PSG apparel appears centre-stage include Sugar MMFK’s ‘Trikot von Paris’, and Guy2Bezbar’s ‘BEBETO’.
Strong links between football, sports apparel and fashion are hardly new, the likes of the Fred Perry, Kappa and Lacoste brands have long had a symbiotic relation with the sport. Nor are connections between football and music a surprise, indeed one can even think of bands such as the Kaiser Chiefs which is named after a football club in South Africa and Saint-Etienne, named after a French Ligue 1 club.
However, the bonds and associations now being forged between Generation Z and PSG are particularly notable. Socio-culturally, they appear to reflect a sense of place and an urban identity that is rooted in sub-groups with diverse and sometimes multiple heritages, where consumption is inextricably bound-up in lifestyle, fashion and digital technology.
The role that PSG plays in people’s identity and sense of place warrants analysis in and of itself. However, it is the political backdrop to the clustering of young people around PSG, that is particularly intriguing. After all, the club is owned by Qatar Sports Investment, an investment vehicle through which the Gulf nation’s government acquires stakes in sports properties around the world. Meanwhile shirt sponsors Ooredoo (a telecommunications company) and QNB (a bank) are both Qatari stated-owned, adding a further interesting cultural-political dimension to the relationship between nation state and publics.
Qatar wrestled with its position in the world from a western standpoint. Indeed, this is a country that has struggled to shake-off its controversial associations with the right to host FIFA’s World Cup in 2022. Ever since the decision was made, Qatar has also been trying to shrug-off stories about its mistreatment of migrant workers and bribery. There are also concerns relating to equality, freedom and democracy.
Yet in the world of rap and the urban environments of Paris, London and other big European cities, for some young people Qatar-owned PSG is the epitome of cool and the embodiment of style, an unlikely emblem of their collective values. Whilst the symbols of state-led corporate Qatar add to the status-laden mix, as they adorn one of world football’s most desired items of apparel.
Nowhere is this convergence more apparent than in the video for Niska’s track ‘Freestyle PSG’, which depicts a lifestyle to which numerous people across the world presumably aspire. Indeed, when watching the video one is reminded of a banner that is often seen when driving around Doha: ‘Qatar deserves the best’.
Whilst the government in Qatar has tried to convince itself and the country’s population that they too deserve the best, the country has been similarly engaged in creating an equally compelling narrative in Paris and beyond. The world-record breaking signing by PSG in 2017 of Brazilian international Neymar being the most prominent example of this.
Neymar’s signing was classic soft power projection, especially as it took place at a time when Qatar’s near neighbours (such as Saudi Arabia) had just cut diplomatic relations with the government in Doha. Much has also been made of the small Gulf nation’s hosting of the 2022 World Cup, another attempt at soft power projection designed by Qatari government to convince the world that they want what many others also want.
Crucially, soft power is the opposite of hard power which involves coercion and force. Soft power is attractive power, a means through which a country attempts to convince others that it wants the same things as they do. But it is still power, which raises the issue of what it is that Qatar actually wants.
A small Gulf nation of less than three million people which, until 1971, was a British protectorate, Qatar is a strategically vulnerable country (precariously wedged in-between Saudi Arabia and Iran) about which people have historically known very little. It is also a country with huge oil and gas wealth.
Yet it is a country that is not without issues, the treatment of immigrant labourers being one such challenge. At the same time, Qatar remains a somewhat conservative nation, bound by the doctrine of Wahhabism. This has typically dictated that matters of gender equality and sexual orientation have not been addressed in the same way as in many other countries.
Nevertheless, Qatar is trying to reform, develop and change whilst at the same time trying to ensure that it becomes a relevant, legitimate and prominent member of the international community. It may seem like a big jump from the committee rooms of government in Doha to the ‘Other Stage’ at Glastonbury; in fact, it is not.
The legitimacy, relevance and visibility delivered by an association with rap, apparel and Thiago Silva is classic soft power. Instead of questioning the country’s ideology or highlighting the state’s failings, all that most people see is status, fashion and a lifestyle statement. In a world where symbols are an increasingly important measure of distinction or uniqueness, PSG’s is shining brighter than others influencing the everyday activities of influential youth groups. This is perhaps the underlying mechanism of soft power projection
In the same way that most people eat at McDonalds without questioning US foreign policy, or marvel at Brazilian football without thinking about deforestation in the Amazon, so Sugar MMFK and PSG make Qatar cool without people feeling the need to question the nation and its state. This, then, is the (rap) power of soft power.
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This article belongs to the GeoSport platform, developed by IRIS and EM Lyon.
