Diplomacy & Crisis News

This article is the English version of : Clément Beaune, « L’Europe, par delà le COVID-19 », published in Politique étrangère, Vol. 85, Issue 3, 2020.

A few weeks after the groundbreaking budget agreement adopted by the European Council on July 21, 2020, it would be tempting to say that COVID-19 changed everything in the European Union (EU), in line with the oft-repeated principle: “It takes a crisis for Europe to act.” Like all clichés, there is some truth in this statement. The EU’s shared debt plan is the most important boost to European integration since the euro, and a step that would have been impossible without this crisis. This major progress owes, in large part, to a less obvious dynamic—the return of a golden triangle, which had not made such an impact since the early 1990s—the French-German partnership and an ambitious European Commission.

The EU must also address that citizens’ expectations regarding Europe have increased, which has long been underestimated. They criticize it less for interfering with national competences than for its failure to act on shared challenges. In the past, it was migration; now it is health, from the lack of harmonized quarantine measures to shared research on a vaccine. Nowadays, citizens expect Europe to take action, and criticize it when it does not act sufficiently, acts too late, or fails to act.
The COVID-19 crisis has also shown that the EU’s effectiveness seems linked to its competences: it is responsive in the economic sphere (suspension of budgetary rules or state aid, large-scale monetary support), largely powerless in coordinating border restrictions, and practically nonexistent in terms of the core health aspect of the crisis…

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Classer un parti, un député ou une série de mesures « à gauche » ne va pas de soi. Cette catégorie a une histoire, et son sens est en permanence redéfini par les luttes politiques. / France, Capitalisme, Histoire, Idéologie, Inégalités, Parti politique, Politique, Socialisme - (...) / France, Capitalisme, Histoire, Idéologie, Inégalités, Parti politique, Politique, Socialisme - 2011/11

Auteur de quelques-uns des meilleurs films politiques des dernières décennies — en particulier « La Bombe » et « Punishment Park » —, le cinéaste britannique Peter Watkins vient d'achever, en France, le tournage de « La Commune ». Fidèle à son style de narration, il nous propose une sorte de documentaire (...) / Cinéma, Communisme, Politique, Histoire, Ville - 2000/03

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Afin de résoudre le conflit entre la Russie et l'Ukraine, M. Jean-Pierre Chevènement avait rencontré M. Vladimir Poutine le 5 mai 2014, à la demande du président français. Il décrit ici le chemin qui a conduit à la défiance, et dessine les moyens d'en sortir. / Allemagne, États-Unis, États-Unis (...) / Allemagne, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Europe, Europe de l'Est, France, Russie, Ukraine, URSS, Conflit, Géopolitique, Guérilla, Médias, Mouvement de contestation, Presse, Relations internationales, Diplomatie, Frontières, Mer noire - 2015/06

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver 2020-2021 de Politique étrangère (n° 4/2020). Hans Stark, ancien secrétaire général du Cerfa à l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Joachim Lange et Henrik Uterwedde, Frankreich und Deustchland: Yin und Yang der EU-Reform  (Nomos Verlag, 2019, 200 pages).

Le 18 mai 2020, le gouvernement allemand provoquait une surprise générale en annonçant avec son partenaire français un plan de relance de 500 milliards d’euros, empruntés par l’Union européenne (UE). Avec cette initiative, partiellement diluée au Conseil européen du mois de juillet, l’Allemagne acceptait le principe d’une mutualisation des dettes européennes – même si elle soulignait par la suite qu’il s’agissait d’une mesure exceptionnelle rendue nécessaire par le contexte de la crise sanitaire et la crise économique qu’elle a déclenchée. Pourtant, s’il s’agit bien d’un véritable tournant dans la politique allemande en matière de gouvernance de la zone euro, il ne s’explique évidemment pas par la seule crise sanitaire.

Pour comprendre le cheminement du gouvernement fédéral, mais aussi le rapprochement, lent mais constant des positions françaises et allemandes depuis le sommet de Meseberg de juin 2018, l’ouvrage de Joachim Lange et de Henrik Uterwedde tombe à point nommé. Réunissant les analyses croisées de neuf économistes allemands et français, il analyse la politique économique des deux pays sous l’angle de l’évolution de la zone euro depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir d’Emmanuel Macron, en trois parties : les propositions de réformes économiques de Macron et les réponses allemandes ; Paris et Berlin face à la zone euro dix ans après la crise de la dette souveraine ; au-delà d’Emmanuel Macron : les réformes dont la zone euro a besoin.

Il ressort de ce plan que les différences structurelles entre les politiques et les performances économiques des deux pays forment certes le cadre général dans lequel évolue l’économie de l’UE dans son ensemble, mais que ces différences, qui s’accentuent, menacent dans le même temps les fondements du marché unique, et donc de la zone euro. Cet avertissement ressort clairement des contributions de Henrik Uterwedde, Rémy Lallement et Martin Hallet, qui passent chacun à la loupe, et donc avec une précision chirurgicale fort peu complaisante, l’évolution économique de nos deux pays.

S’ils critiquent les aléas des politiques de réforme économique en France, et notamment les concessions faites à ceux qui y résistent, les auteurs se montrent tout aussi sévères à l’égard des postulats ordo-libéraux allemands. Michael Thöne revendique ainsi une programmation financière plus audacieuse dans le cadre l’UE, tandis que Christian Kastrop, Frédéric Petit et Birgit Honé réclament des réformes plus ambitieuses, qu’ils détaillent dans leurs analyses.

L’ouvrage mérite clairement une traduction en français, qui pourrait aller de pair avec une actualisation tenant compte des événements de 2020. Il en ressort que les économistes allemands sont conscients des risques que le décrochage économique et les divergences idéologiques entre les 19 (et surtout entre Paris et Berlin) font peser sur le projet européen. En témoignent le retournement allemand face au financement de l’UE, mais aussi les prises d’initiative d’Ursula Von der Leyen. Cet ouvrage, en conclusion, permet de comprendre un changement de paradigme.

Hans Stark

>> S’abonner à Politique étrangère <<

Crimes impunis, déficit extérieur colossal, chômage de masse… le patronage de l'Union européenne n'a pas permis au Kosovo de décoller, et des affaires de corruption entachent la mission internationale visant à instaurer un Etat de droit. / Balkans, Europe, Kosovo, Criminalité, Guérilla, Information, (...) / Balkans, Europe, Kosovo, Criminalité, Guérilla, Information, Justice, Médias, Presse, Corruption, Indépendance - 2015/06

Nombreux sont les projets de réforme de l'Organisation des Nations unies. Au-delà des aspects techniques, c'est le rôle même de l'ONU comme outil de construction de la paix et ses valeurs humanistes qui sont en jeu. / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Europe, Droit, Droit international, (...) / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Europe, Droit, Droit international, Droits humains, État, Géopolitique, Histoire, Relations Nord-Sud, Pacifisme, Relations internationales, Diplomatie, Droit international humanitaire, Organisation internationale - 2015/06

En octobre 1990, la Ligue musulmane mondiale Rabitah tenta de créer un consensus international en faveur de la coalition américano-saoudienne contre l'Irak. Aux Etats-Unis, cet effort se porta notamment en direction des Noirs musulmans. Cherchant à contrecarrer le mouvement d'opposition à la (...) / Islam, Afro-Américains - 1993/02

Robert Farley

Security, Americas

The Cold War saw radical shifts in the balance between fighters and bombers.

