Diplomacy & Crisis News

>> Retrouvez l’article dont est extraite cette citation : « États-Unis : de nouvelles options nucléaires ? », écrit par Benjamin Hautecouverture dans le numéro d’été 2018 de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). <<

The late U.S. Senator John McCain's life was one marked by courage, empathy, pride, and determination.

The “land question” in South Africa is a powerful symbol of the failures of post-apartheid democracy to adequately address the structural roots of poverty and racialized inequality.

What the country teaches the world about the importance of an independent press.

The Trump administration hopes to pressure Palestinians to return to bargaining table.

Cairo is an old hand at playing the East and West off each other—for its own profit.

Shady international influence over U.S. politics didn’t start, and won’t end, with Donald Trump.

On the global scale of human suffering, Yemen outweighs all other countries. In its fourth year, the Yemen war – fueled by regional and other hegemonic powers – is nowhere near its end. Neither the coalition led by Saudi Arabia, which has been accused of war crimes, nor the Iran-backed Houthi rebels, accused of recruiting child soldiers, are close to winning this conflict.

Yemen is a humanitarian catastrophe in progress. And on the political front, the way things are evolving, the Somali model might be a fait accompli. It is hard to imagine a different fate for Yemen than that of Somalia – numerous balkanized political entities cursed with perpetual distrust and hostility.

Two-Sides of the Same

As someone whose ancestral background is deeply rooted in both Somalia and Yemen and with a keen interest in post-colonial political evolution in both societies, I can attest to the profound cultural similarities between these two countries and their peoples.

Both countries have never been left on their own in modern history. Both societies are dominated by a primitive tribal system that preserves history through oral traditions that commonly cling on to toxic narratives against other tribes. Both tend to zealously defend tribal honor or vanity even if that means sacrificing their countries’ interests. Both have religious extremist groups. Both are considered rich in natural resources though they remain two of the poorest nations in the world. In both countries, a culture of corruption is as rampant as their addiction to khat (qat), a plant with amphetamine-like stimulant potency. And the rule of law is by and large superseded by the tribal or clan social and political orders.

Furthermore, both are located in coveted strategic geographical areas. Both have separatist or secessionist movements whose claim to self-determination is based on the artificial demarcations of the British colonial power. Both nations have foreign elements that are hell-bent on advancing their own exclusive interests. And foreign interests in both countries are so camouflaged with domestic political affairs that it is almost impossible to identify which is which.

Despite these daunting similarities, I believe transformation is still possible, though it will require herculean sacrifices.

Geopolitics Rules

Geopolitical conflicts have certain distinctive characters that set them apart from conventional ones. Actors who are set to reap the strategic benefits are seldom visible in the fields. Covert actions frame or shape the overt ones. And those who ultimately show up as most equipped firefighters or the most enthusiastic life-savers are often the real arsonists.

These arsonists, who are routinely armored by credulous or greedy local citizens, are on a mission to establish favorable realities on the ground. They re-engineer the neighborhood and create an environment conducive to perpetual (but manageable) insecurity that makes the local populations in desperate dependency.

Criteria for Junglification

The Saudi-led coalition has taken a page out of the playbook used in the catastrophically failed Iraq war. The strategy was simple: invade under the altruistic pretext of coming to save Yemen. Inflict awe-striking destruction. Destroy historical sites, records, and rituals that could reinvigorate collective memory and collective identity – a sense of nationhood.

Pick a side on a sectarian divide knowing full well that in tribal societies there is nothing wholly monolithic. Support various zero-sum tactics in the hope that they will play right into the Saudi hegemonic interest in the region. Don’t worry about an exit strategy. Count on installed puppets and count on the support of the exploitable sectarian masses and their raging appetite for ethnic-cleansing.

Battle of Hodeidah

The battle to control Hodeidah is still underway, and the longer this continues, the worse the humanitarian crisis will get. After Houthis refused to adhere to the demands to disarm and hand over the Hodeidah port and evacuate the city, the Saudi-led coalition forces have launched a ferocious invasion that shook the foundation on the Houthi control of strategic geographical areas in Yemen.

Soon after, an Emirati navy vessel was destroyed, and missiles were fired at Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh for the first time. This forced a swift change in rhetoric and preconditions and lent the U.N. proposal a fresh appeal for both sides. 

