Diplomacy & Crisis News

Robert Farley

Security, Asia

America's carriers are vulnerable.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Just because flat-decked aircraft carrying ships will likely be with us does not mean that the Ford class, which emphasizes high-intensity, high technology warfare, represents an ideal investment of U.S. defense capital.  The vulnerabilities of the big carriers are real, and the U.S. needs to either remedy those problems, or consider an alternative means of delivering ordnance.

The United States has decided to spend many billions of dollars on the CVN-78 (“Ford”) class of aircraft carriers to replace the venerable Nimitz class. The latter has served the U.S. Navy since 1975, with the last ship (USS George H. W.  Bush) entering service in 2009. The Fords could be in service, in one configuration or another, until the end of the 21st century.

Just as the U.S. government has determined to make this investment, numerous analysts have argued that the increasing lethality of anti-access/area denial systems (especially China’s, but also Russia and Iran) has made the aircraft carrier obsolete.  If so, investing in a class of ships intended to serve for 90 years might look like a colossal waste of money.

As with any difficult debate, we should take time to define our terms, and clarify the stakes. The anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems around the world may indeed curb the effectiveness of the Ford class, but the U.S. will still find uses for this ships.

Define Obsolete:

We need to carefully describe how we think about obsolescence. Military analysts often equates obsolescence with uselessness, especially while pursuing dollars for new gadgets, but the two words don’t mean the same thing. In every war, armies, navies, and air forces fight with old, even archaic equipment.  Built for World War II, the A-26 Invader attack aircraft served in the Vietnam War.  The USS New Jersey, declared obsolete at the end of World War II, fought off Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon.  The A-10 “Warthog,” thought by many to be obsolete before it even flew, continues to fight in America’s wars.  For countries less well-endowed than the United States, the point hold even more strongly; all of the armies currently fighting in Syria and Libya use equipment that the U.S. considered obsolete decades ago.

The point is that even if the ships of the CVN-78 class cannot penetrate advanced A2/AD systems, they can still serve other useful purposes.  Indeed, American carriers since 1945 have entirely earned their keep on these other missions, which include strike in permissive environments, displays of national power and commitment, and relief operations.  “Obsolescence” for one kind of mission does not imply uselessness across the range of maritime military operations.

Carrier vs. A2/AD:

People have predicted the obsolescence of the aircraft carrier since the end of World War II.  The Soviets developed an elaborate system of submarines, sensors, and aircraft designed to strike US aircraft carriers.  The U.S. developed countermeasures, including the F-14 Tomcat, intended to defeat and distract the Soviet systems. As war never happened, we never had the opportunity to test the capabilities of a carrier air wing against a flight of Tu-22M “Backfire” bombers. The Soviets and the Americans worked hard against each other, countering each innovation with an ever-more-sophisticated reply.  Each iteration led to a different constellation of power and vulnerability; the bombers had the upper hand at some points, and the carriers at others.

The next generation of A2/AD capabilities will have a similarly non-linear character. While Chinese missiles might have the range and terminal maneuverability to find U.S. carriers, missile defense and electronic counter-measures might make the missiles ineffective to the point of uselessness.  Similar, improvements in anti-submarine technology could limit or eliminate the vulnerability that carriers face against undersea threats. Carriers that become “obsolete” may not stay that way.

Flexibility:

The utility of a large, flat-decked ship comes primarily from the kinds of aircraft it can carry and launch. The aircraft carrier as a concept has survived, in no small part, because aircraft carriers are good for jobs other than penetrating tightly defended A2/AD systems.  Indeed, no U.S. carrier since World War II has ever needed to directly challenge such a system. Instead (as noted above) aircraft carriers have found themselves jobs in a variety of other conditions.

The U.S. Navy has enjoyed the advantage of nearly unfettered access to enemy airspace over the past twenty-five years, and has structured its air wings accordingly. While the U.S. has been slower than many would have liked to adapt to the new array of anti-access threats, the development of fifth and sixth generation stealth aircraft, as well as the eventual procurement of long range, carrier-based strike zones, can help restore the usefulness of the CVN-78 class, even if anti-access weapons drive the carriers further out to sea.

The Final Salvo:

Plenty of world-beating weapons quickly become obsolete. The fast battleships of World War II went into reserve less than a decade after their commissioning. The early fighters and bombers of the jet age sometimes had even briefer lifespans. Aircraft carriers, in widely variant forms, have enjoyed a good, long run. They survive because aircraft have short ranges, and fixed airfields have significant military and political vulnerabilities. These two factors seem likely to persist.

However, just because flat-decked aircraft carrying ships will likely be with us does not mean that the Ford class, which emphasizes high-intensity, high technology warfare, represents an ideal investment of U.S. defense capital.  The vulnerabilities of the big carriers are real, and the U.S. needs to either remedy those problems, or consider an alternative means of delivering ordnance.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. This was originally published in May 2017 and is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters.

Sukjoon Yoon

Security, Asia

The United States and China have both treated the pandemic as another opportunity to play power politics in the South China Sea.

China has quite shamelessly used its infamous Nine-Dash Line to justify bullying its smaller weaker neighbors, attempting to seize economic control of valuable undersea assets. It has also behaved badly in other ways, creating and militarizing artificial islands to seize strategic control of the South China Sea (SCS) in support of its geopolitical struggle with the United States. 

Liberal democracies now take the view that changing political boundaries by main force is no longer legal, whereas China believes it is simply restoring the historical status quo ante. But the behavior of the United States is hardly less provocative: the Chinese economy relies upon freedom of navigation through the SCS, just as much as other economies, so the U.S.-led freedom of navigation operations seem to be more about preserving U.S. military dominance and keeping China in its place. 

The United States seems determined to preserve its regional maritime hegemony, whatever the consequences, but its military advantage over China is clearly declining in relative terms, and China can afford to play a long game. 

The ASEAN countries, especially those coastal to the SCS, have limited options, though they are trying to achieve a little more autonomy by expanding their maritime forces. But a general arms build-up in the SCS is hardly conducive to peace and good order, and all parties should consider their common interests in preserving a stable security environment. 

The United States and China should, therefore, refrain from any further saber-rattling, and instead work together to resolve their differences within existing international legal and security protocols, and if these are inadequate then new ones should be negotiated: it does not help matters that the United States has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

As a regional middle power, South Korea is advocating balanced and constructive policies, without prejudice to any country, and is demonstrating its successful measures against the coronavirus pandemic during the past couple of months that world nations can have some lessons restored and the threat of serious physical conflicts in the SCS can be reduced. 

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic is a novel factor impacting the maritime disputes in the SCS. The navies of the two great powers, the United States and China, have been directly affected, by having to demonstrate their ability to manage this insidious threat. And there has also been an indirect geostrategic effect arising from the entanglement of military, economic, and public health issues, with both countries playing the blame game and attempting to rally domestic support through conspiracy theories.

Theoretical analysis of middle powers has generally been skeptical about the extent of the leverage which they can exert to influence the great power game, but in 2020 we have seen a situation where South Korea has been admired in almost every country around the world, including in China and the United States, by the common people, and by many of the political leaders, for its strikingly successful response to the coronavirus global pandemic. Are there, perhaps, some lessons from this health crisis that can be usefully transferred to geopolitical crises, such as those of the SCS?

Certainly the pandemic has already had effects far beyond the immediate sphere of health management, the most conspicuous being the concomitant economic crisis. The world is facing the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, and even the greatest powers have lost significant influence, with the magnitude and speed of this collapse unprecedented in our modern world. Regionally, China and many ASEAN members are experiencing multiple crises: in health, in their finances, and with collapsing supply chains for food and goods. ASEAN policy-makers are struggling to cope with this extraordinary situation, and their efforts are without reference to or support from the great powers. Thus, the Philippines decided to terminate its Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, and three ASEAN states have recently tried to push back at China’s unilateral claims in the SCS.

With the United States and China playing a blame game about who is responsible for the coronavirus pandemic, the SCS has been drawn into their struggle to find strategic scapegoats. In April 2020, the United States sent naval cruisers and destroyers to the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands in the SCS for the first time, while two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers were moored at harbors in the region. The Chinese PLA Southern Theater Command accused the U.S. naval vessels of conducting illegal trespass into SCS waters and claimed to have expelled them. It seems probable that the United States and China will continue to exploit the coronavirus pandemic as a tool to influence regional states strategically, which will result in tactical naval operations. With other countries entirely focused on public health, South Korea is well placed to defuse this naval escalation. 

The coronavirus is a novel transnational threat that has revealed South Korea, by comparison with almost every other country, as a shining exemplar of competent, transparent, trustworthy governance. Assuming that Chinese statistic is accurate, then China has managed the pandemic with ruthless authoritarian efficiency, but few outside China have felt inspired by this model, and in liberal democracies, people have once again recognized the true character of China’s monolithic system, which tramples even trivial popular dissent, and grabs everything it can get its hands on from its neighbors around the SCS. As for the United States, a health disaster vies for headlines with an economic catastrophe, and Trump is exposed as a breathtakingly incompetent narcissist who has done the exact opposite of “Make America Great Again” by presiding over a historic decline which will surely end with the United States losing its great-power status. One can only hope that the process is as graceful as the decline of British power in the previous century.

Not only the United States, but all major Western countries as well as Japan have also failed miserably to contain the spread of the coronavirus. Yes, there are degrees of failure: Germany is often lauded as a European success story, but as of mid-April they were suffering about as many deaths daily as South Korea had had in total. Moreover, although there is social distancing in South Korea, there is nothing remotely resembling the lockdowns seen elsewhere, and whilst the economy will be impacted, this will likely be within conventional bounds to manage. South Korea is clearly setting a standard that other countries aspire to emulate, and its global stature seems likely to be considerably enhanced in the post-coronavirus era. China and the United States, meanwhile, are engaged in a pathetically unedifying blame game about which is most irresponsible, and, by extension, which system of governance is superior. 

Taiwan is another country which has dealt very successfully with the coronavirus. So what do South Korea and Taiwan have in common? Both societies are highly connected with technologically savvy populations, both have competent, transparent, and responsive governments that enjoy the trust of their citizens, especially in times of crisis. Both countries have relied upon effective contact tracing which collects and integrates multiple data sources, and people have calmly accepted this as necessary and appropriate, even in a free and open society, because they trust their governments. By contrast, other countries are still arguing about privacy issues. Australia and New Zealand are two other regional middle powers that have dealt well with the coronavirus, and again, the governments of these countries have retained the trust of their populations.

The United States and China have both treated the coronavirus pandemic as another opportunity to play power politics in the SCS. China’s stance offers little benefit to its neighbors in the near future and the U.S. “America First” policy progressively erodes its world leadership. Rather than working together against a global health threat, the great powers are engaged in a coronavirus Cold War. By contrast, the South Korean coronavirus success story provides significant international leverage to raise South Korea’s profile, both during and after the pandemic. Let us hope that this will afford South Korea greater strategic and diplomatic influence, allowing it to function as an essential stabilizing factor in the SCS.

The world is changing, and the coronavirus will surely accelerate change. Once upon a time, there were high-class fashion-leaders and major-label musicians, now there are “influencers” that drive global trends from their teenage bedrooms, and some are hugely commercially successful. Perhaps there is a parallel evolution of governance, in which ordinary people will choose what they like, escaping from autocracy, and ignoring corporate interests who try to buy their compliance. Before the crisis there was growing disillusionment with liberal democracies as currently established, and some were looking to the Chinese system, but this has now become less appealing. And it beggars belief that during the worst pandemic for a century the United States has decided to withhold its World Health Organization funding. Both types of governance are now being challenged by the middle powers, by competent trustworthy governments, of which there are several in the region, including South Korea. The coronavirus crisis has exposed the flaws of both great powers for everyone to see, and there is now an unprecedented opportunity for the middle powers to increase their influence over geopolitical developments, including the sorry situation of the SCS.

Ultimately, nothing short of a comprehensive strategic solution will suffice to restore maritime peace and stability in the SCS, taking full account of all relevant geographical, legal and economic factors.

Dr. Sukjoon Yoon is currently a senior fellow and program coordinator of the Korea Institute for Military Affairs and retired Republic of Korea Navy Captain.

Image: Reuters

Michael Rubin

Security, Middle East

It behooves the United States to plan for post-Khamenei Tehran.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is now eighty-one years old. While his health remains a closely guarded secret, his past medical history, age, and the deaths in recent years of other senior leaders have led Iranians to start considering what a post-Khamenei Islamic Republic might look like. 

There are two main contenders to succeed Khamenei: Khamenei’s fifty-one-year-old son, Mojtaba, and Judiciary Chief Ebrahim Raisi. Neither can campaign openly but the nature of the Iranian system is that the Assembly of Experts, the institutional power center which officially promotes the next supreme leader is a rubber-stamp body, and so the informal campaign is more important than the formal. 

Raisi’s supporters may have just fired the first shot. Last month, Gerdab.ir, an Iranian website that specializes in cyber issues, reported that the Assembly of Representatives of Students and Scholars of the Seminaries of Qom, the Coordinating Council of Cultural Centers of the Seminaries, and more than four hundred professors, students and scholars of seminaries from sixty-five cities across the country, wrote a letter to the head of the judiciary asking it to prosecute the perpetrators of the disaster of “cyber vulgarity and crime.” So far, so good: it should not surprise that religious seminaries would among the most conservative element within an already conservative Islamic Republic. 

The letter quotes Ali Khamenei’s frequent statement that cyberspace should be a realm of strength for the Islamic Republic but then complains that both the Ministry of Communication and the Supreme Cyberspace Council have failed at their task. The Ministry of Communications, of course, is led by Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi who, at age thirty-eight, is Iran’s youngest cabinet member. Iranians often float his name as a potential future president, especially with Hassan Rouhani’s second term winding down. To knee-cap a potential moderate (in the very limited Iranian sense) may be on the hard-liners’ agenda. 

The castigation of the Supreme Cyberspace Council is more interesting. Formed in March 2012 by Khamenei itself, it was meant to unify Iran’s myriad cyber-organizations and coordinate policy. For the seminary activists simultaneously to petition Raisi and complain about the failure of the Supreme Cyberspace Council to protect the public from counter-revolutionary and counter-cultural ideas carried on “television, radio, the Internet, social networks, [and] all kinds of cyberspace devices” is to criticize subtly not only the supreme leader for not backing his rhetoric with action but also by association Mojtaba. 

Most analysts believe that Raisi is among the most conservative figures in Iranian politics. To put that in perspective, in 1989, the Iranian political elite settled on Khamenei to replace Revolutionary Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini not only because Khomeini had endorsed Khamenei, but also because they believed Khamenei to be relatively neutral and weak and therefore not a threat to the internal balance of power. That alone should give pause to foreign diplomats and academics who believe revolutions naturally liberalize with time or that muddle-through reform will triumph in Iran. Raisi’s accession is still far from certain. Remember, up until a year before his death, Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri was Khomeini’s designated successor until Khomeini engineered a last-minute purge. The same, in theory, could happen to Raisi. Likewise, it is uncertain any cleric would emerge if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps decided to exert control over the situation. Still, whether Republican or Democrat or whether a proponent of maximum pressure or conciliation, it behooves the United States to plan for post-Khamenei Iran because it appears the Iranians already are.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). You can follow him on Twitter: @mrubin1971.

Image: Reuters

Merrick “Mac” Carey

Security, Asia

Its stealth, long-range sensors and ability to internally carry Raytheon's AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile make it the world's most effective air supremacy fighter, after the F-22. The Joint Strike Missile (JSM), and Lockheed's Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) provide the F-35B with advanced long-range sea and land strike capabilities. There will soon likely be a JSM variant that will fit into the F-35B's internal bomb bays, thus preserving its stealth.

The F-35B is the Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the fifth-generation Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). As the acronym implies, the B model is distinct from the F-35A and C variants in that it employs a lift fan and thrust-vectoring engine to take off in short distances and land vertically. This unique attribute allows the fighter to operate from short runways, small, simple aircraft carriers and amphibious warfare ships.

The JSF is the world’s only operational fifth-generation fighter in large-scale production. Fifth-generation fighters are distinct from their Cold War-era fourth-generation predecessors (F-15, F-16, F-18, and Russian and Chinese Flankers) primarily in their ability to see enemy fighters and ground threats without being seen. This gives them a substantial increase in combat effectiveness compared with their older cousins. Imagine a battle where one side is blindfolded.

Pairing this generational leap in capability with STOVL flexibility triples the number of allied warships that can operate fifth-generation fighters. These additional platforms could ensure naval dominance over China.

The F-35B is nominally meant to replace the AV-8B Harrier as a close air support fighter, but this doesn't come close to describing its full potential as an air and maritime supremacy platform.

Its stealth, long-range sensors and ability to internally carry Raytheon's AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile make it the world's most effective air supremacy fighter, after the F-22. The Joint Strike Missile (JSM), and Lockheed's Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) provide the F-35B with advanced long-range sea and land strike capabilities. There will soon likely be a JSM variant that will fit into the F-35B's internal bomb bays, thus preserving its stealth.

The AN/APG 81 is the most advanced radar ever fitted onto a fighter aircraft. Its electronically scanned array allows the system to be used for multiple purposes, adding sea search to traditional air search capabilities. Continual software upgrades will only increase that powerful radar's abilities. Finally, by operating at high altitudes, the F-35 sensors can see over the horizon, giving the aircraft a much longer detection range than surface ships. This level of lethality is simply unprecedented in a STOVL package.

Pairing long-range arms with far-seeing eyes gives every F-35B naval platform the ability to see and shoot first.

America’s ten nuclear powered Nimitz-class carriers operate the catapult and arresting wire variant of the aircraft, the F-35C. These carriers offer unrivaled naval power. In terms of speed, range, survivability, capacity for aircraft, sortie generation, and a host of other criteria, the Nimitz is beyond the challenge of any sea-based threats.

However, nuclear-powered carrier fleets are cost-prohibitive for every non-U.S. navy in the world. The F-35B lowers the barriers to entry into the elite club of (fortunately only allied) nations that can operate fifth-generation fighters off of ships.

The U.S. Navy also operates nine non-nuclear-powered amphibious assault ships that are capable of launching and recovering STOVL fighters. Though they are only half the size of the nuclear-powered carriers, and not dedicated exclusively to air operations, they are a significant force multiplier for U.S. naval aviation. Once the F-35B achieved Initial Operational Capability in 2015, the U.S. Navy found that its fifth-generation-capable carrier fleet essentially doubled, from 10 to 19, by adding this group of smaller warships to the mix.

