Diplomacy & Crisis News

Achieving a nuclear-free world is the best way to honour lives devastated by these weapons, the UN disarmament chief told a virtual meeting held on Wednesday to commemorate the International Day against Nuclear Tests, observed annually on 29 August. 

En plein essor depuis le début des années 1980, l'évangélisme mobilise des foules de fidèles réunis par une même vision ultraconservatrice du monde. Capables d'opérer des alliances transfrontalières, les pasteurs de ce courant vitupèrent contre l'avortement ou le mariage homosexuel, au nom d'une lecture (...) / Corée du Sud, Brésil, Nigeria, États-Unis, Religion, Fondamentalisme, Christianisme, Secte, Spiritualité, Société, Capitalisme, Extrême droite, Politique - 2020/09

The socio-economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic prompted UN agencies on Wednesday to call on countries to increase social protection programmes to protect those most at risk. 

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A UN taskforce set up to look into the risks and benefits of the digital economy, has concluded that it could have a transformational impact on sustainable development, and empower citizens, both as taxpayers and investors.

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UN World Food Programme (WFP) has been forced to reduce its food and cash assistance for refugees in Eastern Africa by up to 30 per cent, the agency has said, voicing fears that the reductions could worsen in the coming months unless urgent additional funding is received in time. 

UN Secretary-General António Guterres has called for greater attention to the Rohingya refugee crisis – which entered its fourth year – and for addressing the root causes of the conflict. 

La rédaction de Politique étrangère vous offre à (re)lire des textes qui ont marqué l’histoire de la revue. Nous vous proposons aujourd’hui un article de Roger Lévy, intitulé « Problèmes de la Chine populaire », et publié dans le numéro 6/1957 de Politique étrangère.

1. Le voyage

Une gageure : quitter Paris, le 13 mai 1957 ; aller par le chemin des écoliers, c’est-à-dire Hong-Kong, à Pékin ; rentrer, via Moscou, en quelque trente heures de vol ; être dé retour, après six semaines d’absence ; avoir observé les traits distinctifs de la Chine populaire, son régime, ses hommes ; écrire non la relation du voyage mais les réflexions qu’il suggère ; livrer le manuscrit, fin août, à l’éditeur ; voir, à la mi-octobre, le volume rouge et or aux devantures des librairies parisiennes ; cela tient du prodige. La vérité veut que M. Edgar Faure était préparé à cette performance. Deux fois président du conseil, depuis cinq ans, et ministre des affaires étrangères, il avait fait précéder son exploration du continent chinois de celle du continent soviétique. Il avait pris, autrefois, ses diplômes de russe à l’Ecole des langues — introduction à la connaissance de l’Asie, par le truchement des comparaisons. Il avait acquis l’habitude de survoler les problèmes politiques à l’échelle de la planète. Il est animé, comme tout vrai politique, de l’esprit de synthèse. Donc voici explicitée en deux cent trente pages, la Chine de Mao Tso-tong.

Ni redites, ni anecdotes inutiles. Dès l’abord, l’auteur trace les limites qu’il s’assigne. Politique, il se devait de traiter politiquement de la Chine ; bien entendu dans des perspectives françaises. Ni moraliste, ni sociologue, ni économiste, ni soldat, ni érudit (foin de l’érudition !) mais politique, en vérité, auquel s’imposent les arguments d’une éventuelle reconnaissance diplomatique de la Chine populaire. Que M. E. Faure en soit partisan, cela semblerait vraisemblable. Mais attention ! Ici interviennent les nuances nécessaires. M. Faure marche hardiment au-devant des critiques. Ayant souligné, à diverses reprises, l’irréalisme de la politique occidentale à l’égard de la Chine, pourquoi, objecte-t-il à lui-même, n’avoir pas pris, comme Président du conseil, l’initiative de reconnaître le gouvernement de Pékin ? Il lui est aisé de rappeler que la reconnaissance s’entoure d’un contexte international : problème de Formose, situation de l’O.N.U., etc. Une initiative isolée pouvait, il y a vingt mois, paraître moins valable qu’une avance vers un règlement d’ensemble. En 1955, il fallait s’abstenir d’une action prématurée, incomplète, que la Chine aurait sans doute accueillie en disant : « Et s’il me plaît à moi, de ne pas être reconnue ? »

Le livre, articulé en trois parties — Le voyage et les hommes — La politique intérieure — La politique économique — présente des essais de réponse à ces questions majeures : 1°) Existe-t-il un communisme russe et un communisme à la chinoise ? 2°) La politique intérieure chinoise se décompose-t-elle en des oppositions ou des antagonismes ? 3°) Dans l’évolution économique, qui comporte la réforme agraire et la prime à l’industrie lourde, une économie mixte est-elle destinée à durer ?

