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This summer, the bipartisan, congressionally mandated Afghanistan War Commission (AWC) will kick off a four-year inquiry into the origins, conduct, and conclusion of America’s war in Afghanistan. You should care about this Commission, and you should care about the report they are going to issue. If the AWC produces a quality report—fair, comprehensive, evidence-based—it will guide and inform the next generation of U.S. foreign and security policy.

The AWC presents a rare opportunity: America’s democratic institutions roused to ask pointed questions of the men and women charged with our country’s national security. The Church Committee of the 1970s, and more recently the 9/11 Commission, suggest these types of congressionally-mandated inquiries happen once a generation. A British historian once joked that Britons acquired their empire in a fit of absentmindedness. That is an astute observation. For anyone, myself included, who has patiently explained to friends, family, the pharmacist, the grocer, and others that yes, we really were still in Afghanistan more than two decades after the initial invasion, it certainly rings true. As a nation, we obligated the authorizations and signed the checks without giving much thought about what it is we were authorizing, what we were paying for, or why.

The AWC’s report could ultimately prove to be a consequential moment for the United States. If we get a quality report; if the American people are allowed to read it and consider its meaning and implications for the whole nation, and not just this or that slice of America; and if the report ultimately informs real reforms; it will be significant. More importantly, if you’re looking for proof that democracy in America still works, it counts for something that, after two decades of war, the U.S. government has appointed capable, public-spirited people to investigate and explain clearly and openly what went down in Afghanistan. Exploring and identifying exactly what happened, however, will require AWC members to ask pointed questions ranging the entire breadth of America’s longest war.

Who Was Actually in Charge?

The first question the AWC will need to answer is: how was the war authorized? Authorities are the tendons of our national security. They are the invisible thread that connects the fire team on the ground to the American people back home, linking the budgetary and lawmaking authority of the legislative branch to the operational authority of the executive. Authorities matter.

There are different kinds of authorities and a key question in Afghanistan is: what took place under military authorities, civilian authorities, and intelligence authorities? In a war, authority is usually concentrated in the hands of a commander who, by literal definition, commands the war effort. The commander oversees the theater of conflict, and in this capacity works with Washington to set and implement the president’s strategy. A clear chain of command means clear responsibilities, and responsibility enables the American people to hold commanders accountable for failures and recognize them for their successes. That is the theory.

Yet well before the first American boots hit the ground, Afghanistan defied the logic of normal military operations. America’s involvement in the country before 2001 was driven primarily by the U.S. intelligence community (IC), and the IC took the lead in the discussions about going into Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 Al Qaeda attacks. This, in effect, placed the U.S. Central Command in an apparently subordinate role to the IC. In 2004, for instance, while many former Taliban headed to Pakistan to join the armed opposition to the U.S.-backed Afghan government led by then president Hamid Karzai, the U.S. forces commander on the ground, Lieutenant General David Barno, drafted policies to avoid harm to civilians. But, according to a comprehensive history of the war in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Barno did not command all of the special operations forces conducting the operations in Afghanistan. Numerous books, studies, memoirs, and newspaper reports suggest that, in Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence officers exercised significant autonomy. So then, who was in charge?

A related question is this: what is the appropriate role of intelligence in policy decisionmaking? In theory, intelligence is the function of gathering and analyzing information to inform military and policy decisions. A good AWC report on Afghanistan should ask whether that happened and whether we have—whether we need—updated guardrails to further separate the IC from the U.S. military and policy decision making process.

At the same time, if intelligence officers were in the drivers’ seat, the AWC should ask what impact they had on the core intelligence mission to generate objective, actionable information. Did confusion between the intelligence and policy process have an impact on intelligence? For example, the U.S. IC’s assessment of the durability of Ashraf Ghani’s government following a full U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan very likely was a critical component of U.S. war and policy planning efforts. Unfortunately, this assessment appears to have been inaccurate. The question is why.

What Were Our War Aims?

The United States sent its forces to Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda and bring Osama bin Laden to justice in the wake of 9/11. The moment American forces swept the Taliban from power—and the U.S. administration at the time refused to consider any post-war power structure that included the Taliban—the United States also became engaged in nation-building, whether America’s leaders liked it or not. Yet, it wasn’t really until 2005 that the George W. Bush administration started defining and funding a post-war Afghanistan. By then, however, the Taliban had already launched its insurgency in earnest. As that and subsequent U.S. administrations defined what post-war Afghanistan should look like, they became more and more committed to an idealized vision for developing a social democracy in one of the poorest countries in the world. Why did U.S. objectives seem to grow and then balloon even as it became clearer and clearer to informed observers that lasting, outright victory in Afghanistan was becoming less and less possible?

One excellent study has charted the U.S. tendency over the years to escalate its commitment to Afghanistan in the face of growing adversity. In democratic politics, as in bureaucratic politics, doubling down often cements authority, while flipflopping is the kiss of death. Added to that, Afghanistan was so far removed from day-to-day politics back home that the costs of staying the course in Afghanistan never seemed as bad as the risk that cutting U.S. losses could lead to a major disaster, perhaps including the reemergence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. This logic seems to have driven policy makers from U.S. presidents to senior officials on the ground, apparently motivating them to respond to chronic American underperformance in Afghanistan by chronically overpromising future results that never materialized.

The proliferation of outsized objectives in Afghanistan was often matched by the proliferation of international actors. Beyond Washington and Kabul, funding appeals were met, policies set, and decisions taken by NATO in Brussels and other international organizations and actors in other foreign capitals, which combined created a dense web of overly ambitious commitments to Afghanistan. Did the many, overlapping lines of effort impede coherent planning or complicate U.S. efforts to set and follow its own established operational priorities? It is worth the AWC asking whether the internationalization of development and security assistance efforts in Afghanistan contributed to a mismatch between ends and means, between promises and what was achievable on the ground.