Furthermore, the F-35B enables up to eleven allied warships to operate fifth-generation fighters. Below is a list of the number of STOVL platforms that each allied nation operates: 

•  2 British* 

•  2 Japanese* 

•  1 Italian (with another completing construction)* 

•  1 Spanish 

•  2 Australian** 

•  1 Korean (with another conducting sea trials)**  

* Already have F-35B aircraft delivered or ordered for carrier operations.

** Ships would require some modification for F-35B operations.

 Both the Koreans and Australians already operate F-35As, the land-based variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. South Korea is officially reviewing a proposal to purchase F-35Bs.

The barriers of entry to operate F-35B capable warships are so low that Singapore, a nation of only five million people, is also flirting with the idea. Singapore has announced plans to buy roughly a dozen F-35Bs. It has even advertised models of a domestically constructed STOVL carrier, which would essentially be a larger version of their domestically produced Endurance-class amphibious assault ship. The fact that this is even a possibility for a city-state less than half the size of Rhode Island proves how much of a game-changer this flexible fighter is.

Far too much has been made about the implications of the fledgling Chinese aircraft carrier force. The Chinese navy operates a modest pair of carriers with the worst launching method and the worst type of ship engine.

Unlike U.S. big deck carriers, they have no catapults. Without lift fans, their fourth-generation J-15 fighters do not have true short takeoff capability. Therefore, Chinese carrier-based fighters take off by struggling up a ramp in full afterburner. This causes dramatic payload and range penalties, giving it a significantly shorter operational distance than the combat radius for the F-35B.

Unlike the unlimited range of the U.S. nuclear-powered carriers, or the excellent power and efficiency of all modern allied STOVL amphibious assault ship’s gas and diesel propulsion systems, the Chinese carriers employ complex, cumbersome and inefficient oil-fired boilers. This seriously limits the range and makes maintaining and crewing the ships incommensurately expensive.

This combination produces an underpowered, over-priced aircraft carrier. The Chinese carriers are unable to challenge the allied fifth-generation fleet. This leaves Chinese surface vessels confronting allied carrier-based aircraft. The advantages of aircraft range, speed, and sensor altitude make such potential contests one-sided.

Persian Gulf energy, African resources, and European and U.S. export markets are essential for Chinese economic prosperity. Without energy from the Persian Gulf, in particular, the Chinese economy would collapse in weeks. In order for it to secure shipping access in wartime, China's navy would need to dominate both the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The difficulties of this task are many, and it would essentially be made impossible by even a fraction of the aforementioned allied amphibious assault ships operating from bases encircling Eurasia.

Five European warships rotating on station in the Indian Ocean, in coordination with naval support bases at Diego Garcia and the Persian Gulf, would be an almost insurmountable challenge to a fledgling Chinese blue water force. Should the Europeans be unwilling or unavailable, one Nimitz-class carrier strike group could also do the job. Meanwhile, four allied East Asian F-35B warships could seal off approaches to the East China Sea, by far China's most important sea line of communication. Finally, two Australian warships could present a serious blocking movement on the Strait of Malacca. All of these decisive naval actions could be accomplished without even entering the disputed South China Sea, or coming within range of China's impressive land-based tactical aircraft.

The modern propulsion systems on the allied STOVL amphibious warships enable longer deployments with less maintenance and overhaul time in between cruises. Chinese carriers, powered by oil-fired boilers, have about 30–40 percent of the endurance of the allied platforms. This naval asymmetry gives the United States and her allies veto power over Chinese economic survival for many years.

Even if only one-fifth of this twenty-ship international STOVL fleet were available at any given time, it would be sufficient to completely tie up China's navy, disrupt its vital shipping lanes from the Pacific Ocean to the Red Sea, and cripple its economy. 

The grueling testing and development process of the F-35 left many wondering if incorporating the complex STOVL variant was worth the time and expense. However, the unique advantage it gives—bringing the total number of allied warships capable of operating fifth-generation fighters from ten to thirty, with the potential for more—proves the irreplaceable worth of the F-35B STOVL variant.

Merrick "Mac" Carey is a former senior Capitol Hill aide who is now CEO of the Lexington Institute, a public policy think tank in Arlington, Virginia.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

History, Europe

Allied tanks were crucial to securing a beachhead in Normandy after the D-Day landings on June 6, 1944—and while there were a number of specially designed and modified tanks, one of the more successful innovations wasn't a simple field modification. Yet it proved crucial in breaking through French hedgerows.

Allied tanks were crucial to securing a beachhead in Normandy after the D-Day landings on June 6, 1944—and while there were a number of specially designed and modified tanks, one of the more successful innovations wasn't a simple field modification. Yet it proved crucial in breaking through French hedgerows.

Among the numerous weapons developed specifically for Operation Overlord, were the "Hobart's Funnies"—a series of tanks that were designed to fill specific roles during the D-Day landings. These were conceived by and named after British Major-General Sir Percy Hobart. Among the most famous was arguably the DD tank—the Duplex Drive—which was an amphibious tank fitted with a large watertight canvas housing that actually enabled it to float while a pair of propellers provided propulsion.

The DD "swimming" Sherman was used on all five beaches on D-Day. The DD tanks worked well in the reasonably calm waters off Gold, Sword, and Juno beaches, while twenty-seven out of twenty-eight tanks reached Utah Beach. However, in the rough waters of Omaha Beach, almost all of the tanks launched offshore were lost.

Other "Funnies" included the "Crocodile," which was a Churchill tank that was modified with the addition of a flame-thrower, which made it one of the most deadly weapons in the British Army's arsenal. It proved so successful it was used throughout the latter stages of the war in Europe. Another was the "Crab," which was a Sherman tank equipped with a mine flail to clear a path through a beach minefield. The fail tank wasn't entirely a new invention—a Matilda "Scorpion" had been used two years earlier at the Battle of El Alamein, but in the case of the Crab the fail was powered by the tank's main engine.

Hobart's Funnies proved successful, but none were able to deal with a problem that military planners failed to address prior to the invasion—the French hedgerows, or "bocage." of Normandy. These were the hedges and small trees that grew on the earthen embankment that since Roman times had bordered the fields in the French countryside of Normandy.

The hedgerows caused great problems as the Allied units could not see beyond the next hedgerow while Germans found these to be perfect defensive positions. Allied tanks were unable to climb the embankments without exposing the underside while tanks moving down the narrow roads made prime targets for the enemy. Worst of all disable tanks created a bottleneck that couldn't be easily moved. As a result a small German unit with anti-tank weapons could prevent an entire battalion from advancing.

The solution came not from Major-General Hobart but rather from American Sergeant Curtis G. Culin of the 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 2nd Armored Division, who developed a type of metal sawtooth tusk that could be fitted to the front of a tank. It was made of little more than scrap steel that originally came from the beach obstacles and it proved strong enough to cut through the hedgerows.

The design proved successful and as other tanks were outfitted with similar tusks these quickly began to be called "Rhinoceros" as the plate charged through the bocage like the horn on the African beast. However, it wasn't long before it became known as the Culin Rhino device or Culin hedgerow cutter—and it caught the notice of General Omar Bradley, who ordered that as many Sherman tanks as possible be fitted with the device. By the launch of Operation Cobra—the breakout from Normandy—some sixty of Allied tanks were fitted with the Culin Rhino.

For its creation, Sergeant Culin was awarded the Legion of Merit. This simple innovation highlighted how soldiers in the field were able to adapt, overcome and win the day.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: An American M4 Sherman tank with hedgerow breaching modifications, 60th Infantry Regiment, Belgium. 9 September 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps.

Kacey Ernst, Paloma Beamer

Health, World

Here's what to consider and how to minimize your risks.

We don’t know about you, but we’re ready to travel. And that typically means flying.

We have been thinking through this issue as moms and as an exposure scientist and infectious disease epidemiologist. While we’ve decided personally that we’re not going to fly right now, we will walk you through our thought process on what to consider and how to minimize your risks.

Why the fear of flying?

The primary concern with flying – or traveling by bus or train – is sitting within six feet of an infected person. Remember: Even asymptomatic people can transmit. Your risk of infection directly corresponds to your dose of exposure, which is determined by your duration of time exposed and the amount of virus-contaminated droplets in the air.

A secondary concern is contact with contaminated surfaces. When an infected person contaminates a shared armrest, airport restroom handle, seat tray or other item, the virus can survive for hours though it degrades over time. If you touch that surface and then touch your mouth or nose, you put yourself at risk of infection.

Before you book, think

While there is no way to make air travel 100% safe, there are ways to make it safer. It’s important to think through the particulars for each trip.

One approach to your decision-making is to use what occupational health experts call the hierarchy of controls. This approach does two things. It focuses on strategies to control exposures close to the source. Second, it minimizes how much you have to rely on individual human behavior to control exposure. It’s important to remember you may be infectious and everyone around you may also be infectious.

The best way to control exposure is to eliminate the hazard. Since we cannot eliminate the new coronavirus, ask yourself if you can eliminate the trip. Think extra hard if you are older or have preexisting conditions, or if you are going to visit someone in that position.

If you are healthy and those you visit are healthy, think about ways to substitute the hazard. Is it possible to drive? This would allow you to have more control over minimizing your exposures, particularly if the distance is less than a day of travel.

You’re going, now what?

If you choose to fly, check out airlines’ policies on seating and boarding. Some are minimizing capacity and spacing passengers by not using middle seats and having empty rows. Others are boarding from the back of the plane. Some that were criticized for filling their planes to capacity have announced plans to allow customers to cancel their flights if the flight goes over 70% passenger seating capacity.

Federal and state guidance are changing constantly, so make sure you look up the most recent guidance from government agencies and the airlines and airport you are using for additional advice, and current policies or restrictions.

While this may sound counterintuitive, consider booking multiple, shorter flights. This will decrease the likelihood of having to use the lavatory and the duration of exposure to an infectious person on the plane.

After you book, select a window seat if possible. If you consider the six-foot radius circle around you, having a wall on one side would directly reduce the number of people you are exposed to during the flight in half, not to mention all the people going up and down the aisle.

Also, check out your airline to see their engineering controls that are designed or put into practice to isolate hazards. These include ventilation systems, on-board barriers and electrostatic disinfectant sprays on flights.

When the ventilation system on planes is operating, planes have a very high ratio of outside fresh air to recirculated air – about 10 times higher than most commercial buildings. Plus, most planes’ ventilation systems have HEPA filters. These are at least 99.9% effective at removing particles that are 0.3 microns in diameter and more efficient at removing both smaller and larger particles.

How to be safe from shuttle to seat

From checking in, to going through security to boarding, you will be touching many surfaces. To minimize risk:

• Bring hand wipes to disinfect surfaces such as your seat belt and your personal belongings, like your passport. If you cannot find hand wipes, bring a small washcloth soaked in a bleach solution in a zip bag. This would probably freak TSA out less than your personal spray bottle, and viruses are not likely to grow on a cloth with a bleach solution. But remember: More bleach is not better and can be unsafe. You only need one tablespoon in four cups of water to be effective.

• Bring plastic zip bags for personal items that others may handle, such as your ID. Bring extra bags so you can put these things in a new bag after you get the chance to disinfect them.

• Wash your hands or use hand sanitizer as often as you can. While soap and water is most effective, hand sanitizer is helpful after you wash to get any parts you may have missed.

• Once you get to your window seat, stay put.

• Wear a mask. If you already have an N95 respirator, consider using it but others can also provide protection. We do not recommend purchasing N95 until health care workers have an adequate supply. Technically, it should also be tested to make sure you have a good fit. We do not recommend the use of gloves, as that can lead to a false sense of security and has been associated with reduced hand hygiene practices.

If you are thinking about flying with kids, there are special considerations. Getting a young child to adhere to wearing a mask and maintaining good hygiene behaviors at home is hard enough; it may be impossible to do so when flying. Children under 2 should not wear a mask.

Each day, we are all constantly faced with decisions about our own personal comfort with risk. Arming yourself with specific knowledge about your airport and airline, and maximizing your use of protective measures that you have control over, can reduce your risk. A good analogy might be that every time you get in the car to drive somewhere there is risk of an accident, but there is a big difference between driving the speed limit with your seat belt on and driving blindfolded, 60 miles an hour through the middle of town.

Kacey Ernst, Associate Professor of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of Arizona

Paloma Beamer, Associate Professor of Environmental Health Sciences, University of Arizona

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters

Roger McDermott

Security, Europe

Let's take a closer look.

Moscow’s efforts to develop, test and procure its new Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter have long stalled, with numerous setbacks and delays. While progress has been made, ongoing issues appear to beleaguer aspects of this complex development process, especially following the high-profile crash of an Su-57 prototype during a test flight on December 24, 2019, in Khabarovsk region, in Russia’s Far East. Specialists in Russian airpower frequently defend the Su-57 against critics by asserting that such negative assessments are rooted in exaggerating the merits of the United States’ F-22 or F-35 stealth fighters. While Russia’s defense ministry aims to introduce 76 Su-57s by 2027, recent reporting suggests there may well be further modifications to the platform before production can finally commence (Topwar.ru, May 15).

One likely modification relates to the aircraft’s hydraulic drive, which will be replaced with an electromechanical one. The first test flight for the updated Su-57 is scheduled for 2022. The purpose for carrying out such an upgrade is to reduce future maintenance costs and increase the efficiency of the aircraft. The switch to an electromechanical drive will also offer greater protection to the booster. Yet, the economic factor—reducing the maintenance costs for the Su-57—may well be crucial, since critics within the Ministry of Defense have questioned the reasons for accelerating work on the advanced aircraft, arguing that the Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno Kosmicheskikh Sil—VKS) are currently well served by the Su-35, which has been tried and tested in operations in Syria (Lenta.ru, April 28).

Moscow-based airpower specialists note that international criticism of the Su-57 stems from the lengthy period of its development as well as unfavorable comparisons to the US F-22. One commentary offered examples of such criticism from defense publications in the United States, Italy and China. The Su-57 was dismissed as being not ready for combat against a high-technology adversary. Questions have also been raised over its engines as well as a range of factors that may present challenges to the full stealth capability of the Su-57. One report in Beijing highlighted the issue of stealth technology and concluded that the Su-57 should, therefore, be classed as a fourth-generation fighter. In 2018, India withdrew from a joint program with Russia to create a fifth-generation fighter. The Indian Air Force was dissatisfied with the Su-57’s lack of stealth, weak engines for such a platform, and the numerous delays in terms of program implementation (Topwar.ru, May 13).

While the widespread foreign criticism of the Su-57 undoubtedly causes irritation among Russia’s military experts, it seems the delays to finalizing production, combined with the most recently announced modifications, suggest there could be more serious underlying issues. On August 22, 2018, the defense ministry signed a contract for the supply of the first two Su-57s, delivered during the period 2018–2020; this year, the VKS is scheduled to receive 13 more Su-57s. It is questionable if these targets will be met, however. Since work on developing the Su-57 began in the early 2000s, serial production has been postponed several times. To date, there have been thirteen prototype Su-57s, with three reserved for ground-based testing and ten platforms for flight tests. The Su-57 crash in December 2019 was certainly a fresh setback for the Sukhoi Design Bureau, which is producing this aircraft (Gazeta.ru, April 28).

The platform will enter service equipped with the existing AL-41F1 serial engines with an axisymmetric round nozzle section. Similar power units are installed on the fourth-generation Su-35S. Su-57s with such engines will be delivered to the VKS by the mid-2020s. At a later stage, more advanced “Product-30” engines will be installed on the Su-57s. Although little technical data is publicly available regarding this newer engine, according to Russian air defense specialist Mikhail Khodarenok, there are indications it will have a flat nozzle (Topwar.ru, May 15). This may be linked to efforts to eventually twin the Su-57 to the operational use of the heavy strike, reconnaissance, unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) S-70 Okhotnik (Hunter), which also has a flat nozzle (see EDM, November 13, 2019).

Since Soviet physicist Petr Ufimtsev worked out the fundamentals of stealth aircraft theory in 1962, the US has become the undisputed global leader in the use and application of stealth technology. Moscow has only recently attempted to play catch-up in this field. In essence, radar stealth is achieved by scattering incoming electromagnetic radiation or absorbing it via a protective coating. Even under the best circumstances, some part of a radar’s beamed radiation energy returns, having directly bounced off the stealth craft’s surfaces; yet, at large distances, this echo will hopefully be small enough to be perceived by the radar’s sensors/operators as nothing more than electromagnetic noise. Consequently, the smaller the distance between the radar and the “invisible” aircraft, the greater the likelihood of the plane’s detection, which has spurred the invention of special absorptive coatings to further limit how much of a signal returns to the radar receiver. The formulations of the coatings used in stealth aircraft in the US, Russia and China remain classified. Though it is known that these are polymeric materials with carbon inclusions designed to absorb wave energy (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, May 18).

According to Vladimir Tuchkov, writing in an article for Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, “The designers of the Su-57, however, added four more decimeter radars to the four-centimeter-range radars, the antennas of which are located in the wing. This allows you to launch a rocket in the ‘target location’ so that the missile, approaching the target at a distance of capture by its radar homing, makes a targeted attack.” Tuchkov notes that as well as the stealth challenges for the Su-57, it also has to avoid detection in the visible spectrum and infrared wavelength range. To reduce optical visibility, the designers of the Su-57 added a “pixel color” on the aircraft. However, challenges remain to overcome the thermal or infrared visibility of the jet (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, May 18).

Despite the numerous delays to the production of the Su-57, the defense ministry and the Sukhoi Design Bureau retain confidence that, in the future, Moscow will introduce a genuinely fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft. Meanwhile, lowering the visibility of the platform to radar, optical and infrared detection will need to be finally resolved, while the upgraded engine may become a later addition.

This first appeared in the Eurasia Daily Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation. It was written by Roger McDermott. 

Image: TASS.

Brent Orrell

Politics, Americas

The authors believe that these retirements are likely earlier than originally planned, given the age range of the participants.

Almost 40 million claims for unemployment insurance have been filed in the past two months as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, and it appears that not everyone is looking to go back, particularly older workers.

