Diplomacy & Crisis News

COVID-19 is an “unprecedented global crisis that demands an unprecedented global response”, the chief of the UN health agency said on Monday, unveiling a plan to have two billion doses of coronavirus vaccine available by the end of 2021. 

Nuclear activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) “remain a cause for serious concern”, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said in Vienna on Monday. 

It doesn’t matter whether Bush or Trump was worse when the problems are the same.

Art de la jeunesse, populaire par excellence, auréolé d'un succès sans cesse croissant… la bande dessinée souffre de préjugés tenaces. Elle mérite pourtant d'être considérée pour elle-même. / Culture, Littérature, Médias, Société, Bande dessinée - (...) / Culture, Littérature, Médias, Société, Bande dessinée - 2010/01

Even amid the upheaval of the COVID-19 pandemic, people everywhere must continue to make peace a priority, the UN Secretary-General said on Monday. 

Si l'on retient la présence de Cubains de l'exil dans la tentative d'invasion de la baie des Cochons en 1961, on connaît moins leur rôle dans les opérations ultérieures de la CIA en Amérique latine. / États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Commerce des armes, Narcotrafic, Guérilla, Services secrets, Cuba - (...) / États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Commerce des armes, Narcotrafic, Guérilla, Services secrets, Cuba - 2009/01

No matter the president, Washington won’t stand for Brasilia’s growing ties with Beijing.

Scotland, six years after its last crack at independence, is hankering to be a “global good gal,” charting its own foreign-policy course independent of London.

The results are in from a massive, unprecedented crowd-sourcing survey of international opinion, launched in January 2020 to mark the 75th anniversary of the United Nations. Participants from all walks of life, women, men, girls and boys in developed and developing countries were encouraged to share their hopes and fears for the future and how the UN can help to bring about change. 

Why Pankaj Mishra sees the ideology’s limits more clearly than its most powerful fans.

Republicans prepare to confirm her replacement as Democrats cry foul.

Washington’s reliance on sanctions and maximum pressure will make it harder to strike a new deal constraining Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère 
(n° 3/2020). Marc Hecker, rédacteur en chef de Politique étrangère, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Pierre-Antoine Donnet, Le leadership mondial en question. L’affrontement entre la Chine et les États-Unis (Éditions de l’Aube, 2020, 236 pages).

Pierre-Antoine Donnet a été rédacteur en chef central de l’Agence France-Presse, et correspondant à Pékin et New York. Son nouvel ouvrage a été écrit, pour l’essentiel, avant l’apparition du COVID-19, mais les dynamiques qu’il analyse n’en sont pas pour autant dépassées. Au contraire, la crise sanitaire et ses conséquences dans de nombreux domaines ne devraient rendre que plus vive la problématique centrale de ce livre : la lutte entre la Chine et les États-Unis pour la suprématie mondiale.

L’auteur procède méthodiquement, passant en revue plusieurs champs d’affrontement entre les deux superpuissances. L’économie, le commerce, la défense, le spatial ou encore la haute technologie font ainsi l’objet de chapitres dédiés. Un autre chapitre est consacré à la compétition géostratégique entre Washington et Pékin, que l’auteur qualifie de « grand partage du monde ». Les stratégies régionales des États-Unis et de la Chine y sont rappelées en une trentaine de pages, et illustrées de nombreux exemples. L’effort de synthèse est louable, mais peut donner l’impression d’un tour d’horizon trop rapide.

Chiffres et statistiques permettent de mesurer l’ampleur de la pénétration chinoise dans les pays du Sud, certains États se retrouvant pris au piège d’une dette grandissante à l’égard de Pékin. Dans la partie consacrée au projet des Nouvelles routes de la soie, le cas du Sri Lanka, incapable de rembourser ses dettes, est notamment évoqué. Les dirigeants chinois n’ont accepté d’effacer l’ardoise de Colombo qu’en échange de la prise de contrôle du port en eau profonde de Hambantota. Cette opération « a permis à la Chine de prendre pied dans l’océan Indien, à quelques centaines de miles de l’Inde, son adversaire historique ». Plus près de nous, Pékin s’intéresse aussi aux ports de Méditerranée, comme en témoignent les accords conclus avec la Grèce en 2016 et l’Italie en 2019.