The Hodeidah battle is broadly considered as the most significant since the fall of Sana in September 2014. For the Houthis, it is a “do or die” struggle. Though the coalition claims that the Houthis receive their weapons through Hodeidah, it has been the most important port where 70 percent of Yemen’s food and other essential supplies come through.

If this battle drags on for long, it will exacerbate an already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Yemen.

Likely Outcomes

At the deadly poker table, many continue to make their emotionless moves. There are those who are interested in sectarian supremacy, those interested in regional hegemony, those interested in lucrative mercenary projects, those interested in proxy political legitimacy, and those with the grand strategy to secure geopolitical dominance.

The likely outcome for Yemen is the Somali model – tribal fiefdoms exposed for perpetual exploitation. On July 17, a two-day pow-wow ended in Brussels. The so-called Somalia Partnership Forum brought together six Somali presidents to discuss the affairs of their single nation through a third party or representatives of 58 nations that are all presumably willing to pour more money into Somalia project than they are willing to fight poverty and homelessness in their respective countries.

So, is there an alternative?

The only means to change this imminent trajectory is to accomplish what Somalia has been stuttering and stumbling with – and at times faking it – for decades: a genuine reconciliation followed by a rigorous campaign to sacrifice claims of exclusive tribal rights for inclusive equal rights for all Yemeni citizens. This requires empowering the educated younger generation who by and large transcend the self-destructive clannish worldview of the traditionalist elders.

• first appeared on The Globe Post

The post Yemen’s Fateful Twinship With Somalia appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

En pleins préparatifs de la guerre anglo-saxonne contre l'Irak, ce chiffre est passé inaperçu : fin février 2003, le nombre de victimes de la seconde Intifada et de sa répression a dépassé 3 000 morts, aux trois quarts palestiniens, soit deux fois plus que durant les trois années de la première (...) / Israël, Palestine, Économie, Conflit israélo-palestinien - 2003/04 Bombes à retardement

Le Sommet mondial sur le développement durable, organisé par les Nations unies à Johannesburg (Afrique du Sud) fin août 2002, a mis en lumière les limites de ce concept. Lancé en grande pompe, le sommet n'a pas débouché sur des mesures contraignantes. En effet, de telles décisions nécessiteraient une (...) / Développement, Écologie - 2002/12 Insécurité collective

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). Jérôme Marchand propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Luke Harding, Collusion. Comment la Russie a fait élire Trump à la Maison-Blanche (trad. Flammarion, 2017, 352 pages).

Le journaliste Luke Harding possède une bonne connaissance des mécanismes d’influence sur lesquels s’appuie le Kremlin. Il s’agit cette fois de déterminer si le candidat Donald Trump a bénéficié en 2016 d’interventions téléguidées visant à faire pencher la balance électorale en sa faveur. L’auteur a consulté un certain nombre de sources dignes de crédit, dont Christopher Steele (ex-MI6), auteur du rapport d’Oppo Research qui a mis le feu aux poudres. Et il s’est intéressé à l’historique des relations entre la Russie et le promoteur Trump, ce dernier ayant très tôt entrepris de rattraper ses fiascos immobiliers en sollicitant des appuis étrangers.

L’enquête résumée dans Collusion a été menée en accéléré. Elle n’en établit pas moins des conclusions crédibles : le candidat républicain a profité d’interférences (hackings, fuites, rumeurs) décrédibilisant son adversaire démocrate. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’il s’agit là d’un facteur décisif, comme l’assène le sous-titre de l’ouvrage. Hillary Clinton et son staff d’apparatchiks ont commis un nombre incalculable d’erreurs, en bien des points similaires aux bévues de 2008. Ils n’ont pas non plus pris la mesure d’un outsider ayant animé plusieurs années un show TV à fortes audiences, et doté d’un bagage « spectacliste » bien plus riche que celui d’une oratrice de podiums engluée dans le politiquement correct. À ne pas négliger non plus : le jeu distancié d’Obama, générateur d’incertitudes pour une hiérarchie policière (FBI) peu à son aise dans la prospective électorale et le décodage des courants socio-culturels de fond.

Pour revenir aux manipulations russes, on observera qu’elles témoignent d’une bonne compréhension des vulnérabilités du système politique américain, déstabilisé par une crise de médias traditionnels enfermés dans l’exacerbation narcissique des « différences marginales » (Freud), et toujours pas décidés à traiter le problème de la haute criminalité financière. On notera aussi que Poutine dispose d’un pool de talents confirmés, opérant dans des milieux hétérogènes mais dynamiques, alors que les entourages de l’actuel président des États-Unis (Michael Flynn, Carter Page…) laissent transparaître de sévères déficiences. En contrepartie, on peut se demander avec Harding si les initiatives du Kremlin et de ses relais administratifs (GRU ou FSB) vont avoir les retombées présumées.