Here's What You Need to Know:

As the Cold War opened, fighters and bombers both underwent a transformation.

For instance, Jet engines and the airframes that could handle them transformed both kinds of aircraft. Just as important, the development of nuclear weapons radically increased the lethality of bombers, giving a single plane as much or more killing power than a fleet.

The Cold War saw radical, violent shifts in the balance between fighters and bombers. It also saw the emergence of unmanned missiles, which in different configurations could either kill or replace bombers. Nevertheless, both the Soviets and the Americans continued to invest in both kinds of aircraft, all the way until the fall of the Berlin Wall, and beyond.

Korea:

The first test of bombers would come in Korea. The B-29 Superfortress entered service in the last two years of World War II, but because of ineffective Japanese air defenses and a lack of aviation fuel, was never really tested against the best fighters of the day. Indeed, most Japanese successes against the Superfortress came in the form of ramming tactics, which were obviously unsustainable. For the sake of convenience, the Soviets adopted the same bomber; the Tu-4, a near exact copy of the B-29 (12,000 lbs of bombs at medium altitude, maximum speed 350 mph), meaning that the superpowers depended on the same bomber in the early years of the Cold War.

The ultimate test for the B-29 came over Korea, where it first encountered a modern jet interceptor. The MiG-15 was a hundred miles faster than the Me-262, with twice the thrust-weight ratio and three times the rate of climb. With relatively predictable approach-paths to North Korea targets, Communist MiG-15s enjoyed plentiful hunting against B-29 formations, even when the latter had fighter escort. Some two dozen B-29s were lost to air-to-air combat, at which point the USAF shifted to night-bombing tactics, just as it had during World War II.

The newly-minted United States Air Force had other bombers, including the gigantic B-36 Peacemaker. While the B-36 could carry a heavier load and travel farther than the B-29 (nearly 4,000 miles with a load of 70,000 lbs, and a maximum speed of over 400 mph), no one believed that it could survive in the face of concerted fighter opposition. Indeed, General Curtis Lemay kept the B-36 as far away from Korea as possible for specifically this reason. The USAF even developed a scheme to attach a parasite fighter to the B-36, which would (ineffectually) have tried to fight off Soviet interceptors. On the upside, the B-36 could carry a hydrogen bomb, meaning that not terribly many needed to get through in order to have a major impact on Soviet attitudes.

Jet Bombers vs. Jet Interceptors:

The Soviets and the Americans dove into a race between bombers and interceptors even before the guns of the Korean War had fallen silent. The bomber-obsessed USAF developed the B-47 Stratojet, capable of carrying 25000 lbs of bombs at a speed over 600 mph. It followed this up with the legendary B-52 Stratofortress, which could carry 70000 lbs of bombs over 4000 miles with a maximum speed of 650 mph. The Soviets developed the Tu-16 “Badger,” capable of 650 mph with a 20000 lbs bomb load, and the Tu-95 “Bear,” a massive turboprop-driven plane with a speed of 500 plus mph and a payload of some 24000 lbs.

Developments on the interceptor side followed. Vulnerable to enemy attack for the first time in a long while, the Americans adopted a range of interceptors capable of catching and killing Soviet bombers before they could unleash their payloads. The Soviets, paranoid about the security of their vast airspace, did the same. The rapid rate of technological change in the 1950s meant that many designs were obsolete before they left the drawing board, but by the mid-1960s most of the major fighter producers had settled upon a basic template. There were many interceptors, ranging from the Convair F-106 Delta Dart to the English Electric Lightning to the Saab Draken to the Soviet Su-15 to the ill-fated CF-105 Avro Arrow. All of them tended to max out with speeds around 1500 mph, generally carried substantial radar suites, and had long ranges to cover considerable ground in a hurry. They also carried air-to-air missiles designed to kill their large prey at range (sometimes armed with nuclear warheads).

The next generation of jet bombers would have equaled the interceptors in speed and high altitude performance, but fate intervened. The majestic B-70 Valkyrie had a top speed more than Mach 3 and inspired the Soviet T-4, an aircraft with similar performance. Fortunately or not, by the time the B-70 was ready for production, it had become apparent that surface-to-air missiles and fast interceptors were making high altitude penetration missions suicidal. The XB-70 was canceled, and the Mach 2-capable B-58 “Hustler” retired early. For their part, the Soviets responded to the threat of the B-70 by developing the MiG-25 “Foxbat,” an interceptor that could exceed Mach 2.8 and that carried long-range air-to-air missiles.

Rise of the Fighter-Bomber, and the Diversification of Roles:

But the day of the fighter-bomber was also arriving. Since World War I, the trade-off between heavy, long-range bombers and light, short-range fighters was reasonably well-understood. The high-performance bombers of the interwar period, and the use of a few bomber-type aircraft in night-fighter configuration notwithstanding, fighters enjoyed advantages in speed and maneuverability that made them lethal to bombers, while bombers could carry heavy loads to distant targets.

Fighters had always operated in an attack role, even in World War I. But over time, fighters carried ever-greater payloads of munitions. In the early years of the Vietnam War, the F-105 Thunderchief (nicknamed “Thud”) took on the workhorse bomber role in Rolling Thunder. It could carry 14000 lbs of bombs at Mach 2, although it lacked maneuverability. The North Vietnamese hunted Thuds with the MiG-17 and MiG-21, the latter itself capable of Mach 2 flight.

Bombers did have some advantages; even though they couldn’t run faster than fighters, they could run farther, which could be enough to escape a pursuer. Bombers were also large enough to carry sophisticated electronic warfare equipment, capable of jamming or disorienting the radars on pursuing fighters. The B-52 survived as a low altitude penetration bomber and continued to operate as a conventional bomber over Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Bombers also survived by diversifying. The Soviets developed the Tu-95 into the Tu-142, a long-range sub-hunting plane. They designed the Tu-22M “Backfire” bomber to hunt American aircraft carriers with long-range cruise missiles. The Americans responded to the cruise missile threat with the F-14 Tomcat, a long-range, fast, carrier-borne interceptor with beyond visual range missiles.

The last two generations of bombers began to come into service in the 1980s. They represented a division of effort. On the one hand, the B-1B “Lancer” and the Soviet Tu-160 combined supersonic speeds with low-level penetration capabilities. On the other, the B-2 “Spirit” took advantage of developments in stealth technology to evade radar, missiles, and interceptors. All of these bombers are also capable of traditional conventional bombing and have been pressed into those missions in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

Final Bombs:

A single F-15E Strike Eagle can carry a load as heavy as forty-six Gotha IV bombers, larger than any one of the raids that the terrified London in the First World War. The same aircraft can carry as much ordnance as almost five B-17s, and reach its targets considerably faster. With precision-guidance, those munitions can have a much greater impact on military and civilian targets. The F-15 can do all of that, and yet remains a formidable air-to-air fighter.