Le dernier chapitre est consacré aux faiblesses de la Chine qui pourraient constituer des freins à son ascension. La dette en fait partie : elle a été multipliée par quatre entre 2008 et 2016, et avoisinerait les 300 % du produit intérieur brut. Au nombre des autres difficultés mentionnées, la démographie : les conséquences de la politique de l’enfant unique vont se faire sentir à long terme, et le vieillissement de la population risque de devenir un « casse-tête pour les caisses de l’État ». La question du mécontentement d’une partie de la population n’est pas éludée, l’auteur soutenant que « la stabilité sociale en Chine n’est pas celle que l’on croit ». Il finit par s’interroger sur la capacité des dirigeants chinois à faire perdurer le régime communiste et, au-delà, à permettre à leur pays de dominer les États-Unis. Se gardant bien de répondre directement à la question, il laisse la parole à différents experts dont les avis ne manquent pas de diverger.

« Ma crainte, c’est que le monde d’après ressemble au monde d’avant, mais en pire », déclarait Jean-Yves Le Drian, alors que le COVID-19, parti de Chine, gagnait l’ensemble de la planète. Ce livre ne rassurera pas ceux que cette remarque a inquiétés. Il constitue une bonne introduction à la géopolitique du « monde d’après ». Il n’est pas destiné aux spécialistes, mais pourra donner des clés de compréhension utiles à un large public.

Marc Hecker

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Michael Peck

Security, Europe

There can be no innovation without experimentation.

Key Point: Experimentation inevitably results in failures.

It's not usual for Russia to admit that its weapons have failed. Especially Russian media, purveyor of glorious stories of space MiGs and interplanetary tanks.

Yet Russia's Sputnik News recently published an article back in 2018 on Russian and Soviet weapons that fizzled.

"For each military vehicle that is accepted into service, there are often roughly ten others that never proved to be either effective or economically viable," Sputnik News tactfully reminded its readers. "However, they are not usually 'born' in vain – some of them are later used for the development of new generations of weapons."

Sputnik News cited five examples:

The Papa-Class Submarine

The K-222 nuclear attack submarine (NATO code name "Papa"), launched in 1969, was considered the world's fastest submarine. It reportedly reached a record speed of 44.7 knots. But only one model was ever built. "The problem with the K-222 was that its hull was built from titanium, which made it exceedingly expensive (it was even known by the nickname the 'Golden Fish')," according to Sputnik News. "Aside from this, the submarine was also very noisy, which stripped it of a key advantage — low detectability." However, the article also claimed that it provided valuable lessons for subsequent Russian subs, such as the Charlie-class. Papa also encouraged the development of more advanced U.S. Navy anti-submarine weapons.

Su-47 Berkut

The Su-47 Berkut fighter (NATO code name "Firkin"), which first took flight in 1997, had distinctive forward-swept wings designed to increase maneuverability, longer range and faster subsonic speed. However, "such a design increased the stress on the wings, requiring much more expensive materials to be used in production," Sputnik News said. "In combination with the slated completion date, 1997, at a time when the Russian economy was highly vulnerable, led to the closure of the project." However, lessons from the project were incorporated into today's cutting-edge Su-57.

The Black Eagle Tank

The Black Eagle tank (Russian designation Object 640), based on the T-80, caused a stir in the West when a few prototypes were unveiled in the late 1990s. In particular, it had a large, unmanned turret while the crew sat in the well-protected hull. If that sounds familiar, it's because that's a prominent feature of Russia's new T-14 Armata tank, which has really caused a stir in the West. Sputnik News blamed the cancellation of the project on "a lack of innovation" with the design. Yet curiously, officials told Russian media in 2009 that the Black Eagle never existed as more than a prototype: "There was no such project...and those 20-year-old pictures show a mock-up of a futuristic tank which remained just a product of someone's imagination."

The Caspian Monster

One of the most distinctive craft in history, the Lun-class ground effect vehicle combined qualities of a conventional aircraft, seaplane and hovercraft. Dubbed the "Caspian Monster" when it was deployed in 1987, the sea-skimming craft—bigger than an airliner—was 243 feet long, sixty-two feet high, had a 144-foot wingspan and a speed of 297 knots. It could carry 100 tons of cargo or even six Moskit anti-ship missiles. However, it proved too expensive and only one was built. Nonetheless, its makers announced in 2015 that they were making a modern version.

The Soviet Slipper

The MiG-105, nicknamed "Lapot" (slipper), was an orbital spaceplane conceived in the 1960s as a Soviet response to the abortive U.S. X-20 Dyna-Soar project. Sidelined and then revived in the 1970s as a counterpart to the U.S. Space Shuttle, the spaceplane was attached to a liquid-fueled booster, which in turn was supposed to be launched in mid-air from a hypersonic jet. However, the craft made only made a few atmospheric test flights. "The project was terminated after a decision was made in favor of the rocket-propelled Buran orbital spaceplane," eulogized Sputnik News. "The ideas behind the MiG-105 haven't been used so far, but maybe one day its hour will come."

