Diplomacy & Crisis News

The army reasserts its dominance after public criticism from the former prime minister and his movement.

Israel’s border policies are a danger to the principles of visa reciprocity.

Antony Blinken’s frosty reception demonstrates the limits of Washington’s China strategy.

La censure de plusieurs feuilletons et les tabous imposés à la télévision ont poussé plusieurs acteurs, metteurs en scène et scénaristes turcs à se replier sur le théâtre privé, en plein essor. / Turquie, Art, Audiovisuel, Censure, Culture, Médias, Théâtre - (...) / Turquie, Art, Audiovisuel, Censure, Culture, Médias, Théâtre - 2018/04

According to a recent Gallop Poll, about 82 percent of the Armenian population reject Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement recognizing Karabakh as part of Azerbaijani territory.    Some 86 percent of Armenians cannot imagine Karabakh Armenians having a future within the State of Azerbaijan.   The survey questioned a representative sample of 1,100 Armenians.

This latest survey comes after the International Republican Institute conducted a similar public opinion survey in 2021, where they found that 35 percent of Armenians believe that an acceptable solution to the Karabakh conflict is the recognition of Armenian Karabakh as a state, 34% of Armenians believe that Karabakh should be included as a region within Armenia, 16% of Armenians believe Karabakh should be a region within Armenia and 11% believe the area should be annexed to Russia.  

Only one percent of Armenians then were willing to consider other options that entail a compromise with Azerbaijan.   The same survey found that 90 percent of Armenians believe the relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia is very bad, 77 percent of Armenians claimed that Azerbaijan posed the greatest political threat to their country and only 4 percent of Armenians believed that efforts should be made to improve the relationship with Azerbaijan.

While Azerbaijan laid out five principles for the establishment of peace between their country and Armenia in 2022, where they emphasized that it is pivotal that Armenia recognize Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and only rule within its own internationally recognized borders, Armenians in contrast do not have a united vision regarding a peace treaty with Azerbaijan.    In fact, while Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has shown a willingness to compromise, there is heavy opposition in the Armenian Diaspora, in the Armenian Parliament and among Karabakh separatist leaders to any peace treaty being signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In fact, ANCA in the United States is presently leading efforts to end US military aid to Azerbaijan and to sanction Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev.  According to one of their recent press releases, “Senators Alex Padilla (D-CA) and Marco Rubio (R-FL) teamed up to introduce Anti-Blockade legislation today, backed by the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), and supported by a wide array of American civil society coalition partners, increasing U.S. pressure on Azerbaijan to end its nearly six-month long blockade of 120,000 Christian Armenians in their indigenous Artsakh homeland.”  

This was accompanied by an ANCA online petition to the Association of Christian Lawmakers, asking them “to cancel a planned speech by Azerbaijani Ambassador Khazar Ibrahim, in solidarity with the Christians of Armenia –the world’s first Christian nation, facing existential threats from Turkey and its oil-rich ally Azerbaijan.”  Even as Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan comes closer to signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, which likely would recognize Azerbaijani territorial claims to Karabakh in exchange for Azerbaijan granting Karabakh Armenians equal rights and both Turkey and Azerbaijan ending their economic blockade of the land-locked Caucuses country, ANCA and other Armenian Diaspora organizations have not backed down with their anti-Azerbaijani initiatives in the US Congress and across the globe.

Meanwhile, within Armenia proper, Armenian opposition MP Gegham Manukyan (ARF) believes any peace deal that Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan signs with Baku will not guarantee peace, but will open the door for further Armenian capitulations.  He accused the Pashinyan administration of backpedaling on the rights of the Armenians of Karabakh and merely recognizing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.  And if one considers the latest public opinion surveys by Gallop, Manukyan and other Armenians in the opposition can do much to hinder the successful completion of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 

For this reason, Armenian public opinion remains the main stumbling block for the successful competition of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Thus, for the successful completion of a peace treaty, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan must do more than recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity over Karabakh.   He must also educate his own people to support the peace agreement or else the peace will not last.    

La famille Belhoumi incarne la dernière vague de l'immigration algérienne en France. Retracer son histoire, c'est déplier le processus d'ascension sociale qui s'est effectué en son sein. Car on l'oublie trop souvent : le destin des enfants d'immigrés maghrébins est lié de manière très étroite avec (...) / Algérie, France, Immigrés, Inégalités, Islam, Migrations, Religion, Société, Travail, Maghreb - 2018/04

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The Saudi regime has long been correctly criticized—including during the recent LIV golf saga—for its abysmal human rights record, including the suppression of dissent at home and the murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. And under Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS’s) leadership, Saudi foreign policy was initially fairly aggressive—for example, its regional rivalry with Iran, sanctions against Qatar for being too friendly to Iran, and the aggressive prosecution of a regional war in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels that has killed way too many civilians. Yet as MBS’ leadership has matured, so has Saudi foreign policy into a more pragmatic and neutral stance, resulting in greater effectiveness.