Post-conflict reconstruction is a tremendous task under the best of circumstances. In Afghanistan, the AWC should ask how and why a major, international peacebuilding effort coincided with a major counterinsurgency campaign to secure Afghan population centers and prop-up the then Afghan government. Fortunately, the AWC will have at its disposal the voluminous records of the Department of Defense’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), which documented and continues to document the challenges and pitfalls of reconstructing that country in the midst of a war. Yet SIGAR’s reports are necessarily limited to U.S. governance and U.S. expenditure, which comprise only part of the story. The same question that applied to military command also applies to nation building: who was in charge, and what was the strategy?

The AWC might also consider the wider impact of the contradiction between U.S. reconstruction and war efforts in Afghanistan. U.S. military forces and civilian personnel in Afghanistan typically relied heavily on elite, English-speaking Afghans, familiar with the language of Western governments and donors, to tell them what was going on. What did it mean for ordinary Afghans to experience both the high-flying rhetoric of social reconstruction and the horrors of insurgency and counterinsurgency? What did it mean for hundreds of thousands of ordinary Americans, who responded to the call to defend democracy overseas?

Making Peace

Just as Americans need to understand why U.S. leaders found it so hard to define their objectives for the war, so too should we ask why the United States found it so difficult to find a path to a working and sustainable peace settlement in Afghanistan. This is not a purely historical consideration. In an era of great power competition, the United States needs to be able to speak with its enemies, and needs to be capable of defining limited, achievable objectives amid conflict. This capacity is critical to America’s ability to limit, control, and halt conflict.

There is general agreement among many observers that the Taliban attempted to engage the United States between 2002 and 2005; U.S. officials, however, did not seriously consider talking to the Taliban or initiate Washington’s outreach efforts in earnest until 2010. The U.S. troop surge was well underway and could have provided an important bargaining chip in negotiations, but the surge also reflected years of America’s fighting and sacrifice in Afghanistan. By 2010, interests and suspicions were deeply entrenched on both sides. There were no substantive negotiations. Instead, for years after 2010, a cycle of preconditions and talks about talks wore on. The available evidence suggests there was no effort to link U.S. policy in Afghanistan—the troop surge, for instance, or the drawdown that followed—to any viable process or framework for peace talks.

Why did it take the better part of a decade of war to think about diplomatic engagement? Why did it take another decade to conclude a three-page agreement with the Taliban? Wars cannot be limited in scope and duration—they cannot end—without diplomacy. The commitment to dialogue, dealmaking and compromise is a necessary component of the use of force. Benjamin Franklin’s dictum, that a bad peace beats a good war, recognized that even a peace based on a three-page agreement is when the hard work of development and engagement and changing minds can truly begin.

Speaking with our enemies is hard. And yet the greatest risk to diplomats is not the enemy, but the perpetual fear their own country will condemn them—or worse—for seeking something less than total victory somewhere other than the field of battle. What is achievable is not always just; what is workable is not always reasonable; but we are always just one more offensive away from ideal conditions.

Thousands of lives and trillions of dollars later, the American people deserve to understand why it was so much easier to prolong a fruitless war than to seek a functional peace. Of all the questions the AWC could attempt to answer, this is the most profound. Understanding how and why and when to start or control or stop a fight is the most essential function of statecraft. The Afghanistan War Commission offers America a chance, unique for our generation, to ask whether the U.S. government could have done a better job in Afghanistan and could do a better job in the future of navigating the perils of the very dangerous world we now face. We owe it to ourselves and future generations alike to get this right.

Andrew Baker has over a decade of experience in the public sector and holds a DPhil in International Relations from Oxford University.

The views expressed herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government.

Earlier this week, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu received an invitation from the White House to “probably” meet with President Joe Biden, before the end of the year, somewhere. Meanwhile, Yitzhak Herzog, Israel’s non-partisan president who has limited power, spent Tuesday meeting with Biden in the Oval Office before addressing a joint session of Congress on Wednesday to mark Israel’s seventy-fifth anniversary.

Herzog’s invitation to Washington, arriving before one for Netanyahu, should be viewed by Jerusalem as a reflection of the United States’ deep commitment to Israel, but a recognition that its current policies are out of sync with Washington’s. Having different policies is unarguably Israel’s sovereign right, and Netanyahu’s as its leader. But if those differences become the default, it can threaten to permanently alter the nature of the relationship.

The right approach to Iran, for example, always the dominant foreign policy concern for Jerusalem, continues to divide Israel and the United States; even as strong bilateral communication and meaningful cooperation on the topic has helped mitigate public disagreements, as happened in 2015 over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. But even excellent communication is unlikely to mitigate a public, and angry, Israeli reaction if the Biden administration agrees to even a limited agreement with Tehran. 

As communication has improved on Iran, it conversely seems to have fallen off when it comes to other major foreign policy challenges. The proposed expansion of settlements and settler-Palestinian violence is slowing the pace of progress between Abraham Accords members, most recently demonstrated by Morocco’s decision to cancel the latest Negev Forum. The accords, however, are something the United States places great weight on; a new position was just created at the State Department dedicated to the issue.

Further abroad, Netanyahu’s decision to visit China later this year is prime to compound misalignment since it seems to be less about a genuine bilateral China-Israel relationship and more about a way to needle the United States and compel it to increase its regional involvement.

But Israel is neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE, both of which are trying to employ a strategy of hedging between the United States and China. As Mark Dubowitz, a longtime ally of the Israeli Right and CEO of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, said on Twitter, “If Netanyahu thinks he can … play the US and China off each other, he better hope that Israel becomes a major oil producer, returns the $38 billion in US military aid and no longer requires American support at the UN.” 