2. Les hommes

Des hommes il est proposé trois esquisses celles de Chou En- lai ; de Mao Tso-tong ; de M. L.W.M.

Chou En-lai, venu au communisme en France, dès les années 1920, a déclaré : « II n’était pas possible de transformer les salariés en capitalistes, mais il était possible de transformer les capitalistes en salariés. » Formule qui projette un pinceau lumineux sur l’ensemble du tableau.

De l’entrevue avec Mao, on retiendra que le Chef parle de la Chine « avec une passion contenue, une expression mélangée d’accablement et de confiance ». Deux fois, M. Faure reprendra ces termes émouvants : accablement et confiance. Le grouillement des humains, la pénurie des ressources, le retard des techniques assaillent évidemment le Président Mao. Les conditions lui interdisent de placer de niveau les coopératives françaises et les coopératives chinoises. « Les terres, chez nous, sont trop réduites, dit Mao ; le paysan ne peut pas se diviser entre une exploitation coopérative et une exploitation personnelle. »

Témoignage de la finesse de Mao, qui est de lignée paysanne, vieil étudiant, et toujours poète : son propos de politique étrangère habillé d’une de ces allégories qu’il affectionne :

Le héron et la moule

« Nous avons en Chine une histoire, celle d’un héron et d’une moule. Le héron trouve la moule sur une plage, mais la moule se referme sur le bec du héron. Alors commencent entre eux de longues controverses. Dans trois jours, dit la moule au héron, tu seras mort. Et toi aussi, dit le héron à la moule, dans trois jours tu seras morte de sécheresse. Aucun ne veut céder, et cependant un pêcheur passe et les prend tous les deux. »

M. Edgar Faure interroge tout de go : « Est-ce que c’est un pêcheur russe ou un pêcheur américain ?» La réponse attendue vient avec un sourire : « A mon avis, ce serait plutôt un pêcheur américain. »

M. L.W.M., personnage imaginaire, dont la fiction garantit la modestie et dont l’orthodoxie ne va pas jusqu’au psittacisme, représente, en style composite, l’intellectuel, l’un ou l’autre ministre qu’a tour à tour rencontrés M. Edgar Faure, le Chinois moyen, l’homme de la rue. M. L.W.M. dira notamment :

« Le communisme, si souvent qualifié d’international est d’abord, ici, un nationalisme. En Chine la « face » reflète l’extérieur et non pas l’intérieur, elle ne traduit ni ne trahit les vicissitudes de l’âme. »

M. L.W.M. , aux prises avec un Français redoutable, — car M. Faure refuse de s’en laisser accroire — rétorque : « Votre expérience démontre que l’on peut trouver en Chine, bien qu’ils soient pourchassés et en petit nombre, des mendiants et des voleurs ; que l’on peut trouver des mouches, bien qu’elles soient exterminées, et des chiens, bien qu’ils soient interdits. Mais ce que vous ne trouverez pas sur tout le territoire de la Chine, c’est un nostalgique du gouvernement de Nankin, un authentique adepte du Kouo-min tang, un admirateur sincère de Chiang Kai-shek. »

3. Démontage d’une politique intérieure

Dans la seconde partie du livre on assiste au démontage des rouages de la machine de politique intérieure ; à l’enregistrement de ses modulations.

Il est en Chine, on le sait assez, un parti — le Parti. Que penser des nombreux « petits partis » qui subsistent ou que l’on encourage ? Ces petits partis autorisent une coloration générale « démocratique » du système. Le Parti compte 12 à 14 millions de membres ; les petits partis, 100.000. Ces petits partis eux-mêmes méritent-ils d’être considérés comme non-communistes ? « Ce sont en quelque sorte, dit M. Faure, des partis communistes à recrutement social différencié. »

Dans l’histoire des huit dernières années, on n’omettra pas certaine « Commission consultative », héritage du Kouo-min tang, qui précédait l’élaboration de la constitution et la mise en place d’une Assemblée nationale. Cette Commission consultative de 1949 se survit ; elle « consulte » toujours. Il faut, en effet, que l’on puisse discuter, critiquer, un peu partout, sur de nombreux plans, sur la place publique. Sinon Mao Tso-tong craindrait qu’il ne se forme, dangereusement, des nœuds d’irritation, d’incompréhension.