L’élection de Trump constitue un succès tactique pour Moscou. Elle intensifie la crise hégémonique à laquelle les États-Unis sont confrontés depuis l’invasion de l’Irak et le scandale des tortures. Les manœuvres défensives (dénis mensongers, tweets rageurs, dénonciations névrotiques du « quatrième pouvoir » et de ses libertés) de la Maison-Blanche ajoutent au trouble, en ce sens qu’elles ruinent le travail de re-légitimation morale mené à l’occasion du Watergate (1972-1974). On ne saurait pour autant prédire que la Russie va tirer de cet épisode des avantages durables. La divulgation des manipulations opérées en 2015-2016 a mis de nombreuses capitales occidentales en alerte. Elle a effacé une partie des gains statutaires engrangés dans la crise syrienne. Elle a exposé le fond du ressentiment rancunier qui anime Poutine et le conduit à prêter une importance excessive aux raisonnements régressifs des services spéciaux. Endosser le costume du trickster a sans doute ses charmes. Mais on ne fait pas une politique étrangère de haute volée sur de telles bases.

Jérôme Marchand

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

While countries such as China, India, and Turkey rapidly expand their economic engagement with African countries, the United States is lagging behind. 

The liberal order is largely a myth.

El 4 de agosto, dos drones explotaron en el aire durante un discurso del presidente venezolano Nicolás Maduro en Caracas, en lo que luego fue calificado por el gobierno como un intento fallido de asesinato. A pesar de que la mayoría de las fuerzas opositoras rechazaron el ataque, el gobierno lo usó como excusa para arremeter contra la disidencia, ordenando 34 arrestos, incluyendo el del diputado Juan Requesens. Inquietantes videos circularon poco después por las redes sociales que sugieren que el gobierno drogó forzosamente y humilló al parlamentario para tratar de que confesara su participación en el complot. [Read the English version of this article here.] Para muchos, el ataque de Maduro a las libertades democráticas y la violación sistemática de los derechos humanos en el país significan que no existe otra opción distinta del uso de la fuerza para sacarlo del poder. Pero la...

Selon tous les observateurs, M. Ariel Sharon et son parti devraient sortir vainqueurs des élections législatives du 28 janvier 2003. Mais la campagne offensive du candidat travailliste Amram Mitzna et le nouveau scandale de corruption qui frappe le Likoud avaient déjà réduit, fin décembre, leur (...) / Israël, Criminalité financière, Élections, Conflit israélo-palestinien, Corruption - 2003/01 Ce siècle aura trois ans

Alors que la bourse a chuté de 50 % depuis le début de l'année, la Russie est confrontée, du fait de la tourmente asiatique et de la chute des prix du pétrole, à une grave crise financière. Revenu aux affaires en tant que représentant spécial du président Boris Eltsine, M. Anatoli Tchoubaïs réclame une (...) / Russie - 1998/07

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). Gérard Chaliand propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Levon Ter-Petrossian, Armenia’s Future, Relations with Turkey, and the Karabagh Conflict (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 176 pages).

Le conflit du Haut-Karabagh (1988-1994) constitue pour l’État enclavé qu’est l’Arménie, une victoire qui débouche sur une impasse. Le double blocus qui en résulte, avec la Turquie et l’Azerbaïdjan, grève le développement du pays et accélère l’émigration. La population passe d’un peu plus de trois millions d’habitants à la chute de l’Union soviétique à, sans doute, un peu moins de deux millions.

Dès 1988, le Mouvement national arménien (MNA) dirigé par Levon Ter-Petrossian se développe à l’abri de la glasnost gorbatchévienne et réclame le rattachement de l’enclave du Haut-Karabagh à l’Arménie – l’Arménie soviétisée comportait deux régions enclavées, le Nakhitchevan et le Haut-Karabagh, dont la souveraineté était dévolue à l’Azerbaïdjan.

L’annuaire politique et économique de l’URSS publié à Moscou en 1926 mentionne : « Les Arméniens du Nakhitchevan forment la majorité de la population (55,7 %). En 1991, elle n’en comptait plus aucun. La région autonome du Karabagh montagneux a été formée le 3 juin 1923. La population se compose de 137 000 habitants. Les Arméniens forment
97,4 % de toute la population. » Lors de la dissolution de l’Union soviétique, ils étaient
un peu plus de 75 %.