The announcement over Netanyahu’s decision to visit Beijing follows U.S. frustration with the Israeli leader for his refusal last winter to provide Ukraine with HAWK anti-aircraft missiles, currently sitting in storage. Israel has long been concerned that providing weapons to Ukraine could lead them to fall into the wrong hands and be reverse engineered, threatening Israel’s security. Moreover, Jerusalem was concerned that transferring them to Ukraine would lead Russia to impede Israel’s freedom of action to strike Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria, where Russia still operates.

But by denying the request, Netanyahu essentially dismissed out of hand the United States’ biggest near-term global priority in exchange for hoping Russian president Vladimir Putin doesn’t interfere with Israel’s interdiction strikes; all while Russia’s military relationship with Iran grows closer.

And in Israel itself, civil unrest will probably come to a peak over the next two weeks as legislation to curtail the power of the Israeli Supreme Court as an independent check on the legislature advances.

I happen to be in Israel this week for a conference. On Saturday evening, I wandered from my hotel down to Kaplan Street to observe the judicial reform protests in person. What I saw was tens of thousands of overwhelmingly diverse, patriotic, and scared Israelis, fearful that the judicial reforms will fundamentally undermine, in their view, Israel’s democracy.

While a strong U.S.-Israel relationship will, and should, continue no matter what happens with the legislation, there is no way to minimize or avoid that democracy is a shared, core, and fundamental tenet of the U.S.-Israel relationship; even if both of ours are imperfect works in progress.

The United States engages and has strong relationships with lots of countries that don’t share its ethos for democracy and freedom. But those relationships all come with an invisible ceiling.

On Tuesday, Biden told New York Times columnist Tom Friedman that there is a need, “to seek the broadest possible consensus,” when it comes to the judicial reforms; a follow-up to his comments in March when he said, a “compromise” is needed. Back in March Netanyahu responded to those comments with seeming annoyance, noting that Israel is a “sovereign country” and rejects “pressure from abroad.” But the President then, like now, was not seeking to interfere in Israel’s domestic politics. Rather, he was implicitly reflecting his own Zionism; almost certainly concerned that if Israel no longer meaningfully shares the bedrock principle of democracy, over time, the US-Israel relationship will transform from one with few limits, into a much narrower one with a ceiling.

And that is the challenge of misalignment as a whole. Allies can always agree to disagree on policies. But when they begin to be out of sync on too many of them, it can threaten to alter the contours of the broader relationship, no matter how strong. Such a policy chasm is not going to jeopardize the U.S.-Israel relationship today; but if it continues and widens, it can in the future. 

At some point this year, Biden will probably meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu. How it goes will depend on whether or not the US and Israel are better aligned. 

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council and the former deputy national intelligence officer for the Middle East.

The views expressed are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.

Image: Shutterstock.

Your vacation (hopefully) awaits. And here are the best books to pair with it.

En Afrique, un nombre croissant de lanceurs d'alerte mène dans l'ombre un périlleux combat pour dénoncer corruption et pratiques illégales. Dans des pays où les autres modes d'expression démocratique (élections transparentes, liberté de la presse) sont grippés ou pervertis, révéler les turpitudes des (...) / Afrique du Sud, République démocratique du Congo, Afrique, Criminalité, Entreprise, Répression, Criminalité financière, Corruption, Niger, Algérie, Justice - 2018/05

Ukrainians are in Europe to stay. The bloc can help itself—and Kyiv—by better integrating them.

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In the United States, attention toward recent improvements in South Korea-Japan relations focuses heavily on hard security cooperation vis-à-vis China. Indeed, the Biden administration has worked hard to encourage this. But closer Korea-Japan interaction—if sustained—could also have significant consequences in other areas, especially energy.

Few relationships are as complex and nuanced as the one between South Korea and Japan. The peoples of the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese Archipelago have interacted culturally and economically since ancient times. Nonetheless, Imperial Japan’s invasion and occupation of the peninsula (1910–1945) left behind many unresolved issues and painful historical memories for the Korean inhabitants.

The relationship between South Korea and Japan is bound to change as time passes. A 2022 poll conducted by Korea’s East Asia Institute and Japan’s Genron NGO has shown a sizable shift in opinion since South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol’s government took office in 2022. Compared to the previous year, respondents in both countries are more likely to express willingness to overcome problems in bilateral relations.

In addition, respondents in another poll said that the United States, Japan, and South Korea should strengthen military cooperation. This is due to the intensified nuclear threat from North Korea and the increased sensitivity to various challenges from China. Now, more people in the two countries believe that increased cooperation between Korea and Japan benefits the balance of power in Northeast Asia.

President Yoon and Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida have reinstated so-called “shuttle diplomacy,” and follow-up consultations are underway at the working level. Beyond security discussions, talks on cooperation in the energy sector have resumed after a five-year hiatus; the last Korea-Japan bilateral energy dialogue was in 2018.

Lee Wonju, Director General for Energy Policy from South Korea’s MOTIE (Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy), and Minami Ryo, Deputy Commissioner for International Policy on Carbon Neutrality from Japan’s METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry), held a policy meeting on May 25, on the occasion of the World Climate Industry Expo 2023 in Busan. The officials discussed the need to strengthen energy policy coordination between the two countries, which share high dependence on energy imports and similar energy consumption patterns.

Seoul and Tokyo recognize the need to strengthen energy security and carbon neutrality measures amid the recent unstable energy market. Therefore, the two countries exchanged views on expanding carbon-free energy (CFE) and cooperation in strengthening stable energy supply chains for natural gas and minerals. METI announced the two sides had agreed to continue close communication to expand energy cooperation to various fields.