A recent working paper from the University of Chicago’s Becker Friedman Institute finds that the unemployment rate has not risen to levels that would correspond with the numbers of jobs lost. Through surveys conducted earlier in 2020 and again at the height of the pandemic, they found that some of those who lost jobs have not been counted in the BLS unemployment rate because these workers have dropped out of the labor force. Furthermore, a striking percentage of these former workers cited retirement as their reason for not seeking additional work, rising from 53 percent in the first survey to 60 percent in the follow-on survey. The authors believe that these retirements are likely earlier than originally planned, given the age range of the participants.

There are numerous variables affecting retirement decisions, including household income, personal health, lifestyle preferences, and caretaking responsibilities. Researchers disagree on whether economic downturns postpone or hasten retirement decisions, though it does seem that a household’s financial assets play an important role in this decision.

A unique feature of the current recession is that health officials have been warning the public for months that older people, and especially those living with underlying health conditions, are more at risk of developing more serious forms of the disease than their younger, healthier counterparts. Anxiety about the disease and lower rates of telecommuting might be combining to encourage more early retirement.

Prior to COVID-19, the number of older workers remaining in the workforce was growing at a rapid rate. The US Senate’s Special Committee on Aging found that older workers are on track to make up one quarter of the workforce by 2026. We will have to wait and see whether the pandemic has changed this calculus by creating an exodus of our most experienced and knowledgeable workers.

Learn more: Reemployment is walking; worker safety is chewing gum. We have to do both. | What will 'the ties that bind' look like after COVID? | Workforce education and training, during and after the coronavirus

This article by Brent Orrell first appeared in AEIdeas on May 21, 2020.

Image: Reuters.

Olivia Remes

Health,

Here's a few tips. 

At the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, people’s anxiety levels shot up. Daily reports were coming in about the number of new deaths, there was global chaos and people had to be persuaded to stay inside. And even though this was difficult, we somehow managed to pull through. We slowly became used to our new lives in lockdown, and our anxiety began to subside.

But just as we were settling in to a new reality and routine, the UK government recently announced new measures for lifting the lockdown. Naturally, this has been causing some panic and reports are beginning to surface about how people’s mental health is again being affected. Many people are worrying about whether it is safe to go back to work or send their children to school.

This anxiety is mainly related to uncertainty. We don’t know what the future will hold and this can keep us up at night. It can trigger excessive and uncontrollable worrying, and it can even lead to physical symptoms, such as shortness of breath and heart palpitations.

For people with a pre-existing anxiety disorder or depression, the coronavirus pandemic is a recipe for disaster. Going back out into society might trigger or revive past conditions – such as health anxiety or obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). We’re advised to wash our hands frequently and keep our distance from others at all times – but there is a point when safety behaviours begin to morph into mental disorders.

Sometimes we think that worrying serves a useful purpose, making us vigilant and prepared. We believe that it can help us arrive at a better solution by being proactive about a situation. But worrying for even a short amount of time predisposes us to even more worrying. And before we know it, we’re stuck in a vicious cycle which we can’t escape.

It is a myth that worrying helps us arrive at a better solution. It only makes us feel anxious and stressed – especially if the worrying becomes chronic. Just knowing this can help us take useful steps forward, because we can let go of those anxious thoughts. And most of our worries won’t come true anyway. When researchers at Penn State University asked people to track their anxieties and revisit them at a later point, they saw that 91% of the participants’ worries didn’t come true.

Giving up control

Sometimes, however, this is easier said than done. Sometimes it is very difficult to stop worrying. Sometimes we can’t stop cleaning, and begin to perform repetitive behaviours that can turn into OCD. The way that OCD oftentimes starts is with repetitive, fixed ideas. People read news stories about coronavirus and start worrying that they might get infected if they go back out.

To alleviate this anxiety, they begin to engage in behaviours – such as repetitive, excessive hand-washing – to avert the dreaded outcome. When they do this, they are trying to take control of the situation. But the more they indulge their obsessions, the more – ironically – they begin to lose control. They become unable to rein in their thoughts and lose power over their actions. At this point, OCD has a stronghold over the person and they can’t get out.

One way to prevent this from happening is to do what you can to protect yourself – wash your hands for only the recommended amount and wear a mask – and then let the chips fall where they may. And realise that no matter what you do, it is sometimes impossible to completely protect yourself. Letting go of control is, paradoxically, a way of gaining it back.

This can help us see things more clearly and with a calmer mindset. It also helps us make better decisions. And if you’re worried about restrictions lifting and having to take a crowded tube again - remember, that any anxiety you will be feeling as you’re on that tube will subside. It’s temporary and you will bounce back from it. This is the nature of anxiety, and research has shown this time and again.

Master your life

Another good way to maintain your mental health during this time of constant change and uncertainty is to introduce a positive agenda into your daily routine. How do you do that? By scheduling positive activities into your life and monitoring them. This may include short walks in parks, trying a new recipe or anything else you might enjoy. It’s also important to track yourself to make sure you’re doing such activities on a consistent basis.

When we take the time to engage in pleasant activities, research shows that we not only begin to feel pleasure, but we gain “mastery”. When you have mastery, you start to feel satisfied, having a sense of achievement and control. If you suffer from depression, this technique is particularly useful – it’s like a crane that can help lift you out of a low state. And we know that low mood is something many people have been feeling during this pandemic.

But the road to mastery can be scary to some people. Scheduling things into your life that make you feel happy can be frightening, especially if depression has been a part of your life for a long time.

The rollercoaster of emotions we’ve been experiencing throughout this pandemic might also make us cautious of being too happy too quickly. You might have superstitious thoughts that, if you feel good, something bad will happen. You may worry that it won’t last, or that you’ll get hurt. Isn’t it better to have low expectations – not get too excited and maintain a position of “defensive pessimism”?

Research tells us that the answer is no. Because when we don’t hope and aim for happiness, our lives become a flat line. And isn’t it better to experience a life with ups and down, like a wave with crests and troughs? Embracing life can have a significant impact on our mental health and places us on a path to wellbeing – even during a pandemic.

Olivia Remes, Mental health researcher, University of Cambridge

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters

Colin Barnard

Security, Americas

As NATO becomes the recognized authority for maritime security in the region, de-escalation and even cooperation with Russia could be possible.

Since the Cold War, the U.S. has maintained a steady presence in the Arctic—specifically the European Arctic, or High North—primarily through nuclear submarine deployments while relying on NATO allies in the region for logistical support. However, melting ice caps, an increase in commercial maritime activity, and ongoing territorial disputes necessitate stronger NATO cooperation in the region to achieve a deterrence posture against Russia and safeguard maritime security. Deterring Russian aggression is important in all European bodies of water, and the Arctic will increasingly face the same maritime security issues as other parts of the world, including illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by China and the movement of migrants and refugees by sea.

Checking a Growing Russian Sphere of Influence

The Arctic has reemerged as a front for NATO in recent years, as Russia has ignored European policies not to militarize the region. Since at least 2010, Russia has been reopening and rearming much of the Arctic infrastructure used at the height of the Soviet Union. In 2012, Russia resumed its patrol of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a commercial shipping lane running along Russia’s northern coastline from the Kara Sea to the Bering Strait. In 2014, Russia established a new joint strategic command in Severomorsk to oversee its Northern Fleet with renewed focus on the Arctic. And in 2019, following the first successful navigation of the NSR without icebreakers two years prior, Russia implemented mandatory pilotage for foreign vessels and demonstrated its maritime interdiction capabilities.

Similar to Russia, NATO needs to improve its capability and capacity to operate on the Arctic front. In order to deter the Russian threat and safeguard maritime security, sustained presence in the region is needed. To this end, NATO should create a new standing maritime group dedicated to the Arctic and separate from themaritime groups focused elsewhere. While likely to be hotly debated, a new standing maritime group should gain traction among many of the Arctic states, especially Iceland, Norway, and Denmark, who have long recognized the growing Russian threat in the region. With sustained presence, so too will come sustained situational awareness, which is fundamental for conducting successful operations.

Currently, NATO’s maritime component commander, HQ Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), maintains operational control of NATO’s four standing maritime groups: two destroyer/frigate groups and two mine countermeasures groups. These groups are already overtasked, posturing against a resurgent Russian Navy across the North Atlantic, Baltic, and Black Seas, and lending support to NATO’s maritime security operation in the Mediterranean, Operation Sea Guardian, as well as the EU refugee and migrant crisis. Regardless of these ongoing tasks, these groups are not tailored for Arctic naval operations. For this reason, a new group needs to be formed.

Instead of relying exclusively on frigates and destroyers from NATO navies to form the new group, NATO should look to its coast guards as well, recognizing that many of these forces field ships that are optimized for Arctic operations. The U.S., Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Iceland, and Norway all have Arctic maritime borders, and most have ice-class ships. Denmark has Thetis-class and Knud Rasmussen-class patrol vessels, the latter of which double as icebreakers. Norway has the patrol vessel Svalbard, which also doubles as an icebreaker and recently completed the first Norwegian voyage to the North Pole. Three new patrol vessels will soon join her. Iceland, too, can lend support with their aging but capable Ægir-class or newer Thor-class patrol vessels. Thor is not capable of icebreaking, but it can still operate in the Arctic.

Of course, these examples are just from the smaller NATO navies and coast guards of the Arctic; the U.S. and Canada would have a responsibility to support the group as well. U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers can operate in the Arctic, as recently demonstrated, and where capabilities are lacking, the NATO Defense Planning Processshould abide. NATO partners Sweden and Finland have land borders in the Arctic region and would likely contribute to the group, if not with tangible patrol and surveillance assets, then with information exchange. Beyond historical cooperation with NATO states through agreements such as NORDEFCO, Sweden and Finland have increased cooperation with NATO in recent years, joining the UK’s Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), improving on existing agreements with the U.S., and participating in NATOexercises in the Baltic Sea.

One potential, but not required, outcome of establishing a standing maritime group for the Arctic is the feasibility for NATO to conduct freedom of navigation operations, or FONOPS, against Russia’s excessive maritime claims in the region. For years, the world has read stories of FONOPS in the South China Sea to challenge China’s excessive claims. According to the Department of Defense (DoD), FONOPS are conducted to “consistently challenge excessive maritime claims made by a variety of coastal States, including allies, partners, and competitors.” However, despite excessive maritime claims made the world over, high-profile FONOPS are rarely conducted outside of the South China Sea, including againstRussia.

Concerns over whether or not FONOPS in the Arctic would do moreharm than good are valid, but these concerns are mostly due to the U.S. Navy’s current lack of capability and capacity in the region, which the new standing maritime group would help address. Nevertheless, objections to FONOPS in the Arctic, especially NATO-led, are still likely to be made for fear of escalation with Russia. However, even if Russia were to cite a NATO FONOP, it does not require one to justify its continued aggression, nor did it require one in Georgia in 2009 or in Ukraine in 2014 and 2018. Russia justifies its aggression because of NATO’s continued expansion into once Soviet territory, something which George Kennan, the architect of the Cold War containment strategy,predicted. Russia is going to act regardless of NATO conducting FONOPS.

With this tension between NATO and Russia in mind, some believe a military “code of conduct” is needed for the Arctic. While the recommendation for the deployment of a standing maritime group to the region may appear hardline in contrast, such a group would operate professionally alongside Russian units, as is already done by the other maritime groups. Moreover, such a group would be part of NATO’s increasing role in Arctic maritime security. From assisting with search and rescue operations to helping deter illegal/illicit activity ranging from IUU fishing to trafficking in persons or goods, NATO’s role in the region would be two-fold: deter Russia while safeguarding maritime security. Neither role precludes a code of conduct for the region, and the latter presents an opportunity for de-escalation and possibly even a measure of cooperation with Russia.

The China Angle

Another potential outcome of NATO’s sustained presence and situational awareness in the Arctic is a better deterrence posture against China. China, declaring itself a “near-Arctic” state and achieving observer status on the Arctic Council, is increasingly becoming a player in the region. While for now most of the play has been economic, investing large sums in Arctic states—including NATO allies—and adding the Arctic to its Belt and Road Initiative (Polar Silk Road), it can be assumed that its economic investment in the region will eventually be followed by militarization.

How China might move to militarize the Arctic is anyone’s guess, but its 2018 white paper on the Arctic, as summarized by Lieutenant Commander Rachel Gosnell, USN, clearly states China’s interests in the region, and it has plans to protect them. While much of the paper touts adherence to international law, the world has very little reason to believe China will do so. One example of how China could move to militarize the Arctic is on the back of its seemingly benign fishing fleet. China has stated it has inherent rights to the fish migrating to the Arctic because of its large population. And where China’s fishing fleet goes, militarization will soon follow, as has been demonstrated already by Chinese fishing “militias.”

Conclusion

NATO’s sustained presence and situational awareness are needed to achieve deterrence against both Russia and China while safeguarding maritime security in the Arctic. The first step toward achieving this goal is to increase NATO capability and capacity to operate in the region, centered on a new standing maritime group that is dedicated to the Arctic and separate from NATO’s maritime groups operating elsewhere. This group should be formed by NATO states with Arctic maritime borders and ice-class ships. As NATO becomes the recognized authority for maritime security in the region, de-escalation and even cooperation with Russia could be possible. It is time for NATO to invest in this future, starting with a standing maritime group for the Arctic.

Lieutenant Barnard is serving as a staff operations and plans officer at NATO Maritime Command in Northwood, U.K. He was previously gunnery officer onboard USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and weapons officer onboard USS Firebolt (PC-10), and was recently selected to be a foreign area officer in Europe. He graduated from the University of St. Andrews in Scotland with a master’s in terrorism studies and holds a bachelor’s in political science from Abilene Christian University in Texas. His views are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of Defense, or NATO.

This article by Colin Barnard first appeared at the Center for International Maritime Security on May 15.

Image: U.S. Navy safety swimmers stand on the deck of the Virginia class submarine USS New Hampshire after it surfaced through thin ice during exercises underneath ice in the ArcticOcean north of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska March 19, 2011. REUTERS/Lucas Jackson

Warfare History Network

History, Asia

Many planes were lost to accidents over the steep mountains.

In truth, it really was not a combat operation. For every airplane lost to enemy action, a hundred were destroyed in accidents. Yet the effort to resupply Allied forces in China entirely by air was perhaps the most ambitious effort of World War II.

No other effort—including the amphibious landings on beaches from Casablanca to Normandy and from Guadalcanal to Okinawa—faced so many obstacles; obstacles that had to be overcome to simply keep China in the war and prevent the Japanese from overrunning all of Asia. They were obstacles that are as old as human history: rugged mountains, raging rivers, steaming jungles, violent weather—the very features that dictate how regions are settled, trade routes are developed, and wars are fought. These are the obstacles that ultimately dictate how nations and modern military forces develop. Prior to 1942, these obstacles could have never been scaled. Even then, the cost of surmounting them was extreme.

The actual decision to attempt to resupply China by air is lost to antiquity, although developing events in the spring and summer of 1942 dictated that aerial resupply was the only possible means of getting supplies to a country that by that time had been completely cut off from the sea. By mid-1942 Japanese troops occupied China’s port cities and the southern two-thirds of Burma. The Japanese had cut the Burma Road, and Rangoon had fallen into their hands. Thailand, which lay to the south, was allied with Japan, while Japanese troops occupied French Indochina by proxy from the Germans, who now controlled France. The vast Chinese interior remained under Allied control, but with no suitable roads and all of China’s seaports in Japanese hands, the only means of delivering supplies to the region was by air.

As the first country to experience Japanese aggression, China came to depend on the United States as a valuable ally through the efforts of the American-educated wife of the leader of the Koumintang, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Madame Chiang used her American connections to influence President Franklin D. Roosevelt to provide military supplies and other support to her country. Her brother, T.V. Soong, the head of the China lobby in the United States, made sure that Chinese-Americans did not forget their native land and the many troubles facing it. The Soongs found a ready audience for their message in the evangelical Christian movement in the United States, where China had been a focal point of American missionary efforts for nearly a century.

When war finally came to the United States on December 7, 1941, China immediately took on a strategic importance due to its location in relation to Japan. Although events pushed the massive Asian country to the back burner, Allied planners initially saw China as an avenue from which to take the war to the Japanese homeland. American heavy bombers—Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses and Consolidated B-24 Liberators—could wage a strategic bombing campaign against Japan from air bases in China. In the spring of 1942, the U.S. War Department authorized the establishment of the Tenth Air Force to defend China and begin an aerial offensive against Japan.

Major General Lewis Brereton was transferred from Australia to India to organize an air force that would be made up of a group of heavy bombers, a group of medium bombers, and two groups of pursuit planes, with a troop carrier group to provide air transportation. The famous Doolittle Raid on Japan was actually a part of this plan—18 North American B-25s that had been authorized for China service were diverted by presidential order to make a raid on Japan from an aircraft carrier. The War Department plan called for them to overfly Japan after departing an aircraft carrier in the Pacific, then to proceed on to China. When they got there, the B-25s were expected to form the nucleus of a medium bomber force in China.

It was the impending arrival of the Doolittle force that led to the initial deployment of American transports to India for flights to China. In advance of the raid, 10 Pan American Airways Douglas DC-3 transports operating under contract to the Army Ferry Command were moved from Africa, where they had been supporting British forces, to India. Their mission was to pre-position gasoline and oil at Chinese airfields to service the B-25s when they arrived in China. As it turned out, not a single B-25 arrived intact. The task force was discovered and Doolittle decided to launch the bombers at the limit of their range to even strike Japan. There was little chance that any of them could make China intact. The raid was a propaganda coup for the Roosevelt administration, but the loss of the B-25s and the subsequent capture of the proposed sites for bomber bases destroyed Allied plans for mounting an air campaign against Japan from China in 1942.

Even as the Doolittle raiders were on their way to China aboard the aircraft carrier Hornet, Colonel Caleb V. Haynes was on his way to India via the overland route across Africa and Central Asia with a combined flight of Boeing B-17s and Douglas C-47 transports. Haynes’s force, which was designated as Project Aquilla, was to serve as the nucleus of a heavy bomber force in China. These planes were to join a bombardment group that was being transferred from Australia. (The 7th Bombardment Group had fought in Java and the Philippines—its small force of B-17s and LB-30 and B-24 Liberators had been greatly diminished.)