En 1988, en réponse aux demandes arméniennes de rattacher le Karabagh à l’Arménie,
les Azerbaïdjanais répondent par des pogroms. De part et d’autre, les populations non nationales se réfugient dans leurs pays d’origine. Le MNA parvient à battre le Parti communiste aux élections du Soviet suprême, devenant ainsi le premier gouvernement non communiste en URSS. En 1990, Levon Ter-Petrossian proclame la souveraineté de la République d’Arménie. Jusque-là, Moscou appuie l’Azerbaïdjan. Par la suite, la politique russe prend parti pour les Arméniens, pour contraindre Bakou à rejoindre la Communauté des États indépendants (CEI). Le conflit se termine en 1994 par la victoire de l’Arménie, après avoir causé la mort de 30 000 personnes dans les deux camps. Entre-temps, à Kelbajar, verrou stratégique, les forces arméniennes tuent quelque 600 civils (ce que Bakou désigne comme un « génocide »). Le conflit se solde pour l’Azerbaïdjan par la perte quasi totale du Haut-Karabagh et des territoires adjacents à l’ouest et au sud de l’enclave, et par des centaines de milliers de réfugiés.

Durant les années de sa présidence (1991-1998), Levon Ter-Petrossian s’efforce d’établir des relations non antagoniques avec la Turquie. Il ne fait pas de la reconnaissance du génocide des Arméniens dans l’empire ottoman un préalable aux rapports arméno-turcs.

Des contacts se multiplient avec la direction azerbaïdjanaise pour trouver un compromis acceptable. En vain. Levon Ter-Petrossian est destitué par ceux qui trouvent sa politique trop portée sur le compromis. Après sept ans de silence, il juge ici le bilan de ses successeurs et rivaux.

Levon Ter-Petrossian n’avait pas commis l’erreur de son successeur Robert Kotcharian : poser en préalable à toute entente avec la Turquie, la reconnaissance du génocide des Arméniens. Ni celle de Serge Sarkissian, donnant par la suite son consentement à l’offre turque d’une commission d’historiens turcs et arméniens pour définir la nature des événements de 1915-1917 !

Entre-temps, l’Azerbaïdjan s’est renforcé grâce à son pétrole, et la Russie reste garante de la sécurité de l’Arménie, État à peine souverain. En 2017, après quatre journées d’affrontements déclenchés par Bakou, Vladimir Poutine convoquait les deux présidents belligérants à Moscou et les sommait de mettre un terme immédiat à leurs combats, réaffirmant ainsi qu’il reste, grâce au contentieux du Karabagh, l’arbitre en Transcaucasie. Les positions défendues par Levon Ter-Petrossian étaient pertinentes. Pour la Turquie, les relations cordiales avec l’Arménie étaient-elles nécessaires ? Soutenir Bakou, par contre, paraissait évident. Quant à l’Azerbaïdjan, était-il prêt à renoncer à la possession du Haut-Karabagh ? La dimension passionnelle, de part et d’autre, l’aura emporté, laissant Moscou maître du jeu.

Gérard Chaliand

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

Animated image of the future Tempest fighter plane.

The United Kingdom recently announced that they were working on producing their own stealth fighter project. Named the Tempest, it would become the front line of the Royal Air Force and would commit billions into the UK’s aviation industry. While the F-35 project had multiple innovational links to the British Aerospace industry and would have produced a fair number of skilled jobs in the UK itself, the international fighter project for the F-35 may be on shaky ground. Competition that would remove signatory nations from the F-35 project would make the fighter more expensive to produce, despite there being production and employment guarantees for most contributory members to the project. While the Tempest was announced to be flying with the RAF by 2035, it still might be the case that F-35 “NATO” fighter will still become part of the British air arm alongside the Tempest.