El presente documento plantea una serie de cuestiones para el debate sobre la reforma de la UEM, incluyendo la Unión Bancaria, la Unión de los Mercados de Capitales, el Semestre Europeo y la Unión Política.
Das Verhältnis zwischen Indien und den westlichen Staaten ist zunehmend von einem Paradox geprägt. Auf der einen Seite hat der Aufstieg des Landes bewirkt, dass beide Seiten vermehrt geostrategische Interessen teilen, etwa im Indo-Pazifik. Auf der anderen Seite wachsen aber auch die Differenzen, weil Neu-Delhi sich innenpolitisch mehr und mehr von westlichen Vorstellungen entfernt – was für die Wirtschaftspolitik ebenso gilt wie für den Zustand der indischen Demokratie. Dieser Wandel berührt das Verhältnis zu Deutschland und Europa, denn die Förderung der indischen Industrie oder die Einschränkung demokratischer Rechte betreffen auch europäische Unternehmen bzw. zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen. Das jahrzehntelang in Europa und den USA gepflegte Narrativ der Wertepartnerschaft mit Indien wird sich künftig eher an übereinstimmenden strategischen Interessen und weniger an gemeinsamen demokratischen Werten orientieren.
Das Verhältnis zwischen Indien und den westlichen Staaten ist zunehmend von einem Paradox geprägt. Auf der einen Seite hat der Aufstieg des Landes bewirkt, dass beide Seiten vermehrt geostrategische Interessen teilen, etwa im Indo-Pazifik. Auf der anderen Seite wachsen aber auch die Differenzen, weil Neu-Delhi sich innenpolitisch mehr und mehr von westlichen Vorstellungen entfernt – was für die Wirtschaftspolitik ebenso gilt wie für den Zustand der indischen Demokratie. Dieser Wandel berührt das Verhältnis zu Deutschland und Europa, denn die Förderung der indischen Industrie oder die Einschränkung demokratischer Rechte betreffen auch europäische Unternehmen bzw. zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen. Das jahrzehntelang in Europa und den USA gepflegte Narrativ der Wertepartnerschaft mit Indien wird sich künftig eher an übereinstimmenden strategischen Interessen und weniger an gemeinsamen demokratischen Werten orientieren.
A few weeks ago, six eminent world leaders – including António Guterres, Ursula von der Leyen, and Angela Merkel – called for the revitalization of multilateral cooperation. They reminded us of the “Millennium Declaration,” which was signed by 189 countries in 2000. The Declaration expressed the confidence of the international community that multilateral policies could defeat global challenges such as “hunger and extreme poverty, environmental degradation, diseases, economic shocks, and the prevention of conflicts.”
The Declaration marked the heyday of multilateral optimism. But contrary to the millennial vision of global governance, international affairs today are dominated by entrenched mistrust between governments. Sadly, the above-mentioned article by the six world leaders does not explain what went wrong in the 21st century. Without such an analysis, however, appeals for changing course risk being little more than aspirational talk. To really make multilateralism great again, we have to ask: Why did things go astray?
The adverse effects of nasty surprises with international cooperationFormer British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan is frequently quoted as having said that what he feared most in politics were “Events, dear boy, events.” This catchy phrase points to the proverbial overlooked elephant that has rampaged through international affairs in the last two decades: Apparently, unexpected events escalating into major crises and global disruptions has driven the international community apart and contributed decisively to the demise of multilateralism.
To their credit, the world leaders are aware of the beast. They accurately state that major crises remind us of how interdependent we are, referencing the global financial crisis of 2008 and the current pandemic. However, there have been far more important disruptions in the past two decades: 9/11; the popular revolts in the Middle East, which escalated into civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen; the Eurozone crisis; Russia’s annexation of Crimea; the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom; as well as the presidency of Donald Trump. More could easily be added.
These disruptions shattered international cooperation. Economic crises intensified cleavages within as well as between societies. Austerity and social inequality championed populist and anti-liberal sentiments that were expressed through battle cries of “Take back control” and “America first.” Following 9/11, the war in Iraq split the West, whereas the military confrontations in Libya and Syria continue to divide the international community. Russia was suspended from the G8 after its territorial aggression against Ukraine, closing an important channel of communication with the Kremlin.
The cumulative effect of these disruptions has been a significant decline in the willingness of governments to collaborate. International organizations and multilateral agreements have become political battlegrounds. Many administrations, including those in the United States, China, Russia, India, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, prioritize policies such as decoupling, self-sufficiency, and strategic autonomy. Consequently, the current pandemic is unfolding as a dual crisis of global connectivity and global governance.