Sputnik News is being generous in its epitaphs of weapons that ultimately proved to be expensive flops for the Soviet and Russian economies. Yet the United States is no different. How much of the American taxpayers’ money has been wasted on expensive dead-ends like the B-70 bomber or F-111 fighter?

Communist or capitalist, Russian or American, there is an iron rule: there can be no innovation without experimentation, and experimentation inevitably results in failures.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article first appeared in 2018.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Kris Osborn

Security, Americas

The Navy and Air Force are looking into fighter jets that can use AI to take down enemy planes.

Key point: Drones could help human pilots fight other planes. Here is how the military is looking at winning by using human-drone pairing.

What if an armed, artificial-intelligence-enabled attack drone detects an enemy fighter jet, uses long-range sensors to confirm the target before attacking with a precision-guided air-to-air missile?

What if an unmanned fighter or advanced drone, operated with various levels of advanced AI-informed algorithms, engaged in fast air-to-air combat maneuvers in a direct dogfight or close-in engagement with a manned enemy fighter?

These questions, which raise substantial tactical, strategic and command and control questions, are fast becoming a near-term reality. 

“Autonomous systems going up against a manned system in some kind of air-to-air engagement . . . is a bold idea,”  Lt. Gen. “Jack” Shanahan, Director, Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, told The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in a special video interview series.

Shanahan explained that, while autonomy now exists in various forms of great operational significance, AI-enabled autonomy brings a new frontier of warfare possibilities now being explored by the Pentagon in greater depth.

“AI-enabled autonomy is where we will see some big capabilities come together,” he said.

Autonomy driven by AI does bring a range of new technical, tactical and strategic implications, such as bringing new paradigms of decisionmaking, problem solving and operations. 

Essentially, platforms driven by advanced AI willl be capable of discerning, processing and analyzing vast amounts of information in near real-time, something which not only speeds up “sensor-to-shooter” time but also enables a much greater range of operational activity without a need for human intervention.

Instead of merely following pre-determined navigational “waypoints” established through GPS, something which has been underway for quite some time, drones and even fighter-jets will be able to receive new input, perform in-flight analytics and then make impactful decisions autonomously.

While humans will retain the requisite measures of command and control, AI can facilitate the ability for an unmanned system to, for instance, quickly adjust flight in response to new sensor information. This could include the processing of force location or navigational data independently or even networking intelligence data between nearby manned platforms, unmanned platforms and human-operated ground command centers.

For instance, a drone or unmanned fighter could be operating in a high-risk area when it comes upon enemy troop formations or terrain configurations of great tactical significance, bounce that new information against a vast and seemingly limitless database of information to perform analytics and make necessary adjustments.

Perhaps the on-board computer can access an intelligence database indicating previously successfully courses of action in these circumstances, analyze information about enemy capabilities, assets and weapons, and inform the unmanned platform regarding the best immediate course of action?  An on-board computer could instantly weigh a host of variables to independently make calculations previously determined by humans.

It certainly could be said that the F-35s well-known “sensor fusion” which organizes otherwise disparate sensor information onto a single screen for the pilot, is an early application of AI.

Emerging or future AI-enabled autonomy will incorporate a vastly superior wealth or range of information, improve processing and analytics, and perform decisionmaking related to a host of complex dynamics without needing humans.

Procedural and analytical functions such as information management and data processing can all be done much more efficiently than humans, all while leaving human cognition in an ultimate controlling role.

The speed of calculations and the increasing pace at which AI-informed systems can acquire, process and analyze new information in real-time are in fact expected to enable unmanned dogfighting, combat maneuvering and tactical decisionmaking.

“We will see small numbers of humans controlling larger numbers of machines. In some cases it will be machine-to-machine with humans in the loop,” Shanahan said.

Of course, at least at the moment, all of this rests upon a fundamental and, as of yet, unchanging premise, namely that ultimate control must remain with humans able to utilize those characteristics unique to human cognition.

“The only failure we will have is a failure of imagination,” Shanahan added.

Kris Osborn is Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Spencer D. Bakich

Diplomacy, Asia

What happens if the bromance between Kim and Trump were to fail? 