And yet the biggest air forces continue to buy big bombers. The United States recently placed an order for one hundred B-21 “Raider” stealth bombers. Russia and China have also ordered new stealth bombers, although the ability of the former to complete the project remains in question. The success of the latter depends to a great extent on how well China can integrate stolen technology, as well as develop workable engines. In short, big planes still confer big advantages for air forces interested in strike capabilities. But fighters, whether of the legacy or the stealth variety, will continue to pose a major obstacle for any bomber trying to reach its target.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is the author of The Battleship Book. The views expressed here are his personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, the Army War College, or any other department or agency of the U.S. government.

This article first appeared in 2018.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Ethen Kim Lieser

Public Health, Americas

However, Dr. Fauci did agree with Biden that a degree of normalcy would be possible by the end of 2021.

White House coronavirus advisor Dr. Anthony Fauci has projected that the United States will be “approaching a degree of normality” by the end of this year, but that pandemic-weary Americans may still be wearing face masks and coverings well into 2022.

“You know, I think it is possible that that’s the case (that Americans will be wearing masks in 2022) and, again, it really depends on what you mean by normality,” President Joe Biden’s chief medical advisor on the coronavirus said Sunday on CNN’s State of the Union.

Fauci added that he believes that by the end of 2021, “we’re going to have a significant degree of normality beyond the terrible burden that all of us have been through over the last year. As we get into the fall and the winter, by the end of the year, I agree with (Biden) completely that we will be approaching a degree of normality.”

The comments from the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases come as the U.S. death toll from the yearlong coronavirus pandemic recently surpassed five hundred thousand, representing more than six average NFL stadiums worth of victims. More than a fifth of all deaths worldwide have occurred in the United States, which has less than 5 percent of the global population, according to the latest data compiled by Johns Hopkins University.

Like Fauci, health experts and top government officials have asserted that necessary coronavirus precautions must remain in place to further slow the spread of the virus.

“While the progress we’re making toward recovery is exciting, it’s critical that we don’t ease up on the precautions that we know have worked thus far,” Dr. Iahn Gonsenhauser, chief quality and patient safety officer at The Ohio State Wexner Medical Center, told the National Interest.

“Masks and physical distancing are still our best weapons for limiting spread and, now that we have a vaccine, will make those precautions even more effective and will drive new cases way down if we stay the course.”

Dr. Rochelle Walensky, the director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, shared similar sentiments Sunday on NBC’s Meet the Press.

“We are still at about a hundred thousand cases a day. We are still at around fifteen hundred to thirty-five hundred deaths per day. The cases are more two and a half fold times what we saw over the summer,” she said.

“It’s encouraging to see these trends coming down, but they’re coming down from an extraordinarily high place.”

Other experts have taken on a more wait-and-see approach.

“It is probably too early to speculate on 2022, but it’s certainly probable that masks will still have some type of role,” Dr. Jason Keonin, of Northwest Iowa Surgeons PC, told the National Interest.

The CDC also has recently confirmed that double-masking, or the wearing of two face masks at once, can provide extremely high levels of protection against spreading or contracting the virus.

In addition, the agency’s study discovered that a tighter fit can markedly improve the overall effectiveness of masks. One particular way to improve the fit of medical masks is to make sure they are “knotted and tucked”—which can be achieved “by bringing together the corners and ear loops on each side, knotting the ear loops together where they attach to the mask, and then tucking in and flattening the resulting extra mask material to minimize the side gaps,” the CDC noted.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters.

Accédez à l’article de Florian Vidal ici.

Retrouvez le sommaire du numéro 4/2020 de Politique étrangère ici.

Robert Farley

Security,

Many of the technologies and practices of advanced submarine warfare were never employed in anger. However, every country in the world that pretends to serious maritime power is building or acquiring advanced submarines.

Here's What You Need to Remember: We take for granted the most common form of today’s nuclear deterrent; a nuclear submarine, bristling with missiles, capable of destroying a dozen cities a continent away. These submarines provide the most secure leg of the deterrent triad, as no foe could reasonably expect to destroy the entire submarine fleet before the missiles fly.

There have been three great submarine campaigns in history, and one prolonged duel. The First and Second Battles of the Atlantic pitted German U-boats against the escorts and aircraft of the United Kingdom and the United States. The Germans very nearly won World War I with the first campaign, and badly drained Allied resources in the second. In the third great campaign, the submarines of the US Navy destroyed virtually the entire commercial fleet of Japan, bringing the Japanese economy to its knees. US subs also devastated the Imperial Japanese Navy, sinking several of Tokyo’s most important capital ships.

But the period most evocative of our modern sense of submarine warfare was surely the forty year duel between the submarines of the USSR and the boats of the various NATO navies. Over the course of the Cold War, the strategic nature of the submarine changed; it moved from being a cheap, effective killer of capital ships to a capital ship in its own right. This was especially the case with the boomers, submarines that carried enough nuclear weapons to kill millions in a few minutes.

As with previous “5 Greatest” lists, the answers depend on the parameters; different sets of metrics will generate different lists. Our metrics concentrate on the strategic utility of specific submarine classes, rather than solely on their technical capabilities.

· Was the submarine a cost-effective solution to a national strategic problem?

· Did the submarine compare favorably with its contemporaries?

· Was the submarine’s design innovative?

And with that, the five best submarines of all time:

U-31:

The eleven boats of the U-31 class were constructed between 1912 and 1915. They operated in both of the periods of heavy action for German U-boats, early in the war before the suspension of unrestricted warfare, and again in 1917 when Germany decided to go for broke and cut the British Empire off at the knees. Four of these eleven boats (U-35, U-39, U-38, and U-34) were the four top killers of World War I; indeed, they were four of the five top submarines of all time in terms of tonnage sunk (the Type VII boat U-48 sneaks in at number 3). U-35, the top killer, sank 224 ships amounting to over half a million tons.

The U-31 boats were evolutionary, rather than revolutionary; they represented the latest in German submarine technology for the time, but did not differ dramatically from their immediate predecessors or successors. These boats had good range, a deck gun for destroying small shipping, and faster speeds surfaced than submerged. These characteristics allowed the U-31 class and their peers to wreak havoc while avoiding faster, more powerful surface units. They did offer a secure, stealthy platform for carrying out a campaign that nearly forced Great Britain from the war. Only the entry of the United States, combined with the development of innovative convoy tactics by the Royal Navy, would stifle the submarine offensive. Three of the eleven boats survived the war, and were eventually surrendered to the Allies.

Balao:

The potential for a submarine campaign against the Japanese Empire was clear from early in the war. Japanese industry depended for survival on access to the natural resources of Southeast Asia. Separating Japan from those resources could win the war. However, the pre-war USN submarine arm was relatively small, and operated with poor doctrine and bad torpedoes. Boats built during the war, including primarily the Gato and Balao class, would eventually destroy virtually the entire Japanese merchant marine.

The Balao class represented very nearly the zenith of the pre-streamline submarine type. War in the Pacific demanded longer ranges and more habitability than the relatively snug Atlantic. Like their predecessors the Gato, the Balaos were less maneuverable than the German Type VII subs, but they made up for this in strength of hull and quality of construction. Compared with the Type VII, the Balaos had longer range, a larger gun, more torpedo tubes, and a higher speed. Of course, the Balaos operated in a much different environment, and against an opponent less skilled in anti-submarine warfare. The greatest victory of a Balao was the sinking of the 58000 ton HIJMS Shinano by Archerfish.

