Diplomacy & Crisis News

As the COVID-19 pandemic gathers pace, people worldwide are “being left behind – or pushed even further behind”, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warned on Friday. 

The new U.S. president believes in the legitimacy of American power. Does the rest of the world?

One year after the world declared borders shut, there is still no plan to reduce the toll on millions of lives.

The Biden administration wants to downgrade the region. Here are the countries he can ignore—and the ones he can’t.

A long-awaited intelligence report comes as Biden reassesses the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia.

A 2-century-old Indian Chinese community is threatened by tensions between the two countries.

False realities have been part of the U.S. political scene for decades.

As the democratically elected leader of Myanmar, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is still in detention following the military takeover that triggered country-wide protests, violence and arrests, the UN envoy for the country observed on Friday, declaring that “democratic processes have been pushed aside”. 

Alors que la ministre de l'enseignement supérieur entend purger l'université de l'« islamo-gauchisme », le projet de loi « confortant le respect des principes de la République » prévoit d'instaurer un contrôle idéologique des associations. Dans cette entreprise d'élimination des pensées qui le dérangent, (...) / Histoire, France, Associations, Société civile, Droit, Justice, Défense, Violence, Mouvement de contestation, Politique, Répression, État - 2021/03

Des communistes, des anarchistes et même des militants d'extrême droite : depuis un siècle et demi, nombreux sont ceux qui revendiquent l'héritage de la Commune de Paris. Cette bataille mémorielle s'est parfois jouée sur les murs, à coups de graffitis et d'affiches, dessinant un imaginaire de (...) / France, Mouvement de contestation, Socialisme, Politique, Socialisme libertaire, Répression, Histoire, Communisme, Art, Ville - 2021/03

This article is the English version of : Clément Beaune, « L’Europe, par delà le COVID-19 », published in Politique étrangère, Vol. 85, Issue 3, 2020.

A few weeks after the groundbreaking budget agreement adopted by the European Council on July 21, 2020, it would be tempting to say that COVID-19 changed everything in the European Union (EU), in line with the oft-repeated principle: “It takes a crisis for Europe to act.” Like all clichés, there is some truth in this statement. The EU’s shared debt plan is the most important boost to European integration since the euro, and a step that would have been impossible without this crisis. This major progress owes, in large part, to a less obvious dynamic—the return of a golden triangle, which had not made such an impact since the early 1990s—the French-German partnership and an ambitious European Commission.

The EU must also address that citizens’ expectations regarding Europe have increased, which has long been underestimated. They criticize it less for interfering with national competences than for its failure to act on shared challenges. In the past, it was migration; now it is health, from the lack of harmonized quarantine measures to shared research on a vaccine. Nowadays, citizens expect Europe to take action, and criticize it when it does not act sufficiently, acts too late, or fails to act.
The COVID-19 crisis has also shown that the EU’s effectiveness seems linked to its competences: it is responsive in the economic sphere (suspension of budgetary rules or state aid, large-scale monetary support), largely powerless in coordinating border restrictions, and practically nonexistent in terms of the core health aspect of the crisis…

Read the rest of the article here.

>>> More articles of Politique étrangère are available for reading
on Cairn International <<<

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Auteur de quelques-uns des meilleurs films politiques des dernières décennies — en particulier « La Bombe » et « Punishment Park » —, le cinéaste britannique Peter Watkins vient d'achever, en France, le tournage de « La Commune ». Fidèle à son style de narration, il nous propose une sorte de documentaire (...) / Cinéma, Communisme, Politique, Histoire, Ville - 2000/03

/ Commerce international, Économie, Libéralisme, Mondialisation, Accord international, Monde - Relations internationales / Commerce international, Économie, Libéralisme, Mondialisation, Accord international, Monde - Relations internationales

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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver 2020-2021 de Politique étrangère (n° 4/2020). Hans Stark, ancien secrétaire général du Cerfa à l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Joachim Lange et Henrik Uterwedde, Frankreich und Deustchland: Yin und Yang der EU-Reform  (Nomos Verlag, 2019, 200 pages).