The prince has seen three American presidents who want to cut back on American engagement in the Middle East, he feels that Saudi Arabia must do more for itself and its own security. For example, MBS refused to follow the United States and the West into imposing sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine; instead, the kingdom increased its imports of Russian petroleum products. In addition, Riyadh has diversified its foreign relations in general and especially with China, the largest buyer of Saudi oil and its greatest trading partner. The fruits of better relations with China have been realized with successful Chinese mediation between Iran and the kingdom, restoring diplomatic relations. This rapprochement may also help quell or solve other conflicts between the two countries in the Middle East, especially the brutal Saudi bog in Yemen.

However, Saudis are clearly trying to broaden their foreign policy, in part, to get the United States to pay more attention to the oil-soaked kingdom. The kingdom’s officials haven’t been subtle about this blackmail, claiming they preferred the United States to be their principal ally but needed to broaden their diplomatic horizons, given the lack of U.S. commitment. They have noted that former President Donald Trump did nothing in 2019 when drone and missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities—allegedly masterminded by their then-arch foe Iran—temporarily stifled roughly half of the nation’s oil output. The Biden administration hasn’t been spared either. MBS is quite conscious of how, during the 2020 election, then-candidate Joe Biden promised to make the Saudi prince a “pariah” over the killing of Khashoggi. Two years later, the Biden administration was angered when MBS allowed the OPEC+ oil cartel to cut production, raising short-term oil prices before the U.S. midterm elections.

No one can begrudge the Saudis for diversifying their diplomatic relations, prioritizing their own national interests, and realizing that they need to do more to safeguard their own security. The region-wide benefits of easing relations with Iran in the Middle East through Chinese mediation have enhanced Saudi Arabian security and should have facilitated the much-needed reorientation of U.S. foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific. In fact, over time, the Saudis had become too dependent on the arrangement reached during World War II between then-U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and then-King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud for the United States to defend Saudi oil fields in exchange for access to the oil.

If Saudi Arabia can be more pragmatic about its foreign policy, the United States can and should be more pragmatic about the Roosevelt-Saud arrangement, which was never an ideal arrangement in the first place—the overestimation by World War II and post-war U.S. presidents and policymakers of the importance of Saudi Arabia in the world oil markets have demonstrated as much. A more pragmatic U.S. policy needs to debunk such long-held myths about that market.

There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia is a major oil producer and exporter, and is also an influential member of the OPEC+ cartel. But it alone cannot control the long-term price of crude oil. It may have an influence on the short- and medium-term price of oil, but cheating has always plagued natural resource cartels. Many producers have an interest in saying they will abide by their official production quotas but can make more money if they secretly export above the quota. Of course, in the long run, this severely impedes the ability of any cartel to keep the price of a commodity above the natural market price.

One added reason that the United States can be more pragmatic about cozying up to Saudi Arabia—which the Biden administration, despite its initial hostile rhetoric, has been doing again—is that it is likely to be cheaper to just buy oil at the going world market price rather than to spend U.S. taxpayer dollars to try and defend something that really doesn’t need defending. Saudi Arabia, Iran, or any other producer doesn’t even need to directly sell oil to the United States; putting oil on the market from anywhere reduces the world price.

Finally, the oil market is ever-changing, and the heavy U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf area is less needed now than ever before (and even that was a collective illusion in American policymakers’ minds). The fracking revolution in the United States has again made the United States the world’s largest oil producer, greatly enhancing U.S. “energy security.”

Congratulations to the Saudis for pragmatically diversifying their foreign policy. But Washington should not succumb to MBS’s attempt to play off improved relations with other powers—for example, China and Russia—to get an increased U.S. security commitment. The United States fell for that trick during the Cold War, when non-strategic developing countries flirted with the Soviet Union to get more out of Washington. Similarly, in the current Saudi case, the United States is spending vast amounts of money defending oil that is being exported mainly to China. America can no longer afford to be everywhere in the world. It ought to emulate Saudi pragmatism, which in the present moment means transferring attention and military resources from the Middle East to the more strategically significant Indo-Pacific region.

Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow with the Independent Institute and author of several books, including, No War For Oil: U.S. Dependency and the Middle East.

Image: Courtesy of the U.S. Department of State.

China’s increased military capabilities in recent years, coupled with frequent military exercises near Taiwan, raise concern about a military invasion. Once rare acts, provocative actions such as China’s entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone now occur frequently, in part to coerce Taiwanese officials towards policies more in their favor. War may still be unlikely, with less than a quarter of international relations experts polled earlier this year expecting war across the Taiwan Strait this year. That the United States remains a key defensive partner for Taiwan likely depresses Chinese confidence in such an invasion, with Chinese defense minister Li Shangfu stating war with America would be an “unbearable disaster” for the world.

However, does the Taiwanese public believe the United States is committed to Taiwan’s defense? At one extreme, an overly confident public may balk at increased defense spending or military reforms in the belief that these shortcomings will be covered by Washington. Meanwhile, a public with no confidence may feel its options are limited to increase defense spending, in which it cannot expect to match that of China or find a means to placate it.