Ainsi un parti de treize millions d’adhérents, une dizaine de partis minuscules, une Consultante prolongée, une Assemblée préludent au Front uni. Ce front compte quatre classes : bourgeois, capitalistes, intelligentzia, autour des communistes. Mais l’intégration de la bourgeoisie ne comporte aucune renonciation aux thèses du communisme ; car l’intégration intervient à titre transitoire. Ce n’est pas un contrat d’installation, c’est un contrat d’adaptation. Parti et petits partis, Constituante et Assemblée permettent de déceler l’opposition — l’opposition de Sa Majesté.

Tous ces instruments sont indispensables à qui doit gouverner 600 millions d’hommes ; ils servent à tâter le pouls de la patiente — la patiente, c’est la Chine. Or les courbes de températures ne sont jamais si révélatrices qu’en période de fièvre. On provoquera, en conséquence, des accès, des crises. On a connu, fin 1951, la campagne des san fan ou trois anti, dirigée contre les vices des fonctionnaires. Elle précédait, de peu celle des wou fan, les cinq anti (cinq, chiffre fatidique en Chine) contre les vices des réactionnaires et des bourgeois. Ces campagnes se développaient avant le tcheng feng, rectification du style ; avant « les cent fleurs » ; avant le déviationnisme de droite, de 1957. Campagnes où l’on aperçoit des contradictions. L’erreur serait de les croire irréductibles. Si des divisions existent — telles que s’emploie à les étaler le politburo chinois — elles ne menacent le régime que dans les esprits d’Occident ! Elles ne résistent pas aux manœuvres de l’autorité.

L’analyse d’une de ces campagnes ; le dessin d’une courbe qui la définit — qui s’élève, passe au zénith avant de retomber — a sollicité l’attention de M. Edgar Faure. C’est de la campagne du tcheng feng qu’il s’agit. Annoncée à Moscou, le 4 avril dernier, elle n’est partie de Pékin que… le 1er mai ! Elle n’est arrivée à Paris que vers le 20 juin. Ce décalage a surpris M. Faure, à Pékin. Penché chaque matin sur la presse pékinoise, il en confrontait les éditoriaux avec des textes de journaux russes apportés ou reçus de Moscou. Et M. Faure de constater qu’à l’heure où la campagne était divulguée en Europe, elle semblait presque terminée au Pays du Milieu. Elle y faisait place à la campagne inverse, contre les déviations de droite. Des leaders non-communistes, membres du gouvernement compris, avaient été accusés d’un « gauchisme » exagéré ; ils ont professé des aveux expiatoires. Qu’à cela ne tienne ! Ces ministres démasqués ne se sont pas démis. De ces observations M. Faure sait tirer des enseignements sur l’art de gouverner : les maîtres doivent exciter les esprits, occuper le tapis.

Aucun autre visiteur de la Chine actuelle n’était parvenu à définir si lumineusement le mécanisme du régime, les raisons de ses succès ; à proposer trois clefs qui ouvrent la boîte magique. […]

>> Lire la suite de l’article sur Persée <<

The wild poliovirus has been eradicated in Africa, health officials announced on Tuesday, calling it a “momentous milestone” for the continent. 

The recent agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates has the potential to change dynamics across the Middle East, the UN’s top envoy in the region told the Security Council on Tuesday, urging Palestinian and Israeli leaders to re-engage in efforts to resolve their protracted conflict.

Lack of investigation into the killing of a journalist three years ago in South Sudan is indicative of a wider climate of hostility towards journalists in the country, an independent UN human rights expert has said. 

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Ethen Kim Lieser

Health,

The novel coronavirus might be grabbing most of the headlines these days, but people often forget that over the past hundred-plus years, there have been several other notable virus-related pandemics that were responsible for millions of lives lost.

The novel coronavirus might be grabbing most of the headlines these days, but people often forget that over the past hundred-plus years, there have been several other notable virus-related pandemics that were responsible for millions of lives lost.

Even in an average year, the seasonal flu virus can be incredibly deadly. According to a 2017 collaborative study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and global health partners, between 291,000 and 646,000 people worldwide die from influenza-related respiratory illnesses each year.

In the United States, on average, between nine and forty-five million Americans catch the flu each year, which leads to anywhere between 12,000 to 61,000 deaths. Between October 2019 and April 2020, CDC’s data revealed that there were an estimated thirty-nine to fifty-six million influenza infections and 24,000 to 62,000 fatalities.

More than eight months into the current pandemic, roughly 810,000 deaths have been reported due to COVID-19, according to the latest data from Johns Hopkins University. A substantial and fast-growing figure for sure, but it pales in comparison to the total number of lives taken in other major flu outbreaks. Let’s take a closer look at five of them.

