Diplomacy & Crisis News

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2017). Rémy Hémez, chercheur au sein du Laboratoire de Recherche pour la Défense (LRD) à l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Conrad C. Crane, Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2016, 312 pages).

Conrad Crane, officier de l’US Army en retraite et historien, est aujourd’hui Chief of Historical Services for the Army Heritage and Education Center. Dans Cassandra in Oz, il nous propose une plongée à la première personne en 2005-2006 : au cours de cette période, il a joué un rôle central dans la rédaction du FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, la doctrine américaine de contre-insurrection.

Le récit démarre trois ans auparavant, en 2002. Conrad Crane est alors chercheur au Strategic Studies Institute de l’US Army War College, et l’Irak est au cœur des préoccupations de toute l’institution militaire américaine. Il travaille à un plan pour reconstruire l’Irak, qui sera rendu public en février 2003. Ce plan n’aura que peu d’impact sur les décideurs politiques et militaires mais deviendra par la suite une sorte de symbole des opportunités manquées dans ce pays, Crane y ayant notamment souligné l’importance de maintenir et d’utiliser l’armée irakienne, l’une des rares « forces pour l’unité au sein de la société ».

En novembre 2005, l’auteur est contacté par le général Petraeus, alors à la tête de l’US Army Combined Arms Center, pour participer à l’élaboration de la future doctrine de contre-insurrection de l’US Army. La rédaction de ce manuel suit un processus original pour un document de doctrine de l’Army. La volonté de le publier rapidement conduit à éluder les multiples circuits de validation normalement mis en œuvre. Un premier draft est ainsi rédigé dès février 2006. Un séminaire exceptionnel, réunissant les meilleurs analystes américains de la contre-insurrection, est ensuite organisé pour l’amender. Le FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency est finalement publié le 15 décembre 2006, soit 13 mois après le début du projet. Il rencontre un succès incroyable pour un document de ce type, avec 1,5 million de téléchargements le premier mois.

Après avoir passé en revue l’accueil critique reçu par le FM 3-24, Conrad Crane revient sur sa mission en Irak en 2007, dans le but d’évaluer « la doctrine en action ». Il estime qu’elle a eu un effet sur le terrain, même si le cœur des pratiques observées découle surtout de l’expérience accumulée en Irak et en Afghanistan. Il souligne aussi les difficultés de mise en œuvre, comme le manque d’appui apporté par les autres administrations américaines.

Dans les chapitres conclusifs, l’auteur revient d’abord sur le désintérêt progressif pour la COIN dans les armées américaines à partir de 2011. Pour lui, la guerre irrégulière n’est pas vraiment reconnue comme objet propre par l’administration. Il souligne notamment qu’il est plus difficile de justifier des dépenses militaires élevées pour ce type de conflit que pour une guerre classique. Dans l’ultime chapitre, l’auteur présente 21 « observations » passionnantes sur la guerre. Fondées sur les leçons de l’histoire, elles se veulent des guides pour l’avenir. Ce chapitre mérite tout particulièrement la lecture.

L’ouvrage de Conrad Crane est un véritable témoignage pour l’histoire. Une lecture indispensable pour les amateurs d’histoire militaire, en particulier ceux qui s’intéressent à la contre-insurrection et à l’élaboration et l’impact des doctrines militaires.

Rémy Hémez

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

The United Nations agricultural agency today unveiled guidelines to help Governments balance the needs of farming and climate change when making decisions, such as whether to refill a dried up lake or focus instead on sustainably using the forest on its shore.

Warning of the disastrous impact of an imminent attack on a western city and port and Yemen, the United Nations migration agency has called on all actors to use dialogue and talks rather than military force, which will put more civilians in danger.

The United Nations human rights office today urged the Government of El Salvador to take urgent measures to protect a prominent transgender human rights defender, Karla Avelar, and other activists and individuals working on similar issues.