Eleven of 120 boats were lost, two in post-war accidents. After the war Balao class subs were transferred to several friendly navies, and continued to serve for decades. One, the former USS Tusk, remains in partial commission in Taiwan as Hai Pao.

Type XXI

In some ways akin to the Me 262, the Type XXI was a potentially war-winning weapon that arrived too late to have serious effect. The Type XXI was the first mass produced, ocean-going streamlined or “true” submarine, capable of better performance submerged than on the surface. It gave up its deck gun in return for speed and stealth, and set the terms of design for generations of submarines.

Allied anti-submarine efforts focused on identifying boats on the surface (usually in transit to their patrol areas) then vectoring killers (including ships and aircraft) to those areas. In 1944 the Allies began developing techniques for fighting “schnorkel” U-boats that did not need to surface, but remained unprepared for combat against a submarine that could move at 20 knots submerged.

In effect, the Type XXI had the stealth to avoid detection prior to an attack, and the speed to escape afterward. Germany completed 118 of these boats, but because of a variety of industrial problems could only put four into service, none of which sank an enemy ship. All of the Allies seized surviving examples of the Type XXI, using them both as models for their own designs and in order to develop more advanced anti-submarine technologies and techniques. For example, the Type XXI was the model for the Soviet “Whiskey” class, and eventually for a large flotilla of Chinese submarines.

George Washington:

We take for granted the most common form of today’s nuclear deterrent; a nuclear submarine, bristling with missiles, capable of destroying a dozen cities a continent away. These submarines provide the most secure leg of the deterrent triad, as no foe could reasonably expect to destroy the entire submarine fleet before the missiles fly.

The secure submarine deterrent began in 1960, with the USS George Washington. An enlarged version of the Skipjack class nuclear attack sub, George Washington’s design incorporated space for sixteen Polaris ballistic missiles. When the Polaris became operational, USS George Washington had the capability from striking targets up to 1000 miles distant with 600 KT warheads. The boats would eventually upgrade to the Polaris A3, with three warheads and a 2500 mile range. Slow relative to attack subs but extremely quiet, the George Washington class pioneered the “go away and hide” form of nuclear deterrence that is still practiced by five of the world’s nine nuclear powers.

And until 1967, the George Washington and her sisters were the only modern boomers. Their clunky Soviet counterparts carried only three missiles each, and usually had to surface in order to fire. This made them of limited deterrent value. But soon, virtually every nuclear power copied the George Washington class. The first “Yankee” class SSBN entered service in 1967, the first Resolution boat in 1968, and the first of the French Redoutables in 1971. China would eventually follow suit, although the PLAN’s first genuinely modern SSBNs have only entered service recently. The Indian Navy’s INS Arihant will likely enter service in the next year or so.

The five boats of the George Washington class conducted deterrent patrols until 1982, when the SALT II Treaty forced their retirement. Three of the five (including George Washington) continued in service as nuclear attack submarines for several more years.

Los Angeles:

Immortalized in the Tom Clancy novels Hunt for Red October and Red Storm Rising, the U.S. Los Angeles class is the longest production line of nuclear submarines in history, constituting sixty-two boats and first entering service in 1976. Forty-one subs remain in commission today, continuing to form the backbone of the USN’s submarine fleet.

The Los Angeles (or 688) class are outstanding examples of Cold War submarines, equally capable of conducting anti-surface or anti-submarine warfare. In wartime, they would have been used to penetrate Soviet base areas, where Russian boomers were protected by rings of subs, surface ships, and aircraft, and to protect American carrier battle groups.

In 1991, two Los Angeles class attack boats launched the first ever salvo of cruise missiles against land targets, ushering in an entirely new vision of how submarines could impact warfare. While cruise missile armed submarines had long been part of the Cold War duel between the United States and the Soviet Union, most attention focused either on nuclear delivery or anti-ship attacks. Submarine launched Tomahawks gave the United States a new means for kicking in the doors of anti-access/area denial systems. The concept has proven so successful that four Ohio class boomers were refitted as cruise missile submarines, with the USS Florida delivering the initial strikes of the Libya intervention.

The last Los Angeles class submarine is expected to leave service in at some point in the 2020s, although outside factors may delay that date. By that time, new designs will undoubtedly have exceeded the 688 in terms of striking land targets, and in capacity for conducting anti-submarine warfare. Nevertheless, the Los Angeles class will have carved out a space as the sub-surface mainstay of the world’s most powerful Navy for five decades.

Conclusion

Fortunately, the United States and the Soviet Union avoided direct conflict during the Cold War, meaning that many of the technologies and practices of advanced submarine warfare were never employed in anger. However, every country in the world that pretends to serious maritime power is building or acquiring advanced submarines. The next submarine war will look very different from the last, and it’s difficult to predict how it will play out. We can be certain, however, that the fight will be conducted in silence.

Honorable Mention: Ohio, 260O-21, Akula, Alfa, Seawolf, Swiftsure, I-201, Kilo, S class, Type VII

Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. Follow him on Twitter:@drfarls.

All Images: Wikicommons.

Editor's Note: This piece first appeared on January 18. It is being recirculated due to reader interest. 

Peter Suciu

Japan, Asia

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force increasingly resembles the former Imperial Japanese Navy, but in a smaller size.

Here's What You Need to Remember: One type of warship the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force won't operate is a battleship, and there are no plans for a 21st-century version of the Yamato super battleship.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force increasingly resembles the former Imperial Japanese Navy, but in a smaller size. It has a fleet of some 154 ships and operates 346 aircraft. In 2000 it has also been the world's fourth-largest navy by tonnage, and likely will only increase in size.

In December 2018, Tokyo approved a plan to modify its two Izumo-class helicopter carriers to embark the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II jet fighter. The modifications would enable Japan to operate flattops with fixed-wing aircraft for the first time since World War II. The Japanese government also announced as part of its record-setting defense budget it would purchase additional F-35 aircraft.

With an eventual plan to be equipped with 105 F-35As and 42 F-35Bs, Japan would become the largest operator of the fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft outside of the United States. 

Not Battleships But The Next Best Thing

One type of warship the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force won't operate is a battleship, and there are no plans for a 21st-century version of the Yamato super battleship.

However, according to a recent report from TheDrive, citing Japanese media, Tokyo is now considering the feasibility of procuring two "super-destroyers." Such warships – much like the modified flattops – would seem to be in contradiction of Japan's 1947 Constitution, which renounced war, but is also seen to suggest that Japan's military forces are maintained for the purpose of self-defense.

In this case, however, the super-destroyers would serve as a replacement to the pair of planned land-based Aegis Ashore systems. Work on those was suspended due to technical issues, costs and domestic criticism. The destroyers would be focused on missile defense – primarily from North Korea – and would be equipped with a version of the Aegis combat system that is equipped with Lockheed Martin's AN/SPY-7 Long Range Discrimination Radar. That platform was originally intended for the shore-based Aegis system.