Credible foresight creates trust in multilateral cooperationIn their article, the world leaders shied away from the conclusion that global disruptions are not only a result of, but also an important catalyst for many governments retreating from multilateralism. That is why they are missing the low-hanging fruit for policy innovation: Avoiding nasty surprises by cultivating anticipatory governance, for instance by investing in multilateral foresight and forecasting capabilities.
Hardly any of the major disruptions in international affairs have come as a surprise. Genuine “black swans” are very rare: The 9/11 Commission pointed out that several American agencies had been collecting evidence that al Qaeda was planning attacks; there were plenty of reports from the MENA region analyzing the widespread dissatisfaction with repressive governments and bad governance; experts had frequently warned about the global financial crisis, the Eurozone crisis, and the pandemic; the referendum in the United Kingdom and the elections in the United States could only have two outcomes – so the lack of preparations for the unexpected results had more to do with wishful thinking than surprise.
The exception to the rule is the annexation of Crimea. That the Kremlin would drastically change course instead of waiting out the developments in Kiev, which had proved a winning strategy for Moscow after 2004, came as a real surprise. But in all other cases, plenty of unheeded warnings lined the road to the tragedy of multilateralism.
Of course, governments’ reluctance to trust forewarnings is understandable. The track record of expert predictions is not that impressive. Quite often, they turn out to be wrong. And crying wolf has consequences: Policymakers might be criticized by their opponents, the media, courts of auditors, or the public when they order, for example, vaccines – and a pandemic does not materialize as expected. This happened in 2009 with the swine flu scare, when policymakers in Europe and the United States learned a lesson that partly explains the inadequate preparations for COVID-19.
But some predictions are better than others. Research has shown that the best forecasters achieve up to 30 percent higher prediction accuracy than analysts with access to classified material. Diversity and multi-perspectivity are important criteria for the success of forecasting teams that consistently outperform their competitors. Policymakers should harvest this knowledge. Investing in multilateral foresight and forecasting capabilities promises not only to increase timely awareness of future events. Collectively anticipating risks and opportunities could also stimulate international cooperation and joint policymaking.
This text was also published at fairoberserver.com.
Nachdem es einige Monate ruhig geworden war in den Beziehungen zwischen Nordkorea und den USA, machen die Entwicklungen der letzten Tage deutlich, dass Pjöngjang zurück auf der Agenda der internationalen Gemeinschaft ist. Zunächst wurde bekannt, dass die USA seit Mitte Februar über mehrere Kanäle versuchten, Kontakt mit Nordkorea aufzunehmen, jedoch keine Antwort erhielten. Dann veröffentlichte Nordkorea zwei Erklärungen hochrangiger Regierungsfunktionäre: Am 16. März kritisierte Kim Yo Jong in einem Statement die gemeinsame Militärübung der USA und Südkoreas und mahnte, dass Nordkorea das interkoreanische Militärabkommen von 2018 aufkündigen könnte, solle Seoul »weitere provokative Handlungen« wagen. Zwei Tage später wurde die erste stellvertretende Außenministerin Choe Son Hui mit den Worten zitiert, Nordkorea sehe keinen Grund, zu den Gesprächen mit Washington zurückzukehren; den Vorstoß der USA bezeichnete sie als einen »billigen Trick«. Die Qualität seiner Provokationen steigerte Pjöngjang mit dem Test von je zwei Cruise Missiles und ballistischen Kurzstreckenraketen am 23. und 25. März, womit es erneut gegen gültige Sicherheitsratsresolutionen verstieß.
Diese Entwicklungen deuten darauf hin, dass mit einer weiteren Eskalation auf der koreanischen Halbinsel zu rechnen ist. Dabei folgt Nordkorea bisher seinem traditionellen game plan: Es sendet eine Botschaft, die alle Optionen auf dem Tisch belässt, sorgt damit für maximalen Spielraum und legt, zumindest aus Sicht Pjöngjangs, den Ball ins Spielfeld Washingtons. So hat Nordkorea vor dem Abschluss des Policy-Review-Prozesses in den USA durch gezielte Provokationen den Einsatz erhöht, während es gleichzeitig vermittelte, dass die Tür für ein erneutes Engagement nicht völlig geschlossen ist. »Damit ein Dialog zustande kommt«, so Choe, »muss eine Atmosphäre geschaffen werden, in der beide Parteien auf Augenhöhe verhandeln können«.
Bidens »North Korea Policy Review«Die weitere Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Nordkorea hängt zu einem nicht unwesentlichen Teil davon ab, zu welchen Ergebnissen die Biden-Administration bei der Überprüfung der Nordkorea-Politik kommt. Dieser Prozess ist zwar noch nicht abgeschlossen, aber es zeichnet sich bereits ab, dass die Politik der Biden-Administration sich maßgeblich von jener der Trump-Administration unterscheiden wird.