Korea and Japan have very similar energy concerns and dilemmas. Most importantly, Korea and Japan have built their economies through export-driven manufacturing. Since each country has minimal natural resources, their economic structures have made them highly dependent on imported energy and minerals. Therefore, any external energy crisis would seriously impact both countries. The two oil crises in the 1970s weakened their economies, and since then, both countries have been trying to diversify their energy sources by using natural gas and nuclear power. Nevertheless, maintaining a stable supply of imported energy remains a vital issue for both countries.

Second, both countries declared “2050 carbon neutrality” goals in October 2020 and legislated this goal domestically. Korea’s NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution) under the Paris climate agreement calls for a 40 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 2018 levels by 2030. Japan has committed to reducing its emissions by 46 percent from 2013 levels in 2030. However, both countries have similar structural problems that will make meeting these targets quite difficult.

As mentioned above, both countries have manufacturing-oriented economies that are necessarily energy-intensive. Both depend heavily on fossil fuels for power generation and manufacturing, particularly in the steel sector. Korea relied on coal for 36 percent of its electricity generation and natural gas for 26 percent as of 2022. Japan also relies on coal and gas for over 70 percent of its electricity generation. Decarbonizing the power sector is an urgent task for both countries, which they can only accomplish by constructing more renewable or low-carbon power sources.

Innovation and advancements in grid and storage technologies are needed too. In South Korea, privatization rules power generation, but KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Corporation) still monopolizes distribution. However, KEPCO’s accumulated astronomical deficits (due in part to artificially low electricity prices) make it difficult to reinvest and innovate. Japan has struggled to restart its nuclear reactors since the infamous 2011 Fukushima meltdown.

Third, both countries share common demographic and socio-structural challenges, such as aged societies, low birth rates, declining populations, increasing single-person households, and rural decline. In South Korea, the proportion of single-person households exceeded 40 percent. In Japan, the number of single-person households is also increasing while the population is decreasing. As a result of these demographic shifts, the types of housing and energy consumption behaviors have changed significantly from the past. In addition, the gap between metropolitan and rural areas in both countries is widening, leading to social conflicts and problems in areas such as education and public health. The declining population in Korea and Japan accelerates the so-called “rural extinction” phenomenon. In such a desperate demographic situation, assuming high economic growth in formulating policy is impossible.

Given the above, Korea and Japan are suitable partners to share energy policy ideas and pursue cooperation. The most promising areas are natural gas, recycling and energy efficiency, nuclear safety, and new areas like hydrogen and smart grids.

Natural gas emits fewer harmful air pollutants than coal, and neither Korea nor Japan is likely to reduce consumption substantially anytime soon. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year increased fuel price volatility and concerns about the security of gas supplies. Korea and Japan have been paying the so-called “Asian premium,” buying gas at higher prices than the rest of the world, and are among the largest importers of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from their ally, the United States. Japan is more dependent on Russian LNG than South Korea because of its involvement in the Sakhalin project, where two major Japanese firms remain as investors. While Japan has joined the post-war sanctions against Russia, its firms have not withdrawn from the Sakhalin project, citing energy security.

But the competition for gas is becoming increasingly fierce. European countries seeking to escape Russia have significantly increased their imports of American LNG and LNG from the Middle East. Korea Gas Corporation and Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan have regrettably clashed over the Senoro gas field in Indonesia. However, the discussion should not stop there but rather continue to discuss ways to cooperate by learning from past failures. Korea and Japan, which have similar situations, need to work together to diversify their gas imports and find ways to increase their leverage with suppliers.

Therefore, since stable gas supplies are a crucial energy security matter for both countries, there is a high possibility that they will continue to compete. Still, it is worth trying to structure this competition and institutionalize bilateral cooperation to increase the bargaining power of the two countries vis-à-vis suppliers.

Resource recycling and energy efficiency are also areas where Korea and Japan can cooperate. In Europe, the so-called “battery passport” system, which digitizes information on the entire life cycle of batteries, is being promoted to increase the recycling rate of batteries from a circular economy perspective. This is also an area where Korea and Japan could exchange ideas and share policy approaches.

Furthermore, Korea and Japan can identify common areas for collaboration, such as nuclear safety, smart grids, future cities, and green hydrogen and ammonia supply chains. Hydrogen and ammonia will likely be essential for reducing emissions from each nation’s manufacturing sector.

For these collaborations to be possible, rebuilding trust between the two countries is essential. In particular, it is worth noting that the discharge of the Fukushima nuclear wastewater is prompting a raging political conflict in South Korea. This is, of course, because the political landscape is very divided and polarized. However, the fact that there is opposition in Korea, China, and even Japan shows that the Japanese nuclear industry and regulators have lost a lot of credibility. Korea is one of the most exemplary nuclear operating countries, so if Korea and Japan can further build trust and set high standards, starting with the nuclear sector, it will positively impact Northeast Asia and beyond.

Given the historic nature of the relationship between the two countries and the differences in the structure of their energy markets, it may be challenging to accelerate cooperation. However, if the two countries are willing to share policy ideas on common concerns and identify policy synergies, they can contribute to peace and economic prosperity in the region.

Eunjung Lim is an associate professor at the Division of International Studies, Kongju National University and a board member of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control.

Image: Shutterstock.

President Gustavo Petro’s time at the helm of Colombia thus far has come in two acts. The first began with his taking office in August 2022 and was defined by his pushing ahead on key policies and living up to the hope that his center-left government would help steer Colombia to a more peaceful, greener, and economically equitable future. Act two began with the failure to pass health care legislation in April 2023, which was followed by a cabinet reshuffle and the failure to pass other reform bills. Furthermore, a scandal broke in June involving his former chief of staff, Laura Sarabia, and his ambassador to Venezuela, Armando Benedetti blindsided the administration.