Several factors presumably lead to a confident Taiwanese public. After all, the United States has a long history of aiding Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, even after the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979, as the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has provided the framework for continued arms sales and military training. Taiwan also remains strategically important as a barrier to Chinese naval expansion into critical sea lanes, and defending Taiwan serves as a deterrence against further Chinese aggression elsewhere. Moreover, not only has every president pledged support for Taiwan since the enactment of the TRA, but also a broad bipartisan consensus exists alongside an  American public that appears increasingly sympathetic to efforts to bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

However, there are many reasons for the Taiwanese to be less optimistic. The United States maintains a deliberate policy of strategic ambiguity regarding its commitments to Taiwan in part to deter actions from either side of the strait that would alter the status quo. Despite beliefs that President Joe Biden may have been signaling a shift in policy with a firmer commitment to Taiwan’s defense, White House officials clarified no intention of such. Nor have criticisms of strategic ambiguity, including suggestions that the policy has “run its course” and fails to restrain China, led to its revision.

Likewise, even if the Biden administration and members of Congress were sincere in their statements about defending Taiwan, the potential costs of a military conflict with China would be significant, especially after decades of Beijing investing in military modernization, making any intervention on behalf of Taiwan beyond arms sales much more difficult. Simulations also suggest the difficulty that the United States could defend Taiwan. Simulations by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found the United States able to defend Taiwan, but with tens of thousands of U.S. casualties and associated equipment losses, opening questions as to whether Washington and the broader American public are ready for such a commitment. Related, while the United States repeatedly references commitments to Taiwan, where this falls within the broader priorities of U.S. foreign policy is less clear.

To identify Taiwanese public concerns, I surveyed 1,105 Taiwanese via a web survey (implemented by Macromill Embrain) from May 25 to June 5, using quota sampling for age, gender, and region. I asked respondents: “How confident are you that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China were to start a war against Taiwan?”

Overall, only 35.47 percent of respondents stated they were fairly or very confident in U.S. defensive commitments. However, confidence largely divides on partisan lines, with 73.65 percent of supporters for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) fairly or very confident, compared to only 15 percent and 18.98 percent of supporters of the two main opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) respectively. Additional analyses found that, despite assumptions to the contrary, concern about a potential Chinese invasion did not correspond with levels of confidence, while the partisan divisions remain statistically significant after controlling for age, gender, income, education, and general views of both the United States and China. The results suggest that, despite strengthening informal relations, including “the most comprehensive trade agreement” since 1979, and reiteration by the Biden administration of commitments, the Taiwanese public remains skeptical of this commitment.

One interpretation of the partisan divergence would suggest that the DPP base, in part responding to elite cues from party officials, has engaged in wishful thinking, overconfident about the depth of American defensive commitments and the appeal to protect democracies in light of recent efforts to strengthen bilateral ties. Another interpretation would suggest that KMT and TPP supporters are more likely to view American commitments as cheap talk, however well-intentioned, in the absence of incurred political and economic costs to defend Taiwan and that the United States, acting in its own national interests and constrained by a loss-sensitive public, would fail to meet expectations. Unfortunately, my survey did not unpack confidence further in terms of specific actions (e.g., providing additional arms, and coordination of air and naval forces), but the results may suggest how strategic ambiguity contributes to divergent perceptions in Taiwan.

While the United States remains Taiwan’s strongest security partner and the only one to provide arms sales, ultimately Taiwan’s defense requires both external assistance as well as broad investment in domestic production and reforms in training and personnel. Last year, efforts to address the former were clear as Taiwan increased its defense budget by 13.9 percent for 2023. However, my survey found a divided public on this increase as well, with 44.62 percent believing it was about the right amount, 35.48 percent too much, and 19.91 percent too little. Again, views diverged sharply on party lines, with a majority of DPP supporters (59.14 percent) thinking the current about was about right, compared to 59.38 percent of KMT supporters and 43.07 percent of TPP supporters stating it was too much, likely in part a function of lower expectations of conflict or that such spending may exacerbate miscalculations on China’s part. Regarding training and personnel, the expansion of military conscription currently maintains broad public approval. However, its effects may be limited without a shift in training towards increasingly technology-dependent specialized knowledge.

Timothy S. Rich is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Public Opinion Lab at Western Kentucky University. His research focuses on public opinion and electoral politics, with an emphasis on Taiwan and South Korea.

Image: Shutterstock.

De droite comme de gauche, les gouvernements latino-américains acceptent depuis longtemps de conditionner leurs politiques sociales au maintien d'un verrou fiscal. Lorsque l'économie est florissante, des marges de manœuvre apparaissent néanmoins. Lorsque la récession menace, et que la pauvreté (...) / Amérique latine, Amérique du Sud, Finance, Fiscalité, Néolibéralisme, Économie, Amérique centrale, Inégalités, Socialisme - 2018/04