Another force of B-24s under Colonel Harry Halverson was also planned for China, but its departure from the United States was delayed, and the Halpro force ended up diverting to the Middle East where it would eventually be joined by the Aquilla B-17s. Haynes and his men arrived to discover that the military situation in China had taken a turn for the worse as the Japanese went on the offensive in retaliation for the Doolittle Raid. The planned bomber bases had been overrun, and Japanese forces were advancing into Burma. Haynes and some of his crews gave up their B-17s and were put to work with the C-47s hauling supplies into Burma. As the military situation deteriorated, they evacuated Allied troops from the country.

Unfortunately, the Japanese were successful in both Burma and eastern China, leaving the Allies completely landlocked. Although Chinese forces held the vast interior of the country, the only means of delivering supplies was from India. Even without the threat of enemy action, land delivery was extremely difficult due to the rugged terrain of eastern India and central Burma, but even that possibility was ruled out when Japanese forces cut the Burma Road. With the land routes cut, the only means of delivering supplies to China was by air.

By the spring of 1942, it was apparent that delivering supplies to China was to be a major mission of the Tenth Air Force, the organization the War Department had created for control of air operations in the China-Burma-India Theater. With the loss of the planned bomber bases, China also lost its importance to the strategic plan, but there was one element that dictated that the country could still be important to the Allies.

Chennault’s ‘Flying Tigers’ Evolved into an Air Force Deep in the Chinese Interior

Before the war, retired U.S. Army Captain Claire Chennault had organized an all-volunteer air force staffed by former U.S. military personnel to support China. The American Volunteer Group went into action two weeks after Pearl Harbor and immediately revealed to the world that Japanese air units were not invincible. Chennault’s small force of fighters, known as the Flying Tigers, would evolve into an air force operating deep in the Chinese interior, a force that would tie down Japanese air units in Southeast Asia, preventing some of them from moving to other theaters. Chennault was recalled to active duty as a brigadier general and given command of the China Air Task Force (CATF), a subordinate unit to Tenth Air Force. The CATF would be entirely dependent on airlift for everything it needed to function as a viable combat force.

When it became obvious that air resupply of China would be a major Allied mission in the CBI, the War Department authorized the creation of a special transport unit to move supplies from India to China. In March 1942, Project Ammisca, a special effort consisting of a “ferry” force made up of a hundred recalled Army reservists, mostly active airline pilots, was formed. The reservist pilots reported to the Ferry Command base at Morrison Field, Florida, where they joined enlisted crew chiefs and radio operators. Formed in 1941 to provide crews on temporary duty from the Air Combat Command to ferry U.S.-built aircraft sold under Lend-Lease to the Allies, Ferry Command had no other operational mission.

However, just prior to the war, the command was authorized to contract with the airlines for aircraft and crews to set up a “ferry” of supplies to British forces in North Africa. So, the mission of delivering supplies to China was given to it. The situation became even more complicated when the War Department decided that the “India-China Ferry” should be a Tenth Air Force responsibility. The original plan called for Ammisca to be under the direct control of General Joseph Stilwell, the senior Allied officer in China, but Tenth Air Force commander Brig. Gen. Clayton Bissell naturally believed that if he was to be responsible for the air ferry, all of the assets involved should be under his command.

Ammisca commander Brig. Gen. Robert Olds, an original member of the Ferry Command staff, opposed the transfer, but Bissell’s view won out. When Ammisca arrived in India as the 1st Ferrying Group, it became part of the Tenth Air Force.

There was a third air transportation entity in Asia, one that offered perhaps even more possibilities for success than the 1st Ferrying Group. China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) was a subsidiary of Pan American Airways, which had been established in China in the 1930s. Many of the pilots were former U.S. military fliers—including some who joined the airline after leaving Chennault’s AVG—and they took quickly to air transportation operations in the rugged conditions faced along the routes to China. CNAC would be the prime element in the China Ferry for most of 1942.

Brigadier General Earl Naiden surveyed the route for the Assam-Burma-China Ferry, along with a Trans-India route from Karachi to the Assam Valley, from which supplies bound for China would depart. The most direct and efficient route was across Burma to the airfield at Myitkyina on the Burma-China border, where supplies could be transferred to river barges then to trucks for the remainder of the trip to Chungking and Kunming. But Myitkyina was a strategic target for Japanese forces in Burma, which captured the airfield on May 8, placing the success of the resupply effort to China in doubt.

From Myitkyina, Japanese fighters threatened to control Burmese skies while their bombers were in easy range of the Indian bases from which the airlift was to be mounted. To alleviate the threat to India and reduce Japanese efforts against the air routes to China, the Tenth Air Force made the airfield at Myitkyina its primary target.

The delivery of supplies to China attracted political attention at the highest level of the United States government as President Roosevelt took a personal interest, to the extent that he actually set monthly tonnage goals. Had simply flying supplies into China been the only military consideration in the CBI, the goals might have been met. Unfortunately, Japanese troops were moving westward, forcing the Tenth Air Force to prioritize the use of its forces, with the defense of India becoming primary.

Air transportation was proving to be a major asset to ground operations in the theater, as well as in New Guinea in the Southwest Pacific where Allied forces faced similar obstacles. Military considerations for the defense of India led to frequent diversions of 1st Ferrying Group transports to missions in support of combat operations. Every time a transport was assigned to another mission, one less airplane was available for the China Ferry.

Sinclair’s Scathing Report of the 10th Air Force Accused Them of Having a “Defeatest Attitude” and Lacking a “Singleness of Purpose”

Political interest in the delivery of supplies to China ran high, thanks in no small measure to the interests of the American companies selling war materials to the Chinese. Their representative company was China Defense Supplies, Inc., a corporation that had been formed by Whiting Willauer, a New York lawyer with political connections, to act as a middleman between the Chinese government and the U.S. manufacturers for the delivery of Lend-Lease supplies. Willauer was also instrumental in the formation of the AVG. Payment for materials was contingent on their delivery to Chinese soil, and executives whose companies stood to make millions from the supply effort were not sympathetic to the military problems of the region.

A China Defense Supplies, Inc., representative, one Frank D. Sinclair, who wore the title of “Aviation Technical Advisor” in the company, visited India in the summer of 1942 to observe the airlift. Sinclair, whose background was in the aviation industry and who had airline connections, wrote a scathing report accusing the Tenth Air Force of having “a defeatist attitude” and lacking “singleness of purpose” in regard to the China Ferry. Sinclair’s accusations seem ridiculous today when considering the seriousness of the military situation in eastern India in 1942, which he either failed to grasp or chose to ignore. Nevertheless, the report attracted the attention of the White House. A copy also went to the headquarters of the infant Air Transport Command.

In reality, the effort to deliver supplies to China was proceeding in spite of numerous problems, the most serious of which was the loss of Myitkyina. With the central Burmese airfield no longer available for transshipment, transports were forced to fly all the way to Kunming to deliver their loads, which reduced the efficiency of the transports and the amount of supplies that could be delivered. Furthermore, the threat of interception forced the unarmed transports to fly a more circuitous route, heading north over the eastern reaches of the Himalayas, then turning east to their Chinese destinations. Although the high Himalayas were well to the west, the “foothills” north of the Assam Valley were higher than the American Rockies.

The combination of humid air masses moving north out of the Bay of Bengal and the high mountain elevations produced some of the worst weather conditions in the world—strong winds that made navigation difficult, violent thunderstorms with heavy rain, and severe mountain turbulence that could rip an airplane apart. In the higher elevations the rain turned to ice and snow, which could load the wings and force an airplane into the mountain peaks.

Consideration was given to placing the entire responsibility for the movement of supplies to China on the China National Aviation Corporation, a move that Stilwell opposed. He believed it would be a mistake for U.S. military personnel to be under the control of an organization whose civilian personnel were paid on a much higher scale. Stilwell proposed instead that the CNAC be contracted to the Tenth Air Force, a suggestion accepted by the War Department and by the Chinese government, which owned the airline. The CNAC transports were assigned exclusively to the movement of supplies from Dinjan to China.

The airlift got off to a slower start than the White House wanted, but it was a start nevertheless. The CNAC transports in particular soon established an efficient routine. But the 1st Ferrying Group effort suffered innumerable problems, thanks in part to the diversions of some of its airplanes—one squadron was diverted to the Middle East in June. Only about two-thirds of the group’s assigned airplanes had reached India by mid-1942. Quite a few were involved in accidents during the move while others were diverted to support military operations in Africa and the Middle East. Once they began operations, the transport force was plagued by accidents.

Events in the spring of 1942 eventually affected the China Ferry, although not until late in the year. Lawrence Pogue, the director of the Civil Aeronautics Board, wrote a letter to President Roosevelt expressing his concern that the haphazard awarding of military contracts to the nation’s airlines was detrimental to the future of the industry. Pogue’s solution was the creation of a pseudo-military government-run airline reporting directly to the president, an airline that would function independently of the Departments of War and the Navy.

A second alternative was for the War Department, at least, to set up its own air transportation command to handle airline contracts. A board of military officers was appointed to consider the problem, but before it submitted a solution Army Air Forces commander General Henry “Hap” Arnold took matters into his own hands. On June 20, Arnold issued General Order No. 8, establishing an Army air transportation organization that would be responsible for all air transportation needs except those directly related to combat.

The order took the “air transport” designation that had previously belonged to the groups and squadrons that had been formed to support combat operations and gave it to the new organization. The former air transport units were redesignated as “troop carriers.” The reorganization also transferred the responsibility for issuing military contracts to the airlines from the Air Service Command to the new Air Transport Command.

The Air Transport Command was assigned a dual function, the ferrying of military aircraft, including Lend-Lease aircraft that had been consigned to other nations, from factories to combat units and the transportation of military cargo and passengers. As such, it was divided into two sections, the Ferrying Division and the Air Transportation Division. To staff the new command, the Army drew heavily on the airline industry, which contributed a number of key personnel who were given direct commissions as field grade officers. American Airlines President Cyrus R. Smith was assigned as the chief of staff of the new ATC, initially with the rank of colonel and with the responsibility of organizing and supervising the Air Transport Division.

Both divisions depended heavily on the national airline industry for contract pilots and air crews as well as for former airline personnel to fill military positions. The Air Transport Command also utilized “service pilots,” men with civilian flying experience who were brought directly into the military without undergoing military pilot training. ATC’s Ferrying Division also included a sizable number of female pilots, women with civilian flying experience who were employed in the same manner as male civilian contract pilots with the exception that their activities were confined to North America.

A copy of the Sinclair letter ended up in the hands of ATC Chief of Staff C.R. Smith, who saw and seized an opportunity for his new command and for the airline he managed in civilian life. He elaborated on Sinclair’s complaints to assert that an independent command should be established in the CBI for the sole purpose of delivering supplies to China. Smith proposed that the Air Transport Command “take over” the airlift of supplies to China. His rationale was that since the Air Transport Command was made up of “air transportation professionals,” it would logically be able to produce a better product than the Army’s combat command.

All that would be required, according to Smith, would be support from the theater units in the form of base facilities and the air bases from which the ATC transports would operate. ATC would do the rest. Smith made a powerful case, and his proposal was accepted by General Stilwell. The ATC was to take over the airlift to China on December 1, 1942. Unfortunately, Smith’s proposal was founded to a large degree on wishful thinking, and his command would not only fail—it would fail miserably.

Crews Flying “The Hump” Faced Constant Danger From Enemy Attack and Reduced Aircraft Performance Due to the Rarified Air

The “Hump” that ultimately gave the airlift its name was the Santsung Range, a long ridge that reached 15,000 feet in places and lay between the Salween and Mekong River valleys on the Burma-China border. Fortunately, Allied troops, mostly native Ghurkas and Chinese, held northern Burma, thus affording advance bases for Tenth Air Force fighters charged with protecting the airlift route. Allied fighters and bombers concentrated on Japanese airfields in Central Burma, reducing Japanese fighter capabilities and allowing more direct deliveries from the transport bases in India’s Assam Valley to the destination airfields at Kunming and Chungking.

Even though the threat of enemy air attack was sporadic, the crews flying the Hump faced constant danger, not the least of which was the reduced performance of their aircraft in the rarified air at the airfields themselves. Many of these were located at altitudes several thousand feet above sea level. In six months in 1943, Air Transport Command suffered no less than 134 major accidents on the Hump route, a large number of which occurred during takeoff and landing.

In spite of Smith’s assurances that ATC would increase airlift capabilities over the Hump, tonnage amounts actually declined during the first months after the transfer. The decline came in spite of an increase in the size and perceived capabilities of the airlift force. When ATC took over the Hump operation, it began making plans to add new types of aircraft to replace the Douglas C-47s with which the 1st Ferrying Group was equipped. In early 1943 a contingent of Consolidated C-87 four-engine transports arrived in India. C.R. Smith’s own company, American Airlines, provided the flight crews under contract.

The transport version of the B-24 Liberator bomber, the C-87 promised to increase tonnage capabilities considerably due to its increased payload. However, it failed to live up to initial expectations. The other new type assigned to the Hump operation was the Curtiss C-46 Commando, a large twin-engine airplane capable of carrying a much larger payload than the DC-3 and C-47. But the C-46 was poorly designed, particularly the fuel system, with miles and miles of aluminum and steel tubing that made the airplane a mechanic’s nightmare. Fortunately, modifications to the design turned the C-46 into an adequate transport, although it never lived up to expectations.

Although ATC had promised to increase the airlift tonnage, it would take the India-China Wing another six months to attain the 4,000 tons a month goal it had promised for February 1943. Meanwhile, the White House and War Department were promising tonnage levels twice those that were actually being carried. For example, the goal for September 1943, when tonnage finally exceeded 4,000 tons, was 10,000 tons. The Air Transport Command commander, Maj. Gen. Harold George, passed the buck to the Tenth Air Force, claiming that the India-China Wing was “a relic” of the 1st Ferrying Group that had been transferred to theater command over the protests of the Ferry Command leadership. Such an argument doesn’t hold water. In reality, other units involved in airlifting cargo to China were constantly increasing their capabilities.

By September 1943, the CNAC was averaging 49 tons per airplane per month, while ATC squadrons were only carrying 23—and this in spite of the fact that ATC was equipped with C-87s and C-46s, both of which afforded considerably larger payloads than the CNAC DC-3s. Furthermore, when the 1st and 2nd Troop Carrier Squadrons became operational in India in the spring of 1943, they immediately became far more efficient than ATC. Many of the crews in the two troop carrier squadrons, which were promised to the Tenth Air Force as compensation for the loss of the 1st Ferrying Group, were fresh from training in the United States. Obviously, the problems with the India-China Wing were internal.

Eastern Airlines president and World War I ace Eddie Rickenbacker paid a visit to the CBI in the spring of 1943. With decades of experience in air transportation, Rickenbacker recognized that the real problem with the airlift lay in the command organization. The Air Transport Command was attempting to operate an independent command within a combat zone while expecting to receive priority support from a theater command that was up to its ears in combat operations.

Rickenbacker also noted the lack of suitable airdromes to handle the airlift operation, as well as shortages in weather forecasting, communications, engineering, and maintenance personnel. To Rickenbacker, the only logical solution was to return responsibility for the airlift operation to the Tenth Air Force. Rickenbacker’s views were not shared by those within the military establishment in Washington, especially the leadership of the Air Transport Command. The airlift remained under ATC. The problems continued.

Low morale was a major problem in the ATC units in India, although they were operating under conditions no worse, and perhaps better, than those endured by the combat squadrons. For Americans native to the temperate United States, the heat and humidity of India were a shock. They made life miserable, and they also produced torrential rains that turned the bases into seas of steaming mud. The situation was compounded by the presence of venomous snakes, insects, and vermin of every description.

Another factor unique to ATC personnel that is not discussed in histories of the airlift was the feeling that hauling freight to China was less important than fighting the Germans and Japanese. While the Ammisca pilots were drawn from the ranks of the U.S. airlines, they were also U.S. Army reservists and trained combat pilots. They knew that other reservists had been assigned to the bomber squadrons that were being formed in the United States, often in positions of leadership as flight and squadron commanders. Yet, here they were, pushing freight in unarmed transports in a backwater region of the world.

The lack of the exuberance of youth was also a factor. As a rule, ATC pilots in 1942 and 1943 were considerably older than the young men assigned to the combat squadrons. An older man’s ordeal is often a young man’s adventure. It is worth noting that the efficiency of the airlift began to improve after more and more Army pilots became available for transport duty.

Combat Crews Derided the ATC Crews, Referring to the ATC Acronym as ‘Allergic to Combat’

The Air Transport Command took several steps in an attempt at improving the morale of the airmen assigned to the Hump mission. A major complaint was the poor delivery of mail, so mail was assigned a higher priority in the cargo system. General George convinced the Army Air Forces to authorize the awarding of combat decorations, particularly the Air Medal and Distinguished Flying Cross, to Hump flyers even though the dangers they faced were more from weather conditions and adverse terrain than from an armed enemy. He also obtained a citation for the India-China Wing.

The ATC headquarters encouraged several well-known media representatives to observe command operations, including the Hump airlift. Photographs and articles produced by men such as Ivan Dmitri appeared on the pages of Time, Life, and The Saturday Evening Post. The publicity drew attention to the role of the ATC airmen, but it also led to derision among the combat crews—especially troop carrier personnel—who began referring to the ATC acronym as “allergic to combat” or, in reference to the civilian contract crews, “Association (of) Terrified Civilians.” The hostility toward ATC also reached into the command levels in the combat units, as theater command personnel came to believe that the ATC leadership in Washington was out to build an empire at their expense.

In mid-1943, the Army increased the size and capabilities of the India-China Wing of the ATC more than fivefold, a factor that allowed tonnage levels to finally begin increasing. Additional air bases were placed into service in India’s Assam Valley and in the Chinese interior to handle the vastly increased airlift apparatus. All of the ATC wings were elevated to division status, including the India-China Wing, which became the India-China Division.

In September, Colonel Thomas O. Hardin transferred to the India-China Division to take command of the Hump operation. An airline executive in civilian life, Hardin had a reputation as a hard driver. He was also a practical commander who realized that official policies were often detrimental to mission completion. One of Hardin’s actions was to implement 24-hour-a-day operations on the Hump route, thus greatly increasing the number of flights each day. The additional flights immediately increased tonnage capabilities over the Hump. In December, Hump crews hauled more than 12,000 tons into India. Adverse weather and high terrain made night operations more dangerous, and the accident rate increased.