Nikkei Asia reported that the funding for the system modifications of the AN/SPY-7 will be allocated in Japan's fiscal 2021 budget.

While the Defense Ministry has been expected to approve the vessels, based on an interim report that is due later this month from a private-sector technical study, officials have also considered the option of a special-purpose warship that could be dedicated to intercepting missiles. However, despite the fact that such a vessel would cost less, it could be far more vulnerable to submarine and air attacks.

The other consideration is that even as North Korean missiles are seen as the primary threat, Japan has other priorities that include patrolling the East China Sea due to increased Chinese aggression, and new Aegis-equipped destroyers could be a practical addition to the fleet due to their maneuverability and defenses.

One issue outstanding could be that of personnel. Tokyo opted for the Aegis Ashore system to address the lack of personnel, but now the Maritime SDF may need to be further expanded with the addition of such warships.

A New Class

Yet to come into focus is whether Tokyo would opt to build a new warship or a derivative of vessels currently in the fleet. TheDrive cited a report from Tokyo's Kyodo News agency, which suggested that the government was considering a vessel with a standard displacement of around 8,000 tons – which would be larger than the current Maya-class's displacement of 8,200 tons.

The Maya-class is a modified version of the Atago-class, and the lead vessel Maya was commissioned on March 19, 2020, with a second vessel, Haguro, set to enter service in March of next year. These vessels were also designed to enhance Japan's ballistic missile defense capabilities, but now it seems that Tokyo is thinking even bigger.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article first appeared last year and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

Security, Asia

This was the first time since Washington and Taipei ended formal diplomatic ties in 1979 that the island nation has admitted the presence of U.S. forces.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Despite the fact that Washington has not officially acknowledged the presence of U.S. troops in Taiwan for more than forty years, it is known that military exchanges had been commonplace prior to the Covid-19 outbreak.

This week the Taiwanese government publicly acknowledged that members of the United States Marine Corps have begun training operations on the island nation. A unit of Marine Raiders was reportedly deployed to Taiwan to help boost Taipei's military readiness.

This was the first time since Washington and Taipei ended formal diplomatic ties in 1979—when the United States formally recognized the People's Republic of China—that the island nation has admitted the presence of U.S. forces.

According to Newsweek, which cited the Taipei-based United Daily News, the Taiwan Marine Corps will receive four weeks of training under the American Special Forces unit. The Raiders will reportedly provide training on amphibious assault operations and speedboat infiltration techniques at the Tsoying military base in the southwestern port city of Kaohsiung.

The Marine Raiders were believed to have arrived on the island nation as early as October 26, and subsequently observed two weeks of quarantine as part of the island's measures to contain the novel coronavirus. These are the first troops to conduct training with the Taiwanese military since the Covid-19 outbreak began earlier this year.

"In order to maintain regional peace and stability, routine security cooperation and exchanges between the militaries of Taiwan and the United States are proceeding as usual," the Taiwanese Navy said in a statement on its website.

Plausible deniability 

Despite the acknowledgement from Taipei, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) on Tuesday refused to confirm if the Marines have been deployed to the island nation. Stars & Stripes reported that Pentagon spokesperson John Supple said in a statement to the news outlet via Indo-Pacific Command that reports about the Marines on Taiwan were inaccurate.

"The United States remains committed to our One-China Policy," Supple noted, referring to a policy acknowledging that Beijing believes it has sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing maintains that the island is a breakaway province that would be brought under its control, even if force is required.

Despite the fact that Washington maintains no formal relations with Taiwan, which has a democratically-elected government, current U.S. law—the Taiwan Relations Act—requires that it ensures that Taiwan can defend itself. It has been in place for more than forty years, and ensures Taipei's defense needs.

"The United States will continue to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities," added Supple.

Last month, the United States Department of State approved a second weapons sale to Taiwan in just over a week. This most recent deal was for 400 anti-ship cruise missiles, worth a reported $2.37 billion. That followed the sale of three weapons systems in a separate deal worth $1.8 billion. It was the ninth weapons sale approved by Washington to Taipei since President Donald Trump was elected in 2016.

In addition to the 400 Boeing Harpoon Block II missiles, the recent deal also includes 100 Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems and exercise missiles, radar trucks, and test equipment, along with U.S. technical assistance.

Worst Kept Secret 

Despite the fact that Washington has not officially acknowledged the presence of U.S. troops in Taiwan for more than forty years, it is known that military exchanges had been commonplace prior to the Covid-19 outbreak.

U.S. Army Special Forces have been invited for annual joint sessions with Taiwan's equivalent Army Aviation and Special Forces Command in past years, while U.S. Army Green Berets had taken part in Operation Balance Temper, which took place in the mountainous regions in the center of the island nation. Additionally, U.S. Navy SEALs have trained with Taiwanese frogmen off the coast of the Penghu Islands during Operation Flash Tamper.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article first appeared last year.

Image: Reuters.

Robert Farley

History, Europe

The casualties number in the tens of millions. 

Here's What You Need To Remember: The scars of the war remain, not least in the absence of the populations exterminated during the conflict. The states occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the war (including Poland, the Baltics, and Ukraine) remain deeply suspicious of Russian intentions. For its part, memory of the war in Russia continues to condition Russian foreign policy, and Russia’s broader response to Europe.

The war between Germany and the Soviet Union officially began in late June 1941, although the threat of conflict had loomed since the early 1930s. Germany and the USSR launched a joint war against Poland in September of 1939, which the Soviets followed up with invasions of Finland, Romania, and the Baltic states across the following year.

After Germany crushed France, and determined that it could not easily drive Great Britain from the war, the Wehrmacht turned its attention back to the East. Following the conquests of Greece and Yugolavia in the spring of 1941, Berlin prepared its most ambitious campaign; the destruction of Soviet Russia. The ensuing war would result in a staggering loss of human life, and in the final destruction of the Nazi regime.

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The Fight on Land

On June 22, 1941, the German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe struck Soviet forces across a wide front along the German-Soviet frontier. Romanian forces attacked into Soviet-occupied Bessarabia on the same day. The Finnish armed forces joined the fight later that week, with Hungarian troops and aircraft entering combat at the beginning of July. By that time, a significant contribution of Italian troops was on its way to the Eastern Front. A Spanish volunteer division would eventually join the fight, along with large formations recruited from Soviet prisoners of war and from the local civilian population of occupied Soviet territories.

The course of the war is far too complicated to detail in this article. Suffice to say that the German enjoyed overwhelming success for the first five months of the war, before weather and stiffening Red Army resistance led to a Soviet victory in the Battle of Moscow. Germany resumed the offensive in 1942, only to suffer a major defeat at Stalingrad. The Battle of Kursk, in 1943, ended the Wehrmacht’s offensive ambitions. 1943, 1944, and 1945 saw the pace of Soviet conquest gradually accelerate, with the monumental offensives of late 1944 shattering the German armed forces. The war turned the Wehrmacht and the Red Army into finely honed fighting machines, while also draining both of equipment and manpower. The Soviets enjoyed the support of Western industry, while the Germans relied on the resources of occupied Europe.