Petro is now seeking to regain momentum, but he faces a challenging political and economic landscape, which could be defined by gridlock with Congress, policy drift, and potentially opening the door to social instability. Given Colombia’s importance as a reliable U.S. partner in South America, observers and policymakers in Washington ought to pay attention to these developments.

The Petro Show: Acts I and II

Petro’s victory in 2022 came amid considerable excitement. A former member of M-19, a flag holder for Colombia’s Left, and mayor of Bogóta, he inspired many youthful voters and other marginalized groups who had tired of center-right and conservative governments often hit by corruption scandals, human rights violations, and a hard-nosed approach to dealing with the country’s arms-bearing radical Left. Petro was seen as a new type of Colombian leader; one that could clean up the country’s politics and enact a progressive agenda that would, among other things, pursue more eco-friendly policies (by downsizing the country’s coal and oil sectors) and orient Bogóta toward ensuring socio-economic justice.

Petro’s first act saw the formation of a broad-based cabinet, the passage of a tax reform bill, and an accord to buy land from cattle ranchers and give it to landless rural people. At the same time, he was able to bring the country’s largest remaining armed revolutionary (and drug trafficking) group, the ELN, to the negotiating table as part of his “Total Peace” policy—an ambitious plan to minimize violence, protect civilians, and dismantle the country’s many armed groups. He also restored relations with the dictatorial Maduro regime in Venezuela in 2022—a sharp change in direction that seeks to normalize the border and improve trade, departing from the approach of his predecessor, President Iván Duque.

Act two began roughly around April 2023, following the failure of his health care reform package to make it through the lower house of the country’s congress. Petro, in response, took his government leftwards. He replaced seven cabinet members with leftists, seeking to reinvigorate his reform program. Particularly noticeable was the departure of the market-friendly and internationally-respected Finance Minister José Antonio Ocampo, who was seen by the country’s Left as a sop to the center-right and Right (and whose earlier support was essential to passing legislation in the Congress). He was replaced by Ricardo Bonilla, a former finance chief of Bogóta and close Petro ally.

In practice, the cabinet reshuffle is important. Petro barely won the majority of the vote on the second round (50.47 percent) and his party and allies failed to obtain a majority in either chamber of Congress, making a politically broader cabinet necessary passage of his legislation. While the president appears intent on having a more ideologically cohesive group of people around him that will pursue his agenda with greater vigor, it also sets the stage for less cooperation in Congress and potential gridlock.

The Nanny Scandal and the Family Scandal

Following the cabinet reshuffle, Petro’s administration was hit by a scandal in early June around accusations that his former chief of staff’s nanny, Marelbys Meza, had stolen a large sum of cash in a briefcase from her apartment. Meza told the media that she was taken to a basement near the presidential palace in January 2023, accused of stealing the briefcase, and forced to take a polygraph test.

The scandal quickly blossomed into a wider tangle of alleged illegal wiretapping (something Petro has previously railed against), the alleged suicide of a security officer (suspected of being involved in the wiretappings), expletive-laden leaked audio messages by Benedetti to Sarabia, and allegations of campaign finance violations (made by Bendetti and later retracted). Adding another layer of complexity to the scandal is that Meza appears to have been at the center of a bitter power struggle between Benedetti, a major conservative power broker who allied with Petro during the election, and Sarabia, who worked under Benedetti before leading Petro’s campaign. Sarabia and Benedetti were dismissed from their posts following the announcement that the attorney general’s office had commenced an investigation into the affair. Rounding out the picture, relations between Petro and his attorney general, Francisco Barbosa, are strained, with the president having accused Barbosa, who was appointed by a prior conservative government, of acting against his “change” agenda.

Petro faces other legal problems; there are accusations that his son, Nicolás Petro, might have kept donations to his father’s campaign for his own personal use (some of them allegedly from a former drug trafficker), and that the president’s brother, Juan Fernando Petro, may have received money from the country’s drug cartels. Both men have denied the allegations, but the attorney general’s office has indicated that it is investigating matters. If nothing else, this development only adds to the sense of embattlement felt by Petro and further polarizes the country between his supporters, who believe that this is part of a plot against the president, and those opposed to his progressive agenda.

The scandal has eroded public confidence, with some of the most recent opinion polls putting Petro’s popularity around 33 percent and disapproval ratings a little over 50 percent. When elected he had an approval rating of 56 percent. At the same time, Petro’s reform agenda has stalled. In June a bill to regulate the purchase, sale, and distribution of marijuana narrowly failed in the Senate, while a labor reform bill was shelved after committee members in Congress’ lower house failed to reach a quorum. The fate of two other reforms, pension, and healthcare, remains in limbo.

Where to, Colombia?

Where does Colombia head from here?

Petro sees himself first and foremost as a man of the Left, who, according to The Economist, “believes he is predestined to liberate his country from conservative elites.” He is known to be zealous, temperamental, and impulsive as well as having a tendency to radicalize rather than reconcile after disputes. Petro’s political personality is likely to be severely tested. He is increasingly facing public discontent with lackluster economic growth (with 1.0 percent real GDP projected by the International Monetary Fund for 2023) and high inflation, which is being felt in food prices. Though slowing for the third month in a row, inflation remains high by Colombian standards at 12.13 percent in June.

But that is not all. The nanny scandal has given Petro’s enemies a chance to portray him as a hypocrite, and there is also a degree of public discontent over growing insecurity in urban and rural areas. Under this scenario, there is a risk that Petro may shift his attention away from party politics and seek to take his case for reforms directly to the people hoping for them to demonstrate in favor of his proposed reforms thus pressuring Congress to act.

