Das Bundesverteidigungsministerium hat 35 amerikanische Kampfflugzeuge als Nachfolger für die veralteten Tornado-Kampfjets bestellt. Damit wird die Fortsetzung der nuklearen Teilhabe gesichert. Gleichzeitig werden dem Eurofighter neue Aufgaben im elektronischen Kampf übertragen. Die Einführung der F-35 droht das anvisierte »Future Combat Air System« zu verdrängen, das Deutschland, Frankreich und Spanien gerade gemeinsam entwickeln. Den Konflikt, der mit der Integration der Systeme verbunden ist, kann Deutschland nur im Austausch mit seinen Partnern lösen.
Der Konflikt zwischen der EU und dem Vereinigten Königreich um das Nordirland Protokoll (NIP) ist beigelegt: Nach Zustimmungen durch den Rat der EU und dem britischen Unterhaus wurde das kürzlich verhandelte »Windsor Framework« am 24. März 2023 formell verabschiedet. Das Abkommen sieht Erleichterungen bei den Warenkontrollen zwischen Großbritannien und Nordirland vor und erlaubt dem nordirischen Parlament Mitbestimmung bei der Anwendung von neuen EU-Regeln.
Somit reduziert die Einigung zwei Einschränkungen, welche die Beziehungen zwischen Brüssel und London seit dem Brexit belastet haben. Das ist erstens der Konflikt um den Umgang mit Nordirland und die Umsetzung des NIP. Zur Erinnerung: Das NIP hatte Boris Johnson 2019 ausgehandelt, um den harten Brexit für Großbritannien durchzusetzen. Voraussetzung war, dass für Nordirland weiterhin Teile der Regeln des EU-Binnenmarktes und der Zollunion gelten. So sollte die Grenze zwischen der Republik Irland (EU) und Nordirland (Vereinigtes Königreich) offen bleiben, die Zollgrenze zwischen der EU und Großbritannien in der Irischen See verlaufen. Doch schon direkt nach Abschluss hat Johnson die britische Verpflichtung, Kontrollen in der irischen See durchzuführen, nicht anerkannt. Später setzte seine Regierung das NIP nur teilweise um und forderte eine radikale Neuverhandlung von der EU; 2022 noch hatten Johnson und seine damalige Außenministerin Liz Truss voll auf Konfrontation mit der EU gesetzt. Sie drohten, Kernelemente des NIP per britischem Gesetz einseitig auszusetzen. Diese Drohung hat sowohl das Verhältnis zur EU, zu Deutschland als auch zu den USA schwer belastet.
Für die Einigung haben nun sowohl die EU als auch die Regierung Sunak weitreichende Zugeständnisse gemacht. Mit der »Stormont-Bremse« können nordirische Parteien neue EU-Gesetzgebung stoppen, die automatisch in Nordirland gelten würden. Im Gegenzug akzeptiert das Vereinigte Königreich die weitere Gültigkeit von EU-Regeln in Nordirland, einschließlich der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs. Zur Umsetzung erhält die EU Zugang zu zentralen IT-Systemen. Diese Einigung konnte nicht alle überzeugen: Die nordirische unionistische DUP etwa hält das Windsor Framework für unzureichend und blockiert weiterhin die Regierungsbildung in Belfast. Zwischen EU und britischer Regierung aber ist eine zentrale Barriere aufgehoben.
Niederlage der Brexit-PuristenDie zweite bedeutsame Hypothek für die Beziehungen zwischen London und Brüssel war die Kontrolle der harten Brexiteers über die konservative Partei und die Regierung. Mit dem Triumph bei den Neuwahlen 2019 hatte Boris Johnson alle Positionen in der Regierung mit Brexit-Befürwortern besetzt. In der konservativen Fraktion stürzte die sogenannte European Research Group (ERG) 2019 zunächst Theresa May und drängte die Regierung danach immer wieder zu einer harten Haltung gegenüber der EU– nicht nur, aber insbesondere auch in Bezug auf das NIP. Auch der neue Premier Rishi Sunak ist ein originärer Brexit-Befürworter, setzt aber auf eine pragmatischere Zusammenarbeit mit der EU. Mit einer Kombination aus Einbeziehung von ERG-Vertretern wie Steve Baker in die NIP-Verhandlungen, aus britischer Sicht echten Fortschritten bei den Regeln zu Nordirland dank eines Vertrauensvorschusses der EU, der Unterstützung durch die Labour-Opposition sowie nicht zuletzt einer breiten Brexit-Müdigkeit ist Sunak das gelungen, woran Theresa May noch gescheitert war: Er mobilisierte eine überparteiliche Mehrheit und brachte das Windsor-Abkommen mit einer überwältigenden Mehrheit von 515 zu 29 durch das Unterhaus. Dabei spaltete er auch die ERG: Gegen die Regierung stimmten nicht einmal dreißig Abgeordnete, darunter symbolträchtig die beiden Ex-Premiers Boris Johnson und Liz Truss. Erstmals seit 2019 hat damit der pragmatischere Flügel der konservativen Partei wieder die Kontrolle übernommen.
