Diplomacy & Crisis News

Think the NATO summit was a complete dumpster fire? Think again.

« Du pôle nord à la Terre de Feu, nous formons un seul peuple en lutte pour reconquérir ses droits, même si nos terres sont occupées par d'autres. » Cette affirmation d'un représentant Iroquois à la Conférence Internationale des organisations non gouvernementales sur la discrimination à l'égard des (...) / Colonialisme, Droits humains, Génocide, Identité culturelle, Amérindiens, Inégalités, Mouvement de contestation, Nationalisme, Violence, Amérique du Nord, Amérique du Sud, Autodétermination des peuples - 1977/12

Prime Minister Theresa May thinks it’s her duty to deliver Brexit, but the outcome could entail splitting her party and impoverishing Britain.

A l'automne de 1972 les peuples des confins du Sahara, connus sous le nom de Sahel, subissaient par millions les conséquences catastrophiques de cinq années de sécheresse impitoyable. Malgré les secours internationaux, la famine a prélevé un lourd tribut sur les vingt-deux millions d'habitants de la (...) / Afrique, Action humanitaire, Capitalisme, Faim, Inégalités, Relations Nord-Sud, Pauvreté, Sahel - 1975/02

Dans deux domaines-clés pour l'Amérique latine, les généraux péruviens ont pris des positions qu'aucun autre gouvernement latino-américain, à l'exception de Cuba, n'a osé prendre depuis la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale. L'événement est considérable car, après l'éclosion de l'Eglise rebelle, (...) / États-Unis, Pérou, Armée, Extrême droite, Nationalisme, Stratégie, Violence, Diplomatie, Extrême gauche, Pêche, Indépendance - 1969/07

Politicians must prepare voters for automation; otherwise, opportunistic populists will seize the agenda.

Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki are racing toward peace because they both face the same threat: hard-liners in the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front.

Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities (A2/AD)—the ability to prevent an adversary from entering an area of land, sea, or air—have become a major component of military force postures for powers around the globe, but Russia is the most committed to advancing their development. Russian A2/AD capabilities are shaping NATO’s neighborhood and the Alliance needs a comprehensive strategy to counter them effectively in times of peace, crisis, and conflict.

Russian A2/AD capabilities include traditional air power, unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime capabilities (including submarines and offensive mining), offensive and defensive missile systems (such as the Iskander, Bastion, Kalibr, and S-400), offensive electronic warfare, special operations forces, and cyber capabilities.

During last year’s major military exercise, Zapad-2017, Russia practiced creating three A2/AD bubbles—in the High North, the Kaliningrad Oblast, and Crimea—to limit NATO’s freedom of maneuver and hinder the deployment of large US military formations.

The whole territory of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, as well as parts of Norway, Romania, and Turkey, are within range of different elements of this Russian A2/AD architecture, which will make it much harder for NATO to defend these areas. A scenario where allied forces must break through Russia’s A2/AD system is highly probable.

Russia’s A2/AD systems are important for two other reasons.

First, a leaner chain of command and streamlined decision-making system mean Russia can act much faster than NATO allowing it to achieve escalation control.

Second, nuclear weapons remain a crucial element of Russia’s escalation dominance strategy. In a situation when allied forces would consider breaking through Russia’s A2/AD system, Russia could threaten to use its nuclear capabilities as a deterrent. Russia’s careful calculations of thresholds and escalation triggers have been more a matter of preference than necessity in a larger military strategy. Through this approach, Russia can control the level of conflict escalation, dominating the mechanism and circumstance of escalations where nuclear elements play a fundamental role.

The NATO summit in Brussels on July 11 and 12 will be the third consecutive one to address the Russian A2/AD threat. Since 2014, NATO has adopted several steps to mitigate some of the challenges linked to A2/AD. NATO’s counter-A2/AD strategy should be based on a strategic six-pack.

First, NATO needs improved advanced defense planning to reflect the constantly changing nature and integration of Russia’s A2/AD capabilities. The Alliance must plan now for entry operations into a non-permissive environment in the future.

Second, NATO’s decision-making processes, including both political and military elements, also must be streamlined. If there is anything the Russian A2/AD systems are vulnerable to, it is the speed of NATO’s actions in the early phases of a crisis. Increasing the speed of recognition, decision, and assembly of forces could considerably diminish the effectiveness of Russia’s A2/AD capabilities.

Third, NATO should increase the number of forces and equipment on allied territory covered by the Russian A2/AD bubbles. There is no better way to deter the A2/AD threat than by stationing additional forces in the theater. This process should be preceded by strengthening the concept of pre-positioning of additional military equipment.

Fourth, readiness, deployability, and sustainability of large military formations, especially ground forces, should be enhanced. NATO’s reinforcement strategy should envisage plans for such formations to break through and operate in an A2/AD environment.