Frustration with the democratic process has raised the concern that Petro could seek to govern in a more autocratic and populist fashion, much like El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele. Bukele’s populist approach and hard line on law and order are seen in a positive light by increasing numbers of Latin Americans frustrated by threats to their personal safety and the corruption of entrenched political elites. Petro did beat the drum of populist change as Bogóta’s mayor and as a presidential candidate, though it has yet to be seen whether he would take steps to undermine the autonomy of institutions that could check his concentration of power.

Opinion polls are not giving Petro any relief. According to an Invamer poll released in late June, 70 percent of Colombians feel that their country is on the wrong track, 79 percent are convinced that the economy is in bad shape, and 74 percent are convinced that the corruption rates have increased. This of course is bad news for Petro, but he is not alone; Colombia’s congress has an unfavorable rating of 74 percent, the supreme court with 60 percent unfavorable, and the media at 58 percent. The institution or group seen as most unfavorable was the ELN at 89 percent.

While the Petro administration faces a challenging landscape, the political right is happy to goad Petro into moving further left to cast him as a radical of the same ilk as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, who presided over their country’s economic collapse and the exodus of seven million Venezuelans. Moreover, the peace process with the ELN remains controversial, with plenty of critics. In October 2023, Colombians will vote in gubernatorial and local elections. By stalling Petro’s reforms and goading him to become more radical the right can claim that he is an ineffectual leader and position itself as a force for law and order and economic growth with an eye to the next national elections.

The Future of Colombia

The state of Colombian democracy is important to the rest of Latin America and the United States. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are dictatorships and there are concerns over much of Central America, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Argentina is amid an economic crisis and could be in for contentious elections in October 2023. Prospects for Mexico have also deteriorated, with President Andrés Manuel López Obrador silencing critics, tampering with the country’s independent electoral authority, and expanding the military’s role in the economy.

While there is a pressing need to maintain a constructive relationship with Colombia, policy differences between Bogóta and Washington clearly exist, with Petro’s policy toward Venezuela probably being the most challenging. Considering the Colombian leader’s willingness to accommodate Maduro despite his obvious rigging of the upcoming elections, Petro’s refusal to meet Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó in April 2023 during a Colombian-sponsored Latin American, European, and North American conference on unfreezing negotiations between Maduro’s regime and the opposition, and ongoing call for the lifting of sanctions against Venezuela, Colombian-U.S. relations have developed a certain edge. That said, it is important that the relationship remains constructive. More democratic backsliding in Latin America is not in Washington’s interest and plays to the authoritarian narratives out of China and Russia.

Colombian democracy is stressed, confidence in key institutions is sagging, government policy is in drift mode and the country seems to have tired of the government of change in less than a year. The country’s leader is temperamental but has thus far worked his way through the democratic system, having served as a congressman and senator, the mayor of Bogóta, and run for the presidency twice before he was successful in 2022. Moreover, Colombia’s political stability has been challenged before by revolutionary movements, populist uprisings like the Bogotazo of 1948 and drug cartels. It has weathered each storm. It will probably do so again, but there is considerable downside risk as the Petro administration is increasingly embattled. Another round of social turmoil cannot be ruled out.

Dr. Scott B. MacDonald is the Chief Economist for Smith’s Research & Gradings, a Fellow with the Caribbean Policy Consortium, and a Research fellow with Global Americans. Prior to those positions, he worked for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Credit Suisse, Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, KWR International, and Mitsubishi Corporation. His most recent book is The New Cold War, China and the Caribbean (Palgrave Macmillan 2022).

Image: Shutterstock.

Though the commercial low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite industry is booming, it could have an adverse geopolitical impact.

The LEO satellite market is highly fragmented as firms compete for a dominant share. However, the finite nature of orbital slots and spectrum allocation creates a natural market threshold that will likely prevent future entrants from joining the industry’s competition. This dynamic has created what is in effect a satellite race, with both domestic firms and other countries trying to launch their own satellite constellation to compete with the combined might of U.S. firms. We need to ensure that this scramble for space isn’t a race to the bottom.

The Competition for Space

Earth’s lower orbit has limited orbital slots, or specific satellite positions. Each satellite also requires spectrum access on specific frequencies for communication, which companies in the LEO industry and other industries want and compete for. In other words, both orbital slots and spectrum allocation exhibit dynamics similar to a parking lot: once the parking lot is full, there are no spaces left.

As such, the rapid proliferation of LEO constellations and the dearth of orbital slots and spectrum allocation highlights a need for a proactive space policy that can ensure the sustainability of space as a new frontier for technological and economic progress.

The latter is particularly notable, given how LEO satellite constellations have become remarkably popular for commercial uses. Companies such as SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper have capitalized on consumer demand for high-speed, low-latency Internet connectivity and are vying for the opportunity to send thousands of satellites into LEO to achieve global coverage.

Though the United States has been paving its own path in the space industry, U.S. policymakers need to be conscientious of how the country is setting a precedent in space exploration. Given our current advantage, we can establish policies that ensure safe, proactive space innovation and LEO practices.

American space companies are ahead of the pack when it comes to space exploration, and other countries are taking notice. America’s peer competitors recognize the risk presented by American orbital and spectral slot dominance and are encouraging commercial satellite development accordingly. For example, China’s state-backed “Starnet” system plans to launch thousands of satellites into low-Earth orbit to compete with SpaceX’s Starlink and other Western competitors. To Beijing, mega-constellations such as Starlink give the US a strategic edge and threaten China's national security interests.

Space Chokepoints

Aside from national security concerns raised by American rivals, the finite nature of LEO slots creates a low-Earth atmosphere bottleneck. Any object launched further into space must safely navigate through the orbital paths of the thousands of satellites operating in LEO. A densely packed LEO approaching its carrying capacity could serve as a chokepoint, obviating other space activity. As such, the country that de facto “controls” LEO will determine who can explore beyond it. These dynamics may create a security dilemma and encourage more aggressive space activity, such as intentional satellite collisions.