The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, said today that next week’s UN-facilitated talks in Geneva will benefit from the dynamics of the negotiations which began in Astana, Kazakhstan, earlier this month, which saw an agreement between Russia, Iran and Turkey on ‘de-escalation zones’ in war-torn Syria.

Following last year’s leak of confidential financial documents from a Panama law firm, a United Nations rights expert yesterday called on the countries’ authorities to continue to impose greater due diligence on financial and banking institutions.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2017). John Seaman, chercheur au Centre Asie de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Kevin P. Gallagher, The China Triangle: Latin America’s China Boom and the Fate of the Washington Consensus (Oxford University Press, 2016, 256 pages).

Depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, l’Amérique latine est perçue comme la chasse gardée prioritaire des États-Unis. Mais depuis une décennie ce sont des vents qui soufflent d’Asie, et plus particulièrement de Chine, qui s’imposent sur le Nouveau Continent. À travers le commerce, des investissements et une diplomatie proactive, la Chine a réussi à s’implanter de manière conséquente en Amérique latine, sous le nez de Washington.

La Chine aurait investi 119 milliards de dollars dans la région entre 2003 et 2013, et les banques officielles chinoises y sont devenues les premiers créanciers étrangers. Alors que la Chine est devenue le premier partenaire commercial des pays de l’Amérique du Sud en 2011 (sans compter le Mexique ou l’Amérique centrale), le président Xi Jinping annonce en 2015 son ambition de hausser le niveau des échanges commerciaux avec la région au sens large à 500 milliards de dollars par an en 2025, et d’y investir 250 milliards d’ici là. Au moment où la présidence de Donald Trump laisse prévoir un regain de tension sino-américaine, cette région promet d’être un terrain fructueux de rivalité entre Pékin et Washington.

C’est dans ce contexte de tension que Kevin Gallagher tente de mettre les choses en perspective pour calmer et réorienter le débat dans The China Triangle, en y valorisant un scénario où les pays d’Amérique latine pourraient tirer bénéfice d’une coopération triangulaire avec les États-Unis et la Chine, au lieu de s’enfermer dans l’un ou l’autre camp.

Une des idées fortes de l’auteur est que la Chine ne se positionne pas nécessairement en contradiction avec l’approche « occidentale » dans la région, menée avant tout par les États-Unis et les institutions financières internationales. Au contraire, elle serait plutôt complémentaire. Par exemple, contrairement aux idées reçues, beaucoup de crédits proposés par les banques chinoises sont négociés aux taux commerciaux, et non à des taux préférentiels (les soi-disant sweetheart deals). Pékin aurait par ailleurs tendance à opérer dans des pays jugés à trop fort risque par d’autres, comme le Venezuela, créant dès lors des opportunités de développement qui n’auraient peut-être pas existé sans la Chine. Afin de compenser le risque, les banques chinoises développent des formules comme les « crédits-contre-nature » (ou oil-for-loans), qu’elles auraient notamment appris du Japon pendant les années 1970. Au niveau sectoriel, la Chine vise les infrastructures : la région aurait des besoins estimés à 260 milliards de dollars par an.

Le vrai souci, selon l’auteur, est que les pays d’Amérique latine manquent toujours des moyens de profiter pleinement de leurs relations économiques avec les États-Unis et la Chine. Ils se sont libéralisés trop rapidement à l’ère du Washington Consensus, et avec la multiplication des traités de libre-échange ils ont perdu la flexibilité nécessaire pour investir dans l’innovation et la compétitivité des exportations. C’est en partie pour cette raison que ces pays n’ont pas su capturer et réinvestir les rentes de leurs richesses du sol, vendues alors que le China Boom battait son plein entre 2003 et 2013, pour en faire une vraie aubaine économique de plus long terme. Sous Donald Trump, des changements systémiques semblent proches : les pays d’Amérique latine y trouveront peut-être l’occasion de changer de dynamique.