Le 18 mai 2020, le gouvernement allemand provoquait une surprise générale en annonçant avec son partenaire français un plan de relance de 500 milliards d’euros, empruntés par l’Union européenne (UE). Avec cette initiative, partiellement diluée au Conseil européen du mois de juillet, l’Allemagne acceptait le principe d’une mutualisation des dettes européennes – même si elle soulignait par la suite qu’il s’agissait d’une mesure exceptionnelle rendue nécessaire par le contexte de la crise sanitaire et la crise économique qu’elle a déclenchée. Pourtant, s’il s’agit bien d’un véritable tournant dans la politique allemande en matière de gouvernance de la zone euro, il ne s’explique évidemment pas par la seule crise sanitaire.

Pour comprendre le cheminement du gouvernement fédéral, mais aussi le rapprochement, lent mais constant des positions françaises et allemandes depuis le sommet de Meseberg de juin 2018, l’ouvrage de Joachim Lange et de Henrik Uterwedde tombe à point nommé. Réunissant les analyses croisées de neuf économistes allemands et français, il analyse la politique économique des deux pays sous l’angle de l’évolution de la zone euro depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir d’Emmanuel Macron, en trois parties : les propositions de réformes économiques de Macron et les réponses allemandes ; Paris et Berlin face à la zone euro dix ans après la crise de la dette souveraine ; au-delà d’Emmanuel Macron : les réformes dont la zone euro a besoin.

Il ressort de ce plan que les différences structurelles entre les politiques et les performances économiques des deux pays forment certes le cadre général dans lequel évolue l’économie de l’UE dans son ensemble, mais que ces différences, qui s’accentuent, menacent dans le même temps les fondements du marché unique, et donc de la zone euro. Cet avertissement ressort clairement des contributions de Henrik Uterwedde, Rémy Lallement et Martin Hallet, qui passent chacun à la loupe, et donc avec une précision chirurgicale fort peu complaisante, l’évolution économique de nos deux pays.

S’ils critiquent les aléas des politiques de réforme économique en France, et notamment les concessions faites à ceux qui y résistent, les auteurs se montrent tout aussi sévères à l’égard des postulats ordo-libéraux allemands. Michael Thöne revendique ainsi une programmation financière plus audacieuse dans le cadre l’UE, tandis que Christian Kastrop, Frédéric Petit et Birgit Honé réclament des réformes plus ambitieuses, qu’ils détaillent dans leurs analyses.

L’ouvrage mérite clairement une traduction en français, qui pourrait aller de pair avec une actualisation tenant compte des événements de 2020. Il en ressort que les économistes allemands sont conscients des risques que le décrochage économique et les divergences idéologiques entre les 19 (et surtout entre Paris et Berlin) font peser sur le projet européen. En témoignent le retournement allemand face au financement de l’UE, mais aussi les prises d’initiative d’Ursula Von der Leyen. Cet ouvrage, en conclusion, permet de comprendre un changement de paradigme.

Hans Stark

>> S’abonner à Politique étrangère <<

Crimes impunis, déficit extérieur colossal, chômage de masse… le patronage de l'Union européenne n'a pas permis au Kosovo de décoller, et des affaires de corruption entachent la mission internationale visant à instaurer un Etat de droit. / Balkans, Europe, Kosovo, Criminalité, Guérilla, Information, (...) / Balkans, Europe, Kosovo, Criminalité, Guérilla, Information, Justice, Médias, Presse, Corruption, Indépendance - 2015/06

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En octobre 1990, la Ligue musulmane mondiale Rabitah tenta de créer un consensus international en faveur de la coalition américano-saoudienne contre l'Irak. Aux Etats-Unis, cet effort se porta notamment en direction des Noirs musulmans. Cherchant à contrecarrer le mouvement d'opposition à la (...) / Islam, Afro-Américains - 1993/02

Robert Farley

Security, Americas

The Cold War saw radical shifts in the balance between fighters and bombers.