The Fight in the Air

Mercifully, the nature of the war did not offer many opportunities for strategic bombing. Russia launched a few sorties against German cities in the first days of the war, usually suffering catastrophic casualties. For their part, the German Luftwaffe concentrated on tactical support of the Wehrmacht. Germany did launch a few large air raids against Russian cities, but did not maintain anything approaching a strategic campaign.

Notwithstanding the improvement of the Soviet Air Force across the war, and the effectiveness in particular of attack aircraft, in general the Luftwaffe mauled its Soviet foe. This remained the case even as the Soviet aviation industry far outstripped the German, and as the Combined Bomber Offensive drew the attention of the Luftwaffe to the west.

The Fight at Sea

Naval combat does not normally loom large in histories of the War in the East. Nevertheless, Soviet and Axis forces fought in the Arctic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea for most of the conflict. In the north, Soviet air and naval forces supported convoys from the Western allies to Murmansk, and harassed German positions in Norway. In the Black Sea, German and Romanian ships struggled against the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, winning important victories until the tide of the land battle turned. In the Baltic, Russian submarines and small craft fought a guerilla conflict against Germany and Finland for the first three years, although the Germans successfully leveraged their surface naval superiority in support of retreats in the final year of the war.

The Fight Against Civilians

The Holocaust is perhaps the most remembered legacy of the War in the East. The invasions of Poland and the Soviet Union brought the bulk of Eastern Europe’s Jewish population under Nazi control, facilitating a German policy of extermination. For non-Jews, German occupation policies were nearly as brutal, although populations sympathetic to the anti-Soviet crusade were sometimes spared.

Towards the end of the war, the Soviets did their best to return the favor. Soviet depredations against the German civilian population of East and Central Europe do not generally received the same degree of attention as German actions, in no small part because of an enduring (if problematic) sense that the German deserved what they got. Other Eastern European populations were caught in the crossfire, suffering starvation and other depredations from both sides. Nevertheless, there is no question that the Soviets (and the peoples of Eastern Europe) suffered far more deeply from the war than the Germans.

The Costs

The raw statistics of the war are nothing short of stunning. On the Soviet side, some seven million soldiers died in action, with another 3.6 million dying in German POW camps. The Germans lost four million soldiers in action, and another 370000 to the Soviet camp system. Some 600000 soldiers from other participants (mostly Eastern European) died as well. These numbers do not include soldiers lost on either side of the German-Polish War, or the Russo-Finnish War.

The civilian population of the territory in conflict suffered terribly from the war, in part because of the horrific occupation policies of the German (and the Soviets), and in part because of a lack of food and other necessities of life. Around 15 million Soviet civilians are thought to have been killed. Some three million ethnic Poles died (some before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, but many after) along with around three million Jews of Polish and another two million of Soviet citizenship (included in the Soviet statistics). Somewhere between 500000 and 2 million German civilians died in the expulsions that followed the war.

Statistics of this magnitude are inevitably imprecise, and scholars on all sides of the war continue to debate the size of military and civilian losses. There is little question, however, that the War in the East was the most brutal conflict ever endured by humankind. There is also little question that the Red Army provided the most decisive blows against Nazi Germany, causing the vast majority of German casualties during World War II as a whole.

Postwar

The end of the War in the East left the Soviet Union in control of a vast portion of the Eurasian continent. Red Army forces occupied Germany, Poland, Czechosolvakia, parts of the Balkans, the Baltic states, and parts of Finland. The Western allies remained in control of Greece and much of western Germany, while Joseph Tito established an independent communist regime in Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union redrew the map of Eastern Europe, annexing large chunks of Poland, Germany, and the Baltics, and ceding much of Germany to Polish control. Russian domination over the region would last into the early 1990s, when the layers of the Soviet Empire began to peel away.

The scars of the war remain, not least in the absence of the populations exterminated during the conflict. The states occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the war (including Poland, the Baltics, and Ukraine) remain deeply suspicious of Russian intentions. For its part, memory of the war in Russia continues to condition Russian foreign policy, and Russia’s broader response to Europe.

Robert Farley is a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as an Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

This first appeared in 2016. 

Peter Suciu

Security, Asia

South Korean missile defenses are getting an upgrade.

Here's What You Need to Remember: "JTAGS is vital to warfighters and of growing importance as we create true Joint All-Domain Command and Control systems, especially as we find new ways to integrate and leverage space-based assets.”

Defense contractor Northrop Grumman and the U.S. Army have enhanced the Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) capabilities in South Korea. The deployment of the JTAGS system will improve battle-space awareness and improve missile defense. This has marked the completion of phase one of the platform's modernization efforts.

JTAGS was first fielded in tactical shelters in 1997 to provide in-theater missile warning using data directly from satellite sensors. It receives and processes data that is directly down-linked from the Overhead Persistent Infrared constellation of satellites, which include the Defense Support Program and Space-Based Infrared System sensors, and other infrared satellite sensors. Networked sensor data is also provided from the Highly Elliptical Orbit sensor.

Additionally, 3D stereo processing of multiple sensors is performed to greatly improve tactical parameters. This technology was first developed at Northrop Grumman in 1994 and is still used today throughout the missile warning community. The system disseminates near-real-time warning, alerting and cueing information on ballistic missile launches and other tactical events of interest throughout the theater using multiple communications networks. This allows for the dissemination of data directly to combatant commanders.

Phase One 

As part of the phase one modernization efforts, Northrop Grumman and the U.S. Army installed JTAGS Block II in permanent facilities in Japan, Qatar, Italy, and most recently the Republic of Korea (South Korea). This has included updates to the hardware, software, and communication systems, as well as enhancements to cybersecurity and soldier-machine interface.

The deployments include soldier training as well as exercise support capabilities.

“This is a tremendous milestone in our decades-long mission of delivering missile warning and defense capabilities to protect our joint warfighters and allies," said Kenn Todorov, vice president and general manager, combat systems and mission readiness, Northrop Grumman. "JTAGS is vital to warfighters and of growing importance as we create true Joint All-Domain Command and Control systems, especially as we find new ways to integrate and leverage space-based assets.”

Four JTAGS are deployed worldwide as part of the U.S. Strategic Command's Theater Event System. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command soldiers operate JTAGS, providing 24/7 support to theater operations.

Phase Two 

With the completion of phase one, the defense contractor has already begun executing phase two of the JTAGS Pre-planned Product improvement (P3I) modernization program. It includes the delivery of additional sensor processing capabilities and updating software architecture.

Under the direction of the JTAGS Product Office, Integrated Fires Mission Command (IFMC) Project Office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, Northrop Grumman has been the JTAGS prime contractor since 1994, responsible for developing, fielding, maintaining and enhancing the system worldwide.

Joint Army-Navy crews operate the JTAGS system, which consists of a deployable towed shelter and a crew of fifteen soldiers and sailors which provides 24-hour, 365 day-a-year, all weather threat monitoring.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article first appeared last year and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Security, Asia

The Chinese People’s Armed Forces Coast Guard Corps (CPAFCGC) is also the world’s largest coast guard and has increasingly been taking on a role of a naval force.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The “militarization” of the China Coast Guard actually began in 2007 when the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) transferred two Type 728 cutters, which at the time were the largest China Coast Guard ships in its fleet.

Despite being one of the newest—and certainly lesser-known—branches of the Central Military Commission, the Chinese People’s Armed Forces Coast Guard Corps (CPAFCGC) is also the world’s largest coast guard and has increasingly been taking on a role of a naval force. This month the Chinese Communist Party released a draft law that would empower the Chinese Coast Guard to use actual “military force” against foreign vessels, and that could potentially be applied in disputes in the South China Sea.

Under this new law, China will allow its coast guard personnel to use weapons when foreign vessels are involved in illegal activities in waters under Beijing’s jurisdiction. The draft details, which were first revealed by the National People’s Congress on Wednesday, maintain that the coast guard has the authority to also forcibly drive away foreign vessels that intrude into Chinese territorial waters or even to interrogate their crews.

Paramilitary Unit

This empowerment of the coast guard comes after the service was incorporated into the armed police force, which also included the coast guard fleet being upgraded with significantly larger vessels.

The unit was formerly the maritime branch of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) Border Security, which served the Ministry of Public Security until 2013. Then in March of that year, Beijing announced it would form a unified coast guard commanded by the State Oceanic Administration, and that new unit was then transferred from civilian control to the PAP in 2018 and ultimately under the command of the Central Military Commission.

The “militarization” of the China Coast Guard actually began in 2007 when the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) transferred two Type 728 cutters, which at the time were the largest China Coast Guard ships in its fleet. In March 2017, the service sent its 12,000 ton China Coast Guard (CCG) 3901 cutter—which is not only the largest cutter in the world, but it is also larger in size the U.S. Navy’s aging 9,800 ton Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers or the 8,300-9,800 ton Arleigh-Burke-class guided missile destroyed.

The CCG 3901 is a true warship and is armed 76mm H/PJ-26 rapid fire naval guns, two auxiliary guns, and two anti-aircraft guns. It has a maximum speed of twenty-five knots and given its size it is easy to see why some analysts have nicknamed the white hulled ship the “Monster.”

China’s legal changes come as Beijing has amplified its claims to the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu by Beijing), which are administered by Tokyo, and could be used to target Japanese fishing vessels near the uninhabited islands.

The draft law’s rules of engagement are just the latest transition of the China Coast Guard into a true quasi-military force—and one under the PAP, which answers directly to the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article first appeared last year and is being republished due to reader interest.​

Image: Reuters

Robert Farley

History, Asia

Friendly fire casualties were common in the Vietnam War.

Here's What You Need to Know: The mistaken attack killed three Australian sailors.

Friendly fire casualties were common in the Vietnam War. The unconventional nature of the conflict made for more than the occasional artillery mishap and engagements in dense vegetation often meant combatants had little opportunity to visually identify their targets before firing. As morale deteriorated late in the war, “fragging” incidents became common, with enlisted personnel turning upon their officers. And of course, relations between American and South Vietnamese forces were always strained.

Even in this context, however, one “friendly fire” incident stands out. On June 17, 1968, U.S. fighter jets apparently launched air-to-air missiles that struck a U.S. Navy heavy cruiser and a Royal Australian Navy guided-missile destroyer. How did this happen?

The Ships

In mid-June 1968, numerous U.S. Navy and allied vessels were operating in the vicinity of Tiger Island, just on the North Vietnamese side of the DMZ. The ships were deployed to interdict the “maritime Ho Chi Minh Trail,” which used small boats to deliver supplies to insurgents in coastal areas, as well as to engage North Vietnamese targets with gunfire. 

The USS Boston was a 17,000-ton heavy cruiser, modified from her original World War II configuration to carry a Terrier surface-to-air missile aft. Commissioned in 1944, Boston had served in the final campaigns of the Second World War before entering the reserve fleet. Reactivated for Korea, she was later one of a few vessels to receive a single-end conversion, with the aft turret replaced by the Terrier missile system. Ironically, the guns of USS Boston would prove more lasting than the missiles, which were quickly rendered obsolete by rapid advances in missile technology. Boston was in Vietnam primarily because of what her guns could deliver to Vietnamese shore targets. Boston was accompanied by USS Edson, a 4,000 ton Forest Sherman class destroyer with a heavy gun armament, two small patrol vessels, “swift boats” PCF-12 and PCF-19, and a U.S. Coast Guard cutter were also in the area. 

Alongside the U.S. ships served the Australian destroyer HMAS Hobart. Hobart was a 4,600-ton guided-missile destroyer of a modified Charles F. Adams design. Australia had attempted to build its own class of destroyers, but the effort had resulted in over-priced, underperforming ships. Consequently, Canberra made the decision to buy destroyers from the United States, part of a historic shift of alignment from the United Kingdom to the United States. Hobart was primarily designed for air warfare (with a Tartar SAM system) but also carried a 5” gun and various anti-submarine equipment.

The Incident

On the night of June 16, 1968, unidentified aircraft fired missiles at PCF-12 and PCF-19. Two missiles hit PCF-19, sinking it rapidly. PCF-12 and the Coast Guard cutter responded, pulling survivors out of the water. PCF-12 claimed to identify a pair of North Vietnamese helicopters as the assailants, although such craft had not previously been reported in the area. 

Some hours later, jet aircraft approached the allied flotilla. Hobart and Boston evaluated the aircraft as friendly, rendering them completely surprised when missiles struck the ships. The destroyer USS Edson also came under attack but was not hit. Boston, heavily armored by the standards of the day, suffered only minor damage. Hobart, however, was hit by a missile that killed one sailor and wounded two others. The aircraft circled around for a second pass, firing another two missiles, both of which hit the destroyer. Another sailor was killed and six wounded by the second salvo. One of the missiles ended up in an empty magazine devoted to Hobart’s anti-submarine warheads; had it been filled with weapons, the consequences could have been dire. Hobart opened up when it appeared that the aircraft was swinging around for another pass, firing five 5” shells from its forward gun. Analysis later determined that the missiles were AIM-7s, not generally known to be of use in the Vietnamese People’s Air Force.

The Appraisal

It was quickly apparent that the attack against the large ships could only have come from U.S. aircraft, and it was soon determined that U.S. Air Force F-4 Phantoms were responsible. How did F-4s mistake U.S. ships for North Vietnamese targets? USS Boston, in particular, was a huge ship by the standards of the Vietnam War. By contrast, the largest ships available to the Vietnamese People’s Navy were small patrol boats, generally less than 100 tons in displacement.

The best explanation for the confused night action is that PCF-12 identified enemy helicopters as the assailants that sank PCF-19. The precise type of helicopter remains unclear, but the Phantoms were summoned to deal with the helicopters. Reportedly, USAF Phantoms of the era carried radars that could not distinguish low-flying helicopters from even large surface vessels. An inquiry determined that the attack on Hobart was definitely a friendly fire incident, but also that the attack on PCF-19 earlier in the evening was the result of friendly fire. However, USAF pilots in Vietnam faced significant restrictions against firing on targets that could not be visually identified, making it curious that the Phantoms let loose against the purported helicopters. For what it’s worth, the case has become famous among UFO enthusiasts, who suggested that the F-4s were targeting UFOs when they struck the Australian ship.