By his own reckoning, Donald Trump’s North Korea policy has been a success. U.S.-DPRK relations reached their nadir in the 2017 nuclear crisis, a crisis caused by the failed policies of Trump’s predecessors.  Tensions ran high as he and Kim Jong-un traded personal recriminations (Little Rocket Man vs. mentally deranged U.S. dotard) and threatened each other with obliteration (fire and fury vs. taming with fire).  Yet, the United States and Korea avoided war due to his deft diplomacy, which included flattering letters and three face-to-face meetings. It isn’t really a problem that Kim hasn’t given up any of his nuclear weapons, Trump contends.  As in the real estate business, market conditions aren’t yet right for that kind of liquidation. What’s important is that Trump and Kim now have a deep and meaningful relationship that serves both countries well.

Trump isn’t the first leader to base strategy on personal relationships, but the wise have a backup plan if things go wrong. Should the bond between the two break in a second Trump term, mutual animosity would likely follow as it often does for the jilted.  In that case, Trump will be back to square one, confronting an unpredictable and hostile nuclear power with the capacity to target the American homeland with nuclear weapons.

The development by the North of a nuclear retaliation capacity may induce caution in the Oval Office. However, much depends on Pyongyang’s behavior; the desires of the Kim regime matter greatly. If Kim is content with his position, both domestically and on the peninsula, then his nuclear deterrent will bolster a North Korean strategy aimed at securing the status quo. Under those conditions, U.S.-North Korean relations would be generally stable, even if strained at times. Seeing no need to bear the massive costs associated with regime change, Trump in his second term would probably be content to live and let live. 

Yet, the North’s nuclear arsenal may neither fully remove Kim’s security concerns, nor temper his ambitions. Facing the combined might of the U.S. and South Korean militaries, Kim’s fear of a surprise decapitation strike may make him more belligerent. Alternatively, Kim may be emboldened by his nuclear deterrent and willing to seek to extract concessions from Washington and Seoul by rushing to the brink in the next dispute. In either case, the future of U.S.-North Korean relations would be just as fraught as in the past, but even more deadly as Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal grows and matures.

Greatly concerning would be Trump’s willingness to respond in kind to future North Korean provocations. As my own research shows, Trump failed to understand the basic strategic features of the 2017 nuclear crisis. Most importantly, Trump believed that he, and not Kim, was more resolved to prevail in the crisis—a particularly dangerous misconception given that Washington was threatening war if Pyongyang refused to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Trump failed to realize, moreover, that the threats he was issuing lacked credibility because U.S. signaling was confused and contradictory.  Finally, Trump seemed not to understand that his threats were catalyzing Kim’s resolve to stand firm.  Inflexible and offensively primed, U.S. military doctrine and war plans were ill-suited to sending tacit, behavioral signals of assurance to Pyongyang; a necessity given that Washington was demanding the North’s unilateral disarmament.

War was “much closer than anyone would know,” Trump admitted.  Yet, little has changed in the ensuing three years to alleviate concerns about Trump’s approach to crisis bargaining. Regional stability depends, then, on whether Kim is satisfied with what he has, an admittedly slender reed on which to rest one’s hopes.

Spencer D. Bakich is an associate professor of international studies and the director of the National Security Program at Virginia Military Institute. He is the author of Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars (Chicago 2014).

Image: A suspected missile is fired, in this image released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on March 22, 2020. KCNA/via REUTERS 

A string of assassinations has spawned conspiracy theories and intercommunal suspicion, threatening the country’s stability.

W. James Antle III

Politics, Americas

Yet barring polling malpractice worse than 2016’s, Biden remains the favorite less than two months out, thanks in part to the radicals in his party suddenly becoming risk-averse. But it could have been all so different.

If Joe Biden is the next president of the United States, Democrats will owe a debt of gratitude to their primary electorate, especially in South Carolina.

That’s where Democrats began to collectively pull back from nominating a septuagenarian socialist for president, choosing a more conventional Beltway septuagenarian instead. If the party had continued to follow Bernie Sanders into the abyss, it would have been much easier for President Donald Trump to frame this election as a binary choice between two competing visions—one of them radical—rather than a referendum on his own administration.

This was always the conventional wisdom. The Democratic establishment came of age either losing to Ronald Reagan in the 1980s or winning with Bill Clinton in the 1990s, so they instinctively feared a Bernie Sanders nomination. Never Trumpers could not bring themselves to publicly support an overt socialist, so they begged Democrats not to run one in the general election. Republicans licked their chops at the prospect of running against the Vermont senator the president dubbed “Crazy Bernie.”

But it took coronavirus to make the conventional wisdom fully true. For as many risks as a Sanders nomination entailed, running yet another aging establishment Democrat who generated no enthusiasm from the base and whose best days as a campaigner were long behind them was no safe bet. The playbook that Trump used against Hillary Clinton applied with greater ease to Biden, even if the former vice president was much better liked.

If the Democrats were going to beat an incumbent running on peace (or at least as close as we get to peace in an era of forever wars) and prosperity, someone who could out-populist Trump in their critique of the system might have been the better bet. Sanders could turn Trump into a cookie-cutter Republican — that is, the kind that lost Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin for going on thirty years — while rallying progressives and cutting into the president’s white working-class margins simultaneously. Yes, even under this scenario the possibility of a down-ballot blowout for Democrats was higher. But as the president would say, “What the hell do you have to lose?”

The pandemic changed all this. Gone went the economic boom that was always Trump’s strongest case for reelection (most polls show him retaining at least a slim advantage on the economy even now). In its place was a Democratic Party newly desperate to do whatever it took to win. The party’s centrists always felt this way, of course. But the coronavirus convinced progressives to get with the program.

From that point on, everything that happened over the course of the summer seemed to strengthen the case for normalcy, however loosely defined. After a March rally around his presidential leadership, Trump’s coronavirus briefings degenerated into the absurd. The killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis police custody and ensuing racial justice protests had Americans seeking unity. Trump is constitutionally incapable of meeting that need.

None of this is to say that Biden is a candidate without flaws. A gaffe-prone windbag at even the height of his powers, there are reasons to doubt he is fully up to the rigors of the presidency. He certainly seems ill equipped to contain the leftward lurch of the Democratic Party that even a plurality of its own voters rejected. “I think he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades,” former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who is no ideologue, has said of Biden.

But the campaign has unfolded in such a way as to make Biden at best a minor participant. Trump’s flaws, not Biden’s, have taken center stage and Republicans have been unable to do much to alter this dynamic. The debates could potentially be a turning point, of course, but Biden may only have to beat the expectations game, in which case a minimally competent showing will be a resounding victory.

External events still give Trump a chance. Progress on a vaccine is possible, despite the Democrats’ best efforts to turn one into hydroxychloride redux. Time is running out for an economic recovery to solidify, but it is still possible that reopening will look better by the end of October than it did to many in July. The racial justice protests have periodically erupted into lawlessness and violence, a risk Democrats have belatedly sought to address.

Yet barring polling malpractice worse than 2016’s, Biden remains the favorite less than two months out, thanks in part to the radicals in his party suddenly becoming risk-averse.

W. James Antle III is politics editor of the Washington Examiner.

Image: Reuters.

Kyle Mizokami

Security,

Unlike other artillery units the M270 isn’t designed for direct support of ground troops. Rather, MLRS units concentrate on medium- to long-distance threats.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The shift back to big-power warfare once again puts the focus on rocket artillery. As the U.S. Army reorients back towards fighting conventional armies again, massed fires will be back in vogue. ATACMs rockets are even getting the ability to engage moving ships at sea.

Rockets have been a staple of land warfare for centuries, but it wasn’t until the latter half of the twentieth century that they became a permanent addition to the U.S. Army’s arsenal. Ironically, the Army’s program to develop multiple battlefield rocket artillery to fight the Soviet Army drew inspiration for its rockets from Moscow’s wartime “Katyusha” multi-tube rocket launchers.

Battlefield rocket use dates back to thirteenth-century China. Although China is lauded for inventing gunpowder and derided for promptly using it for fireworks the reality is more complicated: China did use them for war, and even invented multiple-tube rocket launchers capable of launching up to one hundred projectiles. Rocket artillery fell out of favor for hundreds of years, but by the mid-1930s the Soviet Army had started to field the first modern rocket artillery units.

Unlike traditional gun artillery, which used a powder charge to propel a shell through a gun tube, an artillery rocket uses a continuously burning rocket motor to travel to target. The upside is that instead of a single gun tube, several tubes can be clustered together and ripple-fired mere seconds apart. As a result, rocket artillery has a faster rate of fire than tube artillery, although reloading takes longer.

The downside to rocket artillery is that rockets are less accurate. Unlike shells, whose impact point can be precisely computed by knowing the power of the powder charge, weight of the projectile and the length of the gun tube, a rocket flies free after exiting the tube, motor still burning. This makes rockets inherently less accurate and more suited to saturation attacks against area targets instead of point targets.

The Soviet Union relied on rocket artillery extensively during World War II, massing large numbers of truck-mounted multiple-rocket launchers such as the BM-13 and BM-8 to provide massed fires. Rocket artillery was extremely easy to manufacture, a critical issue when Soviet manufacturing was struggling to keep up with the war. A BM-13-16 was simply a collection of bracketed steel tubes mounted on a truck, often a Lend-Lease Studebaker, and the resulting vehicle could hurl sixteen eleven-pound high-explosive warheads a distance of 7.3 miles. What Soviet rocket units lacked in accuracy they made up with in the ability to saturate a target area, and the scream of a BM-13 launcher releasing a salvo of rockets was unearthly.

During the early 1970s, the U.S. Army refocused from Vietnam to a land war in Europe. As a result it looked to revamp its artillery capabilities with an emphasis on striking deep behind enemy lines.

The result was the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, or MLRS. The M270 packs twelve 227-millimeter rockets into the a box launcher and can fire all twelve rounds in less than forty seconds. The M270 is based on the chassis of the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. Tracked and highly mobile, it is designed to move into position, fire, and be ready to move to a new firing position in five minutes or less. This “shoot and scoot” tactic minimizes exposure to enemy counterbattery fire, a tactic that uses radar and other techniques to track back enemy rockets and shells in midair, determine the location of the enemy artillery units, and destroy them before they can displace to a new firing position.

Unlike other artillery units the M270 isn’t designed for direct support of ground troops. Rather, MLRS units concentrate on medium- to long-distance threats. Instead of attacking an enemy mechanized regiment on the move, MLRS units engage targets far behind enemy lines such as unit assembly areas, fuel and ammunition depots, and headquarters units. MLRS rocket fire is also ideal for friendly counterbattery fire missions.

Instead of trying to make the M270 more accurate, developer Vought decided to embrace the rocket’s lack of accuracy and maximize its ability to saturate an entire area. Each of the original M26 rockets carried 644 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional munitions (DPICM). The size of a hand grenade, DPICM rounds were ejected from the rocket while in flight, raining hundreds of the bomblets down on the enemy. The rounds were devastatingly effective against not only exposed infantry and soft-skinned targets such as fuel depots, ammunition depots and headquarters units, but were also capable of inflicting damage on tanks and armored vehicles, destroying them or putting them out of action.

The first use of the M270 was in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when the rocket launchers earned the name “grid killers” for the ability of a single M270 to saturate a one-kilometer-by-one-kilometer box grid on a military map. A MLRS battalion has a total of twenty-seven M270s, giving U.S. Army divisions and artillery brigades incredible amounts of firepower.

An alternate munition used by the M270 is ATACMs, or the Army Tactical Missile System. A large, plump rocket, ATACMs takes the place of six rockets in an M270, meaning each vehicle can carry up to two. ATACMs was designed to attack targets even farther behind enemy lines, carrying up to 950 antitank and antipersonnel submunitions up to eighty miles. Later versions had a range of up to 186 miles.

The tendency for unexpended cluster munitions to linger on the battlefield and cause harm to civilians resulted in the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. The convention bans their use and, although the United States is not a signatory, the Pentagon generally holds to the ban. As a result,  MLRS and ATACMs rockets that carried DPICM have been retired or are being updated to a single “unitary” high-explosive warhead.

The M270 was so effective that a lighter, more mobile version, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) was created. HIMARS packs six rockets or a single ATACMs on a five-ton truck. HIMARS has seen action in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Iraq against the Islamic State. The system’s usefulness against high-end threats has also seen it deployed to the Philippines opposite China, and eastern Europe opposite Russia.

The shift back to big-power warfare once again puts the focus on rocket artillery. As the U.S. Army reorients back towards fighting conventional armies again, massed fires will be back in vogue. ATACMs rockets are even getting the ability to engage moving ships at sea. New, improved rockets with GPS guidance can now destroy point targets. While rocket artillery likely won’t replace gun artillery any time soon, the versatility—and now accuracy—that rockets offer will make them critical capabilities for decades to come.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami. This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Wikipedia.

Robert Keatley

Security, Asia

The diverse city that made its residents proudly label themselves as Hong Kongers and which also attracted so many foreigners has been changed enormously, with the worst yet to come.

Each day the grip tightens. Another dissenter is arrested. Legal cases continue against others, with some facing possible life sentences. Strong warnings against renewed political agitation flow from the local government and Beijing. Educators are told to learn the party line. A troublesome election is delayed for a year.

All this has caused the U.S. State Department to issue a new warning to Americans about visiting Hong Kong (and mainland China) due to “a heightened risk of arrest, detention, expulsion or prosecution.”

From the viewpoint of mainland China, the new situation in Hong Kong—its obstreperous city in the south—can seem just fine. The streets are no longer jammed with protesters, sometimes violent, against policies of local and national governments plus the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Newly-arrived Beijing officials have commandeered a thirty-story luxury hotel as offices from which to chastise Hong Kong bureaucrats who don’t follow orders effectively. Chief Executive Carrie Lam has been downgraded to the role of Beijing’s obedient agent, not the leader of an autonomous local government that responds to public opinion. The police have new authority to arrest perceived troublemakers and seek their financiers. Chances of pro-democracy beliefs seeping across the border and infecting the mainland have been diminished.

Yet in a broader context, there have been no true winners; all concerned have lost something, almost certainly with more losses to come.

For the people of Hong Kong, their civil rights have been severely curtailed by Beijing and a supine local administration that mostly ignores their clear preferences. The prized common law legal system that underpins its boast as “Asia’s Global City,” the world’s third-largest financial center, is being eroded. The “one country, two systems” political arrangement which Beijing promised would let Hong Kong people manage their own affairs with “a high degree of autonomy” is in tatters. Their financial and economic future is uncertain for reasons extending far beyond the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. One small example: a recent survey found that nearly 40 percent of American companies in Hong Kong expect to reduce their presence or leave altogether.

But this has been no clear victory for Xi Jinping, China’s maximum leader, and the Communist Party he leads. To be sure, he has quashed mass protests that he found treasonous, but the price has been high. His effort has increased tensions in the fraught American-Chinese relationship—called the world’s most important by both sides—already at its lowest point for decades. Evidence-free claims that American “black hands” fed the Hong Kong unrest has made resolving broad trade, economic and political differences even more difficult; some analysts worry about war, either cold or hot. American sanctions on eleven Hong Kong-based officials and withdrawal of certain trade advantages leave the city’s banks and companies uncertain about how these and future sanctions will affect them. One byproduct: Hong Kong is no longer a conduit for importing American technology that the United States won’t allow Beijing to buy directly. The crackdown has also increased doubts around the Pacific and in Europe about the wisdom of relying closely on China when important matters are at stake.

All this has left Hong Kong people more disaffected than ever, which cannot have been a Beijing goal. Most have long accepted that their city is unavoidably part of the People’s Republic but the vast majority does not want daily life controlled in detail by the mainland’s ruling party and they identify themselves first as “Hong Kongers,” not as citizens of China. A small pro-independence movement did arise, its influence greatly exaggerated by Beijing to justify the harsh crackdown. But desire for an independent Hong Kong, strongest among students worried about their own futures, more accurately reflects widespread anger and frustration about authorities’ refusal to negotiate serious issues, such as investigating alleged police brutality. The true believers in Hong Kong independence might well fit into one of those double-decker trams that crawl through Wanchai.

Yet if all concerned had shown more foresight, tolerance, common sense, and compromise, the worst might have been avoided. The political showdown that eventually brought disruption, intervention and such damage to public life in Hong Kong was not inevitable.

During its 150-year colonial grip, Britain did little to promote electoral politics other than a limited amount during its final years in charge. Yet 1997’s final handover terms decreed that “Hong Kong people” would govern themselves with great autonomy, with only defense and diplomacy reserved for the central government. Legal and economic systems were to remain intact until at least 2047. It set “universal suffrage” as the “eventual” political goal though precise terms were not clarified. Half the members of the Legislative Council (Legco), which has limited powers, were chosen by popular vote and others by mostly pro-Beijing interest groups. An efficient civil service remained in place, with Beijing’s choice—a politically reliable tycoon—as the first Chief Executive to head an executive-driven governing system.

But Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activists had reason to believe that liberalization could come after ten years—in 2007—and assorted talks continued through various channels with limited progress. Finally, in 2014, Beijing made an offer; it would allow the next Chief Executive to be selected by popular vote with “two or three” candidates competing for the post—provided that an election committee dominated by Beijing’s friends approved them. Angry pro-democracy members of Legco voted this down after its pro-government members made a serious tactical mistake; they fled the chamber in hopes of preventing any vote, allowing those who stayed behind to reject the offer 23-8 even though an all-member vote would have passed it.

Rejection proved a grievous error as even a flawed election would have been a vast improvement over having each Chief Executive named by the 1,200 person pro-Beijing committee. American and other diplomats advised pro-democrats to take the deal and seek further gains later—such as having more Legco members chosen by popular vote rather than by interest groups. Even this flawed system would have seen rivals with differing platforms compete for public support. And it would have normalized the concept of having people select their own leaders, something impossible elsewhere in China. Many Hong Kongers were willing but vocal activists demanded more.

This led to the Occupy Central demonstrations, which earned worldwide sympathy for protesters with their yellow umbrellas but nothing tangible. Beijing authorities, angered by rejection of what they considered a generous concession, made no new offers. Yet if the flawed electoral system had been installed, Hong Kong politics could have been more peaceful and tolerable to China, however imperfect.