The initial vision of the F-35 was seen as a stealth support and strike aircraft that would do the heavy lifting and be able to evade enemy radar and anti-air systems. It was envisioned that the more expensive and elite F-22 fighters would enter enemy airspace in order to destroy their air defenses and the F-35s would come in as a second strike support aircraft to eliminate further threats. Older 4th generation fighters would then follow through with prolonged strikes once the air defenses are non-operational. The Tempest may serve alongside the F-35s as the F-22s would if the UK keeps its links to the F-35 program, but the relationship and whether or not the UK will stay with the F-35s remains to be seen. Some countries like Canada who may exit the F-35 program have chosen to purchase 1990s era F-18A and F-18B types from Australia. Committing to old aircraft, especially those that a country already possesses and needs to be replaced can be dangerous to the aircrew. With material fatigue as well as no effective protection against modern anti-air system, committing to older types sends the message that there will be a lack of participation in future NATO missions, difficult at a time when spending on NATO commitments are due to rise in the next few years. The Tempest does the opposite, showing a commitment to lead missions that require increased radar protection in order to complete its missions.

New 6th generation fighters have one main goal in mind, and that is to defeat ever developing radar and missile systems that are likely to produce hard to defeat defense shields in the future. Modern systems like the S-400 and ever developing BUK-M3 will be widely distributed to any country that wishes to purchase them over the next few years. With more advanced systems already in production in Russia and China, it will be interesting to see how a fighter design set to make its expensive debut in 2035 stands up to modern missile systems by then. With Anti-air systems now being able to target missiles themselves, targeting a larger plane or drones may not be a definitive challenge by 2035, or even by 2020. Whether it be F-35s, Tempests or more F-22s, the focus on pilot safely and security should be paramount in the minds of policy makers and those choosing to place their pilots in active danger zones.

The post The Tempest that May Unravel the F-35 Cooperative appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Ce qui préoccupe le frère Michael Collins, prêtre catholique d'une paroisse de Derry, c'est l'indifférence grandissante de la jeunesse irlandaise à l'égard de l'Eglise. Il l'avoue avec franchise et humour, sans « bigoterie » (comme on le dit si souvent ici pour définir les attitudes religieuses (...) / Irlande du Nord, Christianisme - 1995/01

After the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, a geopolitical gray zone emerged between Western organizations on the one side, and the Russia-dominated space on the other. This model was always fragile, did not help to solve the Transnistria problem in eastern Moldova or the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in south-western Azerbaijan, and was shaken by the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. It finally broke down with Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Against the background of these shocks, a partial solution to the security challenges of the current gray zone for all of the countries of Eastern Europe — whether in- or outside NATO and the EU — could be to revive the old concept of the Intermarium (land between seas). By cooperating and allying with each other, the states between the Baltic and Black Seas could bolster their security and in particular improve the balance of power against Russia, without immediate further Eastern enlargement of NATO and the EU.

Why would that be necessary? NATO’s 2008 Bucharest declaration promised Ukraine and Georgia a future inclusion into the Alliance, yet did not provide them with a Membership Action Plan. In 2013 and 2014, the European Union signed a “new generation” of especially comprehensive association agreements with Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, yet without an accession perspective attached. The European Union’s Eastern Partnership — established with six post-Soviet East European and South Caucasian states in 2009 — touches a wide array of political, economic, and cultural themes, yet fails to provide military security. Only Azerbaijan, among the Eastern Partnership countries, partly resolved its security issue by concluding a separate mutual aid treaty with Turkey in 2010, obtaining the promise of military help from a NATO member and relatively powerful country.

Remaining outside comprehensive military-help schemes, it is no wonder that Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (as well as Azerbaijan before it had concluded its treaty with Turkey) became partially failed states that do not fully control their territories. Russia and its allies took advantage of the lacking international embeddedness of these four countries. Moscow supports separatism directly in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Donets Basin (and indirectly, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh). Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula was simply annexed to the Russian Federation in March 2014.

Neither the EU nor NATO will any time soon be able to fill the conspicuous security vacuum they have left with their hesitant and inconsistent enlargement policies in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Both organization have, in the past, amply demonstrated their inadequacy as strategically thinking and geopolitically resolute actors. Against this background, an increasing amount of post-Soviet politicians, diplomats, and intellectuals are starting to discuss alternative options to at least partially increase their countries’ security. The most prominent among these concepts is the Intermarium.

The Historical Roots of a Union of the Lands Between the Seas

The idea of an association or coalition that would encompass the lands of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, from Baltic to the Yugoslav nations, appeared first in the 19th century. Such an alliance would have been directed against the threats of Tsarist Russia in the east, as well as of, initially, Prussia and, later, the German Reich in the west. After World War I, the idea gained momentum in Poland, which strived to survive and strengthen itself within the ongoing European turmoil. Its first inter-war leader Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935) re-introduced the 19th-century concept of a Slavic union called Międzymorze (Land between the Seas). The term became subsequently known under its Latinized form “Intermarium,” and referred to some sort of alliance of the Central-East and South-East European states located between the Baltic, Black, Adriatic, and/or Aegean seas.