John Seaman

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

 

Onetime colleagues and former officials wonder how the deputy attorney general became Trump’s hatchet man.

(Own report) - The German government is negotiating new German Turkish arms deals, as was confirmed by the German Ministry of Economics. Brigitte Zypries (SPD), Minister of the Economy, spoke with the CEO of Rheinmetall weapons manufacturer about upgrading the Turkish Leopard battle tank. "In principle," such deals with NATO partners "can not to be restricted," according to Berlin. The German government is also seeking to re-invigorate German-Turkish economic cooperation, to strengthen bilateral relations. Germany does not want to loose Turkey as a "bridge" connecting Germany and the EU to the Middle East. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara is not only strengthening the country's economy and, in the long run, make it one of the world's top ten economies ("Vision 2023"), he is also planning to transform the country into an independent regional power, forming alliances as it chooses - no longer dependent on the western states. The reorientation of its foreign policy is accompanied by the country's transformation into a presidential dictatorship.

Lawmakers want the Trump White House to approve U.S. Navy patrols in the disputed waterway to counter China’s expansionist tactics.

A Vietnamese sinking boat (L) which was rammed and then sunk by Chinese vessels is seen near a Marine Guard ship (R) at Ly Son island of Vietnam’s central Quang Ngai province May 29, 2014. (REUTERS/Stringer)

Hanoi officially expressed its displeasure over Beijing’s annual fishing ban in the South China Sea at a regular press conference last week.

The unilateral fishing ban, announced by China’s Ministry of Agriculture, is in effect from May 1 to August 16 and ostensibly issued and enforced to protect against overfishing. The ban includes the Hoang Sa Archipelago (Paracel Islands), Gulf of Tonkin, and Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc, or Panatag Shoal) and has applied to fishermen from both China and other countries since 1999.

During the press conference, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang reiterated Hanoi’s position over the waters, arguing, “Vietnam vehemently opposes China’s unilateral ban on fishing as it violates Vietnam’s authority over Hoang Sa archipelago and its legitimate rights and interests regarding its seas.”

As noted by Hanoi, China’s action is not in the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China (East Vietnam) Sea (DOC) signed by ASEAN and China in 2002, that promises to “enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned.”

Indeed, Beijing’s annual fishing ban extends to waters that have been traditional fishing grounds of Vietnamese fishermen for years. In the last few years, there have been dozens of attacks by Chinese naval vessels on Vietnamese fishing boats in the Paracel Island chain, some of which took place during China’s annual fishing ban. In June 2015, the attacks came every week, as Vietnamese fishing boats were surrounded and boarded by Chinese crews, their fishing gear and catch confiscated, and their boats often damaged by water cannons.

With this history, and the recent fishing ban in mind, Vietnamese State President Tran Dai Quang travels to Beijing to attend the Belt and Road Initiative summit from May 11 to 15, joining some 27 other national leaders. The leaders will discuss the resurgence of the ancient Silk Road trading routes that once carried goods between China and Europe. The Belt and Road Initiative, formerly known as “One Belt, One Road,” was put forth in 2013 by General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of China, Xi Jinping.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative is important to Hanoi, as Vietnam exported some $16.6 billion (10 percent of total) to China in 2015, according to the World Bank. In recent months, Hanoi and Beijing have had a series of cordial meetings to reduce tensions, and President Quang’s visit next week to Beijing could be another opportunity to reduce tensions over the annual fishing ban.

Yet Beijing will be reluctant to lift the ban in waters it considers its own, and Quang (the former head of the ministry of public security) will likely focus next week on bringing more of the trade and investment benefits from China’s Belt and Road Initiative to Vietnam, while his fishermen stay close to shore.

The post Hanoi Protests China’s Fishing Ban appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A Vietnamese sinking boat (L) which was rammed and then sunk by Chinese vessels is seen near a Marine Guard ship (R) at Ly Son island of Vietnam’s central Quang Ngai province May 29, 2014. (REUTERS/Stringer)

Hanoi officially expressed its displeasure over Beijing’s annual fishing ban in the South China Sea at a regular press conference last week.

The unilateral fishing ban, announced by China’s Ministry of Agriculture, is in effect from May 1 to August 16 and ostensibly issued and enforced to protect against overfishing. The ban includes the Hoang Sa Archipelago (Paracel Islands), Gulf of Tonkin, and Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc, or Panatag Shoal) and has applied to fishermen from both China and other countries since 1999.

During the press conference, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang reiterated Hanoi’s position over the waters, arguing, “Vietnam vehemently opposes China’s unilateral ban on fishing as it violates Vietnam’s authority over Hoang Sa archipelago and its legitimate rights and interests regarding its seas.”

As noted by Hanoi, China’s action is not in the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China (East Vietnam) Sea (DOC) signed by ASEAN and China in 2002, that promises to “enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned.”

Indeed, Beijing’s annual fishing ban extends to waters that have been traditional fishing grounds of Vietnamese fishermen for years. In the last few years, there have been dozens of attacks by Chinese naval vessels on Vietnamese fishing boats in the Paracel Island chain, some of which took place during China’s annual fishing ban. In June 2015, the attacks came every week, as Vietnamese fishing boats were surrounded and boarded by Chinese crews, their fishing gear and catch confiscated, and their boats often damaged by water cannons.

With this history, and the recent fishing ban in mind, Vietnamese State President Tran Dai Quang travels to Beijing to attend the Belt and Road Initiative summit from May 11 to 15, joining some 27 other national leaders. The leaders will discuss the resurgence of the ancient Silk Road trading routes that once carried goods between China and Europe. The Belt and Road Initiative, formerly known as “One Belt, One Road,” was put forth in 2013 by General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of China, Xi Jinping.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative is important to Hanoi, as Vietnam exported some $16.6 billion (10 percent of total) to China in 2015, according to the World Bank. In recent months, Hanoi and Beijing have had a series of cordial meetings to reduce tensions, and President Quang’s visit next week to Beijing could be another opportunity to reduce tensions over the annual fishing ban.

Yet Beijing will be reluctant to lift the ban in waters it considers its own, and Quang (the former head of the ministry of public security) will likely focus next week on bringing more of the trade and investment benefits from China’s Belt and Road Initiative to Vietnam, while his fishermen stay close to shore.

The post Hanoi Protests China’s Fishing Ban appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Senator Marco Rubio and Hong Kong democracy activist Joshua Wong (HKFP).

On May 3, prominent Hong Kong democracy figures gave testimony at a hearing with the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) in Washington. Speakers included Hong Kong democracy activists Joshua Wong and Martin Lee, Hong Kong bookseller Lam Wing Kee, Hong Kong’s former British colonial governor Chris Patten, and writer Ellen Bork. The response from Beijing and from pro-Beijing media in Hong Kong was one of predictable nationalistic rage and ugliness, including accusations that Hong Kong democracy activists seeking international support are “race traitors.”

The CECC hearing “constitutes a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs including Hong Kong affairs,” said a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, “The Chinese side is strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposed to it…. Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, and Hong Kong affairs fall totally within China’s internal affairs. We are firmly opposed to any country’s interference in Hong Kong affairs in any form. The attempts of some individuals in Hong Kong to collude with foreign forces in meddling with Hong Kong affairs will never succeed” (See South China Morning Post).

Such statements on everybody’s “interference in China’s internal affairs” are repeated ad nauseam by the Chinese foreign ministry and state-run media; and could be delivered as effectively from a voice recording, over and over again, as from a live human being.

Likewise attacking the activists for “asking foreigners to intervene in local affairs,” China’s state-run Global Times said: “Hong Kong independence advocate Joshua Wong has been condemned as a race traitor after defaming the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy in the U.S. and begging for attention from the U.S. government.” Pro-Beijing Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao also called Wong and Lee “race traitors” and ran an anonymous commentary saying, “It is obvious that Americans are using Wong to attack the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy and the [Chinese] central government, but he is happy about his role as a political clown manipulated by others” (See Hong Kong Free Press).

The pejorative term “race traitor” (汉奸 or hànjiān), which can also be understood as “traitor to the Han [Chinese] people” or “traitor to the Chinese nation,” is commonly used in nationalistic mainland Chinese circles to refer to Hong Kong democracy activists, to Taiwanese who don’t wish to be “reunified” with mainland China (which includes the vast majority of Taiwanese according to opinion polls), and to anyone else considered disloyal to the mainland Chinese “motherland” and its ruling Chinese Communist Party. Joshua Wong and Martin Lee have both been frequently referred to in nationalistic mainland Chinese news media and social media as hànjiān.

Hong Kong has struggled for its democratic rights since the former British colony was handed over to Chinese control in 1997. Under the handover agreement with Britain, China pledged a “high degree of autonomy” for Hong Kong and respect for its democratic rights under the “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement. China has broken these pledges, however, under a systematic program of “mainlandization” aimed at politically and culturally assimilating Hong Kong into mainland China, thereby consolidating mainland control over Hong Kong and preventing “democratic contagion” from Hong Kong seeping into mainland China and challenging authoritarian Chinese Communist Party rule.

As a result, human rights and civil liberties in Hong Kong are now at their lowest point since 1997, and “One Country, Two Systems” has been exposed as a lie. Press freedom and freedom of expression in Hong Kong are in decline, and democratic development is stalled due to interference from Beijing. There is now little reason to believe that Beijing ever intended to keep any of its pledges to Hong Kong in the handover agreement with Britain (See Amnesty International, China Post, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders).

Joshua Wong and Martin Lee in Washington (HKFP).

“On the night of July 1, 1997, my home, Hong Kong, a territory of then-7 million people was handed over from Britain to the People’s Republic of China,” said veteran democracy activist Martin Lee in his statement to CECC, “Twenty years later, we have come to a critical moment: Promised democratic development has been totally stopped, and the autonomy and core values we have worked hard to preserve under both British and Chinese rule are in serious danger…. Twenty years ago, the ‘one country’ part of [the handover] agreement was completed, when China assumed control over Hong Kong…. But I am here to tell you today that we are still waiting for the ‘two systems’ promises to be upheld.”

Ellen Bork likewise said: “Beijing has dropped the pretense of respect for Hong Kong’s autonomy and the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement. The Party is not only preventing Hong Kong from moving forward toward full democracy, it is also advancing communist political culture and taboos within Hong Kong’s society” (See also Lam Wing Kee, Joshua Wong, Joshua Wong and Jeffrey Ngo).

Speaking for the United Kingdom by video conference, Chris Patten said that “China is supposed to keep its word to the people of Hong Kong, and Britain has every right to interfere in that.” However, Patten also criticized the UK government for not being “very robust in drawing attention to breaches – whether large or small – in the undertakings of both the letter and spirit [in the agreement] made by China.” Since his departure as Hong Kong’s last British governor in 1997, Patten has been outspoken in his support for democracy in Hong Kong and in his criticism of the UK government for failing to take a stronger stand against China’s violations of the handover agreement.

“Despite the multitude of challenges, Hong Kong’s future, indeed its destiny, must not be sidelined,” said U.S. senator and CECC chairman Marco Rubio, “China’s assault on democratic institutions and human rights is of central importance to the people of Hong Kong and to its status as a free market, economic powerhouse and hub for international trade and investment…. We cannot allow Hong Kong to go the way of Beijing’s failed authoritarianism and one-party rule.”

Rubio is also a co-sponsor of the bipartisan Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act introduced in February 2017. If passed, this act would establish “punitive measures against government officials in Hong Kong or mainland China who are responsible for suppressing basic freedoms in Hong Kong.”

“Maintaining Hong Kong’s autonomy is a critical U.S. interest,” said U.S. representative and CECC co-chairman Chris Smith, “The U.S. also has a clear interest in Beijing abiding by its international agreements — in Hong Kong and elsewhere…. The democratic aspirations of the people of Hong Kong cannot be indefinitely suppressed. I promise to stand with Hong Kong and call attention to violations of basic human rights as long as I serve in Congress.”

The post China Rages as Hong Kong Democracy Figures Speak to U.S. Commission appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Senator Marco Rubio and Hong Kong democracy activist Joshua Wong (HKFP).

On May 3, prominent Hong Kong democracy figures gave testimony at a hearing with the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) in Washington. Speakers included Hong Kong democracy activists Joshua Wong and Martin Lee, Hong Kong bookseller Lam Wing Kee, Hong Kong’s former British colonial governor Chris Patten, and writer Ellen Bork. The response from Beijing and from pro-Beijing media in Hong Kong was one of predictable nationalistic rage and ugliness, including accusations that Hong Kong democracy activists seeking international support are “race traitors.”

The CECC hearing “constitutes a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs including Hong Kong affairs,” said a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, “The Chinese side is strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposed to it…. Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, and Hong Kong affairs fall totally within China’s internal affairs. We are firmly opposed to any country’s interference in Hong Kong affairs in any form. The attempts of some individuals in Hong Kong to collude with foreign forces in meddling with Hong Kong affairs will never succeed” (See South China Morning Post).

Such statements on everybody’s “interference in China’s internal affairs” are repeated ad nauseam by the Chinese foreign ministry and state-run media; and could be delivered as effectively from a voice recording, over and over again, as from a live human being.

Likewise attacking the activists for “asking foreigners to intervene in local affairs,” China’s state-run Global Times said: “Hong Kong independence advocate Joshua Wong has been condemned as a race traitor after defaming the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy in the U.S. and begging for attention from the U.S. government.” Pro-Beijing Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao also called Wong and Lee “race traitors” and ran an anonymous commentary saying, “It is obvious that Americans are using Wong to attack the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy and the [Chinese] central government, but he is happy about his role as a political clown manipulated by others” (See Hong Kong Free Press).

The pejorative term “race traitor” (汉奸 or hànjiān), which can also be understood as “traitor to the Han [Chinese] people” or “traitor to the Chinese nation,” is commonly used in nationalistic mainland Chinese circles to refer to Hong Kong democracy activists, to Taiwanese who don’t wish to be “reunified” with mainland China (which includes the vast majority of Taiwanese according to opinion polls), and to anyone else considered disloyal to the mainland Chinese “motherland” and its ruling Chinese Communist Party. Joshua Wong and Martin Lee have both been frequently referred to in nationalistic mainland Chinese news media and social media as hànjiān.

Hong Kong has struggled for its democratic rights since the former British colony was handed over to Chinese control in 1997. Under the handover agreement with Britain, China pledged a “high degree of autonomy” for Hong Kong and respect for its democratic rights under the “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement. China has broken these pledges, however, under a systematic program of “mainlandization” aimed at politically and culturally assimilating Hong Kong into mainland China, thereby consolidating mainland control over Hong Kong and preventing “democratic contagion” from Hong Kong seeping into mainland China and challenging authoritarian Chinese Communist Party rule.

As a result, human rights and civil liberties in Hong Kong are now at their lowest point since 1997, and “One Country, Two Systems” has been exposed as a lie. Press freedom and freedom of expression in Hong Kong are in decline, and democratic development is stalled due to interference from Beijing. There is now little reason to believe that Beijing ever intended to keep any of its pledges to Hong Kong in the handover agreement with Britain (See Amnesty International, China Post, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders).

Joshua Wong and Martin Lee in Washington (HKFP).

“On the night of July 1, 1997, my home, Hong Kong, a territory of then-7 million people was handed over from Britain to the People’s Republic of China,” said veteran democracy activist Martin Lee in his statement to CECC, “Twenty years later, we have come to a critical moment: Promised democratic development has been totally stopped, and the autonomy and core values we have worked hard to preserve under both British and Chinese rule are in serious danger…. Twenty years ago, the ‘one country’ part of [the handover] agreement was completed, when China assumed control over Hong Kong…. But I am here to tell you today that we are still waiting for the ‘two systems’ promises to be upheld.”

Ellen Bork likewise said: “Beijing has dropped the pretense of respect for Hong Kong’s autonomy and the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement. The Party is not only preventing Hong Kong from moving forward toward full democracy, it is also advancing communist political culture and taboos within Hong Kong’s society” (See also Lam Wing Kee, Joshua Wong, Joshua Wong and Jeffrey Ngo).

Speaking for the United Kingdom by video conference, Chris Patten said that “China is supposed to keep its word to the people of Hong Kong, and Britain has every right to interfere in that.” However, Patten also criticized the UK government for not being “very robust in drawing attention to breaches – whether large or small – in the undertakings of both the letter and spirit [in the agreement] made by China.” Since his departure as Hong Kong’s last British governor in 1997, Patten has been outspoken in his support for democracy in Hong Kong and in his criticism of the UK government for failing to take a stronger stand against China’s violations of the handover agreement.

“Despite the multitude of challenges, Hong Kong’s future, indeed its destiny, must not be sidelined,” said U.S. senator and CECC chairman Marco Rubio, “China’s assault on democratic institutions and human rights is of central importance to the people of Hong Kong and to its status as a free market, economic powerhouse and hub for international trade and investment…. We cannot allow Hong Kong to go the way of Beijing’s failed authoritarianism and one-party rule.”

Rubio is also a co-sponsor of the bipartisan Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act introduced in February 2017. If passed, this act would establish “punitive measures against government officials in Hong Kong or mainland China who are responsible for suppressing basic freedoms in Hong Kong.”

“Maintaining Hong Kong’s autonomy is a critical U.S. interest,” said U.S. representative and CECC co-chairman Chris Smith, “The U.S. also has a clear interest in Beijing abiding by its international agreements — in Hong Kong and elsewhere…. The democratic aspirations of the people of Hong Kong cannot be indefinitely suppressed. I promise to stand with Hong Kong and call attention to violations of basic human rights as long as I serve in Congress.”

The post China Rages as Hong Kong Democracy Figures Speak to U.S. Commission appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

La lecture conservatrice du « tournant de la rigueur » de 1983 suggère que la fatalité économique a imposé ses évidences à François Mitterrand, deux ans après sa promesse de « rompre avec le capitalisme ». Lors de sa campagne, le candidat socialiste avait toutefois mis en lumière l'ensemble des contraintes auxquelles il se heurtait, et énoncé les mesures susceptibles d'y répondre. En renonçant à appliquer l'ensemble de son projet, le président ne se condamnait-il pas à l'échec ?

Ce graphique de Sarah Cabarry est une version interactive de celui qu'a réalisé Cécile Marin pour le manuel imprimé. Une version fidèle à la double page initiale est disponible ci-dessous.

Environmental violations thrust Nord Stream 2 and its European partners into an awkward position.

The conflict taking place in Syria, initially concentrated solely in the Middle East has spread internationally in recent years. While the effects abroad are not of a violent nature as they are in the streets of Syria and Iraq, many communities in Europe are taking direct and immediate action within their own societies.

Approaches to create safe zones are being sought by Russia, Turkey and Iran in an effort to reverse the mass migration out of Syria. A similar policy position is also being promoted by the current U.S. Administration. While the plan is one that could diffuse mass migration from Syria, it is often those groups with the least protection and international consideration that would still be treated as low priority.