1889 “Russian Flu”

Known as the “Russian Flu,” this particular influenza outbreak is believed to have started in St. Petersburg, but it quickly made its way across Europe and rest of the world. It was also one of the first pandemics to be covered widely by newspapers via telegraph reports. At the conclusion of the outbreak, an estimated one million people had died.

1918 “Spanish Flu”

The 1918 flu outbreak is often remembered as the deadliest pandemic in recent history. Lasting from February 1918 to April 1920, the contagion infected a third of the world’s population in four successive waves and killed at least fifty million people—roughly 675,000 of them in the United States, according to the CDC. The estimated population in the United States in July 1918 was roughly 103 million—so approximately 0.65% of the entire population died from the virus.

1957 “Asian Flu”

First reported in Singapore in February 1957, the new H2N2 virus spread throughout China and other nearby countries before arriving in the United States by that summer. About 1.1 million people died worldwide, including 116,000 in the United States, according to the CDC.

1968 “Hong Kong Flu”

H3N2, the virus responsible for this outbreak, is believed to have evolved from the strain of influenza that caused the 1957 pandemic through “antigenic shift”—a process by which two or more different strains of a virus, or strains of two or more different viruses, combine to form a new subtype. According to the CDC, an estimated one million people died worldwide, with 100,000 of those deaths occuring in the United States.

2009 H1N1 Pandemic

In 2009, the H1N1 virus emerged in the United States and spread quickly around the world. Initially called the “swine flu,” this particular subtype of virus contained a brand-new combination of influenza genes that had not previously been identified. The CDC estimates that between 151,700 and 575,400 people died worldwide during the first year that this virus circulated. Surprisingly, roughly 80% of the fatalities are believed to have been individuals under the age of 65.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Ethen Kim Lieser

Health,

However, that may likely not happen even if they are comparable.

The 1918 flu outbreak is often remembered as the deadliest pandemic in recent history.

Lasting from February 1918 to April 1920, the contagion infected a third of the world’s population in four successive waves and killed at least fifty million people—roughly 675,000 of them in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Now eight months into this current pandemic, it appears that the novel coronavirus will surely head into the history books as well. Whether it will topple the 1918 pandemic in terms of lives taken remains to be seen.

From current trends, however, the infection and mortality rates are only going in one direction—and they are rising quickly.

In all, there already have been about 23.5 million global cases and about 810,000 deaths due to the coronavirus, according to the latest data from Johns Hopkins University. In the United States, there are 5.7 million cases and 177,000 related deaths.

According to a recent study published in the medical journal JAMA Network Open, researchers were able to focus specifically on the number of excess deaths during the first two months of the coronavirus outbreak in New York City and the peak of the 1918 pandemic in the same city.

“This cohort study found that the absolute increase in deaths over baseline observed during the peak of 1918 H1N1 influenza pandemic was higher than, but comparable, to that observed during the first two months of the COVID-19 outbreak in New York City,” said the study, which analyzed public data from the CDC, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the U.S. Census Bureau.

The overall mortality rate with today’s coronavirus pandemic was found to be lower, the researchers noted, but that is in part due to “improvements in hygiene and modern achievements in medicine, public health and safety.” In 1918, there were no viable vaccines or antibiotics that could effectively treat secondary infections that inevitably emerged in flu-stricken patients.

Given these facts, the increase in deaths during the early coronavirus outbreak was considered “substantially greater” than during the peak of the 1918 flu pandemic, the researchers wrote.

“For anyone who doesn’t understand the magnitude of what we’re living through, this pandemic is comparable in its effect on mortality to what everyone agrees is the previous worst pandemic,” Jeremy S. Faust, an emergency physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston who led the team of researchers, told The Washington Post.

Despite stricter mandates to follow public-health guidelines in many parts of the world, the coronavirus is still continuing to spread quickly and putting more lives at risk.

According to new forecast from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington’s School of Medicine, nearly 300,000 Americans could be dead from the coronavirus by December 1.

The data, however, predicts that consistent mask-wearing by 95% of the U.S. population has the potential to save 70,000 lives.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Security, Middle East

Experts warn that Iran could respond to a perceived threat with its combat-tested and highly combat-capable cruise missiles.

This past January Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles at U.S. bases in Iraq in response to the U.S. killing of Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Quads Force commander. The strikes weren’t complete misses but were largely seen as militarily ineffective.

Multiple experts suggested Iran “missed” on purpose so as not to escalate the crisis, but by launching its missiles still, the Islamic Republic was able to save face by responding to Suleimani’s assassination in a U.S. drone strike. 