Initially, Piłsudski sought to achieve such an East European union or even federation that would have included Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. The 1920 Warsaw Treaty, a military-economic coalition with the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic, could have become a first step toward such a coalition. Yet, the alliance did not prevent Ukraine’s and Belarus’s capture by the victorious Bolsheviks during the 1920 Polish-Soviet War. It became clear that those East European lands which had fallen under control of the Soviet Union, founded in 1922, were no longer available for an Intermarium. Subsequently, Piłsudski sought to forge a confederation between about a dozen European states, including the Scandinavian countries, Italy, and Greece, that would have strengthened its members against both Soviet and German threats. However, the broad geographical scale of this project and differences in the interests of the possible member states prevented its realization, and thus could not prevent the Nazi-Soviet assault of September 1939.

In and after the World War II, Eastern and Central Europe suffered the very fate that Piłsudski’s Intermarium had been supposed to prevent. The small nations between the great powers became mere objects of contemporary European history. The years under fascist, Soviet, pro-Soviet, or other communist rule (as in Yugoslavia) added shared experiences to the lands of the Intermarium that had been already before tied to each other by various historic, linguistic, religious, and personal links. Now, some or all of these countries also experienced a short occupation by the Third Reich and its allies, and long-lasting Moscow-backed and/or Soviet-like governments, economic collectivization, totalitarian rule, international isolation, political indoctrination, etc.

Yet another common experience for the countries of East-Central Europe in the 20th century was Western discriminatory discourse on them, which “sliced” the history of these nations away from Europe’s past and memory, an imagination of the European continent sharply criticized by, among others, Norman Davies and Tony Judt.[1] In this discourse, what was thought of as “real” Europe was its western or, at most, central part. For many Westerners, the nations controlled by the (pro-)Soviet regimes seemed to be too foreign and strange to be considered properly Western. This view remained prevalent throughout the 1990s, and, to some degree, even after most formerly communist states had become full members of NATO and the EU.

The Intermarium’s Relevance Today

The creation of a full-scale Central and Eastern European union or federation, as once envisaged by Piłsudski, is not any longer feasible or necessary today. That is because the majority of countries in this region have either already acceded to the EU, are expecting to do so soon, or have concluded far-reaching association agreements that will gradually make them parts of the Union’s economic and legal sphere. The Intermarium’s nations are thereby already closely connected and integrating with each other.

This is also why some initiatives within the EU — like the Visegrad group, Three Seas Initiative, and Via Carpatia transport corridor — are so far of only marginal relevance to Eastern Europe’s security. To be sure, these initiatives have also political dimensions and thus remind of the inter-war Intermarium idea. Yet they are mere additions to the regular integration process within the EU and its Eastern Partnership. They thus lack larger geopolitical clout and remain essentially intra-Union lobbying projects. The Adriatic Charter association, created by the United States, Albania, Croatia, and Republic of Macedonia in 2003, and joined by Montenegro as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2008, is a step towards solving the security dilemma in Europe’s post-Cold War south-east. Yet there is no such project for the “grey zone” states between the EU and Russia, which today are in a somewhat similar situation to interwar East-Central Europe.

In fact, immediately after the break-up of the Soviet bloc and Union, the Intermarium briefly reappeared in its original form in Poland, under the label “NATO-bis” which would have been a separate security organization of Europe’s post-communist countries. That project was driven by fears of Russian neo-imperialism, similar to those of Piłsudski 70 years before. The idea of such a regional security coalition was also championed by non-Polish political leaders in East-Central Europe ranging from Algirdas Brazauskas (1932-2010) in Lithuania to Zianon Pazniak (b. 1944) in Belarus, as well as regional political experts. Yet, most of the states of the presumed pos-Cold War Intermarium alliance soon received membership invitations from the EU and NATO. As a result, for Eastern Europe’s new EU and NATO candidate and later member states, the added value of creating a new regional security organization declined rapidly.