Encouraging efficient utilization of orbital slots should be paramount to international policymakers. Creating an effective satellite allocation system, such as an assigned “parking space” framework, wherein each LEO satellite is assigned a specific orbital slot, could help provide stability and lessen the downstream effects of the projected satellite trends, which anticipate nearly all Earth observation and communication satellites to be sent to orbit without “comprehensive governance.”

Another chokepoint created by commercial LEO satellites is spectrum allocation—the process of issuing frequency bands for communication, which is required by LEO constellations for seamless communication between the satellites and ground stations.

Spectrum band capacity is finite, and distribution is regulated by various international regulatory bodies, which can stifle competition between LEO providers by enabling uneven spectrum access. For example, if different countries try to use the same frequency bands for their LEO satellites, communication failures can be created by interference between the satellites.

If the United States were to create an effective spectrum allocation across different jurisdictions, we could decrease the risk of interference, which would be in all satellite companies’ best interests.

Overall, Washington should reevaluate space regulation and propagate international space norms to foster safe, proactive space innovation and LEO practices. The alternative is the eventual development of aggressive and potentially damaging space competition, culminating in armed conflict for the future of space.

Cassandra Shand is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Cambridge and a Young Voices Innovation Fellow. Twitter: @CassandraShand.

Image: Shutterstock.

Representative Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), who chairs the Congressional Progressive Caucus, called Israel a “racist state,” touching off a controversy about America’s views toward the world’s only Jewish state.

The House on Tuesday passed a resolution pledging unfailing support for Israel, condemning antisemitism and declaring that the country is neither racist nor an apartheid state, in an implicit rebuke of Democrats who criticized the nation ahead of an address by its president to a joint session of Congress.

Americans have supported Israel since the minute of its re-birth in 1948, when President Harry Truman recognized the country. Large majorities of Americans have told pollsters that they supported Israel for more than seventy years—one of the most durable results in American polling. What’s more, America is home to more Jews than any other nation on Earth, including Israel itself. Until recently, support for Israel was nearly unanimous in both political parties.

Israel’s demography is far more complex than critics like Rep. Jayapal imagined. One of out every five Israelis was either born in Morocco or the parents of Moroccans. Another fifth hail from elsewhere in North Africa or East Africa, such as the Ethiopian Jews, many of whom were airlifted out to Israel in the 1980s. Then there are the Israelis from the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Then there are Jews who hail from the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and other eastern lands. And, of course, there are European descendants of the Nazi horror. And all of that only counts the Jews.

Israel also has many Christian and Muslim citizens who fully participate in public life. Indeed, more than a baker’s dozen of Muslims sit in Israel’s Knesset, the country’s parliament. Non-Jews enjoy full constitutional rights in Israel, something that cannot be said of non-Muslims in many nearby states.

Comparing Israel to Apartheid South Africa, a now well-worn cliché, ignores the reality that is visible to anyone who stands on an Israeli sidewalk.

That this controversy erupted during the Israeli president’s visit to Washington DC, who told the press in the Oval Office that he had brought a message of greetings and gratitude from “the whole country of Israel, from all sides of the political spectrum,” only added fuel to the fire.

It is true that the differences exist, and they are publicly aired by the Biden administration, but the American public’s support for Israel has never wavered.

The U.S.-Israel relationship is not simply the convenient overlap of shared interests in fighting terror and promoting democracy. It is far deeper. American non-Jews support Israel in larger numbers than American Jews, according to numerous polls. Christian evangelicals, who make up nearly one-third of the U.S. population, support Israel in numbers approaching unanimity. More than half of the U.S. Catholics tell pollsters that they support Israel.

Why do so many U.S. Christians support Israel? One reason is a Bible-focused religion makes Israel a familiar place, at least in the mental maps of many believers. It does not seem far away or even all that foreign; they have grown up reading and hearing about ancient Israel and seemingly have no trouble translating that into an affection for modern-day Israel.

Another reason is a parallel history. Like America, Israel was settled by farmers and homesteaders . Yet they persevered and built a modern country that waters fruit trees in its deserts and invents software companies in its cities. It is a nation that doesn’t like war, but fights vigorously when attacked and invariably wins. It doesn’t revolt against unpopular rulers; it patiently votes them out.

Perhaps the biggest reason for warm feelings is that both countries have similar institutions and shared values: elected government, social tolerance, dynamic capitalism, the supremacy of law, a reverence for the past, and a passion for innovation.

But Israel is not America in one important respect: it has real extremes that could tear the tiny country apart. In the 1960s, Palestinian politics took a feverish turn, and extreme regimes, like Iran, have funded violent factions for decades including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In response, an extreme Zionism emerged. While it does not carry out terror attacks, it advocates for extreme policies that would result in many Arabs being deported from the land where they were born.

Tragically, but inevitably, these two extremes feed off each other, threatening to ignite a scorched-earth civil war of undiluted barbarism.

Here the parallel with America ends. Even America’s newest immigrants only want to join American society, not end its existence. Partisans of both sides cite the U.S. Constitution as their friend and fear that the other side will tear it up. Americans, of all political stripes, seek only readjustments, not revolutions.

The strength of American constitutional institutions has made it the most powerful and influential country in the world. Since its institutions work, Americans know that America will remain America, no matter who is elected to Congress or to the presidency. They may say something different on social media or at political rallies, but no American really believes, deep down, that their elected representatives would dynamite the national institutions.