Experts also warned that next time Iran could respond with its combat-tested and highly combat-capable cruise missiles. This includes its Mobin, which was displayed at the MAKS 2019 defense trade show in Russia last summer. That cruise missile has a range of 280 miles, a speed of 560 miles per hour and can carry a warhead of up to 265 pounds, while it also has a low radar cross-section and high radar-evading capability. 

Iran has the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East—one that includes land-attack cruise missiles as well as anti-ship cruise missiles that can be launched from land, sea or air. Stopping a cruise missile isn’t impossible, but right now there are no operational weapons systems that can provide air defense against terrain-hugging cruise missiles over land.   

Exporting These Weapons 

While Iran hasn’t been able to build up a robust domestic defense industry, the Islamic Republic has looked to eventually export its indigenously-developed cruise missiles.

“Iran’s displays of advancements in arms development and production are not only a strategic exercise to attract new buyers, but also reveals the possibility of the country being a bedrock of arms imports to fill gaps in its capabilities,” Mathew George, Ph.D., aerospace & defense analyst at GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company, said in an email to the National Interest. 

“Iran has developed its military capabilities domestically over the past decade or so to circumvent the arms embargo, leading to the occasional demonstration and announcement of new aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and developments in armaments,” George added. “Yet, concerns still exist around whether the specifications mentioned are definite capabilities or whether they are hyped versions of older devices, with the latest Qasem Soleimani missile looking identical to the older Shahab 3 ballistic missile.” 

Regional Stability 

Iran is going down a road other “isolated” nations have been forced to travel—developing a local way to produce weapons. This is because western sanctions and arms embargoes that have been directed against Iran have only served to create a vacuum that the country’s nascent has struggled to fill. Iran has what can be described as an enthusiastic, if not quite cutting-edge military-industrial complex. 

Now it is beginning to take the first step toward being an arms supplier—something that could be a concern to the stability in the Middle East and beyond.

“While these developments are a cause of concern for many countries in the region, an additional supplier of arms into the global market will be welcomed by many countries interested in these technologies, but without the deep pockets and rigorous prerequisites required to purchase from traditional suppliers,” explained George.  

However, those embargos and sanctions can go both ways. So not only can Iran not purchase small arms, but it could be very difficult for the Middle Eastern nation to actively try to sell its wares on the open market—at least not without any potential buyers facing their own sanctions from the UN or United States. 

“Iran will work to ensure that nothing domestic will hamper the lifting of the arms embargo,” added George.  

Arms could be a future revenue stream for the country, and potentially an important one as its oil reserves certainly won’t last forever. 

“Stakeholders will most likely allow for the embargo to be lifted and a new round of arms commerce to ensue until an event linked to spurious organizations and clear evidence of Iranian support of that event leads to another suspension of arms trade with the country.”

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. 

Image: Reuters

Sebastien Roblin

Security,

The incident remained shrouded in secrecy for decades.

Key Point: The memory of shadowy episodes like the battle of Lima 85 must be preserved.

Fifty years ago on March 12, 1968, a top-secret U.S. base on a mountain top in Laos was overrun by an elite force of Vietnamese commandos. Only six of the eighteen CIA and Air Force personnel manning the remote outpost escaped with their lives in an incident that would remain veiled in secrecy for three decades.

This was because the U.S. military was legally prohibited from operating in Laos. The southeast Asian nation had been wracked by a civil war pitting right-wing royalists against Pathet Lao communists—the latter backed by North Vietnam, which used Laotian territory to clandestinely funnel troops into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh trail. However, in 1962 Washington, Hanoi and Laotian factions all signed a peace treaty in which the foreign powers agreed to withdraw their forces from the country.

However, North Vietnam only withdrew a minority of its forces, and the United States continued transferring extensive military aid to the royalist and instead began a secret but large-scale aerial bombing campaign in the kingdom known as Operation Barrel Roll. Though warplanes based in Vietnam and Thailand flew missions into Laos, CIA-run mercenary contractors and ‘airlines’ such as Air America flew transport and observation aircraft from Laotian bases.

CIA personnel also recruited local Hmong, an ethnic minority present in several southeast Asian states, to fight a guerilla war against the Pathet Lao. It was with this purpose in mind that CIA personnel first established a base atop the steep cliff of Phou Pha Thi mountain, a sacred place in the Hmong’s animist faith which happened to be strategically located near the border with North Vietnam.