The ATC leadership realized that an essential ingredient in the success of the airlift was an adequate supply of aircraft and engine parts. General George authorized special weekly flights from the Air Service Command supply depot at Fairfield, Ohio, to India. Four C-87s from the 26th Transport Group began the operation in September, but the mission transferred to the Ferrying Division in November and became known as Fireball. To keep the airplanes moving, crew stage bases were set up along the route. The rapid deliveries of aircraft parts also increased the numbers of available operational airplanes.

Although the threat of enemy interception was real, there were actually very few instances when ATC transports were subjected to enemy air attack. The worst period for the ATC, and other crews flying the Hump, commenced on October 13, 1943, when Japanese fighters operating from forward fields in central Burma attacked Allied aircraft over northern Burma. Two transports, a C-46 and a C-87, were shot down that day along with a CNAC DC-3. A B-24 and two Tenth Air Force C-47s were damaged. The Japanese were in for a surprise when they attacked several armed B-24s that were engaged in transport operations, and paid for their mistake with several losses.

Over the next two weeks two more ATC transports were shot down, and three others were reported missing. Two more transports were shot down in December. These were the only ATC combat losses on the airlift to China. Statistics reveal losses to enemy action of seven transports and 13 crew members during the duration of the Hump Airlift.

Even though losses to enemy action were minimal, Hump airplanes and crews were being lost to accidents at a phenomenal rate. So many wrecks were strewn along the route from Assam to Kunming that some Hump crews began referring to it as “The Aluminum Trail.” Still, the majority of the accidents occurred at the airfields themselves, where the combination of higher elevations and hot temperatures put the transports on the very edge of their operational performance envelope.

The accident rate was particularly high among the four-engine C-87s, no doubt due to the lack of adequate runway lengths for the altitudes involved. The Army had established 6,000 feet as the necessary runway length for a loaded C-87, apparently without taking into consideration the phenomenon known as density altitude. Due to high temperatures, density altitude—the altitude that actually effects an airplane’s performance—is significantly higher than the actual elevation, thus increasing takeoff distance considerably. Climb performance is also drastically affected, meaning that the loss of an engine right after takeoff on a hot day in high terrain was a sign of impending doom. It is reported that accidents during the Hump airlift claimed some 600 transports and the lives of 1,000 airmen.

In the spring of 1944, the capabilities of the ATC Hump airlift force were greatly increased with the arrival of additional C-46s that were dedicated to the support of Matterhorn, a special unit equipped with long-range Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers to begin aerial operations against Japan. The Twentieth Air Force deployed to China as a self-sufficient unit. Several XX Bomber Command B-29s were converted into tankers to transport fuel from India to the advance bases in China from which the Superfortresses would depart on missions against Japan.

The Matterhorn force also included its own transport squadrons equipped with C-87s and a new transport version of the Liberator, the C-109 tanker, which entered service in August. While the C-87 was essentially a B-24 that had been stripped of the features that made it a bomber and equipped with a cargo floor, the C-109 incorporated a system of tanks that could be filled with fuel. Both the C-87 and C-109 were designed so that ground crews could drain extra fuel from their tanks at the Chinese bases. Aviation fuel was the major commodity delivered over the Hump, especially in 1944 and 1945.

Support of the Matterhorn force greatly increased the amount of tonnage being hauled across the Hump by the India-China Division. The division received a bonus when XX Bomber Command agreed to transfer its C-87s and C-109s to the Air Transport Command. When the War Department decided to withdraw the B-29s from China in early 1945, the transports that had been dedicated to their support were incorporated into the Hump airlift. It was largely due to the increase in airlift capability that ATC was able to start exceeding its monthly tonnage goals.

In August 1944, Brig. Gen. William H. Tunner replaced Brig. Gen. Thomas O. Hardin as commander of the India-China Division. Tunner was an ATC veteran whose air transport career dated to his assignment as the personnel officer for the Ferry Command before the war. When the ATC was activated, Tunner was placed in command of the Ferrying Division. One of the first production-oriented officers of the Army Air Forces, Tunner achieved a reputation for organization and safety. The India-China Division set unprecedented records while under Tunner’s command, records for which the general was quick to take credit. Many historians credit Tunner with “turning around” the airlift, and the modern Air Mobility Command considers him to be “the father of Military Airlift.” Such, however, is not the case.

The ATC Effort had Fallen Short of its April Allotment by More Than 4,000 Tons, Causing the Assignment of More Aircraft and Crews and Leading to a Great Deal of Resentment Towards the ATC.

Several factors led to the increase in tonnage being airlifted to China, not the least of which was the capture of the airfield at Myitkyina by Merrill’s Marauders in May 1944. Although the town itself remained in Japanese hands until August, the capture of the airfield had a two-fold benefit for the Hump airlift. It deprived the Japanese of an advanced base for their fighters and afforded the ATC a delivery point from which supplies destined for China could be further delivered by truck and barge.

The reduction in the threat of enemy interception allowed ATC crews bound for China to take a more southerly route over lower and less hostile terrain. The lower altitudes now required for flights into China allowed the introduction of the four-engine Douglas C-54 Skymaster to the airlift. Although the C-54 had proven to be a reliable transport with substantial payload capabilities, its limited high-altitude performance ruled it out for flights over the Hump. The C-54 also had a far better safety record than the C-87, although this was perhaps largely due to the Douglas transport being operated at lower elevations than the Liberator Express. However, it was C-46s, not C-87s, that the C-54s began replacing.

Tunner took command in India just as the size of the India-China Division was greatly increased by the transfer of the XX Bomber Command transports to ATC. The combination of an increased force and shorter routes at lower altitudes from India to China naturally resulted in an increase in the amount of cargo carried.

Although Tunner has been given too much credit for the success of the Hump airlift during its final year, he did implement new maintenance and cargo-handling procedures that improved efficiency. One of his first actions was the introduction of what he called “Production Line Maintenance,” a system under which airplanes were placed on a line not unlike an assembly line over which they moved as various maintenance items were completed. Under previous procedures, a crew of men would complete all required maintenance procedures one airplane at a time.

Tunner’s system allowed more specialization as individual mechanics concentrated on specific tasks. He also applied similar techniques to the processing, handling, and loading of cargo. Due to the increase in size of the airlift force and the decreasing military urgency, Tunner was also able to institute safety policies in an attempt to lower the accident rate.

Tunner also benefited from the Allied successes in Europe and elsewhere in the Pacific Theater. By the time he took over the India-China Division, Allied troops were advancing from the Normandy beachhead and, most important, the air war in Europe had been won. The decreasing demand for replacement pilots in heavy bomber groups made more four-engine pilots, aerial engineers, radio operators, and navigators available for transport duty. The reduced demand for trained aircrews in the combat groups led to a reduction in primary flight training, thus releasing the staffs of the hundreds of primary flight schools for military service.

Tunner and the India-China Division also benefited from decisions made by the Army Air Forces as the war in China began winding down. By the spring of 1945, Burma had been liberated, and the massive troop carrier and combat cargo organization that had been developed to support combat operations in the CBI became available for routine transport operations.

Lieutenant General George Stratameyer, the senior American air officer in the CBI, made another decision that greatly increased ATC capabilities. He and his staff decided that the cost in fuel of conducting heavy bomber operations from bases in China was prohibitive and that the four-engine B-24 Liberators of the 7th and 308th Bombardment Groups would be more productive in transport operations than in tactical operations.

In May, Stratameyer ordered the transfer of the two bombardment groups, the 433rd Troop Carrier Group, and the 3rd and 4th Combat Cargo Groups to the operational control of the India-China Division of the ATC. The transfer was not based solely on efficiency. The ATC effort had fallen short of its April allotment by more than 4,000 tons, and the assignment of more aircraft and crews would boost ATC capabilities.

The transfer met with resentment on the part of the combat personnel, who saw their new assignment as degrading. That they had to undergo a week of training under the supervision of ATC personnel caused further resentment among the bomber and troop carrier crews—all of whom were veterans of months and sometimes years of Hump operations. Ironically, the troop carrier and combat cargo squadrons had been carrying considerably more tonnage across the Hump than ATC. In March 1945, troop carrier and combat cargo transport delivered twice the tonnage transported during the same period by ATC.

The former combat aircrews were now under the control of “Tonnage” Tunner, and the India-China Division commander insisted that the combat crews undergo the same training as newly assigned crews fresh from the United States. In spite of their resentment and subsequent low morale, the bomber and troop carrier/combat cargo crews made a large contribution to the airlift to China through the end of the war. It was only due to their contribution that the India-China Division was able to exceed 50,000 tons a month.

With the end of the war, the requirement for the airlift of supplies to China lessened. The airlift continued, however, until November as Allied forces in China moved into occupied territory formerly held by Japanese troops.

Sam McGowan is himself a pilot. He resides in the Houston, Texas, area.

This article originally appeared on the Warfare History Network.

Image: Wikimedia

Richard Douglas

Technology,

Combining their favored .223 Ranch rifle with their American bolt-action line, Ruger has produced an economy rifle that their customers love.

Whether you’re taking fast shots at predators from the cab of a pick-up or shooting cans off a fence rail from 100 yards out, everybody needs a reliable, accurate, and versatile rifle in their arsenal.

While there are a lot of quality rifles on the market today, like the Barrett Multi-Role Adaptive Design (MRAD) Rifle, not everyone has the budget or needs of an expensive, high-precision gun—a more economical and practical option was called for.

Ruger has once again answered that call. Combining their favored .223 Ranch rifle with their American bolt-action line, Ruger has produced an economy rifle that their customers love. Let’s find out why…

Accuracy 

By all accounts, the American Ranch rifle is as accurate as its Ruger predecessors. The cold hammer-forged barrel is firmly attached to the action via a barrel nut system and V-notch supports, which leaves the barrel free-floating. Even with heavy rounds, there is very little recoil. It can handle a wide array of ammo—from 50 to 77 grain—and keeps shots at about 1 MOA. There aren’t any built-in iron sights, but there’s a picatinny rail mounted to the receiver to accommodate optics. All of this combined with the low-pressure trigger pull adds up to a stable shot and accurate sight picture.

Reliability 

The three-lug bolt is on the left rear of the receiver. The smaller field of movement found with the 70-degree throw (as opposed to a 90-degree throw) allows for the bolt to clear your scope when loading. As far as I can tell the magazine feeds clean and it won't jam up on you. Due to the well-crafted barrel, this gun is capable of shooting over 1,000 rounds of fairly cheap shot without any problems, so it's a great rifle to bring to the range. Ruger makes a simple, reliable, and fast-firing rifle.

Handling 

The American Ranch rifle is versatile and lightweight. The safety is tang-mounted and easy to reach with either hand, and the ambi mag release is located at the rear of the magazine well. The 16 inch barrel allows for quick maneuvering in a tight space, and I like the way the 5-round magazine sits flush with the stock. There’s sling mounts on both ends of the stock, and the barrel is threaded for sound and fire suppressor attachments. The synthetic stock material feels pretty cheap, but it’s not bad for the price. All together, it’s a pretty neat little rifle. It’s fairly small and lightweight, easy to handle, doesn’t have a lot of kick-back, and allows for scope and muzzle attachments.

Trigger 

The trigger on the American Ranch is one of my favorite aspects. The user-adjustable trigger can be set between 3 and 5 pounds and the trigger guard is integrated directly into the stock. Out of the box, the pull is about 4 pounds, so there might be an initial adjustment until you’re comfortable with the pressure.

Magazine & Reloading 

This .223 Remington chambered rifle comes with a detachable, 5-bolt, rotary magazine, but you can use 10 and 20 round mags as well. A major selling point with these rifles is that they accommodate AR15 mags. Reloading is easy. The mag release paddle is located on the rear of the magazine well and is designed for ambidextrous use. Load the magazine, slide the bolt to chamber a round, and fire. Ruger also manufactures this rifle in 5.56x45mm, 7.62x39mm, .300 Blackout, and .450 Bushmaster.

Length & Weight 

With an overall 36 inch length, and a 16.1 inch free-floating barrel, the Ruger American Ranch rifle is pretty compact. It also weighs in at 6 pounds, unloaded, so there isn’t a lot of bulk to contend with. It’s lightweight design makes for a great gun to grab for that quick-shot or to sling over a shoulder for longer treks.

Recoil Management 

With the low comb and smooth trigger pull, the recoil on this rifle is negligible at best, but there is a rubber recoil pad on the butt of the gun for support. The addition of a suppressor will do even more to suppress recoil effects.

Price 

The best part about this rifle is affordability. At around $550.00 suggested retail, it’s a great, cheap, investment for those of you who need a reliable gun on a budget. If you’re budget calls for something less expensive, check out the similar Remington 783 Bolt-Action Rifle.

My Verdict? 

The American Ranch rifle is definitely the “every man’s” rifle we’ve all been waiting for. Its lightweight handling and maneuverability, combined with its compact design allow for a reliable and accurate firearm that anybody would benefit from owning. This durable (and affordable!) rifle is a must-have for anything from target practice to varmint hunting.

Richard Douglas is a firearms expert and educator. His work has appeared in large publications like The Armory Life, Daily Caller, American Shooting Journal, and more. In his free time, he reviews optics on his Scopes Field blog. 

Image: Youtube Screenshot.

Warfare History Network

History, Europe

So what went wrong for the Allies?

Key point: Just because a code is cracked, does not mean enough warning is always given. However, the Nazis were unable to ultimately win that battle anyway.

World War II, being far more fluid than World War I, marked the advent of the mobile radio intercept unit whose task was to pick up, decrypt if possible, and pinpoint enemy units sending their messages through the airways. The U.S. Navy set up intelligence teams on various carriers and command ships soon after the Battle of Midway. The British Army, followed by the U.S. Army, put together similar groups in the North African campaigns. They were called “Wireless Units” by the English, “Signal Radio Intelligence Companies” or “Signal Service Companies” by the U.S. Army, and “Mobile Radio Squadrons” by the U.S. Army Air Force.

In England, late in March 1944 while the English and American armies were feverishly preparing for the invasion of Normandy only two months away, the U.S. Ninth Air Force, whose assignment it was to conduct the tactical air war over the Continent, ordered a Major Harry Turkel to form and train a new unit in time for the invasion.

3rd Radio Squadron Mobile

The new unit’s task was to monitor and intercept German Air Force radio traffic while operating out of mobile caravans designed to keep pace with advancing armies. This new unit was to be aptly named the 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile (“G,” for German).

In order to perform the nearly impossible in so short a time, Turkel was given extraordinary powers to co-opt men from any U.S. unit in the United Kingdom. His long arm even reached back to the States.

I was a product of this levy. In late April 1944 I was among 10 who had trained in German at Michigan State College and were then in a code-breaking class at Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Va. We were suddenly ordered to prepare to leave, within 24 hours, by plane for London to join the 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile (R.S.M.).

Voice-Intercept Operations on the D-Day Invasion

For Detachment “A,” the code-breakers, he was able to find two young and intelligent lieutenants, Mortimer Proctor, Jr. of Proctor, Vt. (son of the governor); and Hugh Davidson, a University of Chicago graduate. They were the only ones in the squadron with previous code-breaking experience, as civilians with the Signal Corps in Washington.

With experienced British officers as teachers, we received hands-on training with real-time German messages at various places throughout southern England. The British proved to be excellent instructors and apparently we were apt pupils. On The D-Day Invasion, a 20-man echelon of Detachment “B” led by Lieutenant Gottlieb was off Omaha Beach and landed on June 9, during which two trucks sank. Their voice-intercept operations started on June 11 at Cricqueville-in-Bessin two miles south of Pointe de Hoc. By the end of the month the balance of Det. “B,” all of Det. “A,” and the nucleus of “C” were all dug-in in adjoining fields. “C” was awaiting the organizing of the XIX Tactical Air Command, to take place when Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s Third Army went into action. This was the only period until the war ended that all detachments were “together.” After the breakout from Normandy, “B” and “C” went with the First and Third Armies respectively and “A” served both 8th Air Force Headquarters and SHAEF.

On the night of July 21 my squadron had a weird experience. The usual German night intruders were overhead trying to drop their mines to interfere with our unloading operations at Omaha Beach, and our usual antiaircraft “Fourth of July” show was in full visual and sonic bloom when suddenly, Corporal Albert Gruber, monitoring his Hallicrafter intercept set, heard a panic-stricken German pilot announce, “I’ve been hit—am losing altitude—must get rid of my load.” Before Gruber had finished writing this down on his message pad he saw a blinding flash in the field adjoining his and seconds later a blast wave knocked him off his chair.

Parachutes From Stricken Aircraft

My detachment (“A”) was in the adjoining field and I was hunkered down in my foxhole watching this Heinkel 111, tail aflame, coming in ever lower and suddenly, in the light of our exploding ack-ack fire, seeing several parachutes drop from the stricken aircraft. These were concussion mines. Some exploded setting off our own thermite grenades, kept on or in the vans to destroy them in case of imminent capture. The pressure wave from the grenades pressed me down in my hole as if an elephant were standing on my back.

About a week later the Allies broke out of their breachead, and within a few days Det. “A” left Normandy via Avranches and set up operations at the small village of Parné-sur-Roc near Laval. Our stay there was marked by a flood of activity because many German units, in retreat, were sending panic messages, some poorly enciphered, a few even “en clair.”

Cracking the Code

It was at Parné on August 13 or 14 that we intercepted a message that I recall playing an important part in breaking. Traffic analysis identified the call sign as being that of a German reconnaissance squadron. Direction finding added that the flight originated from La Spezia in Northern Italy and that the aircraft was flying westerly along the Mediterranean littoral. Armed with this information and the fact that the previous duty shift had already postulated the letter “J” I stared at the message with my mind on idle, until, suddenly, in an intuitive spurt the name of the Corsican port of Ajaccio came to me.

This helped break the entire message and we found that the German plane was reporting on a concentration of Allied landing craft in the harbor of Ajaccio. (They were to be used one or two days later for the landings in Southern France.) Ninth Air Force H.Q. became very excited when they received our break. They bombarded us with all sorts of questions. To this day I am not certain about their reasons: whether they hadn’t been previously informed about the new landings or whether they wanted to know more about what the Germans had observed.