Erstens wird Joe Biden die personalisierte Diplomatie von Donald Trump nicht fortsetzen. Vielmehr möchte Washington die regionalen Akteure in Nordostasien wieder unmittelbarer in die Nordkorea-Frage einzubeziehen – und wird möglicherweise versuchen, die Atomfrage (wieder) multilateraler zu gestalten. Während seines jüngsten Besuchs in Japan und Südkorea erklärte Blinken, die Biden-Administration berate sich eng mit den Regierungen Seouls und Tokios sowie anderer verbündeter Nationen, räumte aber auch ein, dass Peking bei allen diplomatischen Bemühungen mit Pjöngjang »eine entscheidende Rolle zu spielen hat«. Ob die Konsultationen zu einem tatsächlichen Konsens führen, bleibt abzuwarten.
Zweitens werden die USA vermutlich eine prozessuale Lösung für die Atomfrage vorschlagen: Blinken selbst argumentierte 2018 in einem Beitrag in der New York Times, dass der beste Deal, den die USA mit Nordkorea erreichen könnten, »mehr als wahrscheinlich« dem Iran-Abkommen ähneln werde. Er schrieb, dass ein Interimsabkommen Zeit verschaffen würde, um ein umfassenderes Abkommen auszuhandeln, einschließlich einer sequenzierten Roadmap, die fortgesetzte Diplomatie erfordere.
Drittens scheint die neue US-Administration einen größeren Fokus auf die Menschenrechtsfrage zu legen. Während seines Besuchs in Seoul machte Blinken deutlich, dass die USA nicht nur Sicherheitsbedenken ansprechen würden, sondern auch die »weit verbreiteten, systematischen Misshandlungen« der nordkoreanischen Bevölkerung durch die Regierung.
Drei Lektionen aus der VergangenheitAgieren, nicht reagieren: Wie die Erfahrungen mit Nordkorea zeigen, kommt es nun darauf an, dass die USA schnell handeln und ihre neue Nordkorea-Strategie sowohl ihren Verbündeten als auch Pjöngjang klar kommunizieren. Wenn die offiziellen Kommunikationskanäle blockiert sind, können Vermittlungsaktivitäten einzelner EU-Mitgliedstaaten wie beispielsweise Schweden und/oder Track-1.5-Vermittler hilfreich sein. Bis dahin ist es entscheidend, sich nicht in ein rhetorisches Tauziehen mit Nordkorea zu verstricken. Handelt die internationale Gemeinschaft gegenüber Nordkorea nicht rasch, wird Pjöngjang vermutlich wieder zu einer kriseninduzierenden Politik greifen – und die internationale Gemeinschaft dazu zwingen, auf weitere Provokationen zu reagieren. Stattdessen sollte es darum gehen, eine weitere Eskalation von vornherein zu verhindern.
Trennung der Themen: Die Nuklearfrage ist höchst komplex. Die Lösung der sicherheitspolitischen Komponenten dieses Problems erfordert die Auseinandersetzung mit einer Reihe unmittelbar damit verbundener politischer, diplomatischer, wirtschaftlicher und historischer Fragen. Wie der Fall der Sechs-Parteien-Gespräche, des bis dato letzten multilateralen Formats zur Beilegung der Nuklearkrise, gezeigt hat, kann ein einzelner Verhandlungsprozess jedoch schnell von der Vielzahl der damit einhergehenden Herausforderungen überfrachtet werden. Daher ist es wichtig, adäquate Formate mit den richtigen Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmern zu etablieren, um die jeweiligen Themen und Herausforderungen zu diskutieren.
Es gibt eine Rolle für Europa: Die EU ist in Sicherheitsfragen auf der koreanischen Halbinsel zweifellos nur ein peripherer Akteur. Gleichwohl bietet die aktuelle Debatte über eine neue Indo-Pazifik-Strategie eine wichtige Gelegenheit für Brüssel, den eigenen Ansatz gegenüber Nordkorea kritisch zu reflektieren, da dieser seine erklärten Ziele – die Denuklearisierung der koreanischen Halbinsel, die Stärkung des Nichtverbreitungsregimes und die Verbesserung der Menschenrechtssituation in Nordkorea – nicht erreicht hat. Auch wenn die Nordkoreafrage nicht im Vordergrund dieser neuen Strategie stehen wird, muss die EU einen größeren politischen Willen zeigen, zur Lösung der anstehenden Sicherheitsfragen in der Region beizutragen, wenn sie ihr Profil als Sicherheitsakteur in der Region stärken will.