This base was one of many ‘Lima Sites’ in Laos intended to facilitate aerial supply of U.S.-allied forces. The main facility was at the peak of the 5,600-foot high mountain surrounded by steep cliffs; you can see the base’s layout in this photo. A path wound downslope to a short 700-meter long airstrip at the base of the mountain was used for resupply and staff rotations, delivered in covert weekly flights by CH-3 helicopters of the 20th U.S. Air Force helicopter squadron.

In the summer of 1966, the U.S. Air Force decided to adapt the base with a new purpose—to serve as radar-navigation system, a or TACAN, by installing a power generator and first a transponder. In the era predating GPS, TACAN sites helped warplanes find their targets, especially, while flying under low visibility conditions or at night. (The first radio navigation system, known as Knickebein, was developed by Nazi Germany, to enable more precise night bombing of England.) In 1967, this was further upgraded to a TSQ-81 antenna and remote bombing system that allowed the base to remotely control U.S. bombers.

Hanoi was only 135 miles northeast of Lima 85, so the clandestine base was able to direct very precise coordinates for U.S. aircraft bombarding the North Vietnamese capital. Because those strikes could involve anything from F-105 fighter bombers to dozens of huge B-52 bombers, this made the base a deadly force multiplier. In just six months, Lima 85 directed between 25 and 55 percent of the air strikes pounding North Vietnamese and Laotian targets.

Because Laotian Prince Souvanna refused to accept U.S. military personnel in Laos, U.S. Air Force personnel deployed to Lima 85 had to sign papers temporarily discharging them from the U.S. military before deploying to Lima, a farcical process known as ‘sheep dipping.’ These technicians were supposed to go unarmed, though they did eventually end up acquiring a handful of small arms. Instead, the base’s security was supposed to be assured by a battalion each of Hmong militia—advised by CIA agents—and Thai Border Patrol policemen deployed around the base of the mountain.

However, Lima 85 may have been concealed from the U.S. public, but it’s presence and purpose were not a secret to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese Army (NVA). Scouts probed the base’s defenses in December 1967, and on January 12, 1968 a flight of four An-2 biplane transports attacked Lima 85 using underwing 57mm rockets, and 120mm mortar shells dropped out the side doors, killing four Hmong. An Air America UH-1 helicopter was scrambled to intercept the slow transports shot down one of the transports using AK-47 fired out the side—one of very few helicopter-on-airplane kills on record. Another An-2 crashed, either due to ground fire or a failed evasive maneuver.

The base was subsequently hit by a mortar barrage on January 30, then on February 18 Hmong militia ambushed and killed a team of NVA artillery observers near the mountain and recovered plans for a coordinated bombardment of the facility. American military leaders knew the isolated base was surrounded by stronger enemy forces and likely to come under attack, but the base’s TACAN support was considered so valuable that Amb. William Sullivan resisted evacuating the site. Unable to deploy significant defenses, the base’s technicians instead began dispatching hundreds of airstrikes against nearby communist forces to secure their position.

Elite North Vietnamese commandos from the 41st Special Forces battalion had already scaled the seemingly impassible cliffs on Phou Pha Thi’s northside without being detected on January 22 and reconnoitered the most feasible infiltration routes. Early that March, a thirty-three man platoon under the command of Lt. Truong Muoc assembled near the mountain, where they were reinforced by a nine-man sapper squad. The commandos were equipped with AK-47s, SKS carbines, explosives, hand grenades and three rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

At 6PM on March 11 an artillery bombardment gave cover for Truong’s pathfinders to clear out mines and secure the infiltration paths to Lima 85. A few hours later, regular troops of the 766th Regiment of the NVA and a Pathet Lao battalions launched an attack that pinned down the Hmong troops in the valley around the mountain. Finally around 9 PM, Truong’s men began scaling up the cliff, the operators splitting into five “cells” to launch a multiprong attack. Cells One and two would concentrate on the command post, cells three and four would seize the TACAN equipment and airstrip respectively, and the fifth cell would remain in reserve.

The base personnel reported the artillery bombardment, but Ambassador Sullivan decided not to order an evacuation unless the attack proved to be overwhelming. Only by 8 AM the following morning did he dispatch helicopters and air support to cover the personnel’s escape.

This was far too late. The Truong’s infiltrators were in position by 3 AM that morning and knocked out Hmong guard posts and the base’s TSQ-81 radar and power generator using rocket propelled grenades. When base commander Maj. Clarence Barton and several Air Force technicians rushed out to assess the situation, they were gunned down by the commandos. By 4 AM, the first three cells had captured all of their objectives. Some were captured and then flung over the cliff on Truong’s orders. Only cell 4 was forced to disengage from its objective, unable to dislodge a superior Hmong force of two infantry platoons and a mortar squad deployed around the airstrip.