A few days later, as Paris was being liberated, we hastily packed up and raced to Chateau Beaumont, the recently evacuated headquarters of the Luft Funkhorch Regiment West, our counterparts, located in La Celle St. Cloud just west of Paris.

The heated barracks with beds and bath were a far cry from the foxholes of Normandy. And in the Chateau proper the code-breakers occupied the tower rooms with a fireplace and a superb view of Paris down the silver lane of the Seine while the intercept operators set up their equipment in the Grand Ballroom. We stayed at La Celle St. Cloud while our “voice” detachments went on to the Ardennes in Belgium (“B”), East of Nancy (“C”), and the newly formed (“D”) at Fouron St. Pierre on the Belgo-Dutch border.

Tracking the German Anti-Aircraft Guns

During the next several months Det. “A,” still at Chateau Beaumont, monitored and decoded messages as usual. We had many adventures during this time, but at 0415—it was December 16—out of the silence of the night, the radios of Det. “A” came alive with a short but hastily sent message. It was unusual to get such traffic at night. The intercept operator took the message up the stairs to the Tower, where in front of a crackling fire, the midnight-to-0800 shift of code-breakers was on duty.

The cryptanalysts had barely started to work on the message, when, at 0419, a second message, exactly repeating the first, was brought in. Eyebrows were raised. Most unusual. This was the first time in their experience that a message had ever been duplicated. It eliminated the possibility of corruption in the code groups or a decryption error.

We quickly identified the German encryption. It was one of a family of codes we had named after musical composers, an “elgar” used by the Germans to contact their antiaircraft units. It was quickly broken, and we read “… 90 JU 52s and 15 JU 88s going from Paderborn area to area 6˚-6˚ 30´, E to 50˚ 31´-50˚ 45´ and returning by same route.” We plotted the co-ordinates on our maps as between Hofen and Monschau on the Belgo-German border. In the dim light of the tower room, eyebrows went up even higher. JU 52s were transports. JU 88s were versatile aircraft used as bombers, night fighters and occasionally as transports; we thought they would be used as transports. Never had the Germans used 105 transport planes at night.

The consensus was that so many aircraft flying into Allied airspace had to be an airborne-operations parachute drop. Our usual addressees—9th Air Force H.Q. in Luxembourg City, IXth TAC in Verviers, SHAEF at Versailles and A14F (Air Ministry Intelligence, London) were promptly notified, and in traditional fashion we received the standard “QRV”—message received.

At 0549 that morning we received a third message. It canceled the operation. This we also sent on to the higher headquarters.

De-Classification in 1996

Whatever use the Allied commanders made of our decodes remains a matter of conjecture. The fact is that the Germans did make the parachute attack early on the following morning, December 17—instead of the 16th—along the Eupen-Malmedy road having flown over the frontier between Hofen and Monschau. It was the early strike of the massive morning attack of three German armies to turn the tide of the war in the West, and launched what we call the Battle of the Bulge. Fortunately for the Allies, the delays, confusions and outright incompetence connected with German “Operation AUK” (also known as Operation STöSSER) resulted in a catastrophic drop for 1,200 Fallischirmjäger that on a smaller scale was worse than the fate they had suffered in Crete in May of 1941.

Records show that American antiaircraft battalions (possibly informed by 3rd R.S.M.’s alert) took a heavy toll on the German transports that morning. To add insult to injury, many German antiaircraft units, apparently never receiving the messages sent by Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich von Der Heydte, the paratroop commander, shot up and shot down many of their own planes.

The cryptanalysts of detachment “A” as well as various RAF Wireless Units and Hut 3 at Bletchley Park, which apparently also took down some or all of the messages, had to wait until mid-1996, when our National Security Agency finally declassified all the documents. They then learned, “The only advance intelligence of the German offensive received in low-grade air codes was the warning of the parachute landings.”

It is obvious that two hours’ warning is not very much but certainly higher headquarters should have been alerted by this unique message that meant that something more than a local counterattack was afoot.

A Mexican Standoff in Belgium

For the 3rd R.S.M. there was another, even more bizarre aspect to the confusion. Our venerable detachment “B” was encamped astride the Eupen-Malmedy road. Headquarters and the voice interceptors were lodged in the town of Jalhay west of the road but the Direction Finding Vans were located at Baraque Michel and Mt. Rigi, the highest points in Belgium, east of the road. The remnants of von Der Heydte’s parachute force (less than a hundred men) landed right between them.

Major Silverstein, Det. “B”’s commander, had been alerted to “A”’s break of the paratroop message, but only knew what direction the Germans were taking, not how deep into Allied territory they were flying. He was rudely shocked when men of the morning duty shift on December 17 ran in, carrying empty German parachutes they had picked up in the woods near town. When Sergeant Bob Siefert led his crew out to relieve the D/F operators he noticed some men filtering through the trees, but it was the guard in front of one van who cautioned him, whispering that he suspected they were Germans.

A Mexican standoff developed. The Germans were too weak to provoke a battle, and our men, armed only with carbines, were certainly not going to take them on. Major Silverstein, fearing capture and the compromise of our secret operations, contacted IXth tac in nearby Verviers requesting permission to move out immediately. But IXth tac as well as 9th Air force H.Q., were still completely unaware of the extent of the attack and advised him to wait. By day’s end, however, Silverstein took matters into his own hands and ordered “B” to move north and join Det. “D” at Fouron St. Pierre on the Dutch border. It was good that he did so because by that time a German battle group under Joachim Peiper was already threatening to capture Malmedy.

Fading Into History

In the spring of 1945 the 3rd Radio moved into Germany with the various Allied armies. Det. “A” took over a “Kurhaus” and a school (used as barracks) in the little village of Bad Vilbel near Frankfurt-am-Main presumably to be nearer to SHAEF.

When the war ended in May the other detachments eventually all moved in with us. Once the war with Japan was over, the majority of the squadron was sent home. I was discharged the day before Christmas 1945. A skeleton unit, called the 2nd—Radio Squadron under ex-Lt. Maj. Mortimer Proctor stayed on until the spring of 1946, and then it also faded into history. Interestingly, during the Korean War, the 3rd Radio was reconstituted and served for over a year in Alaska monitoring Korean and presumably Russian transmissions.

Originally Published November 21, 2014

This article originally appeared in 2015 on the Warfare History Network.

Image: Wikimedia

JD Work

Security, Asia

Here's a fictional account of how that could happen.

The cheers of the crowd were deafening as the sharp prow of theBaekdusan fast carrier (CVL) slid into the dark waters of the protected basin at Sinpo. The adulation may have even carried some genuine enthusiasm by those caught up in the sight of North Korea’s first aircraft carrier officially launching, mixed in of course with mandatory nationalism under compulsion for fear of “encouragement” by watchful political commissars. The formerMistral-class amphibious assault ship was nearly unrecognizable after more than a decade in the yard, resulting in profound changes to the vessel. These changes go far beyond the superficial difference of the dazzle camouflage paint scheme that replaced the earlier haze gray given to her by the original French builders of Chantiers de l’Atlantique. The oddities of the unusual, algorithmically-derived dark blue pattern were perhaps a fitting metaphor for the long, strange journey that brought this hull to North Korean shores. Bringing a new light carrier into service would be an impressive feat for any naval enterprise, let alone the Korean People’s Navy.

From Egypt to the East Sea of Korea

The complex saga began in the bizarre spring of 2020, as the world reeled under the uncertainties of pandemic. Kim Jong Un had already been in isolation out of fear of the disease, and following a cardiac scare that gained worldwide attention, would emerge even more determined to make his mark upon the global stage through his nation’s military.1 Among these assets would be a stunning set of naval capabilities, built around a ballistic missile submarine (SSB) program and the fleet to protect those boats. During these months, an intrusion attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau by commercial cyber intelligence services was attempting to compromise the networks of a cleared defense contractor in the United Kingdom.2 The incident was part of a long-running cyber espionage activity – known commonly as HIDDEN COBRA, Lazarus, or HERMIT – that targeted individuals associated with high-profile defense acquisition efforts to seek out information related to aviation, shipbuilding, missile development, and other critical capabilities.3

Almost overlooked in the flurry of ever-changing malware and forged documents that furthered these machinations, the UK incident was notable only in that the decoy message repurposed a glossy promotional photo from the UK Royal Navy’s Future Aircraft Carrier program. But while this specific lure was detected and the attempt defeated, it was not the last such attempt. Other efforts would persist and ultimately provide sustained access to the shipbuilder, systems integrators, and strike aviation programs. This espionage not only gave the National Defense Commission insight into the capabilities and deployments of newly introduced systems, but the aggregation of stolen documents, technical information, software code, and problem-solving correspondence allowed various Machine Industry Bureaus to circumvent years of research and development activity. Integrating this espionage haul into an ossified and overly centralized military industry was the work of almost a generation of intelligence officers, scientists, and production managers.

For all the edge that stolen intellectual property could offer, the DPRK’s heavy industry could not muster the resources and expertise to construct a major surface combatant out of nothing. To overcome this deficiency, the Korean Worker’s Party turned to the shadowy entity known informally as Office 39. This group essentially served as the organized crime racketeering function of the North Korean state, tasked with generating the illicit revenue required to keep the country functioning and the Kim family in power under the crushing weight of international sanctions. Its far-flung operations ranged from gold smuggling, drug trafficking, cybercrime and other pursuits on a massive scale.4 It would be Office 39’s access to the proceeds of these continuing criminal enterprises that would fund the operation, laundered through the vast markets of the online videogaming industry and the many quasi-legal virtual gambling ventures launched by the casinos of Macau, Manila, and Hanoi – each desperate for gamblers to replace those driven away by pandemic and the downturn of the mainland Chinese economy.

Office 39 would score its grandest coup to date as the Egyptian state collapsed into yet another endless series of coups that continued to ripple out from the Arab Spring. The regime had long established itself through corrupt relationships with key power figures that increasingly were backed by intelligence advantages offered by compromised Orascom telecommunications networks. The HIDDEN COBRA intrusion set subgroup known commonly as APT37, REAPER, Scarcruft, or RICOCHET CHOLLIMA had enabled an initial foothold in the country’s networks after the collapse of a joint venture between the Egyptian firm and the North Korean Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.5 APT37 / REAPER operators built upon this initial access to develop an unprecedented signals intelligence interception architecture across the backbone of telecom infrastructure in the region. Years later, in the frantic uncertainty before Cairo’s ultimate fall, this combination of insider knowledge and powerful friends would give Office 39 the chance to purchase what was then the nearly unserviceable Mistral-class multipurpose amphibious assault ship, ENS Anwar El Sadat.The LHD was the last surviving vessel of two purchased from France after a Gallic deal with the Russian Navy had fallen through in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.6The Sadat’s sister ship, the Nasser, had been sunk at her higher-profile port in Alexandria by Ikwan saboteurs, and the Sadat was left to rust.

The ripple effects of serial pandemics throughout the 20s would again prove key. The near total collapse of the recreational and luxury cruise industry left hundreds of vessels at sea in makeshift flotillas, crewed by unpaid and increasingly desperate mariners abandoned by corporate headquarters which had rapidly ceased to exist.7 These ungainly, massive ships were unsuitable for merchant commerce, and poor choices as pirate motherships – although many crews tried both just to survive. Eventually, they would be destined for the shipbreakers in order to extract any value that could be salvaged. The ordinary yards of Alang and Chittagong, already under immense pressures over environmental regulation and worker safety, could not accept hulls encumbered by high profile, already years-long bankruptcy litigation – and especially would be unable to pay a master and crew whose only tenuous claim to ownership was mere possession.8

But the great decoupling had also killed many other vessels no longer needed for trade with an increasingly broken Chinese market, and like countless oil tankers and container ships, these hulls would be stripped in the newly emerging breaker yards of Africa. Here, the remnants of Belt and Road Initiative mercantilist outposts still raced to extract any resources that could be used to offset crippling debts to Beijing, heedless of legality or consequence.9 One more sale to one more shell company, paid through a Southeast Asian nation banking institution cutout, passed without notice. The Sadat would sit at anchor for nearly two years at harbor in Nacala, Mozambique; just another hulk among the many waiting to be beached and broken in a forgotten port at the wrong end of a frequently failing rail corridor.

Only commercial imagery satellites recorded when the Sadatvanished from port under cover of darkness, and even despite the high revisit rate of increasingly more capable constellations, some uncertainty would persist over exactly which night it happened. Active interest had long since faded and monitoring was reassigned to mere automated change detection algorithms, which dutifully flagged the discrepancy as being lost in the sea of other low-profile vessel movements. The system, triaged only by a bored Office of Naval Intelligence analyst, who did not speak French, apparently did not pick up on the significance of the type designator BPC (for Bâtiment de Projection et de Commandement) as he might have then tagged the vessel as an LHD. Instead, it was mistaken for one of many legacy British Petroleum entries that had never been corrected following Brexit. The error would prove costly, especially as the KPN prize crew now sailing the Sadat would embark on a route that would take her through the most desolate and empty waters imaginable.

The over 9,000 nautical mile journey would depend heavily upon Office 39’s prior experience conducting illicit transfers at sea, especially for the clandestine movement of oil to keep the Sadat’sbunkers topped up.10 Over nearly three months at sea, a quarter of the crew would perish from accident, malnutrition exacerbated illnesses, and what became an infamous purge responding to what the KPN would describe as a mutinous plot by so-called “wreckers.” The global community further failed to respond effectively when the Sadat was at last spotted approaching Indonesian waters, initially unclear on her destination. The distractions of the Taiwan crisis further delayed consensus for action as she transited east of Hokkaido. A promised interdiction operation by Russian forces from Vladivostok did not materialize when the lead Lider-2 (Project 23780M) class destroyer allegedly suffered an unspecified mechanical failure, reportedly preventing pursuit – an event which remains viewed with much skepticism by international diplomats and navalists alike.11

Outfitting

The ship once called Sadat was transformed in years-long process in the yard at Sinpo. Her flight deck was extended, and featured a new ski-jump ramp that offered a Short Takeoff But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) capability for somewhat limited aircraft weights.12 Her obsolete and degraded onboard networks were refitted with an indigenously developed Red Star operating system.13 Somewhat surprisingly new, Iranian-origin 15 Khordad radars and missile canisters would be integrated for air defense, along with multiple CHT-02D torpedo mounts and small arms weapons stations.14 Concept graphics reported by Chinese defense analyst sources also depicted KN-23 SRBM TELs positioned on the aft deck, possibly intended to mimic the U.S. Marine Corps deployment of HIMARS systems on light amphibious warships, although the North Korean missiles have not been observed to date in handheld imagery of the platform.15

On the day of the Baekdusan’s launch, the pierside static display of light aircraft that would operate from her decks also commanded attention, with the ranks of their future pilots assembled alongside in full Nomex suits and oddly shaped augmented reality flight helmets. The two delta wing fighters, a supposedly navalized variant of the country’s indigenously developed “next generation pursuit assault plane,” had been observed through overhead commercial imagery for years. It was still unclear if the North Korean aircraft industry had produced more than a dozen airframes – nearly half of which had already been lost to mishaps during development.

One of these mishaps had claimed the third aircraft previously intended for display, where the platform was lost during the long road movement from the airstrip at Iwon down to the port in the weeks before the ceremony. Handheld imagery of the mishap had circulated among the country’s elites-only StarMesh social media network, where in virtue signaling posts they condemned the heavy transport truck driver for careless driving. It had just as quickly been censored – but not before being picked up and reported to the world by a sharp-eyed Chinese defense blogger.

The obvious gap in the display arrangement had been hastily filled with a Kimchaek unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). While manned flight operations were still considered the prestige assignment, it was the dark composite of the cranked kite design that brought the Baekdusan its truly operational airwing. A nearly direct two-thirds scale copy of the CASIC CaiHong-7, the stealth platform had been a revolutionary development for DPRK strike capabilities despite its quintessentially 2020s vintage design.16 When fitted with beyond visual range air-to-air missiles, the UCAV could also serve in the combat air patrol (CAP) role, as a pair of Republic of Korea (ROK) KF-X fighters found to their surprise when ambushed near the Northern Limit Line a few years ago. Named for the former Korean People’s Army Air and Anti-Air Force Academy, the Kimchaek UCAV’s resemblance to the Northrup Grumman X-47B demonstrator was a constant reminder of the path not taken by the U.S. Navy. The Kimchaek fighters were also fitted for delivery of autonomous standoff naval mines, using a bolt-on kit of Chinese origin for glide, underwater propulsion, fusing and guidance that could be fitted to low-cost conventional gravity bombs that themselves were well within North Korean production capacities. This too incorporated stolen designs that could be originally traced to cyber espionage against the defense industrial base conducted by Chinese Ministry of State Security operations known as APT40, Periscope, KRYPTONITE PANDA, or GADOLINIUM.17

Implications and Outlook

Baekdusan is in many ways a counter-intuitive platform to Western eyes. The KPN still does not appear to have a genuine strategic requirement for the kind of force projection options that are the traditional role of a carrier or expeditionary strike group. However, to a dictator the investment could be justified solely on its basis as a prestige capability – to say nothing of the propaganda value in continued demonstration to domestic audiences of the Jucheideology of self-reliance. It mirrored the accomplishments of their larger neighbor in acquiring and fielding a modified CV, much as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy managed to convert their purchase of the Varyag heavy aviation cruiser (TAKR) into the fleet’s first carrier, Liaoning.18 But this is likely not the whole story, suggesting both wider ambitions and a new strategic depth to the regime’s ultimate priority: the survival and continued rule of the Kim dynasty.

The Gorae SSB and its successors remain a key linchpin of this priority. These submarines continue to represent a significant wildcard in any potential strategic exchange – despite the relative obsolescence of their design, terrible acoustic profile, and frequent maintenance casualties.19 Even as advances in Western intelligence capabilities, prompt conventional strike options, and other left-of-launch methods increasingly threaten the DPRK mobile missile force, the ability of the Korean People’s Navy to sustain a sea-based second strike delivery platform presents an unknowable challenge to deterrence. This challenge becomes especially salient in the case of an ROK attempt at leadership decapitation, whether due to Pyongyang’s feared bolt out of the blue or Seoul’s anticipated crisis escalation scenarios.