Still, in view of continuing threats and risks in Eastern Europe, the Intermarium concept has, since 1991, constantly remained in the air throughout the region. It has also become a vehicle for promoting the interests of Eastern EU members within the union. The term has thus experienced a double revival, as both an enhanced regional cooperation project and as a transregional security concept. When the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) party won the 2015 elections, it announced a more active stance by Warsaw in Central-East European political affairs in both of these regards. Initially, PiS wanted not only closer cooperation within the Visegrad Group members, but also stronger attention toward Ukraine as well as the other Eastern Partnership countries.

Poland’s new focus on the V4, Intermarium, and, briefly, Ukraine had, however, an ambivalent intention. It went along with the new PiS government’s increasing criticism toward Germany and France, who, in the eyes of the Polish conservative party’s speakers, are allegedly using the EU to exploit weaker states and further the liberal anti-traditionalist agenda of their mainstream parties. Manipulating anti-Russian and anti-German sentiments among PiS supporters, the new Polish president Andzej Duda (b. 1972) has re-utilized the concept of Intermarium as an East European cooperation scheme not only directed against Russia, but also presenting it as an alternative to the dominant Western countries within the EU. Somewhat similar motives may have been behind the activities of the new Croatian president, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic (b. 1968), to intensify regional political, economic, and security cooperation of the EU member states between the Baltic and the Adriatic Seas.

In contrast, for Ukrainians, the idea of Intermarium is primarily related to their national security concerns, as Ukraine struggles to survive in its ongoing hybrid war with Russia. In Kyiv, the Intermarium is seen as complementary, rather than antagonistic, to other integration schemes. Kyiv already has — within the logic of an Intermarium — developed special ties with other Central-East European states, albeit in the loose forms of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (known under its acronym GUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) and the Community of Democratic Choice. Later on, Ukraine started certain military cooperation with Lithuania and Poland, and established a common military brigade with them. Lithuania and Poland have for many years been those countries that Ukrainians, according to polls, favor strongly. These and similar developments are an expression of the sense of common interests, perceptions, threats, and, partially, even identity among Moscow’s former colonies in East-Central Europe. Yet, none of the Intermarium-related projects have yet led to the creation of potent security alliance in Eastern Europe.

Worse, the Intermarium as a security concept is becoming increasingly corrupted by narrow interests of Warsaw’s new traditionalistic leadership. What Poland seemingly today wants is to create an alternative center of influence inside the EU to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis Western states. Suspiciousness toward Germany’s ardent Europeanism, desire to regain some of their sovereignty and to protect “traditional values” are now leading to a counter-reaction by Central-East European nations. This has manifested itself in strong opposition against the EU’s refugee distribution quotas by the governments of the V4 countries and Slovenia. (In Kyiv, there has emerged an even more radically anti-Western interpretation of the Intermarium idea by a minor far right party National Corps that has recently grown out of the notorious Azov Regiment, a volunteer National Guard unit, founded in 2014 by a small group of Ukrainian racist ultra-nationalists.)

Yet another cooperation reminiscent of the Intermarium, the already mentioned Three Seas (Adriatic — Baltic — Black Sea) or Trimarium Initiative (TSI), has infrastructure development as its main focal point. It fosters energy cooperation to reduce East-Central Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. While not being a member of the TSI, non-EU countries such as Ukraine may, in the future, benefit from these plans too. US President Trump attended a TSI summit in July 2017.

So far, however, none of the various above projects revives the original Intermarium’s intentions to join forces of smaller Central-East European nations against a geopolitically and militarily more powerful enemy. Today, an Intermarium could stretch from Narva in the north to Batumi in the south. Significant parts of the populations and the majority of foreign affairs experts of the countries between the Baltic and Black seas view Putin’s Russia as their biggest threat. Inside NATO, the political mainstreams of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania regard Russia as a major security problem. The same can be said of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova outside NATO. These states could thus form the core of an East-Central European and South Caucasian defense coalition. Further European countries within, or close to, the “land between the seas” — from the Scandinavian to the Western Balkan nations — might be willing to support, join, or associate themselves with such an alliance.

With regard to its legal set-up, the mentioned 2010 Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Turkey and Azerbaijan could function as a model treaty for a security arrangement between certain eastern NATO states on the one side, and some post-Soviet non-NATO countries on the other. As in Article 2 of the ratified Turkish-Azeri alliance, the exact modus of action, in case of an aggression, could be left open to each treaty party. The pact could simply state an obligation that, if confronted with an attack, the parties would “mutually assist each other”, while the exact contents of the support would be agreed upon once a military infringement has happened. It should thus not conflict with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but would still constitute a warning to the Kremlin that new Russian military adventures will be costlier than Moscow’s low-risk interventions in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. While such a coalition of non-nuclear-weapons states cannot be a comprehensive solution to the post-Soviet security dilemma, it would constitute an enormous improvement for Zwischeneuropa (in-between-Europe).