Here's What You Need to Know:

As the Cold War opened, fighters and bombers both underwent a transformation.

For instance, Jet engines and the airframes that could handle them transformed both kinds of aircraft. Just as important, the development of nuclear weapons radically increased the lethality of bombers, giving a single plane as much or more killing power than a fleet.

The Cold War saw radical, violent shifts in the balance between fighters and bombers. It also saw the emergence of unmanned missiles, which in different configurations could either kill or replace bombers. Nevertheless, both the Soviets and the Americans continued to invest in both kinds of aircraft, all the way until the fall of the Berlin Wall, and beyond.

Korea:

The first test of bombers would come in Korea. The B-29 Superfortress entered service in the last two years of World War II, but because of ineffective Japanese air defenses and a lack of aviation fuel, was never really tested against the best fighters of the day. Indeed, most Japanese successes against the Superfortress came in the form of ramming tactics, which were obviously unsustainable. For the sake of convenience, the Soviets adopted the same bomber; the Tu-4, a near exact copy of the B-29 (12,000 lbs of bombs at medium altitude, maximum speed 350 mph), meaning that the superpowers depended on the same bomber in the early years of the Cold War.

The ultimate test for the B-29 came over Korea, where it first encountered a modern jet interceptor. The MiG-15 was a hundred miles faster than the Me-262, with twice the thrust-weight ratio and three times the rate of climb. With relatively predictable approach-paths to North Korea targets, Communist MiG-15s enjoyed plentiful hunting against B-29 formations, even when the latter had fighter escort. Some two dozen B-29s were lost to air-to-air combat, at which point the USAF shifted to night-bombing tactics, just as it had during World War II.

The newly-minted United States Air Force had other bombers, including the gigantic B-36 Peacemaker. While the B-36 could carry a heavier load and travel farther than the B-29 (nearly 4,000 miles with a load of 70,000 lbs, and a maximum speed of over 400 mph), no one believed that it could survive in the face of concerted fighter opposition. Indeed, General Curtis Lemay kept the B-36 as far away from Korea as possible for specifically this reason. The USAF even developed a scheme to attach a parasite fighter to the B-36, which would (ineffectually) have tried to fight off Soviet interceptors. On the upside, the B-36 could carry a hydrogen bomb, meaning that not terribly many needed to get through in order to have a major impact on Soviet attitudes.

Jet Bombers vs. Jet Interceptors:

The Soviets and the Americans dove into a race between bombers and interceptors even before the guns of the Korean War had fallen silent. The bomber-obsessed USAF developed the B-47 Stratojet, capable of carrying 25000 lbs of bombs at a speed over 600 mph. It followed this up with the legendary B-52 Stratofortress, which could carry 70000 lbs of bombs over 4000 miles with a maximum speed of 650 mph. The Soviets developed the Tu-16 “Badger,” capable of 650 mph with a 20000 lbs bomb load, and the Tu-95 “Bear,” a massive turboprop-driven plane with a speed of 500 plus mph and a payload of some 24000 lbs.

Developments on the interceptor side followed. Vulnerable to enemy attack for the first time in a long while, the Americans adopted a range of interceptors capable of catching and killing Soviet bombers before they could unleash their payloads. The Soviets, paranoid about the security of their vast airspace, did the same. The rapid rate of technological change in the 1950s meant that many designs were obsolete before they left the drawing board, but by the mid-1960s most of the major fighter producers had settled upon a basic template. There were many interceptors, ranging from the Convair F-106 Delta Dart to the English Electric Lightning to the Saab Draken to the Soviet Su-15 to the ill-fated CF-105 Avro Arrow. All of them tended to max out with speeds around 1500 mph, generally carried substantial radar suites, and had long ranges to cover considerable ground in a hurry. They also carried air-to-air missiles designed to kill their large prey at range (sometimes armed with nuclear warheads).