The Baekdusan fast carrier (CVL), or drone carrier (CVLQ) as some would prefer to argue, may instead represent a substantial further investment to protect the Gorae SSB as a second strike retaliation capability, drawing upon older Soviet naval doctrine developed when facing similar correlations of forces and qualitative disadvantages. The bastion model of patrol within confined seas, where access may be controlled via strategic chokepoints or sea denial, may have unexpectedly re-emerged in part as a function of the new time and distance equations that bound the contemporary weapons engagement zone. In this, the DPRK may also be mimicking emerging thinking observed over recurring deployments of the PLAN SSBN force.20 A North Korean carrier provides the option, at least as a matter of doctrine, to delay regional or international naval intervention in order to buy necessary operating space for the survival of the Gorae and her sister boats.

It still remains to be seen if this costly and audacious program will be nothing more than a white elephant. Certainly, the debate is far from finished regarding the limited survivability of a large surface platform like a carrier in the face of contemporary precision guided munitions fires, especially given ever-increasing ranges, loiter times, sensor integration, and autonomy. The remarkable accomplishment of the Baekdusan may be merely reduced to the first flaming datum in a future peninsular conflict.

Still, one cannot help but reflect on what might have been different. The combination of factors that had to line up “just-so” for this carrier to be built was the result of remarkable North Korean tenacity, and no small degree of luck. So many opportunities existed where intervention could have halted Pyongyang’s progress, starting from the earliest cyber espionage campaigns against defense industrial base contractors. But very much like the reaction to early Chinese forays toward a blue water navy in the 1990s, serious people would not take the idea seriously. After all, everyone knew the immense hurdles of building a naval aviation warfare community to operate from a narrow deck at sea. This simply could not be achieved using a rusting hulk headed to the shipbreakers, by the kinds of people more at home in a casino than in a banker’s office or a uniform. Likewise, conventional wisdom demands that serious naval strategists focus on power projection in the open ocean, unencumbered by the distractions of littoral operations in close and confined seas.

But what if they were wrong?

JD Work serves as the Bren Chair for Cyber Conflict and Security at Marine Corps University, and as a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative. He holds additional affiliations with the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and as a senior adviser to the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. He can be found on Twitter @HostileSpectrum. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S. government or other organization.

This article by JD Work first appeared at the Center for International Maritime Security on May 20.

Image: Modified aircraft carrier, Jack Cong.

Image: Modified aircraft carrier. Jack Cong.

Justine Ina Davies, Maria Odland

Health, World

The aim is to prevent the increasing burden that multimorbidity could put on health systems, individuals, families and societies worldwide in the years to come.

With ageing come many benefits, including freedom, wisdom, perspective, and – in many cultures – respect. Unfortunately, the downside is that ageing also brings medical ailments. Many people in wealthy countries have multiple co-existing, chronic conditions. This is known as multimorbidity. In 2016, chronic conditions accounted for over two-thirds of deaths worldwide. Many of these people had more than one condition.

The number of medical conditions that people accrue increases with age. The concept of multimorbidity is well known to healthcare providers in high-income countries where there are large numbers of older people. In poorer parts of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa, populations are younger. The focus of healthcare has been on diseases affecting these younger populations such as infectious diseases and maternal and child ill-health.

But the world is changing. The number of older people in lower income countries is growing. These countries’ health systems are not designed to care for people with chronic conditions. They are more focused on single, acute diseases. This may need to change towards more individual-based health care for chronic conditions. This is why it’s important to establish if multimorbidity is also an issue in lower income countries.

Our work shows that the impact of multimorbidity on individuals living in lower income countries is substantial. This should inform the planning of health system development which will need different medical skills, facilities, policies and resources to care for individuals with multiple chronic conditions in addition to acute single conditions.

Multimorbidity in low-income countries

Previous investments into health challenges in lower income countries are paying off. Fewer women are dying in childbirth, more children are reaching adulthood, and people are living long lives with HIV.

These healthcare successes have conspired positively with increasing country wealth and change in lifestyle and diets to result in life expectancy increasing worldwide, especially in the lower income countries. In fact, by 2050 most of the elderly population will be living in developing countries. But an ageing population means that chronic diseases and multimorbidity will increase.

Multimorbidity in lower income countries has so far been given little attention by researchers. Most research and development funding still goes to infectious diseases and those that predominantly affect mothers and young children.

We recently did a study in Burkina Faso, one of the poorest countries in the world. We found that 20% of people over 40 years of age had multimorbidity – one or more infectious, non-infectious, or mental health conditions.

We also found that the chance of having multiple conditions increased with age, being female, or being unmarried. This is in line with other studies which have shown that increasing age is a risk factor for multimorbidity. People over 60 or 65 years are particularly vulnerable. In addition, research suggests that the combination of mental health conditions and physical conditions is more common among women then men. But more research is needed to map the extent of multimorbidity in different population groups. The evidence is especially low in low-income countries.

In our study, multimorbidity was more common among people with higher socioeconomic status (education and wealth). This differs from what is usually seen in high-income countries, where it is more common among poorer or less educated people. It may be that in lower income countries people who are wealthier can afford the unhealthy lifestyles that lead to multimorbidity.

More troubling, we found that multimorbidity is associated with increased disability, low quality of life, and poor physical performance in Burkina Faso. These are all outcomes that are very important to older people, as they capture health in a broader sense than just assessing medical conditions. We also found that the combination of non-communicable diseases and mental health conditions is particularly negative.

If we found these results in such a poor country, it is highly likely that multimorbidity is a major problem for older people in all parts of the world.

The double burden of disease and the health system

Large improvements have been made in tackling infectious diseases and those that affect younger people. But lower income countries are still struggling with these conditions, in addition to an increasing burden of chronic diseases and multimorbidity. This double burden of disease is overwhelming the health services. This is especially pertinent, given that health services in many developing countries are organised only to handle single conditions, and not to care for patients with multiple chronic conditions.

There’s a lack of health service factors – for example, follow-up systems and availability of doctors or nurses – needed to take care of patients with multimorbidity. There are also patient-side barriers to care – for example, the understanding of chronic conditions and their treatment. These factors culminate in other unpublished findings from our study that fewer than 10% of the people with the chronic conditions of hypertension or diabetes had their conditions adequately managed.

The prevalence of multimorbidity, the fact that conditions are not being adequately treated, and the association with outcomes that matter to patients (quality of life, physical function, and disability) mean that without rapid development of adequate health services to prevent and manage it, multimorbidity will be especially devastating in these settings.

The way forward

Our research from Burkina Faso adds to a growing body of evidence that highlights multimorbidity as a global health issue of major significance. Investments are needed by researchers, development agencies and national governments to prioritise understanding of this emerging global epidemic. The aim is to prevent the increasing burden that multimorbidity could put on health systems, individuals, families and societies worldwide in the years to come.

Justine Ina Davies, Professor of Global Health, Institute for Applied Research, University of Birmingham

​Maria Odland, Research Fellow Global Health, University of Birmingham

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Technology,

Any ideas as to why? We know.

Elon Musk is often seen as either a visionary that will change the world or just the latest billionaire eccentric with crazy ideas. Perhaps the man who seems to evoke not only the lifestyle but also the work ethic of Howard Hughes is a mix of both. What is clear is that he has really good taste in airplanes.

Musk's favorite is the Lockheed Martin SF-71—the legendary U.S. spy plane that could fly three times the speed of sound.

He and his girlfriend, the singer Grimes (real name Claire Elise Boucher), loved the super-fast plane so much that they named their first child after… its predecessor. In a tweet, Grimes explained that the baby boy's name, which is X Æ A-12, comes from a strange combination where X is the unknown variable, Æ is her "elven" spelling of Ai for both love and artificial intelligence, while the A-12 is the precursor to the "SR-17 (sic)."

As Grimes explained, "No weapons, no defenses, just speed. Great in battle, but non-violent."

This does beg the question why the child couldn't have been named X Æ SR-71, but as noted by Grimes' tweet she was confused over exactly what was her favorite aircraft. Moreover, while the SR-71 Blackbird became prominent during the Cold War when it was used primarily for high-altitude surveillance, the A-12 "Oxcart" was actually a faster single-seat version.

The Air Force ordered the larger SR-71 variant as it was deemed superior a "fly off" of the two aircraft. In addition there were fears that Soviet technology was catching up that could render the A-12 Oxcart obsolete.

The two-seater SR-71 Blackbird featured more radar-reflecting surface, which made it less easily detected by enemy anti-aircraft. It could fly at speeds in excess of 2,000 mph, or about three times the speed of sound, and at altitudes that were greater than 80,000 feet. It could cross continents in just a few hours, but it flew so high that pilots navigating by sight couldn't rely on ground features such as roads, but instead needed to look at the mountains, rivers and major coastlines.

When in danger, the pilot could engage the aircraft's afterburners. Simply put, if seen, the SR-71 could outrun rather than out gun anything that came at it.

The futuristic looking plane wasn't without problems however. It required a special fuel, and had to take off with minimum fuel in the tanks and then be refueled once in the air.

Perhaps Musk sees the fuel problem as a non-issue as his Tesla, Inc. has developed electric vehicles and clean energy. Still, naming a child after an airplane still seems like an odd choice—but celebrities have often gone for non-traditional names.

Yet, with respect to Grimes, the A-12 part of the baby's name isn't the only confusing part. Some have noted that the Æ isn't in any way similar to "Ai," but then again neither Grimes nor Musk have actually said how to actually pronounce the child's name. Perhaps it will come down to a case of just calling him, "Elon Musk's and Grimes' son," akin to The Artist Formerly Known As Prince.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Lockheed Martin.

Warfare History Network

History,

The German Death March was truly the March to Nowhere. So how did the POWs try to survive? Read on to find out.

On February 6, 1945, the 10,000 POWs of Stalag Luft IV received their marching orders to move out. They were told it would take several days. It lasted 86, with the men covering nearly 600 miles. Prisoners were pressed onward at a grueling pace. Many soon came down with dysentery, diphtheria, pneumonia, typhus, trench foot, and tuberculosis. Frostbite resulted in the loss of limbs, toes, and fingers.

Major Leslie Caplan, one of the few doctors who endured the death march, recalled, “Some men drank from the ditches that others had used as latrines. Dysentery made bowel movements frequent, bloody, and uncontrollable. Men were forced to sleep on ground covered with feces of those who had passed before them … Our sanitation approached medieval standards, and the inevitable result was disease, suffering, and death.”
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Doctor Caplan tried desperately to get medical supplies from the Germans but was turned down. “I had no stethoscope,” he later wrote, so to examine someone, he “would kneel by the patient, expose his chest, scrape off the lice, then place my ear directly on his chest and listen.”

Often referred to as “luftgangsters” or “terror fliegers,” the air crews of the Allied air forces were not popular among the civilian population who resided in the cities. Many were marked for death if they crashed in an area where the populace was hostile toward them. Some crew members were summarily executed if snared by SS troopers or angry mobs of people for delivering such destruction to their homes.

During the march, however, the farms that dotted the countryside had not been on the receiving end of such destruction. Although it was forbidden to trade with the farmers, many guards ignored the rule and looked the other way, allowing the marchers to barter for food. Items such as watches, rings, cigarette lighters, and even chocolate were given up.

Men had to procure their own food, and there were scant supplies in the war-torn German countryside. Although they could be shot by their guards, the marchers took to stealing farm animals such as pigs and chickens. However, such livestock was scarce. Occasionally some Red Cross packages, if they were not already pilfered by the guards, arrived for them. The hunger became so intense that some POWs started eating uncooked rats they had captured.

Sometimes barns, such as the one Steve Stupak was wounded in, were used to find refuge from the winter weather. Although it was warmer, the lice and fleas were everywhere. Also, animal and human feces, plus the hundreds of unwashed bodies, littered the inside of the structures and made the stench unbearable. Some preferred to remain outside and brave the elements.

It is estimated that 1,300 men perished on the Death March. Carrol F. Dillon, author of A Domain of Heroes, wrote, “No records were kept, hence only a few cases are documented. When the men dropped by the wayside or were sent off somewhere supposedly to a hospital, their buddies never heard from them again. The survivors believe that there were many that died on the Death March. Certainly a much greater number died then we are aware of.”

This article first appeared at the Warfare History Network.

Image: Wikipedia.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Technology,

If you put in the time and do your homework, you don’t necessarily have to overspend. Here are five solid OLED TVs that you can buy right now that are under $2K.

Consider yourself in TV heaven. Via their next-gen tech that utilizes self-emissive pixels, OLED panels offer unrivaled picture quality, accurate colors, deepest blacks and inimitable uniformity and contrast ratios.

Despite all of this visual goodness, if you don’t watch out and control your excitement, you can easily shell out $3K, $4K or more for what is often considered the best TV panel on the planet.

But if you put in the time and do your homework, you don’t necessarily have to overspend. Here are five solid OLED TVs that you can buy right now that are under $2K.

If you want all of your high OLED expectations fulfilled and save some money, look no further than LG’s 55-inch B9 Series. In addition to eye-popping picture quality, this particular TV, which can be had for the bargain-bin price of $1,300, comes with plenty of extra goodies, namely the built-in Amazon Alexa and Apple AirPlay 2. It also boasts Dolby Vision and Dolby Atmos and all of the HDMI 2.1 extras, including eARC, Auto Game Mode and Variable Refresh Rate.

If you are able to come up with another $200, you can upgrade to the 55-inch C9 Series, which features minor improvements in design and processing speeds compared to the B9. If you’re a diehard gamer, perhaps the C9 will be a better fit because it supports FreeSync and G-Sync. As an LG brand, you will also be getting the mostly reliable webOS operating system, which features a pleasant, stripped-down user interface and a decent selection of apps.

No. 3 on the list stays within the LG OLED universe—the 55-inch CX Series. Currently retailing for $1,800, this is another solid option for OLED bargain shoppers out there. Featuring LG’s latest Gen 3 α9 4k processor, you’ll be receiving top-notch upscaling technology, HDR10, HLG and Dolby Vision. In terms of overall picture quality and performance, the CX is a bit like the B9 or C9 on steroids.

Next up is Sony’s 55-Inch 4K OLED HDTV, which can be yours for a reasonable $1,500. Like LG’s OLED panels, the picture quality on this set if pretty remarkable—as you’ll be getting the perfect black levels and unrivaled contrast ratio. The panel’s highly rated response time also works well for today’s graphic-intensive video games and action flicks.

Finally, let’s stick with the Sony A8G OLED and add another 10 inches to it, which puts the price tag right at $2K. That extra screen size in 4K with 8 million hard-working pixels will surely boost your cinema-like experience in your living room. Sony’s Acoustic Surface, X-Reality PRO, IMAX Enhanced, Dolby Vision, Motionflow XR, Google Home and Alexa compatibility and other awesome perks will definitely make you feel like you got a steal on this OLED TV.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek and Arirang TV. He currently resides in Minneapolis.

Sebastien Roblin

Security, Asia

It's one of the world's most dangerous nuclear hotspots.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Despite diverging political agendas on the Indian subcontinent, there should be a common interest in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the likelihood of nuclear war. Growing arsenals in India and Pakistan serve to increase the catastrophic human cost of a potential conflict between the too, without evidently decreasing the frequency of inflammatory episodes of violence that spike tensions between the nuclear-armed states.

While the United States is preoccupied by the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of potential adversaries such as Russia, China or North Korea, the danger of nuclear conflict may actually be greatest between two of its allies, Pakistan and India. The two nations have engaged in four wars starting since their partition along religious lines in 1947. A fifth could be drastically more costly, as their nuclear capabilities continue to grow and diversify.

Several years ago I made the acquaintance of a Pakistani nuclear science student in China. Curious about the thinking behind his country’s nuclear program, I asked if he really believed there was a possibility that India would invade Pakistan. “There’s still a lot of old-school thinkers in the Congress Party that believe India and Pakistan should be united,” he told me.

I doubt there are many observers outside of Pakistan who believe India is plotting to invade and occupy the Muslim state, but a feeling of existential enmity persists. The third conflict between the two countries in 1971 established India’s superiority in conventional warfare—not unexpectedly, as India has several times Pakistan’s population.

The bone of contention has always been the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. At the time of partition, the predominantly Muslim state was politically divided over which nation to join. When Pakistani-allied tribesmen attempted to force the issue, the Hindu maharaja of the region chose to accede to India, leading to the first war between India and Pakistan. Ever since, the line of control between the Indian and Pakistan side has remained bitterly contested, with artillery and sniper fire routinely exchanged. Pakistan intelligence services have infiltrated insurgents and plotted attacks across the border for decades, and Indian security troops have been implicated in human-rights violations and killings of the locals as a result of their counterinsurgency operations.

Pakistan does have to fear the potential of an Indian counterstrike intended to retaliate for a terrorist attack by Pakistani-aligned groups, such as the killing of 166 in Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2008 or the attack on Indian parliament in 2001 by Jaish-e-Muhammad. In both cases, the attackers had ties with Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, and Islamabad has shown limited willingness or ability to crack down on these groups. Complicating matters, civilian control of the military is far from consolidated in Pakistan, and it would be quite possible for ISI or some other agency to carry out such activities on its own initiative without the knowledge or support of the head of state.

India’s military has formulated a “Cold Start” doctrine to enable its forward-deployed land forces to launch an armored assault into Pakistani territory on short notice in response to a perceived provocation from Islamabad. This new strategy was devised after the Indian Army’s armored strike corps took three weeks to deploy to the border after the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, by which time Pakistan had already mobilized its own troops.

Islamabad sees nuclear weapons as its deterrent against a conventional attack, and Cold Start in particular. This is demonstrated by its refusal to adhere to a “No First Use” policy. Pakistan has an extensive plutonium production capacity, and is estimated to possess 130 to 140 warheads, a total that may easily increase to 220 to 250 in a decade, according to a report by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

Many of the new weapons are smaller, short-range tactical weapons intended for targeting frontline troops. To enable a second-strike capability, Pakistan has also empowered local commanders to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes in case the chain of command is disrupted.

While battlefield nuclear weapons are less likely to cause the mass civilian casualties that a strike against a densely populated city would produce, they are deeply worrying in their own way: a state may be more tempted to employ tactical nuclear weapons, and perceive doing so as being intrinsically less risky. However, many simulations of nuclear war suggest that tactical-nuclear-weapon usage rapidly escalates to strategic weapons.

Furthermore, tactical nuclear weapons are necessarily more dispersed, and thus less secure than those stationed in permanent facilities. These issues led the U.S. Army to at first reorganize its tactical nuclear forces in the 1960s, and largely abandon them after the end of the Cold War.