However, paralleling the course of events after 1918 in East-Central Europe, since 1991 the Intermarium idea so far remains within the realm of speculation. The resulting non-inclusion of the gray zone countries continues to leave the perceived costs of further Russian aggression in the region low. Even after 2014, coalition-building in Eastern Europe has not gotten off the ground. The three associated Eastern Partnership countries now receive more political, economic, and also military support from NATO and the EU. Yet, they are still left on their own, by the West and their Central-East European neighbors, in their military confrontations with the Kremlin. The obvious lesson from both the inter-war and early post-Soviet periods is that this is not a sustainable state of affairs for the international relations of Eastern Europe.

Risks and Gains of an Intermarium Today

Our first publication of this assessment in 2017[2] triggered a swift response from MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Poland’s first Minister for European Integration.[3] He acknowledged that regional strategic cooperation is beneficial for all parties involved and for Europe as a whole – but he rejected the idea of a military alliance. Saryusz-Wolski argued that such an alliance would provoke Russia to test the Intermarium’s seriousness. If no “serious action” from members of both the Intermarium and NATO to a Russian challenged followed, the new alliance would be exposed “as a paper tiger.” Conversely, if the Intermarium’s NATO members were to engage actively in confronting Russia, this could undermine the protection provided by the Washington Treaty’s Article 5. Saryusz-Wolski concludes that a “military Intermarium” would erode “the deterrent effect of the [Atlantic] alliance.”

It is true that Russia likes to test reactions of its foes, as, for example, Moscow’s testing of Ukraine’s defenses in Mar’inka in summer 2015 showed. Yet, while Russia wants to portray itself as an unpredictable power capable of an all-out attack, in reality it has preferred hybrid methods and avoided open military confrontation. Even in the turmoil of early 2014, Russia used “little green men” without insignia to occupy Crimea – a scenario also considered by Estonia, but not tried by Moscow.

Russia still does not admit its military presence in Donbas and continues to claim that its soldiers spotted there are mere “volunteers.” The Kremlin behaves in this way as the West would likely view an open military attack as a “red line” making “business as usual” with Russia impossible. Against this background, the primary goal of an Intermarium would be, for the member countries, to deal jointly with hybrid threats. The limited nature of such threats would make it for NATO’s hypothetical Intermarium member states relatively easy to respond. Such engagement is unlikely to mean participation in a conventional war, and a subsequent erosion of the deterrent effect of NATO. In any way, a loosely formulated alliance treaty can leave it up to each party to decide which exact means – military or non-military – it chooses for fulfilling its alignment obligations. The formulation “military Intermarium” is Saryusz-Wolski’s, and not ours.

Saryusz-Wolski also claims that EU member states skeptical of the Eastern Neighborhood Policy will deny “association or membership benefits to Eastern European states, citing their Intermarium membership as sufficient enough.” We cannot follow such the reasoning behind such a speculation. Saryusz-Wolski’s estimates that “however suboptimal the current situation may be, it is still preferable to the institutionalization of parallel security structures.” He advises using “economic means to achieve the political goal of peace and stability.” Such conclusions let us suspect that he does not see or does not want to fully acknowledge the direct security challenges that will remain for the “gray zone” states in Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus, as well as the indirect risks for their Western neighbors who made it into NATO and the EU.

Kostiantyn Fedorenko is a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv, and frequent commentator on current Ukrainian affairs for various European media outlets.

Dr. Andreas Umland is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv, and editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” published by ibidem Press at Stuttgart and distributed by Columbia University Press at New York.

NOTES

[1] E.g.: Tony Judt. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Penguin Books, 2006.

[2] Kostiantyn Fedorenko and Andreas Umland, “How to Solve Ukraine’s Security Dilemma? The Idea of an Intermarium Coalition in East-Central Europe,” War on the Rocks, August 30, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/how-to-solve-ukraines-security-dilemma-the-idea-of-an-intermarium-coalition-in-east-central-europe/.

[3] Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, “In Between Security Arrangements: The Trojan Horse of Military Intermarium,” War on the Rocks, October 13, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/in-between-security-arrangements-the-trojan-horse-of-military-intermarium/.

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