Neue Optionen für mehr KooperationZusammengenommen geben diese beiden Entwicklungen der britischen Regierung Raum, pragmatischere Lösungen zur Zusammenarbeit mit der EU zu entwickeln, ohne sofort entweder am Vertrauensverlust der EU in Bezug auf das NIP oder innerparteilichem Widerstand zu scheitern. Hierfür ist ein neues Abkommen weder notwendig noch empfehlenswert. Denn das von Boris Johnson ausgehandelte Handels- und Kooperationsabkommen hat zwar den harten Brexit umgesetzt, enthält aber Instrumente, um die Zusammenarbeit auszubauen. Hier bieten sich mindestens vier Bereiche an: Erstens die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, in der die von der Regierung Sunak im März verabschiedeten außenpolitischen Leitlinien die Bereitschaft zu mehr Zusammenarbeit mit der EU erkennen lassen – etwa bei der engeren Abstimmung zu Sanktionen, der militärischen Unterstützung für die Ukraine, der Cyber-Sicherheit oder der Zusammenarbeit in der neu geschaffenen Europäischen Politischen Gemeinschaft. Ein zweiter Bereich ist die Energiepolitik, etwa bei Offshore-Windanlagen in der Nordsee. Der dritte konkrete Bereich wäre die britische Beteiligung an der EU-Forschungsförderung Horizon, die bis dato wegen des Streits um das NIP auf Eis gelegt war. Potentiale gibt es aber auch beim Abbau der durch den harten Brexit neu entstandenen nicht-tarifären Handelshemmnisse, zum Beispiel über die britische Kooperation mit EU-Agenturen. Schnell wird dabei aber London wieder mit der Frage konfrontiert werden, ob es in Einzelbereichen EU-Regulierung akzeptiert.
Das »Windsor-Framework« kann zum Befreiungsschlag in den Beziehungen zwischen Brüssel und London werden und diese in eine tatsächliche Post-Brexit-Ära führen. Gleichzeitig sollten die Erwartungen realistisch bleiben. Eine Rückabwicklung des Brexits steht nicht auf der Agenda – und die EU wie das Vereinigte Königreich werden in all diesen Bereichen um ihre Interessen ringen. London wird auch bei mehr Offenheit zur Kooperation mit der EU auf seine Eigenständigkeit und Souveränität achten, und sich nicht zum Juniorpartner degradieren lassen wollen. Die EU ihrerseits bietet Drittstaaten bisher eine Beteiligung ohne Mitspracherecht an, woran bereits etwa die Fortsetzung der britischen Beteiligung an dem Satellitennavigationssystem Galileo gescheitert ist. Um den positiven Zwischenraum auszuloten, sollte die bei Windsor gezeigte Flexibilität als Vorbild dienen.
The transition towards a more sustainable world economy is a fact, as the internationally community has realized that business as usual practices will lead to ecological disasters, from global warming, loss of bio-diversity to the contamination of maritime water bodies. Research, development and innovations are powerful tools to align the needs of a growing world population with the necessities of keeping global development within the planetary boundaries. There is, however, a huge and growing - rather than diminishing - divide in both inputs and outputs to the science and innovation systems. Developing countries, which are most severely affected by the multiple ecological crises cannot invest very high financial and human resources to address their specific challenges though research and development. This calls for determined international action and North-South cooperation in science, technology and innovation. The paper analyses the North-South divide in research and development and discusses, how international cooperation may strengthen the capabilities of the Global South to respond to the challenges and, wherever possible, take advantage of new economic opportunities in a world transitioning towards more sustainable growth patterns.