Pakistan fields nearly a dozen different types of missiles to facilitate this strategy, developed with Chinese and North Korean assistance. Ground based tactical systems include the Hatf I, an unguided ground-based rocket with a range of one hundred kilometers, and the Nasr Hatf IX, which can be mounted on mobile quad-launchers. Longer reach is provided by Ghauri II and Shaheen II medium-range ballistic missiles, which can strike targets up to around 1,600 and 2,500 kilometers, respectively.

The Pakistani Air Force’s American-made F-16 fighters are also believed to have been modified to deploy nuclear weapons. The older F-16As and Bs of the Thirty-Eighth Fighter Wing and the newer Cs and Ds of the Thirty-Ninth are both believed to be based near nuclear-weapon storage facilities. The PAF’s five squadrons of Mirage IIIs, based in Karachi and Shorkot, meanwhile, have been modified to launch the domestically-produced Ra’ad nuclear Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), with a range of 350 kilometers. New JF-17 fighters jointly produced with China are also thought to be capable of carrying the Ra’ad ALCM.

The Pakistani Navy lacks a nuclear strike capability, but appears interested in acquiring one. In January of this year, it released a video claiming to show a test launch of a Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile. The domestically produced Babur is similar to the Tomahawk, and designed to approach its target at low altitude to avoid detection. Pakistan already possesses land-based TEL vehicles to deploy the nuclear-capable weapon.

Reflecting its superior conventional abilities, India does adhere to a “No First Use” nuclear weapons policy. Its security posture is also complicated by long lasting tensions with China, dating back to a border war in 1962 in which Beijing seized territory in the Himalayas. Today, China is closely allied economically and militarily with Pakistan, and even has a naval base in Gwadar as part of a strategy to envelop India. India, by contrast, continues to receive much of its weaponry from Russia, but does not enjoy the same kind of military alliance. It has instead dramatically expanded civilian nuclear cooperation with the United States and other nations in the last decades.

India possesses a smaller number of nuclear weapons, estimated in 2015 to range between ninety and 120. However, New Delhi recently acquired a full nuclear triad of air-, land- and sea-based nuclear platforms when it deployed its first home-produced nuclear-powered submarine, the INS Arihant. The Arihant is capable of launching a dozen K-15 Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, these are limited to a range of 750 kilometers, and are thus incapable of reaching the major inland cities of Pakistan or China, a shortcoming India is attempting to address with new K-4 missiles, derived form the land-based Agni-III. New Delhi intends to produce three more nuclear submarines over the years, while Pakistan is considering building one of their own.

India’s chief nuclear arm is thought to lay in its Mirage 2000H and Jaguar fighter-bombers, which can carry nuclear gravity bombs. In 2016, India signed a contract for thirty-six nuclear-capable fourth-generation Rafale fighters from France, further enhancing its aerial striking power. India has also modified its Su-30 fighter-bombers to carry the BrahMos cruise missiles with a range of five hundred kilometers. These could theoretically carry nuclear warheads, though none are believed to have been so equipped so far.

India also has its own array of ground-based nuclear ballistic missiles. The most numerous are slow-firing Prithvi short-range ballistic missiles. Twenty mobile Agni-1 ballistic missiles with a range of seven hundred kilometers are also deployed along the border with Pakistan, while ten heavier Agni-II systems with a range of two thousand kilometers are situated in the northwest for potential strikes on China. India also possesses a small number of rapid-deploying Agni III missiles with a range of 3,500 kilometers, and is developing an Agni IV MRBM and Agni VI ICBM with sufficient range to hit Chinese cities on the Pacific coast.

If there is any silver lining to this steady escalation in nuclear firepower, it’s that neither India nor Pakistan appears to possess chemical or biological weapons. (India completed the destruction of its stock of mustard gas in 2009.) However, the potential for catastrophic loss of human life if nuclear warheads rain down on the cities of the Indian subcontinent is self-evident.

Indian prime minister Narendra Modi and Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif showed goodwill in a surprise meeting in 2015. Unfortunately, neither state appears capable of shaking out of its intractable pattern of conflict, driven by domestic political forces, which makes diplomatic accommodation difficult. The struggle for Kashmir occupies an important part of Pakistani national identity, and there has yet to be a civilian head of state in Islamabad with the will and authority to bring an end to cross-border infiltration and support for terrorist or insurgent fighters. For its part, the Indian Army has failed to respect local Kashmiri leaders and significantly improve its human-rights record.

In 2016 the killing of Kashmiri militant Burhan Wani led to an outbreak of domestic civil unrest in Kashmir that resulted in dozens of civilian deaths. After attackers killed seventeen Indian Army troops in Uri on September 18, the Indian army launched a cross-border raid under murky circumstances ten days later, followed by heavy exchanges of artillery and sniper fire in October and November that killed or injured dozens of civilians and soldiers on both sides of the Line of Control.

The United States sits awkwardly astride the two states. During the Cold War, the United States tilted in favor of Pakistan due to India’s good relations with the Soviet Union. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, against the advice of the State Department, even dispatched a carrier task force in a futile attempt to dissuade India from its support of Bengali independence fighters. However, in recent decades, U.S. diplomacy has moved gradually in favor of democratic India, both due to its potential as a future superpower and its role as a counterbalance to Chinese influence. The role played by President Clinton in helping negotiate the end of the Kargil conflict in 1999 stood as a key turning point in the region—and marked one of the most dangerous confrontations in recent history, as it two nuclear-armed states were at risk of entering into full-scale conflict.

U.S. relations with Pakistan, meanwhile, have worsened despite a continuing flow of American arms for the Pakistani military. This mutual distrust is due to the presence of Islamic militant groups on Pakistani soil and U.S. drone strikes targeting them. Washington and Islamabad have genuinely diverging interests in regards to Afghanistan, the latter desiring to control Afghanistan out of fear that it might otherwise fall under Indian influence. Pakistan, however, can fall back on its relations with China if the U.S. alliance collapses, leading to a complicated diplomatic balancing act.

Despite diverging political agendas on the Indian subcontinent, there should be a common interest in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the likelihood of nuclear war. Growing arsenals in India and Pakistan serve to increase the catastrophic human cost of a potential conflict between the too, without evidently decreasing the frequency of inflammatory episodes of violence that spike tensions between the nuclear-armed states.

India and Pakistan will of course retain their nuclear arms, and continue to see them as vital deterrents to attack. However, for such policies to remain tenable in the long run, the longtime adversaries must seek to bring an end to a pattern of recurring conflict that is entering its seventh decade this year.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This piece was originally featured in March 2017 and is being republished due to reader's interest.

Image: Reuters

Hanif Sufizada

Security, Middle East

Could COVID-19 make decades of carnage even worse?

After the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, and then spreading to many parts of the country and more than one hundred locations around the world, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared coronavirus a pandemic.

According to statistics released by the end of this date, the virus has spread to almost every corner of the world and infected almost 5,000,000 people, of which over 300,000 have died and around 1,800,000 have recovered. It has been speculated by many medical professionals that the actual total death rate is much higher due to people dying at home, the inability to test everyone, and deaths attributed to other illnesses not linked to the disease. Coronavirus spread quickly in European countries, especially Italy and Spain. Likewise, it spread quickly in the Middle East hitting Iran, Pakistan, India, and of course, Pakistan.

Because of declining demand in world markets due to the pandemic, many companies have been shutting down, leading to unprecedented levels of unemployment around the world-amounting to 36.5 million in the United States according to the U.S. Department of Labor. It looks like the situation will not become normal anytime soon. The private sector, especially non-financial corporations, has also resorted to borrowing. The UN and World Bank have mentioned that we will witness a sharp decline in economic activity around the world in the first half of this year, and continue for many months thereafter.

The Afghan Economic Impact

From January 1 to April 11, nearly 243,000 people crossed back into Afghanistan from Iran, according to the International Organization for Migration. Iran has been hit hard by coronavirus with it causing a major blow to its already shaky economy. But the influx of returnees, without a clear coronavirus diagnosis, brought serious threats with them to Afghanistan, which the current government, embroiled in a political crisis and negotiations with the Taliban, may not be able to address on its own. Recently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan helped nearly 91,486 Afghans stranded in different countries to return home. This included 70,000 people from Pakistan, 13,600 from the UAE, 5,400 from India, 2,000 from Turkey, 300 from Qatar, and 186 people from Kazakhstan. Also, 634 inmates from different countries were released and helped return to Afghanistan. According to the Ministry of Public Health of Afghanistan on May 19, 7,653 positive cases of the coronavirus have been reported so far, with Kabul (2,231 cases) and Herat (1,286 cases) ranking first and second, respectively. Of these, 178 people have died and about 850 have been recovered so far. But people are skeptical of the Ministry of Public Health's statistics.

Afghanistan is currently running short of sufficient resources and equipment to cope with the outbreak of the coronavirus. The virus cannot only cause a health crisis in Afghanistan, but also an economic crisis. The pandemic has shaken the world economy. However, the people of Afghanistan have not been serious about flattening the curve.

The serious economic consequences that can be expected from the coronavirus include:

The unprecedented decline in business activity. Coronavirus will further damage business activities, especially the small and medium enterprises which make 80 percent of Afghan businesses. Like other countries where firms have been shut down, here in Afghanistan, national and international flights have been suspended indefinitely. Other manufacturing and service companies have also halted their operations or completely shut down. The pandemic could further damage informal businesses because they neither have insurance nor access to bank loans. If the coronavirus spread worsens within Afghanistan, it will have a detrimental effect on market supply and demand. A decline in business activity will further slow economic growth and reduce government revenue. A recent study conducted by Biruni Institute concluded that, due to sluggish activity, the Afghan economy will contract by 3.3 percent at least in their moderate scenario and 9.9 percent in an acute coronavirus scenario. In addition, the $1 billion reduction in U.S. aid to Afghanistan is expected to take a heavy toll on the already fledgling economy.

Increased food prices. Afghanistan is an import-driven economy, with more than 80 percent of its food imported from other countries. With the spread of the coronavirus in neighboring nations such as Pakistan and Iran, imports may decrease as these countries become aware of their own domestic consumption. UN Food and Agriculture Organization senior economists and agricultural analysts have warned that lockdowns and high food purchases may increase global food inflation. Despite a large supply of cereals and oilseeds by major exporters, the hoarding of commodity items by large importers such as big companies and governments is enough to create a crisis. That is why, in just the first month into the outbreak, Kabul witnessed a dramatic increase in the price of food, especially flour. The authorities, thankfully, intervened in a timely manner and took measures to prevent a dramatic increase in food prices around the country. Prior to the news of the coronavirus outbreak, the price of 50 kg of flour was up to 1,400 Afghanis ($19), but in just one day the price of 50 kg of flour skyrocketed between 1,900 ($25) to 2,500 Afghanis or $33, forcing some people to buy food at a high price. Afghanistan has strategic reserves in twenty-two provinces with a capacity of 263,000 metric tons of food, but currently, it has 20,212 metric tons of wheat in its stock. It is noteworthy that India has also pledged to provide 75,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan. In April, India shipped the first consignment of 5,022 metric tons of wheat to Afghanistan to ensure food security during these trying times.

The Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) has announced that it can merely afford to distribute food for three months from the national strategic reserve. According to MAIL, six million tons of wheat are needed annually, of which four million and five hundred thousand tons are harvested and about two million tons of wheat is imported from the neighboring countries. But last year, Afghanistan imported $656 million worth of flour and wheat from the neighboring countries. In late April 2020, President Ashraf Ghani announced a bread distribution program to take place initially in Kabul, Balkh, Herat, Kunduz, Nangarhar, and Kandahar. The government has now decided to extend the program to the remaining twenty-eight provinces of the country to help the needy and stabilize prices. 

Rising unemployment. In 2019, the unemployment rate in Afghanistan was about 1.52 percent according to the World Bank. If on the one hand, the current political crisis and peace talks with the Taliban remain unresolved, and on the other, the number of people infected with the virus grows exponentially, I am afraid the unemployment rate in the country will increase dramatically. The National Union of Afghanistan Workers & Employees said last week that approximately two million workers and employees have lost their jobs due to the spread of the coronavirus and preventive measures like the lockdowns in the cities. The Ministry of Economy warned earlier that unemployment in Afghanistan will increase by 40 percent and poverty will increase by 70 percent because of unemployment and the spread of the coronavirus. And seeing that informal businesses account for 80 percent of the country's economic activity, quarantining cities will further increase unemployment thus aggravating the economic constraints.

A Big Blow to Exporters. Afghanistan mainly exports fruits to countries such as India, Pakistan, and others. If the coronavirus situation worsens, Afghanistan's exports may see an unprecedented decline due to border closures. Transport restrictions, such as the restrictions on international air travel, will also cause serious damage to the already struggling economy. The coronavirus will dramatically influence the country’s exporting strategy, especially with new standards in the food and agriculture sector. Pakistan had closed its border with Afghanistan but announced in April that it would open the two border crossing points thrice a week to facilitate the entrance of cargo trucks and containers into Afghanistan. On May 17, Pakistan decided to open its border crossings—Torkham in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Chaman in Balochistan—for six days a week to facilitate cross-border trade.

Recommendation to the Afghan government

1. Serious Enforcement of the Anti-Hoarding Law. To prevent commercial opportunism in the free market system that prevails in Afghanistan, Articles 800 and 801 as well as Articles 900 to 905 of the Afghan Penal Code considers hoarding a crime. Since hoarding disrupts the economic order of society, the Afghan government must act seriously in accordance with the provisions of the law. Merchants and shopkeepers must work shoulder-to-shoulder with the government. Last month, food markets in Kabul saw a large influx of people, but fears and threats of the coronavirus and the need for people to hoard food resulting in profiteering. In the fight against the coronavirus pandemic, the government must act more seriously and businessmen must be fair.

2. Strengthen Strategic Grain Reserves. Over the past decade, Afghanistan has twice experienced severe shortages of wheat due to declining production and the threat of wheat supply from the region's export markets. As a result, large numbers of Afghans, especially those living in rural and remote areas, have faced a shortage of wheat. The government these days needs to increase its strategic reserves. The government must import more flour from countries that it has good trade relations with and can easily transit import, and export with Afghan traders before the spread of the virus is uncontrollable.

3. Increase Investment in the Health Sector. Afghanistan's public health sector is weak in general, which makes its population vulnerable to the rapid spread of the coronavirus. Currently, there are only two coronavirus testing labs with a total capacity of nearly 2,000 tests per day. There are four in Kabul (National Public Health Lab, National Veterinary Lab, Afghan-Japan Hospital, and Military Hospital), and one each in Herat, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Balkh, Paktya, and Kunduz. A new one-hundred-bed coronavirus hospital is now open in Herat. The Afghan-Japan hospital initially could not conduct even a hundred tests per day when it started operations. Now it can do at least six hundred tests per day, which is still not sufficient given the alarming number of people at risk.

Additionally, health workers are more prone to the virus. According to Public Health officials, more than 350 medical staff have been infected with the virus. This may put serious pressure on the health system, which will ultimately cause adverse economic effects in the country. In the absence of the necessary health facilities and adequate health workers, the increasing number of deaths will cause more damage to the workforce, and companies and small and large entrepreneurs will be harmed.

4. Quarantine Affected Cities and Create a Safety Net. The government should create a stronger safety net with the cooperation of international organizations and distribute food and other basic necessities to the people. And if it is in the power of the government, it should help the people with the distribution of cash via assistance programs. Although this may seem impractical, it will help the government save the country. How much is a human life worth? To prevent the rapid spread of the coronavirus, the government should have mandated compulsory quarantine in areas most exposed to the coronavirus much earlier. Still, people are very indifferent to lockdowns. Only recently, hundreds of people were out in the city doing their Eid shopping despite the fact that the government extended lockdown measures until May 25 across the country.

5. Support the Private Sector. Since small and large domestic businesses will be affected by the pandemic, the government should assist them with tax exemptions or subsidies. As the coronavirus spreads, private investors are likely to leave the country, which would be a major blow to the economic cycle. In order to ensure that there is no disruption in the food supply chain and other basic necessities of the citizens, the customs tariffs, especially the tariffs imposed on foodstuffs or raw foodstuffs, should be reduced or be put at zero.

6. Handle Financial Markets Disruption. The Central Bank of Afghanistan, as it is sensitive to the risks of banks in developed countries, must be prepared to respond to the turmoil in the financial markets. To restore financial stability and boost growth, it may need to reduce interest rates and inject liquidity. It is worth mentioning that with the global infection of coronavirus, the issue of transmission of this virus through coins and paper money has also been considered. Afghanistan is a country where cash is still a common mode of financial transactions. The WHO announced on its website that it has not yet conducted a specific study on the rate at which viruses can be transmitted through banknotes and coins, but in general coronavirus can survive for several days on various types of surfaces. The organization strongly recommends that people use electronic money transfer tools as much as possible and wash their hands thoroughly if they come in contact with banknotes and coins. Therefore, the Afghan government should make sure to inform people that they should wash their hands, including after handling money—especially if they are eating or touching food. The government may also explore ways to collect old money from the market.

7. Observe Strict Transparency in International Aid. The international community has so far pledged over $600 million to Afghanistan to help the country in its fight against coronavirus. Of that amount, $100 million was provided by the World Bank, 117 million euros were pledged by the EU, $50 million was pledged by the Asian Development Bank, $35 million was promised by the United States, and $220 million in loans were granted by the International Monetary Fund. Other countries such as China, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and the Czech Republic also provided material aid—in many cases in the form of medical equipment. The government needs to undertake transparent management and spending of the aid money.

Afghanistan’s Future

Now that Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani have signed a power-sharing deal, they should pay serious attention to addressing the coronavirus crisis in the country besides prompting entry into intra-Afghan negotiations with the Taliban, who are hampering and harming the coronavirus efforts across the country. The United States on the other hand should also act more fairly in helping Afghanistan at this difficult time of the crisis. A serious effort by the Afghan government, the United States, and the Taliban will not only help Afghanistan to avoid a major human catastrophe, but also salvage its nascent economy from the coronavirus pandemic storm.

Hanif Sufizada is a former Director of Private Sector Development at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock in Afghanistan. Currently, he manages higher educational programs at the Center for Afghanistan Studies at University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Image: Reuters