Surviving U.S. personnel had fled to a ledge on the side of the cliff, where they were trapped as grenades and small arms fire rained down upon them. Firing back with their assault rifles, they attempted to call down an airstrike nearly on top of their position.

Finally at dawn, Air America helicopters covered by A-1 Skyraider attack planes swooped down upon the mountain. Hmong troops, led by two CIA agents and supported by Skyraiders, engaged in a fierce firefight as they attempted to dislodge the NVA commandos from the TACAN site. Though North Vietnamese platoon held its ground, the fracas provided a distraction for five surviving Air Force technicians and two CIA agents to be extracted.

Chief Master Sergeant Richard Etchberger, one of the airmen trapped on the cliff, refused to board a rescue chopper until he had loaded three of his injured comrades on the Huey’s rescue sling. As he was being lifted away, the Pennsylvanian was mortally wounded by a parting burst of assault rifle fire. Communist forces would retain control of Phou Pha Thai mountain and later repel a Hmong offensive to seize it back.

Muoc’s assault on Lima 85 had significantly weakened the U.S. air campaign over North Vietnam and Laos. According to Vietnamese accounts, he lost only one commando and killed at least forty-two Thai and Hmong troops as well as a dozen U.S. airmen. However, Truong would return home to a court martial rather than a hero’s welcome; his superiors were outraged that he had destroyed the valuable TACAN equipment and killed the technicians instead of capturing them.

Ironically, both Washington and Hanoi collaborated in preserving the secrecy of their war in the Laos. North Vietnam needed to maintain and secure the Ho Chi Minh trail’s route through Laos, while the U.S. military was compelled to try to stop them there. That both were violating a treaty they had signed was merely something that had to be concealed from the public.

In a tragic postscript, Etchberger would be posthumously nominated for the Medal of Honor, but would have the request denied by the Air Force due to the need to maintain the secrecy of the U.S. air war in Laos, which would actually escalate under the Nixon administration and be exposed with the release of the Pentagon Papers. The United States dropped one ton of bombs for every person living in Laos, delaying but not preventing, the eventual communist victory in 1975.

Only thirty years later did the United States officially acknowledge the battle at the clandestine site. Etchberger would finally be awarded the Medal of Honor in a ceremony on September 1, 2010. Earlier in the 2000s, Vietnamese veterans of the battle helped U.S. military personnel locate the remains of airmen that had been cast over the side of the cliff, and later those of Major Barton as well.

Preserving the memory of shadowy episodes like the battle of Lima 85 may not heal the wounds of the past, but it can help bring about an honest reckoning of the mistakes that were made and inspire reflection as to how to avoid repeating them in the future.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

This article first appeared in 2018 and is reprinted here due to reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Fred Lucas

Politics, Americas

Why the President is staying away from his former associate's arrest.

A month ago, President Donald Trump lashed out on Twitter about a 3-mile section of border wall built by a private company. 

On Thursday, after former campaign and White House adviser Steve Bannon was indicted for fraud for his role in the privately funded wall project, Trump offered little sympathy.

He said he thought Bannon’s project was “showboating.”

Bannon pleaded not guilty Thursday afternoon in federal court in Manhattan. 

He was arrested for allegedly ripping off donors to the “We Build the Wall” campaign in a case brought by federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York. 

The prosecutors charged Bannon and three others, including group founder Brian Kolfage, a triple-amputee Air Force veteran. 

Asked by reporters Thursday about news of Bannon’s indictment by the Justice Department for fraud in raising private funds to build a section of wall, Trump noted that Bannon has a lot of affiliations. 

“He worked for Goldman Sachs, he worked for a lot of companies. But he was involved likewise in our campaign, and [was] part of the administration early, early on. I haven’t been dealing with him at all,” Trump said at the White House. 

“I know nothing about the project other than I didn’t like it when I read about it. I didn’t like it. I said, ‘This is for government [to oversee]. This isn’t for private people,” Trump said, adding:

It sounded to me like showboating. I think I let my opinion be very strongly stated at the time. I didn’t like it. It was showboating and maybe looking for funds. You’ll have to see what happens. I think it’s a very sad thing for Mr. Bannon. I think it’s very surprising.

The president added: “I didn’t know he was in charge. I didn’t know any of the other people, either. It’s sad. It’s very sad.”

Building an extended border wall was a key part of Trump’s 2016 campaign for president. In early 2019, he declared a national emergency to use federal funds for the wall construction. 