The transition towards a more sustainable world economy is a fact, as the internationally community has realized that business as usual practices will lead to ecological disasters, from global warming, loss of bio-diversity to the contamination of maritime water bodies. Research, development and innovations are powerful tools to align the needs of a growing world population with the necessities of keeping global development within the planetary boundaries. There is, however, a huge and growing - rather than diminishing - divide in both inputs and outputs to the science and innovation systems. Developing countries, which are most severely affected by the multiple ecological crises cannot invest very high financial and human resources to address their specific challenges though research and development. This calls for determined international action and North-South cooperation in science, technology and innovation. The paper analyses the North-South divide in research and development and discusses, how international cooperation may strengthen the capabilities of the Global South to respond to the challenges and, wherever possible, take advantage of new economic opportunities in a world transitioning towards more sustainable growth patterns.
The transition towards a more sustainable world economy is a fact, as the internationally community has realized that business as usual practices will lead to ecological disasters, from global warming, loss of bio-diversity to the contamination of maritime water bodies. Research, development and innovations are powerful tools to align the needs of a growing world population with the necessities of keeping global development within the planetary boundaries. There is, however, a huge and growing - rather than diminishing - divide in both inputs and outputs to the science and innovation systems. Developing countries, which are most severely affected by the multiple ecological crises cannot invest very high financial and human resources to address their specific challenges though research and development. This calls for determined international action and North-South cooperation in science, technology and innovation. The paper analyses the North-South divide in research and development and discusses, how international cooperation may strengthen the capabilities of the Global South to respond to the challenges and, wherever possible, take advantage of new economic opportunities in a world transitioning towards more sustainable growth patterns.
Germany’s shortage of skilled workers has sharply increased, especially in the social and education sectors, health and care, construction and skilled crafts, information technology and jobs in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). Simultaneously, the demand for low qualified labour has also been growing, for instance in help and household-related services. While EU member states continue to be the source for the majority of labour migration, their migration potential is declining due to their similarly ageing and shrinking populations. Recruiting workers from third countries, including Germany’s development partner countries, will become of strategic importance. In spite of many recent reforms, the recruitment of workers from third countries is still inadequate, and not enough attention has so far been paid to development policy aspects. Germany’s recruitment activities need to be more closely embedded in fair, development-orientated partnerships with countries of origin, in which their interests are taken into account and the rights of migrant workers are respected. Since many industrialised countries now recruit workers, this could also be a competitive advantage for Germany. The German government should make use of the extensive experience gained from the pilot projects to attract skilled workers for large-scale recruitment programs. These projects will require the systematic cooperation of all relevant ministries (whole-of-government approach) as well as the involvement of civil society and the private sector to set the course for development-orientated recruitment. The German government should engage even more strongly in the relevant global processes and forums whilst advocating fair recruitment.
Friedensicherung durch die Vereinten Nationen hat in Mali keine Zukunft. Für die seit 2013 bestehende Mission MINUSMA sind die politischen Rahmenbedingungen schlechter als je zuvor. Sie hat nicht die uneingeschränkte Unterstützung des VN-Sicherheitsrats und noch weniger die der malischen Regierung. Bevor ihr Abzug eingeleitet wird, sollte die Mission dennoch im Juni 2023 ein letztes Mal verlängert werden. In der derzeitigen Hochrisikophase für Mali ist es besser, das Instrument MINUSMA noch für ein Jahr im Land zu behalten, statt es aus der Hand zu geben. Die Mission kann positiven Einfluss auf die Transition zu einer neuen politischen Ordnung ausüben und den Schaden begrenzen, der durch Menschenrechtsverletzungen und den kollabierenden Friedensprozess verursacht wird. Deutschland sollte daher an seinem bestehenden Abzugsplan bis Mai 2024 festhalten.
In response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the United States and 37 countries formed a coalition in February 2022 to implement a barrage of export controls outside of any formal arrangement. By contrast, US controls on China are often unilateral, such as its October 2022 measures on semiconductors that went ahead without explicit consent, let alone a commitment by its allies to join. But to deny China access to “dual-use” technology, unilateral export controls will not be effective. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced during her visit to the White House, the European Union (EU) wants to renew its export controls on dual-use products and new technologies and to coordinate them more closely with US measures. That means that member states will need to develop a common position on the scope of their export controls – including the extent of their alignment with the United States – as well as ways forward with multilateral controls of dual-use goods, given the freeze of the Wassenaar Arrangement due to Russia’s actions.