Israel’s future has been in doubt since its beginning. Its neighbors have taken many decades to acknowledge its legitimacy. Terror groups send rockets and set bombs. Even a sizable plurality of its Arab citizens say that it shouldn’t exist. This is a social challenge far beyond anything that any other industrial democracy must endure. And yet those who call for Israel’s end are not jailed, beaten, or driven from their jobs. Their remarks are shrugged off; their democratic rights are respected.

Israeli openness had also created a dynamic economy. In Tel Aviv, citizens continue to experiment, test, and invent-both software systems and new social ideas.

America and Israel should not doubt the strength of their democracies. The aftermath of dramatic campaigns in both countries shows that a system of government that lets the people rule has the energy to survive and thrive.

At pivotal moments in its history, Israelis have delved into the writings of Zionism’s founders and found a way forward. Today, the words of David Ben-Gurion still ring true: “We don’t have the approach of the German Social Democrats. . . of the British Labor Party. . . [or] Soviet communism. We have paved our own way.”

While the danger of Iran and its proxies are still there, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s greatest challenge is to rely on this exceptional friendship between the two countries to strengthen the Abraham Accords, which brought peace between four Arab lands and Israel in 2020.

Today, a new hope has emerged, to open a new chapter in Palestinian history, The young Palestinians really want peace, prosperity, and dignity.

Rather than faulting Netanyahu’s controversial judicial reform, the Biden administration would be wise to build on the Abraham Accords. The American public would remember those efforts during an election year and enjoy vast, bipartisan support. Peace is always worth a chance.

Ahmed Charai is the Publisher of Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. He is on the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, the International Crisis Group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

L'opposition à l'« appropriation culturelle » s'apparente à la revendication d'un capital culturel. De telles luttes révèlent en un sens l'avancée impressionnante de la privatisation de toute chose — y compris la souffrance. Elles représentent aussi une variation sur un thème familier : la justice (...) / Mouvement de contestation, Politique, Citoyenneté, Racisme, États-Unis, Mouvement de libération, Capitalisme, Identité culturelle, États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Culture - 2018/05

How China and Russia use intelligence agencies to undermine America.

The West should assist the private actors helping arm Kyiv.

The establishment of the U.S. Space Force marked a significant milestone in America’s commitment to maintaining its dominance in space. As the guardians of the final frontier, it is imperative that the Space Force maintain the highest standards when it comes to the launch of mission-critical satellites. However, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s recent proposed changes to the launch services procurement process in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) risk undermining the Space Force’s ability to deploy our most crucial space-based defense assets.

The third phase of the Space Force’s National Security Space Launch Program, which covers launch contracts awarded in 2025, includes a two-lane approach. “Lane 1” allows for multiple vendors and diversity of launch technologies. “Lane 2” will select two medium and heavy-lift rockets vendors that will deploy critical satellites into orbit. The importance of these payloads to the national defense requires reliable launch vehicles and companies with proven processes and capabilities. This dual-lane approach affords ample opportunities for entrants in the launch services to develop and demonstrate new technologies with low-risk missions while ensuring that the nation can respond to threats quickly and reliably.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, apparently bowing to pressure from Blue Origin, proposed on June 23 the creation of a “Lane 2A”. This would allow new entrants in the heavy-lift domain to enter the field several years into the procurement process in the name of increased competition. This misguided change to the process introduces unnecessary uncertainties that can compromise the success of our most vital missions.

Blue Origin has experienced multiple delays in developing the New Glenn rocket and its engines. The engines and the New Glenn are over three years behind schedule, and neither has been flight tested. Indeed, Blue Origin’s launch experience is limited only to its New Shepard suborbital flights, which have been on hiatus since a rocket nozzle failure caused an in-flight abort in September 2022.

Other entrants into the space launch business are experimenting with materials and manufacturing innovations that may—or may not—pave the way for cheaper access to space. Some have proven successful, but only after a rigorous testing process and many flights. Relativity Space lost its first 3D-printed launch vehicle in March this year. Virgin Orbit went bankrupt after the failures of its air-launched two-stage vehicle. Even SpaceX lost several payloads due to failures in the past decade while developing and certifying its Falcon 9.

The recent tragedy of the deep sea “Titan” reminds us of the importance of rigorous testing and gaining experience with new technology over the long term before entrusting it to important missions. While failures can be tolerated with lower-risk flights like those envisioned by Lane 1 of the Space Launch Program, the stakes are too high to jeopardize a Lane 2 mission using unproven technology.

Lane 2 satellite launches are not only costly endeavors but also carry significant national security implications. A failed launch can result in the loss of critical assets or disruption of communication systems. The financial implications of such failures are staggering, as taxpayer dollars are wasted on unsuccessful missions. By prioritizing reliability over competitive experimentation, the Space Force can avoid unnecessary costs associated with failures and allocate resources more efficiently.

Finally, the Space Force operates within a complex ecosystem that involves coordination with multiple government agencies, private contractors, and international partners. The utilization of established vendors ensures a cohesive and accountable framework for collaboration. These vendors have well-defined processes, reliable supply chains, and established relationships with key stakeholders, fostering seamless integration of efforts. Using unproven vendors and new technologies may introduce compatibility issues, potentially jeopardizing the cooperative relationships critical to mission success.

While embracing innovation and exploring new technologies is vital for advancing space exploration, Congress must prioritize reliability and mission success for America’s defense satellite launches. Using established vendors with proven track records, robust testing procedures, and technological maturity is essential to minimize risks and maximize the probability of success. By exercising prudence in its current vendor selection process, the Space Force can uphold its commitment to national security, protect taxpayer investments, and ensure a future of robust space exploration and defense.

Jonathan H. Ward is a freelance writer on the U.S. space program and is the co-author of Bringing Columbia Home: The Untold Story of a Lost Space Shuttle and Her Crew.

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