Fifth, the NATO Defense Planning Process should prioritize capabilities, including heavy ones, to counter A2/AD systems on land, in the air, and at sea. These should include electronic warfare, anti-submarine warfare, air defense, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, as well as precision-guided artillery. These capabilities should be embraced by the cross-domain fires concept.

And, sixth, allied formations must regularly train in a non-permissive environment to practice for potential deployments. Moving troops into a zone covered by A2/AD specifically should be an important element of NATO’s training and exercises.

NATO’s deterrence and defense posture is based on credibility. The Alliance must be able to counter Russia’s A2/AD capabilities if it is to remain a reliable defense alliance and security actor.

 

This article was originally published by the Atlantic Council.

Dominik P. Jankowski is the newly appointed political adviser and head of the political section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO.

The post Six Ways NATO Can Address the Russian Challenge appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). Julien Nocetti, chercheur au Centre Russie/NEI de l’Ifri et spécialiste des questions liées à la cybersécurité et au numérique, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Susan Landau, Listening In: Cybersecurity in an Insecure Age (Yale University Press, 2017, 240 pages).

La sécurité informatique serait le « ventre mou » de nos sociétés ultra-connectées. Le diagnostic de Susan Landau se distingue de la myriade d’essais et d’articles annonçant, depuis des années, l’imminence d’un « Pearl Harbor numérique » dévastant sur son passage les acquis de la révolution numérique.

Ses principales idées ne sont pas toutes novatrices (la « double face » des technologies numériques…), mais elles ont le mérite d’éviter tout jargon technique excluant les non-initiés. Nous serions ainsi entrés dans un nouvel âge de « cyber-vulnérabilité », dont la responsabilité incomberait principalement au gouvernement américain, qui a sapé les piliers de la confiance de l’internet à l’échelle mondiale en affaiblissant les systèmes de sécurité et de chiffrement.

L’auteur prend clairement parti en faveur du droit pour tous au chiffrement des données, étayant l’idée que se cristallise sur cet enjeu la tension entre l’intérêt supérieur des États et les exigences des masses en matière de respect de la confidentialité des échanges. À cet égard, l’affaire de San Bernardino, en 2015, a marqué une nouvelle ère dans les débats sur la cybersécurité. Le conflit qui a opposé pendant de longs mois Apple (refusant de dévoiler ses clés de chiffrement) aux autorités fédérales américaines via le Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), est devenu le symbole d’une bataille politique de souveraineté entre États, qui ne peuvent accéder à certaines données lors d’enquêtes sur des faits de terrorisme, et géants du Web, qui ont commencé à proposer des outils de chiffrement renforcé après les révélations d’Edward Snowden sur la surveillance de masse de la National Security Agency (NSA), en 2013.

Susan Landau resitue les enjeux actuels dans l’« histoire » de la cybersécurité et des crypto wars. Désignant les efforts de Washington, dès les années 1970, pour limiter l’accès du public et des pays étrangers, via des contrôles à l’exportation, à des méthodes de chiffrement assez fortes pour résister à la cryptanalyse de la NSA, les premières crypto wars ont pris fin dans les années 2000 avec la généralisation et la sophistication croissantes des technologies de chiffrement. Les affaires Snowden puis San Bernardino ont remis en cause l’issue des crypto wars : la deuxième « guerre du chiffrement » se focalise désormais sur la question des « accès exceptionnels » que s’arrogent les services de police et de renseignement.

L’issue de cette deuxième crypto war est loin d’être décidée : en affaiblissant la sécurité au lieu de la renforcer, les responsables politiques, rarement dotés d’une solide culture numérique, font peser un risque majeur sur les démocraties. Réseaux criminels, terroristes, États : la liste des acteurs potentiellement malveillants s’est considérablement élargie et les failles trouvent souvent leur origine dans le facteur humain. Tel est le double avertissement de Susan Landau, qui cite tant le piratage des fichiers de la convention démocrate aux États-Unis en juin 2016, que la diffusion du virus israélo-américain Stuxnet dans les centrifugeuses d’uranium iraniennes en 2010.

Ce panorama occulte néanmoins la responsabilité des géants de la tech américaine, dont la puissance inédite fait l’objet de vifs débats politiques et de société aux États-Unis et en Europe. L’affaire Facebook/Cambridge Analytica est venue rappeler que les données personnelles de dizaines de millions d’individus pèsent peu face aux stratégies commerciales des grandes plates-formes.

Julien Nocetti

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

The president's pivot to "strategic impatience" has made an already difficult task substantially more so.

Trump’s summit with Putin risks tarnishing a legacy of Republican moral leadership.