Am 1. März stellten die Bundesministerinnen Annalena Baerbock und Svenja Schulze bei einem gemeinsamen Auftritt die Leitlinien des Auswärtigen Amtes (AA) für eine feministische Außenpolitik (FAP) und die Strategie des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) für eine feministische Entwicklungspolitik (FEP) vor. Trotz der Abstimmung zwischen den beiden Ressorts und ähnlicher Konsultationen mit der Zivilgesellschaft legten die Ministerinnen formal wie inhaltlich unterschiedliche Dokumente vor, die auch unterschiedlich stark auf feministische Ansätze zurückgreifen. Aber gemeinsam haben sie eine Debatte in Deutschland über Ziele und Mittel internationaler Politik angestoßen. Damit aus dem angestrebten Kultur- bzw. systemischen Wandel mehr wird als Gleichstellung, bedarf es allerdings ressortübergreifender Anstrengungen.
In recent years, global production of plastics has surged and is expected to increase further over the following years, with over a quarter being attributed to plastic packaging. Plastic packaging poses environmental risks due to the fossil fuels consumed in its production and the impact on eco-systems due to its inappropriate disposal. A large share of mismanaged plastic waste can be attributed to a few developing and emerging countries (DECs) in Asia. Their expected income and population growth, as well as associated increase in consumption and urbanisation, is expected to further strain inadequate waste management systems. In response, young ventures offering circular business models in packaging have emerged to tackle plastic packaging pollution. These ventures are embedded in an entrepreneurial ecosystem in which policies are, among others, determining enablers, and policy-makers have a key role in setting optimal framework conditions for circular business models in packaging to succeed. At the same time, policy agendas that address resource efficiency and the circular economy are on the rise in multiple DECs. For this reason, this paper addresses the question of the extent to which existing policies are supporting and enabling circular business models. This paper first discusses opportunities, risks, and challenges of existing circular business models in packaging in terms of waste hierarchy levels – reducing and dematerialising, reusing and refilling, replacing, and recycling – before examining the entrepreneurial ecosystems in which they operate. With a focus on policy as an enabler for circular business models in packaging, a holistic overview of possible policies in the circular packaging context is provided. Against this conceptual background, India is examined as a case-study. In recent years, multiple Indian start-ups have emerged, offering reusable packaging solutions or bio-based packaging alternatives, while other ventures seek to improve waste management and recycling. India’s previously introduced policies, including the Plastic Waste Management Rules, Swacch Bharat Mission, extended producer responsibility and a ban on single-use plastic, are the first stepping stones towards an enabling ecosystem for circular business models in packaging. However, this paper points out further opportunities – so far, India’s key policies have been addressing the downstream on the macro level. This study showed that macro-level policies need further enforcement and should be complemented by upstream policies. Meanwhile, meso-level and micro-level policies have been rather neglected. Policy-makers and development cooperation are encouraged to take action now, given the limited window of opportunity to establish a supporting framework for circular economies in development policy.