Issues abroad affect the fate of many individuals and groups in the Middle East. For those who are targeted for simply being born into a certain group and at risk of seeing its community go extinct, the situation is the most precarious. In those case, often assistance does not come, depending greatly on Western leaders foreign policy priorities. Unfortunately the essential foundations of humanitarian values are usually disregarded in the calculations of politicians seeking reelection.

Safe zones will be affected greatly by politics locally and abroad. The overwhelming pressure that will lead to decisive policy decisions in Europe will come from the two to three million additional refugees coming through Greece and eastern EU members into the heart of Europe.

European politics to a great degree may become dependent on a working safe zone and brokered peace in Syria. Two million migrants in Turkey could return home, or be pushed into another quagmire while passing through to Europe, contributing to the ever worsening of EU-Turkey relations in 2017.

The ones who will benefit from safe zones may be refugees who side with the stronger forces in the region, set up often by the same armies that created indiscriminate conflict in the first place. Refugees may be the ones fleeing attacks by the forces running those same zones, and enemies of those forces may be targeted again. The catalyst of the conflict in Syria and Iraq may persist in regions where it would be safe for those supporting the local government.

A safe zone cannot absolve itself from the larger religious conflict, or ignore the fact that minorities in the region are often targeted by both sides

Groups like Yazidis, Christians, and other minorities that are often targets of genocide remain safe. Without a concerted effort by the United States, Russia and European powers, the most vulnerable populations will remain in danger.

Resolving the humanitarian crisis in Syria today requires a holistic plan to end conflict between all active groups. Without safe zones it will be difficult to address both local and foreign concerns and succeed in stopping conflict in the region.

The post Decompressing A Crisis Through Safe Zones appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The conflict taking place in Syria, initially concentrated solely in the Middle East has spread internationally in recent years. While the effects abroad are not of a violent nature as they are in the streets of Syria and Iraq, many communities in Europe are taking direct and immediate action within their own societies.

Approaches to create safe zones are being sought by Russia, Turkey and Iran in an effort to reverse the mass migration out of Syria. A similar policy position is also being promoted by the current U.S. Administration. While the plan is one that could diffuse mass migration from Syria, it is often those groups with the least protection and international consideration that would still be treated as low priority.

Issues abroad affect the fate of many individuals and groups in the Middle East. For those who are targeted for simply being born into a certain group and at risk of seeing its community go extinct, the situation is the most precarious. In those case, often assistance does not come, depending greatly on Western leaders foreign policy priorities. Unfortunately the essential foundations of humanitarian values are usually disregarded in the calculations of politicians seeking reelection.

Safe zones will be affected greatly by politics locally and abroad. The overwhelming pressure that will lead to decisive policy decisions in Europe will come from the two to three million additional refugees coming through Greece and eastern EU members into the heart of Europe.

European politics to a great degree may become dependent on a working safe zone and brokered peace in Syria. Two million migrants in Turkey could return home, or be pushed into another quagmire while passing through to Europe, contributing to the ever worsening of EU-Turkey relations in 2017.

The ones who will benefit from safe zones may be refugees who side with the stronger forces in the region, set up often by the same armies that created indiscriminate conflict in the first place. Refugees may be the ones fleeing attacks by the forces running those same zones, and enemies of those forces may be targeted again. The catalyst of the conflict in Syria and Iraq may persist in regions where it would be safe for those supporting the local government.

A safe zone cannot absolve itself from the larger religious conflict, or ignore the fact that minorities in the region are often targeted by both sides

Groups like Yazidis, Christians, and other minorities that are often targets of genocide remain safe. Without a concerted effort by the United States, Russia and European powers, the most vulnerable populations will remain in danger.

Resolving the humanitarian crisis in Syria today requires a holistic plan to end conflict between all active groups. Without safe zones it will be difficult to address both local and foreign concerns and succeed in stopping conflict in the region.

The post Decompressing A Crisis Through Safe Zones appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Will Congress, the FBI, and the Justice Department hold the Trump administration accountable or cave to political pressure from the White House?

He can make his case in person next week.