« Il faut se préparer au pire », a expliqué M. Bernard Kouchner, « et le pire, c'est la guerre ». Cette déclaration du ministre des affaires étrangères à propos de l'Iran a suscité bien des critiques et mis en lumière les inflexions de la nouvelle diplomatie française (lire « Sarkozy »). Elle a surtout (...) / États-Unis (affaires extérieures), France, Iran, Proche-Orient, Relations internationales - 2007/10

Kay Bailey Hutchison will have to clean up whatever mess the president leaves behind in Brussels.

L'eldorado universitaire américain n'a cessé de fasciner les élites mondiales, aveuglées par les établissements richement dotés, les campus rutilants et les bibliothèques gorgées d'ouvrages. Même si pendant les décennies de l'après-guerre une certaine démocratisation de l'enseignement supérieur est (...) / États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Inégalités, Recherche, Université - 2007/09

AI will change everything. Workers must adapt — or else.

Filmmaker Claude Lanzmann, dead at 92, showed the world the Holocaust through eyewitnesses.

Mexico’s President Elect, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, as his best animated self.

 

After decades of one party rule under the PRI, two standard six year Presidential terms under the PAN and a brisk return to the PRI to remind voters why they ejected them in the first place, Mexicans came out en masse to vote for the ex-mayor of Mexico City, Manuel Lopez Obrador. As the ex-mayor of Mexico City, Mexico’s new President led from the left of the political spectrum as is often the case in many large cities, but won as an independent, apart from Mexico’s main established parties. He challenged the regional and national governments to become a well known quantity running one of the largest cities in the world, and is said to have done a pretty decent job with Mexico City’s transit system during his time as mayor. He is Mexico’s new populist President, and as predicted at the end of populist driven elections, the comparisons to their northern neighbours have begun.

While comparisons to populist leaders lead many to conclude that all populist electoral victories may reflect a US experience, the popularity of Obrador comes with the experience of him as a well-established political voice in Mexican politics. He is well known as a left leaning political voice, but also may likely have to tack back to the centre on several policy files unlike his Canadian counterpart, but remain in the realm of socially oriented policies, unlike his French counterpart. Lopez Obrador’s policies seem to reflect a regional and social division of how they are applied and who they need to serve. He is well aware that raising the cost of business along the border regions and on international firms operating in Mexico will damage their competitiveness as US tax rates have significantly declined. This is not the case in Canada where taxes seem to give birth to more taxes despite the competitive reality of a lower taxes across the border. While this type of policy may seem right of centre, it addresses economic challenges to Mexico is a realistic fashion.

The victory of President elect Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, often referred to as AMLO, seemed to soak up the political will of those that were tired of years of problems that never seemed to be successfully challenged by established political parties. Like Macron in France, AMLO ran apart from the establishment, also running apart from any record that may be tied to them. Challenging corruption and security issues was paramount, as it always is in Mexico since the PAN turned up the heat on security issues during their time in office and the metaphorical kitchen caught fire, mind you it was a PRI built kitchen. While Macron swiftly moved to the centre in his policy approaches post-election, Lopez Obrador may have to have a creative response to the current NAFTA negotiations if he wishes to maintain his socially oriented policies. Negotiating with an aggressive American side and a Canadian side that are blind to most issues facing Mexico will be a challenge as local politics in the US and Canada are pushing NAFTA and Mexico into dangerous territory. While the North American economy is strong, working out the best deal for Mexico while maintaining a socially balanced agreement that serves the Mexican economy and the unique state of Mexico’s population compared to their NAFTA partners will be an enormous challenge.

Corruption is often why many well established parties lose the electorate, but once elected, the problems that plagued or were even created by the last governments lay on the shoulders of the current government. The characteristic one term, six year Presidential term for Mexican Presidents give a lot of time and opportunity to challenge the status quo, but it is a great challenge that anyone who sees themselves as valuing their country can support if the end of corruption is made into a possibility. The problem with corruption however is that once it is entrenched, it is almost impossible to eliminate. This will be the greatest challenge to AMLO and has been to all government in modern Mexican history.

The post Mexico’s New Six Year Presidential Experiment appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

>> Retrouvez l’article dont est extraite cette citation : « L’Inde peut-elle devenir une grande puissance ? », écrit par Nicolas Blarel dans le numéro d’été 2018 de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). < <

Beijing is angry over the U.S. trade war, but Trump’s own mishandling of North Korea talks are the main problem.

En 1967, le Royaume-Uni, puissance dominante dans la région du Golfe depuis près d'un siècle, annonce le départ de toutes ses troupes basées à l'est du canal de Suez. En 1971, le retrait est achevé, et plusieurs émirats accèdent à l'indépendance. Mais la stabilité de cette riche région pétrolière reste au (...) / Arabie saoudite, Asie, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Irak, Iran, Proche-Orient, Royaume-Uni, Armée, Colonialisme, Conflit, Histoire, Pétrole, Koweït - Proche-Orient