In recent years, global production of plastics has surged and is expected to increase further over the following years, with over a quarter being attributed to plastic packaging. Plastic packaging poses environmental risks due to the fossil fuels consumed in its production and the impact on eco-systems due to its inappropriate disposal. A large share of mismanaged plastic waste can be attributed to a few developing and emerging countries (DECs) in Asia. Their expected income and population growth, as well as associated increase in consumption and urbanisation, is expected to further strain inadequate waste management systems. In response, young ventures offering circular business models in packaging have emerged to tackle plastic packaging pollution. These ventures are embedded in an entrepreneurial ecosystem in which policies are, among others, determining enablers, and policy-makers have a key role in setting optimal framework conditions for circular business models in packaging to succeed. At the same time, policy agendas that address resource efficiency and the circular economy are on the rise in multiple DECs. For this reason, this paper addresses the question of the extent to which existing policies are supporting and enabling circular business models. This paper first discusses opportunities, risks, and challenges of existing circular business models in packaging in terms of waste hierarchy levels – reducing and dematerialising, reusing and refilling, replacing, and recycling – before examining the entrepreneurial ecosystems in which they operate. With a focus on policy as an enabler for circular business models in packaging, a holistic overview of possible policies in the circular packaging context is provided. Against this conceptual background, India is examined as a case-study. In recent years, multiple Indian start-ups have emerged, offering reusable packaging solutions or bio-based packaging alternatives, while other ventures seek to improve waste management and recycling. India’s previously introduced policies, including the Plastic Waste Management Rules, Swacch Bharat Mission, extended producer responsibility and a ban on single-use plastic, are the first stepping stones towards an enabling ecosystem for circular business models in packaging. However, this paper points out further opportunities – so far, India’s key policies have been addressing the downstream on the macro level. This study showed that macro-level policies need further enforcement and should be complemented by upstream policies. Meanwhile, meso-level and micro-level policies have been rather neglected. Policy-makers and development cooperation are encouraged to take action now, given the limited window of opportunity to establish a supporting framework for circular economies in development policy.
In recent years, global production of plastics has surged and is expected to increase further over the following years, with over a quarter being attributed to plastic packaging. Plastic packaging poses environmental risks due to the fossil fuels consumed in its production and the impact on eco-systems due to its inappropriate disposal. A large share of mismanaged plastic waste can be attributed to a few developing and emerging countries (DECs) in Asia. Their expected income and population growth, as well as associated increase in consumption and urbanisation, is expected to further strain inadequate waste management systems. In response, young ventures offering circular business models in packaging have emerged to tackle plastic packaging pollution. These ventures are embedded in an entrepreneurial ecosystem in which policies are, among others, determining enablers, and policy-makers have a key role in setting optimal framework conditions for circular business models in packaging to succeed. At the same time, policy agendas that address resource efficiency and the circular economy are on the rise in multiple DECs. For this reason, this paper addresses the question of the extent to which existing policies are supporting and enabling circular business models. This paper first discusses opportunities, risks, and challenges of existing circular business models in packaging in terms of waste hierarchy levels – reducing and dematerialising, reusing and refilling, replacing, and recycling – before examining the entrepreneurial ecosystems in which they operate. With a focus on policy as an enabler for circular business models in packaging, a holistic overview of possible policies in the circular packaging context is provided. Against this conceptual background, India is examined as a case-study. In recent years, multiple Indian start-ups have emerged, offering reusable packaging solutions or bio-based packaging alternatives, while other ventures seek to improve waste management and recycling. India’s previously introduced policies, including the Plastic Waste Management Rules, Swacch Bharat Mission, extended producer responsibility and a ban on single-use plastic, are the first stepping stones towards an enabling ecosystem for circular business models in packaging. However, this paper points out further opportunities – so far, India’s key policies have been addressing the downstream on the macro level. This study showed that macro-level policies need further enforcement and should be complemented by upstream policies. Meanwhile, meso-level and micro-level policies have been rather neglected. Policy-makers and development cooperation are encouraged to take action now, given the limited window of opportunity to establish a supporting framework for circular economies in development policy.
Die Wasser-Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen will Wege zur nachhaltigen Nutzung der Ressource aufzeigen. Dazu ein Statement von Astrid Cullmann, wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin:
Die Tatsache, dass sich die Vereinten Nationen mit ihrem Wassergipfel zum ersten Mal seit fast 50 Jahren ausschließlich mit der wertvollen Ressource Wasser beschäftigen, zeigt: Wir stehen vor enormen Herausforderungen. Nicht nur im globalen Süden ist die Lage alarmierend, auch in Deutschland wird Wasser durch einen Überverbrauch und Schadstoffbelastungen in manchen Regionen immer knapper.
Rebuilding Ukraine starts now – even if it is being undertaken against a backdrop of conflict, violence and destruction, with Russia continuing to wage its war of aggression. In granting Ukraine European Union (EU) candidate status, the EU has also made the country’s recovery one of its own priorities. If this reconstruction project is to succeed, then it is necessary to take into account specific contextual conditions, along with experiences from other recovery processes, such as those in the Western Balkans and Iraq.
