Diplomacy & Crisis News

Revenant à Chypre vingt-deux ans, presque jour pour jour, après les « événements », le voyageur ne peut qu'être frappé par les changements notables intervenus depuis. Le coup d'Etat avorté du 15 juillet 1974 contre Mgr Makarios, alors président de la République, n'est plus qu'un mauvais souvenir. Le chef (...) / Chypre, Grèce, Turquie, Conflit, Politique, Méditerranée, Mer Égée - 1996/10

/ Proche-Orient, Palestine (Jérusalem), Palestine, Colonisation, Israël - Proche-Orient / Proche-Orient, Palestine (Jérusalem), Palestine, Colonisation, Israël - Proche-Orient

Au cours des années 80, le gouvernement japonais a décidé de faire de l'aide publique au développement (APD) une priorité nationale. 1988 fut à cet égard une année décisive quand le premier ministre de l'époque, M. Takeshita Noboru, prit l'engagement de faire du Japon le premier contributeur mondial en (...) / Japon, Aide au développement - 1991/10

The history and politics of post-Soviet Belarus and Ukraine are very different. The current Belarusian transformation could be leading to results similar to those of the 2018 Velvet Revolution in Armenia, rather than to those of the 2013–2014 Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. Yet, Moscow’s pathological imperialism towards Russia’s Eastern Slavic “brother nations” may mean that the future of Belarus will be more similar to that of Ukraine than currently appears to be the case. First published on “Utrikesmagasinet.”

Ukraine and Belarus are two of the culturally closest nations of Europe. Their Eastern Slavic languages, major Christian-Orthodox сhurches, and locations between Russia on the one side, and the EU as well as NATO on the other, are comparable and intertwined. Both are, on one level, very close to the also largely Orthodox and Eastern Slavic Russians. Yet, the Ukrainians and Belarusians are, as post-colonial people, on another level, fundamentally different from post- and neo-imperial Russians whose international ambitions are partly more similar to those of today’s Turks and Chinese.

While some Ukrainian fringe groups harbor irredentist dreams towards southern Russia’s Kuban region, hegemonic transborder pretenses can be found neither in Ukrainian nor in Belarusian mainstream political discourses. Ukrainians and Belarusians are – unlike many Russians, Hungarians or Serbs – territorially saturated people. In spite of these and other substantive and structural resemblances between Belarus and Ukraine, most commentators – whether Western, Russian, Belarusian or Ukrainian – today emphasize the differences rather than similarities between the two brother nations. “Belarus is NOT Ukraine!” is the core message of many politicians and experts in recent comments on the ongoing electoral uprising in Minsk.

Differences between Belarus and Ukraine

Indeed, the Belarusians have a pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet history that is distinct from that of the Ukrainians. Belarusian nationalism during the Tsarist period was much weaker than Ukrainian liberationism and ethno-centrism – an important dissimilarity still relevant today. The Belarusian diaspora during the Cold War was less organized and active than the far more visible Ukrainian émigré communities of Western Europe and North America. Last but not least, the new Belarusian state has – unlike the Ukrainian one – participated in several of Russia’s various neo-imperial organizational schemes after 1991.

Above all, Belarus was a co-founder of the two principal organizations holding together Moscow’s hegemonic realm on the territory of the former Tsarist and Soviet empires today. Minsk stood at the roots of the so-called Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russia-dominated sort of “Warsaw Pact 2.0.” The CSTO was, hardly by accident, founded on Putin’s 50th birthday, in then Communist Party-ruled Moldova, on 7 October 2002.

Belarus was also a founding member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) whose initial trilateral treaty was signed by Moscow, Minsk and Astana in the midst of the Kremlin’s escalation of its hybrid war against Ukraine, on 29 May 2014. A Moscow-directed pseudo-copy of the EU, the EEU has taken over considerable national prerogatives, in such fields as trade and production regulation, from its member states. The EEU is today the major vehicle for the Kremlin’s promotion of Russia as an independent global “pole” in a supposedly multi-polar world. Belarus is important for the Kremlin’s geopolitical mirage as it is the only country that provides the EEU with an, in terms of geography, exclusively European element (Armenia is culturally European, yet geographically Asian).    

Moreover, Belarus signed on 8 December 1999 – exactly eight years after conclusion of the Belovezh Accords that had dissolved the USSR – a Treaty on the Foundation of a Union State with Russia. Soon this historical document was fully ratified by both countries. Yet, the Union Treaty has paradoxically not led to the emergence of a new political union so far. In spite of the appearance of certain institutional trappings, the Russian-Belarusian Union State exists only on paper.

Nothing even remotely similar has ever been the official policy of Kyiv. Contrary to frequent misperception, Kyiv has been more or less pro-European under almost all of its leaders since 1991 – and not merely under its loudly pro-Western presidents Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010) and Petro Poroshenko (2014–2019). With a presidential decree, Kyiv declared full EU membership as an official aim already in 1998. The Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), Ukraine’s unicameral parliament, wrote the aim of accession to the EU and NATO into Ukraine’s National Security Law in 2003, and into the Ukrainian Constitution in 2019. The conclusion of an Association Agreement with Brussels in 2014 is seen, in Kyiv, as a fundamentally insufficient arrangement. The Association Agreement is understood by many Ukrainians as being merely a step towards full membership in the EU.

These are some of the facets that mark Ukraine and Belarus as different geopolitical entities in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the closest post-Soviet equivalent to the Belarus case appears to be Armenia which looks similar in terms of its links to Russia and recent history. Like Belarus, Armenia is a member of the CSTO and EEU as well economically tied to Russia. While Minsk is Moscow’s closest partner in East-Central Europe, Armenia is the most pro-Russian country in the Southern Caucasus. Moreover, in 2018, Armenia experienced an electoral uprising that is not dissimilar to Belarus’s in 2020. Like the recent protests in Belarus, the Armenian Velvet Revolution had no geopolitical dimensions, and led merely to the replacement of an old-style politician with a new reformist leader. The ousted Armenian leader Serzh Sargsian and Aliaksandr Lukashenka were born only two months apart, in 1954. The new Armenian leadership under Nikol Pashinian has been following an internally reformist and externally conservative course.

Pashinian’s combination of domestic reforms with foreign continuity is similar to the current discourse in and around Belarus. Preserving close ties to Moscow while resetting a petrified political system is what is expected from, and intended by, the Coordination Council of the Belarus opposition. The relatively stable development in Armenia since the change of power in Yerevan in 2018 appears to be Belarus’s future to expect after Lukashenka’s departure. What many observers foresee, prefer and advise today with regard to Belarus is, in a way, a repetition of Armenia’s rather than Ukraine’s post-revolutionary path.

Why Belarus’s transition may become different from Armenia’s

Yet, things may be not as easy it seems, at first glance, for the future of the Belarusian regime change. Not only is the 2020 ouster of Lukashenka turning out to be far more challenging than the relatively quick and peaceful disposal of his age-mate Sargsian in 2018. The stance of Russian imperialism vis-à-vis Belarusian nationalism is more complicated than Moscow’s relatively simple hegemon-client relationship with Yerevan. Armenia could conduct a Velvet Revolution under slogans of national pride, dignity and freedom without stirring up larger emotions in Moscow, as long as Yerevan had no plans to leave the EEU and CSTO.

The 2020 use of ethno-national symbols and rhetoric in Belarus, in contrast, is more irritating for imperial nationalists in Russia than Armenians’ celebrations of their nationhood had been in 2018. Belarusian nationalism has a more pronounced European dimension and is geographically closer to the core of Europe than Armenian nationalism. A citizen of Belarus who identifies her- or himself as an ethnic or political Belarusian rather than in pan-national Eastern Slavic terms will tend to see the people of Belarus as, above all, belonging to Europe. That could, in principle, be unproblematic vis-à-vis Moscow as long as Russians too define themselves as first and foremost as Europeans.

Yet “Eurasia”, rather than merely Eastern Europe, is the name that Moscow chose in 2015 for the transnational realm that it claims to be the center of, and even for the continent it is located in. One wonders how much nationally awakened Belarusians will be willing to follow the Kremlin in this demarcation of a unique civilizational realm distinct from EU and the West. If the Russians insist on being Eurasians rather than Europeans, that could be unproblematic for some Armenians who, given their geographical location, may be willing to embrace such a mixed definition of their identity. Yet, a nationally aware Belarusian may have problems to accept belonging to a larger cultural “Eurasian” collective rather than the familiar European civilization.

Moreover, the geopolitical ambition of the Kremlin with regard to Eastern Slavic nations is different from that concerning Southern Caucasian people – a lesson that Ukrainians have bitterly learnt since 2014. Moscow is today satisfied with Yerevan’s continuance in the EEU and CSTO. Yet, with regard to Russia’s Western border, many in Moscow are still dreaming of a Belarusian-Russian political unification (as well as of various expansionist forays into Ukraine). To be sure, this pan-Slavic vision of Russian imperialists has also been surprisingly popular within Belarus, until recently. Yet, the current celebration of Belarusian nationhood, people’s power and individual freedom that the anti-Lukashenka protests have triggered are changing public perceptions of state-society relations in Belarus, by the day.

The liberationist pathos of the 2020 protests is posing a double conceptual problem for a future realization of the Belarusian-Russian union. One is on the structural level, as it is clear not least to Belarusians themselves that a Russian-Belarusian union will not be a merger of equals. The entire population of Belarus is only slightly larger than that of greater Moscow.

The protesters today insist on the popular sovereignty of the Belarusian political nation. One way they express this is with a national flag which is not the Belarusian state’s official banner. Today’s protesters in Belarus are thus, in some ways, more radical than the Ukrainian 2004 and 2013–2014 revolutionaries who used the official Ukrainian national flag (apart from numerous party banners) as the main non-partisan visual marker symbolizing their fight for popular sovereignty. Will Belarusians, after their exhausting protests, agree to belong to a union state with a different banner than the one they have used, and with its power center in Moscow rather than Minsk?

The second conceptual problem lies in the similarities of Lukashenka’s and Putin’s political regimes and economies. Many Belarusian may be happy, in principal, to enter a union with Russia. But a Russia that is ruled by another long-term president who is even older than the hated Lukashenka and that has a political system rather similar to Lukashenka’s may be unattractive also for Belarusian russophiles. That will be even more so if Russia’s economy remains hampered by deep structural problems and accumulating foreign sanctions.

Armenians may also have second thoughts about their economy’s integration with Russia’s. Yet Yerevan’s alliance with Moscow is more geopolitical than geoeconomic. Rather than economic interest, the prime kit holding the Armenian-Russian alliance together is Yerevan’s engagement in a risky territorial conflict with Baku over Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh region. There is – at least, on the surface – no comparable geostrategic imperative making Minsk dependent on Moscow. Instead, the Belarusian economy’s orientation towards Russia’s markets and energy have been the prime movers of integration between the two countries. Yet, what happens if the Russian markets for Belarusian commodities continue to shrink, and if the world price for fossil energy resources remains low?

Conclusions

Certainly, Belarus is not Ukraine. But it is also not Armenia. Such assertions may sound trivial or even ridiculous. However, the practical implications of the latter claim have grave repercussions for the geopolitics of Eastern Europe. If Belarus cannot easily follow Armenia’s post-revolutionary conciliatory path: Which exact way is it going to go? If the modern Belarusian nation emerging from the protests is defining itself as European rather than Eurasian: What implications has this, for instance, for Belarus’s continuance in the Eurasian Economic Union?

If post-revolutionary Belarusian nationalism is unsuitable for submission to a Russian-Belarusian union state: What will the Kremlin’s opinion on, and way to deal with, such a problem be? The presumed real winner of the August 2020 Belarusian presidential elections Svetlana Tykhanovskaia confirmed in an interview that Crimea legally belongs to Ukraine. She thereby manifestly violated Putin’s 2020 Constitution that explicitly forbids any questioning of the integrity of Russia’s territory to which, according to the Russian Constitution, Crimea belongs. How will this and many other ideological differences between the modern outlook of the Belarusian opposition, on the one side, and the neo-imperial worldview of Russia’s current leadership, on the other, be reconciled? And what will Moscow decide to do, if it comes to the conclusion that these contradictions cannot be diplomatically resolved?

In the worst case, Belarus’s fate may become more similar to Ukraine’s than the two nations’ very different modern histories and international embeddedness suggest. As long as irredentism and revanchism remain major determinants of Russian foreign political behavior, the principal distinctions between Ukrainian and Belarusian national self-identification and foreign orientation may be too small to make a notable difference for Moscow. Post-revolutionary Belarus may, from the Kremlin’s viewpoint, have to submit to a Russia-dominated union state and to accept its belonging to Eurasia rather than Europe. If not, the greater moderation of Belarusian protesters in comparison to Ukrainian revolutionaries may be of little consequence for Moscow.

The continuing friendliness of today’s Belarusians towards Russia, during and after the protests, may be insufficient to compensate for their dangerously growing lack of submissiveness. Unless Russia itself and especially her foreign outlook changes soon and deeply, Russian-Belarusian may be heading for a showdown. Perhaps, the best chance for a post-Lukashenka Belarus to avoid a fate similar to that of post-Yanukovych Ukraine is a major political transition in Russia. Not merely would Putin have to be replaced, , but also the Putinist domestic regime and foreign doctrine. A principal international reorientation in Moscow and a Russian retreat from neo-imperialist projects could mean that Belarus will, after all, be similar to Ukraine. If allowed to follow the geopolitical path of Kyiv, Minsk will likely also turn towards the West rather than continue its traditional pro-Russian path.

Dix-septième chambre du tribunal de Bobigny, novembre 2005 : une pluie de condamnations tombe sur les jeunes des cités populaires ; les protagonistes de l'embrasement des banlieues sont pris dans le filet pénal. Durant les quinze premiers jours du mois, pas moins de 115 d'entre eux sont présentés (...) / France, Criminalité, Jeunes, Banlieue - 2006/11 Dégâts et débats

Deux mois d'élections ont fait resurgir un groupe social dont les responsables politiques et les commentateurs ne soupçonnaient plus l'existence : « les ouvriers ». Simultanément, ces scrutins paraissent avoir signé la disparition, dans ce qui tient lieu de débat politique, de la question de la (...) / France, Politique - 2002/07

The effects of Covid will likely been seen in the economic collapse of many businesses in the autumn. While most societies have organised themselves to some degree to handle any future waves of the virus, the commercial effect will likely start to show signs of a deteriorating economy over the fall and winter months. Smaller and medium sized businesses may bare the brunt of the losses as they often have less of a cushion, still are dedicated to cover the costs of rent and utilities towards governments that have surprisingly given little breaks to those companies and smaller property owners, and are often working using credit through their banks or other means. Since the 2008 economic crisis little had been done in the banking industry to ween smaller companies off lines of credit coming from banks and financial institutions, and when that dependency turns into an immediate recall of operating funds, many businesses folded in 2008. It will certainly occur again in 2020.

When asked, many people say that their first act after any lock-down will be to take a vacation. Many in country or regional trips have taken place as it is less risk to individuals healthwise and to their funds if a trip is cancelled due to an outbreak. Many who had trips planned before Covid have been unable to get their funds back from their airline, as consumer protection laws were rapidly adjusted so that airlines did not have to refund postponed or delayed flights. This left consumers who normally had protections on their payments without recourse, as when the governments adjusted the laws in favour of the companies, consumers suffered. The logic behind not having an airliner or other large business refund all of the customers at once is to keep those companies solvent to perhaps apply the service or refund at a later date, and preserve the company and the jobs of their employees.

While smaller businesses are often dependent on credit from banks in order to operate, larger companies often have the pull and can hire dedicated people to improve their financial standing in a country. While the travel industry is aching to return, the airliners themselves may hinder further growth. Airlines often operate with little profit margins, as leasing aircraft, changes in international fuel prices, insurance and little profit from the fare on each seat eats greatly into their industry’s gains. Like many smaller businesses, credit has been used extensively in the airline industry to keep them afloat. With the effects of Covid, the airline industry has really be put on a leash as losses very rapidly took over profits in a very short time. Due to the amount of credit depended upon and small profit margins, even national carriers are hanging by a thread. For years, each time I would enter the court house in my country, our national carrier was in bankruptcy hearings constantly, and this was the case on every occasion. This was the best case scenario, in the best of times. It is likely the case that the longer effects of Covid on the economy will open any cracks in our systems and it is important that time and money are not wasted if jobs will be available in the future. Most of these positions will not return if the opportunity is squandered.

C'est une des dates les plus noires de l'histoire de la gauche au XXe siècle : il y a trente ans, le 11 septembre 1973, le putsch de la junte présidée par le général Augusto Pinochet mettait un terme, dans un bain de sang, à trois années d'une expérience sans précédent. Pour la bourgeoisie chilienne (...) / Chili, Amérique latine, Socialisme, Coup d'État, Histoire, Politique - 2003/09

En 2050, le nombre de Japonais devrait avoir diminué de plus de trente et un millions par rapport à l'an 2000. Du jamais-vu dans un pays développé. Classiquement, l'Archipel choisit de retarder les départs à la retraite tout en misant sur la consommation. / Japon, Démographie, Économie, Entreprise, (...) / Japon, Démographie, Économie, Entreprise, Finance, Logement, Protection sociale, Santé, Société, Technologies de l'information, Technologie, Travail, Retraites - 2013/06

Si les Etats-Unis sont les premiers à dénoncer la corruption et l'argent sale quand ils veulent clouer au pilori un gouvernement qui ne leur plaît pas, ils restent très discrets quand il s'agit d'un pouvoir ami ou d'un Etat assurant leur approvisionnement énergétique. C'est ainsi que la banque (...) / Afrique, Amérique latine, Chili, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Criminalité financière, Banque, Finance, Guinée-Équatoriale, Dictature, Corruption - 2005/08 Le temps des utopistes

Decoupling from China would scotch the best hope for preventing environmental disaster.

Le Kenya est parsemé de réserves et de parcs nationaux destinés à protéger la nature et les animaux sauvages. Dans la région de Mara, au sud du pays, les populations masaïs sont confrontées à un double défi : cohabiter avec la faune, garante du tourisme, et maîtriser les revenus tirés de la terre. (...) / Kenya, Agriculture, Écologie, Tourisme - 2000/11

Le 1er septembre, Guillaume Erner a consacré son émission « L’invité(e) des matins » sur France Culture à la crise sanitaire et aux enjeux que cela représentait pour l’Europe. Son invité était Clément Beaune, secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, qui a notamment écrit dans le numéro de Politique étrangère qui vient de paraître (n° 3/2020) un article intitulé « L’Europe, par-delà le COVID-19 ».

Il y a cinq ans, l’Europe était frappée par une crise migratoire qui l’avait divisée. Aujourd’hui, la liste des dossiers qui attendent le secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, fraîchement nominé, est toujours aussi ambitieuse. Au programme, l’harmonisation de la gestion de la crise sanitaire, les négociations sur le Brexit, mais encore la mise en œuvre du plan de relance. Mais dans cette succession de difficultés, les 27 ont aussi réussi à s’entendre de façon inédite, en créant pour la première fois un endettement commun européen pour financer la relance des économies. Et si les épreuves étaient une opportunité pour l’Union Européenne ? 

Pour en parler nous recevons Clément Beaune, secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, nominé le le 26 juillet dernier. Il est auteur de l’article “L’Europe, par-delà le COVID” à paraître dans la revue Politique étrangère de l’Ifri, en ligne le 3 septembre, en librairie le 7 septembre.

Sur les velléités de la Turquie

Il y a une stratégie de provocation de la part du président turc. Ce n’est pas pour rien qu’il a ciblé la Grèce et la France. La Grèce est l’ennemi historique et la France est le pays de l’UE est au rendez-vous de cette solidarité indispensable face a des actions de la part de la Turquie qui se multiplient en Méditerranée orientale pour aller envoyer des bateaux dans les eaux de Chypre, mener des actions contraires au droit international en Libye qui menace aussi la sécurité européenne. 

Emmanuel Macron est arrivé lundi 31 août à Beyrouth pour sa deuxième visite après la double explosion qui a détruit le port de la capitale libanaise le 4 août dernier

« On ne choisit pas le Liban face à la Turquie. C’est un ensemble géopolitique important pour la sécurité de l’Europe. La France doit être active. Il faut reconnaître qu’on n’a pas les moyens de la Chine ou des États-Unis, mais il ne faut pas minimiser nos forces. C’est par l’Europe, en matière diplomatique, géopolitique et de sécurité, nous devons aller vers une défense européenne, qui nous relèverons le défi ».

Un plan de relance deux fois inférieur à celui des États-Unis ? 

Le plan de relance européen est un élément d’un plan plus large. Il faut additionner les plans de relance nationaux et ceux à venir. 

Le Brexit, où en est-on ? 

« Les choses n’avancent pas beaucoup. Le Royaume-Uni souhaite sortir de l’Union Européenne et ne doit donc plus avoir accès au marché européen. On ne peut pas avoir accès au marché européen sans respecter les règles sanitaires, environnementales… de la communauté. Le no deal est un risque. Cela n’empêche pas de commercer, mais il y a un certain nombre de barrières, comme les droits de douane. Nous avons intérêt à limiter les frictions mais on ne le fera pas au prix du non respect des règles ».

Réécoutez le podcast de l’émission ici.

Le phénomène religieux fait irruption sur la scène internationale. Parallèlement nous assistons à une montée générale de l'intolérance, et à de multiples demandes d'interdit. Cela inquiète les laïcs, tentés, à leur tour, de nier le monde religieux qualifié d'obscurantisme. Ainsi réapparaissent les vieilles (...) / Laïcité, Religion, Fondamentalisme - 1989/06

Le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2020) vient de paraître ! Il consacre un dossier spécial aux conséquences du COVID-19 sur la mondialisation, avec notamment en exclusivité un article de Clément Beaune, secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, et de Didier Houssin, président du comité d’urgence de l’OMS. Un second dossier sur l’urbanisation et ses évolutions à l’heure de la technologie font de ce numéro un incontournable de la rentrée.  Et comme à chaque nouveau numéro, de nombreux autres articles viennent éclairer l’actualité : la relation transatlantique, la démocratie israélienne…

Au-delà des systèmes de santé nationaux, le COVID-19 interroge les grands équilibres mondiaux, et souvent les modes de coopération qui les organisent. Politique étrangère parcourt les questions qui s’imposent à la réflexion post-crise.

L’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) a-t-elle failli ? La phase de mondialisation libérale est-elle close ? Les États sont-ils condamnés à récupérer leurs souverainetés ? Comment le secteur financier « encaisse-t-il » la crise ? Et en quoi la crise elle-même est-elle particulière – d’ailleurs, qu’apprenons-nous des crises qui se succèdent ?

Dans un texte de référence, Clément Beaune – secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes – expose comment les responsables français voient dans le temps troublé de la crise la chance d’un nouveau départ vers une Union européenne remodelée : les décisions de crise pourraient préluder à une mutation politique essentielle.

Les concentrations urbaines ont été au premier chef victimes et acteurs de la crise. Au-delà, que dit la dynamique d’urbanisation du monde des grands équilibres démographiques ? L’urbanisation est-elle une fatalité ? Modifie-t-elle les équilibres politiques internationaux ? Les villes sont-elles le nouvel espace des guerres ? Et les contrôles technologiques qui s’y imposent annoncent-ils notre avenir : de la smart city à la smart society ? Enfin, à la veille de l’élection présidentielle américaine, peut-on imaginer que les rapports euro-américains de sécurité évoluent, pour aller vers une Alliance atlantique rééquilibrée ? Et qu’Israël s’affranchisse enfin de la profonde crise de son système politique ?

Découvrez le sommaire complet ici.

Lisez gratuitement :

• l’article de Clément Beaune, « L’Europe, par-delà le COVID-19 » ;
• l’article de Didier Houssin, « La coopération sanitaire internationale à l’épreuve du COVID-19 ».

 > > Suivez-nous sur Twitter : @Pol_Etrangere ! < <

-Protecting the rights of the most vulnerable ethnic minorities is the future of unified Korea’s inescapable fate-

“Korean Dream” stories of first-generation Vietnamese policewomen reveal that South Korea is indeed a mature democracy that cherishes multiculturalism and aims to protect the most vulnerable ethnic minorities. In South Korea, multiculturalism is not merely a symbolic recognition of the resource-abundant and high-status middle class immigrants’ bourgeois glory. Its “true guardians” defend it by realistically accounting for the blood, sweat, and tears of the most vulnerable ethnic minorities, thus transforming BTS’s fanciful teenage romanticism to a righteous pluralistic reality.

Across South Korea, there are currently seven first-generation Vietnamese policewomen on active duty to protect their community from domestic violence and school violence. The policewomen’s language and intercultural skills are indispensable community assets cementing the South Korea-Vietnam relations as the bridge between the community and new-comer ethnic compatriots, especially immigrant Vietnamese wives suffering the consequences of homicides committed by their Korean husbands. Immigrant Vietnamese wives are one of the truly vulnerable ethnic minority groups of the South Korean society; the language barrier and lack of knowledge in the South Korean legal system hinder them not only from protecting themselves from crimes but also from properly exercising their rights.

The Korean Dream story of Nguyen Hong Mihn, who now works for the Jangseong County Police Department in South Jeolla Province, showcases how the seven Vietnamese policewomen have walked an arduous life path to achieve their goals. After graduating from Chosun University with a degree in economics, Mihn started her career as a part-time court translator that inspired her to later apply for her current position. For a self-determined woman like Mihn, being a mother of three children was not an impediment to achieving the goal at all. She successfully persevered in the ten months of dieting and physical training by managing to lose 40 kg of her postpartum weight gain. Such perseverance enabled her to endure three months of fitness and technical knowledge tests, six months of professional training, and another two months of internship. “Most Vietnamese brides don’t know much about Korean language and culture. The husbands force their wives to study their native language and culture, but they themselves are not willing to learn the mother tongue and culture of their wives, so it leads to misunderstanding and then comes violence;” Minh identifies the mopish compulsions of the South Korean husbands as the root of intercultural conflict from her onsite mediation experience. The real-life insights of Mihn and other Vietnamese policewomen will turn South Korea’s multicultural future to a glorious direction.

Nowadays, multicultural skills in protecting the rights of vulnerable ethnic minorities, as described above, are increasingly in demand in South Korean public services. Over the last decade, the country’s foreign resident population has doubled to nearly two million (approximately 4% of the total) in 2019 from one million in 2008. Among various ethnic groups that have transformed South Korea’s multicultural landscape, the Vietnamese form the most strongly bonded family ties with South Korean people. This is largely because the Vietnamese brides in South Korea make up the largest ethnic group of foreign brides with an annual influx of approximately 6000 women. Despite their continuous contribution to strengthening the bond between South Korea and Vietnam, the human rights situation of the Vietnamese brides’ is rather gloomy. According to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, nearly 40% of them have been exposed to sexual abuse, verbal abuse, and coercion by their husbands who are obsessed with the “you are not in Vietnam” mentality. Unfortunately, the victims’ communities have been lenient in terms of punishing the megalomaniac criminals, with arrests accounting for 13%, indictment, 8.5%, and prison sentence, only 0.9% of the reported cases. 

 

In recent weeks the confluence of many issues and events of different shades and dangers made Somalia’s political situation more complicated. This being the last year of the current administration, challenges of that nature are not entirely new, but the intensity and volatility of these developments are.

However, this piece is not an attempt to chronicle each one of said challenges and lay the blame on one political actor or another, but to illustrate how the dirty and notoriously impulsive local politics that dominate the discourse has been turning the attention away from Somalia’s national interest and international predators that are elbowing each other for zero-sum booty control.  

The most critical being the American guerilla diplomats’ covert coup against their British counterparts that has been protecting Soma Oil and Gas’ exclusive interests. These diplomats adhere to no international laws and often employ shady tactics that neither the U.K. Foreign Office nor the US State Department would be willing to acknowledge.

Who Didn’t Start The Fire?

On Saturday July 25, the Lower House of the Somali parliament has held an extraordinary session passed a vote of no-confidence motion to oust Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire amidst electoral rancor that kept the federal states drifting away from the center.

Interestingly, the ousting came only a few days after he successfully orchestrated Dhusamareeb Agreement signed by President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo and the federal states and when there was less than six months remaining from the current government’s term.

After the election related items on the agenda were discussed, the Speaker of the Parliament, Mursal Mohamed Abdurahman, literally rammed in a no-confidence motion that was not even part of the agenda, ignored the ‘point of order’ raised by some MPs, and continued the hand counting. Within an hour or so, the surgical removal was complete: 170 ‘yes’ & 8 ‘no’. After ensuing commotion by the objecting MPs, the Speaker gaveled out of the session. Mission accomplished.

 Cold War Beween Partners 

Despite the popular perception that this was solely driven by that all too familiar ‘xilligii kala guurka’ (time to part ways) politics, this was the last phase of the diplomatic cleansing of the U.K. influence- Khaire. He was Soma Oil and Gas’ East Africa man whose initial appointment this analyst has vehemently opposed.

It was the culmination of a systematic, delicately executed overthrow to end UK’s dominance of the Somalia affairs. It started with the recruitment of Qatar to directly counter-balance against UAE and bankroll Farmajo’s election. It was not a hard sell under since Qatar was under a long simmering UAE/Saudi Arabia led aggression since the Arab Spring. Moreover, it may be worth noting that Qatar already had on the ground a network of brokers who in the past provided dark money to former President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration for other projects.

Once Farmajo became the president, the systematic process to cut off all advisors, technocrats, security experts, and members of the Council of Ministers who were from or were associated with UK began. In a parallel process, the relationship with UAE had to be suspended. This was critical for mainly two reasons: One, it would get rid of UK’s cash cow of corruption. “Let me call our friends” was the notorious code of reassurance used by British diplomates that UAE embassy will be delivering the cash. This under the radar process kept their hands clean. Two—perhaps more important than the former—it would pull the plug off on the (UAE-funded) ICJ maritime case.

Though locally it is considered a patriotic initiative taken by former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, this was a Soma Oil and Gas project. ICJ rule in favor of Somalia meant another corrupt giveaway to this shady company that illegally owns Somalia’s natural resources. Farmajo is on board with a behind the curtain deal to pull the case out of ICJ and settle for a ‘negotiated’ deal with Kenya that brings in new partners. This may explain why there were multiple postponements of public hearings- something that, contrary to the Somali government’s claim, could not have been unilaterally done by the court. Hence, an official announcement after the extension is secured should shock no one.

Prez Farmaajo & US Commander

Going back to the first major step; it was followed by the takeover of the command center- UNSOM. Merely two months into his new position, the former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Nicholas Haysom, was accused of interfering in a sovereign state’s internal affairs. Tough I was never a big fan of the dubious role that the British diplomatic team and their field commanders at UNSOM played before Haysom, I was critical of the persona non grata charade and I suspected it being a “a cover up”. So Ambassador Haysom was shortly replaced by an American, Ambassador James Swan.

This was followed by pressuring Qatar to drop Prime Minister Khaire from the recipients of the electoral facilitation cash that brought him and President Farmajo to power. Khaire and his network of predatory capitalists spent two weeks in and around Doha meeting with certain elements in the (useful) king-making business. The answer was simple: the game has changed and you are on your own, old partner.

As soon as it became clear to Khaire that he could neither be part of any extension that may be granted to his partner (Farmajo) nor could he expect cash-loads coming from Qatar, he had to resort to a political kamikaze operation labled as a peace process. He reached out to the federal-states, especially Puntland and Jubbaland that lost trust on the central government, as his most viable partners; hence the Dhusamareeb Conference.

Dominance and Its Risks

Farmajo went to participate in the Dhusamareeb conference with his own uncompromising agenda: grant me a term extension of two years so I could marshal the nation to ‘one-person-one-vote electoral system’.  After Dhusamareeb One and Two, the federal-states and the central government reached an agreement: Farmajo will get no extension and a technical committee made of all stakeholders would determine the kind of election and it would be unveiled and ratified at Dhusamareeb Three.     

On Aug 13, with Khaire out of the way and Farmajo seeming to have gained a momentum for his term-extension agenda, Ambassador Donald Yamamoto’s office tweeted this:

“@US2Somalia is eagerly waiting for #Dhusamareb 3 Mtg results. The need for wide spread consultations & genuine compromise is key. The election model needs broad based support from FGS, FMS, Parliament, & other stakeholders. Timely elections, no mandate extensions. #Somalia.”

And on Aug 20, as soon one-sided Dhusamareeb Three shenanigan to ensure the extension concluded, the same office tweeted:

“@US2SOMALIA has worked for inclusion of all views at the table in #Dhusamareb3, but can’t help those absent. Spoilers withholding participation sacrifice democracy for own ambitions. Parties will need to move forward with timely model agreed.”

Though these statements are reminiscent of a bygone era known as the ‘transitional period’ it supports my last article that Somalia is under a dysfunctional trusteeship, I venture say it was intended to serve, on the one hand, as a reassurance for UK and other donor nations that US is not supporting an extension; on the other hand, to put a thumb on the scale and coerce the federal-states to march behind Farmajo. It is the only way to harvest what was sowed a few years earlier. But, since the term extension appears to be like striking a matchstick over a pool of kerosene, it must be done through a legitimate process- the federal parliament.

Execution Express

Meanwhile, following Trump‘s patented method of appointing care-takers to a number key posts to avoid congressional scrutiny, Farmajo appoints a Care-taker Prime Minister with a free-hand to exercise full authority over the Council of Ministers. This flies in the face of the very constitution that Farmajo often references to underscore the power vested in the federal parliament. So exercise and expedite to the max is what the care-taker did.

Immediately upon assuming his new post, the care-taker Prime Minister, Mahdi Guled, dashed through the approval of a few international projects and appointed the Somali Petroleum Authority without any transparency, without capacity and integrity review of the members of this highly critical body of trustees. This same questionable authority is all of sudden set to make a critical decision that could haunt Somalia for generations. The method, the timing, and the haste should raise a red flag. 

 Who Owns It?

These controversial events of the past three plus years that shook the foundation of Somalia’s political structure confirm a looming danger that some analysts were warning against- a perfect storm emanating from resource curse, geographical curse, and clannism curse.

There are two things that one must keep in mind when conducting any political affairs or developing any strategies for domestic or international end:

One, there is no such thing as ‘spontaneous combustion’ because all things political are driven by an overt or a covert objective, or both. Two, if you are not interested or are not able to assess behavioral patterns or connect the dots, you are better off finding another career to pursue.

2021 is here and not much has changed since the last election. The political situation is in total disarray, drone attacks reached the danger zone and security continues to worsen, corruption still remains a skill in high demand, sovereignty still remains a pie in the sky, and many hands continue to operate inside the cookie jar of resources. So long as the dominant political discourse remains on clans, personality politics, and methods of transitioning power, expect the wheel of exploitation to gain more ground and the predators to get more emboldened.   

Somalia still remains a political prospect that is between a romantic ideal and corrosive reality; between conformity with clannism and the reformation toward statehood; between a living idea and a dying potential; between yearning for liberty and enabling the subjugators; between individual interest and collective benefit.

An enlightened intergenerational movement to reclaim Somalia is needed more than ever; also, leaders with vision and strategy that transcend the clan mentality in order to reimagine a new nation and put the common good and national interest before all others.

Suite au sondage réalisé sur ce blog, nous avons le plaisir de vous offrir en avant-première l’article du numéro d’automne 2020 de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2020) – disponible dès lundi 7 septembre – que vous avez choisi d'(é)lire : « La coopération sanitaire internationale à l’épreuve du COVID-19 », écrit par Didier Houssin, président du Comité d’urgence de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) dans le cadre de l’épidémie du COVID-19.

Au cours des derniers mois, l’espèce humaine a été confrontée à un nouveau et dangereux membre de la famille des virus à couronne : après le coronavirus SARS-CoV-1, responsable de l’épidémie de Syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère (SRAS) qui a débuté en Chine en 2003, puis le MERS CoV apparu en 2012 en Arabie Saoudite, le SARS-CoV-2 est responsable de la pandémie de COVID-19 dont les premières manifestations ont été identifiées fin 2019 en Chine.

Après environ six mois de transmission d’un virus dont le tropisme est l’appareil respiratoire des êtres humains, le bilan au 8 juin 2020 fait état de près de 7 millions de cas recensés et de plus de 400 000 décès, principalement dans les zones Europe et Amériques de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS).

La pandémie est encore en cours. La trajectoire et l’intensité de la transmission du virus peuvent réserver des surprises. Toutefois, il est possible de faire quelques premiers constats sur la gestion de cette épidémie. Le moins que l’on puisse dire est qu’elle s’est d’emblée révélée peu propice à la coopération internationale en matière sanitaire.

L’internationalisation de l’épidémie liée au virus SARS-CoV-2

L’épidémie due au virus SARS-CoV-2, qui s’est déclenchée en Chine dans les dernières semaines de 2019, n’est pas apparue comme une totale surprise. Les risques zoonotiques afférents à la mise en contact de populations humaines denses avec de nombreuses espèces de la faune domestique et sauvage, en particulier dans les marchés d’animaux vivants, sont connus. Les précédentes épidémies à coronavirus en ont déjà été l’expression.

Le premier signalement de cas groupés de pneumonies de cause inconnue à Wuhan, dans la province chinoise du Hubei, a été fait à l’OMS le 31 décembre 2019. Un nouveau coronavirus a vite été mis en cause. Son génome a rapidement été séquencé à partir de plusieurs prélèvements faits en Chine chez des malades, en particulier dans le Hubei.

Dès le 12 janvier 2020, les autorités sanitaires chinoises ont rendu publique la séquence génétique de ce nouveau coronavirus, en introduisant cette séquence dans la base de données GISAID qui recueille les séquences génétiques des virus influenza. Cette rapidité traduit, à la fois, les progrès faits en matière de génétique moléculaire virale, et la volonté de partager des informations génétiques utiles à la compréhension de ce virus. Les connaissances progressent aujourd’hui plus vite sur la nature d’un virus émergent que sur les effets de celui-ci sur la population, ou sur ses modes de transmission.

Dès le 13 janvier 2020, la portée internationale de l’épidémie liée au virus SARS-CoV-2 est apparue avec un premier cas signalé en Thaïlande. La dimension internationale de l’épidémie était sans doute plus précoce, mais cela reste encore à bien documenter à l’heure où sont écrites ces lignes.

Face à un risque sanitaire nouveau susceptible de concerner le monde entier, l’OMS devait avoir un rôle de chef de file. Cette agence de l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) est à la fois un organisme muni de compétences techniques en matière de santé, et un organisme politique composé de la quasi-totalité des États existant dans le monde. Sa gouvernance s’appuie sur l’Assemblée mondiale de la santé, qui réunit l’ensemble des 193 États membres de l’Organisation, et un Conseil exécutif composé de 34 membres. Face au risque de diffusion internationale d’une maladie, l’action de l’OMS et des États membres s’appuie sur un instrument juridique international essentiel : le Règlement sanitaire international (RSI), dont la dernière version a été adoptée en 2005. Quand point un risque nouveau, le directeur général de l’OMS doit, selon le RSI, convoquer un Comité d’urgence ad hoc, composé de scientifiques, et dont le rôle est, avant tout, de donner un avis au directeur général : l’événement en cours doit-il être qualifié d’« urgence de santé publique de portée internationale », ce qui, selon le RSI, renvoie alors à des droits et devoirs spécifiques pour l’OMS et ses États membres ?

Aucun pays ne souhaite être la source d’une urgence de santé publique de portée internationale, en raison notamment des effets qui en résultent, en termes d’image et sur le plan économique. À l’inverse, l’image de ce même pays sera fortement dégradée s’il apparaît que l’OMS a été prévenue avec retard d’un événement sanitaire de ce type. En 2003, cette critique justifiée avait été faite à la Chine lors de l’épidémie de SRAS.

Lisez le texte dans son intégralité ici.

Source: ASEAN

ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations)’s long-term susceptibility to the multidimensional Thucydides Trap between Washington and Beijing has turned the region into a theater of (soft power) competition between the two superpowers. Reflecting the many-faceted volatility of the region’s geostrategic landscape, the fundamentals of the U.S.’ strategic approach to ASEAN should gravitate more towards cultural initiatives that comprehensively sustain liberal resiliency in the region. Realizing ASEAN’s potential as a (technologically) competitive hub of cultural pluralism would not only benefit the U.S. in weaving the universal notion of the “Pacific community” with ASEAN, it is also key to defining future liberal narratives of regional governance.

Strategic Importance of ASEAN to the U.S.

As the host of the Malacca Strait, the bottleneck of the South China Sea trade route, and the world’s second-busiest energy transport route, ASEAN has been geostrategically crucial to the political and economic interests of stakeholders worldwide. Such significance continues to render the region economically prosperous. Over the last five decades, ASEAN doubled its global GDP share from 3.2% in 1967 to 6.2% in 2017. With twice the population of the U.S., the ten natural resource-abundant ASEAN member states are projected to become the fourth-largest trading bloc in the world by 2050. For the U.S.–ASEAN relations, these rosy prospects precipitate a favorable economic climate between the two. ASEAN has become the number one investment destination in the region and the fourth-largest trading partner with a trade size of $263 billion, accounting for 5.2% of U.S. total exports. Like the ever-more prosperous economic relations, the U.S.–ASEAN cooperation has also reached its apex in its 40-year diplomatic history. The first ASEAN–U.S. Maritime Exercise kicked off last year as part of ASEAN’s four-year (2016–2020) plan of action. This year, the collective’s concerted support for U.S.-led freedom of navigation exercises was reaffirmed when Cobra Gold—the annual military drill the U.S. has held with its oldest Asian ally, Thailand, since 1982—was extended to 27 countries. Security experts see ASEAN’s increasing ties with the U.S. as the archipelagic power bloc (essentially, Indonesia and the Philippines) hedging efforts against Beijing-dominated expansionist endeavors in the South China Sea. Despite the emerging consensus on deploying a hedging strategy against China and on recognizing the U.S.’ indispensability in assuring regional security and prosperity, ASEAN chronically faces the dilemma of tight-roping between the U.S. and China to defend the value of ASEAN centrality.

U.S. Engagement in ASEAN

ASEAN’s high strategic importance to the U.S. over the last few decades has revamped the U.S.’ understanding of it beyond it being a mere subset of East Asian policy. The U.S. became the first nation to appoint an ambassador to ASEAN in 2011, two years after joining the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009; the U.S.–ASEAN relationship was promoted to the level of strategic partnership in 2015.

The U.S.’ initiatives for earning the hearts of the ASEAN people have so far focused on boosting economic and policy connectivity that leverages Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)’s three-pillared agenda of trade liberalization, business facilitation, and technological transfer. Notably, the Obama Administration’s 2016 U.S.–ASEAN initiative takes a “whole of America” multi-stakeholder approach to strengthen U.S.–ASEAN connectivity in the fields of business, energy, innovation, and policy. Recent developments in the Trump administration, however, have created abysmal policy inconsistencies that have caused previous engagement efforts to deteriorate. Particularly, the Trump administration’s fiasco of withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017 triggered a political and economic vacuum that left ASEAN with no choice but to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Pundits often view the RCEP as the relatively less stringent and less costly TPP alternative that functions as the software of China’s regional economic influence.

To cope with this woeful new normal, the U.S. now needs new and restructured ASEAN strategies. Fortunately, the future of the Trump administration’s three new ASEAN initiatives in cyber-connectivity networks, supply chain networks, and certification networks give an inkling about where these new and restructured strategies should stand.

First, the U.S.–ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership (UASCP) is an initiative that provides ASEAN with a $10 million investment in innovating smart city and cybersecurity solutions for the 26 member cities in the ASEAN Smart City Network (ASCN). In theory, UASCP should aim to technologically equip ASEAN citizens with tools to help them live sustainable, productive, and possibly liberal lifestyles, as well as with the democratic capability to free themselves from any repressive power constraints, such as the Orwellian “big brother” type of 5G censorship. Second, the Blue Dot Network (BDN), which is seen by many as a U.S. countermove against China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is a multi-stakeholder initiative to establish pan-Pacific certification schemes that voluntarily regulate sustainability standards in the region. Instead of dividing the Pacific region into “us” the liberals and “them” the commies (although anti-China rhetoric is often strategically necessary to consolidate “us” the liberals in saving the cost of performing our democratic rituals), BDN should focus on harnessing its comparative advantage in raising environmental and labor standards in the region. Third, the Economic Prosperity Network (EPN) governs pan-Pacific supply chain mechanisms by linking like-minded economies. In part, the EPN should function as a catalyst to boost ASEAN’s manufacturing advantage against China. UASCN, BDN, and EPN, though at the rudimentary phase of development, should set policy cornerstones for the future direction of the U.S.–ASEAN strategy.

However, discourses on policies integrating these cornerstones to define the liberal future of regional governance—which regulates manufacturing, product, and consumption standards—are missing. This policy rupture leads intellectuals like Amy Searight to stress the importance of architecting the universal notion of the “Pacific community,” which not only legitimatizes the institution but also establishes a fundamentally shared identity between ASEAN, the U.S., and the Pacific Islands.

Raising Standards in the Indo-Pacific: the CaliSEAN style

Unique cultural pluralism in ASEAN distinguishes the community’s identity from that of other Asian groups, particularly from the relatively homogenous East Asian identity. The U.S. needs theoretical grounds to co-innovate and co-transcend the pluralistic ASEAN identity, which seems to have some underlying commonalities with Californian cultural pluralism, into the communal Pacific identity that politically leverages ASEAN’s aspirations for democracy and good governance. In this way, ASEAN can better navigate their central “values-competition,” especially with China, which raises product, manufacturing, and consumption standards in the region and, in return, could invigorate U.S. liberal leadership in the region. The “California Effect”—a term first coined by American political scientist David Vogel to describe regulatory competition-based harmonization of environmental standards—could probably be the best starting point for designing a sustainable, resilient, and liberal Pacific community. For instance, the fallouts of the California Effect extend to the socio-cultural aspect of ASEAN governance (e.g., holographic promotion of the CaliSEAN-style AI pop artist/tourism among young generations and other out-of-the-box ideas).

It is now in the hands of the next generation of American internationalists to conceptualize pluralistic and competent CaliSEAN identity and values. When this centrality of cultural pluralism can indeed reassure America’s progressive leadership in the region, ASEAN and the U.S.’ Indo-Pacific allies will better hedge the governance risk arising from future cross-cultural inequalities.

La rédaction a le plaisir de vous offrir à lire en exclusivité l’article de Clément Beaune, secrétaire d’État chargé des Affaires européennes, « L’Europe, par-delà le COVID-19 », publié dans le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2020), à paraître le 7 septembre. Dans cet article, Clément Beaune pose un diagnostic précis des défauts de l’Europe et indique la marche à suivre afin de redonner du souffle au projet européen.

« Quelques semaines après un accord budgétaire d’une ambition inédite, acté par le Conseil européen le 21 juillet 2020, il serait tentant de dire que le COVID-19 a tout changé dans l’Union européenne (UE), selon le principe savamment répété : « L’Europe n’avance que dans les crises. » Comme tout cliché, cette simplification a du vrai. Le saut d’intégration réalisé avec l’endettement commun de l’Union est l’étape d’intégration européenne la plus importante depuis l’euro ; elle aurait été impossible sans cette crise. Mais il est vrai, surtout, et moins visible, que cette avancée majeure doit beaucoup au retour d’un triangle d’or qui n’avait plus connu pareille vigueur depuis le début des années 1990 : le couple franco-allemand, étroitement associé à une Commission européenne ambitieuse.

Élément de continuité sous-estimé et combiné à une réelle nouveauté, elle aussi minimisée : les attentes des citoyens à l’égard de l’Europe ont augmenté. Ils ne la critiquent pas tant pour son intrusion dans les compétences nationales que pour son inaction face aux défis communs : hier les migrations, aujourd’hui la santé, du manque d’harmonisation des mesures de quarantaine à la recherche commune d’un vaccin. Aujourd’hui, on s’attend à ce que l’Europe agisse, on la critique quand elle ne le fait pas, ou peu, ou tard.

La crise a d’ailleurs montré que son efficacité semblait corrélée à ses compétences : réactive dans le champ économique (suspension des règles budgétaires ou d’aides d’État, soutien monétaire massif), en large partie impuissante pour la coordination des restrictions aux frontières et presque inexistante dans le cœur sanitaire de la crise. Enfin, il n’est pas anodin de noter, avec la nécessaire prudence liée à toute fiction politique, que si le Royaume-Uni était encore membre de l’Union, l’accord sur le budget et un tel plan de relance aurait certainement été inaccessible.

Ces trois éléments – la nécessité d’un logiciel européen commun, les attentes croissantes des citoyens et la pertinence renouvelée du moteur franco-allemand – dessinent la matrice d’un projet européen qui doit revoir ses méthodes comme sa substance pour incarner une puissance ferme, rapide et audible dans un monde brutal que les Européens redécouvrent, tel l’empereur de Chine des Nouvelles orientales de Marguerite Yourcenar s’apercevant avec rage que le monde réel n’est pas celui des toiles superbes que son vieux peintre Wang-Fô lui avait idéalement décrit.

Quel projet européen pour Emmanuel Macron ?

Commençons par la méthode européenne du président de la République, non seulement car elle dit beaucoup du fond, mais aussi car elle marque la nouveauté la plus importante dans l’action européenne des présidents français depuis François Mitterrand. Cette rupture méthodologique a été encore peu perçue ou commentée. Elle repose sur la combinaison permanente de trois éléments. […] »

Lisez l’article dans son intégralité ici.