The next generation of jet bombers would have equaled the interceptors in speed and high altitude performance, but fate intervened. The majestic B-70 Valkyrie had a top speed more than Mach 3 and inspired the Soviet T-4, an aircraft with similar performance. Fortunately or not, by the time the B-70 was ready for production, it had become apparent that surface-to-air missiles and fast interceptors were making high altitude penetration missions suicidal. The XB-70 was canceled, and the Mach 2-capable B-58 “Hustler” retired early. For their part, the Soviets responded to the threat of the B-70 by developing the MiG-25 “Foxbat,” an interceptor that could exceed Mach 2.8 and that carried long-range air-to-air missiles.

Rise of the Fighter-Bomber, and the Diversification of Roles:

But the day of the fighter-bomber was also arriving. Since World War I, the trade-off between heavy, long-range bombers and light, short-range fighters was reasonably well-understood. The high-performance bombers of the interwar period, and the use of a few bomber-type aircraft in night-fighter configuration notwithstanding, fighters enjoyed advantages in speed and maneuverability that made them lethal to bombers, while bombers could carry heavy loads to distant targets.

Fighters had always operated in an attack role, even in World War I. But over time, fighters carried ever-greater payloads of munitions. In the early years of the Vietnam War, the F-105 Thunderchief (nicknamed “Thud”) took on the workhorse bomber role in Rolling Thunder. It could carry 14000 lbs of bombs at Mach 2, although it lacked maneuverability. The North Vietnamese hunted Thuds with the MiG-17 and MiG-21, the latter itself capable of Mach 2 flight.

Bombers did have some advantages; even though they couldn’t run faster than fighters, they could run farther, which could be enough to escape a pursuer. Bombers were also large enough to carry sophisticated electronic warfare equipment, capable of jamming or disorienting the radars on pursuing fighters. The B-52 survived as a low altitude penetration bomber and continued to operate as a conventional bomber over Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Bombers also survived by diversifying. The Soviets developed the Tu-95 into the Tu-142, a long-range sub-hunting plane. They designed the Tu-22M “Backfire” bomber to hunt American aircraft carriers with long-range cruise missiles. The Americans responded to the cruise missile threat with the F-14 Tomcat, a long-range, fast, carrier-borne interceptor with beyond visual range missiles.

The last two generations of bombers began to come into service in the 1980s. They represented a division of effort. On the one hand, the B-1B “Lancer” and the Soviet Tu-160 combined supersonic speeds with low-level penetration capabilities. On the other, the B-2 “Spirit” took advantage of developments in stealth technology to evade radar, missiles, and interceptors. All of these bombers are also capable of traditional conventional bombing and have been pressed into those missions in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

Final Bombs:

A single F-15E Strike Eagle can carry a load as heavy as forty-six Gotha IV bombers, larger than any one of the raids that the terrified London in the First World War. The same aircraft can carry as much ordnance as almost five B-17s, and reach its targets considerably faster. With precision-guidance, those munitions can have a much greater impact on military and civilian targets. The F-15 can do all of that, and yet remains a formidable air-to-air fighter.

And yet the biggest air forces continue to buy big bombers. The United States recently placed an order for one hundred B-21 “Raider” stealth bombers. Russia and China have also ordered new stealth bombers, although the ability of the former to complete the project remains in question. The success of the latter depends to a great extent on how well China can integrate stolen technology, as well as develop workable engines. In short, big planes still confer big advantages for air forces interested in strike capabilities. But fighters, whether of the legacy or the stealth variety, will continue to pose a major obstacle for any bomber trying to reach its target.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is the author of The Battleship Book. The views expressed here are his personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, the Army War College, or any other department or agency of the U.S. government.

This article first appeared in 2018.

Image: Wikimedia Commons