• Functional statehood: Ukraine is better placed in this regard than many other countries, particularly given the functional and widely accepted statehood throughout much of its territory. Reconstruction assistance can kick-start a forward-looking, sustainable green transformation in the economy and society. At the same time, there is a risk that massive external cash flows could feed old networks of corruption and patronage and create new ones. Clear accountability structures are required, along with sanctions for the misuse of funds, if this is to be counteracted.
• Agile planning over linear phase model: Rebuilding work is taking place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Consequently, planning processes must be flexible in order to adapt to different war scenarios. A linear sequence of recovery phases fails to properly address the situation. This is already visible when it comes to efforts to secure critical infrastructure. Its proper functioning is essential to people’s daily lives and to all forms of reconstruction, yet this infrastructure could become a target for attacks again at any time.
• Ukraine as a self-confident partner: As a result of the war’s trajectory, the Ukrainian Government is adopting a self-assured demeanour in its dealings with international donors. While this is essentially a positive thing, it can also give rise to a resistance to reform. The prospect of EU accession creates a common objective to work towards and can also establish coherent criteria for the recovery process, but only as long as accession remains a credible prospect.
• Managing reconstruction assistance: Recovery funds have proven an effective means of coordination, though it remains to be seen whether there will be a single fund or several complementary ones. A central Ukraine fund should be (co-)managed on the donor end by the European Commission, as it has at its disposal the strongest reform incentive, namely EU accession. In the meantime, the EU needs to ensure that the Commission and the member states also provide the majority of the funding between them.
• Diversity and inclusion: The governance structures of the reconstruction project should be designed to afford participation and a say to pluralist political institutions and civil society voices, and strengthen gender equality. In order to counter brain-drain, it is also imperative that young, mobile population groups (including refugees abroad) feel included.
• Social equity: Incorporating social factors into the recovery process will also be essential. Vulnerable groups will require particular support, given the alarming level of impoverishment among the population as a result of the war.
• Investment incentives: Essential reconstruction services have to be provided by the private sector. This requires that clear incentives be created, not least by providing investment guarantees.
• Developing trauma sensitivity: The rebuilding work is taking place in a context of violence and trauma. This requires that all stakeholders develop a particular sensitivity in dealing with survivors of violence and engaging with a traumatised society.
Rebuilding Ukraine starts now – even if it is being undertaken against a backdrop of conflict, violence and destruction, with Russia continuing to wage its war of aggression. In granting Ukraine European Union (EU) candidate status, the EU has also made the country’s recovery one of its own priorities. If this reconstruction project is to succeed, then it is necessary to take into account specific contextual conditions, along with experiences from other recovery processes, such as those in the Western Balkans and Iraq.
• Functional statehood: Ukraine is better placed in this regard than many other countries, particularly given the functional and widely accepted statehood throughout much of its territory. Reconstruction assistance can kick-start a forward-looking, sustainable green transformation in the economy and society. At the same time, there is a risk that massive external cash flows could feed old networks of corruption and patronage and create new ones. Clear accountability structures are required, along with sanctions for the misuse of funds, if this is to be counteracted.
• Agile planning over linear phase model: Rebuilding work is taking place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Consequently, planning processes must be flexible in order to adapt to different war scenarios. A linear sequence of recovery phases fails to properly address the situation. This is already visible when it comes to efforts to secure critical infrastructure. Its proper functioning is essential to people’s daily lives and to all forms of reconstruction, yet this infrastructure could become a target for attacks again at any time.
• Ukraine as a self-confident partner: As a result of the war’s trajectory, the Ukrainian Government is adopting a self-assured demeanour in its dealings with international donors. While this is essentially a positive thing, it can also give rise to a resistance to reform. The prospect of EU accession creates a common objective to work towards and can also establish coherent criteria for the recovery process, but only as long as accession remains a credible prospect.
• Managing reconstruction assistance: Recovery funds have proven an effective means of coordination, though it remains to be seen whether there will be a single fund or several complementary ones. A central Ukraine fund should be (co-)managed on the donor end by the European Commission, as it has at its disposal the strongest reform incentive, namely EU accession. In the meantime, the EU needs to ensure that the Commission and the member states also provide the majority of the funding between them.
• Diversity and inclusion: The governance structures of the reconstruction project should be designed to afford participation and a say to pluralist political institutions and civil society voices, and strengthen gender equality. In order to counter brain-drain, it is also imperative that young, mobile population groups (including refugees abroad) feel included.
• Social equity: Incorporating social factors into the recovery process will also be essential. Vulnerable groups will require particular support, given the alarming level of impoverishment among the population as a result of the war.
• Investment incentives: Essential reconstruction services have to be provided by the private sector. This requires that clear incentives be created, not least by providing investment guarantees.
• Developing trauma sensitivity: The rebuilding work is taking place in a context of violence and trauma. This requires that all stakeholders develop a particular sensitivity in dealing with survivors of violence and engaging with a traumatised society.
Rebuilding Ukraine starts now – even if it is being undertaken against a backdrop of conflict, violence and destruction, with Russia continuing to wage its war of aggression. In granting Ukraine European Union (EU) candidate status, the EU has also made the country’s recovery one of its own priorities. If this reconstruction project is to succeed, then it is necessary to take into account specific contextual conditions, along with experiences from other recovery processes, such as those in the Western Balkans and Iraq.
• Functional statehood: Ukraine is better placed in this regard than many other countries, particularly given the functional and widely accepted statehood throughout much of its territory. Reconstruction assistance can kick-start a forward-looking, sustainable green transformation in the economy and society. At the same time, there is a risk that massive external cash flows could feed old networks of corruption and patronage and create new ones. Clear accountability structures are required, along with sanctions for the misuse of funds, if this is to be counteracted.
• Agile planning over linear phase model: Rebuilding work is taking place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Consequently, planning processes must be flexible in order to adapt to different war scenarios. A linear sequence of recovery phases fails to properly address the situation. This is already visible when it comes to efforts to secure critical infrastructure. Its proper functioning is essential to people’s daily lives and to all forms of reconstruction, yet this infrastructure could become a target for attacks again at any time.
• Ukraine as a self-confident partner: As a result of the war’s trajectory, the Ukrainian Government is adopting a self-assured demeanour in its dealings with international donors. While this is essentially a positive thing, it can also give rise to a resistance to reform. The prospect of EU accession creates a common objective to work towards and can also establish coherent criteria for the recovery process, but only as long as accession remains a credible prospect.
• Managing reconstruction assistance: Recovery funds have proven an effective means of coordination, though it remains to be seen whether there will be a single fund or several complementary ones. A central Ukraine fund should be (co-)managed on the donor end by the European Commission, as it has at its disposal the strongest reform incentive, namely EU accession. In the meantime, the EU needs to ensure that the Commission and the member states also provide the majority of the funding between them.
• Diversity and inclusion: The governance structures of the reconstruction project should be designed to afford participation and a say to pluralist political institutions and civil society voices, and strengthen gender equality. In order to counter brain-drain, it is also imperative that young, mobile population groups (including refugees abroad) feel included.
• Social equity: Incorporating social factors into the recovery process will also be essential. Vulnerable groups will require particular support, given the alarming level of impoverishment among the population as a result of the war.
• Investment incentives: Essential reconstruction services have to be provided by the private sector. This requires that clear incentives be created, not least by providing investment guarantees.
• Developing trauma sensitivity: The rebuilding work is taking place in a context of violence and trauma. This requires that all stakeholders develop a particular sensitivity in dealing with survivors of violence and engaging with a traumatised society.
Die Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft Verdi und die Eisenbahn- und Verkehrsgewerkschaft (EVG) haben für kommenden Montag zu einem gemeinsamen bundesweiten Warnstreik aufgerufen. Die aktuellen Arbeitskämpfe kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:
Wir erleben zurzeit eine Wende auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Die Zeiten eines Arbeitgebermarktes, in dem Arbeitgeber*innen Löhne und Arbeitsbedingungen mehr oder weniger diktieren konnten, scheinen vorbei. Der Arbeitsmarkt entwickelt sich zu einem Arbeitnehmer*innenmarkt. Bereits heute gibt es in Deutschland zwei Millionen offene Stellen und eine riesige Fachkräftelücke, die sich in den kommenden zehn Jahren noch vergrößern wird. Viele Arbeitgeber*innen wollen diese Tatsache noch nicht wahrhaben und fordern mehr „Bock auf Arbeit“, höhere Arbeitszeiten und geringere Lohnsteigerungen.
Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (m/w/div) für 10 Wochenstunden.