Concluding Thoughts

Some lessons; even relatively small weapons (such as an AIM-7) can inflict significant damage on modern warships. While Boston was armored as a World War II heavy cruiser and thus was unlikely to suffer any real damage, the missiles that hit Hobart inflicted casualties and could have done serious damage under the right (or wrong) circumstances. The death of three Australian sailors was tragic, but an unlucky hit could have resulted in the loss of the ship.

Second, simple courtesy should demand that pilots tasked to missions over water should be trained to identify the difference between an American heavy cruiser and a North Vietnamese patrol boat (or helicopter for that matter). At the very least, pilots operating over water in the same area as friendly surface vessels should have had a sense of the danger implicit in launching missiles without clear targets. The Vietnam War was riven with inter-service conflict and inappropriate joint training, although the results weren’t always as dramatic as a missile attack on a cruiser.

Modern technology makes incidents like this far less likely, with improved friend or foe recognition systems and radars that are better at discriminating between surface and air targets. At the same time, the increased lethality of modern weapons threatens to make the impact of friendly fire incidents considerably more devastating.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

This article first appeared in March 2020.

Image: Flickr

Robert Farley

Security, Middle East

Built on a foundation of pre-independence militias, supplied with cast-off World War II weapons, the Israel Defense Forces have enjoyed remarkable success in the field.

Here's What You Need To Remember: When considering the effectiveness of Israeli weapons, and the expertise of the men and women who wield them, it’s worth noting that for all the tactical and operational success the IDF has enjoyed, Israel remains in a strategically perilous position. The inability of Israel to develop long-term, stable, positive relationships with its immediate neighbors, regional powers, and the subject populations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip means that Jerusalem continues to feel insecure, its dominance on land, air, and sea notwithstanding.

Since 1948, the state of Israel has fielded a frighteningly effective military machine. Built on a foundation of pre-independence militias, supplied with cast-off World War II weapons, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have enjoyed remarkable success in the field. In the 1960s and 1970s, both because of its unique needs and because of international boycotts, Israel began developing its own military technologies, as well as augmenting the best foreign tech. Today, Israel boasts one of the most technologically advanced military stockpiles in the world, and one of the world’s most effective workforces.

(This first appeared in 2015.)

Here are five of the most deadly systems that the Israeli Defense Forces currently employ.

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Merkava

The Merkava tank joined the IDF in 1979, replacing the modified foreign tanks (most recently of British and American vintage) that the Israelis had used since 1948. Domestic design and construction avoided problems of unsteady foreign supply, while also allowing the Israelis to focus on designs optimized for their environment, rather than for Central Europe.  Around 1,600 Merkavas of various types have entered service, with several hundred more still on the way.

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The Merkava entered service after the great tank battles of the Middle East had ended (at least for Israel). Consequently, the Merkavas have often seen combat in different contexts that their designers expected. The United States took major steps forward with the employment of armor in Iraq and Afghanistan (particularly in the former) in a counter-insurgency context, but the Israelis have gone even farther. After mixed results during the Hezbollah war, the IDF, using updated Merkava IVs, has worked hard to integrate the tanks into urban fighting. In both of the recent Gaza wars, the IDF has used Merkavas to penetrate Palestinian positions while active defense systems keep crews safe. Israel has also developed modifications that enhance the Merkavas’ capabilities in urban and low-intensity combat.

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Indeed, the Merkavas have proved so useful in this regard that Israel has cancelled plans to stop line production, despite a lack of significant foreign orders.

F-15I Thunder:

The Israeli Air Force has flown variants of the F-15 since the 1970s, and has become the world’s most versatile and effective user of the Eagle. As Tyler Rogoway’s recent story on the IAF fleet makes clear, the Israelis have perfected the F-15 both for air supremacy and for strike purposes. Flown by elite pilots, the F-15Is (nicknamed “thunder”) of the IAF remain the most lethal squadron of aircraft in the Middle East.

The F-15I provides Israel with several core capabilities. It remains an effective air-to-air combat platform, superior to the aircraft available to Israel’s most plausible foes (although the Eurofighter Typhoons and Dassault Rafales entering service in the Gulf, not to mention Saudi Arabia’s own force of F-15SAs, undoubtedly would provide some competition. But as Rogoway suggests, the Israelis have worked long and hard at turning the F-15 into an extraordinarily effective strike platform, one capable of hitting targets with precision at long range. Most analysts expect that the F-15I would play a key role in any Israeli strike against Iran, along with some of its older brethren.

Jericho III:

The earliest Israeli nuclear deterrent came in the form of the F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers that the IAF used to such great effect in conventional missions in the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War. Soon, however, Israel determined that it required a more effective and secure deterrent, and began to invest heavily in ballistic missiles. The Jericho I ballistic missile entered service in the early 1970s, to eventually be replaced by the Jericho II and Jericho III.

The Jericho III is the most advanced ballistic missile in the region, presumably (Israel does not offer much data on its operation) capable of striking targets not only in the Middle East, but also across Europe, Asia, and potentially North America. The Jericho III ensures that any nuclear attack against Israel would be met with devastating retaliation, especially as it is unlikely that Israel could be disarmed by a first strike. Of course, given that no potential Israeli foe has nuclear weapons (or will have them in the next decade, at least), the missiles give Jerusalem presumptive nuclear superiority across the region.

Dolphin:

Israel acquired its first submarine, a former British “S” class, in 1958. That submarine and others acquired in the 1960s played several important military roles, including defense of the Israeli coastline, offensive operations against Egyptian and Syrian shipping, and the delivery of commando teams in war and peace. These early boats were superseded by the Gal class, and finally by the German Dolphin class (really two separate classes related to the Type 212) boats, which are state-of-the-art diesel-electric subs.

The role of the Dolphin class in Israel’s nuclear deterrent has almost certainly been wildly overstated. The ability of a diesel electric submarine to carry out deterrent patrols is starkly limited, no matter what ordnance they carry. However, the Dolphin remains an effective platform for all sorts of other missions required by the IDF. Capable of maritime reconnaissance, of sinking or otherwise interdicting enemy ships, and also of delivering special forces to unfriendly coastlines, the Dolphins represent a major Israeli security investment, and one of the most potentially lethal undersea forces in the region.

The Israeli Soldier:

The technology that binds all of these other systems together is the Israeli soldier. Since 1948 (and even before) Israel has committed the best of its human capital to the armed forces. The creation of fantastic soldiers, sailors, and airmen doesn’t happen by accident, and doesn’t result simply from the enthusiasm and competence of the recruits. The IDF has developed systems of recruitment, training, and retention that allow it to field some of the most competent, capable soldiers in the world. None of the technologies above work unless they have smart, dedicated, well-trained operators to make them function at their fullest potential.

Parting Thoughts: 

When considering the effectiveness of Israeli weapons, and the expertise of the men and women who wield them, it’s worth noting that for all the tactical and operational success the IDF has enjoyed, Israel remains in a strategically perilous position. The inability of Israel to develop long-term, stable, positive relationships with its immediate neighbors, regional powers, and the subject populations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip means that Jerusalem continues to feel insecure, its dominance on land, air, and sea notwithstanding. Tactics and technologies, however effective and impressive, cannot solve these problems; only politics can.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.