That dim possibility ended last year when Chief Executive Lam suddenly introduced a sweeping extradition bill that far exceeded what was needed to solve a limited problem. It would let criminal suspects be shipped to many other jurisdictions, including to mainland courts where judges are picked by the ruling party and effective defense is difficult to impossible. Any Hong Kong resident—including foreigners—could then be tried there for allegedly breaking China’s ill-defined criminal laws, such as “making trouble and creating a disturbancem” if Beijing demanded their extradition. The fact that they may have done nothing illegal under Hong Kong law would not matter.

Hong Kong’s bar association and other legal experts warned this gravely eroded the city’s common law system but were ignored. Lam and her pliant enablers went ahead, pushed by Beijing. Huge and increasingly violent demonstrations, and harsh police reprisals, ensued. Youthful demonstrators demanded that the extradition bill be withdrawn, which eventually happened. But they had added four other demands that the government found even more objectionable, including for Lam’s immediate resignation. Many demonstrators were students also motivated by grievances about poor job prospects, costly housing, a widening income gap and an establishment seemingly indifferent to their needs—the combination of the Lam administration, the mainland’s Communist Party and its pliable Hong Kong loyalists, plus local business leaders who consistently echo the Beijing line for their own commercial reasons.

In theory, some demands might have been negotiable in part. But the energetic and youthful crowds had no recognized leaders authorized to speak for them—even if the government side had wanted to talk, which it didn’t. That reflects China’s increased intolerance since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012; the CCP has become more brutal when repressing perceived foes such as Tibetans, Muslim minorities, academic critics and human rights advocates. Thus it had no sympathy for Hong Kong’s young protesters and clearly had lost faith in the local government’s ability to keep order.

Beijing’s solution: a new National Security Law imposed on Hong Kong that clearly violates the city’s de facto constitution which outlines its supposed autonomy, known as the Basic Law. In extremely vague terms the security law outlaws sedition, separatism, collusion with foreigners, and other items; its imprecision allows authorities to arrest almost anyone who says or does something they find offensive, and perhaps ship them across the border for prosecution—with life terms a possibility. It allows those Beijing officials housed in that former hotel to ignore Hong Kong laws they find restrictive; warrant-free searches and arrests are now possible, for example. Once admired as a haven for free speech and a free press, new restrictions are taking hold; some foreign journalists have been forced to leave, for example. Already scores of leading dissenters, including outspoken publisher Jimmy Lai, have been booked and accused of foreign collusion. More than 9,000 others have also been arrested. Beijing postponed September’s scheduled Legco elections for a year—a clear violation of the Basic Law—with a dozen pro-democracy members told they cannot seek re-election.

China did not need to act so harshly. Hong Kong did have a serious law and order problem but posed no threat to the nation’s security despite claims to the contrary. In any case, the crackdown reflects Xi’s determination to squelch any deviation from his “China dream” of what modern China should be. One obvious byproduct: gone forever are Beijing’s fading hopes that Taiwan might someday join the mainland under some form of “one country, two systems”—one reason former leader Deng Xiaoping invented it decades ago.

The most recent opinion poll shows a 60 percent disapproval of this harsh law but the administration is undeterred. Carrie Lam plans to spend the next year or two “rectifying mistakes”—such as teaching students and their parents to think better of the Chinese regime and ruling party under a new “patriotic” education plan, perhaps replicating a mainland program of the early 1990s.

All this leaves Hong Kong changed permanently. Life there probably will remain less restrictive than elsewhere in China for some time but with freedoms steadily eroded. As the legal system withers, foreign companies will find it less attractive as a base for Chinese or regional operations. Yet Hong Kong will remain useful for prosperous mainlanders, despite its diminished role in the national economy. It’s the favorite place for Chinese companies to place new share issues, while many rich mainlanders park their vast wealth—obtained legally or otherwise—in local real estate or shell companies that route their cash abroad. However, many of Hong Kong’s best and brightest plan to emigrate; Britain has said it would welcome up to three million of them if Beijing will let them go. But a dozen protesters who tried to flee to Taiwan by speedboat were seized by the Chinese coast guard before they got far. They now face prosecution.

Much has been lost and will never return. The diverse city that made its residents proudly label themselves as Hong Kongers and which also attracted so many foreigners has been changed enormously, with the worst yet to come.

Robert Keatley is a former editor of the Asian Wall Street Journal and the South China Morning Post, both of Hong Kong.

Image: Reuters.