Bannon, who left his executive role at Breitbart News in 2016 to help run the Trump campaign, was credited—along with veteran Republican political operative Kellyanne Conway—with helping steer Trump to victory. 

Both Bannon and Conway got White House jobs, but Trump fired Bannon after just seven months over suspicions that he was a leaker to reporters. 

After the parting, Trump would refer to Bannon as “Sloppy Steve.” 

Bannon, however, continued being a fierce defender of Trump in the media. 

The other two men indicted by the Justice Department were identified as Andrew Badolato and Timothy Shea.

The ProPublica-Texas Tribune first reported in July that a 3-mile section of the group’s wall in the Rio Grande Valley had severe structural problems. 

White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany issued a statement Thursday asserting that Trump had no involvement in Bannon’s project. 

“President Trump has always felt the wall must be a government project and that it is far too big and complex to be handled privately,” McEnany said in the statement, adding:

The Trump Administration has already built over 300 miles of Border Wall, thanks to the great work of our Army Corps of Engineers, and will have almost 500 miles completed by the end of the year.  Our southern border is more secure than it has ever been.

President Trump has not been involved with Steve Bannon since the campaign and the early part of the Administration, and he does not know the people involved with this project. 

This article by Fred Lucas first appeared in the Daily Signal in 2020. 

Image: Reuters

Charlie Gao

Security, Asia

Koreans hate -- and love -- their Russian tanks.

Key Point: The T-80U is still a relic, but one that has served admirably.

One of the great ironies of the military balance in the Koreas is the fact that South Korea operates more advanced Russian tanks than North Korea. This situation came about in the 1990s after Russia inherited a $1.5 billion debt to South Korea. A deal was made: Russia would give many items of then top-of-the-line military equipment, in exchange for South Korea canceling 50 percent of Russia’s debt. Interestingly, this included the T-80U Main Battle Tank. Nowadays, South Korea fields three “modern” main battle tanks, the T-80U and the indigenous K1 and K2. But how do Korean tankers think the T-80U stacks up against the Korean tanks, which were designed with a more Western philosophy?

In a pure technical comparison, the T-80U lags behind the K1A1 and K1A2. The T-80U has been kept in a relatively stock configuration, while the K1A1 and K2 have been receiving upgrades from the Korean defense industry. While the T-80U has a Day/Night panoramic commander’s sight in the PNK-4S, the K1A1 and K2 both have thermal commander sights. The Korean defense industry puts out the modern M279 APFSDS round for the 120-millimeter cannons of the K1A1 and the K2, but the T-80U is still using imported Russian ammunition. The K2 also has many features that the T-80U doesn’t have, being one of the newest MBTs in the world.

The reliability of the T-80U also doesn’t gain it favors in South Korean service. Reports state that the T-80U’s reliability isn’t the best, although it is better than the BMP-3. Although some T-80U parts, such as the tracks, are produced in South Korea, the majority of parts must be ordered from abroad. The cost of ordering replacement parts from Russia has been steadily increasing over the years (with the cost of some parts doubling or tripling from 1996 to 2006), so many in the South Korean government are considering getting rid of the T-80U to cut maintenance costs.

Not all is bad, though. Koreans do report some advantages over the K1A1 and K2 domestic tanks. The T-80U’s engine has better acceleration performance and is lighter than the domestic tanks due to its turbine nature. Unfortunately, this also makes it consume more fuel. The reduced weight compared to domestic also allows it to be more nimble in the mountains of Korea.

Soldiers who crewed the T-80U generally didn’t have nice things to say about it. The more cramped internal design compared to the K1A1 and K2 could seem claustrophobic, and in gunnery, the T-80U was found to underperform the domestic tanks, both in accuracy and in reload speed.

However, one must take into account the time period in which these criticisms were made. Most soldiers who made these comments compared the T-80U to the K1A1, which only started seeing service in 2001. Compared to the original K1 tank which was Korea’s most advanced tank at the time, the T-80U possessed far more advantages, packing a 125-millimeter gun to the K1’s 105-millimeter, as well as better advanced armor technology. The T-80U was the most advanced tank on the Korean Peninsula when they first arrived. The lack of modernization due to the foreign nature of the parts for the tank and lack of will to “domesticize” a foreign design impeded the T-80U from being fully embraced by the South Korean military. As a result, nowadays Korean tankers don’t find the T-80U to be favorable, as it’s still a relic. But it is one that served admirably, and even contributed to the K2 Black Panther project when it was in its infancy.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues.

This article first appeared in 2018 and is reprinted here due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters