The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN)

The Taleban use Pakistan as a sanctuary: most of the movement’s leaders are settled there and it is the movement’s preferred place for training, meeting and as a rear base. It is also the prime destination for ‘rest and recuperation’ (R&R) and the rehabilitation of wounded fighters. But how do the Taleban move between the battlefields of Afghanistan and their bases in Pakistan? AAN’s Fazal Muzhary and Borhan Osman have been analysing the jihadi ‘commuting routes’ between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The information in this dispatch is largely based on conversations with Taleban fighters, former Taleban officials who have recently quit the movement, local residents and doctors in southern and south-eastern Afghanistan and with Afghans living in Pakistan’s Balochistan province who have contacts with the Taleban. The two authors have been collecting information on this subject since 2014, while doing other research in these areas.

When Mullah Akhtar Mansur was officially taking over the Taleban leadership in 2015, more than 2000 field commanders travelled from across Afghanistan to Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Balochistan province and the Taleban’s effective headquarters. Responding to an urgent call by the leadership council (also known as the Quetta shura) for a ‘general assembly’ planned for 31 July 2015, they arrived within three days. During that time, according to eyewitnesses, flocks of armed Taleban crossed the Durand Line. Traces of dust followed the convoys, each made up dozens of cars and motorbikes, driving along the dusty, gravel routes which cross the border in southern Afghanistan.

The Taleban did not need to think hard about which crossing points to choose for entering Pakistan. Among the dozens of options available, they were familiar with the crossing points used by their comrades who routinely cross the border. They did not need to worry about anyone intercepting or stopping them on these routes. On the Afghan side, most of the territory they were passing through was already under Taleban control. On the Pakistani side, areas near these crossing points were either lawless or manned by government security forces who did not seem bothered by the movement of militants fighting the Afghan government and its allies.

Such ease of movement between the two countries has made it possible for local Taleban cadre to commute, on a regular basis, from one side of the de facto border to the other. Before going into details about two of the Taleban’s favourite crossing points, it might be useful to have an overview of the general cross-border movements of people between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The border is too long to be sealed

The Durand Line, which serves as the de facto border between the two countries, is about 2,400 kilometres long and passes through a third of Afghanistan’s provinces. It is non-demarcated and extremely porous, arbitrarily dividing communities who continue to maintain relations across the line. According to a former Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan, Rustam Shah Mohmand, there are 235 crossing points along the border, which translates into almost one crossing point per 10 kilometres. Only 20 of them are used frequently and only two of them have all the essential border controls in place, such as immigration, customs and security checkpoints. These are the most frequented: one is the Torkham Gate in eastern Nangarhar province and the other is the Wesh–Chaman Gate in the southern Kandahar province. While these two crossing points are used by people from across Afghanistan, the 18 other frequently used crossings are used mostly by the local population on both sides of the line and are motorable. They are also used by smugglers and traffickers of illicit drugs, as well as by militants fighting in both countries who want to reach major urban centres in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The rest of the crossing points are mostly local trails connecting one community or part of a community to another, but they do not usually lead to major cities in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

The multiplicity of routes along the long, porous Durand Line and the rugged terrain it runs through have long made it, in practice, impossible to completely ‘seal’. Long before the current wave of insurgency, in the 1980s, demands to seal the border were much stronger than they are now. Then, anti-government mujahedin insurgents regularly moved across the Durand Line to launch attacks inside Afghanistan. Like the Taleban, the mujahedin used Pakistan as a sanctuary, training centre and supply base, but in a much more open, public way. The then government in Kabul with support from the Soviet Union tried much harder to stop the cross-border movement of fighters and weapons. They failed. A declassified CIA report from 1981 concluded that closing the border to insurgent infiltration was not feasible unless the Soviets and the government in Kabul conducted massive and long-term operations and put in far greater resources than the Soviets were then doing. Taleban ‘commuting’ is therefore a time-honoured technique and its effectiveness well-proven.

The Taleban’s favourite entryways for infiltration and exfiltration

To illustrate the Taleban’s movement across the Durand Line in some detail, here is a brief description of the two crossing points most frequented by the insurgents along the southern zone, the Baramcha and the Badini crossing points:

1. The Bahramcha crossing point

Located in Helmand’s remote Dishu district, the Bahramcha crossing point is 300 kilometres south of the provincial capital, Lashkargah. The border passing through Dishu is 163 kilometres long. On the Pakistani side of the border line lies Chaghi, a predominantly Baloch district Chaghi, a district of Balochistan province, with  the Gerdi Jangal (sometimes spelled Jungle) town and refugee camp . The majority of the population on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border used to be Baloch, while, particularly on the Pakistani side, Pashtuns – mainly from the Eshaqzai tribe – have moved south latest since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as refugees. Dishu has been out of the control of the Afghan government since as early as 2003.

The wider area in which the Bahramcha crossing point is located saw some of the earliest signs of insurgency, starting in 2002, a year after the fall of the Taleban, according to the memoirs of one of its participants. Neither the Afghan government, nor the Pakistani authorities have any offices for registering the movement of people and supplies in Bahramcha. It is used both as a foot and motor crossing. It is the most used route for drug trafficking in Afghanistan and the border area hosts one of the biggest networks of heroin labs. The terrain is divided between sandy and mountainous environments.

Bahramcha is one of the most important crossing points for Taleban fighters, especially those from the south and south-western, as well as western provinces, such as Helmand, Farah, Nimroz, Herat and Ghor. (Kandahari and Uruzgani Taleban mostly use a crossing point in the Registan district in Kandahar province). Bahramcha and the broader Dishu district is lawless in terms of there not being a regular government, leaving the area to be ruled by the shadow government of the Taleban. The insurgent movement is in control of the drug market and its lucrative tax flow. Bahramcha is not only a major hub of drug processing labs, but also home to Taleban training camps and bomb production factories. This infrastructure supplies the Taleban battlefield in Helmand as well as in neighbouring Farah and Nimroz provinces.

The Afghan Taleban use this point for moving their fighters and transferring their wounded for treatment in Pakistan. Wounded fighters are mostly taken to private hospitals in the closest towns on the Pakistani side of the Durand line, namely Dalbandin and Chaghai. Those in need of further or more complicated surgical operations are taken to Quetta or Karachi. The Taleban also use this crossing point to connect to one of the main meeting places of the movement, Gerdi Jangal. Situated 360 kilometres from Quetta and 90 kilometres from the Afghan border, Gerdi Jangal is inhabited mostly by Eshaqzai , the majority of them originally from Helmand. This is the same tribe from which many Taleban leaders are drawn, including the powerful late leader Akhtar Mansur.

Taleban commanders and fighters from the southern, south-western and western provinces use this route for normal movement, between their homes in Pakistan and the battlefield, or if they live in Afghanistan, to visit leaders in Quetta and enjoy some R&R. One south-based Taleban cadre told AAN that some in the ranks move between Gerdi Jangal and Helmand on an almost regular basis, commuting weekly. They ride non-stop in groups of five to 15 on motorbikes from the southern districts of Helmand to Balochistan.

The same route is also the most preferred for high-level Taleban. According to senior Taleban sources, Akhtar Mansur was as familiar with the terrain and people on both sides of the border as any normal local trader. He would frequently move around the areas in and around Bahramcha and had an extensive network of contacts with the local population in the border areas from Bahramcha up to Nimroz, befriending influential figures along the border in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. According to sources familiar with his movements, Bahramcha and surrounding areas were also Mansur’s favourite retreat when he wanted to hide from the Pakistani authorities, when, for example, he came under pressure. Current Taleban leaders, such as key commanders, military chiefs and governors, also use the same route to travel from their homes in Pakistan ‘on mission’ to oversee operations on the ground. Several Taleban sources told AAN that at least six of the most senior military and civilian Taleban leaders have crossed into Helmand province using Bahramcha this year, alone.

When it comes to the experiences of insurgent networks with this border crossing, it was not the Taleban who discovered this route. In the 1980s, the Afghan mujahedin also used Bahramcha in a similar way, to get training and supplies from Pakistan and then move into Afghanistan to fight the Soviet occupation forces and the PDPA regime. Most of the mujahiden fighters who were active in the southern provinces, particularly in Helmand, used it for moving weapons, recruits and injured people. Beside the mujahiden, most Afghans from southern, south-western and western provinces seeking refuge in Pakistan also used this route. When the fight against the Soviets was over and civil war broke out between mujahedin factions, some mujahedin commanders smuggled the Russian military equipment they ‘inherited’ from the Soviets and the Kabul government into Pakistan for sale, using this same crossing point.

2. The Badini crossing point

Named after the area on the Pakistani side of the border, the Badini crossing point is located in the Shamulzai district of Zabul province. It borders Zhob district of Balochistan province on the Pakistani side and is located about 75 kilometres south of Qalat, the provincial capital of Zabul. According to a former Taleban official who was in charge of customs in Badini during the Taleban regime, this crossing point used to have all the usual border controls. During the Taleban era, he said, it was manned by security posts and goods were checked for customs.

After the fall of the Taleban in 2001, it seems the Afghan government has since tried to maintain active checkpoints here, manned by the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP). However, the number of the forces deployed is limited and does not cover all the motorable trails which travellers could take to cross the de facto border. This crossing serves as the most accessible and favourite entryway for the Taleban of Zabul and Ghazni and parts of Uruzgan, Wardak and Paktika provinces. It connects these provinces directly to a town known for being home to many Taleban in Pakistan, Kuchlak, 25 kilometres north of Quetta. There is a significant overlap in the tribal makeup of the local population on both sides of the line, with Kakar Pashtuns in the majority.

The Taleban have used the Badini crossing point since the insurgency kicked off in nearby provinces, from around 2005. One Taleban fighter, who travelled to Pakistan using this crossing point in 2010, said he did not see the Afghan National Border Police or any other security force at the crossing point. When he got to the Pakistani side, he said there were Pakistani border police, who let him and his comrades continue their trip unhindered. “The Pakistani border police did not stop us,” he said. “They just waved to us as a sign of welcome. We moved on with our motorbikes to reach Quetta. No one stopped us along the way.”

Taleban fighters usually pass the Badini crossing point in convoys of cars or motorbikes. For the wounded, if they can not be treated in local or regional hospitals inside Afghanistan, such as the major hospital hub in the Nawa district of Ghazni province, they are taken to Pakistan using Badini.

Just recently, in summer 2017, Taleban fighters in Ghazni and Zabul reported to AAN that the crossing point was blocked from the Afghan side. The rumour was that US forces were deployed to the border, making it impossible for Taleban to cross. Local officials in Zabul, however, rejected the reports of the deployment of foreign forces along the Durand line. In a couple of instances AAN know of, wounded Taleban fighters who could not be transferred to Pakistan due to the closure of Badini died from their wounds. In September 2017, Taleban fighters said the border crossing was opened for motorbikes and foot traffic only. It still closed to general vehicles.

The wider Badini area has also attracted the attention of government officials in the south because of what they say is the existence of Taleban training camps on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. The police chief of Kandahar, General Abdul Raziq, said in 2011 that the Taleban had training camps on the Pakistani side of the border near Badini. Raziq said that Taleban fighters were getting training not far from the eyes of the Pakistani police, one near the crossing and another nearby in Qamaruddin Karez and then were being sent to Afghanistan to fight.

Like other crossing points, Badini also has a history of cross-border movement from the 1980s, during the mujahiden insurgency against the Soviets. The mujahiden of the southern front, specifically Zabul, Ghazni, Uruzgan and partly Wardak provinces got their supplies from Pakistan and moved their men across the border using Badini. The border area remained out of the control of the then Soviet-backed government. Civilians from the same set of provinces also used this crossing point to flee to Pakistan.

Why do the Taleban find it easy to move across the border?

There are several reasons for the Taleban’s smooth cross-border travels at crossing points such as Bahramcha and Badini. What follows is a closer look at the major reasons, specifically the absence of government, the permissive behaviour of the Pakistani security agencies, the shared communal bonds across the border and the abundance of illegal networks that provide cover for the insurgents.

First, the absence of government security forces along these crossing points means the Taleban can readily travel between the two countries. The de facto border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is long, poorly demarcated and there are a multiplicity of formal and informal border crossings. This means it would need the deployment of a huge force and supporting resources to watch all the crossing points, even just the motorable ones. There has been no serious effort from the Afghan government to deploy troops to all the border points along the Durand Line which are, or could be used, by militants. It has established check points only at a limited number of the crossing points and the Taleban normally avoid these. The problem is that the main entry points used by the Taleban have long been out of the control of the Afghan government, meaning the government cannot deploy a force there.

It has been the Taleban’s well-thought out strategy when initiating its insurgency to threaten the government’s control around these crossing points. That is true for both Bahramcha and Badini. They were some of the earliest areas to slip out of the government’s control as the Taleban stated their comeback from 2003 onwards. It seems this was part of the Taleban’s strategy when planning their return in those early years. According to a former Taleban official who witnessed the initial discussions of comeback in the early years, many of the first-tier commanders of the first military shura that was formed in late spring 2003 started their operations from the areas near the border with Pakistan, in the provinces of Zabul, Kandahar and Helmand. The plan, he said, was to establish a toehold in areas with easy exit routes to Pakistan. Badini and Bahramcha along with the surrounding areas saw some of the highest concentration of commanders in those early years.

The second reason has been the permissive, friendly response that Taleban fighters receive from Pakistani forces. While the Afghan security apparatus has been unable to control the cross-border movement, or the government has been unwilling to allocate sufficient resources, there is apparently no such problem on the Pakistan side. As evidenced by the Taleban fighter’s quote above, the Pakistani forces posted there often greet the Taleban with a welcome, rather than trying to disrupt their movements. The lack of cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani border forces, or to put it more straightforwardly, the Taleban-friendly attitude of the Pakistani forces to the Afghan government’s enemies has encouraged Taleban fighters to travel as often as they want to.

Thirdly, the interwoven network of the tribal communities residing on the two sides of the Durand Line facilitate cross-border movement. In most cases, it is the same community with the same tribal structure divided only by a virtual border line. The communal relationship and the need for daily movement within such communities is the main reason why the Durand Line remains porous. This also allows insurgents who strike a chord with these communities to operate freely, using communal bonds. Initially, it is often insurgents with the same tribal affiliation who serve as trailblazers for such a route. Once the ‘co-tribalist’ Taleban find their way into a community, others follow suit, using the network and sympathy their comrades have made for the movement. Such relationships are enough for the local communities to make it easy and safe for Taleban to navigate the border areas. The Ishaqzais around the Bahramcha crossing point and the Kakars around Badini (but also beyond these areas) have long been key supporters of the Taleban.

Fourthly, there is an abundance of networks of smugglers and drug traffickers who have been using the same border crossings for a long time. The smuggler networks pre-date the current insurgency, and also facilitate it. They provide a cover for the militants, and relations between the two groups are usually cooperative. The Taleban can, therefore, find cover within the trans-border, local communities which are sympathetic to the insurgents and within the networks of illicit traders. In both cases, the Taleban are easily absorbed within the crowds of non-insurgent ‘commuters’.

The Taleban’s increasingly homeward movement

Since early this year, the Taleban have appeared to be suffering new pressure from their hitherto largely friendly host, Pakistan (possibly because Islamabad is under pressure from the United States to rein in the insurgents). With the caveat that this section is an ‘at-first-glance’ impression based on limited accounts from local residents and Taleban along the southern border (the same pressure is reported along the south-eastern border as well, according to local sources in Paktika, although AAN has not dug deeper here), rather than the result of in-depth examination, nevertheless, our interlocutors have said the Taleban are experiencing new pressure from Islamabad. They say the Taleban have been increasingly looking for alternatives to Pakistan inside Afghanistan for various ‘services’.

The trend had started much earlier, after 2014, of trying to rely less on Pakistan and move training camps and medical services inside Afghanistan. In 2015, many Taleban military leaders also moved into southern Afghanistan, using the Bahramcha crossing point, after some members were detained and others threatened after they failed to show up for talks hosted by Pakistan with the Afghan government (read more here). The movement into Afghanistan was also encouraged by the drawdown of international forces at the end of 2014, which, along with a change in targeting (with orders to concentrate on al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Khorasan Province or ISKP) meant a substantial decrease in the air power that had been used to target both Taleban leaders and mid-level commanders. The Taleban started to open local health facilities in the different areas of the south and hire local doctors to treat their wounded. One of the largest such centres, which was developed before 2014, is in Nawa district of Ghazni. However, air strikes by both the United States and Afghan airforces have been intensifying, as reported here, making it difficult for the Taleban to pursue their ‘Afghanisisation’. The insurgents will most likely have to scale back their hopes for coming home.

Restricting the militants’ movement is possible, but not stopping it

If border crossing could be made more difficult, the Taleban would likely look for shelter and bases within the civilian population inside Afghanistan. Increased air strikes would discourage them from building training camps, military bases and their own health facilities in ways visible from the air, but the movement would likely try to adapt, possibly by using civilian population centres and public facilities (for example, existing health centres and schools) as cover. The most important element of the insurgency, aside from the human, weapons, are increasingly available inside Afghanistan. Individual Taleban get arms when they are seized from the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and then split them as ‘war bounty’. Or, they buy them directly from members of the ANSF or from the black market. The exceptions are certain bomb-making explosives and chemicals.

Whether the Taleban’s cross-border infiltration and exfiltration could be made significantly more difficult is another question. The government would need to take control of the border areas where the most commonly used crossing points are located and introduce border controls. Such a concentrated and sustained effort has yet to be tried. Sealing the Durand Line entirely is, in practice, unfeasible without the commitment of a huge force permanently deployed to the 2,400-kilometre long de facto border and/or the solid support of local populations. It would also be politically undesirable: the Afghan government would not want to appear to be recognising the Durand Line by sealing it and dividing the local communities. This means the government is generally in favour of free, cross-border movement. Kabul wants the border to remain porous and with movement unrestricted for everyone, but for the militants. However, at the moment, they do not have the control to be able to pick and choose who moves.

Opting even for the less resource-intensive task of taking control of the main border crossings frequented by the Taleban could have a significant impact on the Taleban’s scale of operations. However, it would be unlikely to be decisive in turning the tide against the insurgents. As long as the insurgency continues to enjoy local support in some areas of Afghanistan, the Taleban could continue to operate within Afghanistan, despite restrictions on their cross-border travel.

Edited by Sari Kouvo and Kate Clark

There has been a six per cent decrease in the number of civilians killed and wounded in the conflict this year compared to the first nine months of 2016 – a year which saw record highs in civilian harm. The latest UNAMA report on civilian casualties provides, as always, sobering statistics of how Afghan civilians are being killed and injured in the war and by whom. AAN’s Kate Clark has been looking at the figures and assessing what they say about trends in the conflict. She also takes a special look at what the recently announced, intensified air campaign by the United States and Afghan air forces may mean for Afghan civilian casualties.

This latest report from UNAMA covers the first three quarters of this year (1 January to 30 September 2017), comparing them with the same period in 2016. It can be read here.)

There is some good news in UNAMA’s latest report, primarily that civilian casualties have fallen compared to the first nine months of last year. However, it was a slight decrease and masked a one per cent increase in civilian deaths. It was also only a reduction from a record high for civilian casualties in 2016. Such fluctuations in quarterly reporting have been seen before without annual reductions. (The last annual fall was in 2012 compared with 2011 – see AAN analysis here.) Even so, the reduction of six per cent in civilian deaths and injuries is welcome. In total, UNAMA documented 8,019 civilian casualties in the first nine months of the year (2,640 people killed and 5,379 injured).

What UNAMA defines as anti-government elements, ie insurgent groups, (1) were responsible for the bulk of the casualties: 5,167 overall (1,760 deaths and 3,407 injured) or 68 per cent of the total during the first nine months of 2017. They caused one per cent fewer civilian casualties compared to the same period last year. UNAMA attributed 66 per cent to the Taleban, 10 per cent to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), aka Daesh, and the remainder to “unidentified Anti-Government Elements, including self-proclaimed Daesh/ISKP.” The figure for ISKP is huge, considering their limited territorial footprint, but is a consequence of their willingness to attack unprotected gatherings of civilians for sectarian reasons. (See recent AAN analysis here.)

Civilian casualties attributed to pro-government forces – UNAMA’s term for Afghan government and international forces (primarily the United States, which is now the only country with a combat mission in Afghanistan) and militias under their control (2) – were 19 per cent lower, compared to the first nine months of 2016. Pro-government forces were responsible for 1,578 civilian casualties (560 deaths and 1,018 injured), or 20 per cent of the total. Over half of these occurred during ground fighting.

UNAMA said it could not attribute eleven per cent of civilian casualties to either side, but said they occurred during fighting. (3)

Causes of civilian deaths and injuries 

The fall in civilian casualties so far this year was particularly marked in ground engagements, which is still the largest overall cause of civilian harm. Deaths and injuries here fell by 15 per cent overall and by 37 per cent in those attributed to pro-government forces. UNAMA reported a seven per cent rise in casualties from anti-government elements in ground engagements. Ground engagements caused 35 per cent of civilian casualties in the first nine months this year – 2,807 overall (684 deaths and 2,123 injuries)

UNAMA said the government’s commitment to mitigating civilian casualties had “led to fewer civilian deaths and injuries from their operations.” This was particularly marked in the north-east. (4) This was a change in tone from UNAMA’s 2016 annual report when it called for a cessation in the use of indirect use of mortars, rockets, grenades and other weapons in civilian-populated areas. “[C]lear tactical directives, rules of engagement and other procedures,” it said, needed to be developed for the use of explosive weapons.

The other factor, however, reducing the casualties in ground engagements was that there were less of them this year. Frontlines have been relatively static in the south, (5) unlike last year which saw heavy fighting in both Helmand and Uruzgan provinces, including two attempts by the Taleban to capture Lashkargah in Helmand and insurgent offensives against Tirin Kot in Uruzgan, as well as attacks on many of the districts of those two provinces. In the north, the Taleban also overran most parts of Kunduz city, before being driven back. This year, so far, there have been no major Taleban offensives against any large population centres.

One factor, not mentioned by UNAMA, may be the increased threat to the Taleban from the air, with both the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and US Air Force increasing the numbers of sorties flown and munitions dropped (more on this below). This may be reversing a trend seen from 2014 onwards, when ground engagements became the main cause of civilian casualties (the trend was visible from 2013. This had come about, as international aircraft were withdrawn and the Taleban were able to mass in large numbers and launch ground offensives without fear of being wiped out from the air. Significantly, the increase in the casualties from the Taleban side this year were largely from “small arms fire”, not heavy weapons.

Both the US and Afghan air forces have become more active in 2016 and that is reflected in the civilian casualties resulting from aerial strikes. Although still representing only six per cent of the total number of civilian casualties reported, the increase in the actual numbers was sharp: 52 per cent more civilians were killed and injured from the air in the first nine months of 2017, compared with the same period in 2016, with two thirds of the casualties women and children. 466 civilians were killed and injured in aerial operations in the first nine months of the year (205 deaths and 261 injuries). UNAMA attributed 38 per cent of those casualties to the international military (the remainder would be either from the Afghan Air Force or made up of incidents which could not be attributed to either.) The issue of airstrikes will be analysed in more detail below.

Other trends made evident in UNAMA reporting were a four per cent decrease in casualties from suicide and complex attacks, although that included 13 per cent more deaths. Such attacks result in 20 per cent of total civilian casualties – 1,584 in all (382 deaths and 1,202 injuries).

There was also a reduction in the number of civilian casualties from IEDs. They were responsible for 18 per cent all civilian casualties in the first nine months of the year, a reduction of eight per cent compared to the same period in 2016. There were 1,403 casualties (498 deaths and 905 injuries) from IEDs. The use of indiscriminate and therefore unlawful pressure-plate IEDs on roads used by civilians led to 803 civilian casualties (371 deaths and 432 injured), reflecting an 11 per cent increase in deaths from these devices. A quarter of these fatalities were children.

Many more civilians have been killed and injured in targeted and deliberate killings this year: there was a 13 per cent overall increase in casualties and a 33 per cent spike in civilian deaths. UNAMA said it had documented “disturbing trends of intentional killings targeting religious leaders, civilians perceived to support the Government or Afghan national security forces, and continued attacks against civilian Government workers and judicial and prosecutorial figures.”

Another troubling statistic was the many Shia Muslim Afghans killed and injured in the first nine months of the year. There were 278 civilian casualties (84 deaths and 194 wounded) of worshipers targeted as they attended mosques or religious ceremonies. (See recent AAN reporting here).

Air strikes and Civilian Casualties

Only six per cent of all civilian casualties in the conflict up to 30 September 2017 were a result of air strikes. While bearing this in mind and also the tendency for air strikes, particularly those conducted by the US Air Force, to receive a disproportionate attention in the Afghan and international media, it seemed reasonable to look at this issue in more detail, given the 52 per cent rise in casualties caused by them in the first nine months of the year (a trend continuing from 2016). It is especially relevant given the plans to intensify the US and Afghan air campaign further and, on the US side, the loosening of restrictions on when air strikes can be ordered.

Last year, in its 2016 annual report on the protection of civilians, UNAMA called for “an immediate halt to the use of airstrikes in civilian-populated areas and… greater restraint in the use of airstrikes where civilians are likely to be present.” It also wanted “[C]lear tactical directives, rules of engagement and other procedures” developed and implemented for the use of armed aircraft. In this report, it “reiterated its concern at continued increases in civilian casualties from aerial attacks, particularly among women and children.”

On 10 October 2017, the US and NATO commander in Afghanistan General Nicholson warned the Taleban that “a tidal wave of air power is on the horizon.” Both the US and Afghan air forces are flying more sorties, dropping more munitions and planning further increases in operations. The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported a 24 per cent increase in personnel in the Afghan Air Force in the second quarter of 2017, compared to the first quarter and an 83 per cent increase in sorties flown over the same three months. Some of that was due to “a slightly lower tempo of operations in the winter months,” it said, but it was largely due to “a considerable increase in the AAF’s recent operational activity.” It did not report on the number of munitions dropped.

Meanwhile, the US Air Force has also been more active, dropping munitions in quantities not seen since ‘the surge’ – the period 2009 to 2012 when 100,000 US troops came to be deployed to fight the Taleban (NB the first easily available data on US air munitions and sorties is from 2012) (6). The US Airforce has reported that September 2017 “marked a record high month for weapons employed in Afghanistan since 2012, with 751 munitions being delivered against Taliban and ISIS–Khorasan targets; a 50 percent jump from August.” The nearest known comparable months are July and August 2012, with, respectively, 504 and 509 munitions dropped. The comparable yearly figures are 947 munitions delivered by the US Air Force in Afghanistan in 2015, 1,337 in 2016 and, already in the first nine months of this year, 3,238. (Data here)

In testimony to the US Congress on 4 October 2017, Secretary of State for Defence Jim Mattis described how President Trump had made it easier to launch air strikes. (His comments were widely reported, although the transcript of the hearing has yet to be published):

“At one time, sir, we could not help Afghan forces unless they were in extremis” — that is, under direct, urgent threat, Mattis said. “And then eventually that was rescinded, but they still had to be in proximity. They had to be in contact [ie coming under fire from insurgents]. Today, wherever we find them, the terrorists — anyone trying to throw the NATO plan off, trying to attack the Afghan people and the Afghan government — then we can go after them.”

President Obama had already loosened restrictions imposed under the 2014 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) which had only allowed combat operations against al Qaeda and “its associates”. From June 2016, strikes could also be ordered against the Taleban and for “strategic effects” (for example to prevent a population centre falling to the Taleban) and not just “counter-terrorism” (for more detail, see earlier AAN analysis on the US military strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, who also testified to Congress, gave further details or the changes.

“The conditions aren’t specific to, as Sec. Mattis alluded to, a specific engagement or a specific time,” Dunford added. “So if they’re in an assembly area, a training camp, and we know they’re an enemy and a threat to the Afghan government, our mission or our people, [US and NATO commander in Afghanistan] Gen. Nicholson has the wherewithal and flexibility to make that decision.”

Significantly, the extra 3500 or so US forces, announced on 3 October 2017 as being deployed to Afghanistan are operating at a much lower level. They are operating in battalions, rather than just advising at corps headquarters. Mattis referred to them as combat troops: “The fighting will continue to be carried out by our Afghan partners,” he said, “but our advisers will accompany tactical units to advise and bring NATO fire support to bear when needed… Make no mistake, this is combat duty.” It seems the post-2014 fudge when President Obama wanted to carry on fighting in Afghanistan and insist that the combat mission was over, when it was not clear which US forces were involved in ‘the can be combat’ US Freedom Sentinel’s mission and the non-combat NATO Resolute Support mission is at an end. US forces will now be openly deployed in the field, calling in airstrikes and providing direct tactical advice on the front lines to Afghan forces.

The Afghan Air Force is doing better than it has before – although the historical precedents are very poor. War crimes reporting from before 2002 shows the sustained use of the Afghan Air Force to target civilians, when it was controlled by the PDPA (a junior partner to the Soviet air force which carried out widespread bombing of rural areas in the 1980s) and later by Shura-e Nazar and Jombesh, who got hold of the remnants of the air force after the fall of the PDPA regime in 1992 and used them to bomb civilian areas during the civil war in Kabul (all factions also used artillery indiscriminately in the capital). The Taleban, who seized some of those even fewer remaining air assets also used them to bomb civilians, including the hospital and Oxfam office in Yakowlang, in Bamyan province in 2001, and opposition-held parts of Dara-ye Suf district, in Samangan province in 2000, even bombing people who fled the town and tried to seek shelter in the mountains.

The current Afghan Air Force may not be targeting civilians as its previous incarnations did, but it has to do much more to avoid civilian casualties. UNAMA notes that, in October 2017, the Government formally endorsed the National Policy on Civilian Casualty Prevention and Mitigation, which covers all of the ANSF, not just the air force. The UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in Afghanistan, Tadamichi Yamamoto, said there must be a full implementation of the new policy and in particular: “…ensure the impartial examination and systematic tracking of civilian casualties and is legally obliged to ensure independent investigations into any incidents causing civilian casualties that may amount to serious violations of international humanitarian law.”

It is especially necessary to watch how the Afghan Air Force develops, given that its role is planned to expand markedly in the next five years. This expansion is a key component of the current US/Afghan military strategy (see here and here) and training, hardware and considerable US funding is in the pipeline. (7)

Assessing the plans to intensify the air campaign

That many more Afghan civilians have been killed and injured in air strikes so far this year compared to 2016 is clear. From the data available, though, it is impossible to determine whether, proportionate to the number of strikes, more civilians are being killed and injured (which would indicate poorer efforts to protect civilian casualties) or not. In calculating the overall calculus of civilian harm from air strikes, the decrease in casualties from ground engagements, which may partly be a result of the increased air deterrent on the Taleban, would also need to be factored in. Nevertheless, there are elements of the US and Afghan strategy to increase the use of air strikes which already ring alarm bells.

First, compared to the pre-2014 period, the US military command is far less transparent: in those earlier years, there was a real engagement with national and international organisations (including the UN and concerned NGOs, such as AAN) on how to mitigate civilian casualties. There was also a genuine effort, in training, tactical directives, (8) command and control, reporting and investigating, to minimise the harm to civilians. The US motivation was the realisation of the damage that dead and injured Afghan civilians were doing to its war effort. That emphasis on protecting civilians is no longer evident.

Pre-2014, there was also much more political pressure to avoid civilian casualties: an angry President Karzai and frequently outraged Afghan media has been replaced by the rather silent President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah and a far more subdued media. The current government recognises its dependence on the US and has been far less likely to criticise. If civilian casualties really rise, however, popular discontent may force this onto the political agenda again.

The second question, however, is what is the overall aim of this policy? General Nicholson, delivering Black Hawk helicopters to the Afghan Air Force at what The Washington Post described as an “elaborately staged ceremony at Kandahar Air Base [which] marked the formal launch of an ambitious plan to modernize and expand the Afghan air force over the next five years” (see here), vowed that the escalation of the air campaign would be “the beginning of the end for the Taliban.” His words brought a strong sense of déjà vu, not only claims made during the surge years, but even earlier, to 2001, claims that in the end amounted to nothing.

If the intensified air campaign is just aimed at pushing the Taleban back, although we may see that happen, we would also likely see the insurgents adapting their strategy. They did this before, after suffering huge losses in ground engagements in 2006 and 2007. They also bounced back very rapidly after US surge troops left and then most international forces withdrew in 2014; Afghan forces proved unable to hold the territory that the foreign troops had won. The Afghan insurgency tends to adapt, which means that new strategies and the creation or expansion of forces have not, in the long run, lead to territory being held, civilians protected or there being any decisive reduction in the level of violence: the war continues, in different ways. The US and Afghan strategy only makes sense – unless a forever war is really the preferred option – if any gains against the Taleban are exploited politically and the same energy and commitment is put into finding a political, negotiated end to the war, as has been shown in fighting it.

(1) In UNAMA’s 2016 Protection of Civilians, it wrote:

Anti-Government Elements encompass all individuals and armed groups involved in armed conflict with or armed opposition against the Government of Afghanistan and/or international military forces. They include those who identify as ‘Taliban’ as well as individuals and non-State organized armed groups taking a direct part in hostilities and assuming a variety of labels including the Haqqani Network, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkari Tayyiba, Jaysh Muhammed, groups that identify as “Daesh”/Islamic State Khorasan Province and other militia and armed groups pursuing political, ideological or economic objectives including armed criminal groups directly engaged in hostile acts on behalf of a party to the conflict.

(2) UNAMA in its 2016 Protection of Civilians report wrote:

The term “Pro-Government Forces” includes the Afghan Government’s national security forces and other forces and groups that act in military or paramilitary counter-insurgency operations and are directly or indirectly under the control of the Government of Afghanistan. These forces include, but are not limited to, the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Border Police, National Directorate of Security and Afghan Local Police – which operate under Government legal structures – and pro-Government armed groups and militias that have no basis in Afghan law and do not operate under formal Government structures. This term also includes international military forces and other foreign intelligence and security forces. 

(3) Some will have resulted from ‘explosive remnants of war’ left over from fighting. They killed 134 civilians and injured 378, most of them children. The Afghan government has now formally ratified Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons concerning explosive remnants of war. “The implementation of this protocol,” said Danielle Bell, Chief of UNAMA’s Human Rights Service, “which will come into effect in February 2018, will prevent many similar and avoidable casualties from occurring in the future”

(4) UNAMA includes in the northeastern region, Badakhshan, Baghlan, Takhar, and Kunduz provinces.

(5) UNAMA defines the southern region as comprising Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan, and Zabul.

(6) Thanks to Jack Serle from the Drone Warfare project at The Bureau of Investigative Journalism for pointing out, after publication, that there is data cached. While the US Air Force has stripped away old numbers, he said, Alexa O’Brian has archived pre-2012 air power summaries here.

(7) SIGAR’s most recent report, to the end of June 2017, reported that:

As of May 18, 2017, the United States has appropriated approximately: $5.2 billion to support and develop the AAF since FY [financial year] 2010, with roughly $1.5 billion of it requested in FY 2017. Of the total amount since 2010, $2.2 billion was spent on the Special Mission Wing, the special operations branch of the AAF. CSTC-A [Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan] noted that the FY 2017 figure includes DOD’s recent request to Congress for $814.5 million to fund the Afghan Aviation Transition Plan (AATP), which will replace the AAF’s aging, Russian-made Mi-17 fleet with refurbished, U.S.-made UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters obtained from U.S. Army stocks. 

It added:

The AAF’s current inventory of aircraft includes:

• 4 Mi-35 helicopters
• 46 Mi-17 helicopters (19 unusable)
• 27 MD-530 helicopters (one unusable, two combat losses)
• 24 C-208 utility airplanes
• 4 C-130 transport airplanes (one unusable)
• 19 A-29 light attack airplanes (12 are currently in Afghanistan and seven are in the United States supporting AAF pilot training)

SIGAR also said that:

As part of the AATP, over the next several years, the AAF will receive a significant number of new or refurbished airframes to grow the AAF’s inventory. According to USFOR-A, in FY 2017, two more A-29 aircraft have been purchased, but not yet fielded. In order to replace the AAF’s aging Mi-17s, the United States has also procured 53 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as well as 30 MD-530s, three AC-208s, and four additional A-29 aircraft (for a total of six) using FY 2017 funds.289 While the delivery timelines and training requirements are still being determined, by the end of the AATP in 2023, the AAF will have a total of 61 UH-60s, 58 Fixed Forward Firing UH-60, 54 MD-530s, 24 C-208s, 32 AC-208s, 4 C-130 aircraft, and 25 A-29s.

(8)  In 2012, the then commander of US and NATO forces, General John Allen issued a new ‘fragmentary order’ altering the tactical directives outlining offensive fires could be delivered. Civilian residences could no longer be targeted unless, as Allen said, “my troops are pinned down, can’t move, and the only option they have is to deliver fires on these structures, or I decide, the senior leader out here, I decide to deliver fires on these structures.” The result, he of the new order, he said, was that civilian causalities as a result of air fires, “plummeted immediately.” Before then, air fire had been the main way in which civilians were killed by ‘pro-government forces’ (international military and ANSF together), killing four times as many civilians as any other tactic.

 A new political group called ‘Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan’ has emerged in Afghanistan’s crowded political field. It presents itself as being in opposition to the National Unity Government and has called for “a return to the constitution.” The group has been seen from the outset as pro-Karzai. He, meanwhile, seems to have intensified his attempts (once again) to stage a comeback in the political arena. Yet, there are also growing political differences between the group and former president. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili (with input by Thomas Ruttig) looks at the background of some of the group’s leading members and its perceived link with the former president and asks where the two might diverge or converge.

The launch

On 16 July 2017, another new political group called Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan (the People’s Axis of Afghanistan) declared its existence with the pointed motto of “returning to the constitution” and in so doing, “returning to political legitimacy.” The new group’s motto makes clear – as have its leading members ­– that it considers the National Unity Government (NUG) unconstitutional and illegitimate because it has not fulfilled some of the core stipulations of the September 2014 agreement which formed the basis of its existence. The NUG had a deadline of two years to convene a loya jirga tasked with deciding whether to amend the constitution and create a permanent post of executive prime minister. To convene the jirga, it also had to hold elections for district councils ­– the constitution stipulates that the heads of district councils attend – and parliamentary elections – now more than two years overdue. (Read the full text of the agreement here) (1) The NUG has failed to carry out these tasks within the deadline.

That failure has provided an opportunity for various political groups that have emerged over the past few years (AAN’s analysis here and here) to question the legitimacy of the NUG. (2) However, almost all of them have chosen not to burn all bridges with the government, as they mainly seek to pressure it in order to acquire, or regain, a share of government positions. Unlike these groups, Mehwar has presented itself in outright opposition to the NUG and has vowed not to become part of it, that is to say, it has said its leaders will not accept any positions that might be offered.

Criticism of the NUG as a jumping-off point

Rahmatullah Nabil, who acts as the unofficial leader of the group, turned into a vocal critic of the NUG after he resigned from his position as Director of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) on 10 December 2015 over differences with President Ghani vis-à-vis Pakistan (read AAN’s report on his resignation here. In his speech at Mehwar’s inauguration ceremony, he called the NUG an “illegitimate authority,” as it had “come into existence, not on the basis of the people’s votes, but based on an agreement between the two election teams and in conflict with articles of the constitution.” He added that the NUG “itself is the fundamental challenge for [solving] all the existing problems and crises” and ruled out any prospect of working with it, saying: “Mehwar-e Mardom, in no way, wants to be a partner in political power with the National Unity Government. From this perspective, we announce emphatically that our struggle is not for acquiring position and status in this illegitimate authority.”

Senior members of Mehwar-e Mardom have adopted the same tone. Ajmal Baluchzada, a former civil society activist (3) and head of Mehwar’s secretariat, told AAN on 28 September 2017 that the NUG had “created a crisis, is not able to manage it and evades tackling it.” He explained this crisis as being the “unconstitutional formation” of the NUG, its failures to implement the political agreement, the persistent disagreements between the president and the chief executive, between the president and his vice-president and ministers, and the illegitimacy of the parliament, suggesting that all these factors have rendered the NUG incapable of reform.

Membership and prominent leaders

On the day of its launch, Mehwar issued a press release, describing itself as a “broad political umbrella, the shared home of ethnic groups and conscientious and elite citizens of Afghanistan,” which “wants to carry out its unending struggle towards institutionalisation of political legitimacy and realisation of democracy as a functioning, active opposition in conjunction and aligned with the people of Afghanistan.”

In a conversation with AAN on 14 September 2017, Nabil claimed that “Mehwar comprises of people from different provinces [and political backgrounds], both leftists and rightists, and people from different generations.” He further asserted that the group came together after “an in-depth analysis of the past 40 years” of Afghan conflicts which had concluded that those conflicts had an external source, namely “a group [that] emerged in the political arena, brought a [policy] copy from the Kremlin and disregarded the traditional society in favour of the intellectual class and rejected the traditional society.” This was a reference to the Soviet-backed, left-leaning People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (later Homeland Party; AAN background here) that ruled the country following a coup d’état between 1978 and 1992. According to Nabil, however, the Afghan people have suffered both from what is often categorised as leftist extremism and Islamic fundamentalism as well as ethnic discrimination. He said, “People were imprisoned or disappeared for the ‘crime’ of growing a beard. People were killed in their hundreds both for the ‘crimes’ of praying and not praying. People sporting surma (kohl) got killed [referring to Pashtuns], (4) people with small eyes got killed [referring to Hazaras], people with big noses [referring to Pashtuns] got killed.” He said that Mehwar intended to initiate a “cross-current” dialogue.

The group’s constitution says that it is run by a leadership council of between “40 and 101 members.” Nabil told AAN on 14 September 2017 there were around 75 founding members who, as a stopgap measure, “constitute the leadership council… [u]ntil the convening of the first general assembly of Mehwar,” as the group’s constitution sets out. This means that it is still open to new entries. There are conflicting reports, however, about who exactly is on this body, including from within Mehwar itself. Two senior leaders told AAN that they were still developing a list of the members. In the absence of such a list, Mehwar officials continue to contradict each other when it comes to who are is leading the group.

This said, Nabil (AAN’s previous reporting on his background here and here) and another leading member, former chief electoral officer and transport and civil aviation minister Daud Ali Najafi, confirmed to AAN that most of the names published by Kabul daily Etilaat Roz and Fars news agency on 17 July 2017, the day after the inauguration, were correct. In addition to Nabil and Najafi themselves, Mehwar members include:

At least four other former ministers from the Karzai era – Rangin Dadfar Spanta (former foreign affairs minister, now head of Mehwar’s political committee), Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defence), Daud Shah Saba (Mines), Karim Brahwi (Borders and Tribal Affairs, also a former governor of Nimroz), and a former deputy minister, Mirza Muhammad Yarmand (Interior);

At least two other former governors, Amer Muhammad Akhundzada (also Nimruz) and Tamim Nuristani (Nuristan)

MPs, including Shakiba Hashemi (Kandahar), Saleh Muhammad Saljuki (Herat) and Jafar Mahdawi (Kabul)

Civil society activists and prominent individuals, including Daud Naji, former journalist and currently senior member of the Enlightening Movement (see AAN’s reporting about the movement here and here), Azarakhsh Hafezi, head of international relations of Afghanistan‘s Chamber of Commerce and Industry and board member of the country’s International Chamber of Commerce, Metra Hemmat, another civil society activist, and Obaidullah Alekozai, head of the Ulema Council of Afghanistan’s eastern zone.

Najafi also provided the following additional names that he said were on the list of founding members: Zalmai Rasul, another foreign minister under Karzai and a 2014 presidential candidate; Spanta’s confidant, Daud Muradian, who runs the Kabul-based policy think tank Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies; and Shiwayi Sharaq, a member of the Uprising for Change Movement (see AAN’s previous report on the movement here). Moreover, unlike Nabil, Najafi also confirmed the membership of Kandahar police chief and strongman General Abdul Razeq and former deputy national security adviser Ibrahim Spinzada (better known as Engineer Ibrahim) who was one of the most influential people in the Karzai administration. Najafi added, though, that Razeq, as a serving general, did not participate in meetings.

Mehwar does not define itself as a political party, although some media do – see for example here and here). Nabil’s denial of Razeq’s association with Mehwar look to be aimed at protecting Razeq. Afghan law bans serving members of the security forces from joining political parties, and last month President Muhammad Ashraf Ghani issued a decree again banning members of the armed forces from joining political parties and also taking part in demonstrations). The Mehwar leaders might also have denied Razeq’s association with their organisation because he has well-known and long-standing allegations of torture and killings against him (by the United Nations Committee against Torture, as well as other human rights organisations. His membership would certainly contradict membership criteria, which, according to Nabil, are in place: “Those who join us should not,” he told AAN “be human rights violators recognised by Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the international community, be corrupt, tolerate discrimination, be wrapped in the politics of deal-making.”

Apart from Razeq, none of the politicians mentioned as Mehwar founders currently hold any government position. With this, as Hasht-e Sobh columnist Ferdaws put it, the group has drawn a boundary between itself, as opposition, and the government – in contrast to most of the other existing political groups that insist that they are not in opposition, but just critical of some aspects of the government’s policies. This includes the Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan, established under the leadership of Abdul Rabb Rasul Sayyaf in late 2015. Interestingly, two Mehwar leaders – Wardak and Rasul – were previously listed as members of this council.

Ex-president Karzai’s role

Despite the fact that former president Karzai was not present at the inauguration ceremony and is not an official member of the group either, from the very outset, Mehwar was seen in the Afghan media and by the public as a pro-Karzai political organisation. In the view of columnist Ferdaws, for example, “the presence of Najafi and a number of others in the political organisation of Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan shows that Hamed Karzai holds influence over this organisation.” The group, he said, is perceived as the “continuation of Karzai’s efforts to dominate the political environment of the country”.

Mehwar’s clear-cut opposition to the NUG indeed corresponds with Karzai’s repeated and fierce criticism of the current government. In advance of the NUG’s second anniversary on 29 September 2016 – which Karzai considers its expiry date – he repeated his call for a loya jirga to “restore legitimacy and confidence in the NUG,” warning that failure to do so would “cause problems for our land and increase discontent.” (See AAN’s previous reporting here) (5) This year, he has stepped up his networking activities and made a new push for his loya jirga plan. He used the Eid-ul-Adha holiday in early September 2017 to pay visits to the homes of influential politicians such as Muhammad Adib Fahim, the 32 year old son of the late Marshal Fahim and First Deputy Director of NDS, chairman of the Ahmad Shah Massud Foundation and leading member of the Jamiat-e Islami party Ahmad Wali Massud (AAN analysis here) and Second Deputy Chief Executive Muhammad Mohaqeq. He is also a senior members of the semi-opposition group, the Coalition for Salvation of Afghanistan. (Also known as the ‘Ankara coalition,’ this quasi-opposition group was formed by internal NUG dissenters and northern strongmen and also includes First Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum, foreign minister and acting chairman of Jamiat Salahuddin Rabbani, and Balkh governor Atta Muhammad Nur (see AAN’s previous report here). Former minister of water and energy and Herat strongman Ismail Khan also told the local Hushdar news agency, on 8 October 2017, that Karzai had called him a few days before to say that he would send documents outlining his programme for the way out of the current situation of the country and how to take action to solve the problems. According to a source close to Mehwar, Karzai had also approached a senior member during the Eid holidays and asked why the organisation was not supporting his jirga idea.

On 13 September 2017, Yusuf Saha, a press officer for Karzai, tried to play down these contacts when he told AAN that the visits were not in pursuit of any political agenda. However, Ahmad Wali Massud, has confirmed that Karzai did come to see him to discuss the loya jirga. Saha said that Karzai:

…now proposes that if [the parliamentary] elections [scheduled for July 2018] are not held and the security situation continues to deteriorate even after the announcement of the new US strategy as it has deteriorated after the signing of the bilateral security agreement, the loya jirga is an alternative. The loya jirga will be for finding solutions to the crises and problems facing Afghanistan.

Karzai has also stuck to his sharp, anti-American rhetoric. While many Afghan politicians and large segments of the general public welcomed the new United States military strategy presented on 22 August 2017, Karzai announced his opposition to it in a series of tweets in English, as well as a statement in Pashto. (6) His latest denunciation, on 7 October 2017, during an interview with the BBC, even went as far as to accuse the US of “bringing up” and supporting Daesh. He also called for a ‘traditional loya jirga”’ to review the new US strategy and assure Afghanistan’s neighbours that its soil wold not be used in favour of American and others’ interest. Traditional loya jirgas, also called ‘consultative loya jirgas’, were a Karzai invention largely aimed at shoring up domestic support for actions that he wanted to take or wanted to avoid responsibility for taking, or sometimes to stir up debate (see AAN analysis here, here and here and here). As president, he was very much in charge of who attended and could steer the outcome; that would no longer be the case.

On the domestic level, Karzai has also tried to repair his image as a national figure by distancing himself from the Taleban. In particular, on 23 April 2017, two days after a deadly attack by Taleban infiltrators on the army corps headquarters in Balkh province, Karzai said that he would no longer call the Taleban his brothers: “With consideration of [this] act in which the [Taleban] killed our people, I can no longer call them brothers. I rather address them as a group which poses harm to Afghanistan; anyone who kills an Afghan for the sake of foreigners’ objectives is a terrorist whether it is Taliban, Daesh or anyone else.” A year earlier, he had caused an unprecedented outpouring of anger against him when he said in an interview with the BBC on 24 September 2016 that the Taleban were an “Afghan force that [can] come and capture a territory” and the Afghan National Security Forces, also as an Afghan force, did not have the right to take it back from the Taleban. As a response, during a ceremony held on 30 September 2016 to commemorate the anniversary of the death former president Borhanuddin Rabbani, some participants chanted “death to Karzai” while he was in attendance. See AAN’s reporting here.

Many Afghan and foreign observers have interpreted Karzai’s statements and active networking as signs that he continues to harbour ambitions of taking up a leading political position again, despite denials, and the fact that the constitution rules out a third stint as president. For instance, on 21 September 2017, Foreign Policy wrote: “It has been three years since the former Afghan president, once a close ally of the United States who depended on American backing, left his old role. He is adamant that he has no interest in returning to the presidency. But Karzai is far from retired.”

Karzai, however, did try and fail to exploit the NUG’s two-year anniversary to his advantage after many of the previously existing political groups with whom he had maintained some sort of connection did not pick up his call. In particular, the Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan led by Sayyaf, one of Karzai’s key advisors when he was president, did not embrace his agenda.

Political divergence between Karzai and Mehwar

Karzai’s ambitions, his unstinting condemnation of the US and his rejection of elections as a way out of what is characterises as “the current crises of legitimacy with the parliament and the NUG alike” all seem to have made Mehwar reluctant to be seen to be associated with him. Karzai’s volatile behaviour in dealing with the international community, wrote one commentator in 8 Sobh newspaper, could become “the group’s Achilles heal,” given that Mahwar wants to be seen as a new political start-up.

Indeed, in contrast to Karzai, Mehwar-e Mardom has adopted a more cautious stance towards the new US strategy for Afghanistan. On 23 August 2017, in a Facebook post, it welcomed “President Trump’s new stance on how to tackle [the] terrorist heartlands” and “the US President’s decision to not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, including through the state-building exercise” and urged the US government to “take practical steps and mount the necessary pressure on Pakistan to destroy terrorist nests and fight terrorism.” At the same time, and corresponding with Karzai’s position, it expressed concern about “insisting on the use of military force” inside Afghanistan and Trump’s “ambiguity about the privatisation of Afghanistan’s war.”

Nabil has denied to AAN that Karzai is behind Mehwar. He insisted that the former president did not have “any role at all” in the organisation. He alleged that the government was “highlighting [a Karzai] role” to undermine the new group and said, “Most of our members are critical of Karzai Saheb.” Najafi reinforced Nabil’s point, “Since most of us worked with him [in the past], it is said that we are also currently with him.” A senior Mehwar member, who did want to be quoted by name, hinted that Karzai’s personal ambitions were a problem for the organisation, “I personally think that he [Karzai] wants something like: people saying in the jirga, ‘Mr President, please step in. The country is in crisis.’” Nabil, however, spoke dismissively of the possible jirga, indirectly putting down any possible hope Karzai might harbour of leverage it for political gain. “I believe that the jirga is just a tool,” he told AAN. “What will the outcome be? Is it just to [re-]distribute the [government] positions?”

On Karzai’s part, his press officer Saha was categorical about the former president’s position: he did not “have any direct relation with Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan and what is said in the media – that the president is leading the group – is untrue.”

On a side note, Mehwar has also sought to (at least publicly) disassociate itself from former foreign minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, who is a contentious figure because of his continued affiliation with Karzai and the views he shares with his former boss. One senior Mehwar member told AAN that Spanta was no longer a key member of the group due to his continued attachment to Karzai and that he had recently been replaced by Hamed Saburi as head of the organisation’s political committee. Yet, Spanta did speak during a recent Mehwar seminar, on 21 September 2017 in Kabul, held under the title, “The National Unity Government after three years”. In that speech, he said that friendly relations with neighbouring and regional countries were more important than strategic cooperation with America. A photo, taken of him speaking, featured on Mehwar’s Facebook page where he was still identified as a member of its leadership council.

The election issue

Offering evidence that Mehwar has no link to Karzai, both Nabil and Najafi told AAN they were opposed to the loya jirga plan advanced by Karzai. Nabil pointed out that he had rejected this as a Mehwar position at its inauguration ceremony. In its 16 July statement, the group said it “believes that the political power should be entrusted, through free, fair and transparent elections, to those political forces and groups that are victorious in democratic elections.” Nabil and Najafi both told AAN that Mehwar was engaged in intensive discussions regarding the viability of holding elections next year. Nabil said “We seek to discuss with all currents on whether elections are held or not. If yes, will they be transparent or plagued by corruption? Do you have any plan?”

Najafi said they had already had “three or four meetings with the Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan [led by Sayyaf and including former minister of interior Omar Daudzai and several Jamiat leaders including Ismail Khan, Yunos Qanuni and Besmellah Muhammadi], the New National Front [led by former finance minister Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi (7)] and the High Council of Jihadi and National Parties [that includes, inter alia, former president Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, former vice-president and current head of the High Peace Council Abdul Karim Khalili and head of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan Sayyed Hamed Gailani]” and were working “on a plan about transparency and changes to the IEC [Independent Election Commission].”

These meetings have now culminated in the formation of a new group: Shura-ye Tafahum-e Jiryanha-ye Siyasi Afghanistan (Understanding Council of Political Currents of Afghanistan) which includes Mehwar-e Mardom, the Coalition for Salvation of Afghanistan (the Ankara group), Sayyaf’s Council for Protection and Stability, Ahadi’s New National Front; former interior minister Nur ul-Haq Ulomi’s Mutahed Milli (National United) Party, the Loy Kandahar Unity and Coordination Movement, the Eastern Provinces Coordination Council, Jombesh-e Guzar (the Transition Movement, a Tajik nationalist grouping which announced its existence on 11 May 2017 (see AAN’s report here) the Uprising for Change; and the Commission for Coordination of Political and Civil Organisations. The group issued a joint statement on 7 October 2017, calling for the replacement of the members of both electoral commissions (the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC)) with “other eligible members in agreement with political parties, civil society organisations and prominent political figures.”

This move indicates that Mehwar has already been working proactively with other political groups to carve out room for it to pressurise the NUG over elections. However, Mehwar’s position about elections is far from unambiguous. For example, Najafi said in his speech at the Mehwar inauguration that the group reserves the right “to resort to appropriate and acceptable solutions in consultation with the people and political groups if the government refuses to hold elections on its specified date by resorting to its own specific methods.” In conversation with AAN, Najafi also explained that, “if the government fails to deliver elections [in time], then we will work on an alternative plan which could include an interim arrangement, a loya jirga and international conference.”

Such a development, ie Mehwar coming round to supporting the convening of a loya jirga, could lead to a convergence between it and Karzai. A diplomatic source in Kabul told AAN that both Spanta and Nabil have explained in meetings that they would push for a loya jirga once – as they are certain – the National Unity Government and IEC fails to hold elections. Furthermore, a senior Mehwar member claimed that he had told Karzai he “should talk to those old political parties and figures and convince them. First you should bring them on side, and if they want [a loya jirga], we will also follow the rest.” He explained that Mehwar was “pursuing long-term politics with a long term vision.” This could indicate that Mehwar and Karzai may only march separately for the moment and might come together under certain circumstances in the future.

Relations with the protest movements

Mehwar has also been attempting to attract the new grassroots protest movements that have emerged during the NUG’s tenure by speaking in their favour. In the group’s inauguration ceremony, Spanta criticised the NUG for its way of dealing with them. He tried to appeal to the Enlightenment Movement which was formed in May 2016 out of protests against the government’s routing of an important power line from Turkmenistan, known as TUTAP. One of its large protest marches, on 23 July 2016 in Deh Mazang in Kabul, was attacked by suicide bombers, leading to the death of more than 80 people (see AAN’s previous reporting on the perpetrators here). Spanta blamed the government for what he said was its “intentional” failure to ensure the security of the protest, saying:

The monopolistic and totalitarian machinery of the government for the first time in the last 15 years not only intentionally refused to ensure the security of the citizenry movements in Afghanistan, but also with organised negligence enabled the enemies to massacre close to hundred youths of the Enlightenment Movement.

Spanta also referred to the government response to the demonstrations in the wake of the 31 May 2017 Kabul terror attack (see AAN’s previous reports here, here and here as “bloody suppression and unabated use of government force” that turned “legitimate demonstrations by youths of the Uprising for Change Movement into bloodshed”. 

But aside from a few representatives among its founder-members, Mehwar so far has not proven able to incorporate either of these movements in their entirety. Leading representatives of these movements are keeping their distance, or expressing themselves with some scepticism about the new group.

Aref Rahmani, an MP from Ghazni and senior member of the Enlightening Movement, for example, told AAN on 24 September 2017 that there was a substantive difference between his movement and Mehwar. He said it was unlikely for the movement, which he said was of a purely civil nature and much broader than Mehwar, to come under a political umbrella like Mehwar, which is comprised of individual politicians and political currents. Another senior member of the Enlightening Movement who did not want to be named told AAN that its High Council was very upset with Daud Naji and Jafar Mahdawi for joining Mehwar because they had set a precedent for other members of the movement to join one or another political group ahead of the next presidential election. If that indeed happened, it could either contribute to the fragmentation of the movement or to the subsuming of at least of some of its elements under a political party agenda. At some point, the senior member added, Naji and Mahdawi might have to decide whether they stayed with the Enlightening Movement or worked with Mehwar.

Moreover, President Ghani has also been taking steps to accommodate the Enlightening Movement which makes it trickier for members to join the oppositionist Mehwar. Ghani issued a decree on 17 September 2017 appointing a commission – to include representatives of the Enlightening Movement – to “thoroughly review the demands emanating from the 500 KV power line project” and to organise an “official, government commemoration” to be held at the presidential palace for the protestors killed on 23 July 2016 by suicide bombers during their demonstration in Deh Mazang. The movement realises that if its members join political groups, particularly those who declare themselves in opposition to the NUG, this might harm the new negotiations with the government about their core agenda.

Meanwhile, and somewhat in contrast to the above, Omar Ahmad Parwani, a member of the Uprising for Change movement – that also has at least one leading activist among the Mehwar founders – told AAN on 24 September 2017 that his movement would be willing to cooperate with those criticising “the wrong policies of the government,” but that this cooperation would be issue-based and the movement would not compromise its independence.

Conclusion: a deniable nexus with Karzai?

Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan, the country’s newest political group, is made up of close Karzai allies and former aides. It has clearly defined itself as being an opposition to the government and has ruled out joining it. It has distinguished itself from most of the other new political alliances that have sprung up over the past few months and years, including Sayyaf’s Council and the ‘Ankara coalition’, which have keep their options of joining or continuing to work with the government open. (The only exception is Ahadi’s front.) However, despite the fact that Mehwar’s leading members have sworn not to accept any government position, it cannot be excluded that at least some of the leading politicians who participated in Mehwar’s launch, as well as other members (especially those who seem not to be clear if they are fully associated with Mehwar or not) might be tempted to break ranks if government positions were proffered.

Describing itself as a ‘political umbrella’, Mehwar’s apparent intention to tap into broader discontent with the NUG among the general public and grassroots movements has yet to pay off. The group’s perceived association – albeit denied – with former president Karzai and the suspicion that it could act as his vehicle back to power, has not helped it make headway.

Mehwar’s stated position of preferring elections over a loya jirga, at least for the time being, seems to have created a political divergence between it and Karzai. However, if parliamentary and district elections are not held next year – both key international stakeholders (8) and Mehwar leaders have said they doubt they will be – Mehwar might fall back on the alternatives, including demand a loya jirga. They might also join forces in this with Karzai. For the time being, though, Karzai represents a more radical (and more anti-US) strand among NUG opponents than Mehwar currently wants to be associated with. However, some of the statements made by Mehwar leaders quoted above show that the evolution of a Karzai-Mewar nexus cannot be ruled out, at all.

Karzai might also be tempted to soften his tone, in the interests of persuading Mehwar to come on board with the hope of winning a broader political mobilisation. Currently it looks as if Karzai, on his own, will not be able to muster enough political support to achieve what appears to be his objective – a political comeback through a loya jirga. Many constitutional hurdles would anyway still stand in his way to return to the presidency through elections.

Even if elections are held on schedule, Mehwar could still provide an organisational platform from which it and Karzai could work together to get their preferred candidates elected to parliament. They might also find their interests coalescing around a single candidate in the next presidential elections, with Mehwar finding it needed Karzai’s support, if it wanted to promote its ‘man’ in the poll.

Editing by Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark

(1) The NUG, in its September 2014 founding agreement, imposed a two-year deadline on itself to convene a loya jirga in order to amend the constitution and consider the creation of the post of a permanent executive prime minister. The convening of a loya Jirga, as laid out in article 110 of the Afghan constitution (therefore it is called a “constitutional loya jirga”), however, is linked to both an elected parliament and district councils whose members would constitute the majority of its members. Article 110 of the constitution stipulates:

(…) The Loya Jirga consists of: 1. Members of the National Assembly; 2. Presidents of the provincial as well as district assemblies [councils]. Ministers, Chief Justice and members of the Supreme Court as well as the attorney general shall participate in the Loya Jirga sessions without voting rights.

The NUG agreement further stipulates:

On the basis of Article 140 of the Constitution, the national unity government is committed to holding district council elections as early as possible on the basis of a law in order to create a quorum for the Loya Jirga in accordance with Section 2 of Article 110 of the Constitution.

Parliamentary elections, however, have not been held; they were due in 2015; district councils have never been elected so far. For all loya jirgas held between the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003/04 (the one that approved the new constitution) and now, district council seats have been filled by surrogates from the provincial councils.

(2) Some argue that the NUG’s term ended with the expiry of the 2014 agreement in 2016 and that it should have been replaced by a new arrangement, either through a loya jirga (called for mainly by Karzai and his supporters) or snap elections (put forward mainly by former finance minister Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi’s New National Front). (See AAN’s previous analysis here).

(3) Ajmal Baluchzada was a civil society activist, mainly in the field of human rights. He was one of the founders of the Armanshahr/Open Asia Foundation. In 2014, he joined Zalmai Rasul’s presidential campaign, was later appointed as an adviser to NDS chief Nabil and now works with him in his new political capacity.

(4) Kohl, black eyeliner, is often used by male Pashtuns, particularly in the Kandahar region.

(5) The type of loya jirga Karzai proposes would, however, be different from the one envisaged in the NUG agreement. This agreement calls for a constitutional loya jirga in the composition explained in endnote 1. Karzai, meanwhile, advocates for a ‘traditional’ loya jirga where the president appoints all members. (More on different loya jirga concepts and Karzai’s use of them, in this AAN analysis.)

(6) The tweets read:

I very strongly oppose the new U.S. strategy towards Afghanistan as it is against peace and the national interest of Afghanistan.

The strategy excludes bringing peace and prosperity to Afghanistan and is focused on more war and rivalry in the region

U.S. must seek peace and stability in Afghanistan rather than extending conflict and bloodshed in Afghanistan and the region.

On 13 April 2013, after the US forces dropped the ‘Mother of All Bombs’ on an Islamic State in Khurasan Province (ISKP) position in Achin district of Nangarhar, (See AAN’s previous reporting here) Karzai, contrary to both camps in the NUG, who welcomed the bombardment, called it “brutal act” against Afghan people, the environment and the country’s sovereignty.

(8) For example, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Afghanistan Tadamichi Yamamoto, in his briefing to the United Nations Security Council on 25 September 2017, stated, “Timely elections will enhance the credibility of the political system and institutions. Many stakeholders, however, remain skeptical that credible elections will be held on time.”

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has said it has “no other choice but to drastically reduce its presence and activities in Afghanistan, in particular in the north of the country.” The decision follows three attacks on its staff in less than a year, including the worst suffered by the organisation worldwide in decades. The ICRC has been working with victims of the Afghan conflict since 1979 and is one of the most widely respected organisations working in Afghanistan. AAN’s Kate Clark looks at why it has found itself unable to operate in parts of the Afghan north and what that says about the Afghan conflict and the ability of neutral, humanitarian organisations to work.

“This is a difficult moment for the ICRC and the staff,” said head of delegation, Monica Zanarelli, announcing the drawdown. “After 30 years of continuous presence in the country, we are reducing our presence and operations.” The ICRC is laying off staff and closing two of its offices, in Faryab and Kunduz provinces, while its sub-delegation in Mazar-e Sharif will be “seriously downsized”

The impact of this drawdown will be keenly felt. Those three ICRC offices cover nine provinces in the north and north west of Afghanistan. Activities run out of the Mazar office will now be limited to the ICRC’s Re-establishing Family Links programme (tracing separate family members, facilitating phone calls to detainees and arranging family visits) and cooperation with the Afghan Red Crescent Society. The orthopaedic centre in Mazar, which treats those who have lost arms and legs and need prosthetic limbs as well as those with other disabilities, will remain open for now, but the ICRC is looking for others to run it. All other activities out of Mazar will be stopped, including the ICRC’s assistance programmes.

At the government’s Sheberghan hospital in Jawzjan province which the ICRC has supported until now, ongoing projects, such as the rehabilitation of the emergency ward and delivery of already promised medical supplies, will be completed, but after that, ICRC spokesperson Thomas Glass told AAN, “we will no longer support the hospital, at least not in the same capacity as we have until now.”

Glass said it was hard to put a number on those who will be affected in north and north-western Afghanistan by the ICRC’s reduced presence. “But taking into account the different activities we had,” he said, “the beneficiaries can be counted in the hundreds of thousands.” The ICRC is also reviewing its activities in the rest of the country.

Three attacks in nine months

It has been a nasty, gruelling nine months for the ICRC in Afghanistan. On 19 December 2016, a Spanish member of staff, Juan Carlos, was abducted as he travelled from Mazar-e Sharif to Kunduz and held hostage for a month. Then, in February of this year, armed men attacked an ICRC aid convoy in the Qaduq area of Qush Tepa district of Jawzjan province, killing six Afghan staff and abducting two others. The convoy had been bringing much needed livestock feed to rural communities. It was only after seven months that the two hostages were released, on 5 September 2017. All ICRC operations had been on hold following the February attack, but had resumed gradually over the summer.

Yet, just six days after the hostages were freed, on 11 September 2017, a Spanish physiotherapist, 38 year old Lorena Enebral Perez, described by Zanarelli as “energetic and full of laughter,” was killed. Perez helped people who had lost legs or arms or had other forms of disability to learn to stand and walk or feed themselves again. She was targeted by one of the patients, a man who had suffered polio as a child and had been coming to the rehabilitation centre for 19 years, ever since he was two years old. He pulled out a pistol apparently concealed in his wheelchair and shot her. “This was the heart of the ICRC,” said Glass, “one of the safest places in Afghanistan.”

“Let’s be very clear,” said Zanarelli, “We are not leaving Afghanistan. Limiting our staff’s exposure to risks is our focus, all the while assisting the people affected by the conflict the best way we can.” Even so, the closing down of the ICRC’s centres in Kunduz and Faryab and scaling back its work in Mazar will affect many. Without the ICRC, the polio victim-murderer would have had no other place to find treatment and help. There are many like him who will now have no access to treatment. The closures show just how difficult parts of Afghanistan have become for humanitarian organisations to work in.

A long history of working in Afghanistan, now under threat

The IRCR has been working in Afghanistan for decades. The Soviet-backed PDPA government finally allowed it to start operations on Afghan soil in 1987, although by then, it had already been treating Afghan victims of the conflict in Pakistan for eight years. It has been one of the most tenacious of agencies, maintaining a presence through the worst of the civil war and the Taleban era (1).

These are not the first attacks on the ICRC since 2001. Indeed, the murder of ICRC engineer Ricardo Munguia in Uruzgan by the Taleban in March 2003 heralded the start of the uprising, (2) its sudden brutality a shock to those who thought and hoped the conflict was over. On 29 May 2013, the ICRC was attacked again, its office in Jalalabad targeted by suicide bombers who killed an unarmed guard and wounded a delegate before the attack was suppressed by Afghan security forces (read AAN analysis here). That attack was not claimed. The ICRC scaled back its activities after both attacks, before gradually ‘growing them back’ again. This time, however, ICRC spokesperson in Kabul Thomas Glass told AAN, it was not a temporary move. “This is not a short-term decision,” he said. The scaling back has been driven by both the frequency of the recent attacks and their severity. The attack in Jawzjan attack (six killed and two abducted) was the worse single assault suffered by the ICRC globally in recent decades. (3)

There is no other organisation which does what the ICRC does during wartime (read about its mandate in Afghanistan here and worldwide here). It has working relationships with all parties to the conflict, including insurgent groups. It brings the dead bodies of combatants of all stripes home for burial and provides medical care to both civilians and wounded combatants. It traces and visits security detainees, keeping them in touch with their families and offers rehabilitation for those who have lost limbs or have disabilities. It also privately advises, cajoles and castigates all sides in the conflict in order to prevent violations of the laws of armed conflict. It acts as a neutral intermediary, enabling humanitarian action to take place across front lines. It is specifically protected by the Geneva Conventions.

The ICRC does not employ armed guards, instead relying on its reputation for neutrality, the goodwill and respect of the public and on talking to all parties to the conflict to ensure the safety of its staff. The Taleban speak highly of it. Possibly this is the only international organisation they have such words for. After the Jawzjan attack, for example, the Taleban said the ICRC’s activities were “invaluable for the poor and needy Afghans,” and in 2012, the movement also condemned the murder of a British ICRC delegate in Pakistan, stressing that the ICRC was “an impartial organization [that] works throughout the world for the needy, helpless and oppressed people.”

Yet, in the last few years, the fragmentation of the conflict, in particular, broken or unreliable chains of command, has made it especially difficult and dangerous for the ICRC and other humanitarian organisations to work in Afghanistan. The Taleban as an organisation may cooperate with the ICRC, but its writ does not travel to all its commanders on the ground. Moreover, there has been a proliferation of armed groups, including those of a criminal bent and those purporting to fly a Daesh flag.

The Jawzjan attack was a case in point. The likely culprit was Qari Hekmat, an ethnic Uzbek with a long history as a Taliban commander and up to 200 men under his command. The provincial governor, Aziz Latifi claimed he had shifted his allegiances to Daesh, but even if he had, financial gain, rather than any change in ideology seemed the likely motivation for the attack and abductions. Although the Taleban hierarchy condemned the assault on the convoy, they could not stop their field commander targeting the ICRC or ensure the swift freeing of the hostages. (4) When it is unclear who answers to whom and who is actually in control, it is impossible to get reliable security guarantees, which means ICRC staff cannot work safely, as Glass explained:

There is a fragmented security landscape, especially in the north, with different armed groups and increasing criminality. It’s a grey zone, extremely difficult to read and assess the situation. In Jawzjan, we had all the security guarantees, we were confident that we could do the distribution in this area. We were very surprised when we suffered the attack. This weighed heavily on our decision. It’s increasingly difficult, given the security environment in some areas, knowing who is who.

 After the Jawzjan attack, the Taleban Health Commission said it was grieving for the six murdered workers. It also called on the ICRC to “refrain from suspending their services as the Afghan nation is need of humanitarian aid and health services more than ever before.” It promised that the Taleban would “take all necessary steps for your security in areas under our control.” It should, of course, be the Afghan government ensuring security, but in parts of the north neither the government or insurgent leadership can do that. In such circumstances, unarmed humanitarians cannot work, despite the obvious need from the people they would like to serve.

The need for humanitarians

The ICRC itself has described the cost of the war to Afghans:

Widespread conflict continues to devastate the lives of Afghans in many districts and villages. The threat of civilian casualties, internal displacement, and insufficient access to medical care, are only some of the challenges. All of them occur against a backdrop of a splintering of armed groups, night raids, air strikes, suicide bombing, and the laying of improvised explosive devices. The expansion of the conflict to previously quiet areas has increased people’s difficulties and left whole communities trapped between the warring parties.

The spread and nature of the conflict makes the need for humanitarian operations greater than ever, but it is not just the ICRC facing attack. As AAN reported last year, health facilities and workers, also specifically protected under the Geneva Conventions, are under increasing threat, abused by all parties to the conflict. The situation has worsened this year, with the number of incidents already double last year’s (41 in 2016, 86 as of the end of August). Dominic Parker, head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan told The Guardian that the intensification of the conflict was seemingly going hand in hand with a further erosion of respect for obligations under international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict. “Health facilities have repeatedly been abused as fighting positions,” he said, “and earlier this year armed groups forced health clinics to close, depriving half a million people from access to healthcare.”

According to a recent report by the independent research organisation, Humanitarian Outcomes, Afghanistan suffered more attacks on humanitarian workers than any country in the world except South Sudan. (Attacks in Syria were fewer, but more lethal. In Afghanistan, the most common type of attack is kidnap, followed by shooting. In Syria, it is aerial bombardment.)

Most NGOs and international humanitarian organisations, including the ICRC, have already modified their operations to try to protect staff while continuing to reach the most vulnerable. The fact that the ICRC, with its reputation for neutrality and service built up over decades, has had to accept that it can no longer work safely in parts of Afghanistan is deeply worrying. It is a sign of just how messy and brutal the conflict has become.

(1) The ICRC was forced by the Taleban, along with all other aid and humanitarian organisations, to leave Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. A handful of international staff from the Kabul office, including the head of its orthopaedic rehabilitation programme since 1992, Dr Alberto Cairo, relocated to Jabal al-Saraj, in the Northern Alliance-held part of the Shomali. He drove back to Kabul the day the Taleban fled the capital and resumed his work there.

(2) Witnesses said the gunmen who ambushed Munguia’s vehicle telephoned their commander, the notorious, late Mullah Dadullah. Having spared his Afghan colleagues, they wanted to confirm whether they should kill the foreigner working for the ICRC. The witnesses reported that Dadullah gave the order to shoot Munguia. Dadullah was one of tens of thousands of Afghans to have a prosthetic limb; possibly his had been fitted by the ICRC, although Dr Cairo (see footnote 1) told this author he could not be sure as many combatants gave false names when receiving treatment.

(3) Other comparable attacks are far and few between. They would include, in 1996, the killing of six ICRC workers in Chechnya and in the Democratic Republic of Congo where again six workers were killed, in 2001.

(4) For a look at some of the dynamics of the northern insurgency, see AAN reporting on non-Pashtun Taleban in the north, in Faryab and Sar-e Pul, and Jawzjan and on those aligning themselves with the local chapter of Daesh, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) here and on what can be a very confused picture as to allegiances on the ground.

One of the key elements of the Afghan government’s Road Map for pushing back the insurgency is increasing the fighting capabilities of Afghan government forces. This includes the expansion of the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) praised special operations forces. However, this expansion is spurring already existing tendencies that are turning these units into shock troops, rather than actual special forces. Moreover, such a focus on shock troops concentrates efforts on capturing territory from the insurgency, rather than addressing the more pressing problem – which is holding cleared areas. AAN guest author Franz J. Marty (*) illustrates these and other questions by taking a closer look at the ANA’s special operations forces and the plan to expand them.

When the conventional forces of the Afghan state cannot cope with insurgents on the battlefield, they usually call in units of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) for support. These units are often referred to as ‘Commandos’. Compared to conventional troops, they are superior forces that usually manage to defeat insurgents or at least push them back. Because of this high demand for the ANASOC, the Afghan government, supported by its allies, is now doubling the number of these forces. By doing so, it hopes also to double their success. Taking a closer look reveals, though, that this will probably not be done that easily and will take the ANASOC even further away from its original mission – to conduct actual special operations.

The big picture: the ANSF Road Map

The intended expansion of the ANASOC has to be seen against the backdrop of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (1) Road Map, as laid out in a report by the US Department of Defense (US DoD) to US Congress in June 2017. The Road Map is an official Afghan policy document, although it can be assumed that the NATO-led coalition and especially the United States military provided support in developing it (see AAN’s previous analysis here). According to unclassified documents of the NATO-led coalition seen by the author, the Road Map envisions breaking what it sees as a stalemate between Afghan government forces and the insurgency; extending security, with the goal of securing control over what is seen as a critical mass of 80 per cent of the Afghan population; and “expand[ing] governance and economic development and compel[ling] or incentiviz[ing] Taliban reconciliation.” Hence, the Road Map does not hope to defeat the insurgency, but rather to tilt the war in favour of the government.

The Road Map has four key elements: (i) leadership development; (ii) countering corruption; (iii) increasing fighting capabilities by expanding the Afghan Special Security Forces (of which the ANASOC makes up the lion’s share, but there are also other units) (2) and the Afghan Air Force; and (iv) improving unity of command and effort.

With respect to the Road Map, it is imperative to keep in mind that neither the Afghan government or the coalition backing it is expecting the plan to lead to any major changes on the battlefield in the near future. On the contrary, the plan is to “realign” Afghan government forces in 2017 (3) (this phase is dubbed “build momentum”) and to “continue building offensive capability… while disrupting insurgent strongholds” in 2018 (dubbed “seize the initiative”). This is meant to set the conditions for “execut[ing] large-scale offensive operations in 2019” (dubbed “exploit the initiative”) and finally, in 2020, to consolidate the hoped for gains.

The latest quarterly report of the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) citing US Forces-Afghanistan notes, though, that “[w]hile [Afghan] President Ghani has put the execution of the strategy within a four-year time frame, its actual implementation will be conditions-based, rather than time-driven” (this mirrors the new US stance on Afghanistan – see US President Trump’s speech here and AAN analysis here). “Conditions-based” in this context apparently means that the intended “large-scale offensive operations” will be executed once the ground and the troops have been fully prepared, rather than according to a rigid timetable – ie if realigning the force, building offensive capabilities and disrupting insurgent strongholds should take longer than originally planned, this would cause a delay in executing the large-scale operations.

In any event, the ANASOC is set to play the crucial role in “disrupting insurgent strongholds” and carrying out “offensive operations.”

From division to corps

The ANASOC was reported to have been established as an independent division (called ferqa-ye amaliatha-ye khas) of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in 2011 and officially upgraded to a corps (qul-e urdu-ye amaliatha-ye khas) on 20 August 2017 (see press release here). According to Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Qayum Nuristani, ANASOC Public Affairs Officer, this upgrade will entail roughly a doubling of its strength from about 11,300 to 23,300 personnel. This expansion of personnel and units will – due to the need of recruitment, training and the establishment of completely new units, while at the same time maintaining enough troops as a fighting force in the field – take years. According to a spokesman of the Afghan Ministry of Defence (quoted here), completion of the expansion was initially planned for 2020, but a coalition source told AAN it would need more time.

This expansion will, according to the US DoD report quoted above, not augment the authorised end-strength (4) of the ANSF, as “[t]he manpower required for the ANASOC growth will come from realigning tashkil (5) positions from conventional forces.” In other words: conventional ANA forces will be reassigned to the ANASOC, and their number will decrease by the same amount as the ANASOC troops will rise.

While the ANASOC usually recruits its members directly from ANA training centres, Nuristani explained that the currently-planned, rapid expansion will mainly be facilitated by reassigning the two Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades (lewa-ye zarbati) – one based in Kabul, one in Kandahar – to the ANASOC. These two brigades consist of seven Mobile Strike Force Vehicle kandaks (battalions). According to the US DoD, they are also set to provide the ANASOC with their own armoured ground assault vehicles and make them more self-sufficient. (So far, the ANASOC did not have such mechanised assets in their own units.) (6) (The possible impact of reassigning those two Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades will be addressed in more detail later in the text.)

Nuristani also stated that the Special Mission Wing (lewa-ye 777 hawayi) will be incorporated into the expanded ANASOC corps. (Given that this concerns air assets, this will not be further addressed in this analysis which concentrates on ANASOC ground forces.)

Original mission

According to the US DoD June 2017 report, “[t]he ANASOC’s mission is to increase the Afghan Government’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations, and, as directed, execute special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other [ANSF] pillars.” (7)

An elite group of Afghan National Army commandos graduated to become the first Afghan Special Forces during a ceremony at Camp Morehead May 13, 2010. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Sarah Brown/RELEASED)

The centre-piece of special operations are direct actions which are commonly referred to as ‘raids’. Their characteristics – short duration, small scale and the fact that they are conducted in “denied” areas (ie not on a clear battlefield) and often behind enemy lines – set them apart from conventional operations. Another example of special operations is reconnaissance in denied areas. (8) Yet another type of special operations are “internal defence missions” that are aimed at countering an insurgency at the level of ‘tribe’ or village; hence, such missions are at the same time counterinsurgency and stability operations. For example, in what the US military calls Village Stability Operations (VSO), special forces are assigned to support village leaders and train village defence units of the Afghan Local Police. (9)

This, at least, was the original idea behind the ANASOC. However, the ANASOC has strayed away from this original mission.

Misuse and changing mission

There are consistent reports about ANASOC forces being used outside the initially intended mission, as described above. For example, the June 2017 US DoD report previously quoted states that “the [Afghan Special Security Forces; of which the ANASOC is the main part] frequently is used as the offensive arm of the [ANSF] and tends to suffer misuse by conventional forces…,” even going as far as “employing [Afghan Special Security Forces] at checkpoints or as personal security detachments.” Nuristani partly acknowledged this, saying that ANASOC forces often support conventional ANA units to retake lost territory or fight especially resilient insurgents.

What this use of the ANASOC means is that it has, in practice, become a ‘shock’ rather than a special force – ie a force to boost the offensive capabilities of conventional forces in conventional operations, rather than one that conducts highly specialised, small-scale operations in terrain that conventional forces cannot reach (see also this media report). (10) Not only this. A SIGAR report noted that “[a]s of early 2017, the [Afghan Special Security Forces] conducted 80% of all the ANA’s offensive operations.” This means that the ANASOC, despite being just a small fraction of the conventional ANA forces, has not only become a shock force, but the primary offensive force, bearing the brunt of the fight against the insurgency – although this would clearly be the mission of the ANA’s conventional forces.

The same SIGAR report, dated 30 April 2017, claims that misuse of Afghan Special Security Forces has become “mostly regionally isolated” and that “[w]hile there are still notable repeat offenders, the vast majority of [Afghan Special Security Forces] misuse has significantly decreased.”

However, the already-mentioned June 2017 US DoD report rather suggests a change of the ANASOC’s mission away from the initially envisioned special operations to a shock force than preventing such originally non-intended use. The report states, “[t]he [ANSF] Road Map contains plans to… establish the [Afghan Special Security Forces] as the primary offensive maneuver force within the [ANSF], while the conventional forces become the primary option for consolidating gains and holding key terrain and infrastructure” – with a “primary offensive maneuver force” by definition conducting conventional, and not special operations. (11)

At the same time, there are efforts to at least curb the most blatant misuse of special operations forces, such as employing them at checkpoints or as personal security detachments. According to Nuristani, ANASOC forces are already now not used anymore as personal security detachments (this could neither be verified or disproved). He acknowledged though that it would sometimes still be necessary for ANASOC forces to remain in the field to hold an area, but insisted this would not be permanent.

Given the fact that the Afghan Ministry of Defence frequently emphasises the conducting of night operations and that there will also be a need for certain other special operations, the ANASOC will not become solely a shock force, but will continue to conduct certain special operations. This was confirmed by an ANASOC officer, who, however, clarified that special operations such as night raids are rather rare and that the vast majority of ANASOC operations are aimed at retaking territory lost to the insurgency or to support conventional forces in other conventional operations. Hence, special operations are on the fringes of the ANASOC mission and not at its centre, as one would expect with what are called special operations forces.

In this regard, one could argue that – while the existence of a shock force itself is positive – the blurring of conventional and unconventional missions is not advisable, as (unconventional) special operations are (as set out above) completely different from conventional operations and require different units and capabilities.

Order of Battle

The issues raised above are further obfuscated by questions regarding the ANASOC’s order of battle (ie its organisation and command structure). To understand these problems, one has to first grasp the general ANASOC order of battle though.

According to official documents, the ANASOC so far consisted of two Special Operations Brigades (lewa-ye amaliatha-ye khas), one made up of four and the other of five Special Operations Kandaks (battalions) (SOKs) (kandak-e amaliatha-ye khas/commando) that were aligned with regional ANA Corps. The US DoD stated in its June 2017 report already quoted above that “[t]he SOKs are the primary tactical elements of the ANASOC, and they conduct elite, light-infantry operations against threat networks in support of the regional corps’ counterinsurgency operations and provide a strategic response capability against strategic targets.” SOKs are also referred to as Commando Kandaks, as they are (at least largely) made up of special soldiers that are called Commandos (more on this below). An additional, separate Special Operations Kandak, the 6th SOK based in Kabul, functioned “as the ANA’s national mission unit,” providing “the President of Afghanistan and the [Chief of ANA Staff] with a rapidly deployable special operations force able to respond to national-level crises throughout Afghanistan.” (12)

The current plan, as confirmed by Nuristani, foresees the expansion of the ANASOC with two additional Special Operations Brigades (raising the total to four such brigades) and the so-called National Mission Brigade (lewa-ye wazayef-e khas-e melli). Asked how many additional SOKs this would encompass, Nuristani refrained from giving a specific number, but said that it might amount to even more than the doubling of the current ten SOKs. (13)

The four Special Operation Brigades will be – similar to the so far nine common SOKs – “regionally oriented, [but] centrally controlled,” a coalition source explained. This suggests that ANA Corps commanders will, as so far, have to request ANASOC assistance, upon which the Chief of Army Staff or ANASOC HQ will decide and, if approved, give the regionally stationed Special Operations Brigades their respective orders.

The National Mission Brigade was inaugurated on 31 July 2017 and will take over the role of the 6th SOK. According to the June 2017 US DoD report, it has already reached initial operational capability and is scheduled to reach full operational capability in March 2018. The same report also stated that the National Mission Brigade “and associated headquarters element will consist of elements of the ANA 6th SOK and the [Qeta-ye Khas].” The Qeta-ye Khas (Special Forces in Dari; transcribed as Ktah Khas by the US Department of Defense) is (or rather was) a small special forces unit that existed in addition to the Commandos, that make up the vast majority of the ANASOC’s fighting force. While in theory and (at least initially) also in practice there was a crucial difference between Commandos and Qeta-ye Khas, this difference is far from clear anymore.

Commandos and Qeta-ye Khas – and the confusion surrounding them

The Qeta-ye Khas was, as reported here, originally a separate unit consisting of several teams modelled after the US Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha, informally called A-teams. (14) As of spring 2015, there were 72 Afghan A-teams, according to a Qeta-ye Khas member quoted by a specialised publication. (15) Assuming the US model of 15 persons per A-team, this would amount to 1,080 personnel. The June 2017 US DoD report indicates a somewhat higher number though, stating that the Qeta-ye Khas comprises 1,190 personnel out of an authorised end-strength of 1,291. (This number might include supporting personnel and not necessarily means that the number of Afghan A-teams had changed by that time.)

The original plan was that such Qeta-ye Khas A-teams conduct various special operations – particularly direct actions and special reconnaissance. This was also what set the Qeta-ye Khas apart from the other special operation forces, the Commandos, that were solely meant for direct actions (see here). In this regard, the Qeta-ye Khas would usually conduct the more special and covert direct actions (for example targeting high-value insurgents in more inaccessible terrain) than the Commandos. (16)

However, at some point that could not be determined, the Qeta-ye Khas was integrated into the ANASOC. How this was exactly done and what its current status is, is also hard to determine. But it is relevant as it directly affects the way the ANASOC is able to conduct missions – ie whether it still retains small special forces teams for special operations or whether it rather turned into a unit of Commandos that was initially intended for more overt raids, but has become a shock force.

According to Nuristani, the Qeta-ye Khas is now fully integrated into the National Mission Brigade and has been transformed into a SOK that does not differ from other SOKs, neither in mission nor training. Nuristani was very clear about this, stating that Qeta-ye Khas and the Commandos are one and the same thing. He even used the terms interchangeably or in combination (Qeta-ye Khas Commando). He asserted, though, that the Commandos (including the former Qeta-ye Khas) would be able to provide shock forces and conduct special operations at the same time.

However, an ANASOC officer who requested anonymity explained matters slightly differently. He also confirmed that the former Qeta-ye Khas has indeed been completely absorbed by the ANASOC/Commandos and does not have a separate name anymore. The officer explained though that each SOK has – besides several companies (tolay) of regular Commandos – one “special” company. These “special” companies conduct the actual special operations, usually in small teams (apparently A-teams), while the bulk of the Commandos are used as shock forces (this source, like Nuristani, described the use as shock force – contrary to a western understanding – as special operations, adding that Commando operations, at least in theory, do not exceed 72 hours). The source also insisted that these special forces would – compared to other Commandos – receive additional and separate training as had been the case for the former Qeta-ye Khas (as of now, those special companies are probably made up of the former Qeta-ye Khas). This is seemingly supported by the June 2017 US DoD report which reads that “each SOK contains eight ANA Special Forces teams.”

However, adding to the confusion, the exact same US DoD report states at another point that “[t]he [Qeta-ye Khas] is a light infantry SOK consisting of three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company,” which would suggest a separate unit. Such a separate Qeta-ye Khas unit was also displayed in official documents seen by this author in July 2017. Furthermore, in a press conference held in Kabul on 24 August 2017 – after the official inauguration of the National Mission Brigade on 31 July 2017 that allegedly definitively absorbed the Qeta-ye Khas into the ANASOC/Commandos – US Army General John W. Nicholson, commander of US Forces–Afghanistan and the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission, referred to “commandos and [Qeta-ye Khas]”, implying two separate types of forces. Even more tangibly, at the mentioned official inauguration of the National Mission Brigade, the (former) Qeta-ye Khas still wore their uniforms and sand-coloured berets that distinguished them from the Commandos who wear slightly different camouflage and burgundy red berets.

While none of the above accounts could be definitively verified, in this author’s assessment, the most likely variant is that the former Qeta-ye Khas has indeed been integrated into SOKs, but still exists as special companies that often (but probably not always) conduct independent missions.

In any event, the confusion regarding the Qeta-ye Khas adds to the blurring of the use of ANASOC forces for special operations and as a shock force. While this does not necessarily have to impair the ANASOC’s ability to conduct special operations, it certainly has the potential to do so, as we will see.

What does all this mean for the battlefield?

Given the ANASOC’s successful track record (17), it can be expected that its expansion will, as planned, indeed increase the ANSF’s fighting capabilities and bolster their offensive prowess.

Some argue though that this expansion could cause a decrease of the ANASOC’s quality. For example, a Washington Post article warned that “[r]apidly growing the elite forces could also dilute the commando units to a point where they are indistinguishable from regular units, suffering the same issues with discipline and morale while increasing the threat of insider attacks.” While the intended rapid growth and the above displayed confusion about the status of the Qeta-ye Khas indeed carries the danger of a decrease in quality, it seems unlikely that this will be as dramatic as stated in the article. This is mainly due to the fact that the ANASOC training centre (the ANASOC School of Excellence) will also be expanded and that, according to a coalition source, the expected increase of foreign advisors will specifically include special forces trainers. This means that ANASOC forces will still receive – compared to regular units – better training, ensuring that they keep their edge over conventional forces. Even so, a certain decrease in quality cannot be ruled out completely.

ANASOC National Mission Brigade inauguration at 31 July 2017. Photo: Franz J. Marty.

The more significant danger is that the ANASOC might loose part of its ability to conduct special operations and further drift into becoming a mere shock force. In fact, a former Commando and current regular ANA officer told this author in August 2017 that the (former) Qeta-ye Khas mostly, if not always, supports the Commandos in missions that are even difficult for the Commandos – ie implying that the (former) Qeta-ye Khas has slid into a similar role in relation to the Commandos as the Commandos play for conventional forces. This could not be verified; however, there have been similar allegations in the past. (18)

Another, probably more crucial question is, whether the improvement of offensive capabilities will lead to the intended extension of government control throughout the country. In this context, one could argue that defeating insurgents in offensive operations – which will be the main, if not sole objective of the expanded ANASOC Corps – was never the main problem of the ANSF, as experience shows that insurgents were and still are unable to withstand concentrated government efforts, if and when mounted. The main problem is rather that the ANSF fail at holding and securing areas after they have been taken or re-taken, giving insurgents that melt away when facing a superior force like the ANASOC the opportunity to re-infiltrate such areas later.

While not clearly articulated, the intention of the Afghan government and its international backers seems to be that relieving conventional forces of bearing the brunt of the fighting by making an expanded ANASOC the “primary offensive maneuver force” will enable conventional forces to successfully hold and secure cleared terrain. This, however, might be a fallacy.

First of all, although freeing up conventional forces from fighting will give them more time to concentrate on holding territory, without specific efforts to hold terrain and train conventional forces accordingly, this might remain a significant problem. And at least to this author’s knowledge, the focus is on increasing offensive capabilities like the ANASOC; this holds true despite recent reports (here and, by AAN, here) about the intended establishment of an additional holding force, as such plans are still in an early stage and remain unclear (see also endnote 11). In any event, Nuristani was – even before reports of plans for such a holding force were published – confident that holding areas would not be a problem, although he acknowledged that in war, there was always the possibility of losing territory again.

Secondly, this could be exacerbated by what military historian Roger Beaumont called the “selection-destruction” cycle. (19) This concept is based on the fact that the best available personnel are selected for elite units, which do have a higher casualty rate due to their missions involving disproportionally intense combat (for the Afghan Commandos, the above mentioned ANASOC officer confirmed a high casualty rate). This, however, leads to “the overall effect… to select and then destroy the talent within a force under pressure,” according to counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen. (20) However, even if the selected personnel in the elite units are not killed, their mere selection “makes high quality leadership less available for conventional units” (see endnote 19). In the current case of the ANSF, this could mean that – in order to satisfy the need of the rapidly expanding ANASOC – conventional forces might be drained of their best personnel. This, in turn, may cause a decline in quality of such conventional forces. (It is also noteworthy that the source text quoting Beaumont (endnote 19) clearly states that “conventional units… must carry the bulk of the fighting load,” thereby reinforcing the above-mentioned argument that special operations forces like the ANASOC are not meant to be the “primary offensive maneuver force”.)

Such a potential degrading of conventional forces might be mitigated though. As mentioned, the growth of the ANASOC will be mainly facilitated by reassigning the existing two Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades to the ANASOC. These two brigades were, according to Nuristani, already so far independent – ie not part of any regional ANA Corps. This consequentially means that the conventional regional ANA Corps will not be significantly drained of personnel or otherwise negatively affected by the growth of the ANASOC. In this context, Nuristani also dispelled concerns that – due to the rapid expansion – the ANASOC might be forced to take on recruits that do not adhere to the same high standards as before, pointing out that the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades already consist of selected personnel that would match the high requirements of the ANASOC.

Furthermore, given that the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades have apparently not been effectively used so far, transferring them to the ANASOC will probably have less of an impact on the conventional forces than one might think at first sight. An earlier US DoD report, published in June 2016, stated that the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades “are often used in defensive operations or employed in static positions, which hinders their intended use as an offensive maneuver capability.” And given that the coalition is in any event pressuring Afghan forces to abandon static positions, the so far defensively or statically used Mobile Strike Forces Vehicle Brigades would have probably been realigned to other missions, even if there were not to transition to the ANASOC.

Whether and to what extent transitioning those forces’ armoured vehicles (see endnote 6) to the ANASOC will have a significant impact on the performance of the ANASOC, remains to be seen. Nuristani stated though that the intention is to pair every two (infantry) SOKs with one Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Kandak (kandak-e zarbati), adding that the ANASOC was in need of such mechanised assets.

Conclusion: an improvement or a dilution of tasks and quality?

The roughly doubling of the ANASOC paired with its good track record will certainly increase the fighting capability of the ANSF. However, the expansion seems to spur already existing tendencies that have turned the ANASOC more into a conventional shock force rather than an actual special operations force. While a shock force is – given that the insurgency has become more aggressive in the past years – in itself a useful and maybe even necessary asset, it could be argued that this should not be done at the expense of special operations and that a clear separation of shock and special forces would be advisable. More critically, it could even be said that making the ANASOC not only a shock, but the “primary offensive maneuver force” of the ANSF, simply circumvents the actual problem that conventional ANA forces are apparently not up to their main task, which would be bearing the brunt of the fight, in both, offensive operations to wrestle territory back from the insurgency and defensive operations to hold captured areas.

In addition, as overcoming insurgents in concentrated efforts has never been a significant issue for the ANSF, it could be contended that the expansion of the ANASOC fixes something that is not broken, while the real issue – successfully holding cleared areas – has apparently not been adequately addressed (however, see the mentioned, so far unclear plans for a new holding force ). Given that the expansion of the ANASOC will allow conventional ANA forces to mainly concentrate on holding terrain and if a separate holding force is indeed established, the hold aspect might nonetheless improve. This, however, has to be proven first and might turn out to be a mirage.

Edited by Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark

(*) Franz J. Marty is a freelance journalist based in Afghanistan and focuses on security and military issues. He can be followed @franzjmarty on twitter and be contacted via franz.j.marty@icloud.com.

(1) AAN continues to use the original (and shorter) term Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), although other official entities, among them the US Department of Defense, have switched to using Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF).

(2) The general term “special operations forces” mentioned in the title and at the beginning of this dispatch is not clearly defined in the context described in this dispatch (ie it is not clearly defined which forces besides the ANASOC, if any, it encompasses), and it was only used to make the introduction easier. However, this analysis will only cover the ANASOC, including the Qeta-ye Khas. Apart from the introduction, it will, whenever possible, refer to strictly defined terms of units or forces in order to ensure accuracy.

In the terminology of the US Department of Defense, the Afghan Special Security Forces consist of the ANASOC, including the Qeta-ye Khas (Special Forces), the Special Mission Wing (lewa-ye 777 hawayi) and the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). Some accounts imply that also some forces of the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan’s intelligence service, are part of the Afghan Special Security Forces; this could, however, not be verified.

The Special Mission Wing is a special air wing, independent of the Afghan Air Force that supports the Afghan Special Security Forces with air assets. The GCPSU is, contrary to the ANASOC, a police and not a military unit – although it does conduct paramilitary operations, most prominently responses to high-profile terrorist attacks.

The ANSF Road Map also foresees a growth of the Special Mission Wing and the GCPSU, albeit on a far smaller scale than the ANASOC growth. The Special Mission Wing personnel is planned to grow from 788 (out of a so far authorised end-strength of 902) to reportedly 1,000. The GCPSU personnel is planned to grow from 6,426 (out of a so far authorised end-strength of 7,042) to reportedly 9,000.

(3) The main aspects of realigning the ANSF are: (i) the reassignment of conventional forces to the ANASOC in order to facilitate the latter’s expansion (see in more detail later in the main text); and (ii) the transfer of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a separate police unit that performs paramilitary duties, as well as “the paramilitary portions of the Afghan Border Police (ABP),” both of which have so far been subordinated to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, to the Ministry of Defence. This is, according to the US Department of Defense, done to “consolidate the combat capabilities of the [ANSF] under the [Ministry of Defence] and allow the [Ministry of Interior Affairs] to focus its efforts on developing community policing capabilities and upholding the rule of law.”

(4) According to a SIGAR report, as of 20 May 2017, the ANA (including 8,413 personnel of the Afghan Air Force; and also all ANASOC personnel) comprised 180,031 personnel out of an approved end-strength goal of 196,534 (91.6%). (All numbers also include civilian personnel.) Given general fluctuations due to recruitment and attrition, the diminishing of conventional forces will probably differ slightly from the increase in ANASOC personnel; however, such minor differences will most likely be negligible.

(5) Tashkil means ‘shape’ or ‘structure’ in Dari and “refers to the official list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the [Afghan ministries of defence and interior affairs] to detail authorized staff positions and equipment items for each unit,” according to the June 2017 US Department of Defense (US DoD) report already quoted above.

(6) The US DoD report already quoted in endnote 5 does not clarify, whether the two Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades consist of seven kandaks (battalions) each or altogether. AAN was unable to clarify this point.

According to the June 2016 US DoD report, the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades “consist of wheeled medium armored vehicles that provide a rapidly deployable mechanized infantry capability to undertake and reinforce operations.” More specifically, according to Jane’s World Armies (July 2015), the ANSF have been equipped with three variants of the M1117 Armoured Security Vehicle built by Textron Marine & Land Systems: “1. an armoured personnel carrier (APC) with an enclosed turret; 2. an APC with one-person turret armed with a .50-calibre machine gun and 40 mm automatic grenade launcher that also features the US Army’s Objective Gunner Protection Kit; and 3. an ambulance version. All are in the latest Enhanced Survivability Standard (ESV), which features upgraded suspension, improved seating, and a higher level of protection against mines and IEDs than offered by Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. It was reported that 50 might also be mortar-carrying, capable of transporting 82 rounds, but this remains unconfirmed.”

On 28 September 2017, the US DoD awarded a 12,692,527 US dollars firm-fixed-price foreign military sales contract to a US company, Textron Systems Marine & Land Systems, to provide the ANSF with an unspecified number of additional Mobile Strike Force Vehicles. The estimated completion date is 28 September 2018. It is unclear for which forces within the ANSF these vehicles are intended.

(7) The quoted passage of the June 2017 US DoD report describes the mission ANASOC was originally intended for. This derives from several previous reports of the US Department of Defense that, however, did not had a similarly condensed mission statement.

(8) Direct actions are, according to US military terminology, defined as “short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.” According to the same terminology (here), special reconnaissance consists of “reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces.”

(9) “Afghan National Army Special Forces: An insider’s account”, published in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 May 2015.

(10) To set this into relations: the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom (British Army, Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Air Force, including Reserves) (as of 1 July 2017, about 196,000 personnel) are – albeit there are of course many significant differences – in size roughly comparable to the Afghan National Army (including Afghan Air Force) (as of 20 May 2017, 180,031 personnel out of an approved end-strength goal of 196,534 (91.6%); see endnote 4). However, the highly regarded British special forces, specifically the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Service (SBS), amount to only a few hundred men (no exact numbers are available), while the ANASOC expands from 11,300 personnel to 23,300. This clearly shows that the SAS and SBS are highly specialised units for actual small-scale special operations, while the ANASOC has become something far more conventional.

(11) Making the conventional ANA forces responsible for holding terrain is also meant to relieve police forces from such holding duties, so that they can “focus [their] efforts on developing community policing capabilities and upholding the rule of law” – ie actual police work (see the June 2017 US DoD report). This is also why the paramilitary forces of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) and parts of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) will be transferred from the Ministry of Interior Affairs to the Ministry of Defence, as this will make the distinction between (para)military tasks of fighting as well as defending terrain (responsibility of the Ministry of Defence) and actual police work (responsibility of the Ministry of Interior Affairs) more clear. In how far this will or can be implemented effectively is, of course, another question.
In this regard, it has to be noted that there are plans to establish a new force under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence that will mainly be tasked with holding once cleared terrain (see AAN analysis here). While this force is allegedly modelled after the Indian Territorial Army, at the time of writing (23 September 2017), details remained unclear. (Different accounts suggest different set-ups, ranging from building such a force with new recruits to incorporating or reassigning conventional ANA forces, the ANCOP and/or Afghan Local Police to this new force).

(12) The last quote regarding the 6th SOK’s mission technically refers to the new National Mission Brigade. However, given that this was taken over from the 6th SOK, it is nonetheless applicable here.

(13) The June 2017 US DoD report gives some hints at additional details of the alleged expansion; however, they do not form a coherent picture.

(14) An A-team usually consists of 15 personnel: a captain, a first lieutenant executive officer, a team sergeant, two weapons sergeants, two engineer sergeants, two communications sergeants, two intelligence sergeants, two medical sergeants, an information disseminations sergeant and a civil-military operations specialist.

(15) “Afghan National Army Special Forces: An insider’s account”, published in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 May 2015.

(16) “Afghan National Army Special Forces: An insider’s account”, published in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 May 2015.

(17) Gen Nicholson stated at a press conference in Kabul on 24 August 2017 that “[t]he Taliban have never won against the commandos and [Qeta-ye Khas].” While it could not be verified that the ANASOC indeed always prevailed, they certainly did so in the overwhelmingly vast majority of operations, as insurgents (employing traditional guerrilla tactics) tend to melt away when facing a superior adversary in order to fight another day.

(18) “Afghan National Army Special Forces: An insider’s account”, published in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 May 2015.

(19) Quoted from LTC Gary L. Bounds, “Notes on Military Elite Units”, CSI Report No. 4, US Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, June 1990.

(20) Quoted from David Kilcullen, “Why Donald Trump’s ‘mini-surge’ in Afghanistan invites scepticism”, published in The Australian, 27 May 2017.

The Afghan government is arming local civilians and strengthening the police presence across the country to try to protect Shia Muslim places of worship in the run-up to Ashura. The commemoration will take place this Sunday (1 October 2017). With these last-minute measures, the government is reacting to demands from the community and criticism that it has failed to protect Shias from sectarian attacks by the local branch of Daesh. According to leading Shia politicians, these measures will not be temporary. Thomas Ruttig and the AAN team have looked at what is happening on the ground in a number of neighbourhoods in and beyond Kabul and on the possible repercussions.

The wave of violence against Afghanistan’s Shia community has continued with two attacks on Thursday and Friday (28 and 29 September 2017) in Kabul. In the first incident, in the late afternoon on 28 September, three people, including two policemen, were killed and 16 others injured in a blast near Pamir Cinema (at the western end of the main Maiwand Street), in the Chendawol area of Kabul’s old town that has a significant Shia population, according to an Afghan media report. A spokesman for the Ministry of Interior (MoI) stated that the blast was triggered by a magnetic bomb attached to a police vehicle. AAN detected Daesh online sources hinting at its involvement in this attack and claiming it was directed against a Shia takiakhana (assembly hall) in the area.

In the second incident, a group of attackers, including two suicide bombers, reportedly caused blasts among Shia worshippers who were leaving Hussainia mosque in the Qala-ye Fathullah in centre-west Kabul in the early afternoon. The casualty figure was at five dead and 25 injured, at least, a few hours after the incident (media reports here and here). There was no claim of responsibility for this attack by the late afternoon (Kabul time) on Friday.

Historically, Ashura processions were not marked by sectarian violence in Afghanistan, but that has changed over the last few years. Since 2011, almost every Ashura has seen terrorist attacks on Shia congregations. But it is not just at Ashura that Shias fear attack: over the past two years, Daesh’s a local branch, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), has vowed – and made good on its threats – to attack Shia Muslims and it has perpetrated attacks throughout the whole year. Attacks on Shia mosques and other targets particularly proliferated countrywide after the emergence of ISKP (see here). Since summer 2016, at least seven Shia mosques have been attacked in various regions of Afghanistan; five of those attacks happened this year. (1) ISKP and ‘Daesh Central’ in Syria and Iraq have repeatedly justified its attacks on Hazaras by accusing them of helping their enemies’, ie fighting in pro-regime militias in Syria, and attacking them as ‘apostates’. (‘Daesh Central’s’ justification of the 11 October 2016 attack in Kabul is quoted here); read also our reporting of Afghans fighting in Syria here, here and here).

Not surprisingly, though, as Ashura approached, pressure mounted on the government to get serious about protecting mourners this year. (2)

Ashura is the tenth day of Muharram, the first month in the Islamic lunar calendar, when particularly Shia Muslims mourn the killing of Hussain Ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad in Karbala, in today’s Iraq, in 680 AD, in fighting over who would lead the Muslim umma. Shiite neighbourhoods are decorated with black, red and green banners and tents set up where free food and tea is distributed to the participants. The occasion is marked by marches and ceremonies where people grieve for the events of Karbala, sometimes with men beating or flagellating themselves. For nine days, the ceremonies grow, with the climax on Ashura day itself.

What the government has promised to do.

Less than two weeks before this year’s Ashura, on 19 September 2017, extra protection measures were announced by Second Vice President Sarwar Danesh after he had presided over a meeting of high-ranking government, security officials and a “joint people’s security commission” that includes Shia clergymen, MPs and other representatives. In a meeting with a number of Shia and Sunni ulema on 25 September 2017, President Ashraf Ghani also assured both communities that measures had been taken to commemorate Ashura “in a secure environment” and that “the enemies of Islam… cannot damage the unity of our people and prevent our religious activities.” (see here)

Police usually only guard mosques (of all sects) on certain occasions, during Friday prayers and on other religious holidays, when particular ceremonies are held or VIPs are attending, often on the initiative of the conveners of such ceremonies. This year, additional police have been deployed around places of worship of the Shiite community, coordinated by the Ministry of Interior. Danesh, himself a Shia, called “especially” on the youth to secure places of worship in their respective areas during the days of Muharram.

A second and far more controversial measure is the arming of civilians to guard Shia mosques and takiakhanas. Acting Interior Minister Wais Barmak who participated in the meeting presided over by vice president Danesh said on 20 September that “hundreds of people” had been recruited for training by his ministry. He also confirmed that “measures… to distribute weapons, salaries and other necessary means to the newly recruited people” have been taken. AFP, without a concrete source, gave a figure of “over 400” recruits. The selection of guards was reported to have been made by local elders and communities and in cooperation with mosque committees. (The model here of ‘community defence forces’ would be the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and planned Afghan Territorial Army – see recent AAN analysis here).

Deputy Chief Executive Muhammad Mohaqqeq told ulema in a meeting on 22 September 2017 that, based on a plan approved by the National Security Council, 600 mosques were supposed to get guards. If this figure is correct, the numbers of recruits given are far too low to cover the amount of sites to be protected. Similar doubts were raised by participants of the meeting.

In Kabul, a smaller number of Sunni mosques are also reportedly included in this programme. This might be a step to alleviate concerns among the Sunni majority vis-à-vis the arming of Shia civilians, in a general atmosphere where inter-and intra-communal mistrust and between communities and the government and its security forces has been on the rise.

Danesh has emphasised that these measures would not be limited to this year’s Muharram. He spoke of a “medium-term policy… for across the country… [and for] one to two years,” depending on how security conditions develop.

The second vice president also appealed to those participating in the Ashura commemorations to behave in a way that prevents provoking “unwarranted emotions.” He did not explain further. However, the mourning rituals of Muharram have become very public and far more visible each year since 2001 and not everyone is happy with this assertive display. (For a detailed look Ashura before 2001, during the Taleban era, see here, and for a longer view of sectarian relations, see here.)

The rituals of Muharram have become an identity marker for Afghanistan’s Hazara and other Shia communities who were long and systematically oppressed, but who have become more self-assured in recent years, after their successful resistance to the Soviet occupation (the Hazarajat was the first largest liberated area in the 1980s). There has been immense progress in education and political representation during these years, albeit with many caveats (see a good, detailed examination of this, here.) In previous years, some groups of Sunni Muslims have objected to what they perceive ‘too assertive’ displays of Muharram rituals, leading, for example, to clashes between fringe groups at Kabul University (see here). In 2016, the Shiite community was asked by the authorities to keep commemorations low-key, “to ensure better security in Kabul city and the safety of mourners.”

What is happening on the ground

The security measures began to materialise in the very last days before Ashura and seem to be concentrated in those big cities – Kabul, Herat and possibly Mazar-e Sharif – which have been targets of sectarian attacks in previous years. This has been confirmed for Herat where the measures were reportedly discussed between Vice President Danesh and the province’s governor, Muhammad Asef Rahim. A locally based observer confirmed to AAN that the government has armed some local people who are visible in and around mostly Shia mosques in Herat city and outside of it. The weapons have been given to them via local structures such as Community Development Councils. Additionally, he reported, some local people, “mostly Shias outside Herat city,” have armed themselves, with “simple shotguns” already in their possession or bought for the occasion and are patrolling their areas in shifts, mostly throughout the night. He adds that “day-to-day life is going on amid the increasing securitisation.”

However, the same measures seem not to apply in the cities of Ghazni and Kandahar, both of which have a sizeable Shia population. According to local sources contacted by AAN, including local residents and journalists, security is “very tight” around mosques in the Shia parts of Ghazni, but with all the security personnel in ANP uniform. No additional plain-clothed personnel are visible there so far, according to neighbours of such mosques. The same goes for the Shia neighbourhood of Top Khana in Kandahar.

In Kabul, AAN observed police contacting elders in different police districts of the city to identify volunteers who could carry out body searches on Ashura. The police also appealed to the elders for their neighbourhoods to corporate with the force. People have been asked to keep their eyes open and identify strangers not belonging to the communities. Access roads to mosques and takiakhanas will be blocked and body searches implemented by a mixture of police and civilian guards, both for and by men and women, on the day of Ashura, itself.

From one Shia area in west Kabul, AAN heard that five people had been chosen for each mosque by the Shia Ulema Council and the MoI. The recruits have to be from the mosque’s precinct and the mosque’s board of trustees (hay’at-e umana) have to agree to them; the MoI will issue them with a special ID card with their photos of the guard and, as an additional back-up, a photo of a relative on it. According to local residents, they will be paid 6,000 Afghani monthly. In one neighbourhood mosque in the Telegraph area of Police District Six, for example, the MoI gave five AK 47 assault rifles and 75 bullets to each of its five recruits on 26 September.

In some mosques, the board of trustees or those in charge have also taken extra measures on their own initiative. At Rasul Akram Mosque in Shahrak-e Omid Sabz (better known as the Haji Nabi township) where President Ghani has attended Ashura commemorations over the last few years, they have put up a barrier of cement blocks in a radius of approximately a hundred metres around the mosque, with only small entrances left towards the mosque. This was not the case in previous years. In some areas of Kabul, armed people in plain clothes protecting Shia mosques and takiakhanas have already been already observed. It was not clear, though, whether they were part of the government plan or locally mobilised guards. (More voices from Kabul, including from those involved in the programme, here on al-Jazeera.)

In one mosque in Khairkhana, women were asked by elders after a previous terrorist attack in the area not to attend the commemoration. Security guards also told participants in already on-going commemorations to stay in one venue and not, as is normal practice, go from one mosque to another, in an effort to prevent strangers from infiltrating the crowd.

Members of the AAN team have also observed cases where plain-clothed armed personnel were standing guarding stands distributing tea, milk and other foodstuff specific installed for Muharram.

Perhaps not unexpectedly, the first criticisms of the mosque guard programme has also emerged. The website of Salam Watandar, a popular radio programme developed and formally sponsored by the BBC, in a report from Kabul’s 13th police district, in the southwest of city, quotes local neighbourhood representatives (wakilan-e guzar) and residents that some wakils are keeping their neighbours in the dark about the programme. There are allegations that some wakils are mainly putting forward their relatives and sympathisers as guards. Shia member of the Kabul provincial council Abdul Ahmad Ali Yazdanparast, however, denied reports of wrongdoing and the head of the police district claimed the lists had been compiled in cooperation with the mosques’ religious affairs commissions and in cooperation with the Ministry of Hajj.

This account, however, does not rule out manipulation. As understandable as the anger of various communities about the wave of ISKP terrorist attacks and the inability of the government to protect them is, the mosque protection programme does open the door to abuse. The pattern of ‘village guards’, also armed civilians, being co-opted by interest groups, commanders and powerful politicians is familiar, as is skimming off resources. This becomes particularly problematic if local civilian guard forces become longer-term and adequate oversight measures are lacking. In such circumstances the new guard forces can just look like new militias.

Conclusion: Last-minute, long impact?

The government seems to have reacted only at the last minute to the legitimate security concerns of the Shia community, despite having months to plan for this year’s Ashura. There are also doubts about the effectiveness of arming civilians. It is doubtful, for example, that they would be able stop a complex attack in a crowded place when masses of worshippers are marching or trying to enter a certain mosque or congregation site. In 2016, even regular ANSF units, trained to search and monitor, failed to detect the ISKP bombers in Kabul’s Sakhi shrine. Moreover, even if the searchers succeed in their task, an atrocity could then simply occur at their check-post, which could be as crowded as the site it is supposed to protect, and likely with little downward impact on casualty figures.

All in all, the plan looks much more like a symbolic act of reassuring the Shia communities that the government is ‘doing something’, rather than achieving a real improvement security. Crowds of civilians are among the most vulnerable of targets and the most difficult to protect, so what is being implemented may be the best that could be expected. However, the warning signs are also there, from previous experiences of arming civilians and giving them little training and indifferent oversight. The longer groups of armed civilians exist, the more opportunities of misuse will arise, as the different stages of militia programmes have sufficiently shown (AAN analysis here). There are particular risks when, as currently, inter-and intra-communal mistrust (see AAN analysis here and here) and mistrust between communities and the government and its security forces are on the rise from all sides.

Edited by Borhan Osman and Kate Clark

(1) On the eve of last year’s Ashura, on 11 October 2016, at least 14 people were killed (including the local police chief) and 26 more injured by a gunman, dressed in a police uniform, who had sneaked into the Sakhi Shrine, near Kabul university. The shrine is one of the most important Shia places of gathering in the country. (See AAN reporting here.) In a simultaneous attack next to a Shia mosque in Balkh district, 15 people were killed and more than 30 wounded by an IED (see here).

On 21 November 2016, a suicide bomber killed 32 and injured more than 50 people (UNAMA figures) in Baqir al-Olumi mosque in Kabul during a service to commemorate the death of Imam Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson and a Shia martyr (see here).

In February 2017, policemen (possibly members of the Afghan Local Police) and relatives were reportedly attacked when leaving a mosque after prayer in Jawzjan province. Eleven people, including one woman, were killed.

On late 15 June 2017, during the last days of Ramadan, suicide bombers attacked the al-Zahra mosque in west Kabul (see here and here), killing, according to different sources, between four and seven people and injuring as many as 18 others.

On 1 August 2017, armed men stormed the fully occupied Jawadia mosque in Herat’s Bakrabad neighbourhood during evening prayer, shooting at the worshippers and subsequently blowing themselves up. With 29 dead and 65 injured, this became the worst attack of its kind in Herat so far. Afterwards, local protests broke out, with immediately after, angry people pelting a nearby police station with stones and accusing the policemen of not adequately protecting them. A later protest demonstration was attended by thousands – notably, it was a mixed crowd of Shias and Sunnis.

On 25 August 2017 a suicide bomber and gunmen stormed the Shia Imam Zaman mosque in Kabul’s Khairkhana neighbourhood during Friday prayers, killing about 40 people and wounding nearly 100 (see here), making this the worst attack on a Shia mosque in the country. Calls to allow people to arm themselves and protect their own mosques increased markedly after this attack.

In two other incidents in Herat, a Shia imam was killed in a drive-by shooting in December 2016 and a bomb exploded in May 2017 outside a bakery, killing seven people and injuring 17 more. In the case of bakery bombing it seems likely that the device exploded prematurely; the actual target is believed to have been a religious gathering of Shiites in a mosque nearby.

ISKP did not claim all but most of those attacks, the 11 October bombing in Kabul and the 12 October bombing in Balkh, the attacks in Kabul on 21 November 2016 and 15 June and 25 August 2017, and the February 2017 attack in Jawzjan. In Herat, it claimed the bakery and the Jawadia mosque bombings, but not the other incidents.)

ISKP had already claimed its first massive anti-Shia attack, a suicide attack on a public demonstration on social issues, organised by Hazara activists, in Kabul on 23 July 2016 (see here). At least 80 people were killed and more than 200 wounded. (Footnote this: Even before the emergence of ISKP, in 2011, Shia congregations were attacked in Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif. More than fifty people were killed in an attack on an Ashura procession in Kabul’s Muradkhani, while four more people died in Mazar (see AAN analysis here and here).

The ISKP attacks on Shia targets echo the approach of ‘Daesh Central’, and that of violent sectarian groups in Pakistan, some of which now associated with Daesh. In those countries, they have been part of a widespread, violent, sectarian, Sunni-versus-Shia conflict (see AAN analysis here) and it appeared that ISKP, as well as being consumed by sectarian hatred, also sought to provoke the same tit-for-tat violence in Afghanistan. This has not succeeded so far. Indeed, attacks have been followed by calls on all sides for national unity and Muslim brotherhood. That includes the Taleban, who have condemned attacks against Shia worshippers and mosques (see for example here, after the August 2017 attack in Herat). Many Afghan Shias and Hazaras, however, have complained about the government’s failure to protect them, some alleging indifference or collusion.

(2) The various communities of Shia Afghans are not alone in feeling under threat. Other communities and political forces in Afghanistan have alleged, too, that the government is either incapable or unwilling of protecting them, particularly after the ‘Black Week’ in Kabul in June this year (see AAN reporting here and here). There were even allegations that the security forces, or other parts of the government, had colluded with the terrorists. (See also AAN’s analysis of the latest government security plan for Kabul, the “Green Belt”, here.)

In the first eight months of 2017, Afghan government revenues grew by nearly 13 per cent compared to the same period of 2016. This follows on from strong revenue performances in 2015 and 2016 and is one of the few positive trends in the Afghan economy, in contrast to its continuing weak overall showing in terms of economic growth and employment. Guest authors Bill Byrd and M Khalid Payenda* look at how the government has achieved this revenue growth and how it could maintain it. They also look at how modest economic growth could be encouraged and warn of the need to minimise any economic disruption and revenue losses during the next election cycle, given that both parliamentary and presidential elections are now looming over the horizon.

Strong revenue performance: what and how?

The Afghan government is performing well in terms of increasing revenues, with the double-digit growth in 2015 and 2016 continuing into 2017 (see earlier reporting here. After increasing by 11.4 per cent in the first half of the year, revenue has grown robustly in the seventh and eighth months as well and in the first eight months as a whole is up by 12.9 per cent compared to the same period of 2016. (1)

Importantly, and in contrast to 2015 and 2016, the revenue increase in the first half of 2017 was not due to rises in tax rates. On the contrary, Afghanistan was forced under the conditions of its entry into the World Trade Organisation to reduce some import tariff rates, costing the government budget roughly Afs 3-5 billion (on the order of $45-70 million) in annual revenue. (2)

Nor has depreciation of the Afghan currency – which would artificially raise revenues denominated or collected in foreign currency – accounted for any of the revenue growth. The exchange rate of the Afghani against the US dollar actually appreciated slightly in the first half of 2017 as compared to the first half of 2016. (3) Though part of the increase in revenues may be attributable to a slight uptick in inflation, the bulk of the solid revenue performance so far this year reflects the fact that the government has made stronger and more successful efforts to collect the revenues that are due.

Specifically, in the first half of 2017, revenues denominated or collected in foreign exchange accounted for around 40-45 per cent of total revenue and increased by 13-14 per cent compared to the same period last year. As noted, none of this increase can be attributed to depreciation. (4) The remaining roughly 55-60 per cent of total revenue was denominated and collected in Afghanis. It increased by around 10 per cent, but here inflation needs to be taken into account. There was a six per cent increase in the consumer price index, so this figure can be deflated by six per cent to remove the impact of inflation. (5) Thus, a little over half of the increase in Afghani revenues, or no more than about one-third of the total increase in revenue, can be attributed to inflation. This means that, after subtracting the effect of inflation and taking into account that the exchange rate did not depreciate, revenue growth on the order of eight per cent in the first half of 2017 can be attributed to stronger and more successful government revenue collection efforts.

The performance of customs duties and fees has been notable, increasing by nearly 15 per cent during the first half of 2017. This turnaround from the poor performance of customs collections in past years is impressive. The major factors here appear to have been customs units managing to reduce the incidence of mis-declaration of goods (falsely labelled in order to pay a lower tariff rate) and under-valuation of goods (declared at below the actual import price so as to lower duties). The average value of customs declarations in the first seven months of the current year rose by six per cent compared to the same period of last year, most likely reflecting less under-valuation of imports. Another indicator of improvement is the 13 per cent increase in the number of trucks reported by the Customs Department in the first seven months of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016. This increase may, in part, reflect growth in the volume of imports, but also, in part, less revenue leakage, perhaps due to some trucks that previously had crossed the border without submitting a customs declaration now providing declarations.

Other areas of progress

As well as the strong growth in revenues, it is worth noting a few other bright spots in the macroeconomic and economic reform spheres. These include gaining the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) ‘seal of approval’, accessing more on-budget aid, getting off the money-laundering ‘watch list’ and some progress in anti-corruption efforts.

Following the promulgation of the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) at the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan (BCA) on 5 October, 2016, when $15.2 billion was pledged by donors over four years, Afghanistan has made further progress on economic reforms while maintaining macroeconomic stability. The latter is evidenced inter alia by continuing low (single-digit) inflation, a stable foreign exchange rate for the Afghani and maintaining foreign exchange reserves in excess of $7 billion (sufficient to cover more than 10 months’ worth of imports). The Afghan government’s macroeconomic program has been endorsed by international financial institutions, resulting in confirmation of additional financial support.

On 24 May 2017, the IMF Board approved the completion of the first review under Afghanistan’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF). Though the ECF includes only a small amount of financial assistance – $6.2 million was disbursed upon completion of the first review — the fact that Afghanistan has remained on-track with the IMF program constitutes an important seal of approval for the country’s macroeconomic management. The IMF seal of approval is also significant because it is required for other international agencies to provide aid directly to the Afghan budget, as well as for bilateral donors who provide some of their aid in this way (either directly or through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, the ARTF).

Related, on 12 July, a $482.3 million package of new assistance from the World Bank and the donor-financed ARTF was signed. This package supports various development projects, (6) and it also includes a $100 million development policy grant, which consists of direct, un-earmarked budget support to the Afghan government (ie not tied to any specific project). This is in addition to the ARTF ‘recurrent window’, which disburses around $400 million per year to cover part of the operating budget.

Another recent achievement is that on 23 June, Afghanistan was removed from the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘grey list’ of countries being monitored for Anti Money Laundering/Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) risks and compliance. This milestone is an important signal of international confidence in the country’s banking practices from a money laundering/terrorism financing perspective.

Finally, some progress has been made in fighting corruption. The recently formed Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) has received 95 cases, of which 15 have been referred for prosecution. Thirty-one individuals have already been sentenced to prison for a combined total of 209 years, close to seven years each on average. These include three officials from the Ministry of Urban Development convicted of corruption and six from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) for taking bribes. To date, US$ 9 million has been recovered from offenders.

Looking ahead: how to navigate the economic and election-related ‘headwinds’

These successes aside, the fundamental problems of Afghanistan’s weak economy and high joblessness remain unchanged and there appears little prospect for improvements in the short run. The economic headwinds stem in part from the earlier shock to aggregate demand as a result of the sharp reduction in international military expenditures associated with the withdrawal of the vast bulk of international forces between 2012 and 2014, combined with the Afghan economy’s limited ability to adjust its structure in response to the shock and shift to other drivers of growth. However, deteriorating security and political uncertainty in recent years have contributed to the ongoing economic malaise. These problems are likely to constitute a continuing drag on economic growth in the coming several years.

So modest expectations definitely are called for, but what can be done to improve the economy at least somewhat in the face of these ‘headwinds’? A critical priority is to prevent the fiscal and economic situation from getting worse in the run-up to and during the upcoming election cycle (with parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018 and the next presidential election for 2019). The fiscal crisis that occurred around the 2014 presidential election – characterised by a haemorrhage of government revenue, cash management problems, imposition of extraordinary controls stopping some budgeted and committed expenditures, building significant government arrears, an urgent request for ‘emergency’ short-run aid and inability to complete review of the IMF program – was very damaging. It took considerable time and effort for the government and Ministry of Finance to turn the situation around and get back on track. Afghanistan cannot afford a repeat of anything like such a crisis in the coming two years and some measures could help to prevent that.

First, a stable, cohesive, effective management team at the MoF, and also at Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB – the country’s central bank), will be crucial. The recent management changes at the MoF, resulting in all deputy ministers now being confirmed in their positions (as opposed to some of these positions being vacant and filled in an acting capacity hitherto), provides grounds for hope that this will be possible. It will be essential for political interference in the ministry’s work of budgeting, macroeconomic management and especially revenue collection to be avoided during the election season and the minister and his team need to be empowered to prevent such problems from arising.

Second, the catalyst of the 2014 fiscal crisis was extremely weak revenue mobilization performance, which reached its nadir during and immediately after the election. While it is neither necessary nor desirable for revenue to keep growing as rapidly as it did during the impressive turnaround of 2015-16, continuing robust revenue increases and at least maintaining the revenue-to-GDP ratio, will be important in preventing the kind of revenue erosion seen in 2014.

Third, a contributing factor exacerbating the 2014 fiscal crisis was the MoF’s lack of access to funds, which severely hindered and greatly complicated short-run cash flow management as its deposit balance with DAB was drawn down and virtually exhausted in the latter half of 2014. (7) To avoid such problems in the future, the MoF’s deposit balance at DAB should not become the binding constraint on short-run cash management. Options for greater flexibility can be pursued, whereby if necessary for short-run cash management, the MoF could temporarily run a modest negative deposit balance, incur an overdraft, or engage in some form of limited short-term borrowing from DAB as necessary and appropriate.

Making macroeconomic policy more growth-friendly

Although expectations of higher economic growth should be kept modest, the government could encourage this through macroeconomic policy, public expenditure management and improving the business environment.

With regard to the overall macroeconomic stance, although any attempt at major fiscal stimulus through deficit financing via government borrowing would be risky and must be avoided, fiscal policy should not be contractionary (ie shrinking aggregate demand), either. For example, in 2014 the government incurred a modest domestically-financed fiscal deficit (after – ie not including – donor grants) of about 1.7 per cent of GDP, by running down MoF deposits at DAB, with no adverse macroeconomic consequences in a recessionary economic environment. On the other hand, in 2016, domestic fiscal policy turned slightly contractionary, with the government running (after donor grants) a small fiscal surplus of 0.9 per cent of GDP, manifested in an increase in MoF deposits at DAB.

Public expenditure – how it is spent and on what – can modestly support a more buoyant economy. One priority is to improve and expedite budget execution – this is important in a country where budgeted expenditures are equivalent to around one-third of GDP. If budgeted funds are not actually spent and/or if there are long delays in budget execution, the stimulating effect of public spending on the economy gets lost. Afghanistan suffers from chronic shortfalls in its execution of the development budget (money for public investments and other development projects), whereas the recurrent budget (money for running costs, including salaries) tends to get fully spent. On average, only around half of the development budget actually gets spent each year. Increasing the development budget execution rate would help create jobs, build infrastructure, stimulate economic growth and over time generate more revenues for the government.

Although a common perception is that poor budget execution is due to low capacity in implementation of projects, in reality, budget execution issues in Afghanistan are more complex. One of the main reasons for low budget execution is the quality of project preparation. Currently, many projects get pushed into the budget that are poorly prepared, or in some cases are not prepared at all and in reality are little more than vague concepts. Also, no matter how well-designed and prepared, a project cannot achieve spending targets if the plan is not realistic. Hence improving the front end of the budget process is important, including ensuring that the projects in the budget are fully costed, with a realistic spending timetable.

Shifting the composition of expenditures toward quick-disbursing activities that have a high ‘domestic content’ and relatively low spillover into imports, such as labour-intensive public works and cash-for-work programs and other transfers to the poor, can increase the macroeconomic impact of a given level of public spending. Expenditures that have a higher ‘multiplier’ effect on aggregate demand can be prioritised, also including those with a high salary and other recurrent spending component, such as education, health and direct cash transfers, as well as the security sector. (8)

On the revenue front, the relatively high level of taxation of Afghanistan’s small tax base of formal-sector companies and especially the cumbersome tax administration processes, constitute another obstacle to business activity (beyond the broader security, political and economic headwinds) (see earlier AAN reporting here). For example, overly high tax assessments, combined with the requirement that 50 per cent of the assessed amount be paid in advance to avoid very high penalties during the appeal process, squeeze those companies that try to comply with the law. On the other hand, non-compliant taxpayers can avoid such problems by paying bribes – a phenomenon which also breeds resistance within the system against reforms that would bring in greater revenue. Simplification and streamlining of tax administration, E-filing (recently launched for large taxpayers, planned to be rolled out for medium taxpayers next year) and reducing the pre-payment requirement during appeal and the penalties for delayed payment (both currently under consideration) would begin to improve the situation. More generally, the way forward is to minimise the multiplicity of stages in obtaining tax clearances and reduce the opportunities for discretionary contacts between companies and tax officials. This could be accomplished by combining E-filing with an automatic acceptance of tax return, followed by randomised and risk-based auditing of returns.

Turning to customs duties (currently the most important single source of revenue), further improving the customs administration and containing corruption will be a priority and continuing robust increases in customs collections, as seen in the first half of 2017, would support overall revenue growth. In addition to the role of import tariffs in raising revenue, they can also be an instrument, if used judiciously and in moderation, for protecting and nurturing the development of domestic production. While high tariffs would be inappropriate, ineffective and most likely would further encourage smuggling, it does not make sense to cut tariffs and provide no protection at all for goods which Afghanistan is producing domestically, where it has some, at least, potential comparative advantage and where the economy has a capacity for a supply response (ie the right incentives would stimulate greater production). Many agricultural products fit this bill and, moreover, Afghanistan does currently import very large amounts of agricultural goods (some of them implicitly or explicitly subsidised by the exporting country).

Other obstacles to private sector development are legion. A simpler, more business-friendly regulatory environment would be highly desirable and while eliminating corruption altogether is an unrealistic objective, it needs to be contained and rendered less debilitating to businesses. Improvements in both of these dimensions are especially important for smaller businesses and start-ups. However, those benefiting from bribes associated with the current regulatory complexity will try to block reforms. It must also be recognised that a better investment climate, even if it can be achieved, is unlikely to translate any time soon into higher private investment and expansion of business activity, as long as the major security and political headwinds as well as uncertainty and short-termism remain prevalent.

What should international actors do?

Afghanistan’s international partners can and should provide meaningful support to Afghanistan’s macroeconomic stability and growth agenda, while recognising the need for modest expectations:

• In the face of security challenges and political uncertainty during the next election cycle, stability in international strategy and support for Afghanistan will be critical. Medium-term support was agreed at the 2016 Warsaw (for the security sector) and Brussels (for civilian assistance) meetings, generating international commitments covering 2017-20; these need to be reaffirmed.
• Shifting the composition of aid in favour of giving more assistance directly to the Afghan government budget (on-budget) and toward quick-disbursing, high domestic content activities, would help provide a modest boost to the economy.
• Endorsing a modest degree of fiscal flexibility and supporting a non-contractionary fiscal policy stance (after donor grants) would help enable the macroeconomic framework to be modestly growth-friendly in the current recessionary economic environment.
• International actors can also support efforts to improve the investment climate and help contain corruption, while recognising that these will yield benefits only over the medium-term and, in particular, if the protracted conflict ends or at least there is a major reduction in violence.

Conclusion

The government has done well to maintain robust growth in revenues over the first eight months of this year and has continued to demonstrate sound macroeconomic management. However, the next few years will test whether these achievements can be sustained in the face not just of insecurity and insurgent violence, but also political uncertainty during the approaching election cycle. Sustaining steady revenue increases (even if at a slower pace than during 2015-16), effective macroeconomic management and stable international support will be crucial for navigating the next several years. As we have said, there are bright spots – which should not be overlooked – but the Afghan economy is still weak and unemployment high. Government and donors can take some pro-active measures which would modestly improve the prospects for economic growth, but expectations here have to remain realistic.

* Bill Byrd is a senior expert at the US Institute of Peace and M Khalid Payenda is Deputy Finance Minister in the government of Afghanistan. Both co-authors have closely followed fiscal and macroeconomic developments in Afghanistan for many years and published extensively on these subjects, including earlier updates on revenue performance. Research support by Hassen Ullah Ahmadzai, Sub Director Fiscal Policy in the Ministry of Finance, is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ personal views and should not be attributed to the Ministry of Finance, the Afghan government or to the US Institute of Peace (which does not take policy positions).

Edited by Kate Clark

(1) Revenue and fiscal data presented in this paper are from the Ministry of Finance (Afghanistan Financial Management Information System); the calendar years mentioned refer to the corresponding Afghan fiscal year, which covers the period from approximately 21 December to 20 December (ie 2015 refers to 1394, 2016 to 1395, 2017 to 1396). The raw revenue figures show a decline of 4.4 per cent between the first half of 2016 and the first half of 2017 (from Afs 80,027 million to Afs 76,520 million). However, the former figure needs to be adjusted downward for the large one-time transfer of Afs 10,260 million from the Afghanistan’s central bank (DAB) to the budget (which is not a revenue and certainly does not reflect revenue mobilization efforts), as well as a one-time transfer of Afs 1,090 million from the Ministry of Urban Development. The resulting adjusted total revenue figure in the first half of 2016 that is appropriate for comparisons is Afs 68,677 million, yielding the 11.4 per cent revenue increase in the first half of 2017. The preliminary adjusted revenue figure for the first eight months of 2017 is Afs 104,435 million, a 12.9 per cent increase over Afs 92,514 million in the first eight months of 2016

(2) Based on estimates by MoF staff.

(3) The average of the monthly rates reported by DAB (midpoint of their buying and selling rates) actually appreciated slightly, from Afs 68.67 for US$ 1 in the first half of 2016 to Afs 67.53 for US $1 in the first half of 2017. (See here.)

(4) On the contrary, foreign exchange-denominated and/or collected revenues actually should be slightly inflated to account for the small exchange rate appreciation. However, this approach has not been adopted in the interest of taking a conservative approach in ascertaining the portion of revenue growth attributable to stronger revenue mobilization efforts..

(5) The best deflator to use would be the GDP deflator, but that is not available for six-monthly data and only with a lag for annual data. Generally the GDP deflator tends to be somewhat lower than CPI inflation; thus, using the latter results in a more conservative estimate of revenue effort and/or can be considered to incorporate at least to some extent the real growth of the economy, which was slightly over two per cent in 2016.

(6) Specifically, the package includes development projects supporting communities with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees from Pakistan, urban development, electrification in Herat, establishment of a strategic grain reserve, rural all-seasons access roads and the women’s economic empowerment national priority program.

(7) The inability to spend budgeted amounts in 2014 resulted in the loss of aid that, otherwise, would have been available on a reimbursement basis, for example from the ARTF’s enhanced matching grant program for operations and maintenance spending.

(8) The May 2017 World Bank Afghanistan Development Update discusses the fiscal multiplier and estimates of the multiplier for different categories of expenditure, as well as options for increasing the multiplier and thereby raising the stimulus impact of a given level of public expenditure. These latter options — including increasing absorptive capacity and greater market competition/contestability in key sectors such as construction and banking — would have a positive impact only over time, whereas shifting the composition of expenditures in favour of quicker-disbursing and higher domestic content activities would have a short-run positive impact. (See here, pp 16-23.)

Following the devastating 31 May 2017 bomb attack in the Afghan capital, President Ashraf Ghani commissioned his security experts to develop a new security plan for Kabul. Although apparently not officially approved or fully funded yet, the plan called the ‘Zarghun Belt’ (Green Belt) was announced in mid-August. Jelena Bjelica and Kate Clark (with input from the rest of the AAN team) have been collecting details about the new plan and mapping out what it should entail. They find it designed largely to improve the security of key government institutions and some of the diminishing ‘international community’ in Kabul, despite official claims that its aim is to protect everyone. 

The lethal truck bomb attack near Kabul’s Zanbaq Square on 31 May 2017 (see AAN’s dispatches here and here) killed at least 92 civilians and injured nearly 500. It also caused heavy damage to surrounding infrastructure, including the German Embassy which had to be closed. This and the subsequent protests that ensued (see AAN reporting here) have been game-changers for Kabul’s security planners.

A week after the attack, on 7 June 2017, President Ashraf Ghani, chairing the armed forces’ commander-in-chief’s meeting, ordered high-ranking security officials to undertake comprehensive efforts to improve Kabul’s security, including its diplomatic areas, and the wider province. (1) One of the two international security experts that AAN spoke to for this report hinted to us, however, that the plan that has emerged was driven as much by high-ranking internationals residing in Kabul; it is not clear whether they were from the various diplomatic missions or NATO’s Resolute Support or both.

The roll-out of the new Kabul security plan was announced at the Government Media Information Centre (GMIC) on 14 August 2017 (see here; see also Reuters’ reporting based on an interview with a security official from 6 August here) by the Ministry of Interior and the Kabul Municipality. (Based on AAN queries with relevant security authorities, it is not clear which authority is responsible for enacting the plan or its various parts.)

The details that follow have been somewhat tricky to collate as there are apparent contradictions within and between official statements and press reporting, not only about the what and where of the security measures, but also the when.

The plan has been presented as comprising various new or improved security measures for Kabul city, but many had actually already been discussed or had been waiting to be implemented or had already been in use for long time. It also appears that the plan, despite being announced by the government, has not actually been finalised or signed off, but is, AAN was told by an international security analyst, still sitting on Ghani’s desk. Another security expert said the plan was waiting for funding, and only a few steps had, thus far, been initiated.  The larger projects within the plan, he said, would only be executed once funding was secured. Further confusion has been caused by officials and the media using terms such as ‘diplomatic area’ and ‘green zone’ as well as ‘Green Belt’ which they then often do not define in geographical detail. So, a warning: there is some inherent confusion in how the plan has been presented. We have tried to clarify, where possible, and point up remaining contradictions, where necessary.

A three-phase plan – as presented by the Ministry of Interior

Deputy Minister for Security at the Ministry of Interior and acting chief of Kabul’s Asmai Police Zone 101, Muhammad Salem Ehsas, said at the GMIC press conference that the security plan, named the ‘Zarghun Belt’ (Green Belt, sometimes also, confusingly, translated as Green Zone) would be implemented gradually over the next six months. He said that “Wazir Akbar Khan, Shashdarak, Sherpur and some other areas [of the city] were part of the Green Belt.”

Abdul Basir Mujahed, spokesman for Kabul police, in conversation with AAN said the plan, which he referred to as the ‘New Plan for Kabul Province’, had been endorsed by the Ministry of Interior and approved by the president and would be rolled out in three phases, firstly, covering ‘the diplomatic area’, then other Kabul urban districts and finally Kabul’s rural districts. (2)

It is probably worth trying to pin down the geography of the plan, here.

The first phase of the plan appears to concentrate on what is often referred to, by officials and the media, as the ‘diplomatic area’ of Kabul, or the green zone (after the heavily fortified area of Baghdad used by successive Iraqi regimes and the US and other military and civilian authorities). The map below shows the extent of the current green zone and its proposed extensions, as discussed in security meetings. The extent also matches the neighbourhoods mentioned by deputy minister Ehsas under ‘Green Belt’.

Kabul’s green zone/diplomatic area (the green area on the map) does indeed host many embassies, including those of some of Afghanistan’s key backers – the United States, Germany, France, the UK, Saudi Arabia, India and Turkey, as well as the World Bank country office. Moreover, this area also hosts key government agencies and ministries, including the presidential palace, the Chief Executive’s palace, the ministries of interior, defence and foreign affairs, the NDS, Independent Directorate of Local Government, Sedarat and Radio Television Afghanistan. The CIA and the international military’s headquarters is also within this zone, as are some international contractors. Many commanders and politicians live there and even some ordinary people. However, many other embassies, including many northern European ones are located elsewhere in the city. The term ‘diplomatic area’, then, is a misnomer.

The red area on the map – the extension of the green zone as we know it so far – brings the northern part of Wazir Akbar Khan and Sherpur into the zone. Sherpur used to be a popular neighbourhood. “For centuries,” AAN wrote in 2010, “this plot of land was part of the finely woven agricultural fabric surrounding Kabul [comprising of] traditional mud houses, small pieces of farmland and a historical garden.” One morning in 2003 though, then Kabul Chief of Police, Bashir Salangi ordered it to be bulldozed. 100 armed police forcibly evicted the people living there, injuring some. The land was then parcelled out by the Minister of Defence, the late Marshal Qasim Fahim, to cabinet members (then Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani was one of the very few to refuse land and to criticise the land grab), politicians and commanders (with a strong bias towards Fahim’s Jamiat-e Islami comrades; read more here). Today, northern Wazir Akbar Khan and Sherpur is home to a few embassies, but also to many commanders and politicians. As will be seen below, some new security measures have already been taken in this area.

The other possible extension (in blue on the map) would bring in some stretches of the approach road to Kabul Airport. It seems, according to New York Times reporting, that this will mean US embassy employees will “no longer need to take a Chinook helicopter ride to cross the street to a military base [formerly the headquarters for American Special Operations forces in the capital] less than 100 yards.” It would, of course, mean ‘safe access’ to the airport for everyone else located within the extended green zone.

Green area signifies the current green zone (roughly), red is the planned extension where some new measures are already implemented, and blue is a possible additional extension. (Google Earth puts Bibi Mahru in two locations – the road named Bibi Mahru on the map is wrong, ‘BiBi Mahro’ is correct). Credit: an international security organisation.

General Ehsas has tried to insist that diplomats would be better defended, motorists little affected and the whole of Kabul protected:

In fact, we don’t have any special plan to close or open the roads. The traffic is normal, but on days that we have a VIP guest, the Wazir Akbar Khan roads will be temporary closed for an hour. Wazir Akber [sic] Khan is a diplomatic area and we are making efforts [to ensure] the diplomats’ security and this is our priority. We want to enhance our security plan on Wazir Akbar Khan area. All Kabul is our ‘green zone’ because all Kabul people need security. We have a special security plan and it’s carried out day by day and our aim is not to close the streets.

Other politicians have also sought to insist that everyone will benefit. Member of Kabul provincial council Rahimullah Mujahed claimed the plan would benefit 80 per cent of the population of Kabul, because the installation of new security posts in various squares and other locations would stop security threats to the city, as a whole. Positive claims were also heard from President Ghani and the head of the Capital Zone Development Authority, Ilham Omar Hotaki, as reported by Pahjwok:

[Hotaki] said the Kabul Green Zone plan would bring about a positive change in the living style of Kabul residents and would play a role in improving their economic and social standard. President Ghani said the government would also contribute to the execution of the green zone plan, which he called as effective in bringing about change in social living and improving security of the foreign diplomatic missions.

However, speaking to Reuters, Ehsas appeared to be more frank. “In this security plan, our priority is the diplomatic area,” he said. “The highest threat level is in this area and so we need to provide a better security here.”

Looking into the details of the plan, it appears indeed that the new security measures will largely benefit the already protected and may lead to worsening security for others.

What are the new security measures in Kabul?

The security plan, despite not having been officially published and apparently being confidential, includes at least six elements that have been spoken about by officials or written about in the media. That information provides the basis for the details below. Many are in the current green zone; others outside it.

More checkpoints

According to acting deputy interior minister General Ehsas, “26 checkpoints have been placed around diplomatic areas in Kabul so far, 10 mobile checkpoints have been considered in the routes connected to it.” Elsewhere, he mentioned the 26 checkpoints being in the Green Belt (which he defined as located in Wazir Akbar Khan, Shashdarak, Sherpur and some other areas).

At each of those 26 checkpoints, Kabul police spokesperson Mujahed told AAN, the number of security personnel had been increased from between eight to ten policemen to 15 or 16.  He also said that two companies from a Kabul anti-riot police battalion had been sent for training before they undertook the security of the checkpoints.

Many of the new fixed checkpoints have been under discussion by the relevant authorities and their foreign counterparts for many years now. For example, the new Sherpur checkpoint at a much used road fork, just in front of Emergency Hospital, an international security analyst told AAN, had been on the agenda of many security meetings.

Meanwhile, some checkpoints outside the green zone in the Qala-ye Fatullah and Taimani areas have been dismantled. Since 2009, those were parts of another series of checkpoints, called the ‘Ring of Steel’, introduced by then minister of interior Hanif Atmar. This neighbourhood is home, not to diplomats and government ministries, but to many international and national NGOs, as well as ‘ordinary Afghans’, of course. It has been heavily targeted by kidnappers over the last couple of years, as well as by suicide bombers. The checkpoints at the Salim Karwan intersection, in Medinat Bazar, near the Attorney General’s Office and at Street 3, Taimani, have all been removed, “This seems to run counter to the Kabul police’s declared prioritization of NGO-inhabited areas,” said one analyst, “and indeed, there are empty checkpoints where there used to be manned ones.” While the police have appeared diligent looking for insurgency-related materiel and individuals at these checkpoints, there have been repeated accusations of police collusion with the kidnap gang(s), given their ability to pass through the checkpoints.

Vehicle barriers and metal gates

Kabul police spokesman Mujahed told AAN that a number, possibly up to 40, of metal ‘security gates’ (these are tubular roadblocks that prevent vehicles of a certain height from passing through streets; Reuters has a photo here) were being installed. Some would be flexible and mobile, allowing big vehicles to pass in an emergency. He said he could not disclose their exact number until all were erected. In July and August 2017, the Afghan National Security Forces installed a number of metal gates on specific roads leading to the Green Belt. These gates range in height from two to two and a half metres. A few are outside the green zone or its proposed extensions (as per the map) Those installed close to the city centre are located at: the Sherpur crossroads, close to Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum’s house; the intersection in front of the Emergency Hospital in Shahr-e Now; near to the Kabul police compound/ Sedarat intersection; Pul-e Mahmud Khan intersection; the Abdul Haq Square; in Third Macrorayon; in front of the Kabul municipality; near Azizi Plaza in Bibi Mahru from where a road leads to Fourth Macrorayon; in Pul-e Bagh-e Umumi. New gates are going up in fresh locations.

At the 14 August press conference in GMIC it was announced that large lorries delivering necessary services would be directed along specified roads within the Green Belt and would now only be allowed to enter the Green Belt via the airport road after the police had searched them (see here). Reuters reported that cars would also be generally barred on nine of the fifteen streets in the “diplomatic area” or leading into it and totally and permanently barred from the remaining six (it is not clear if or how residents will be allowed to use these roads).

Mujahed told AAN, “Kabul police have the right to check any kind of car and if anyone tries to avoid this, legal action will be taken.” In practice, police inspect cars selectively and ‘known people’ (meaning passengers who are known to the policemen on the checkpoint) are usually not inspected; at most checkpoints, female passenger are also not searched.

The security forces are also now blocking almost all the roads leading towards the presidential palace (and the Serena Hotel) from 10:00 at night until 6:00 in the morning. The roads include those passing behind Ministry of Telecommunications along Zarnigar Park, from Pul-e Mahmud Khan and from Pul-e Kheshti overnight. This measure starts from 10:00 at night until early morning.

Scanners

Four hangar-style scanners, each weighing around 30 tonnes have been installed at the four ‘gates’ to Kabul city, in Pul-e Charkhi, Company, Tank-e Logar and Sar-e Kotal at Khairkhana, ie respectively on the roads to Nangarhar, through Logar to Loya Paktia, through Maidan Wardak to Ghazni and southern Afghanistan and the Shomali to the Afghan north. The scanners, donated by China as part of an economic and security agreement with Beijing signed in 2012, had crossed into the country by rail from Uzbekistan. (See also this Reuters report from December 2016). It was reported that the scanners had been ‘gathering dust’ for over a year in a Kabul warehouse because of infighting between different Afghan interior ministry’s departments over which one should install them and a dispute over who should purchase the land on which the giant scanners would be installed. (3) After the terrorist attack at Zanbaq Square, the scanners were finally, it seems, taken out of storage. Mujahed told The Kabul Times they would stop the entry of drugs, explosives, ammunition and other illegal substances into the city.

Four hangar-style scanners, each weighing around 30 tonnes have been installed at the four ‘gates’ to Kabul city. Credit: Tolo, 2017

Several Kabul residents whom AAN spoke to said they had observed that it takes the police at least ten minutes to scan a car and at certain times of day when there is a heavy traffic congestion, the policemen do not scan any vehicles at all.

K9 units

In early August, ANSF deployed five ‘K9 units’, dog teams trained to search for explosives and other illegal materials, to several locations in Kabul City: Pul-e Mahmud Khan, Wazir Akbar Khan, Bibi Mahru Hill, Abdul Haq Square and Kabul Airport’s main entrance.

Although K9 teams have been intermittently present at Kabul Airport for almost a year, deployed there on a 24-hour basis, some vehicles have been exempt – those belonging to VIPs and ‘known people’ and those with female passengers. There is no fixed time frame for how long the K9 teams will be deployed to these five locations.

Other measures

Deputy Minister Ehsas said that police patrols, both on vehicle and motorcycle, would be increased in Kabul city. Apparently, 80 motorcycle patrols will be established, but as the motorcycles have not been purchased yet, it is a presumption that this will only happen at some point in the future.

Ehsas also said a 500-member police anti-riot battalion featured in the security plan. It appears that they have been deployed to guard the Wazir Akbar Khan and Sherpur areas. However, this 500-strong battalion was always part of the Kabul security architecture and it had, previously, been spread around Kabul City, an international security expert told AAN. According to this expert, the plan is now to re-train the battalion. The money for this may also be part of the Afghanistan-China 2012 economic and security agreement, the text of which is confidential. Known parts of the agreement suggest that a number of policemen would be sent to China for training. Either way, it seems that the green zone will benefit from a concentration of police on motorcycles, while the rest of the city will suffer a corresponding scarcity.

According to one of the international security analysts AAN consulted, there would also be increased patrolling in the Wazir Akbar Khan, Sherpur, Qala-ye Fathullah, Kart-e Chahar and Kart-e Se neighbourhoods.

T-wall removal: part of the plan or not?

The removal of anti-blast ‘T-walls’ is not part of the security plan, but worth mentioning in the context of Kabul’s security. A campaign to remove them was  started a few weeks after the Zanbaq Square attack, announced by acting Kabul mayor Abdullah Habibzai, on 23 June 2017, supposedly in response to the demands of the citizenry (see here and here).

Removing T-walls has been a demand from the public for many years now. Former president Karzai ordered their dismantlement in 2010, in order to improve traffic flow on the capital’s roads (see here). The move was short-lived, however, and it was noticeable that the former president fortified his own residence with concrete blast walls as soon as he left the presidential palace.

T-walls protect those behind them, but amplify the blast for everyone else in the vicinity. For the common people then, they are an ‘insecurity mechanism’. In some places, they seem particularly appalling, for example, on the road outside the old Ministry of Interior. They actually increase the exposure of the Lycée Malalai girls school and the Jamhuriat and Antani Hospitals on the other side of the road to danger; if there was an attack on the ministry, the school and hospitals would receive a far greater blast.

T-walls also partially block roads and hamper traffic flow, as they are rarely built within the perimeter of the protected person’s property, but jut out onto the pavement or even into the middle of the road, blatantly grabbing land from the public. Many would also argue that by increasing security for those with power sheltering behind them, they reduce their incentive to improve the security for everyone in the city. (Compare similar dynamics when those who can afford generators and bottled water are in charge of systems which fail to deliver mains electricity and drinking water to the general population.)

New roads

The new security plan’s biggest ambition is to totally close off the ‘diplomatic area’ by building by-pass roads. Head of the Capital Zone Development Authority Hotaki presented a proposal, on 3 August 2017, to build ten kilometres of new roads as part of the security plan which he called the “Kabul Green Zone.” He said short and long-term measures had been considered in the security plan and five ‘security zones’ would be established in Qala-ye Musa, Bibi Mahru, Qala-ye Khayat and Qala-ye Nazir/Qala-ye Khatir (both names were reported, here and here), all neighbourhoods adjacent to the ‘core zone’ of Wazir Akbar Khan, Shashdarak and Sherpur. On 16 September 2017, Tolo television reported an announcement by the municipality to build one such new road linking the Airport Road to Bibi Mahru and onto Qala-ye Musa (police district 10), north of Bibi Mahru hill, to avoid Wazir Akbar Khan and Sherpur (which are in its south). This would mean the destruction of homes in popular neighbourhoods. So the creation of ‘security zones’ here means security for others, not the inhabitants.

Hotaki said anyone losing their homes, would be re-housed. However, particularly given that government promises on housing and land are rarely honoured those facing the demolition of their homes could be forgiven for being sceptical (see also AAN analysis here and here).

Indeed, rather like building T-walls, this looks like another grab of resources from ordinary people to improve the security of the already privileged.

A few thoughts about the new Kabul security plan

In general, it is difficult to protect the population when Taleban and Daesh insurgents are prepared to kill civilians and do not (despite statements to the contrary) recognise the city’s population as ‘their people’ who have to be safeguarded in any attack. The insurgents’ readiness to commit suicide also makes them a tricky enemy to protect against.

Physical barriers alone will also never be able to protect a large and sprawling city like Kabul. Even in Najibullah’s time, when the population was smaller and more homogenous, his triple-ring defences could not protect the population then from mujahedin attack, in those days mainly the systematic targeting of relatively low-profile targets – police and army checkpoints, barracks and individuals (see AAN analysis here). Even if the Taleban did not have sympathisers inside the city ready to help with logistics or provide safe houses, they would still be able to force cooperation through threats, for example from people with relatives in villages under Taleban influence or control, or for money. Good intelligence is important here.

Even so, physical security measures can help. In terms of the overall safety for the Afghan capital, the new vehicle barriers at the city’s gates and the K9 teams would seem to be positive steps and will be the most visible changes in Kabul’s security architecture. Otherwise, it seems the new measures are actually aimed at the already well-protected, despite claims by officials to the contrary. One security expert told AAN that the Palace was committed to protecting its citizens and boosting Kabul’s security, but that the availability of foreign funding was affecting where the plan was being rolled out. Moreover, although some diplomats and some government ministries will become safer, others, including the majority of international NGOs and the vast proportion of the population, will see little improvement in their security and a possible deterioration. As with T-walls, closing streets and thereby exacerbating traffic congestion, demolishing homes so that by-passes can be built and emptying some existing checkpoints to concentrate efforts elsewhere, it appears that, at present at least, the many will bear the cost of better protection for the few.

The major institutions in the green zone, both foreign and Afghan, are the obvious targets for the Taleban and Daesh, but not the only ones. Better security in those areas could lead to the insurgents seeking easier or softer targets to attack, or using different methods, outside the better protected zones. See, for example, the increase in magnetic improvised explosive devices (MIEDs) used against vehicles in the last two years, in Kabul but also elsewhere. Whoever is on the periphery of highly defended areas will also find their risk of being caught up in an attack has increased. The 31 May 2017 attack was a case in point, with foreign or Afghan government installations the intended target, but Afghan morning commuters comprising almost all the victims, after police guards at an existing barrier stopped the truck bomb entering the green zone.

It is also important to recognise that security is not limited to insurgent attacks. Citizens also suffer from criminality, and according to one of the security experts AAN spoke to, this has recently seen a “slight uptick” – here better policing could help – and racketeering and extortion when the police, themselves are often the perpetrators. (See here AAN analysis of inefficiency and corruption in the Ministry of Interior.

Concerns have also been raised by fire fighters’ and ambulance drivers interviewed by AAN as to whether their vehicles will actually be able to drive beneath the new metal gates. There will be other knock-on effects, as well, not just increased congestion for everyone, but for emergency services in particular. It can already take hours for ambulances and private cars carrying the wounded through the heavily congested Shahr-e Naw to reach the Emergency Hospital. One of the key response institutions in case of attack, can now only receive wounded people from one direction.

The Zanbaq Square atrocity rightly led to demands for greater protection, not just from diplomats, but from many others living in Kabul. However, after looking at the details of the new security plan, the question remains: whose security will it protect? At the moment, at least, this is not a Green Belt for all.

(1) Pajhwok news agency reported that also present at the meeting were Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, National Security Advisor Muhammad Hanif Atmar, Attorney General Farid Hamidi, Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG)’s acting director Abdul Baqi Popal and senior security officials.

(2) Then Kabul Governor Hamid Ikram (he retired in mid-September), went even further at the GMIC press conference, suggesting that the security scheme would be extended not only to Kabul city, but to other provinces, as well. If true, this raises the question of whether a security plan designed for Kabul (with its specific layout) could simply be copied and applied to other cities in Afghanistan.

(3) Different, or possibly additional locations for scanners were reported by Tolo on 6 August 2017: Arghandi, Sang-e Nabeshta and Kotal-e Khairkhana. Haq Nawaz Haqyar, deputy security chief for  Asmayi Zone 101 of Kabul said the police was also trying to install them in Dasht-e Pichari, Gul Bagh, Butkhak and Tangi-ye Tarakheil.

In recent days, Afghan government officials have raised the possibility of standing up a new militia force, the Afghan Territorial Army (ATA), modelled after both its Indian namesake and the Afghan Local Police (ALP). AAN understands that President Ghani is currently considering a pilot project for the ATA in the Achin and Kot districts of southern Nangrahar. This is, of course, the stronghold of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the local franchise of Daesh and the centre of the United States’ and Afghan government’s battle against it. AAN’s Kate Clark and Borhan Osman have been considering the viability of the pilot project and what might be its long term consequences. They also recall how an earlier United States arming of tribesmen in Achin paved the way for its takeover by Daesh.

Update: AAN has been told that a second government/NATO delegation will be visiting India for more research on the ATA and that no decision is expected until after that. We also received some comments and information from various readers (something which we always welcome) and did a little more digging. There is small  update, marked in the text, to do with powerbrokers behind the militias.

This dispatch is a follow-on from a previous piece  which looked at the ATA proposal in the light of the ALP experience and considered how it fitted into General Nicholson and President Ghani’s military strategy for Afghanistan.

 This dispatch is published as part of a joint three-year project by AAN, the Global Public Policy institute (GPPi), and the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani. The project explores the role and impact of militias, local or regional defence forces and other quasi-state forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, including mechanisms for foreign assistance to such actors. Funding is provided by the Netherlands Research Organisation.

 Militias and Americans in the fight against Daesh

The fight against Daesh in Afghanistan is politically important: one of Nicholson’s aims for 2017 is to “defeat” the group, something that President Trump echoed when he described America’s goal of “winning the war” and “obliterating ISIS.” The districts where it is present in Nangrahar province are also some of the few where US boots on the ground – and US planes in the air – are in evidence. The US military has been working very closely, not only with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), particularly Afghan special forces, but also local militias. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police (ANP) are present, but have earned a reputation for failing to hold ground.

Local fighters, by contrast, have made a name for being effective, aggressive against the enemy and, unlike other places, not particularly abusive of the population. They are under arms as members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP) and other, mostly local, ‘uprising forces’ funded by the National Directorate for Security (NDS) and raised by local powerbrokers. Here, the proposal to establish an Afghan Territorial Army (ATA) would seem to be a consolidation and regularisation of what is already happening on the ground, bringing informal ‘uprising’ militia forces into an official tashkil (personnel roster) and to place them under formal Afghan National Army (ANA) command. (1)

The current militia forces in southern Nangrahar were part of an experimental drive in 2015 by the NDS to set up ‘popular uprising forces’ (going under various local names, including Khezesh-e Mardomi and Patsunian, but in southern Nangrahar called the Hemayat-e Mardomi or People’s Support) (read more here ). They received arms from the Ministry of Defence, not just light, but also heavy weaponry, including pika (PK machine guns), dashaka (DShK heavy machine guns) and rocket-propelled grenades.

 This may sound like the state established these militias. However, local powerbrokers have been crucial or even primary in their formation. Foremost among these powerbrokers is Haji Abdul Zaher Qader, MP and former deputy speaker of the parliament and, among other senior positions in the Afghan police force, a former border police chief in Badakhsan and Takhar. He is one of the most powerful men in Nangrahar and, currently, the most powerful member of the influential Arsala clan, a prominent mujahedin family which fought with the Hezb-e Islami Khales faction (now largely defunct as a political party). Haji Zaher has forces in the uprising militias, as well as the ALP and ANBP in Achin, Nazyan and Kot districts. Earlier in the summer, he pressed for long-term support and more equipment from the government for anti-Daesh militia in the province.

Others mobilising forces for the militias are Haji Hayat Khan, another former jihadi commander, close to Provincial Governor Muhammad Gulab Mangal and active in Kot, as well as the less prominent Malek Dehqan who is active in Nazyan district. The forces of all three men have been instrumental in holding territory taken from Daesh, something ANSF units have repeatedly failed to do. Locals also described them to AAN as fearlessly chasing Daesh militants, again in contrast to conventional ANSF units.

Haji Zaher is easily the most prominent of the three powerbrokers. His current alliance with the US military and his record in mobilising forces for them has made him very important, more influential than the provincial governor or ANA Corps commander and giving him the basis even to stand against National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar (accusing him of supporting Daesh and calling for the National Security Council’s budget to be cut ). Zaher is not particularly popular locally, but he is rich – he boasted to parliament in 2013 that he was worth more than 365 million US dollars – and he can mobilise men.

Update: We may have given the impression that Haji Zaher, Hayat Khan and Malek Dehqan were rivals. However, Dehqan is a sub-commander of Haji Zaher, while the militias of Hayat Khan work closely with Zaher’s. Another question raised by a reader was whether the aim of central government in setting up the ATA would be not to regularise Zaher’s militias, but to sideline them, by setting up rival militias. If correct, the goal would be to reduce Zaher’s influence in Nangrahar. However the means would be risky, involving the creation of rival, pro-government armed groups with the risk of exacerbating intra-tribe hostility.

The ATA, modelled on the ALP?

This is all a long way from the proposed ‘village defence forces’ of the ALP, which officials said the ATA would copy (see AAN’s previous dispatch  about the ATA). In the ALP model, according to agreed (but not always implemented) procedures, forces are very local, chosen by the community and not deployed elsewhere, except with the permission of the provincial chief of police. They should only take part in defensive action. Where existing militias have simply been ‘re-badged’ as ALP, the units have tended be the most abusive and troublesome. For more detail on this, see also a recent AAN report on accountability in the ALP .

Sixteen years experience of standing up militia forces in Afghanistan, mainly with foreign, mainly US military backing, some by the Afghan government, has provided a lot of guidance about risks and benefits, particularly in the following areas: accountability whether through formal chains of command or through community control, or better both; local ‘buy-in’ for a force or lack of it; whether the new force will harm the local tribal, or sub-tribal balance of power; whether it makes potentially abusive powerbrokers richer or more powerful (with special reference to elections and the possible benefits of crime, especially in the opium industry) and whether the potential long-term negative consequences of raising a militia have trumped its short-term benefits. For more detail on this, see AAN’s first dispatch on the ATA).

Community ‘buy in’ and the local balance of power

The fight against ISKP is popular locally. It is seen as an ‘existential fight’ and ISKP as a foreign force which has behaved with unparalleled brutality towards civilians. These, then, are the grounds for a successful campaign and for Zaher, in particular, to gain popularity. Indeed, little criticism of his mobilisation of men is heard in Nangrahar. Although Zaher is not particularly popular locally, people from the districts, including tribal elders and observers, will not speak against the uprising forces or against Zaher because their hatred of Daesh is so great. Even so, the raising of militia forces is not without controversy.

If you have a one-hour conversation with locals and dig into history a little and ask about ‘the day after Daesh’, fears surface about what could happen after the hoped for victory against ISKP. One reason is that, in this area, people have hostilities even within the same tribal structure. That is one reason why, from the Shinwar tribe, for example, some are contributing men to the militias, others not. Some maleks and elders who have disputes with others have been aligning themselves with Zaher to use his authority against rivals – to settle scores, get power or money for land disputes or to bolster their position in local politics. This dynamic can have dangerous consequences.

Indeed, the emergence of ISKP can be traced back to the US arming one sub-tribe – the Sepai of the Shinwar, including in Achin district, in 2009 to face the Taleban. The ‘Shinwari Pact’, much hailed at the time, turned to catastrophe as the Sepai used their new-found power to grab land from the rival Alisherkhel sub-tribe, resulting in conflict within the larger tribe. This led the Alisherkhel to call in Pakistani militant groups for support and to the area sinking into chaotic militancy and violence. Intra-tribal solidarity was eroded – with devastating consequences. When Daesh threatened their lands, the weakened Shinwar were simply unable to stand against them. Their area was swiftly captured by the militants in early 2015. (For more detail on this, see here).

It is understandable then, why people fear that this fresh mobilisation and arming of civilians could again be brewing trouble in the long run. A hard look at local politics, demography and history in southern Nangrahar demonstrates a high risk that arming civilians in paramilitary forces is likely to throw the tribal and sub-tribal balance out of kilter.

Drugs and votes

Two serious issues have emerged in research on the ALP and other post-2001 militia forces – their relationship with the opium economy and with elections.

Militias have been repeatedly used since 2001 for strengthening patronage networks ahead of elections, getting the vote out, both in the form of actual and stuffed ballots, and keeping supporters of rival candidates from getting out to vote. (2) A natural tie-in between control of armed forces and of borders and provinces where drug smuggling and other criminal enterprises can earn money has also been seen. (This is not limited to militias, of course, as work on the Ministry of Interior has shown.) International Crisis Group has described this phenomena, for example, among “those ALP units with ties to factional militia leaders, often in places where Afghan powerbrokers want control of drug routes or other strategic territory” and said it gives the units effective impunity. It reports the comment of one Afghan senator: “‘Drug mafias are controlling ALP in many places… They can make a phone call from their village to a minister and avoid the chain of command.’” (3)

Nangarhar enjoys both a large vote bank, making it highly significant for presidential candidates, as well as those running in parliamentary elections and a significant role in Afghanistan’s opium industry. It ranked fifth in the ranks of poppy-cultivating provinces last year and has important border crossings for smuggling drugs out of Afghanistan and importing the precursors needed to make heroin. (4) On past experience, such a provincial profile would lead to concerns about how militia formation might forge or strengthen relations of patronage ahead of elections and about what militia forces might be used for after the battle with Daesh is (hopefully) won.

Zaher, himself, stands accused of drug smuggling. On 15 August 2011, the Attorney General’s Office summoned him by letter to answer accusations that he was the head of a drug smuggling gang (see the letter here ). His secretary and cousin Bilal Wali Muhammad had been caught with a large amount of heroin in a border police car in Takhar. ABC News reported that a manhunt was on for Zaher himself, although he was never arrested . Zaher said it amounted to a political plot against him. In the end, Bilal was sentenced to 19 years in jail, only to be pardoned just ahead of the 2009 presidential elections in a deal by President Karzai to get Bilal and Zaher’s uncle, Din Muhammad, on board as his campaign manager. ABC News also reported Afghan officials saying Karzai had wanted to name Haji Zaher as head of the border police, but a US military intelligence assessment (which the network had obtained in 2006) had “named Zahir as a drug smuggler.” (5)

Locals have alleged that Zaher benefits from smuggling and illegal checkpoints and these ‘business interests’ have been hurt by the growth of ISKP and the Taleban, reducing the territory in Nangrahar under his influence. If this is the case, getting rid of Daesh may also have financial incentives. There may also be political ones. David Mansfield, writing for AREU, said Zaher was aggrieved, after backing Ghani in the 2014 elections, that neither he nor one of his supporters got the Nangrahar governorship. Instead, it went to ‘technocrat’ Salim Khan Kunduzi, who is also nephew to the deputy leader of National Security Advisor Atmar’s Rights and Justice Party. “[T]he appointment of Kunduzi as governor,” wrote Mansfield, “was seen by Zahir as an affront; a signal that National Security Adviser Hanif Atmar was in ascendance, and a further impetus to bypass government institutions, exemplified by his establishment of a private militia.”

Whatever Zaher’s motivation is for raising anti-Daesh militias, the close working relationship with the US military the mobilisation has given him is likely to leave him permanently more powerful.

One other curiosity to note which may influence Zaher’s future prospects is that he has carved out a position mainly as an anti-ISKP figure. He has not taken a known hostile position against the Taleban. AAN was told there are channels between both parties. Local officials in Achin and Pachir wa Agam districts, as well as NDS officials, have said that, during the past two years, there has been occasional cooperation in the common fight against ISKP between the Taleban and local uprising forces, with the endorsement of local Afghan officials. (In Achin, we were told that Taleban positions were marked with a particular flag in spring 2016, so that the US would not mistakenly bomb them. Even if incorrect, the rumour indicates something interesting about public perceptions.) US air strikes against Taleban fighters in the southern Nangarhar districts have not been absent, but they have been far less frequent than attacks against the ISKP. There have also generally been few reported Taleban attacks against American forces in these areas.

Abuses and accountability

In terms of the uprising forces’ treatment of civilians, up till now, they have generally behaved well in Nangrahar. But militias loyal to Zaher did mete out criminal violence towards locals in the early years after 2001 – see detail in this 2004 report by Human Rights Watch) which documented militias loyal to Zaher and to his rival, Hazrat Ali, seizing land and other property, kidnapping civilians for ransom and extorting money. It also found their close relationship with US forces left them untouchable, politically and in terms of the Afghan criminal justice system. (6)) Not surprisingly, there is some fear that history will repeat itself.

Concerns about a wider lack of accountability and of Zaher condoning, indeed encouraging, brutality have already surfaced, most publicly in December 2015 when uprising forces loyal to Zaher beheaded a number of alleged ISKP fighters and displayed their heads on the main road. In the best case scenario those killed had been fighters hors de combat (ie prisoners, protected persons under the Geneva Conventions, making this a war crime). Locals, however, described them as “Afridi boys” who had been settled in the area for a long time; civilians who were suspected simply because they were from the same tribe and area (Khyber Agency) as many of the Daesh fighters. Zaher was unrepentant, telling reporters it had been retaliation for the beheading of four of his militiamen, “Do you think if they behead you,” he asked, “you cook them sweets?” He has posted grisly pictures of decapitated heads and militiamen with their feet on dead bodies on his Facebook page.

Accountability mechanisms governing the uprising forces in Achin have not been in place up to now. One aim of regularising the uprising forces may be to try and get better formal command and control. This could also be the reason for creating an ATA, rather than bringing additional forces into the ALP, with the hope that accountability would be stronger through the military than the police. However, at the moment, Zaher is more powerful than the provincial corps commander and it would likely be difficult for the Ministry of Defence to discipline his forces. An obvious, basic question, then, is who would actually be in charge of the militias if they were re-badged as ATA: Zaher and the other power-brokers, or the ANA?

The use of militias and their possible regularisation as ATA units in Achin and Kot is, in part, a bid to patch over the deficits in regular ANA and ANP forces. This is a recurrent reason for standing up militias: the US military and/or the Afghan government feel they do not have the time to improve regular ANSF forces and reach for the, allegedly quicker and cheaper, ‘militia option’. It may feel a simpler solution at the time, but has been shown to risk stoking up future troubles. Armed forces, established with formal command and control mechanisms and with some insulation from powerbrokers, are easier to control. However, if the US military or Afghan government had qualms about backing the armed men of a figure with a history of running abusive militias, boasting about war crimes and with official accusations against him of drug smuggling, it has not held them back. Rather, the perceived imperative of defeating Daesh won out.

The ATA in Achin and Kot – a useful place to pilot?

The location of the possible pilot test for the ATA – two districts where local militias have been raised to fight a ‘foreign enemy’ with close US military cooperation – also reveals potential flaws in rolling out the project nationally. In southern Nangrahar, there has been genuine and widespread support from the local population to fight the ISKP, despite some disquiet about future consequences. The militias here have also had extremely close cooperation with American forces, unusual in recent times given the limited nature of the US combat mission. The local militias in southern Nangrahar feel themselves monitored, one possible reason why they have held back from abusing civilians.

All of this makes for Kot and Achin being highly abnormal among Afghanistan’s many insurgent-plagued districts where the enemy is the Afghan Taleban and Afghan forces are fighting without any international presence on the ground. Nowhere else in Afghanistan can be found the same combination of an external, existential threat, the watching eyes of foreign forces and extreme animosity towards the enemy. This raises the question of whether Achin and Kot can really serve as the site of a genuine pilot project for the ATA.

(1) This also raises questions about who is and will fund the militias/ATA and, as a follow on, whether there is any external funding. (In relation to the militias, The Wall Street Journal reports security officials saying the CIA picks up most of the bills for the NDS, but that its funding is discretionary. The US military is the largest funder of the ANA.

(2) Goodhand and Hakimi described how Aref Nurzai, ally and relative by marriage of former president Karzai, used militias (known as the Community Defense Force or CDF) as “vehicles for strengthening patronage relationships in relation to the [poll].” They also describe how then Balkh governor, Nur Muhammad Atta, pre-eminent strongman in the north, was accused, “of fanning insecurity and arming local militias to disrupt elections in Pashtun areas and undermine the incumbent’s [Karzai] electoral chances and boost his rival Abdullah, a political ally of Atta.” In neighbouring Kunduz, reported Derksen, “President Karzai, Jamiati power brokers, and others vied for influence through local appointments and by giving or withholding support to local militias.” They included the provincial governor, Engineer Omar, who asked his brother-in-law, General Muhammad Daud, the provincial NDS chief, to recruit local militias to “stem the insurgency’s rise and help secure the vote.” Earlier, Human Rights Watch wrote in its 2011 report on the ALP, “Since it came to power in 2001,” reported the Afghan government has been using and paying militias, with an increase in their deployment for elections in both 2004 and 2005.” Militias were also used, to help both Karzai and Dr Abdullah, north and south.

(3) Particularly egregious among criminally-oriented militias were the Private Security Companies (PSCs) used by the international military for transport supplies and guarding bases between 2005 and 2009 and described in a 2011 US House of Representatives investigation as “warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders masquerading as PSCs.” They were involved in drug smuggling, land grabbing and other criminal activities: the House of Representatives called the sector a “protection racket.”

(4) UNODC tracked opium production rising by 43 per cent in Nangrahar last year compared to 2015. However, production has fallen markedly in the districts controlled by ISKP which banned it. Production fell in Achin from 3,004 to 698 metric tonnes and in Kot, from 2,040 to 80 metric tonnes (between 2014 and 2016).

(5) Barnett Rubin described in 2000 how the Arsala clan had become rich:

The Arsala clan (Haji Abdul Qadir [Zaher’s father] and his brothers) was at the center of the commercial development of Jalalabad, profiting from Nangarhar province’s skyrocketing opium production and using the Jalalabad airport as a center for the import of goods from Dubai for smuggling into Pakistan in alliance with Afghan and Pakistani Pashtun truckers and the local administration of the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province].

“The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan”, World Development Vol 28, No 10, pp 1789-1803, 2000.

(6) Human Rights Watch wrote:

Hazrat Ali and Haji Zahir’s commanders throughout the Nanga[r]har area operate criminal enterprises and continue to engage in numerous human rights abuses, including the seizure of land and other property, kidnapping civilians for ransom, and extorting money—as Human Rights Watch has previously documented. As noted below, U.S. and coalition forces continue to cooperate with these forces in operations against the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

The Afghan government and its United States military backers are considering standing up a new militia force, an army version of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and modelled on the Indian Territorial Army. Officials claim this is their only option if isolated communities are to be protected from insurgents. Human rights groups have reacted with shock. AAN’s Kate Clark looks at the multiple, unhappy precedents for this force, but also at where militias have, occasionally, worked to defend communities, rather than abuse them. She considers the serious questions that would need to be answered before the government went ahead with this plan and also asks what it means for the third of a million-strong ANSF that a new militia is felt to be needed.

AAN has been told that President Ghani is currently considering a pilot project for the ATA in the Achin and Kot districts of Nangrahar, heartland of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the US/Afghan government fight against it. In a second dispatch, we will assess the viability of this pilot project using lessons learned from previous experiments with militias.

This dispatch is published as part of a joint three-year project by AAN, the Global Public Policy institute (GPPi), and the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani. The project explores the role and impact of militias, local or regional defence forces and other quasi-state forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, including mechanisms for foreign assistance to such actors. Funding is provided by the Netherlands Research Organisation.

Many, including this author, could not believe their eyes when they read a New York Times piece on 15 September 2017 quoting un-named officials about a proposal to establish a new militia force for Afghanistan modelled after a combination of the ALP and the Indian Territorial Army. For many years now, there have been scathing critiques of both (1) and of other Afghan militias including allegations that they engage in widespread abuses, undermine accountability, or simply do not work to protect the population. It seemed astonishing then that the Afghan government and US military would be planning to create another of these forces. 

Yet, the proposal appears to be serious. It was followed up with other articles quoting named Afghan Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials; according to The New York Times, Tolo TV and AFP, the proposal is to establish ‘village defence forces’ in other words civilians who would be recruited locally and given arms to protect their areas. This new ‘Afghan Territorial Army’ (ATA) may include some 20,000 forces – that would be more than two-thirds the size of the ALP (now at 29,000 forces). One Afghan MoD official told AFF it will “operate under an army corps and will be used to fill the gaps.” Spokesman for the ministry, Dawlat Waziri told Tolo:

“People will be recruited from their areas, because they know their region and realize how to keep it … The forces will not go from one place to another. It is almost the same as the Local Police, but there is a big difference.” [This difference not explained in the report.] 

The New York Times reported that the move would regularise the use of “local militias” which it says the government has often turned to when “districts have come under Taliban attack and the regular forces [are] stretched.” Pro-government militias have been increasingly used by Kabul since the completion of handover of security from international to national forces in 2014, both in Nangrahar and in the north (they were also raised before that – see AAN reporting here, here and here). Some militias have been badged as ‘uprising forces’; others not. None have any status in Afghan law and their chains of command tend to be opaque, both factors which tend to foster abusive behaviour. (2)

One aim of the ATA, it seems, would be to bring such militias under formal state control.

The role of these re-badged militias, according to The New York Times, would be “holding areas cleared by the regular army, whose units would take on a primarily offensive role.” The new force would be cheaper than the national army, it said “and more sustainable and accountable than the existing militias.”

AAN understands the ATA proposal has the backing of the US military, Afghan ministry of defence and NATO Resolute Support and is now on President Ghani’s table waiting his final decision. However, reports say it was met with scepticism and disquiet by many of Afghanistan’s major donors, particularly the European countries. They have maintained their refusal to support the Afghan Local Police because of concerns over funding militias, so it seems unlikely they would back the ‘Afghan Territorial Army’. Human rights groups also immediately raised detailed concerns, founded on experience of uncovering abuses by previous militia forces. Human Rights Watch warned that “the expansion of irregular forces could have enormously dangerous consequences for civilians.”

The ATA within Afghanistan’s new military strategy

The reason for setting up the ATA – a force that is presented as replicating the ALP, but under MoD control (more on which, later) – has not been made clear. Officials have yet to reveal any difference in their role or make-up, except that they would be “better trained.” Like the ALP, the ATA would be recruited locally and, we are told, not deployed elsewhere.

It is also not clear why the Afghan government and its US military backers want to stand up a new force at all, when there are so very many Afghans under arms already. As of May 2017, (see here) there were a third of a million men and women (3) – 336,000 – in the ANSF, of whom 180,000 are ANA and 156,000 ANP.

The ATA proposal needs to be seen within the new military strategy of President Ghani and General John Nicholson, commander of US and international forces in Afghanistan; this was backed by President Trump in a speech on 21 August 2017 (read about it in detail here). Its aim is to ‘tilt’ the war in Kabul’s favour, with the aim of capturing back territory so that 80 per cent of the population is in Afghan government control. They want to eliminate Daesh and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, but have expressed no hope in defeating the Taleban (few predict that either side can achieve victory on the battlefield).

The key failure since the transition from international to national responsibility for security, which was completed at the end of 2014, has been the inability of the conventional elements of the ANA and ANP to hold territory against the Taleban and the ANA’s inability to take offensive action to gain or re-gain territory. Because of that, Kabul has continued to lose territory to the Taleban and, to recapture it, Afghanistan’s special forces been relied on, flown round the country and heavily overused. Despite their efforts, the land may be lost again as other army and police forces fail, yet again, to hold it. (AAN will be publishing a special despatch on the Afghan Special Forces, soon.) The scale of this failure can also be seen in monetary terms. SIGAR’s latest running total of US aid (alone) to the ANSF since 2001 is more than 73.5 billion dollars (see here).

One possible response to these failings would be to improve the effectiveness and morale of the conventional parts of the ANA and ANP, but doing so would take time – time that Nicholson and Ghani do not think they have. The fundamental problems of weak leadership, low morale, nepotism (and in the Ministry of Interior, at least, the buying of positions) and other forms of corruption would need time and determination and, in the case of the highly powerful and highly corrupt MoI, courage and political capital, to sort out. (The difference, one senior international officer told AAN, between the two ministries was that the problem with corruption in the MoD was dodgy contracts; in the Ministry of Interior, he said, “It is everything.” Read in detail about the MoI here). Reforms have started, particularly in the less problematic Ministry of Defence, but they will not result in a well functioning (at least to the degree necessary) ANA and ANP any time soon. However, the US wants to defeat Daesh this year, a time-table which may make short-term ‘solutions’ look more attractive.

The ALP, a trouble history and a somewhat better present

Because the declared model for the ANA is the ALP, it is worth looking in some detail at how that has worked and what lessons can be learned from it. The ALP was certainly not the first militia that central government or its backers set up to try to compensate for weaknesses in state forces; the practice goes back to PDPA president Babrak Karmal and his Soviet advisors, although they were more associated with his successor, Dr Najibullah. Since 2001, the US military (and to a very limited extent, the UK and German armies, see here), as well as different Afghan stakeholders have repeatedly toyed with different models of standing up local militia forces, sometimes with a level of connection to Afghan national forces, sometimes not. On occasion, the Kabul government was not informed of these efforts, while at other times, it was centrally involved. For details of the post-2001 forces, see the appendix: A Brief History of Afghan Militias.

The immediate precursors to the ALP were established from 2009 onwards, as (mostly) US Special Operations Forces (SOF) experimented with creating local militias which they termed ‘village defence forces’. There was usually, but not always, some element of Afghan government buy-in. The US military hoped to stand up dependable, local forces in the face of a strong insurgency and a weak ANSF. In July 2010, Karzai who was against the militia forces reluctantly passed a law creating the ALP, which would ultimately absorb the majority of these local forces, both those stood up by international forces and a number of local militias answering to Afghan powerbrokers. The ALP was regularised to fall under MoI command in 2012, with local units answering to district and provincial police chiefs. The ALP is now present in almost all Afghanistan’s provinces.

AAN and others have, over the years, uncovered multiple instances of ALP units abusing the local population and being co-opted by strongmen and factions. Units portrayed as shining examples of locals taking security into their own hands and fighting the Taleban were revealed, with a little digging, to be violent towards civilians or cooperating with the Taleban or fighting their neighbours. (See examples here, here, here and here).

As a result of such investigations, the ALP gained a lasting reputation as an abusive militia force, at least among many researchers and human rights groups. However, the ALP has actually improved in recent years (see AAN reporting here) and always had a more mixed record than its reputation suggested. The unit within the MoI overseeing the ALP has undertaken reforms to improve its accountability – ensuring local policemen are paid, armed, exist and trained and holding individuals to account when they have committed crimes. There has also been a tightening up on their misuse, as private guards or being deployed away from their villages (abuses are more likely to occur away from home, particularly in ethnically mixed areas, against ‘other’ group). UNAMA’s tracking of abuses and violations suggest that the ALP is no worse than other Afghan forces, and in fact, in many cases appears to be causing fewer civilian casualties and engaging in less abuse. In its mid-year 2016 report, UNAMA only noted three incidents in which the 29,000-strong ALP had engaged in threats or harassment of the civilian population. There are grisly exceptions, however, with continuing accusations against some units of abuse, including murder, rape and extortion. Where the ALP is bad, it is very bad.

There is some evidence, as well, that the ALP may be more effective than many have assumed. UNAMA said, for example, in its 2014 annual report on the protection of civilians in the conflict that, “Most communities reported improved security following ALP deployment.” Also, as a forthcoming AAN dispatch will show, the Taleban have, from very early on, recognised the ALP as a major threat, especially in the south and east of Afghanistan, which have long served as the Taleban’s bedrock. This is precisely because where the ALP works, it draws on the same community support as the Taleban. (4) (See also this rather more mixed picture of the force from the International Crisis Group from 2015 here), this assessment of Helmand’s security where ALP have played a mixed role and this example of an abusive ALP unit eventually being turned around by community pressure (see here).

Successful ALP units, ones which usefully protect the local population against the insurgency and do not abuse them, tend to be where the community has wanted the force and has control over it. (5) They are often in places where the community is homogenous. Often it is in Pashtun areas where it fits best, within the known framework of arbaki or other traditions of setting up temporary, local, tribal defence forces (a study of ALP working in non-Pashtun areas can be read here).

Where the ALP fails, sometimes catastrophically, is where it exacerbates existing factional, ethnic or tribal rivalries. This most often happens in the north with its long and complex history of militias and militia abuses, but has been seen in the south and east as well, including in Pashtun areas. A key sign of danger is when the ALP has been drawn from one of several competing local groups or where it has been co-opted by a powerful politician, commander or faction with clout locally and in Kabul (so giving ALP units effective impunity).

The ALP is now seven years old. Training, command and control and pay have all become fairly standardised over the years as institutional control has grown. Despite continuing abuses by some units, the ALP may be the best that can be hoped for from an Afghan militia. Certainly, all the many other militia forces raised in the post-2001 period, often re-badged and rarely stood down have behaved more badly. One of the issues which is unclear in the ATA proposal is whether this will be an ALP-style set up, as it now exists, with a careful selection of locations and members of ATA units, and reasonable command and control, or actually just a re-badging of militias already in existence which claim to be protecting villagers, but have very different agendas. For a recent example of just such a ‘village defence force’ which engages in crime and oppression locally, see this piece containing serious allegations against Commander Piran Qul’s NDS-funded ‘uprising force’ in Takhar (see here).

Will the ATA work: questions that need to be asked about setting up a new ‘village defence force’?

As Ghani weighs the decision to stand up the ATA, critical questions should be whether the initiative is likely to work to help protect and stabilise contested areas, and what the potential other consequences of creating such a force might be.

First, it is important to establish the criteria and set out some benchmarks, based on lessons learned. AAN, in partnership with German foreign affairs think tank GPPi, is currently in the middle of a research project scrutinising foreign-backed ‘militia forces’, looking at where they work, where they do not and why. Certain key issues keep recurring to do with effectiveness and accountability, assessed in terms of protecting the community from insurgent attacks and not abusing the local population. Based on past experience with the ALP, before the government or its American backers stand up another village defence force in Afghanistan, the following questions, at least, should be asked.­

Who actually chooses the members of the force?

Claims that defence forces have been chosen by ‘the community’ have often turned out to be duplicitous. Where locals actually want a defence force and are involved in choosing members, there is a higher likelihood of success.

Are they chosen from one tribe, sub-tribe, ethnic group or faction in a mixed area?

If so, expect disaster. ALP has worked best where the local community is homogenous or has a history of cooperation on local defence.

Is there a history of militia abuse in the area and/or powerful commanders with strong links to the state/US military and/or a history of war crimes?

If so, expect fresh abuses of civilians, in-fighting with other armed groups, involvement in the drug trade and other criminal enterprise and commanders wanting to re-badge illegal militias as men officially under arms.

Will anyone make money or gain politically out of the force?

Look for benefits going to local commanders or politicians who often agitate for local forces, regardless of whether they will be of any actual use in protecting people drawn to the money. If the militia is being set up in an area with the potential for it to be used for drugs or other smuggling, expect them to get involved, if only in ‘taxing’ shipments.

Are there elections coming up?

Be wary of forces being set up purportedly to guard local populations which are actually aimed at getting someone’s vote out, whether actual or ballot-stuffed votes. Village defence forces may also actually be aimed at stabilising an area, so that people can vote, but history has taught scepticism on this front.

What command and control and accountability mechanisms are in place?

One tricky issue here is that ‘village defence forces’ are supposed to belong to the community and, if set up by the state, to the state, through formal mechanisms, as well. This raises questions about command and control. In general, though, it can be said that we have seen problems arising with both the ALP and uprising forces where communities did not want them in the first place or were not involved in setting them up and where they are not loyal to the local community.

In terms of the state’s command and control, ie through the ANP hierarchy, we have seen impunity for units which have stronger, informal links to the factional leaders or politicians who mobilised them and who may be more influential than those supposedly in charge, the ANP district and provincial police chiefs. Control by either community of the MoI can be near impossible in such cases. Accountability for the ALP has improved as a result of eventual determined pressure from the US military and those in charge within the MoI, but it was many years before the political will was there to ensure this.

Why is it felt the militia force is needed?

Is the militia force being set up because this looks easier than fixing other, more fundamental, problems? That might be weaknesses in the ANSF or unpopularity, ineffectiveness, unresponsiveness or corruption in government – local, provincial or national. Creating militias as a short-cut solution to deeper problems has become a familiar pattern since 2001.

What happens if things go wrong?

This question seems rarely to be asked. The government and/or its US military ally have generally established militias apparently with the hope that all will go well, while ignoring the possibility for failure or disaster. It is worth taking a cool look at the outset at local politics and demography, land and water disputes and the possibility that arming some people may send the local factional, tribal or ethnic balance out of kilter. The potential long-term costs need to be considered, not just the possible short-term benefits.

Is there a date for standing down the force?

Militias are easier to stand up than they are to stand down.

The bar for raising a new militia force should be very high indeed in Afghanistan, given their troubled history. In a second dispatch, AAN will use these ‘lessons learned’ to help analyse the proposed pilot project for the Afghan Territorial Army which, we understand from several sources, would be in the southern Nangrahar districts of Achin and Kot. Might it be viable or lead to further complication and trouble? Achin and Kot are Daesh heartland and centre of the US/Afghan battle against the group. It is also where the US military created an earlier militia which went so badly wrong, it helped pave the way for Daesh to secure a base in Afghanistan.

A post-script

Also mentioned in press reporting on the ATA was a plan to set up a new 15,000-strong tribal militia, under the Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs, modelled, a source in the ministry told AAN, on the tribal border protection force of the Najibullah era. It also existed earlier under the monarchy. The same source said the government was also planning to create a new deputy ministerial post and department within the ministry with the name of Conflict Resolution, Peace and Reconciliation. The process for creating both department and tribal force would start after parliament approves the acting minister, the former governor of Kandahar (and Nangrahar), Gul Agha Sherzai.

Alarm bells over this proposal should be ringing loudly: in the immediate post-2001 period Sherzai’s militia and state forces under his control, in close cooperation with US forces, abused and predated on former Taleban commanders and tribal and factional rivals of Shirzai’s in Kandahar. Influential men who were trying to live in peace, found themselves targeted for arrest, torture and extortion. Some found themselves handed over to US forces as ‘terrorists’ and sent to Bagram and Guantanamo Bay. Such actions earned Sherzai considerable money in US bounties, as Anand Gopal’s masterly work “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar” (see here) has detailed. Shirzai’s rule in Kandahar turned out to be one of the most important factors sparking rebellion and eventually insurgency in the province.

Edited by Thomas Ruttig, Borhan Osman and Erica Gaston

(1) As Human Rights Watch commented in its press release on the Afghan proposal:

The Indian Territorial Army, the model for this proposed defense force, has been deployed to support Indian counter-insurgency forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Territorial army personnel have been implicated in serious abuses, and its irregular status has contributed to a lack of accountability.

(2) UNAMA pointed out in its 2016 report into the Protection of Civilians in the conflict:

The increased practice of using untrained and unregulated pro-Government armed groups in such operations [against ‘anti-government elements’], sometimes to compensate for a lack of Afghan security force personnel, raised serious protection concerns for civilians both during such operations and during the post-operation phase. Pro-Government armed groups lack the training provided to Afghan national security forces and the discipline and accountability imposed through a formal command structure…

UNAMA continued to receive reports of Government authorities‘ unwillingness or inability to control the illegal activities of pro-Government armed groups due to their reliance on such groups to fight against Anti-Government Elements and the protection provided to some groups by powerful political figures. The use of irregular government militias operating outside a well-defined chain of command increases the risk that such groups exploit a fragile security environment, further compounding the protection risks faces by civilians and the possibility of human rights abuses. UNAMA urges the Government once again to disband pro-Government armed groups and dismantle the political patronage of such groups.

(3) [added 1 October 2017: Women accounted for 1.3 per cent of the ANSF,  according to the most recent SIGAR quarterly report.]

(4) One US expert group with top-level access to the ALP and the US military in 2013 said that ALP units ranged from “highly effective” – enhancing local security, undermining insurgent influence, and facilitating governance and development – to those “causing more harm than good to the counterinsurgency” – ineffective, predatory, or engaged in collusion with the enemy. It reported the US SOF’s own assessment, as one third of ALP units being effective, one third counter-productive and one third somewhere in between. (Mark Moyar, Ronald E Neumann, Vanda Felbab-Brown, William Knarr, Jack Guy, Terry Corner and Carter Malkasian, “The Afghan Local Police Community Self-Defense in Transition,” Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, August 2013, unpublished, but seen by AAN).

(5) Often, better ALP were marked out also by good training by US Special Operations Forces (SOF) who, in the early days, ‘embedded in the community’. This was not always the case, however.

Annex: A brief history of militia forces in Afghanistan

This is an edited version taken from a literature review by AAN and GPPi which looked at local, community or sub-state forces in Afghanistan. Full details and sourcing is available here.

It is not the first time that central government or its backers have sought to fill in gaps in state forces by setting up militias. Soviet-backed Presidents Karmal and Najibullah took this route in the 1980s: this was, for example, the origin of (now Vice-President) General Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Jombesh movement; also forces under current Kandahar police chief Abdul Razeq were formerly a 1980s militia in that province, under the lead of Ismatullah Muslim. (Muslim’s militia was a mujahedin group that ‘joined the government’.) The militias then were set up to keep the mujahedin at bay, but the litany of their abuses was long (read more about it in the Afghanistan Justice Project’s project). Many would also argue that many of the mujahedin forces, by the 1990s, had turned into little more than militia forces, with some having better command and control than others, but all accused of gross human rights abuses, war crimes and infighting (again, see the Afghanistan Justice Project report for detail on this).

Since 2001, irregular forces have regularly been established or backed by international military forces or set up by the Afghan government. They have included:

2001-2005

In 2001, the US military and CIA armed and funded the factions of the Northern Alliance and various Pashtun commanders to fight the Taleban. Some had been fighting the Taleban previously and were involved in fierce battles in the autumn of 2001; others were re-mobilised immediately after the start of the US-led intervention and simply drove into areas vacated by the fleeing Taleban and seized power locally. Under the new administration led by Hamed Karzai, those forces were re-named as the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and put under Ministry of Defence (then under the control of the Shura-ye Nazar network within Jamiat-e Islami which presented their forces, at least, as a continuation of the old pre-Taleban Islamic State of Afghanistan army); it imposed a notional, formal structure of eight corps with divisions, garrisons, and other divisions: the tashkil was for about 200,000 men, although in practice many were ghost soldiers (with salaries paid into other pockets).

In practice, the AMF were often little more than re-hatted militias still loyal to their pre-2001 commanders and with little central command and control (see Human Rights Watch reporting of their many abuses here. From 2003, a nationwide programme of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) thinned out some of the AMF ranks while a new military force, the Afghan National Army (ANA), was created from scratch with a deliberate mixing of ethnic groups. However, DDR largely failed to demobilise the militias of the AMF, and many of its elements were incorporated into the Afghan National Police (ANP). Others, never integrated into the AMF or other state forces, continued fighting alongside the US Special Operations Forces and CIA and were often referred to collectively as ‘campaign forces’, for example, the Kandahar Strike Force, the Afghan Security Guards in Paktika and the Khost Protection Force, which still operates, (at least according to the latest reports) under CIA control. The campaign forces were notoriously abusive, with their relationship to US forces making them ‘beyond the law’ (see details here and here).

Both ISAF and the US military’s counter-terrorism mission used local militias to guard bases or as partners in operations, despite local people’s dismay; they had hoped ISAF would protect them from local militias, not partner them; the various local ad hoc arrangements were formalised in 2003 and they became know as the Afghan Security Force (ASF). The ASF was largely demobilised in 2006 when reporting suggests it numbered about 2,500 fighters, 90 per cent of whom joined the ANA or the Afghan National Police (ANP).

2005-2009

From about 2005 onwards, with the outbreak of the insurgency, ISAF expansion and later ‘the surge’ (the increase in US troops to almost one hundred thousand in 2009-2012) and the absence of a strong ANSF, the international military needed Afghan forces to guard bases and convoys and gave out contracts worth millions of dollars for this purpose. Many of the old militias were ‘re-hatted’ as guards in Private Security Companies (PSCs) which were licensed from 2006 onwards by the notoriously corrupt Ministry of Interior, and owned by relatives or close allies of the most powerful figures in government. These militias were extremely powerful and well-connected and were described as running a “protection racket” in a US House of Representatives report; money was syphoned off into private pockets, including the Taleban’s.

Increasingly unhappy with the power and money being channelled into non-state militias, President Karzai demanded the guard forces be regularised and brought under state control. From 2009, onwards, PSCs began to be replaced by guards from a state-owned enterprise within the Ministry of Interior, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF); there was pressure from commanders and strongmen to get ‘their men’ into this force.

From 2005, onwards, there was also increasing experimentation with irregular fighting forces. In response to Karzai’s request to create ‘tribal militias’, the NATO funded and the US trained the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) in 2006, as a temporary counter-Taleban force in southern Afghanistan; it was highly corrupt. Like the PSCs, it also ended up legalising illegal militias, bringing groups loyal to local governors into the official sphere. Following extensive international criticism and reports of Taleban infiltration, it was quietly shut down in 2008.

2009 to date

From 2009, onwards, the US military, especially the SOF, began to pioneer ‘village defence forces’. The first was the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) in 2009, initially funded and implemented by US SOF in coordination with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) under Hanif Atmar (now National Security Advisor) in four districts of Wardak province. Overlapping with AP3, US Special Operations Forces set up various different community defence forces in southern Afghanistan, which were originally called the Local Defense Initiative (LDI), aka Community Defense Initiative (LDI/CDI). These Village Stability Operations (VSOs) would eventually morph into the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which was officially authorized in August 2010 under the MoI. Still US-funded, it is a 28,000 strong force and present in most provinces.

Other international forces also supported local defense organizations or militias in their areas of operation. The Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIPP) which operated in four, possibly five northern provinces, was set up in August 2011 as a joint German-US military initiative, using money from an American discretionary fund. There was also the Intermediate Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) in Marja, Helmand (set up by US marines), and Community-Based Security Solutions (CBSS) set up in three eastern provinces. All were disbanded or absorbed into the ALP in 2012 after Karzai heard about their existence and banned them.

There have also been initiatives to establish militias by the government which did not get international funding, such as the Community Defense Force (CDF) established by President Karzai and funded by the Ministry of Interior ahead of the 2009 presidential elections, on paper to provide security to polling stations, but actually to help get the Karzai vote out.

The government has been establishing what it calls National Uprising Groups (patsunian or Khezesh-e Mardomi), to fill the (supposedly temporarily) security gap in places too remote for the ANSF or even the ALP to operate. They fall under no Afghan legal framework, but various parts of the government are reported to hire and arm them, particularly the NDS.

In addition to the ALP program and the national uprising forces, there remain a large number of ‘pro-government militias’, as they are termed by UNAMA. These are militias which are mobilised and on occasion fight for the government, and often refer to themselves as ‘ALP’ but have no formal position.

The Taleban have put in place administrative and military institutions in northern Jawzjan province that function relatively well. The shadow administrative posts are held by local non-Pashtuns. The recruitment of Uzbeks, in particular, has proved effective for the Taleban. However, Daesh’s appearance in this Uzbek-dominated province has created concerns, not only for the local government, but also for the Taleban. The Taleban, so far, have failed to fully block Daesh’s infiltration among the Turkic community in Jawzjan, but have contained it. AAN’s Obaid Ali explores the presence and capacity of Daesh to stand against the Taleban, the reasons for their infiltration, and the challenges the Taleban face in opposing it.

This dispatch is part of a series on the non-Pashtun Taleban in the north (for Tajik Taleban in Badakhshan, read our previous reporting here, for Uzbeks in Takhar, Faryab and Sar-e Pul here, here and here).

On 21 August 2017,the Taleban assaulted the Khamab district centre and quickly overran the government compounds in the town (see media report here). The militants seized governmental buildings, such as the district governor’s office, and the main bazaar of the district, for almost half a day. When reinforcements from the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) arrived and airstrikes were carried out, the Taleban withdrew from the districtcentreand the Afghan security forces returned to their positions.

Speaking to AAN, a local elder said that the government forces retreated with little resistance. However, local officials claimed that, after a few hours, the ANSF mounted a counter-attack and pushed the Taleban back from the district centre. According to the provincial police chief, now the district is undersecurity forces control again (read short report here). Engineer Ahmad, the district governor, when speaking to AAN, said the Taleban were still located in villages near the district centre and it was feared they might target itagain.

The repeated fall and recapture of Khamab district centre raised serious questions for locals as it was not the first time that the centre had fallen into Taleban hands. In December 2014, for instance, Khamab district fell entirely into Taleban hands. The Taleban seized the district centre again for ten days in October 2015, until the first vice president Abdulrashid Dostum led counteroffensives against them.

Khamab is just one example of how security in Jawzjan has deteriorated to such an extent that other district centres have also regularly changed hands between government forces and militants. In June 2017, the militants overran the Darzab district centre, seizing governmental offices for a few days. According to provincial security officials, the ANSF conducted a large-scale clearance operation, pushing the militants back (read short report here). However, as Muhammad Dawar, the district governor, said that 98 per cent of Darzab district continues to be controlled by militants. He told AAN that the security forces only control the Afghan National Police headquarters and the district governor’s compound; the remaining areas are all under the militants’ control. As a result, he said, “the governmental offices are removed to the provincial centre, Sheberghan.”

When considering the current security dynamic, the militants have made significant inroads in Jawzjan, which borders Turkmenistan in the north. As in Darzab, the government presence in Qushtepa is also limited to the government offices in the district centre,while militants rule the remaining parts. Rahmatullah Turkestani, the provincial police chief of Jawzjan, admitted to AAN that militants largely controlled bothdistricts in the southwest of the province, He said that, as in Khamab, the government and Taleban both hold half the territory in Qarqin district. According to the police chief, five other districts are also heavily contested by the Taleban: Aqcha, Faizabad, Mangijik, Muradian and Khaniqa. Aqcha, the second largest city in the province, has been “under siege” by the Taleban since mid-August, according to an Afghan media report. On 18 September, the security forces started a large scale counteroffensive to push the Taleban back from villages around Aqcha district centre. They claim that so far 15 villages have been cleared from Taleban presence. The operations continue (media report here). Furthermore, the provincial police chief said, security forces have been engaged simultaneously on several battlegrounds in the northeast and southwest of Jawzjan province. Meanwhile, Khwaja Duko and the district around Sheberghan city, he said, are relatively calm and under government control.

Militancy in Jawzjan

The Talebaninroads into this Uzbek dominated province are, in fact, part of the movement’s strategy to localise the warfare by offering positions to local non-Pashtuns, as AAN has already described for other provinces in the Afghan north (read our previous analysis here, here and here). It has been a priority for the insurgents to recruit from the Turkic communities and to appoint local commanders from them to help run their war-machine.

The Taleban promoted Mawlawi Abdulrahmanin 2016, to a position as a member of their leadership council. This increased the number of Turkic speakers with the council to two; the first one being Sheikh Qasem – a Turkmen from Jawzjan. Mawlawi Sunnatullah, an Uzbek, who served as group commander during the Taleban regime in the 1990s, was announced as shadow provincial governor for Jawzjan in 2017. When theTaleban re-established their presence in the province in 2009, Mawlawi Sunnatullah had returned to Darzab, where hegathered a group of 20 to 25 fighters who were mainly operating here and in neighbouring Qushtepa.

Currently, Mawlawi Sunatullah leads more than 800 fighters in the province. Local, young, Uzbek, educated religious figures, lead the Taleban shadow administrative and military committees. Qari Ghani, an Uzbek from Qushtepa district, for example, leads the shadow financial committee, while the military committee is led by Mawlawi Ahmad Shah, an Uzbek from Faizabad district, and the judicial committee by Qari Hafiz, an Uzbek from Aqcha district.

These two districts, as well as Aqcha district, to the south and northeast of Sheberghan respectively, were the first areas of activity for the post-2001 insurgency in the province. More active pockets of insurgency were seen in 2010, just a few kilometres from the provincial capital; both near the highways connecting Mazar-e Sharif and Sheberghan (to the east), and Sheberghan and Faryab (to the west). This made the routes unsafe for travel (for more background read this AAN’s 2011 report on the insurgency in the north, p53). (1)

The Taleban leadership council’s recruitment efforts among the Turkic communities have produced effective results. This has ensured, not just the Taleban’s presence, but it has also generated fighters loyal to the movement. This is part of the long-term strategy by the leadership council to ensure adequate manpower and financial resources at a local level. The Taleban tasked influential Uzbek and Turkmen figures, who had rejoined the movement in 2004, to implement this strategy and to help revive the militancy among the Turkic community in the northwest.

The recruitment was pursued through two main avenues. First, it started with young Uzbek madrasa students in Pakistan. This was carried out through Uzbek religious scholars, who taught at madrasas in Pakistan. One of them was Sheikh Abdulbari, an Uzbek from Darzab district. During the Taleban’s Emirate, in the 1990s, Abdulbari served as a mid-level military commander in the north and later led a religious school, Madrasa-ye Faruqia, in Kabul where it was not only Uzbeks that used to study there. After the fall of the Taleban regime, he fled to Pakistan where he continued serving as a madrasa teacher. According to sources in Pakistani madrasas, Sheikh Abdulbari mainly targeted Uzbek students, providing them with accommodation and food.

The first group of young, Pakistani, madrasa-educated Uzbeks were deployed to the north in 2009. They all became mosque preachers in Aqcha, Muradian, Khanaqa and Khamab districts. From there, they started a campaign against the government.

First, they criticised the activities of the government; later calling it a ‘puppet of foreigners’. The government watched this for four months and then put most members of the group in jail.

Second, secret Taleban delegations often visited former mid-level Taleban commanders from the northwest to muster them to take up arms again and fight against the government. According to sources close to the Taleban, Mawlawi Abdulrahman (an Uzbek from Faryab), Hafiz Nurullah (a Turkmen from Jawzjan), Mawlawi Abdulsalam Hanafi (another Jawzjani Uzbek), who was the Taleban deputy minister for education and, therefore, one of the highest-ranking Uzbeks in the regime, all frequently visited the northwest to mobilise fighters, as well as to instruct local commanders on the ground.

They were able to utilise the already existing small pockets of opportunistic Uzbek commanders, who were loyal to no particular group, until and as long as sustainable financial resources were channelled to their pockets. Some of those commanders served as Taleban group commanders and fighters in the 1990s, while others were locals with criminal backgrounds. The restarting of the Taleban movement in the area prepared the ground for these actors to label themselves as fighters of the insurgency in order to access to financial resources. These resources were obtained, either at the local level (through taxation and other revenue), or the payments came from the leadership council budget.

However, this did not happen without problems. For example, there were small-scale internal struggles over taxation and revenue collection among the Taleban commanders in the province from 2009 and until 2013 when the Taleban leadership council insisted their field commanders document revenues collected from locals and report this to the financial committee of the movement. The Taleban assigned influential and loyal commanders to oversee the income flows. Mawlawi Abdulrahman, for instance, was authorised to lead the insurgency in the northwest, as well as making the field commanders accountable. This was a Taleban attempt to reach two objectives: to oversee the income of resources and to prevent opportunistic groups from taking advantage to prevent local commanders from establishing private fiefdoms outside of their control.

Mawlawi Abdulrahman managed to implement successfully the Taleban leadership council’s strategy of recruiting large numbers of fighters and commanders from the Turkic communities. He also prevented irregularities among the insurgents and made sure there was more accountability in their operations. However, when it came to financial resources, he struggled. Some local commanders refused to document their revenue collection in order to keep a larger share of it for themselves. In 2014, for instance, a number of field commanders did not transfer the collected revenue to the provincial shadow financial committee. This elicited a tough response from the Taleban who, according to sources in the movement, for example, disarmed or even expelled disobedient commanders.

Daesh branding as an opportunity

The Taleban’s efforts to prevent irregularities, as well as getting a better hold on income resources, has created an environment of mistrust among field commanders. The Taleban provincial leadership’s obvious failure to fully control those income flows opened up a competition, which, sometimes, has turned into open disputes and quarrels among local Taleban commanders as to who should keep control over certain territories to raise income through taxation and revenue. The appearance of Daesh in this situation – both in the international, as well as in the Afghan arena – provided the commanders with an outlet they could turn to when they did not want to adhere to Taleban discipline.

Their Taleban superiors repeatedly accused Qari Hekmat and Mufti Nemat, field commanders in Jawzjan and in Darzab and Qushtepa, respectively, of irregularities, harassment of locals over taxation and misuse of their authority. Qari Hekmat had served as the shadow district governor in Darzad, and Mufti Nemat as the head of the Taleban military committee for Darzab and Qushtepa districts.

In 2014, according to locals, Qari Hekmat developed a conflict over collecting revenue with another local field commander, Qari Aman, known as Shamsullah, an ex-deputy Taleban shadow governor for Jawzjan. Both are Uzbeks from the Darzab-Qushtepa area. Locals told AAN that, eventually, both commanders disappeared for a short while as they went to Pakistan to discuss the issue with the leadership council. Both returned after a few months, but Qari Hekmat was removed from the Taleban’s ranks in the province. According to local journalists, the Taleban spokesman told them that Qari Hekmat was no longer a Taleb commander in the province. They say he told them “the Taleban are not responsible for his activities in Jawzjan.”

At the same time, the appearance of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fighters in Qushtepa district opened a new chapter for Qari Hekmat. IMU is an organisation that was a former Taleban ally, but one that had shifted allegiance to Daesh in 2015 (read our previous analysis here). This provided the opportunity to shift allegiance and the Qariimmediately pledged allegiance to Daesh. In 2015, he started to target, not only the Afghan security forces, but also those commanders within the Taleban movement in Darzab district who had now become his enemies. Over the past two years, he has successfully managed to shape his unit as a Daesh-associated group and has received several delegations from the core Daesh base in Jalalabad province.

In 2014, the Taleban leadership council also expelled Mufti Nemat from the Taleban ranks. When he visited Pakistan in 2013, he was accused of corruption and misusing his authority and kept in custody there.

After his release that same year, he initially went a different way to cope with his ejection from the Taleban. To present himself as a convert to Daesh provided Qari Hekmat with an easy cover to settle his score with hisex-comrades in the Taleban movement and to remain in power in the area under his control. In contrast, Mufti Nemat joined the peace-process hoping to gain access to government resources (see short video here). When he returned to Jawzjan, he decided to surrender to Dostum with some 200 fighters (read media report here). Mufti Nemat stayed in Sheberghan for almost two years hoping to join the ALP or pro-government militia forces in the province. As a follower of Salafism, he intended to expand the Salafi ideology in the province at the same time. In November 2016, he established a Salafi madrasa called E’ya-ye Sunnat (Rehabilitation of the Sunnah) in the city and where male and female students attended classes. This created concerns among the dominant Hanafi Sunni scholars. Both sides engaged in a serious public debate about the interpretation of certain religious subjects. Eventually, the provincial department of the Ministry of Hajj issued an order to shut down Nemat’s madrasa. In November 2016, the madrasa was closed and Mufti Nemat banned from teaching in the province. He then reached out to Qari Hekmat and also joined the Daesh-affiliated group in Darzab.

In the case of Jawzjan, when compared with power-saving opportunism, it was ideological motivation that seemed to play a lesser role among commanders and their fighters to link up with Daesh. According to local sources, the Salafi ideology is a core motivation among Daesh fightersin eastern Afghanistan (see AAN analysis here) but has limited followers here. According to Muhammad Rasul Mujahaz, head of the Ulama Council in Jawzjan, Salafism only appeared recently in the province. “There was no Salafi mosque or madrasa, only in Darzab district a small group of Salafis attempt to promote the ideology.”

The appearance of Daesh has created a serious challenge for how the local Taleban handle disgruntled commanders. According to Taleban sources, a number of delegations from the Taleban side were sent to meet Qari Hekmat and to assure him a position and authority in the province; an offer he rejected. Simultaneously, Daesh also courted him. Hekmat received several delegations from their side, too. In 2016, for instance, the Taleban detained a five-member Daesh delegation that tried to reach Qari Hekmat and were killed by local Taleban. In revenge, Qari Hekmat fighters captured and killed ten Taleban members. In August that year, another high-level delegation from the Taleban side, including Mawlawi Abdulrahman, Sheikh Abdulbari, Hafiz Nurullah and Abdulkhaleq reached Qari Hekmat to encourage him to rejoin the Taleban. According to Taleban sources “the discussions left no impact.”

Conclusion: A three-way struggle

The emergence of Daesh as a second insurgent group in the northwest and its attempts to establish a footprint among the Turkic communities has created serious concerns for the local government, as well as for the Taleban. The local conflict constellation is now a triangle with Daesh as its weakest side. Governments in neighbouring Central Asia are watching this development with concern as a potential threat to their countries.

Daesh’s emergence presents an unprecedented outlet for Taleban commanders who either do not want to subordinate themselves to the stricter discipline of the Taleban movement or want to keep their local fiefdoms free of too much outside interference. On the other hand, this is a rather dangerous option for them, as such shifts of allegiance often is followed by a strong Taleban reaction. According to locals from the north, in a number of cases, local Taleban even eliminated suspected commanders for fear of them shifting their allegiance to the new group.

Nevertheless, Daesh constitutes a challenge to the Taleban recruitment strategy among the non-Pashtuns. They see the danger of losing followers to the new group, particularly those who have a strong local base. But, so far, they have tried to keep the conflict at a low profile. Ethnic sympathy among the Uzbeks, to which both sides belong, might contribute to this kind of approach.

This is reflected by Qari Hekmat’s case, where the Taleban used a soft, political approach to win him back by negotiations. So far, the Taleban have not taken serious action against Qari Hekmat. This is largely because the Taleban want to avoid invoking infighting among the local Uzbeks; not least because it would make media headlines, which would be against their desire to tackle the issue at the local level. They also fear this could drive more of their commanders to Daesh.

The overwhelming presence of the Taleban in most districts of Jawzjan, as well as in the wider north, so far prevents potential Daesh sympathisers to openly join the ranks of the “Islamic State Khorasan Province.”

Also, the government has failed so far to take advantage of the three-way conflict by winning over disgruntled Taleban commanders. Already earlier, a number of Taleban field commanders, who had ‘joined the peace-process’, went back to the Taleban given its failure to ensure security and job opportunities for those who change to its side (read media reports here, here and here).

Edited by Thomas Ruttig

(1) A German journalist who just travelled on the Mazar-Sheberghan road told AAN of clearly visible Taleban presence in the few villages along this route.

The number of Afghan asylum seekers in Italy has been steadily rising over the last decade. Numbers grew particularly rapidly between 2013 and 2015 and only in recent months have they slowed down. Throughout the last ten years, not only has Italy become a fixture in the mental map of Afghan migrants, but it has seen its role changing from that of a country of mere transit to one of destination. For some, Italy is a safe second-choice when they could not reach their intended destination or have been rejected from there. For others, it is a stopgap to obtain legal papers on their way to another place. Afghans in Italy remain a mostly ‘transitional’ community, despite the thousands seeking and obtaining asylum. In the end, only a fraction of those arriving remain for good. AAN’s Fabrizio Foschini and Jelena Bjelica have been looking at the path of Afghan migration to Italy in the last decade and at the direction where it is heading.

This research was supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.

Read our previous separate dispatch about unaccompanied Afghan minor refugees in Italy here.

After years of growth, now is a good moment to take stock of the phenomenon of Afghan migrants in Italy. This year is in fact seeing the continuation of a trend which first became apparent in late 2016. The number of Afghans seeking asylum in Italy, rapidly growing for a decade, is now beginning to taper off. Reasons for this are multiple, as we will see, but let us first get acquainted with the chronology and the specificities of this relatively new episode in the decades-long history of Afghan exile.

Afghan refugees in Italy: From ‘pure’ transit to a more mixed approach

The history of Afghan asylum-seeking in Italy might with some cynicism be summarized under the title: “From the Aristocracy to the Lumpen-Proletariat of Political Asylum-Seekers”. The gap between the first Afghans who sought refuge in Italy and the latest newcomers is vast. The first to escape political turmoil and seek shelter in Italy arrived in 1973; they were the former king, Zaher Shah, with a small retinue of aides, and members of the aristocracy who fled Afghanistan after the coup d’état by which Sardar Muhammad Daud seized power. They were occasionally joined by a few more of the old monarchist elite, each time a power change shook Kabul’s security to a new degree of violence. Altogether, they never amounted to more than a few hundred persons, and they had the financial and social means to fully integrate and start a new life in Italy or, eventually, in other European countries. (1)

Afterwards, only occasionally did Afghans arrive in Italy, a few hundred people mostly from urban backgrounds who had been displaced by the civil war of the 1990s. They were joined by groups of Hazaras, who fled Afghanistan during the harsh times of the Taleban campaigns to subdue Hazarajat in the late 1990s and, after a stopover of some length in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and/or Greece, would make their way to Italy between the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. Most only transited through Italy on their way to northern Europe, but a significant number, amounting to a few thousands, ended up applying for asylum there.

The early 2000s: A squat in Rome

Afghans aiming for Europe in the early 2000s had the Scandinavian countries, UK, Belgium or Germany in their sights, but definitely not Italy. However, a major route bringing Afghans to Europe crossed Italy. Most Afghans would arrive, hidden on ferries coming from Patras or Igoumenitsa in Greece which sailed to the Adriatic ports of the Italian peninsula, while others travelled on small boats, crossing from Greece or Albania and arriving on the southern shores of Italy. If identified by the police, Afghans would be brought to various big camps for asylum seekers, but would quickly manage to hit the road again and regroup with fellow countrymen – most were men or older boys – in Rome. (2) The capital was then a hub for information and organisation for the next stage of the journey. Afghans heading to northern European countries would typically spend some weeks in Rome before embarking for their next intermediate destination, France.

This role, as a linking point, brought about the most famous episode involving Afghan refugees in Italy, the creation of la Buca – the hole or the pit – a spontaneous squat where mainly Afghans lived open-air or in tents and makeshift shelters in and around Rome’s Ostiense train station. Afghans transiting through Italy would concentrate there between 2007 and 2012. They received support from only a few organizations, such as MEDU (Medici per i Diritti Umani or Doctors for Human Rights). They resisted several attempts to evict or relocate them by state authorities. The camp hosted a couple of hundred persons at its height, but its centrality and the sheer length of such an unsolved situation shocked the public opinion, drawing attention to the plight of Afghan refugees, until then an unheard of phenomenon for the Italian public.

In those days, some Afghans would stop and apply for asylum in the country, either out of necessity or realizing for the first time that Italy could offer a reasonable degree of safety and protection of rights. Also, many had been fingerprinted on arrival before travelling on, only to be sent back by other European states under the Dublin Agreement. Among other things, this made the country of an asylum-seeker’s entry to the European Union, if it could be proved, responsible for their case. (3) The story of a man from Bamiyan interviewed by AAN in Rome helps illustrate the type of vicissitudes Afghans were then subjected to:

I left Afghanistan in 2005 and came to Italy, from Greece, for the first time in 2006. They put me in a big camp in Crotone, and after some days I walked out of it. My objective was to reach Scandinavia, so I continued my travel and applied for asylum in Norway. After I got there, they told me that I was a ‘Dublin case’ because I had left my fingerprints in both Greece and Italy: they said they would not send me back to Greece because there were no guarantees that my rights would be upheld there, but that, if Italy had accepted responsibility for my case, I would have to go back there. I said “Fine, I didn’t come here to break the law.” Italy accepted me, so I came back. As soon as I arrived, they sent me back to the same camp in Crotone. Then they said I had my fingerprints in Greece and I was to be sent back there. I travelled to Rome and found a lawyer. I said “How is it possible that Italy accepted responsibility for my case from Norway and now wants to send me away? If they summoned me here, they should deal with my case.” Eventually, I won in the court and I was granted the five-years protection in 2009.

The 2010s: ‘Dubliners’ on the move

Starting from 2010 onwards, the number of asylum application by Afghans started to swell rapidly.

Statistics show that, by 2007, the number of Afghan refugees had surpassed those of the late 1990s, with 971 asylum requests; this number doubled the following year, reaching 1840. Another sharp rise was registered from 2013 onwards, with 2056 asylum applicants in that year, then 2994 in 2014 and 3975 in 2015 (the year with the highest total). (The data, from the Ministry of Interior, is available here.)

While the first Afghan refugees to come to Italy had been mostly Hazaras, by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Pashtuns began to comprise the main group of Afghans transiting through Italy. They were the majority in Ostiense, in Rome, and in the following years also became the majority of those who applied for asylum in Italy. The vast majority came from just a handful of provinces, namely: Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, Logar, Paktia, Baghlan and Kunduz. A high number among them had lived most of their lives in Pakistan and some had been born there (the same was true for many Hazaras, who had dwelt in Iran or Pakistan before – see also this AAN dispatch).

On top of a streak of Dublin cases sent back to the country where they were first fingerprinted, Italy had also become the ‘backup’ choice for other Afghans. Italy has a record of making few ‘Dublin transfers’, ie sending migrants to the EU country where they were first recorded as having made ‘landfall’. This has made it a sort of safe haven for those Afghan refugees who had ‘dangerous’ Dublin fingerprints, for example from Hungary and Bulgaria (and later also Croatia), or, in a paradoxical reversal, for Afghans who had managed to reach northern European countries without leaving their fingerprints en route, but who had been refused asylum in the north and were being threatened with deportation to Afghanistan. Some of those migrants would then make their way back to Italy to apply for asylum there, hoping it would not send them back, as Dublin cases, to Norway, Sweden, Denmark or the UK.

On top of ‘returnees’ who had already been up north without success, Italy started to be considered a more viable first choice by many Afghans who had just arrived in Europe and who either doubted their chances of obtaining asylum in northern European countries, or who were out of money, tired or unfit for further travel or simply afraid of further shocks connected to illegal travel or threats of deportation. The main reason for this was that Italy guaranteed Afghans an almost absolute certainty of receiving some sort of asylum protection.

What seems to have been the most important factor in informing Afghan migrants’ decision about whether to apply for asylum in Italy and, indeed, whereabouts in Italy, was concern about the waiting time at various stages in the process, as Italy has problems in coping with asylum seekers, in general. There was the wait before the hearing of one’s asylum case, the wait for the subsequent, albeit usually positive, answer and the wait for asylum documents and other papers (ID card, travel document, etc) to be issued by the local authorities. Immediately after this concern came considerations about the type of reception locally available (time of wait before accessing reception in a facility for refugees, hospitality in camps versus private housing, type and amount of benefits provided).

The most important factor in decision-making was the presence of fellow Afghans from the same home area, if not of close friends and relatives, as they were the main factor in passing information on to and shaping the perception of newcomers. Their counsel was the main drive behind the choice of individuals coming for the first time to the EU or having been rejected from other EU countries and deciding to head (back) to Italy and/or to a specific part of it. The distribution of Afghan asylum seekers in Italy, influenced by these factors, resulted in their concentration in the north-eastern regions, in particular in Friuli Venezia Giulia, which is easily accessible for both new arrivals from eastern Europe and returnees from northern Europe and where, at least in the regional centre of Trieste, a reception programme with higher standards than those found in many other parts of Italy was already in place.

Chances of ‘recognition’ and reception in Italy

Before looking at the most recent trends, it is useful to look at two factors which govern the treatment of asylum seekers and whether they chose to stay in a country or try to go on: the rate of recognition and how they are received.

Italy has consistently had one of the highest rates for recognising Afghans as asylum seekers in Europe. In 2015-2016, the rate was stable at 97 per cent of all asylum requests, much higher than Germany (55 per cent), Sweden (46 per cent) and the UK (35 per cent). (For Germany see previous AAN research, for data about other countries see here.) In the words of an Afghan interpreter who works with the commissions who adjudicate the cases of Afghan asylum seekers: “(For Afghans), Italy is good in that nobody asks you who you really are or what did you do before.”

For anybody acquainted with the accurate research done in some European countries on the personal background of Afghan asylum seekers, the amount of knowledge acquired by the Italian ‘Territorial Commissions’ (bodies composed of UNHCR officials, members of the local administration and the Ministry of Interior deciding on refugees’ applications) is indeed minimal. Cases are usually adjudicated after a single interview that lasts between 40 minutes and three hours. Only rarely are people summoned for a second hearing. There are probably differences between the commissions in different locations – their number has risen in recent years from 10 to 20 to deal with the increased workload – with some reportedly trying to be more accurate. (3) However, the decision to grant Afghan nationals some form of protection based on their need for asylum is less a matter of investigating and ascertaining that an individual has actually fled persecution than one stemming from a concern that Afghanistan is generally unstable and unsafe.

Italy, for example, does not allow for the principle of “a safe place inside one’s country” as some northern European countries do who suggest that somebody who got into trouble in Jalalabad could move to Mazar-e Sharif to live a safe life. Therefore, the only way Afghans can be denied protection is when their Afghan identity is questioned (for example, there have been several instances of Pakistanis trying to pass themselves off as Afghans). Otherwise, the debate revolves mainly around what type of protection should be given. In line with the rationale behind the decision to grant almost all Afghans asylum because of the general state of their country, the most common type of protection issued is what is called ‘subsidiary protection’, given to individuals fleeing a conflict zone: 86.8 per cent of Afghan asylum seekers whose cases were adjudicated in 2016 received this. A handful of Afghans coming from areas considered comparatively safe (by now, basically a few spots like Mazar-e Sharif and Bamiyan), or who have not been able to claim convincingly that their lives would have been at risk had they stayed in Afghanistan, are given ‘two-year humanitarian protection’ (only one per cent of the total in 2016). Only those individuals who can prove they were members of the security forces or who were specifically targeted because of their public standing are entitled to the most secure status of ‘political asylum granted’ (9.2 per cent in 2016). (4)

Waiting times for the various decisions in an asylum-seeker’s life vary considerably from one Italian city to another and depending on the season and the overall number of arrivals of migrants. Typically, increased numbers of boat trips across the central Mediterranean in summertime clog the reception system, the related bureaucracy and the work of the commissions. Taking as an example Trieste in north-eastern Italy, where between 2012 and 2015, Afghans formed a majority of asylum seekers (and which has accounted for at least one-tenth of all Afghan asylum seekers in Italy in the last five years), waiting times for accommodation ranged between one day and more than one month. (When there were constant arrivals of people from the Balkan Route,  on the eve of the opening of the Balkan humanitarian corridor in the summer of 2015, one of the Old Port’s dilapidated warehouses had a stable population of as many as 200 migrants, in a small replica of Belgrade’s Savamala; see previous AAN reporting about Belgrade squat here and here).

In the nearby city of Gorizia, an additional factor – the hostility of local politicians to refugee support organizations – meant accommodation was extremely underdeveloped and several dozen refugees were living in the town’s parks, making the alleged problem of their mere presence all the more acute for the population. The waiting time from asylum request to interview in north-eastern Italy was usually around six to seven months for ‘non-Dublin’ cases. That got increasingly longer before 2015, when new commissions were opened relieving the one in Gorizia of some of its burden.

Where the problem, nationally, of long waiting times went even deeper is in the issuing of various documents by police stations. Having to cope with a population of migrants which rose from fewer than 300 in 2014 to 1200 in 2016, Trieste police station started to experience serious delays in issuing the required papers, permits of stay and travel documents. This culminated in mutual frustration. Asylum-related paperwork in many parts of Italy, excepting a few small towns hosting limited numbers of migrants, but endowed with effective and experienced local institutions, can be even more complicated and subjected to delays (for a geographic breakdown of the waiting times for some asylum-related documents see here).

The Balkan humanitarian corridor of 2015-16 and its backwash into Italy

As mentioned, asylum requests from Afghans reached their height in 2015, with 3975 applicants. This is tiny compared to countries like Sweden, who in the first eleven months of 2015 received 36,262, but more than others like the UK, who got 1446 (data from here). This increase in arrivals could be read as a direct effect of the opening of the humanitarian corridor in the summer of 2015, when migrants were allowed through the Balkans to the EU (the corridor was effectively closed with the signing of the Turkey-EU deal in March 2016), but in fact the trend had been there since the end of 2014. (It is sometimes forgotten that the humanitarian corridor was a reaction to a situation already at boiling point, ie huge numbers of people trying to cross south-eastern Europe, as much as it was a factor which contributed to more people’s decisions to try to reach Europe).

The most direct effect of the opening of the ‘institutionalised’ Balkan Route for Italy was the reduction and near end of Afghans crossing the sea from Greece to the Italian Adriatic ports. Rome was thus cut off from the transit route towards northern Europe as almost no Afghans were then travelling through Italy to go northwards. At the same time, the number of Afghans turning to Italy after first applying and being rejected for asylum in northern European countries increased. The phenomenon assumed a new dimension because many Afghans (together with other refugees, like Iraqi Kurds) would choose to move to Italy to ask asylum even before their cases were thoroughly dealt with in the countries where they had first applied for asylum.

As detailed in previous reports by AAN (read our thematic dossier here) a great number of Afghans arrived in Europe between the summer of 2015 and March 2016 traveling through the Balkan countries. The route from Serbia to Hungary was replaced by that through Croatia and Slovenia, with the same destination as before: Austria. From there, a majority of Afghans proceeded further, most to Germany and some to the Scandinavian countries. While the humanitarian corridor was open, only a tiny fraction of these Afghans turned south once they were in Austria to come down to north-eastern Italy. In fact, the boom of arrivals in Trieste and Gorizia in the summer of 2015 was mostly caused by Pakistani nationals (the second biggest group of asylum seekers in Italy, now largely Punjabis) who had Italy as their first choice of destination. The effect of the Balkan Route was more evident starting from the late spring of 2016, when asylum seekers who had arrived in Germany or Austria a few months previously started to flow in, travelling south from the Austrian border and applying for asylum in the Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto and Trentino Alto Adige regions of Italy (read media report here).

Fear of deportation seems to play a decisive role as well. As one of the Afghan refugees interviewed by AAN, a young man from Paktia who just arrived in Gorizia from Germany put it: “We were in Germany and one day our president asked the German government  ‘Please send our dear youth back to us’ …  so we all knew we would be deported and we had to run away.” (5)

There are other instances of migrants who got caught in the ambiguous stances of European states and have come to Italy as a last chance to get protection in Europe, to make the risks and costs of the project worth it, for example, Afghan migrants who in November 2015 crossed the Russian-Norwegian border bicycling. According to those among them who turned up in Trieste almost one year later, they were told that the reported loophole in the border regulations, with Norway recognising asylum seekers who arrived on bike, was meant for Syrians only and that Afghans who came that way were collectively denied asylum. The official story was that all migrants who had thus crossed were to be sent back to Russia, irrespective of their nationality (see also this AAN reporting). The Afghan cyclists who came to Trieste had done so to avoid deportation by Norway.

In another, concerning development, several Afghans – including families – who crossed Croatia via the humanitarian corridor of 2015-16 and were fingerprinted there, purportedly only for ‘security purpose’, and who ended up applying for asylum in Switzerland or Austria, were later been labelled as ‘Dublin’ cases with Croatia being the responsible nation. They were deported to Croatia whence some eventually fled to nearby Trieste. In July 2017, the European Court upheld the right of states to deport as ‘Dublin cases’ even those asylum seekers who had passed through the Balkan humanitarian, despite the fact that migrants were then routinely told their fingerprints in Croatia would not result in responsibility of that country under the Dublin Regulation (media report here).

Meanwhile, the use of the Balkan Route by Afghans did not stop, men and older boys (see our separate report on unaccompanied Afghan minors here) trying to sneak across the Turkish-Bulgarian border and then into Serbia (see also this AAN report on smuggling route through the Balkans here), whence they would sometimes continue through Croatia, Slovenia and Italy; others would come by ferry from Greece while families started to occasionally arrive in Italy on container ships coming from Turkey. (6)

Changing demographic profiles and decreasing asylum applications

Afghan asylum seekers in Italy are somewhat more varied since 2015 than they were between 2012 and 2015: personal observation by one of the authors of Afghans applying for asylum in Trieste from June 2016 (thus, persons who were mostly arriving from a failed or interrupted asylum request in another European country) showed 24 provinces of Afghanistan represented, although there was a strong predominance of residents of Nangarhar who represented one-fifth of the total. The number of individuals from Kunduz and Baghlan, who until 2015 were very common among asylum seekers in this part of Italy, seem to have reduced, while smaller numbers of Hazaras, who used to be the majority until around 2010, are again featuring among asylum-seekers. What has remained a constant compared to the pre-2015 situation is gender: Afghans in Italy are overwhelmingly single adult men (92 per cent of a sample contacted by IOM in February-April 2017 in Friuli Venezia Giulia, with 6.5 per cent of the sample being male minors).

One might wonder why the number of Afghans seeking asylum seekers in Italy decreased from 2015 to 2016 (with 2856 applications), if so many Afghans are leaving central and northern European countries out of hopelessness or fear of being deported, while new arrivals from Serbia and Greece have not stopped? It is now dropping even more considerably, with only 684 requests for the first seven months of 2017. The reason seems to be France.

France has some advantages for Afghan asylum seekers over Italy. This transalpine country features a recognition rate for Afghans almost as high: in 2016, 82.4 per cent of Afghans seeking asylum were given protected status in some way (data here). Apart from already being an established destination for Afghan asylum seekers, France was historically the common staging point for Afghans coming from Rome and traveling further north, to Scandinavia or to the UK.

Afghans made up a consistent part of the population of the migrant camp known as ‘the Jungle’ in Calais – personal observation suggests it was common for Afghans migrants in Trieste and Gorizia to start for Calais shortly after receiving their Italian asylum documents. In October 2016, together with the dismantlement of the Jungle, France put some efforts into improving its reception for migrants, opening up many new camps and facilities and improving the conditions for asylum seekers. It was at this point that France became a favoured destination for Afghans, in particular for those arriving from Greece or Serbia, who would no longer stop in Italy, but aimed for the better reception benefits (reportedly 350 euros per month versus 250 euros on average of an Italian decent-quality project) and a better job market. Afghan asylum applications in France jumped from 2122 in 2015 to 5646 in 2016, making Afghans the second most numerous group of asylum seekers there.

Italy, now a second chance destination for failed asylum seekers, but a chance for what?

Through the last decade, obtaining protection and the various necessary documents in Italy has not meant the beginning of a new, sedentary life for the majority of Afghan newcomers. Mostly, they would move out of Italy to try and find a job in some other European country – usually in the black market, hoping to regularise their position in due time. Or, if they were discovered, they had the fall-back plan of returning to Italy, rather than just face deportation to Afghanistan.

But what of those who stayed in Italy? One Afghan interpreter who has been working for years with asylum seekers all over the country assesses the percentage of those who ‘gave it a try’, and stayed in Italy for some time at least after receiving their asylum documents, at maybe 40 per cent. (Personal observation of the Afghans in Friuli Venezia Giulia through the last three years leads to the impression that the percentage is even lower).

Some of those who stay for a while after the end of the state-sponsored reception, move on to private housing, mainly with a view to start the procedure for family reunification. For them, Italy represents a mid-term solution: they work for a while and in the meantime, apply for family reunion; as soon as the wife and kids arrive on a family visa, they travel further and without him to northern European countries where recognition rates for women and children are still relatively high. Afterwards, they are able to reunite with the husband who would not have been able to get asylum status in those countries as a single man. (7)

As the Italian economy has not performed particularly well during the years of the boom of Afghan arrivals, the economic incentives to remain for good have been few. Also, with an increased number of refugees, Afghan newcomers receive less attention and fewer educational and vocational training opportunities compared to those who arrived five or ten years ago. Individual Afghans without strong local connections who have made it have either been lucky or very brave and perseverant in pursuing an individual choice, instead of joining the mass of Afghans trying their luck out of Italy. But chances for integration might be narrowing amid the increasing number of migrants and the creeping xenophobia to which Italians, relatively new to being hosts of mass migration, are falling prey. As a 20-year old boy from Jalalabad commented on a recent episode involving an Afghan and two Pakistani asylum seekers in Trieste, accused of raping a 12-year old girl (see media report in Italian here):

People come here very young, they are barely kids, they leave their families behind and the moment they arrive in Europe, they forget [their families]. … Then they are accepted in a reception project, they get their documents and then they get kicked out of the project. And then they end up in the streets again, back to sleeping in the stations. And then they do something wrong. Somebody does something wrong and everybody gets a bad name because of that and the public opinion turns against the refugees and the state becomes eager to get them out of the reception projects more quickly and that only makes things worse.

State-sponsored reception programmes can last up to six months after an asylum seeker has received his or her positive answer, although in many parts of Italy, the local prefectures reduce this amount of time. Entry into a SPRAR (Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees) project that offer more time and support for integration, once and ideally still the standard practice, has by now become a rare occurrence due to the large numbers of migrants of all nationalities.

Many Afghan refugees coming to Italy are bruised by past experiences in Afghanistan, during the travel or while applying for asylum in other countries; they seldom engage immediately in learning Italian, even in the few places where courses are available in sufficient number and quality. They often say they are not sure whether it is worth it until they know the result of their application, but this does not ring true: they know that the recognition rate in Italy is extremely high. More realistically, they still do not know what they will do after they get protection, as their original project for a new life in Europe has not been achieved. Also, a large number of refugees coming from the same cultural area, like the Afghan-Pakistani transitional community of asylum seekers in Trieste that is almost one-thousand strong, can work as an obstacle towards integration. It reduces the incentives for individuals to find their own paths to integration, something Afghans and other refugees need to pursue to gain access to the job market in Italy.

Italy lacks an established Afghan diaspora, a cohesive and economically well-developed community which could provide newcomers with support, advice and job positions. The nature of the first Afghans who settled in Italy, members of the elite who were negligible in number, exacerbated a phenomenon that can be found in Afghan communities in other European countries as well, that is an ‘insulation’ between older migrants, from urban and educated backgrounds who are integrated at a cultural level, and more recent newcomers.

Afghan communities in Italy are also still small and scattered. Of the 20,000 Afghans who may be residing permanently in Italy (there are no official statistics), Rome is said to host around 6000. There are two main communities loosely aligned with two ethnic groups: the Hazaras and the Pashtuns. They are roughly equivalent in number and each also attracts Tajiks, Uzbeks and other Afghans.

These two leading communities worship at different mosques and never get together to organise official gatherings or festivities, although at an individual level, there are sometimes very strong friendships. Neither of the communities has managed to produce a leadership or an organization which could work for the advancement of Afghans in Italy. Past attempts have ended unsuccessfully, while current associations labelled as Afghan whom AAN interviewed are ineffective and aimed only at extracting money from migrants in exchange for help in completing necessary paperwork.

Afghans in Rome are active in a variety of jobs, mostly in restaurants and as manual labour. They have so far failed to create the sort of string of commercial ventures that communities such as the Bangladeshis have done. Those with a more solid background who invested their capital in such enterprises lament the high taxes and the many obstacles they feel are put in front of them by state authorities, who, as one man said, “are not used to the idea of refugee businessmen and every time refugees open a shop, go and make trouble for them by subjecting it to unending controls.”

Without easy access to the job market or solid roots in the country, it seems the destiny of many Afghans who come to Italy is to eventually move on: they spend maybe three to four years there waiting to obtain asylum documents during which time they try to find a job or bring their families to Europe, but then they hit the road again, to start anew somewhere else. At the moment, according to some of the Afghans interviewed by AAN, at least some, after receiving Italian asylum documents, go on to France and apply for asylum there, as well, opportunistically signing up for another round of reception in a project for asylum seekers, for lack of other prospects.

Bureaucratic mechanisms devised by European countries to prevent ‘asylum-shopping’ are ineffective: refugees still try to improve their situation step by step, that is, country by country. The different standards in different European states, in terms of recognition rates, reception benefits, opportunities for family reunion, risks of deportation and job opportunities and standards of living provide too many incentives and pushes for Afghan migrants not to try shifting from one country to another to better their situation. The risk is that they do not invest enough of their energies and time putting down roots anywhere. This attitude may be easily portrayed as opportunistic by those who resent their presence, but the truth is that the prime victims of such a system are the Afghans themselves. As one proverb says: dar ba dar, khak ba sar – going from door to door brings nothing but destitution and humiliation.

The years-long perpetuation of conditions of liminality, economic dependence, uncertainty and unfulfilled integration must be seen as a real disaster for thousands of Afghan youths. The shortcomings of the current Italian reception system and its lack of help with integration and the contrasting attitudes towards Afghan asylum seekers by different European states risks creating scores of what could be termed ‘failed citizens’. In Italy, as elsewhere, this may lead to a multiplicity of ills: social distress, criminality, xenophobia and right-wing populism, expansion of illicit economies run by mafia networks, indentured and inhuman labour conditions for refugees stuck in a legal ‘limbo’ or rootless and unable to stand for their rights. As they are Afghans, it may be easier for commenters to later blame the ‘failed state’ they come from for any troubles they cause. Others may blame the failure of European politics.

Edited by Sari Kouvo and Kate Clark

(1) This was not the first instance in which an Afghan king sought asylum in Italy, as King Amanullah famously also chose Italy as a place of exile after being dethroned in 1929. Also, in his case, only a few families of supporters followed him and settled in the country.

(2) There were many instances of push-back on arrival by the police in Adriatic ports such as Bari, Ancona and Venice. Afghans and other migrants would often end up traveling back to Greece on the same ship on which they had arrived.

(3) The Dublin Regulations are a series of EU laws determining which of the Union’s countries are responsible to examine asylum applications, making the first country through which the person entered the EU and left his/her fingerprints responsible. The first convention was signed in 1997, while new regulations were implemented in 2008 and 2013 (non EU-countries like Norway and Switzerland also apply its provisions).

(4) Initially they were based in: Gorizia, Milan, Rome, Foggia, Syracuse, Crotone, Trapani, Bari, Caserta and Torino. As of 3 October 2016, the Ministry of Interior referred to 20 Territorial Commissions and 27 sub-Commissions. During 2015 and 2016, new Territorial Commissions started operations in Verona, Ancona, Brescia, Bologna, Cagliari, Catania, Firenze, Lecce, Palermo and Salerno; sub-Commissions were established in Forlì, Campobasso, Enna, Reggio Calabria, Perugia, Frosinone, Caltanissetta, Ragusa, Genova, Agrigento, Novara, Bergamo, Livorno, Monza-Brianza, Padova, Vicenza and Treviso (see here).

(5) This high recognition rate and the fact that there are fewer Afghans appealing against the commission’s decision (unless they aim at a higher type of protection than what they were given) makes Afghans less affected, at least for the moment, by the new law reform Minniti-Orlando, severely curtailing the options of asylum seekers appealing. However, the law also aims at penalises asylum seekers who move from one European country to another as Afghans have been forced to do by recent developments. For an interview summarizing criticism of the changes brought by the law see here, see here.

(6) Italy has not been pro-active in sending Afghans back to their country: in the last five years, there were only two or three voluntary repatriations per year from Italy to Afghanistan, and, also given the high recognition rate, virtually no risk of deportation to Afghanistan. (IOM data by personal communication; data for 2016 is available here.) By comparison, France has organised 529 voluntary repatriations of Afghans in 2016 (see here).

(7) Statistics of the number of Afghans arriving to Italy by sea corroborate the growing importance of the land route through the Balkans even before the opening of the humanitarian corridor in 2015. They also show the sudden drop of arrivals by sea during the time of the corridor, and their partial resuming from mid-2016 onwards, as an old-fashioned alternative to the now more difficult land route.

2012: 651 (only until mid-June, when there was a stop in reporting from the Ministry of Interior)

2013: 964

2014: 784

2015: 117

2016: 437

2017: 73 by sea in the first six-months (the last data is coherent with the drop in the overall numbers of Afghan asylum seekers which was 616 in the same period of 2017).

Data from the Ministry of the Interior as shared by IOM Italy, personal communication.

(8) This instrumental use of family reunification has been confirmed by, among others, lawyers offering legal aid to asylum seekers in Rome. The procedure for family reunification was relatively easy in the past, but it has become increasingly difficult. In particular, it seems to be hard for the relatives in Afghanistan to gain access to the Italian Embassy in Kabul to complete all the necessary paperwork and because of newly-required medical tests to prove consanguinity.

A landmark case in the United States means that, for the first time, two of those responsible for the CIA’s post-2001 torture programme, have been held accountable in the courts. Much of this torture programme was carried out on Afghan soil. The two psychologists who designed and implemented the programme, have paid compensation to two survivors and to the family of Gul Rahman, an Afghan who died of hypothermia after being left semi-naked on a bare concrete floor in a CIA black site near Kabul in November 2002. US courts had thrown out previous attempts at litigation on the grounds of ‘national security’. As AAN’s Kate Clark reports, the successful case may open the door to other claims, including against government officials.

Gul Rahman, an Afghan living in Pakistan, had been driven up to Islamabad for a medical check-up and was staying with Ghairat Bahir, son-in-law of Hezb-e Islami leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, when on 29 October 2002, both men were kidnapped by US agents and Pakistani security forces and rendered to a CIA black site in Afghanistan. Both were tortured. Bahir survived (for details, see the appendix), but Rahmat Gul froze to death on the bare concrete floor of a cell in CIA custody after interrogators ordered his clothes removed because he was being “uncooperative.” A CIA review listed contributing factors leading to his death: “dehydration, lack of food, and immobility due to ‘short chaining’ [ie being held on a short chain]”

The US never informed Gul Rahman’s family of his death. Nor did they return his body. It was only many years later, in 2010, that an investigation by the Associated Press revealed he had been killed in Afghanistan.

Now, two architects of the CIA torture programme have agreed to pay an undisclosed sum in compensation to Gul Rahman’s family and two men who survived the programme, Tanzanian Suleiman Abdullah Salim and Libyan Mohamed Ahmed Ben Soud (spellings for these and others mentioned in this dispatch are as per the official US spelling). The case, brought on behalf of the two men and Gul Rahman’s family by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), was against two psychologists, James Mitchell and John ‘Bruce’ Jessen, who had been contracted by the CIA to create and implement its torture programme. The two men decided to settle before the case went to court, after failing repeatedly to get it thrown out. The ACLU explained why this is such a landmark case:

Until now, every lawsuit trying to hold people accountable for the CIA torture program has been dismissed at initial stages because the government successfully argued that letting the cases proceed would reveal state secrets. But unlike previous cases, this time the Justice Department did not try to derail the lawsuit. The defendants attempted to dismiss the case multiple times, but the court consistently ruled that the plaintiffs had valid claims.

A change in the legal landscape

What changed matters was the release of a redacted summary of an investigation by the US Senate Intelligence Committee into the CIA’s rendition and torture programme in December 2014 (read it here and our analysis of its contents here). Even though much of the information had already been in the public domain (in investigations by human rights groups and journalists who spoke to survivors and, in some cases, personnel), the fact that it was the US Senate that had published the report and that it was based on the CIA’s own files meant the information was now both public and incontrovertible. The US courts – and the government – could no longer argue so easily that scrutinising the CIA’s programme would jeopardise state secrets – the grounds on which two earlier cases had been thrown out.

In May 2006, a US court turned down a claim against the former director of the CIA, George Tenet, brought by the ACLU on behalf of a German-Lebanese man, Khaled El-Masri. He was kidnapped in Macedonia in December 2003 and rendered to Afghanistan. He was drugged, beaten, stripped and given “putrid water” to drink (read here). El-Masri was held for five months even after his innocence became clear and then, said the ACLU, “deposited at night, without explanation, on a hill in Albania,” without apology or the means to get home. Nevertheless, the court accepted a US government intervention in the case which argued that allowing it to proceed would jeopardise state secrets.

A second case was also dismissed, in February 2008. This was against a subsidiary of Boeing, Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc, which had been used by the CIA to render detainees. The ACLU which filed the lawsuit argued on behalf of five detainees that “Jeppesen knowingly participated in these renditions by providing critical flight planning and logistical support services to aircraft and crews used by the CIA to forcibly disappear these five men to torture, detention and interrogation.” Three of the five plaintiffs were flown to Afghanistan where they were tortured (see details in footnote 1). Again, the court accepted a government intervention asserting “state secrets privilege” and claiming that further litigation would undermine national security interests.

This time, in the case against Mitchell and Jessen, the government chose not to try to shut the case down and the court also rejected various attempts by the two men to halt proceedings. Rather, just as the case was about to go to jury trial, the pair decided to settle the claims. By this point, the court had already decided some important questions of law.

“First,” ACLU attorney Dror Laden told AAN, “there is the series of decisions the court issued that torture committed by the government and the executive branch is a question for the courts. Judges have the power and the responsibility to decide if war crimes or torture were committed.” Secondly, he said, “This case shows how national security litigation can be conducted without jeopardising national security.” He described how dozens of lawyers were present in the court room with the government side speaking up if they were concerned that questions of national security were about to be disclosed. “The answer,” he said, “is not to shut down lawsuits from the beginning, but to creatively look at how the parties can move forward in conjunction with each other.”

What the psychologists did

The Senate report revealed (or in many instances confirmed), not only the extent of the CIA’s torture programme, but also the pivotal role played by Mitchell and Jessen. As the ACLU writes:

Drawing on their experience as psychologists and relying on experiments conducted on dogs in the 1960s… [they] proposed that CIA prisoners should be psychologically destroyed through the infliction of severe mental and physical pain and suffering. They theorized that inducing a state of “learned helplessness” in captives would eradicate any resistance they might have to interrogation. This theory had never been – and could not legally or ethically be – tested, and their program involved not only torturing prisoners but experimenting on them in violation of the international ban on non-consensual human experimentation.

Despite the CIA having previously adopted a position that torture did not work, attitudes changed following the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Worries that the agency would be committing war crimes were assuaged by a Justice Department decision to define the methods proposed as not torture. President Bush’s assertion that ‘war on terror’ detainees were not covered by the Geneva Conventions, which expressly outlaw torture, also eased the way. As ACLU has written: “the decision to torture was made deliberately, in a program characterized by human experimentation, intentional brutality, and the painstaking manipulation of the law. It was as clinical as it was cruel.” The two psychologists were contracted to design the programme of interrogation and torture, despite the fact that, as the Senate report noted, “Neither psychologist had experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa’ida, a background in terrorism, or any relevant regional, cultural, or linguistic expertise.”

The Senate report named 119 men as having been subject to CIA rendition and 39 of those as victims of torture. Most of the torture described in the report took place in black sites on Afghan soil and five of the 39 named torture victims are Afghan, including Gul Rahman (see the appendix for detail on the other four men). Many more men were tortured than are named in the report, however, including by the CIA and also, after CIA methods spread, by the US military, in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. Practices included: prolonged sleep deprivation (for more detail on why this is so extremely destructive, see footnote 2), forced nudity, starvation, beating, water dousing, waterboarding and extreme forms of sensory deprivation. The ACLU said the two psychologists:

… designed the abusive procedures, conditions, and cruel treatment imposed on captives during their rendition and subsequent detention, devised the torture instruments and protocols, personally tortured detainees, and trained CIA personnel in administering torture techniques. In a clear conflict of interest later acknowledged by the CIA, the two men were also tasked with evaluating the “effectiveness” of the program from which they reaped enormous profits.

Mitchell and Jessen received 1.5 and 1.1 million dollars respectively from the CIA in fees and, after they formed a company in 2005 to supply the CIA with personnel and to expand the programme, a further 81 million US dollars in the years up till 2010.

The two survivors

The two men, who along with the family of Gul Rahman, brought the case against Mitchel and Jessen were a Libyan dissident and a Tanzanian fisherman. Both had been rendered to Afghanistan. Mohamed Ahmed Ben Soud had fled Libya in 1991 and was living in Pakistan when he was kidnapped in a joint US-Pakistani operation in April 2003 and taken to Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch revealed that the then Libyan president, Muammer Gaddafi, had passed his and other names on to the US claiming they were terrorists. For much of the next year, said ACLU, the CIA kept Ben Soud “naked and chained to the wall in one of three painful stress positions designed to keep him awake. He was held in complete isolation in a dungeon-like cell, starved, with no bed, blanket, or light,” not allowed to wash for five months. CIA agents forced Ben Soud into a box less than half a metre wide, hanged him from a rod and submerged him in icy water, until a doctor would decide his temperature was dangerously low. In August 2004, he was rendered to Libya where he was sentenced to life in prison, only released in 2011, a day after the start of the revolution that led to the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi.

Suleiman Abdullah Salim, a Tanzanian citizen, was working as a fisherman and trader in Somalia when, in March 2003, the CIA and Kenyan security forces abducted him and rendered him first to Kenya and then to Afghanistan. He was beaten, slammed into walls, hung from a rod and chained into painful stress positions for days on end. The CIA also subjected him to sleep deprivation and forced him into small boxes. He was finally freed in 2008, long after his family had given him up for dead.

More lawsuits?

The decision by Jessen and Mitchel to pay compensation may open the door to future claims. In the United States, only the state can bring a criminal lawsuit, but individuals can bring civil claims for damages. What would be even better, Human Rights Watch’s Guantanamo expert, Laura Pitter told AAN, would be if the US government acted proactively without the need for victims to go to court.

… these suits are extremely expensive. So either an NGO like the ACLU or perhaps the Center for Constitutional rights willing to make the investment necessary to pursue the case like this has to take it on, or law firms or other private attorneys do in the hopes that if they win they can recover attorneys’ fees. But that is a big risk and a big investment. The risk is lower now that the ACLU case settled because they got some good rulings, and admissions, from the defendants, but it’s still a risk so we will see. 

Up till now, the state has chosen not to prosecute anyone for the many crimes committed under the CIA’s torture programme. President George Bush authorised the programme and although President Obama banned torture as soon as he took office in 2009, his administration also decided not to prosecute. “We tortured some folks,” said Obama (quoted here) a few months before the release of the Senate torture report. “You know, it is important for us not to feel too sanctimonious in retrospect about the tough job that those folks had. And a lot of those folks were working hard under enormous pressure and are real patriots.” It is impossible to see this situation changing under President Trump.

As the Office of the Prosecutor in the International Criminal Court has pointed out, the scope of the Department of Justice’s preliminary review (August 2009 to June 2011) of allegations of CIA abuse of detainees, “appears to have been limited to investigating whether any unauthorised interrogation techniques were used by CIA interrogators, and if so, whether such conduct could constitute violations of any applicable criminal statutes.” (emphasis added) In other words, there has been no criminal investigation into the use of authorised torture techniques, a point highlighted by the Office of the Prosecutor which quoted the US Attorney General:

“…the Department of Justice (DOJ) will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees.”

There have been no prosecutions of anyone involved in the killing of Gul Rahman. His case, along with that of the Iraqi, Manadel al-Jamadi, who died in CIA custody in 2003 at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, was referred to the Justice Department. It decided not to bring charges and, in 2012, the US Attorney General prosecutors announced that the investigation would be closed because “the admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt” (see here and here).

In March 2003, said the Senate report, “just four months after the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA Station in Country recommended that [redacted] CIA officer receive a “cash award” of $2,500 for his “consistently superior work.” The manger of the detention side stayed in position and “was formally certified as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical portion of his training requirement was waived because of his past experience with interrogations” at the site.

Other avenues to seek justice

Some victims of the CIA have sought other avenues of redress, although no-one, before the current case has been able to touch any of the Americans involved in the torture programme. Two men who are still held in Guantanamo, Abdul Rahim al-Nashiri and Abu Zubayda, sued Poland at the European Court of Human Rights. It ruled on 24 July 2014 that Poland had violated the European Convention on Human Rights when it co-operated with the CIA in their renditions, allowing the unlawful detention and torture of the two men on its territory in 2002–2003. The court ordered the Polish government to pay each of the men 100,000 Euros (118 USD) in damages (read here and here). On 13 December 2012, the same court found in favour of Khaled El-Masri against the government of Macedonia which had aided the CIA in his rendition (see here and here). German authorities, though, terminated their inquest against 13 CIA staff accused of involvement in the case in April 2017. On 20 September 2012, the highest court in Italy upheld convictions against 23 CIA agents and a US air force officer, in absentia, over the abduction in February 2003 of an Egyptian imam, Abu Omar. Two Italians were also earlier convicted. Abu Omar was held in Egypt where he was tortured, including with the use of electric shocks, and held until February 2007 when he was released without charge.

Some countries have given compensation to victims. They include the UK which chose to give the nine British nationals and six British residents released from Guantanamo around one and a half million dollars each, settling civil damages claims rather than, reported AFP, “contest in court allegations that Britain’s security services were complicit in what happened.”  One of the child prisoners at Guantanamo, Canadian Omar Khadr, was given damages by his government amounting to an equivalent of eight million US dollars.

Up till the Mitchell and Jessen case, however, only claims against those tangentially involved in torture had succeeded, largely the countries which aided the CIA in its rendition programme. The pay outs by the two psychologist torturers does make future civil claims in the United States more likely. However, there is still no prospect of criminal prosecutions of American torturers in America itself. This fact, that successive US governments have chosen to give officials impunity for some of the most serious crimes possible, means the International Criminal Court (ICC) could take up this case. As AAN has reported, (3) the ICC has already decided that there is a case to answer for CIA and US military torture. It is currently pondering whether or not to proceed with building cases against specific alleged perpetrators.

Appendix: Other Afghan victims of CIA torture

There are many published accounts of Afghans having been tortured by the US military and by the CIA. They include the following:

Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the Living: American, the Taliban and the War through Afghan Eyes, New York, Metropolitan Books Henry Holt and Company

Abdul Salaam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, London, Hurst 2011

Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition, Open Society Foundations, February 2013

Enduring Freedom Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, March 2004

There have also been official US investigations into torture by US personnel, including: United States Senate Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, Committee on Armed Services, 20 November 2008

Other official US reports (up till 2008) are listed by the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) here: Research Brief: Selected examples of Defence, Intelligence and Justice Investigative Reports into detention and interrogation practices, 2 November 2008

There have also been numerous reports by journalists, including for example by Craig Pyes and Kevin Sack, ‘Two Deaths Were a “Clue That Something’s Wrong”’, The Los Angeles Times, 25 September 2006 and, ‘U.S. Probing Alleged Abuse of Afghans’, The Los Angeles Times, 21 September 2004

As well as Gul Rahman, four Afghans are named by the Senate as having been tortured by the CIA. The four are:

Ghairat Bahir, son-in-law of Hekmatyar, kidnapped with Gul Rahman in October 2002 and held in the CIA’s Salt Pit for six months. “’I was left naked, sleeping on the barren concrete,’” Bahir told AP. He said his interrogators would tie him to a chair and sit on his stomach. They also hung him naked, he said, for hours on end. Bahir was subsequently moved to US military custody in Bagram and released in May 2008.

Arsala Khan, when in his mid-50s, was captured in 2003 and accused of having guided Osama bin Laden through the mountains of Tora Bora to safety in 2001. Kept in a CIA black site in Afghanistan, the Senate report said:

After 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, Arsala Khan was described as barely able to enunciate, and being “visibly shaken by his hallucinations depicting dogs mauling and killing his sons and family.” According to CIA cables, Arsala Khan “stated that [the interrogator] was responsible for killing them and feeding them to the dogs.” Arsala Khan was subsequently allowed to sleep. Two days later, however, the interrogators returned him to standing sleep deprivation. After subjecting Khan to 21 additional hours of sleep deprivation, interrogators stopped using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

Khan was kept at Bagram for a further four years, despite the US coming to believe he was innocent, after, the Senate report said, “the development of significant intelligence indicating that the source who reported that Arsala Khan had aided Usama bin Laden had a vendetta against Arsala Khan’s family.”

Janat Gul (also known as Hammidullah), former president of Ariana Airline, was captured in January 2003 in Lashkargar, Afghanistan. He was held in a secret CIA prison in Bucharest, Romania, in 2004 where he was subject, said the Senate report to “continuous sleep deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, and walling until he experienced auditory and visual hallucinations. Janat Gul was subsequently transferred to Guantánamo Bay and was finally released to Afghanistan on April 18, 2005.

Muhammad Rahim was detained by the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, and handed over to the US in 2007. It seems Pakistan had told the US he might know the whereabouts of bin Laden and, as AAN has written, while held in a CIA black site in Afghanistan, Rahim was subject to slapping, hooding, solitary confinement, dietary manipulation and prolonged bouts of sleep deprivation:

Rahim was forcibly kept awake by being shackled in a standing position; he was also made to wear a diaper so that toilet breaks would not interrupt the sessions and, probably, as a further means of humiliation. After a first session of 104.5 hours – more than four days – without sleep, he started suffering hallucinations and was allowed to sleep for eight hours. Then, after a psychiatrist determined he had been faking the hallucinations, he was forcibly prevented from sleeping for another two and a half days. In all, he suffered eight sessions of sleep deprivation, including three which lasted for more than four days and one, the last, which lasted for almost six (138.5 hours).

The CIA interrogators, said the Senate Report, produced no disseminated intelligence report. Even so, the US believed and continues to believe it had captured a senior associate of bin Laden. He was transferred to Guantanamo and remains there till this day. He is the last known detainee of any nationality to be rendered and tortured by the CIA and the last Afghan to be taken to Guantánamo Bay. Because the US military has classified Rahim as a ‘high value’ detainee which means the detail and much of the substance of the US case is secret. His lawyer has said he cannot publically say why he believes Rahim is innocent because to do so would reveal classified information. He has been deemed a ‘forever prisoner’, ie not suitable for release or criminal trial. (For more on this case and the many questions surrounding the US assertions of Rahim’s al Qaeda membership, see this longer AAN report).

(1) The following allegations were made (text from the 8 September 2010 decision by the Court of Appeal when it overturned its earlier ruling, made in April 2009 that the government could not invoke the state secrets privilege to dismiss an entire suit, only to dismiss specific evidence):

Plaintiff Binyam Mohamed, a 28-year-old Ethiopian citizen and legal resident of the United Kingdom, was arrested in Pakistan on immigration charges. Mohamed was allegedly flown to Morocco… where he claims he was transferred to the custody of Moroccan security agents. These Moroccan authorities allegedly subjected Mohamed to “severe physical and psychological torture,” including routinely beating him and breaking his bones. He says they cut him with a scalpel all over his body, including on his penis, and poured “hot stinging liquid” into the open wounds. He was blindfolded and handcuffed while being made “to listen to extremely loud music day and night.”

After 18 months in Moroccan custody, Mohamed was allegedly transferred back to American custody and flown to Afghanistan. He claims he was detained there in a CIA “dark prison” where he was kept in “near permanent darkness” and subjected to loud noise, such as the recorded screams of women and children, 24 hours a day. Mohamed was fed sparingly and irregularly and in four months he lost between 40 and 60 pounds. Eventually, Mohamed was transferred to the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he remained for nearly five years. He was released and returned to the United Kingdom during the pendency of this appeal.

Plaintiff Bisher al-Rawi, a 39-year-old Iraqi citizen and legal resident of the United Kingdom, was arrested in Gambia while traveling on legitimate business. Like the other plaintiffs, al-Rawi claims he was put in a diaper and shackles and placed on an airplane, where he was flown to Afghanistan. He says he was detained in the same “dark prison” as Mohamed and loud noises were played 24 hours per day to deprive him of sleep. Al-Rawi alleges he was eventually transferred to Bagram Air Base, where he was “subjected to humiliation, degradation, and physical and psychological torture by U.S. officials,” including being beaten, deprived of sleep and threatened with death. Al-Rawi was eventually transferred to Guantanamo; in preparation for the flight, he says he was “shackled and handcuffed in excruciating pain” as a result of his beatings. Al-Rawi was eventually released from Guantanamo and returned to the United Kingdom.

Plaintiff Farag Ahmad Bashmilah, a 38-year-old Yemeni citizen, says he was apprehended by agents of the Jordanian government while he was visiting Jordan to assist his ailing mother. After a brief detention during which he was “subject[ed] to severe physical and psychological abuse,” Bashmilah claims he was given over to agents of the U.S. government, who flew him to Afghanistan in similar fashion as the other plaintiffs. Once in Afghanistan, Bashmilah says he was placed in solitary confinement, in 24-hour darkness, where he was deprived of sleep and shackled in painful positions. He was subsequently moved to another cell where he was subjected to 24-hour light and loud noise. Depressed by his conditions, Bashmilah attempted suicide three times. Later, Bashmilah claims he was transferred by airplane to an unknown CIA “black site” prison, where he “suffered sensory manipulation through constant exposure to white noise, alternating with deafeningly loud music” and 24-hour light. Bashmilah alleges he was transferred once more to Yemen, where he was tried and convicted of a trivial crime, sentenced to time served abroad and released.

Plaintiff Ahmed Agiza, an Egyptian national who had been seeking asylum in Sweden, was captured by Swedish authorities, allegedly transferred to American custody and flown to Egypt. In Egypt, he claims he was held for five weeks “in a squalid, windowless, and frigid cell,” where he was “severely and repeatedly beaten” and subjected to electric shock through electrodes attached to his ear lobes, nipples and genitals. Agiza was held in detention for two and a half years, after which he was given a six-hour trial before a military court, convicted and sentenced to 15 years in Egyptian prison. According to plaintiffs, “[v]irtually every aspect of Agiza’s rendition, including his torture in Egypt, has been publicly acknowledged by the Swedish government.”

Plaintiff Abou Elkassim Britel, a 40-year-old Italian citizen of Moroccan origin, was arrested and detained in Pakistan on immigration charges. After several months in Pakistani detention, Britel was allegedly transferred to the custody of American officials. These officials dressed Britel in a diaper and a torn t-shirt and shackled and blindfolded him for a flight to Morocco. Once in Morocco, he says he was detained incommunicado by Moroccan security services at the Temara prison, where he was beaten, deprived of sleep and food and threatened with sexual torture, including sodomy with a bottle and castration. After being released and re-detained, Britel says he was coerced into signing a false confession, convicted of terrorism-related charges and sentenced to 15 years in a Moroccan prison.

(2) As AAN has previously written, the effects of sleep deprivation are well documented, including by the US courts. Hernan Reyes, a specialist in the medical effects of detention working with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), writing about psychological torture for the ICRC Journal quoted a 1944 case in America (Ashcraft v. Tennessee):

Although [the defendant] Ashraft was only subjected to 36 hours of sleep deprivation, the court ruled it to be both physical and mental torture. In a ruling not only categorizing sleep deprivation as torture but further emphasizing the unreliability of any information obtained in such a way, US Justice Hugo Black stated that ‘‘deprivation of sleep is the most effective torture, and certain to produce any confession desired.’’

After two nights without sleep, according to a psychoanalyst working with victims of torture who was quoted by Reyes, “the hallucinations start.” After three nights, people dream while awake, “a form of psychosis,” the psychoanalyst says. “By the week’s end, people lose their orientation in place and time – the people you’re speaking to become people from your past; a window might become a view of the sea seen in your younger days. To deprive someone of sleep is to tamper with their equilibrium and their sanity.”

(3) AAN wrote:

The information available, says the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), provides a reasonable basis to believe that during interrogations of security detainees and in conduct supporting those interrogations, members of the US armed forces and the CIA:

… resorted to techniques amounting to the commission of the war crimes of torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape… Specifically:

Members of US armed forces appear to have subjected at least 61 detained persons to torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity on the territory of Afghanistan between 1 May 2003 and 31 December 2014. The majority of the abuses are alleged to have occurred in 2003-2004.

Members of the CIA appear to have subjected at least 27 detained persons to torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity and/or rape on the territory of Afghanistan and other States Parties to the Statute (namely Poland, Romania and Lithuania) between December 2002 and March 2008. The majority of the abuses are alleged to have occurred in 2003-2004.

Crucially, the OTP says, these “alleged crimes were not the abuses of a few isolated individuals,” but rather were part of a policy:

The Office considers that there is a reasonable basis to believe these alleged crimes were committed in furtherance of a policy or policies aimed at eliciting information through the use of interrogation techniques involving cruel or violent methods which would support US objectives in the conflict in Afghanistan.

A new law on freedom of assembly is under consideration in Afghanistan. The National Security Council (NSC) decided to replace the current Law on Gatherings, Demonstrations and Strikes (hereafter called the Assembly Law) after the deadly explosion which targeted protesters in the Deh Mazang area of Kabul on 23 July 2016. A draft of the law, leaked on 8 July 2017, has led to strong reactions from civil society, as it became obvious that the new law would seriously restrict the right to organise and participate in demonstrations, public gatherings, strikes and sit-ins. A group of civil society activists has now asked the government to amend the draft. In this Q&A, AAN’s Ehsan Qaane goes through the new draft law in detail, explains why it was drafted, what its implications might be and what reactions to it have been.

1. Why is the Assembly Law being redrafted?

Various factors came together to prompt the renewal of the Assembly Law: the fear of demonstrations getting out of hand and threatening a vulnerable government, the wish to limit the negative repercussions of prolonged protests on the economic and civilian life of a city, the need to protect demonstrators in mass protests from possible terrorist attack, and the need to fix a faulty law.

The current law was enacted in January 2003 based on the 1964 constitution (also known as King Zahir Shah’s Constitution, full text here), as the current constitution had not yet been endorsed (this happened in the Constitutional Loya Jirga on 24 January 2004). The decision to renew the Assembly Law was made by the National Security Council on 31 August 2016, one month after a suicide attacker detonated his explosives in the middle of a mass protest by the Enlightenment Movement, on 23 July 2016; the bomber killed more than 80 people and injured around 300 others (see AAN’s analysis about the Enlightenment demonstration here and here). The drafting process of the new Assembly Law was accelerated during another round of massive demonstrations and sit-ins by another protest movement, ‘Uprising for Change’ that took place in Kabul from 2 to 20 June 2017 (more details here and here). Uprising for Change is a socio-political movement, led by group of independent young politicians and civil society activists, mainly Tajiks.

The Enlightenment Movement, led by a group of MPs, social activists and young politicians, mainly Hazara, had called the 23 July 2016 demonstration in Deh Mazang to protest the Afghan government’s decision to route a major electricity transmission line, known as TUTAP (an acronym for Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan) from Hairatan to Kabul through Salang, rather than through Bamyan (see AAN’s analysis here and here). The protesters claimed the decision was motivated by discrimination against Hazaras who form a majority in the central region of the country, including Bamyan province. The protesters demanded the routing of TUTAP through Bamyan.

Though President Ghani banned any demonstrations for ten days after the Deh Mazang attack, his ruling failed to stop protests outside the country, which continued for several months, against the government in general and him in particular. Expatriate Afghans demonstrated against the president when he attended the Brussels Conference in October 2016, the Munich Security Conference in February 2017 and during a visit to Australia in April 2017. (1)

The Enlightenment demonstration was neither the first, nor the last demonstration since President Ghani’s administration was inaugurated in September 2014. At least in the capital, three large demonstrations were organised before the Enlightenment protest and one after it. There was the Farkhunda demonstration on 24 March 2015 (2), the demonstration of the so-called Tabasum Revolution on 11 November 2015 (3) and the first demonstration of the Enlightenment Movement on 16 May 2016. (4)

Then on 2 June 2017, thousands of Kabuli citizens, organised by Uprising for Change, took to the streets after a massive truck-bomb was detonated in Wazir Akbar Khan killing 150 people and injuring 500 more (more details here and here). The protesters demanded the resignations of President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar and the security minsters for what they said was their continued failure to protect the lives of Afghan citizens in Kabul and other provinces. Six protesters, including Salem Izadyar, the son of the deputy chairman of the Upper House of the Afghan Parliament, were shot dead by soldiers from the Kabul garrison (see here). The situation was further inflamed when his funeral was targeted by two suicide bombers. The protesters, mainly Tajiks, installed protest tents at several intersections in Kabul, virtually shutting down parts of the city for 18 days until their last tent was forcibly removed by the Kabul garrison during the night of 20 June 2017 (see here).

While the Uprising for Change sit-ins continued in Kabul, President Ghani organised a large number of meetings with various groups, including political parties, civil society organisations and trade unions. In his meetings, the president discussed the negative impact of the ongoing sit-ins to public order, to the income of the private sector and the lives of private citizens. According to his official website, President Ghani met around 3,000 individuals and promised to “set the limits of freedom” explaining that “our national interests and Islamic values are our limits” (see here). According to a one-page report that was attached to the leaked draft of the law, the Law Committee of the cabinet resumed and accelerated drafting the new Assembly Law on 12 June 2017, ten days after the Uprising for Change had started its protest.

These five large demonstrations against the National Unity government (NUG) in Kabul, and many smaller ones outside the country have challenged the effectiveness and legitimacy of its security and development strategies in the two and half years since its establishment. However, as well as concerns from the government that the protests highlighted its vulnerability, there were also other reasons why the NUG has wanted to try to restrict the right to protest.

Negative impact of protests on public order and economy

The government argues that these demonstrations have harmed public order and the economy, through the closure of roads, shops, banks, business centres and government institutions. Therefore, according to Second Vice-President Sarwar Danish, who heads the Law Committee of the cabinet, “the Assembly Law must balance maintaining the right of citizens to protest with the public order” (see here). According to the one page report, which was prepared on 10 April 2017 by the Ministry of Economy in cooperation with the security organs (AAN obtained a hard copy), as many as 187,713 state employees had not been able to get to work during the demonstration on 23 July 2016. In the report, three solutions were recommended to reduce financial losses:

“1) The route of a demonstration and place of gathering or sit-in have to be outside the centre of [large] cities to maintain public order and keep the roads open; 2) the route of a demonstration and place of gathering shall be away from business centres; and 3) the organisers of protests shall guarantee the security (masuniat) of the protest, the maintenance of public order and public property, traffic discipline and social and economic interests.”

Securing the protestors

The need to provide security for protesters may have been another reason behind the redrafting of the Assembly Law. This concern has existed from the beginning of the establishment of the NUG, with a review made three months into the presidency, and a drafting of a demonstration regulation by the National Security Council on 27 December 2014. The regulation aimed at preventing terrorist attacks against protesters (according to a hard copy of an NSC document obtained by AAN). Although it is not clear when the draft was finalised, five routes for demonstrations and a few places for gatherings and sit-ins were specified in the new regulation. All are located in the suburbs of Kabul city. (5)

A faulty law

Finally, the need to fill some gaps in the current Assembly Law was mentioned in official documents as the most pressing reason to draft a new Assembly Law. Although these documents did not provide details about the gaps, the new draft law does contain some improvements on the old one. Some of them are discussed in the next paragraphs.

2. What are the most important changes in the new draft of the Assembly Law?

The draft of the new Assembly Law, leaked on 8 July 2017, has six chapters and 33 articles. There are many changes, some for the better. Compared to the Assembly Law, the new draft has a better structure, with some articles having been shifted from one chapter to another, and some paragraphs from one article to the other. Some definitions have been added, for instance for sit-ins. But most of the changes curtail the freedom of assembly: more restrictions have been added to the right to protest, more responsibilities have been given to the organisers of protests, and more authorities given to the police (who now have fewer responsibilities).

The most substantive change is the addition of new provisions that introduce restrictions to the permitted time, subject, manner and place of demonstrations, strikes and gatherings, as well as limitations to the right of participation. Some of these restrictions may violate the constitution.

Restrictions on what protestors are allowed to protest

According to para (1.1) of article 8, protesters only have the right to protest when they have “reform objectives”, ie objectives that aim to improve the “situation of the country socially, economically, politically, culturally, artistically and in terms of [workers’] unions and security.” Protestors could of course argue that a protest that is critical of the government and that does not explicitly fall under any of this categories could still be seen as having ‘reform objectives’ but the government could choose to disagree. For instance, the Uprising for Change movement demanded the resignation of the president, the CE and the national security adviser, arguing that the resignation of these officials would change the security situation for the better. However, this demand was called “irrational” by some Afghan senators.

In para (1) of article 21, the drafters of the new law – representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and the Attorney General’s Office and Nasrullah Stanekzai, the head of the Presidential Judicial Board – listed the characteristics of unlawful protests, saying that “gatherings, strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins on the basis of ethnic, religious and regional demands are not allowed.” This restriction harms the right of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the rights of residents of particular areas. For example, based on this article, it appears that Afghan Sikhs would no longer be able to demonstrate to demand the protection of their religious rights. Or the residents of Kandahar would, for instance, not be allowed to organise a sit-in to ask for cheaper electricity in their area. Such restrictions were never part of the Assembly Law, which in its article 4 only determines a few basic red lines saying that “the protesters shall not carry weapons, violate the constitution or stand against national interests.”

Restrictions on when and how long protestors are allowed to protest

There are already restrictions in the current Assembly Law and these have been added to. The ban on demonstrations between sunset and sunrise and within 48 hours of an election, referendum or Loya Jirga (Article 8) has been expanded to include demonstrations during those events as well (Para (2) of article 11 of the draft law). There is a new ban on any sit-in that lasts more than three days (Para (7) of article 10). The ban on any kind of protests during a state of emergency (Article 21) remains.

Although limitations on demonstrations before and during an elections or referendum might make sense, this seems less obviously true before or during a Loya Jirga. During an election or referendum, each citizen uses their vote to make a decision, but in a Loya Jirga it is the officials and politicians who make decisions about issues that are directly connected to the fundamental rights of citizens, including amending of the constitution. Citizens should be able to protest and raise their voices, before and during a Loya Jirga.

Not allowing a sit-in to continue for more than three days makes it a much less effective tool for protesters, as the government knows the protest must end and will not cause it any serious problems. In general, protests are not held only to make the government aware of people’s demands, but also to force the government, through public power, to address them.

Restrictions on where protestors are allowed to protest

Article 3 of the new draft, and also of the current Assembly Law, distinguishes two types of places: public and private. ‘Public places’ refers to roads, squares, parks and other places where people can freely move and assemble. ‘Private places’ refers to an area where movement and assembly is subjected to the permission of the owner, possessor, or custodian officials. The definitions of public and private places are very similar in the Assembly Law and the new draft. Only “the permission of possessor or custodian officials” which covers state property, is added to the definition of private place provided in the draft. In other words, state property is now considered a ‘private place’.

Article 8 of the current Assembly Law only bans demonstrations, gatherings and strikes in areas close to military establishments, places where explosive and combustible material is stored, hospitals and nurseries.

The new draft expands certain restrictions using the notion of public and private places. According to para (2) of article 7, the police may ban gatherings, strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins in private places, “if necessary,” though the term of ‘necessary’ is left undefined. Para (3) of article 10 stresses that “No person may use the right to gatherings, strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins to block public roads in a manner that prevents the movement of traffic and operation of government and non-government institutions.” Para (1) of article 14 gives authority to the police to specify the route of protests under “specific conditions” which, again, are not defined either. Para (1) of article 11 states that:

Gatherings, strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins shall not be held in the following places: 1) within 500 metres of military facilities; 2) within 500 metres of explosive and combustible material storage spaces; 3) in border regions; 4) within 200 metres of hospitals, kindergartens, nurseries, holy sites, schools, higher education institutions, and government administrations; 5) in the vicinity of critical and important storage facilities and resources; 6) in the vicinity of detention centres (prisons, detention centres, [police] custody centres, and juvenile rehabilitation centres); and 7) on public roads that prevent movement of traffic completely.

Given how big cities are constructed in Afghanistan, this seriously limits the choice of available routes and places for demonstrations. Moreover, security concerns over mass protests often lead the government to close the roads along the route of a demonstration. The new rules will so severely restrict where protests can be legally held that is difficult to imagine them now being able to take place in the centre of big cities. Indeed, none of the routes described in the 2014 demonstration regulation would be permissible for protests.

Restrictions on protestors’ right to participate in protests

The current Assembly Law, as well as the new draft, bans protests by members of the Afghan security forces (article 24) and foreign citizens (article 22; who could be expelled from the country).

Para (5) of article 10 of the draft law also bans the participation of children and para (6) bans “influential people” from “politically intervening” in any kind of protest (the term is not defined in the draft). Banning children and ‘influential people’ from participating in protests appears to be contrary to article 36 of the constitution; it gives the right of demonstration or gathering to all citizens of Afghanistan, without any explicit exception. The constitutional right to demonstrate does not only cover the right to be actually present at these civic protests, but appears to cover the broader right to be involved through political, technical and financial support, which might be interpreted as ‘intervention’ under para (6) of article 10.

Other restrictions in the new draft law

Both the current Assembly Law and the new draft ban all kinds of protest when security concerns exist. Article 14 (current Assembly Law) and article 18 (the new draft) state that if the area of gathering, strike, demonstration or sit-in is no longer safe because of security concerns, protesters must immediately leave the area. Articles 8 and 29 (the new draft) say that protests will be allowed when there are no security concerns. However, neither the current law, nor the draft provides a specific and clear definition or description of the term “security concerns.” This vagueness can easily be misused by the government. The cancelation of a demonstration on 24 July 2017, on the date of anniversary of the 23 July 2016 Enlightenment demonstration and suicide attack, could be an example here, at least according to MP Raihana Azad, a member of the high council of the Enlightenment Movement and the only female MP from Uruzgan province. She said the Kabul police sent two letters to the Enlightenment Movement warning of the high possibility of terrorist attacks against protesters during their planned demonstration. It said that if they wanted to protest, they would be responsible for any consequences. As a result, the organisers cancelled the demonstration, despite not being convinced about the reality of security threats.

Para (6) of article 10 of the draft bans hunger strikes that could result in the death of the hunger striker(s). (A strike (etesab) in the new draft is defined as “the collective abstention by employees of governmental or non-governmental organisations from working, or the refraining from eating, which they exercise in order to achieve a specific goal.”

New divisions of responsibilities and authorities

The draft has given new responsibilities to the organisers of demonstrations, gatherings, strikes and sit-ins, which are legally problematic. Para (4) of article 9, for instance, makes the organisers responsible for any unlawful action that happens during the protests, regardless of whether the organisers had any role, whether active or passive, in the unlawful act. This is against the ‘modes of liability principle’ that crime is a personal act, guaranteed in article 26 of the constitution. Para (2) of article 25 (Chapter Five: Criminal Provisions) obliges the organisers “to prevent the protesters from resorting to arbitrary violence and, if they are unable to do so, to report the issue to the security authorities.” Para (3) of article 25 also obliges the organisers to identify protesters who commit violence and introduce them to the police. This seems not only impractical, but to also interfere with article 134 of the constitution, which stipulates that the investigation of a criminal act is the responsibility of police. Identifying perpetrators is part of investigating a criminal act. Putting this responsibility on the shoulders of organisers is akin to giving permission to random people to intervene in a criminal investigation and prosecution processes, something which is not allowed by the Criminal Procedure Code. Moreover, the organisers are unlikely to have the capacity to do so.

In relation to the authority of the police, the new draft law is technically clearer than the existing law. Article 5 of the draft law names the Ministry of Interior as the enforcing authority of the Assembly Law. Only when the police are unable to control violence during protests, can it ask help from other security forces, according to para (3) of article 17.

Police obligations, duties and authorities are covered under chapter three (article 14 to 20) of the draft law. Article 17 gives the police the authority to use physical barriers (such as containers and T-walls) and provide riot gear and equipment to policemen if protests turn violent. If protesters continue to commit violence, the police can respond aggressively, including opening fire, based on the Police law (gazetted in 2009). Although this provision is already covered in the current Assembly Law, more details and technical clarity is provided in the draft.

The most egregious point in the draft, however, is the authority given to the police to withhold permission for demonstrations, gatherings, strikes and sit-ins, if they determine they may threaten the public order or there is a security concern (para (3) of article 29). Though the organisers can appeal a refusal to the Ministry of Interior (in Kabul) or the governor’s office (in provinces), the subsequent decision of the ministry or the governor’s office will be final (para (4) of article 29). The police also have the authority to cancel a permission after its issuance it has been given (para 2 of article 20).

3. How do the new draft and the current Assembly Law protect the freedom of assembly?

Both the current Assembly Law and the draft mention protests as the right of every Afghan citizen. According to article 4 in the new draft (article 2 in the current law):

Citizens of the country shall have the right to gather, strike, demonstrate and sit-in, without carrying weapons and in accordance with the law, for peaceful and lawful purposes which are not against the national interests and provisions of the Constitution.

Article 36 of the constitution foresees the right of “demonstrating and gathering,” without defining this, but does not explicitly mention the right to go on strike or hold a sit-in. ‘Strike’ was added and defined in the current Assembly Law and ‘sit-in’ in the draft of the new assembly law. Recognition and definition (4) of demonstration, gathering, strike and sit-in are the most notable parts of these two legislative documents in terms of maintaining the right to protest.

In addition to that, article 6 of the current Assembly Law obliges the government to ensure the security of the protesters. This provision has been removed from the draft.

Both the draft and the currently Assembly Law prevent intervention by the police in ongoing peaceful protests, ie those which are conducted in accordance to the law. Both documents forbid the government from prohibiting citizens from using their right to conduct demonstrations, gatherings, strikes and sit-ins without “serious specified excuse[s]”. These two obligations make the government responsible for providing an atmosphere in which citizens can enjoy their right to protest.

Though the mentioned provisions are strong, they are in practice undermined by the many other restrictions and the fact that the government has absolved itself of the responsibility to ensure the security of protesters.

4. How has Civil Society and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) reacted to the new draft law?

Nine days after the draft was leaked on 8 July 2017, a group of Afghan civil society organisations called a press conference to share their concerns about the draft (full text here). They compared the legislation to the laws of the Afghan communist regime (1979 to 1992) saying that:

The recent National Unity Government’s decision to redraft the demonstration [Assembly] [L]aw, particularly after the last two demonstrations [the Enlightenment demonstration and the [U]prising for [C]hange demonstration] is evidence of an attempt to control the freedom of citizens. This reminds the public of the suppression, torture, and assassination policies that were enacted from the late 1970s to the late 1980s […].

In their press release, they also mentioned:

The draft law stands against all democratic values and principles. The confining and limiting aspects of this draft obviously violates the constitution of Afghanistan, all democratic values, and are against all the gains that we have struggled for during the past fifty years of our history.

The day after the press conference, on 18 July 2017, the Law Committee of the Afghan cabinet invited representatives of civil society organisations and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to provide their opinions in the draft. According to Khalil Raufi, one of the civil society representatives, they could not review the whole draft in the meeting. Nevertheless, Sarwar Danish asked them to submit their recommendations in writing. In the meeting, Danish asked the representative of the Ministry of Justice to finalise the draft after receiving the recommendations and to submit the draft to the cabinet for its approval.

The AIHRC and the group of civil society organisations submitted their recommendations on 25 July 2017 (see here). They recommended removing all phrases that were open to differing interpretations or that could be misinterpreted. (6) They determined that para (4) of article 9, which holds organisers responsible for any unlawful acts committed by protesters was against article 26 of the constitution and asked for its removal. They also recommended that all protests should be based on the principle of ‘pre-announcement’ rather than ‘pre-permission’ meaning that protesters do not need to gain permission to protest, but rather that informing the police should be enough.

(So far, there has been no organised response from other parties, whether economic groupings of business people or trade unions) or political parties. Nor has the draft been debated in parliament.)

5. How do the two main mass opposition movements view the draft law?

The Enlightenment Movement has not had any public position on the new draft of the Assembly Law, but MP Raihana Azad of its high council, criticised the government’s move in a conversation with AAN on 13 August 2017. She accused President Ghani and a close circle around him in the palace of trying to shut up any voice against the government by re-writing the Assembly Law:

Demonstrations and media are two tools that citizens and political opponents have to raise their voices against the policies and failures of the National Unity Government. The draft [of the new Assembly Law] indirectly and practically bans demonstrations, even though it determines demonstration as a right of citizens. The barriers on place, in the draft, are set in such a way that the protesters cannot find places in big cities for their demonstrations. They are not allowed to demonstrate close to universities, schools, hospitals, military facilities and explosive materials storages. The protesters are banned to close roads during their protest, which is impossible to avoid in practice.

The Uprising for Change movement released a statement at the end of their final demonstration on 27 July 2017, denouncing the draft as against the constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (see here) Asar Hakimi, a member of the leadership council, told AAN on 14 August 2017 that he believed the current Assembly Law was being re-drafted to restrict civic movements like his own. He believed the curtailment of sit-ins to only three days was, in particular, a direct response to their 18 day sit-ins and protest tents in June 2017. Hakimi also complained that even now, the situation for protesters was not easy; when the Uprising for Change informed Kabul police about their second demonstration, it took almost a week for the permission was issued, though the police are obliged to provide a space for protest 24 hours after an application is submitted.

Edited by Martine van Bijlert, Sari Kouvo, Jelena Bjelica and Kate Clark

(1) For example, on 5 October 2016, during the Brussels Conference for Afghanistan, where most of Afghanistan’s international donors came together to promise their support for the coming four years, a demonstration against President Ghani’s development policy was organised in Brussels. The protesters asked Afghanistan’s international donors to support the Afghan government on the condition that there would be no more discrimination. Inside the country, public discontent among the Hazara population increased against the president and his national adviser, Hanif Atmar, with some claiming that government officials, including Atmar, had intentionally not provided security to the protesters. For more analysis about the challenges the Enlightenment Movement created to the National Unity Government (NUG), see this previous AAN analysis).

(2) Six months after President Ghani became president of the National Unity Government (NUG), Farkhunda Malikzada, a young woman, was cruelly beaten to death and her body burned by a mob in the centre of Kabul, while dozens of Afghan policemen watched (more details here and here). The shocking crime in the middle of the city led to a large demonstration in front of the Supreme Court on 24 March 2015 (more details about the prosecution of the perpetrators here). The protesters criticized the NUG’s security forces for its failure to protect Farkhunda, noting that the atrocity occurred within a few kilometres of the presidential palace, and went on for more than half an hour. They demanded that the Supreme Court prosecute both the perpetrators and the policemen who did not prevent the murder (see here).

(3) On 11 November 2015, thousands of Kabul citizens demonstrated and marched toward Pashtunistan square, where one of the entries of the presidential palace is located. The protesters had named their demonstration Enqilab-e Tabasum (Tabasum Revolution), after Shukria Tabasum, a nine-year old girl, one of seven Hazaras who had been abducted and beheaded by anti-government forces in Zabul province (local officials claimed that ISIS had committed this atrocity). They had been part of a larger group of 31 Hazaras who had been taken hostage on their way from Kandahar to Kabul and held for 50 days, before being beheaded (see here). The massive demonstration and the fact that a group of angry protesters managed to enter the grounds of the presidential palace (but were stopped after the security guards opened fire), greatly alarmed the government (see this AAN dispatch for more details and this article).

(4) On 16 May 2016, the Enlightenment Movement held its first demonstration, which was even larger than the one that took place a few weeks later on 23 July 2016. Karim Khalili, the former second-vice president under Karzai (now the chairman of the High Peace Council), was one of the organisers that time. He left the movement to create a joint technical committee, established by President Ghani, that was to revise the route of TUTAP line. However the main body of the movement did not accept the governmental led committee and continued their protest.

(5) Based on this regulation, demonstrations can only be conducted on the following routes 1) Shahid Mazari Square toward Haji Nabi [Omid Sabz] town (west and southwest Kabul); 2) Kutal-e Khairkhana to Cheshm-e Dugh (north Kabul); 3) Chaman-e Hozuri (centre of the city); 4) Kart-e Naw to Ahmad Shah Baba Maineh Square (east Kabul); and 5) Beni Hesar to Pul-e Sang Naweshta (south Kabul). Parks, such as Shahr-e Naw Park, Chaman-e Hozuri and Park-e Heseh Awal-e Khairkhana, were allocated for gatherings and sit-ins.

(6) For example sub para 3 of para (1) of article 8 states: “the organisers [of protests] shall commit not to carry weapons, lacerating and battery tools, not to disrupt the public order and safety and not to promote divisions, hatred, discrimination, violence and conflict.” They suggested to only keep “shall not carry weapons, lacerating and battery tools” and remove the other parts.

(7) In the new draft, demonstrations, gatherings, strikes (with mini-changes compare to the current Assembly Law) and sit-ins are defined as follows:

Gathering: an assembly of more than 10 people in an organised and coordinated manner in a public space where they express their opinion and sentiments regarding a legitimate and lawful matter to attract the government and public opinion regarding the matter.

Strike: the collective abstention by employees of governmental or non-governmental organisations from working or refraining from eating which they exercise in order to achieve a specific goal.

Demonstration: a peaceful, organised and public gathering and march of people on a specified route to express their sentiments or make specific demands.

Sit-in: a situation where one, or more than one, person occupies a specific place by setting up tents, or without tents, in order to make legitimate and lawful demands or see his/her absolute rights or those of other persons fulfilled.

The American president’s long-awaited announcement on United States policy in Afghanistan has finally been made: more troops (number unspecified) and no end-date to the US deployment; fighting “to win” (defined only as preventing a Taleban take-over), aiming at “killing terrorists” and not “nation-building”; new, unspecified threats against Pakistan to stop supporting the Taleban and a call on India to do more and; postponing any attempt at a negotiated end to the conflict to a hoped-for and ill-defined future. AAN’s Kate Clark looks at President Trump’s ‘new strategy’ for Afghanistan and finds it to be little different from Obama’s, albeit announced with more bluster.

As Donald Trump has admitted (see the transcript of this speech here), he has made a U-turn on Afghanistan: “My original instinct,” he said in his announcement at Fort Myer, a US military base, on 21 August 2017, “was to pull out.” Indeed, in 2013, he had tweeted that “Our troops are being killed by the Afghanis [sic] we train and we waste billions there,” and “We are building roads and schools for people that hate us. It is not in our national interests.” Once in charge, however, he has been forced to change his mind: “[T]he consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable… A hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum that terrorists, including ISIS and al Qaeda, would instantly fill, just as happened before September 11th.”

As his unhappy conservative base has noted – see the website of his former chief strategist, Steve Bannon, Breitbart News (if it is difficult to access, see reporting of it here) – the new strategy is little different from Obama’s. The president, said Breitbart, has “flip-flop[ed].”

The other possibility that was floated was of privatising the war, sending in mercenaries instead of US soldiers. That did not get a mention in the speech, but it also did not preclude the greater use of contractors.

Indeed, the plan looks to be, pretty well, what was drawn up by the US commander on the ground, General John Nicholson, in partnership with President Ashraf Ghani and the Afghan government, seven months ago. (Read a transcript of Nicholson’s testimony to Congress in February here and an analysis of the plan here). Nicholson described the Afghan conflict then as in stalemate and said he aimed to tilt the war more in favour of the government, but with no illusion that the war could be ‘won’. There was just a vague desire that this would, in the end, lead to more favourable grounds for eventual political negotiations with the Taleban. Tilting the balance of the conflict, he believed, could be achieved by enabling the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to fight the Taleban better, by continuing US support to the government, limited US and other international troop increases to allow more advisors to be embedded at senior levels in the ANSF and reform of the Ministries of Defence and Interior. He also said there should be increased efforts to persuade Pakistan to stop supporting the Taleban. After seven months mulling over his Afghan strategy, Trump accepted his advisors’ counsel of the need to stay in Afghanistan.

What was in the speech

 Trump said that he had decided withdrawal was not a realistic option because of the sacrifices already made by US service-people which meant they “deserve[d] a plan for victory.” He said as well that a withdrawal would create a power vacuum, allowing terrorists to re-establish a safe haven in Afghanistan. He said the dangers were exacerbated by the high concentration of extremist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan and because Pakistan and India are nuclear powers.

He said the US was going to ‘win’ the war, but defined winning, not in terms of victory, but merely preventing the Taleban from winning:

Our troops will fight to win. We will fight to win. From now on, victory will have a clear definition: attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan, and stopping mass terror attacks against America before they emerge.” (emphases added)

Trump specified several pillars of his new strategy. First, there would be no numbers or dates:

A core pillar of our new strategy is a shift from a time-based approach to one based on conditions. I’ve said it many times how counterproductive it is for the United States to announce in advance the dates we intend to begin, or end, military options. We will not talk about numbers of troops or our plans for further military activities.

Conditions on the ground – not arbitrary timetables – will guide our strategy from now on. America’s enemies must never know our plans or believe they can wait us out. I will not say when we are going to attack, but attack we will.

This is a reaction to Obama’s announcements of withdrawal dates – which satisfied anti-war Democrats, but effectively helped the Taleban with their war planning. AAN warned in 2012, that “the US and other NATO member states may well be preparing the ground for more instability, rather than less.”

Secondly, Trump promised the “integration of all instruments of American power – diplomatic, economic, and military – toward a successful outcome.” He gave no more details, but it is worth noting that, there has been no permanent ambassador in Kabul since December 2016 and Trump dissolved the post of a separate Special Advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Thirdly, Trump said he would be taking a harder line against Pakistan.

…Pakistan has…sheltered the same organizations that try every single day to kill our people. We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars at the same time they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting. But that will have to change, and that will change immediately. No partnership can survive a country’s harboring of militants and terrorists who target U.S. servicemembers and officials. It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to civilization, order, and to peace.

The Taleban insurgency could not survive in its current form or at its current strength without Pakistani backing and sanctuary. However, Trump’s threats are not specific and the US track record in trying to force or influence Islamabad to take action is not good. The US needs Pakistan’s land and air space to get military supplies in and out of Afghanistan so does not have an entirely free hand in dealing with Islamabad. There is also the fear that if the US cut its support to Islamabad, a more chaotic and extremist government might emerge, in control of nuclear weapons. (See Chris Kolenda for more on this, both what the US could do and its past failures). Finally, Pakistan has developed a way of dealing with such pressure since 2001, giving the US statements it wants to hear, creating hope that it will finally change its approach, while making sure its shadowy intelligence structures keep a free hand on the ground. Trump also wants India to do more “especially in the area of economic assistance and development.” There was no mention of other key regional players, either China, which does have traction in Islamabad, or Iran.

Fourthly, Trump said that “micromanagement from Washington, D.C. does not win battles.” He promised to “lift restrictions and expand authorities” for his military on the battlefield. Shifting responsibility to the generals in the field and the Secretary of Defence may also be useful if the war is not ‘won’ and he needs someone to blame down the line.

… we will also expand authority for American armed forces to target the terrorist and criminal networks that sow violence and chaos throughout Afghanistan. These killers need to know they have nowhere to hide; that no place is beyond the reach of American might and Americans arms. Retribution will be fast and powerful.

Expansions in the authority to target already came under Obama (widened from only targeting al-Qaeda and its ‘associates’ to the Taleban) and have led to more US air strikes and, whatever else they may or may not achieve, more Afghan civilian casualties (70 per cent more in the first six month of 2017 than in the same period in 2016). It is worth noting that UNAMA (see AAN analysis here has called on both the US and Afghan air forces to be more restrained: “to refrain from the use of airstrikes in civilian-populated areas and apply greater restraint in the use of airstrikes in areas where civilians are likely to be present.” (These are part of a much longer list given by UNAMA – see footnote 1.) Targeting ‘criminal networks’ would breach International Humanitarian Law unless they are parties to the conflict and, it is worth remembering that there are criminal networks on both sides, the Taleban and the government.

Trump does not specify what he would allow his military to do that it is not already doing. Killing ‘terrorists’ in any numbers will anyway be quite difficult with the limited numbers of troops the US has on the ground and the fact that many, if not most are engaged in an advisory and training role, rather than combat. There is no official breakdown of the numbers of American troops involved in the NATO advisory mission and the US-only counter-terrorist, ‘can-be-combat’ mission, but General Nicholson said in February that “additional forces would enable us to thicken our advisory effort across the Afghan ministries and do more advising below the corps level.”

Trump has called on NATO allies to supply more forces, even though many have already committed to this, including  Australia, Norway and the UK, but also said that the bulk of the effort must be made by Afghans:

Ultimately, it is up to the people of Afghanistan to take ownership of their future, to govern their society, and to achieve an everlasting peace. We are a partner and a friend, but we will not dictate to the Afghan people how to live, or how to govern their own complex society. We are not nation-building again. We are killing terrorists.

Trump does not specify what he means by ‘nation-building’, (2) but since 2001, the US has veered between what has been cast as a ‘pragmatic line’ – killing terrorists, working with rights abusers as necessary, focussing on ‘stability’ rather than justice – and trying to encourage or enforce better governance. This looks to be a return to the former approach. Is this just empty rhetoric or will there be implications for the widespread support US gives to education, health and other services, and to trying to get democratic elections? Trump also made the threat that if Kabul does not do ‘nation building’ correctly, there will be (again unspecified) consequences:

America will work with the Afghan government as long as we see determination and progress. However, our commitment is not unlimited, and our support is not a blank check. The government of Afghanistan must carry their share of the military, political, and economic burden. The American people expect to see real reforms, real progress, and real results. Our patience is not unlimited. We will keep our eyes wide open.  

Trump also appears to have believed Ashraf Ghani’s promises that profits can be made in Afghanistan:

As the prime minister [sic] of Afghanistan has promised, we are going to participate in economic development to help defray the cost of this war to us.

Presumably, Trump was thinking of the US getting its share of Afghanistan’s untapped mineral wealth, although Ashraf Ghani (in his response to the speech) took a different slant, seeing the military plan as:

…part of a package of support enabling Afghans to achieve the goal of stability and self-reliance, by focusing on efforts for the eradication of poverty, economic investment, and better equipping the ANDSF to achieve its military objectives.

Trump’s announcement was full of strong words and bluster. He made threats, but they were unspecified – what will Trump do to Pakistan? What are the consequences if Afghans falter in their “determination and progress”? He expresses his aims forcefully, but in themselves, they are unclear – the US will fight to win, but what does ‘winning’ mean if not the defeat of the Taleban? Indeed, he contradicts himself here when he admits that, “Military power alone will not bring peace to Afghanistan or stop the terrorist threat arising in that country” and that, “strategically applied force aims to create the conditions for a political process to achieve a lasting peace.” Yet again, a negotiated solution to the conflict is postponed to an ill-defined, hoped-for future.

Afghan reactions

The Afghan government is happy. The US ambassador in Washington DC, Hamdullah Mohib couched the plan as a joint effort “on the front lines of this global struggle between good and evil. Daesh, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban – along with more than two-dozen other terror groups – threaten not just the people of Afghanistan but also the United States and other nations.” The Taleban, meanwhile, repeated their standard formula that Afghanistan was “not a threat for anybody, nor its soil would be used against anyone,” meaning that if they were back in power they would not interfere in anyone else’s affairs, and that “baseless claims and the intelligence propaganda could fuel bloodshed and war.” They also threatened that, if the US troops stayed, Afghanistan would become the “graveyard of the American empire.”

Trump’s strategy, while not new, does give the Afghan government some breathing space for the reforms that are needed to make the state and the ANSF more effective and accountable: if the state is not worth fighting for, if low and middle-ranking police and soldiers see generals and others pocketing money from the war effort, why should they fight to defend it against the insurgency? (For more on this, see our analysis of the Ministry of Interior here). President Ghani said in his response to Trump’s speech that, “The Afghan government is prioritizing acceleration of its rigorous reform agenda to eradicate corruption, and enhance effectiveness, transparency, and rule of law.” If reforms are not carried out, however, the breathing space could just be for those in the state who are making money out of the war time to make some more money.

One seasoned observer, former US ambassador Ron Neumann, writing on 16 August 2017 (see here), said he was more optimistic than he has been for many years, although recognising the continuing perils:

The three things that have so impressed me in my visit last month are in the reform of military leadership, civil service improvements, and anti-corruption efforts. None of the changes are complete, to be sure. All could be lost or reversed. The pushback against them from entrenched political elites is intense. The forthcoming elections may undercut them.

This summer has seen some of that pushback, a sharpened ethnicisation of politics and, already, the destabilising influence of the coming elections, which, incidentally, Trump did not mention. Elections always lead to a ‘churning’ of the elites as candidates seek to find political alliances and look for sources of money and patronage for getting votes. To put protégées of key allies behind bars for corruption, as is increasingly happening (media reports here and here), could harm the chances particularly of a president that wants to be re-elected. (3)

At least, Washington should now be a more steady backer: one source of anxiety causing sleepless nights in Kabul – the uncertainty over whether the US would stay or withdraw –has now been removed.

Edited by Thomas Ruttig

(1) UNAMA also called for:

…better planning call for better measures review current targeting criteria and pre-engagement precautionary measures to prevent civilian harm during aerial operations; and conduct transparent post-operation reviews and investigations following allegations of civilian casualties during aerial operations with a view to improving operational practice and accountability as well as to ensuring operations are carried out in line with international humanitarian and human rights law obligations.

(2) And as many Afghans would point out, their nation does not need building. The state, however, is a different matter.

(3) The more than two years overdue parliamentary elections were also not mentioned. However, the lack of a legitimate parliament creates an institutional gap in the Afghan system, making it more lopsided towards the executive power.

A new attempt is underway to relaunch Hezb-e Watan, the ruling party that was revamped by President Najibullah in 1990 when he renamed the PDPA and tried to shed it’s communist past. Although the intention is to bring together an important segment of the former leftist forces in Afghanistan, the relaunch also has the potential to cement the existing fragmention. Whatever the case, the party will be entering the fray seeking to mobilise and court support as Afghanistan’s pre-election period begins to heat up. Thomas Ruttig and Ali Yawar Adili look into the party’s post-1992 history and the relationships between its many successor groups and discuss how this may affect its revival.

Pre-announcing the “legal re-launch” of Hezb-e Watan

A large number of people – “thousands”, according to a BBC report – gathered in a Kabul hotel on 28 July 2017 for the fourth “consultative gathering for a legal relaunch of Hezb-e Watan” (Homeland Party) (media report here). Hezb-e Watan is not just any political party in Afghanistan. It is the reincarnation of the Soviet-backed Hezb-e Dimukratik-e Khalq-e Afghanistan (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, PDPA) that ruled the country after a coup in 1978 and under the Soviet occupation (1979-89) until 1992, albeit, since 1990, under its new name Hezb-e Watan.

The party was banned and dissolved by the mujahedin government in 1992. Several attempts to officially revive it after 2001 have been rejected by the Ministry of Justice (under which all parties have to register). The conferences, that still did not officially declare the “existence” of the party, are a way to explore how this could work.

The convener of the conferences was Abdul Jabbar Qahraman, a former MP, who relinquished his seat to become the president’s envoy for security affairs in Helmand in January 2016; a position he left after three months, as he told a Dari-language Russian website. Qahraman was a member of the central committee of the 1990s Hezb-e Watan, as he told AAN, but he is mainly known for his earlier association with the party as a pro-government militia leader in the country’s south (more about this below).

Qahraman stated in his speech to the conference that his party supported the current government, but only its “sound policies” (media report in Pashto here). He called on all former Hezb-e Watan members to re-join the party on the basis of its former leader Najibullah’s policy of ‘national reconciliation’ (ashti-ye melli) – an approach Qahraman suggested to be applied again on the current situation. This policy remains to be, after 25 years, the major feature and rallying cry for the ‘Najibist’ segment of the various PDPA successor groups. (1)

Under Najibullah’s lead, the party in 1990 dropped its leftist programme and its goal of turning Afghanistan into a socialist society in favour of a power sharing arrangement with his armed Islamist opponents. The new Watan party now wants to position itself as the heirs to this policy and the person of Najibullah, who was killed by the Taleban in 1996.

Emal Layan, a member of its leadership, echoed this position, saying the new Hezb-e Watan sees itself today as “centre-left.” This meant, he explained, that “moderate and inclusive policies for people from all walks of life lie at the heart of the party’s policies, including activities in favour of the rights of the toilers (zahmatkashan), including workers and [other] ordinary people.” He particularly pointed to the need for an insurance system.

Layan told AAN that the party is concentrating on gathering “mainly Hezb-e Watan cadres from the second-level and third-level”, rather than its prominent senior members. Indeed, the most prominent former PDPA/Hezb-e Watan leaders that were associated with earlier revival attempts of the party were absent from the conferences. Several of them confirmed to AAN that they did not receive invitations. (2) Layan said once this organisational process is completed, the party would right a new programme. He also said it will be decided at a future congress who will lead the party.

It is unclear what the mobilisation potential of the relaunched Hezb-e Watan might be. When still in power, and when the previous incarnation of the party held its last congress in 1990, it had 185,000 members, according to a former leader involved in those events (he is not part of the current revival attempt). Layan estimates that 60 to 80 per cent of these members are not politically active today and believes that this is the potential the party can tap into. As videos of the fourth conference showed (see one here), the old guard seemed to have been dominant among the attendants, but there were also a number of people from the younger generation (including women).

Hezb-e Watan relaunch in July 2017, with Jabbar Qahraman and Najibullah portraits in the background. Photo: Hezb-e Watan.

Hezb-e Watan’s PDPA past

The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan was founded in 1965, sailing the worldwide leftist wave. (3) It became popular among the progressive part of the Afghan intelligentsia; it mobilised among university and high school students and helped to build trade unions. One of it factions, Khalq (People) was dubbed the “teachers’ party” – its leader, Nur Muhammad Tarakai, (murdered in 1979 by his deputy) was a teacher too. This strong presence of schoolteachers gave the Khalq faction a substantial outreach into rural areas. Babrak Karmal (who died in 1996 in Russian exile), the leader of the PDPA’s second faction, Parcham (Banner), was a popular student leader who had served a jail term for this activity. 1965, the year of the first relatively free parliamentary election under a new constitution, saw four PDPA leaders elected as MPs. Khalq and Parcham operated separately and virtually as parties in their own right from 1967 to 1977. (4) Both also recruited young army and police officers, separately.

With the help of two military coups – in 1973 and 1978 – engineered by army officers loyal to the party, the PDPA took over power in two steps and ruled the country enabled by a large suppression apparatus under the Soviet occupation. From 1978 to 1987, the PDPA ran a one-party state. Najibullah’s change towards a more moderate course partly came in response to the sustained pressure of the armed resistance against his regime. It was also inspired by Soviet aspirations, starting in the second half of the 1980s, to cut the costs of its occupation, pull their troops out and hand over responsibilities to its protégé regime.

Despite some local successes, Najibullah’s efforts to make peace with the mujahedin failed. After the new Russia under Boris Yeltsin cut all aid, his regime was deprived of financial resources and fragmented and collapsed in April 1992. Troops of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, that had been the regime’s shock troops, but switched sides to the mujahedin, stopped Najibullah from leaving the country, after which he sought shelter in the Kabul UN compound. Four years later, when the Taleban moved into the capital, he was brutally murdered after UN protection was removed in the chaos accompanying the takeover.

The PDPA regime, when in power, committed mass atrocities against political opponents of all shades, particularly in its early years. Its targets ranged from supporters of the Islamist mujahedin and Maoist urban guerrilla groups to the old monarchist elites and tribal leaders. It covered all real and imagined opponents of the new regime (AAN reporting here and here). The memory of these misdeeds still haunts many Afghans, and continues to mar the image of any Afghan group that wishes to claim the PDPA’s and Hezb-e Watan’s political heritage. Najibullah’s efforts to later moderate the party, however, do mean that he escapes some of the worst judgements and enjoys a moderate, and seemingly growing, level of popularity.

Re-emergence in fragmentation

After the ban of Hezb-e Watan in 1992, most of its leaders went into exile, where some continued to be politically active. The party fragmented into a plethora of groups that first re-emerged among the diaspora, but increasingly also had a presence inside the country. By 2016, there were at least nine registered political parties that had some link to the former PDPA or Hezb-e Watan, and many more without registration – altogether over twenty.

Most of the small post-PDPA parties are led by individual former Khalq and Parcham leaders. They are negatively associated with, either the extremely repressive Tarakai/Amin period, or with Karmal, who was brought in and propped up by Soviet troops. By comparison, the brand “Hezb-e Watan”, and the name of its late leader Najibullah, today ring more positively, and not only among its own activists. A growing number of Afghans seem to, retrospectively, consider Najibullah to have at least been a shrewd politician, a good organiser and a commander of a functioning security apparatus—particularly when compared to more recent government leaders. Some seem willing to now overlook the atrocities committed by the KhAD, also in Najib’s time. For those who had not been directly affected, this may seem a long time ago while those committed under the mujahedin and Taleban regimes are often still more present.

As an Ahmadzai Pashtun born in Sayyed Karam in Paktia province, Najibullah is particularly popular in Afghanistan’s southeast. The first time this author saw a portrait of him (next to one of then president Hamed Karzai) was in a restaurant in Paktia’s capital Gardez in 2004. Since then, posters with his portrait have regularly turned up at Kabul street corners. There have even been banners at the international airport (see photo) for a while and his speeches are sold on DVD in the bazaar.

The new Hezb-e Watan party is trying to capitalise on this popularity, as reflected by several portraits of Najibullah put on display at the Hezb-e Watan conference venue. Rumours that Najibullah’s wife, Fatana, who lives in India, or his daughter Heela, who lives in Europe, might attend the conference, contributed to its high attendance, according to participants who, as they told AAN, were disappointed when neither appeared. When AAN spoke to Heela Najibullah, who has just published a book taking stock of her father’s national reconciliation policy, she said she had never intended to attend the conference and had not been consulted about the party’s relaunch. Her mother had already made it clear in an interview in 2012 that she had no intention of becoming politically active. [Corrected on 23 August 2017: Heela told AAN that “there is nothing absolute, I can’t predict the future but for now we are not active in the current political processes.”]

From militia to party leader

The leader of the latest incarnation of Hezb-e Watan, Abdul Jabbar Qahraman, also came to prominence under Najibullah’s government. Qahraman, a Nurzai Pashtun from Spin Boldak in Kandahar province, led a pro-government militia in Maiwand district in his home province as part of Najibullah’s extensive militia programme. In the early 1980s, he studied at Kabul’s military academy (a short bio here). Under this programme, which was strongly supported by the Soviets, army officers, such as Jabbar, were allowed to decommission and start militias in their home provinces. (5) (There are a number of remnants of this programme among Afghanistan’s current militias.) In Maiwand, Jabbar got his nickname Qahraman (which means “hero”) for his success in pushing back the local mujahedin. Later on, his militias, like other militias, received the same status (and even better pay) than regular army units. Jabbar received a general’s rank and a division’s status for his militia. His group was often sent into other hotspots of fighting, similar to Dostum’s militia from the north.

After his return to Afghanistan in 2007, Qahraman successfully ran for parliament in Helmand in the 2010 elections. When the current government lost control to the Taleban in 2015 over an increasing number of districts in Helmand (AAN analysis here), President Ashraf Ghani decided to employ his experience and made him special security envoy for Helmand in early 2016. (In 2010-11, Qahraman had already advised the US army on the defence of his former stronghold Maiwand, according to sources familiar with the local situation.) The envoy position gave Qahraman, as “operational commander” – at least in theory – control over the security forces in the province (media report here). He tried his 1990s recipe again, employing a mixture of talk offers to the Taleban and the use of irregular forces. However, after three months, Qahraman stepped down from the post claiming that widespread corruption had made his mission impossible. Incidentally, the police chief for Helmand from that time, has just been given a three-year jail term for corruption and nepotism by an anti-corruption court in Kabul (he has appealed the sentence; read here).

His return to Helmand gave Qahraman significant political clout and access to senior government officials, including the National Security Council. Former Hezb-e Watan members, who are carefully watching his current party project, in Kabul and from abroad, speculate that it is this access that might have helped him to secure the necessary resources for such a costly exercise, involving several large conferences.

The many Hezb-e Watans

After political parties were allowed once again under the 2004 constitution, several groups have attempted to relaunch Hezb-e Watan in the Afghan diaspora and in Afghanistan. (7) As a result, there are now several Hezb-e Watans competing for its political legacy. In addition to Qahraman’s faction, there are two other Hezb-e Watans that have been officially launched and still exist.

The first emerged in 2012 after eight years of talks between various Najibist groups. Some of them joined a party congress symbolically held in Kabul on 27 September, the anniversary of Najibullah’s death. They consulted the Najibullah family hoping one of them would take the lead. This led to Ms Najib’s statement that she would not participate in any attempt to relaunch the party. Mir Afghan Bawari was then elected its leader. The new party described itself on its website as “national and democratic, progressive and reformist.” Qahraman was not part of this group.

However, the party’s application for registration with the Ministry of Justice was rejected. The ministry urged them to choose another name, as this one had been banned in 1992. The party instead chose not to officially register, but is still active. Bawari recently told an Afghan news website that they had 13,000 members with a presence in 30 Afghan provinces. Faqir Muhammad Wadan, one of the party’s leading members who lives in Germany, told AAN that there were also party structures in Western Europe, former Soviet countries and Australia. (8)

One faction of this party led by Sherullah Jabbarkhel took up the MoJ offer and registered under the altered name Hezb-e Melli-ye Watan (National Homeland Party). It also started a Najibullah Foundation to the indignation of the family who had not been consulted.

The groups led by Bawari and Jabbarkhel did not attend Qahraman’s conferences, but also did not seek to undermine his efforts. (9) Bawari told AAN that they did not have a negative view towards this new initiative, “but we talked to him two months ago and told him we already had an existing organisation” and urged him join. Jabbarkhel took the same line: “We did not participate in the gathering because we are an already constructed house, and he is just designing a house.” Layan, from Qahraman’s group, told AAN that they hope their new party will be: “at the centre of all factions that have branched out of [the old] Hezb-e Watan.”

There are also sceptical voices. Asef Baktash who had been active in most previous attempts to unite the progressive political forces, including but not limited to the former PDPA/Hezb-e Watan clientele, on a reformist basis, told AAN the current attempt was like the hope that “Jesus Christ descend from heaven and revive a dead body.” He said the currently active “splinter groups” were no comparison to the strength of the original Hezb-e Watan and “cannot bring back the party to its previous strength.”

For Bawari’s group, the problem is that Qahraman might succeed in taking over the Hezb-e Watan brand – if the MoJ agrees to register a party under that name this time (which it might, given Qahraman’s good relations with the government and, possibly, the passage of time). Wadan, from Bawari’s group, told AAN that they expect exactly this to happen, but had not yet decided whether they would join Qahraman in this case and that talks were ongoing. Jabbarkhel, from the third faction, told AAN that, if Qahraman succeeds in the registration, his party would form an alliance with him.

All three groups have made it very clear that they do not plan to relaunch the old PDPA. They all distance themselves from the Parchamis (who they now call ‘Karmalists’, after Najib’s predecessor) and the Khalqis. They allege that many former Parchamis are in cahoots with Russia and many Khalqis with Pakistan and note that they do not want to join hands with people who are remote-controlled from abroad. Indeed, in 1992, a number of prominent Khalqis fled to Pakistan and joined hands with then Pakistan-supported Hezb-e Islami after the regime’s breakdown, while a number of Parchamis joined the then Russia-supported Northern Alliance. A number of them have returned to Afghanistan and set up their own parties.

Pre-election positioning: A crowding political field

The new revival attempts of Hezb-e- Watan can be seen as part of a broader invigoration of Afghanistan’s political scene. It follows in the footsteps of the formation of other new groups, such as the ‘Ankara coalition’, or Etelaf baray Nejat-e Afghanistan (Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan) as it is officially called, which was sealed in Vice President Dostum’s mansion in the Turkish capital, the New Jombesh that was established by dissidents from Dostum’s party  (read AAN on both here and here) and a pro-Karzai coalition called Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan (People’s Axis of Afghanistan) (press release here and an earlier AAN analysis here). The political comeback of Hezb-e Islami leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in the fall of 2016, in a partly welcomed, partly condemned, peace agreement with the Afghan government, also belongs to this line (see AAN collection about it here). In addition, a number of new protest movements as well as mujahedin councils have sprung up (outlined by AAN here, here and here), some with links to existing political parties, others in an attempt to shed the old leaders of their particular ethnic group.

These new and returning parties and newly mixed coalitions foreshadow the pre-election positioning and alliance building that will only heat up from now on. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for July 2018 and presidential elections for the following year. Both Hezb-e Watan and the New Jombesh have announced they intend to ‘participate’ in those elections. Hezb-e Islami leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, even self-confidentially declared that the next president will be someone supported by his party.

So far, the new Hezb-e Watan seems to be targeting mainly its 1990s predecessor’s members. They may hope to become a gathering point for former leftists and the newly interested but, so far, there are few indications that they will be able even to unite the ‘Najibist’ spectrum of the former pro-Soviet Afghan left. One of the obstacles, other than the general difficulty of getting political leaders to unite (and give up the claim to be number one), are current political differences: While Qahraman’s group sees itself as an ally of Ghani, Bawari told AAN: “We supported Dr Ashraf Ghani in the last elections, but the president failed to deliver on the promises he made to the people. I do not think we will support Ashraf Ghani again.”

Other – non-Najibist – post-PDPA parties are not interested in joining forces with the Najibists, as Liaqat Ali Faramarz, a member of the leadership council of Hezb-e Mutahed-e Melli-ye Afghanistan (National United Party of Afghanistan, NUPA), told AAN. Faramarz’s party is led by former PDPA general Nur-ul-Haq Ulumi, a former Parchami (he served as interior minister in the National Unity Government under Ghani and Abdullah; see AAN’s previous reporting here) and is part of the coalition that supported Dr Abdullah in the 2014 presidential election. It defines itself as “non-ideological” and “pro free market.” NUPA and several other post-leftist parties, in June 2017, have just finalised their own, multiple-step unification process that has taken several years to achieve. (10)

Regardless of the mobilisation power of this latest Hezb-e Watan relaunch, and whether it will succeed, or not, in bringing together all or most of the Najibists, substantively, it does not represent the return of an ideological Afghan left. Radical leftist ideas have been widely discredited – in Afghanistan more than in most other places – due to the bloodshed that ensued under its rule. Many of the former leftists of all strands today define themselves as ‘social-democrats’, supporting (and actually enjoying) political pluralism and electoral parliamentarianism. Some are strongly engaged in trade and professional unions. This is also reflected in the new Watan party defining itself as ‘centre-left’, while some other post-PDPA groups, such as NUPA, reject any notion of being leftist at all.

At the same time, as in the West, there is also an interest in leftism among young, educated Afghans, but more in a curious rather than an ideological way. Many of them find it difficult to identify with the groups originating from the Old Left, but even more so with the dominant Islamist ideology. However, whether a new Hezb-e Watan will attract them, remains to be seen, particularly as there is also a more radical Afghan ‘New Left’, with the Solidarity Party (that has repeatedly drawn the ire of Islamists). The Solidarity Party has established contact with leftist parties in the west, for example, in Germany and Sweden, as well as in Pakistan. It is visibly dominated by the young generation and has a young woman as its leader (AAN reported here).

But, even if the new Hezb-e Watan, and the various initiatives alongside it, has only limited success, it potentially represents a not insignificant part of the electorate and is still likely to become a target of political mobilisation and courting. This is similar to when the current president signed cooperation protocols with various parties before the 2014 election, including the leftists, in an attempt to secure their votes.

Najibullah when still in power. Photo: Payyam-e Watan website

(1) Najibullah became a PDPA student leader in the mid-1960 while studying at the medical college of Kabul University. He was head of the country’s intelligence service from 1980 to 1985. He became the PDPA leader in 1986 and was Afghan president from 1987 to 1992.

For several years, Najibullah (only one name) used only Najib, often also Dr Najib or Dr Najibullah. His family also confirmed once more that his name was only Najibullah, without Muhammad, as often used in media.

(2) The absentees included Eng. Nazar Muhammad, the highest ranking among the former pro-Najib Hezb-e Watan leaders (he was one of the four secretaries of the party’s central committee, ie de facto deputies of Najib) and 88-year old Sulaiman Laeq, one of Najibullah’s key 1990s allies (he is also a well-known Pashto poet from the Mujaddedi family and former UNAMA political officer). Laeq told AAN: “I was not consulted about the initiative. Otherwise, I would have attended the meeting. My position towards all Hezb-e Watan factions is similar: I do not belong to them, but I am optimistic about them. I am against those [other] groups who terrorise, loot and kill our countrymen.”

(3) Afghanistan’s left was divided into two currents: pro-Soviet (represented mainly by the PDPA) and pro-Beijing (usually called Shola-ye Jawed, Eternal Flame – which also fragmented into many groups). The Najibists – which combine the former Parchamis (to which Najibullah belonged) and Khalqis who supported Najibullah’s national reconciliation policy of the late 1980s – today have become a third faction among the former PDPA members (in addition to the old Parcham and Khalq networks). The former Parchami. who were against Najibullah’s new policy (and the fact that he replaced their leader Karmal as party leader and president). are today known as ‘Karmalists’. Most Khalqis were against the Soviet intervention in the first place, as it removed and killed their then leader Hafizullah Amin, the former deputy of murdered Tarakai. Many of them also opposed Najibullah, the former Parchami, as many of them were in jail when he was head of the intelligence. The attempt to overcome this notorious factionalism was one of the reasons to recreate the PDPA as Hezb-e Watan.

(4) Khalq and Parcham were brought together again in 1977 under major Soviet pressure via the Indian Communist Party. By then, Parcham had been pushed out of its de facto coalition with President Muhammad Daud, a member of the former royal family, who had attained power in the first PDPA-engineered coup in 1973. (Khalq was never part of this coalition.) The party was reunited, but fierce power struggles between the two factions continued, and. apart from some minor factions, PDPA members were, either “Khalqi”, or “Parchami.” Najibullah belongs to Parcham.

The two factions were named after the party’s consecutive and short-lived party newspapers during the country’s ‘decade of democracy’ (1963 to 1973), the period between the introduction of the 1964 constitution, which changed Afghanistan into a fully constitutional monarchy, and the military coup led by Daud in July 1973. The new constitution brought about formal elements of parliamentarianism, including a two-house parliament, a free press and relatively free and pluralistic elections. For the first time, it opened the way for the formation of political parties, from Marxists to Islamists. As the king has never signed the drafted political parties law, all parties remained unofficial.

(5) See: Jonathan Steele, Ghosts of Afghanistan: The Haunted Battleground, Berkeley 2011, 141ff.

(6) See for example: Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: Dynamics of Warlordism in Afghanistan, 1980-2007, London 2009, 76; Mike Martin, An Intimate War: An Oral History Of The Helmand Conflict 1978-2012, PhD dissertation, London 2011, chapter 3, 20.

(7) The first new Hezb-e Watan already had emerged in the mid-1990s in Belgium. It was led by a young relative of the last aide-de-camp of Najibullah and successfully established branches all over Western Europe. This party formally expelled all old leaders (with the exception ofNajibullah, obviously) in an attempt to draw a line under the PDPA past. The party has now disappeared.

(8) Bawari was a member of the 1990s Hezb-e Watan central committee and headed its economic department. Wadan was also a central committee member, where he led its propaganda department. He was later secretary of the party’s provincial committee for Nangarhar.

(9) This process has resulted in a merger of NUPA with Hezb-e Melli-ye Taraqi-ye Mardom Afghanistan (Afghanistan People’s National Progress Party). The latter, with its complicated name, is the result of three parties joining forces earlier on (the National Party, the People’s Party and the Fatherland Progress Party; “fatherland” was dropped). On the way to unification, most parties involved suffered the loss of breakaway groups that can be expected to continue working under the old names.

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 “Music is essential for the very survival of man’s humanity.” In the opening lines of his book ‘War, Exile and the Music of Afghanistan’, John Baily motivates his research with this quote from fellow ethnomusicologist John Blacking. For the author, who spent more than four decades researching and performing the music of Afghanistan alongside Afghan musicians inside and outside the country, the Afghans’ strong sense of humanity is on full display. His latest book on the topic of Afghan music tries to take stocks of this humanity that survived tumultuous times and constitutes a vital part of Afghan culture.

Books on Afghan music are rare, especially compared to the number of publications on Afghan society and history. The main stories about Afghan music tend to be written by non-specialists and focus mainly on its prohibition during Taleban rule. So far, no major studies have captured how Afghan musical traditions have changed throughout the decades of conflict and exile, nor fully reflect how much Afghan diaspora communities look to music for their identity and mental balance, as John Baily puts it:

…music seems to have been about normalization, reassurance, ticking over, keeping things going through difficult times in anticipation of going home.  

The book: Documenting “the sound that transmits a culture”

‘War, Exile and the Music of Afghanistan’ – Book Cover

‘War, Exile and the Music of Afghanistan’ (Ashgate, 2015; now also published in paperback by Routledge) is structured along a chronology of historical events. The first five chapters each refer to a distinct period of contemporary Afghan history, the major political features of which are briefly presented before moving to an exploration of music inside the country and later among the Afghan diaspora. Chapter six focuses more specifically on “The Global Circulation of Afghanistan’s Music” but it also respects the chronological order and is based on the fieldwork the author conducted among Afghan diaspora communities in the early 2000s after his first return to post-Taleban Kabul. A final chapter allows Baily to compare the various approaches to music that the diaspora communities developed and to make some interesting observations on the nexus between Afghan identity and music.

The book starts with a concise yet detailed history of the development of Afghan court music, following the patronage of a series of Afghan kings and rulers from the 1870s onwards and introducing instruments, places and concepts still particular to Afghan music to this day. All the while, the book makes sure that the readers unfamiliar with the political history of the country become acquainted with its major events.

For those already acquainted, it is very interesting to read about Afghanistan’s succession of political leaders from kings to presidents through a different lens. Political shifts between modernity and social conservatism are analysed mainly for their significance on Afghan music, rather than according to the conventional patterns of state formation and fission that have obsessed scores of political scientists. The music-oriented historical sections continue throughout the book, and relate Afghanistan’s musical history till recent days. However, it is the narratives of John Baily’s fieldwork with musicians which constitute the most interesting parts of the book.

After studying Afghan music in Kabul and Herat between 1973 and 1977,(1) John Baily (together with his wife Veronica Doubleday, also a scholar of Afghan music and an established singer) continued to research Afghan music wherever he could get in touch with musicians who had left the war-torn country. He took extensive notes from his fieldwork and often filmed what he witnessed. In the text, the author embarks on a worldwide journey following the footsteps of this particular branch of the Afghan diaspora. The journey takes him not only to the 1980s Peshawar, but also to Islamabad, Mashhad, Tehran, Fremont (California’s Little Kabul), London, Sidney, Melbourne, Hamburg and Dublin – wherever Afghan refugee communities, big or small, make music.

Starting from the very subtitle The Ethnographer’s Tale, Baily refers to his book as a personalised account of his encounters with the world of Afghan music over a period of 40 years. His personal identity inside the Afghan musical scene was recognised as that of a shauqi, an amateur enthusiast musician (contrasted in popular usage – and not altogether unfavorably – with that of the professional performers, called kesbi or sazenda). As such, he offers a unique insight into the lives, styles, thoughts and practices of the musicians who made up that world. It is fascinating to discover how Afghan musicians managed to save their music and carry it – not always fully intact, but alive – with them from one place of exile to another and, in some cases, back to Afghanistan.

Given the family connections that usually define becoming a musician in Afghanistan, the ethnographer’s tale becomes the story of a number of Afghan families who throughout the decades have tried to maintain art at its best, alongside the struggle to survive. The book can thus be read as both an ethnographic account replete with recollections of fieldwork and a “choral” history recounted through an anthology of oral sources.

Each of the ten field trips that Baily writes about in his book provides a vivid setting for the book’s main characters. Some of these character-musicians – hamkaran (colleagues, as Baily aptly refers to them) – reappear from visit to visit, others are seen only once, but all, whether great stars of the Afghan music scene or obscure hereditary musicians of provincial background, are given a full and fair portrayal.

This aspect of the book is particularly charming, especially to those who have been closely in touch with Afghan musicians (or any musicians, for that matter). To this music lover, some descriptions of the musicians’ personalities and behaviour sounded immediately familiar: the primadonna manners of singers and (some) rubab players (music can be food for the soul, as the Sufis would have it, but it also provides an avenue for competition and personal self-affirmation) versus the meeker and more generous attitude of tabla players. This is all compounded by music’s ability to bridge the social and educational gap between well-off, cosmopolitan shauqi musicians and the streetwise and uncouth sazenda, who might cater to popular tastes but who may also privately cultivate a passion for the theoretical knowledge systematised in Hindi or Iranian classical music.

The portraits offer the author the chance to draw a larger sketch of a world that has been in perpetual transition through conflict and displacement. The diaspora’s art is shaped by their places and conditions of exile and by the influences of nearby musical scenes, chiefly those of Peshawar and Mashhad. For readers acquainted with Afghan music, it is enjoyable to recognise throughout John Baily’s narrative the occasions that gave birth to some of the most important recordings of Afghan music available to this day.

The book also tracks the development and diffusion of instruments, techniques and technologies, from the role of Radio Kabul/Radio Afghanistan as a centre for the enhancement and propagation of Afghan music in the monarchial period to the informal cassette and CD industry that emerged among Afghans communities worldwide.

The incredible richness of detail – the book is filled with interview excerpts, names of musicians, dates and venues of performances – is proof of the careful annotation of Baily’s experiences in his diaries. It is also a reflection of the role he played inside the Afghan music scene – a true shauqi, who generously channeled economic and political resources to help preserve the art of those whose passion he shared without competing for the stage with the real performers. This lends a flavour to the book that transcends just that of an ethnographer’s tale, and in doing so has become the first record of the story of the standard-bearers of Afghanistan’s musical tradition – a record that John Baily, after his first visit to post-Taleban Kabul, had recommended to establish. His personal recollections of 40 years of Afghan music, dictated to himself in his diaries, videos and memories, are as much his ethnographer’s tale as that of the Afghan musicians.

The movies: a treasure of images and sounds

The book comes with a DVD featuring four films that Baily shot at different stages and places during the decades of the musicians’ exile (2). Compressed in a single DVD, the sound and video quality is sometimes compromised, but the content more than compensates.

The first film, Amir, explores the lives of Afghan musicians in Peshawar during the 1980s through an intimate portrait of a Herati musician that John Baily used to know from pre-war Herat. Thanks to the protagonist, the movie has a few intense, personal moments showing the distress visited upon Afghan refugees. Amir’s attachment to his land is most tangible when he comments on the provenance of the marble of the tomb of the Pashtun poet Rahman Baba – carved in Afghanistan and “sent to Peshawar by lorry” by order of the Afghan king – only to burst into tears afterwards, confessing that visiting the shrines of famous saints and Sufi mystics is the only consolation for him as he waits to return to Herat, a city known as the “dust of the saints” for the number of shrines it holds.

The longing for the lost homeland and the casual, spontaneous pride that Afghans take in their country is gently made apparent in the last sequence where, with his musician colleagues resting in the background in a dreamy haze induced by the Ramadan fast and the heat of Peshawar, Amir plays the popular anthem Da Zmung Zeba Watan (Our Beautiful Homeland) solo on the rubab. After introducing it with a beautiful shakl (3), he plays it in a soft, even stuttering way at first, then increasingly determined and fast – all along ignoring requests to play something else.

What Amir and Baily did not know then was that the exile that made Afghans desperate to return to their homes was just the beginning of a series of exoduses and returns that would continue for most or the remainder of their lives, and may even outlive then.

The second movie, Across the Frontier, is also set in Peshawar, this time in the year 2000. Seen from an Afghan perspective, Peshawar is indeed just across the frontier, untouched by the Taleban’s prohibition of music. However, at this darkest hour of the Afghan conflict, the mood is gloomy. The movie depicts Afghan musicians and musical traditions surviving hard times, showing the virtuosos of Kharabat crammed in Khalil House, a Hazara wedding in one of the shiny wedding halls that would later become a fixture of the Afghan urban landscape, a group of senior performers commemorating the death of one of their peers, who had been also an expert of the poetry of Bedil, whose knowledge and interpretation in pre-war Afghanistan had reached the status of a sort of lay mysticism.

The third documentary, Tablas and Drum Machines, brings the scene to Fremont, California, and focuses on the socialisation rites and attitudes to music among the well-established Afghan community, depicting the inauguration of a music school by renowned tabla master Ustad Asif Mahmoud. The last movie, A Kabul Music Diary, brings us to Afghanistan in what is hopefully a final homecoming for many of the Afghan musicians so far seen in exile. As if closing a circle. the closing scenes of the final movie feature the same unofficial anthem as Amir plays in the first, Da Zmung Zeba Watan. This time it is performed by a young pop group in front of a mixed audience in the auditorium of Kabul University. It elicits a vigorous applause from the crowd.

A tale in search of a happy ending

When the book was first published in 2015, there were already signs of trouble ahead. Security in Afghanistan had significantly deteriorated under the influence of Taleban assaults and the appearance of yet more radical militant groups, while the unity of the new government proved fragile. With tensions inside Afghan society on the rise, many young men (and in some case whole families) were seeking a way out of the country, creating a new wave of refugees abroad. Still, Baily’s conclusions are deliberately hopeful. The last story he recounts in his book is that of the creation of ANIM, the Afghan National Institute for Music that Dr. Ahmad Sarmast managed to start in 2010, an achievement which does give reasons for optimism.

At a time when even the fragile stability achieved in the last fifteen years seems endangered, the book offers sound reflections on the future. The awareness of the hardships that Afghan musicians faced and the acknowledgement of the losses that a whole musical world has risked should sound an alarm bell for all those who cherish Afghanistan’s culture. While the support programs and research done during the last decade have reduced the risks that Afghanistan’s musical tradition can be washed away by the violence of conflict, more should be done to ensure that musicians remain free to perform within the Afghan society and are protected from social stigmas and economic constraints so they are valued for what they truly are: the custodians and crafters of an important part of Afghan culture.

The resilience and bravery with which Afghan musicians weathered the storms and carried on with both their lives and their talent provide a ray of hope from an unexpected corner in these dark times for Afghanistan. Amidst all doubts about the future of the Afghan government and society, one of the few certainties, reinforced by John Baily’s authoritative account, is that no matter in what condition Afghans will find themselves, they will seek solace in listening to their own music and there will always be musicians able to perform it .

(1) Although the book never loses its main track following Kabul-based music, which since decades set the trends for the whole country, Baily is also extremely familiar with the musicians’ scene in Herat, with its particular instruments, cultural heritage and approach to music – influenced by Iran as well, compared to the mostly Hindustani imprinting on Kabul music.

(2) These four films are:

– Amir: An Afghan refugee musician’s life in Peshawar, Pakistan (filmed in 1985);

– Across the Border: Afghan musicians exiled in Peshawar (filmed in 2000);

– Tablas and Drum Machines: Afghan Music in California (filmed in 2000);

– A Kabul Music Diary (filmed in 2002).

(3) The shakl (literally “shape”) is the Afghan counterpart to the alap of Hindustani classical music: a non-rythmic introduction to a song or music piece improvised by the musician by exploring all the range of notes included in the specific rag (mode) in which the melody is constructed.

Armed militants have overrun Afghan Local Police (ALP) and a public uprising unit’s posts in the Mirza Olang village of Sayad district in Sar-e Pul province on 6 August 2017. Dozens of civilians were reportedly killed. There is another dimension, however, that created widespread international media reporting about the incident: claims by local officials that Taleban and Daesh fighters – usually fighting each other – had committed the atrocities in a “rare joint” operation. AAN’s Obaid Ali explored the insurgents’ configuration in this area and found no Daesh presence there (with input from Thomas Ruttig).

On 3 August 2017, the Taleban carried out a large-scale assault against positions of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and public uprising units stationed in Mirza Olang village, roughly 15 kilometers south of Sayad district. Its population mainly consists of Shia Hazaras. Afghan media, quoting local officials (see for example here), reported a large number of civilian casualties. (The Taleban denied that allegation, see here.) On 8 August 2017, the release of 235 hostages was reported, but provincial authorities said more were still “trapped.” A local ALP commander told AAN about 40 families were caught up in the fighting and their fate remains unclear.

UNAMA stated that it was investigating the reports. If the reports about the civilian killings are confirmed and local Taleban commanders are responsible, it would represent a departure from the repeatedly declared official Taleban position that the Shia minority is not considered a target and would be tantamount to another war crime.

The Taleban attack on ALP and uprising positions in Mirza Olang, however, corresponds with patterns observed in other provinces more generally. In Baghlan province, for instance, the Taleban conducted a large-scale offensive against ALP and public uprising bases led by a Hazara commander in 2016 who refused to surrender his security checkpoint at Surkh Kotal (read previous AAN analysis on this here). ALP units have also been targeted in Zabul and Uruzgan provinces, in some cases over long periods of time (AAN analysis here, here and here).

Sayad district borders Qush Tepa and Darzab, both also highly contested districts of neighbouring Jawzjan province in the west and southwest and Belcheragh district of Faryab and Kohistanat district of Sar-e Pul in the south. Kohistanat was captured by the Taleban in July 2015 and remains largely under Taleban control. The militants consider Mirza Olang a strategic area from where they can threaten Sayad’s district centre as well as the highway leading to Kohistanat district of Sar-e Pul further in the south. Both districts have been in the focus of Taleban activity in this remote northern province for a number of years. Their most recent attack on Sayad occurred in April this year. Kohistanat has been largely controlled by the Taleban since summer 2015, and its district centre has changed hands several times over the past two years, in July 2015 and again in late July this year, only to be reclaimed by Afghan government forces two days later (reporting here and here).

Eyewitness: how the resistance collapsed

The ALP and public uprising units in the village are led by Hazara commanders. In total, they were able to muster only under 70 fighters from the Hazara community: 36 from the ALP unit and from the 30 public uprising forces.

Gul Hussain Sharifi, the leading ALP commander in Mirza Olang, told AAN the Taleban had been besieging the security checkpoints for two years. According to him, the local government ignored several requests to send in reinforcements. For the recent clash, he added, the Taleban had gathered fighters from all around the province, and the limited number of the local security forces were not able to defeat them. After a day and half of intense clashes, one ALP member and four public uprising fighters were killed. Eventually elders from the village approached him, asking him to retreat with his fighters as otherwise all of them would be captured or killed by the militants. (According to established guidelines, elders vet the ALP members from their villages.)

In early morning of 6 August 2017, Sharifi told AAN, he and his fighters and members of the public uprising group members fled to provincial centre all along with their families. That led to the collapse of the security checkpoints, after which point other villagers also fled the area. Only ten families along with four elders stayed in the village. According to Sharifi, some families who intended to flee got stuck in the Mirza Olang valley where fighting was going on. He said that “35 civilians who wanted to flee from the village were shot dead by militants.”

Habib Qasemi, another ALP commander in the area who resisted against the Taleban in the recent assault and managed to flee to provincial centre, told AAN that over the past two years most of the public uprising fighters had left their jobs due to a fear that the area will fall into the militants’ hand. In that period, he said,their number dropped from 150 fighters to only 30. He said that “this is not enough force to protect this strategic area.”

Taleban structures in Sayad

The Taleban had established a strong, multi-ethnic foothold in Sar-e Pul at least by 2012 (see AAN analysis here), starting from first pockets in 2009 (see this AAN report, p4). The province is another example where they successfully recruited and integrated non-Pashtuns; most of the positions in the local Taleban structures are held by them (AAN’s previous analysis on this here). This leaves limited potential space for Daesh-affiliated groups, and there have been no reports that such cases were successful over the longer term.

A recently published report by Kabul-based The Liaison Office and German institute BICC mentions two cases from late 2015 when “influential local commanders—a Tajik affiliated with Hizb-e Islami in Kohistan and an Arab described as Salafi Taliban—had independently ‘invited’ Daesh to their respective area to increase their power base“ through “Urdu-speaking Pakistani guests.” Reportedly, the ‘guests’ left the province again after about a month, and there was no indication that “a link had been created with [Daesh’s Afghan headquarters in] Nangarhar and the Daesh Shura.” The report also mentions that the Taleban’s difficulties with guaranteeing a steady flow of supplies to local commanders might encourage them to look for other sponsors.

In the case of Sayad, Mullah Nader leads the Taleban in the district. He is an Aimaq from Al-Malek village in Sayad and served as a group leader during the Taleban’s Emirate in the 1990s. After the fall of the Taleban regime in 2001, he laid down his weapons and ran a small business (most likely drug smuggling) in Kohistanat district. He was arrested by government forces in 2003 and later managed to escape. He has been reported active in the area again at least since 2010 and re-established the Taleban movement in the province by mobilising fighters from his town and his network of drug smugglers. Since then he has served in different posts in the Taleban’s shadow administrative and military structure. Recently, Mullah Nader has been appointed as the Taleban’s shadow district governor for Sayad.

According to sources close to the Taleban in Sar-e Pul, he has strong family relations with Sher Muhammad, another Taleban mid-level commander in Sayad. Sher Muhammad (alias Ghazanfar) is also an Aimaq, from Kandah village of Sayad. He received a religious education in Sar-e Pul and is currently leading a small group of 25 fighters, mostly his relatives and villagers.

After the recent attack and the killings in Mirza Olang, many media outlets quoted Sayad’s district governor Sharif Aminyar, claiming that Ghazanfar is Daesh-affiliated. Speaking to AAN, provincial council member Aref Sharifi also said there was no difference between Daesh and the Taleban in the district and that both groups cooperated and conducted coordinated offensives against security forces.

The recent attack on the Sayad security posts was led by Mullah Nader. Ghazanfar and his fighters fought with them under the Taleban banner. The Taleban also claimed Ghazanfar as their commander after the recent fighting in Sayad (read here), indirectly, though perhaps not intentionally, assigning responsibility to him for the killings of civilians in Sayad.

According to sources close to Taleban in Sar-e Pul, before the fighting, Ghazanfar had reportedly visited Daesh-affiliated commander Qari Hekmat in his area of operation in Qush Tepa district of Jawzjan. According to onging AAN research, Hekmat is an Uzbek and former Taleban commander who had been expelled from the movement after a dispute over taxation with the Taleban shadow provincial governor and ‘unauthorised kidnappings’ and subsequently declared allegiance with Daesh. He largely controls Qush Tepa district. (The Jawzjan insurgency will be discussed in more detail in an upcoming AAN’s dispatch.) It is possible that Ghazanfar even declared allegiance to Daesh as the New York Times reported.

According to those sources, however, Mullah Nader reached out to Ghazanfar and brought him back to Sayad with his group of 25 fighters and under the Taleban banner.

Conclusion

The Taleban’s large presence, their obvious intention to eliminate rival groups and their superior manpower and resources limit the space for Daesh to establish a footprint in areas such as Sayad, and in fact in most areas of northern and north-eastern Afghanistan (read our previous dispatch on this here and here). With Salafist influences and sympathies for Daesh spreading among some limited religious circles and younger fighters, or due to funding and supply issues, local commanders might find it opportune to signal readiness to ally to Daesh, or at least explore the option. This seems to have been the case with commander Ghazanfar. His case and research quoted above also show that the Taleban are still able to rein in such commanders in most cases. In this light, to interpret the Sayad attack as a joint ‘Taleban-Daesh’ operation stretches the facts too far.

The temporary capture of Janikhel district centre by Taleban forces in late July 2017 stands out in the relatively static, mountainous and geographically and tribally fractured region of eastern Paktia and Khost. There, most district centres continue to be in government hands, while many areas outside of them are more or less under Taleban control. However, the situation has become more fluid over some time. Although the capture was a raid and show-of-force, rather than an attempt to seize and hold a district centre, it seems to reflect a more aggressive approach on the part of the insurgents in that area. As AAN Thomas Ruttig and Fazal Muzhary find, the Taleban’s increased footprint in and stronger hold on parts of this area close to the border with Pakistan is also the outcome of a long-term neglect of an area that, for a long time, has been taken for granted as being pro-government.

What happened in Janikhel?

Early on 25 July 2017, after two days of fighting, a large group of Taleban fighters overran the centre of Janikhel district. The district itself is a small, mountainous strip of land at Paktia’s border with Khost province, close to Pakistani Waziristan and with a number of important local roads running through it. On 5 August 2017, government officials reported they had recaptured the district centre (media report here). Local observers based in the region and in Kabul told AAN that a large government force was deployed and this convoy made it to and retook the district centre. Later, Afghan officials were flown in to see the success.

This followed some days of ANSF fighting their way up to Reshpegi Kandao, a pass about three kilometres away from the district town on a winding route leading uphill through forested and mountainous area that had been heavily mined by the Taleban. Fighting seems to have finished now (ie as of 7 August 2017) and the insurgents returned to their previous positions. They are mainly in Kotkai, a plain towards neighbouring Musakhel district (in Khost province), where they have established several bases over recent years. They might have left the district centre, the observers believe, in order to avoid attracting airstrikes to the area.

The exact number of casualties of the fighting on both sides is not clear. Both the Afghan government and the Taleban have claimed to have inflicted considerable casualties on each other. Government sources, after the recapture of the district centre, claimed 140 insurgents were killed and over 120 more wounded. Provincial police spokesman Sardar Wali Tabasum said that at least sixteen ‘Pakistani militia forces’ were among those killed during the initial days of the fighting. The Taleban claimed they only lost one killed. According to Abdullah Hasrat, the spokesman for Paktia’s governor, five Afghan security forces were killed and another four wounded, but local people told Azadi Radio (see here) that they saw dead bodies of 12 security forces one day after the fall of the district centre to the Taleban. The Taleban claimed 15 ANSF killed and 15 more were captured alive – a fact earlier denied by Hasrat. In a video released on 30 July 2017, they were shown sitting in a semi-circle being questioned about their provinces of origin and whether they had been treated well (which all of them said was the case). The video also showed some dead bodies of ANSF fighters.

According to the observers, the Taleban carried away large amounts of weapons, including a number of US-made Humvee military vehicles. (Such vehicles are sometimes used as car bombs during attacks, such as that on 20 July 2017 in Gereshk, see here, probably because the Taleban lack the means to keep them operational.)

The district centre fell to the Taleban on the second day after the fighting broke out. On the first day, the pro-government defenders had beaten back the attackers. They set up additional security posts around the centre, which is located high in the mountains, and, as the local observers confirmed, apparently did not see the second wave of attackers coming and were surprised by it. (That there was a surprise effect is surprising in itself, but not unprecedented, as AAN has reported, for example, from Kunduz province – see here.)

The Taleban had pulled together fighters from several districts of Paktia and Khost, as well as from Waziristan on the other side of the Afghan-Pakistani border, local observers told AAN. Waziristan is where most of their bases still are. The comparatively small, closely knit local tribes of Paktia and Khost on the Afghan side have been reluctant to allow them to operate permanently on their territories, and due to the short distances, cross-border raids are effective enough. But there are also areas held by the Taleban inside Afghanistan, for instance, Janikhel’s Kotkai plain, about ten kilometers away from the district centre that has been under Taleban control for several years. According to one local journalist, who did not want to be named for reasons of personal security, the Taleban fighters mainly came from the Haqqani and the Mansur networks, the two traditional Taleban sub-groups in the Afghan southeast (more background on them here).

A member of the provincial council told the German news agency dpa that the fighting has displaced 250 families.

The run-up to the events

It appears the attack was a raid and show-of-force, rather an attempt to seize and hold territory. It reflects a more aggressive approach on the part of the insurgents, particularly in the eastern, mountainous parts of Paktia and Khost, but also in the two provinces’ capitals, Gardez and Khost. (1) For many years, the situation has been relatively static in this mountainous, geographically and tribally fractured region. Most district centres continue to be in government hands, while many areas outside of them are more or less under Taleban control. (As local journalists pointed out to AAN, there is also an economic factor behind the Taleban control of the area, which exports locally gathered pine and walnuts to Pakistan. The Taleban levy taxes on these to generate one important local source of income for their fighters.) This has changed slowly over a number of years with a growing number of significant incidents.

On 20 May 2017, there was an assault by three attackers, one of them being a suicide bomber, on a bank branch office in Gardez, the Paktia’s provincial capital. This caused the death of three people and injured 30 more. Almost simultaneously, a suicide bomber with a very strong explosive device hit a convoy of the Khost Protection Force (KPF) – a local US-run private militia that is not part of the regular government forces – that had stopped in Khost city for shopping. The attack killed 18 people and was claimed by the Taleban. After the withdrawal of most US forces from the region and the closure of a number of their forward bases, the 4-6,000 strong KPF is the Taleban’s main local adversary. They have been effective in pushing back the Haqqani network’s influence in the three Dzadran districts of Paktia (Waza Dzadran, Shwak and Gerda Tserai). (2) This was followed on 18 June 2017 by a coordinated attack on the police headquarters in Gardez. This reduced much of the compound to rubble and killed at least nine people. Gardez, and its outskirts, has been the scene of string of smaller attacks, such as assassinations, often with the use of magnetic bombs. The latest of these incidents happened on 2 August 2017 against a vehicle of a local intelligence official killing two people.

There was also new fighting in Dand-e Pattan in June and Dzadzi Aryub in July 2017, two border districts that, for many years, were known as staunchly pro-government and safe areas, but where conditions have deteriorated over the past years. Taleban activity has also been registered closer to Gardez, as fresh AFP photos of armed insurgents in Ahmad Aba district show (see one here). This increased presence has been met by frequent drone and other air strikes, for example, on 8 July 2017 in Mamozai, Zurmat district, also close to Gardez and a traditional Taleban stronghold (see this news article as well as 2016 AAN reporting about that area) and in Waza Dzadran on 1 August 2017.

The surprise factor of the attack on Janikhel is astonishing because its district centre has fallen to the Taleban at least once before, almost a year ago, on 27 August 2016 after a siege of almost two weeks. People in Baghlan province had then protested (see here) and demanded that the government send additional forces to rescue the besieged soldiers, who were mainly from their province. After the rescue, the district fell to the Taleban.

The Taleban left after ten days, pushed out by air attacks, but torched the district governor’s office building, the houses of government employees and local policemen, as well as other administrational buildings as they retreated (read here). At the time of this latest Taleban attack, the buildings were almost reconstructed, but then destroyed again, as a demonstration of the incapacity of the government to defend the place.

Furthermore, Janikhel has had a pattern of regular Taleban attacks going back in time to at least as early 2007. (3) The Taleban claimed to have captured the district centre first in late 2008. In a 2009 pre-election assessment, UNAMA counted the district as one of three “high risk districts” in Paktia, together with Zurmat and Gerda Tserai, the home village of the Haqqani family. It is, incidentally, since 2001 the only district centre in Paktia that was ever captured by the Taleban, and one of only a few in Loya Paktia (all the others are in Paktika, such as Omna that was taken in September 2016, and Wurmamay that was held for around two weeks in October 2016). [Corrected 8 August 2017: Three districts in Paktika, Naka, Dila and Omna, are the only districts in the region fully, ie including the district centre, controlled by the Taleban.]

Why now, and why Janikhel?

Janikhel, although small and not very populous (official statistics estimate around 100,000 inhabitants), is of strategic importance for the region of eastern Paktia and Khost. The first reason is that the second-largest road connecting the two provincial centres, which the local population mainly uses, runs through the district. (There is also a more direct main road, further to the south.) Second, it is the junction of a number of smaller roads – and insurgent routes, including the one over the Reshpegi Pass – leading to other hotspots in the region, for example, to Waza Dzadran (Paktia), which is controlled by a local rival of the Haqqanis, and Sabari (Khost) districts. Sabari, with its old, madrassa-based ideological Hezb-e Islami and later Taleban networks (the former often under the latter’s command) is another geographical origin of the insurgency in Loya Paktia, which started with the anti-Soviet resistance in the 1980s.

Even more importantly, Janikhel connects – through mountain passes in the border district of Dand-e Pattan – the Haqqani network’s logistic bases over the border in Parachinar (4) with the areas on the Afghan side of the border that are already widely under Taleban control (Dand-e Patan and Janikhel in Paktia; Sabari, Musakhel and Qalandar; the latter three being in Khost province) with other areas further inland, where the Taleban have lesser influence, but is showing an increased activity, such as Ahmad Aba and Sayyed Karam districts near Gardez and further on to Logar and Kabul. Janikhel may also have been chosen for the July raid because its centre sits on a forested mountain range (with even higher mountain tops around it) that is more difficult to defend and further out of reach of the KPF, than the other three districts.

Government neglect, tribal fragmentation…

Local politicians claim that they had seen the attack coming. Mujib Rahman Chamkani, a member of parliament from Paktia province, told AAN that he and his fellow MPs from the province had been telling the government to block the flow of the Taleban from the adjacent districts, which he said had destabilised Janikhel for the last five years, but no action had been taken. The last time he raised the issue, he said, was two weeks before the district fell. He said that they visited “all four security branches: the National Security Council (NSC), Ministry of Defence, National Directorate of Security (NDS) and the Ministry of Interior.” But local intelligence operatives, he claimed, told the central government that their information was incorrect. Chamkani added: “We got a call from the president’s office, who told us a day after our meeting that the situation in Janikhel was normal and the district was not in danger of falling to Taleban.”

According to Chamkani, there are Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers, Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) forces deployed to this district. Altogether, he estimated this to total some 300 to 500 men. (Provincial spokesman Hasrat told AAN he could not disclose the number of the deployed forces.) Chamkani, local residents and observers told AAN that the Taleban had clearly outnumbered the government forces.

Chamkani further told AAN that ALP members from his home district (also called Chamkani) told him that they had wanted to come to the rescue of Janikhel, but ran out of fuel half-way there. The local officials, he added, did not give the ALP “enough food, ammunition and fuel for the vehicles or motorbikes.” The governor spokesman rejected these claims as baseless. Other observers also spoke of poor coordination between the various regular and irregular pro-government forces in the area.

As AAN has reported previously from other parts of Afghanistan, what is seen locally as government neglect often leads to theories about possible collusion between government officials and the insurgents. As Chamkani put it: “This [the lack of supplies and coordination] makes one doubt the security officials, [and suspect] that they might have a cooperation with the Taleban or may not have the serious intention to prevent the Taleban from attacking this district.”

However, this is only the latest manifestation of the area’s strained relations with the central government, the origins of which reach back to the first years after the overthrow of the Taleban regime by the US-led 2001 military intervention. This is particularly true for the Pashtun tribe of the Mangal that constitutes almost 100 per cent of the population of Janikhel, Musakhel, Qalandar and Lajja Mangal districts, as well as large parts of Dand-e Pattan, Chamkani and Mirzaka. In the early years, the Mangal and most other tribes of Loya Paktia professed an open pro-government position. The Mangal were particularly well-organised under a central tribal council that resided in Janikhel centre. In 2003, the council decided unilaterally to stop growing poppy (which was not a major, but a visible crop, locally) in response to the anti-narcotics policies adopted by the donors and the new Afghan central government, and in exchange demanded development projects for their area. The decision was committed in writing to the UN mission in Afghanistan. However, neither donors, nor the central government of then President Hamed Karzai, responded to this initiative; the UK – as lead nation for the international community’s anti-narcotics drive – concentrated its funding almost entirely on Nangrahar, which then was a larger growing area.

Another political decision of the Mangal Central Shura very likely contributed to the tribe’s neglect by the Afghan government. During the 2003 ‘constitutional consultation’ in the run-up to the Constitutional Loya Jirga over the turn of 2003 to 2004, the tribe unanimously opted for a restoration of the Afghan monarchy; a decision that clearly angered Karzai. The Mangal council also complained that they were ‘consulted’ about a constitution, the draft of which the government refused to publish.

The failure of the Mangal council to attract projects and funds led to its delegitimisation within the tribe and to the fragmentation of the Mangal tribal leadership in general (and, also, to the resumption of poppy production). By 2009, there were around a dozen Mangal shuras each claiming to represent the entire tribe. Local observers also point to the frequent changes of the Paktia provincial governor (two alone since November 2016), leading to discontinuity and ever-changing realignments and intrigues among the provincial and district administrations and the MPs from the province.

Tribal fragmentation, Taleban gains…

Janikhel district, and the wider Mangal-populated areas of Paktia and Khost illustrate how weak administration, neglect by the central government (even if partly only in local perception) and disintegration of the tribal structure turned an area with a pro-government population into a recruiting ground for the local Taleban, particularly the Haqqani network. According to observers, the Haqqani network has seen an influx of young Mangal men in recent years, motivated largely by joblessness and lack of perspectives. The fact that no Mangal has risen up to the Haqqani network’s leadership, and that the network continues to be dominated by the clan that has given it its name (from the Mezai subtribe of the Dzadran), has not prevented this trend.

The temporary fall of Janikhel illustrates how vulnerable many district centres in Loya Paktia are, even though the Taleban rarely make any serious attempts to capture them. The attack, though ultimately repelled, was a successful show-of-force that had both propaganda (the video that was released) and material value (the military hardware that was captured). It also showed that the Taleban have the initiative and are able to force the government into a reactionary mode. On the other hand, it also illustrates that the insurgents are still not strong enough to keep and hold a district centre in this part of Loya Paktia.

For the time being, the fighting in Janikhel seems to have been more about control over the insurgency supply routes, than over the actual district centre itself. However, it does indicate a more aggressive approach and comes on the back of a slow spread of territorial control of the Haqqani network in eastern Paktia and Khost. This spreading control has been fostered by the slow, long-term fragmentation of institutions of tribal leadership that had earlier guaranteed a considerable degree of tribal unity and, at least a tacit support for the central government. This might be the most concerning development in the region, as it might be irreversible.

(1) Together with Paktika, further south, Paktia and Khost used to be one province until the 1970s (called Paktia); Khost and Paktika were established as separate provinces under President Daud (1973-78). Therefore, to this day, these three provinces are often referred to as Loya (Greater) Paktia (or P2K in NATO language). Provincial borders between them do not count for much with the local population, nor the insurgents, particularly for those tribes now spread over several provinces. As a result of the breakup of the original province, several tribes were split, including the Dzadran (to which the Haqqani family belongs; they now live in three districts each in all three provinces) and the Mangal (the main population of Janikhel) were split. This spread the central government’s dealings with them over three different provincial administrations, thus making it more difficult.

(2) The KPF is, according to different sources, between 4,000 and 6,000 strong and run by the CIA and operates across the provincial boundaries of Loya Paktia. In late 2015, the Washington Post, in an investigative report described severe human rights violations committed by the force (read here).

(3) The earliest attack was reported by Pajhwok News Agency on 3 April 2007 (not online; in the author’s archive).

(4) According to independent Pakistani media reports (see, for example, here), the Haqqani network leadership relocated to Parachinar before the 2014 Pakistani anti-Taleban military operations. Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder of the Haqqani network (the remnant of the 1980s Loya Paktia network of the Hezb-e Islami/Khales mujahedin party), is known for his long-standing relationship with the Pakistani intelligence service ISI (more AAN background here).

The Afghan government has found itself in a complicated legal tangle again. After the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution (hereafter, Constitutional Oversight Commission) dismissed its chair, the president ordered an evaluation of the Commission’s performance in a move that looks designed to curtail its independence. Although the legal basis for the Commission’s dismissal decision does look shaky, there are concerns that the president’s move might have been prompted by the Commission’s critical stance on, inter alia, the constitutionality of the peace deal with Hekmatyar, and a report it prepared on cases of violation of the Constitution. AAN’s Ali Adili and Ehsan Qaane (with input from Sari Kouvo) look at the details and find that it is another example of the confusion on who has the legal last say in the Afghan state, and of how that can be used politically.

Why did the president decide to evaluate the Constitutional Oversight Commission and what are the pitfalls?

On 16 May 2017, President Muhammad Ashraf Ghani issued decree number 747 (a copy of which has been obtained by AAN) establishing a government committee to evaluate the work of the Constitutional Oversight Commission and to examine “existing problems” for the period that it had been operating in its current composition, 1394 to 1396 (2015-2017). The government committee is led by Nasrullah Stanakzai, head of the Presidential Advisory Board for Judicial and Legal Affairs and includes members from the High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption (HOOAC), National Directorate of Security (NDS), Attorney General’s Office, the Independent Joint Anti-corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) and the Administrative Office of the President (AOP).

The evaluation was prompted by the decision of the Constitutional Oversight Commission (a copy of which was obtained by AAN) to remove Mohammad Qasem Hashemzai from the chairmanship of the commission and to deprive him of its membership. The decision was taken by the other six members in a meeting on 16 April 2017; Hashemzai himself was not present. (1) The decision was submitted to the president’s office, the office of the chief executive and both houses of the Parliament, for their information. In the decision the commissioners alleged that Hashemzai had failed to ensure the independence of the commission, had not upheld its good reputation, had lacked in leadership, and moreover for health reasons (old age and weak memory) was no longer fit to head the commission.

President Ghani did not accept the decision and instead established a governmental committee to investigate both the decision and the work of the commission. On 20 May 2017, the committee’s head Stanakzai sent a letter (a copy of which was obtained by AAN) to the Constitutional Oversight Commission asking it to send the evaluation committee all documents related to its “professional, administrative and financial performance” of the years 1394-1396 (2015-2017).

The remaining members of the commission perceived the intervention as a challenge to their independence, arguing that a governmental committee has no right to demand documents related to the professional performance of an independent commission. On 24 May 2017, they sent a response to Stanakzai’s letter and issued a recommendation (a copy of which was obtained by AAN), in which they welcomed a review of the commission’ financial and administrative affairs, but challenged the president’s order to evaluate its substantive work. They argued that the “holding to account (pasokh-gu) of the Commission’s members by any other body for its professional affairs (opinions and decisions) harms the principle of independence which is necessary for the proper fulfilling of their duties.” They also suggested that, should the president find it agreeable, he could appoint a higher-ranking committee to mediate between the six commissioners and their (former) chairperson. This committee could comprise of the Attorney General, two members of the National Assembly and the head of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption, under the supervision of the second vice-president.

In discussion with AAN, one of the commissioners noted that the Constitutional Oversight Commission understands ‘independence’ in its professional affairs to mean that no outside institution has the right to probe or investigate their decisions, or how they decide. This relates to their legal opinions, advice and interpretations. Additionally, according to the Commission, neither the Constitution, nor the Commission’s law make the members responsible to the President or MPs. Based on this logic, the Commission also does not appear in the questioning sessions of the Wolesi Jirga (it, for instance, refused to show up in the Wolesi Jirga to answer questions on its 3 August 2016 legal opinion about the electoral law (see AAN’s reporting here, even though they were summoned by the MPs.)

With regard to the Commission’s seeming willingness to accept mediation and possibly walk back on their previous decision, a member of the Commission told AAN that “Legally we can change our previous decision [to deprive Hashemzai of his chairmanship and membership], if the President does not support Hashemzai and Hashemzai resigns from the Commission in light of article seven of the Commission law.” The commissioners then still seem set to make sure that Hashemzai does not continue, but they are providing other options for his removal. This may be because they do want to keep themselves on the right side of the president, but it also seems to indicate that they are no longer convinced about the legality of their own decision.

On the other hand, while the president does have reason to be concerned about the Commission’s move to go beyond their mandate by removing Hashemzai (more on that below), establishing a government committee to evaluate the work of an independent commission does raise important questions. The unresolved question of who has the last say when it comes to reviewing the constitutionality of laws and interpreting the Constitution has been a point of contention since the Constitutional Loya Jirga and the subsequent adoption of the Constitution in 2004. The ensuing legal ambiguity has provided ample room for political manoeuvring (in disputes with the parliament, for instance, previous president Karzai tended to count on the Supreme Court for rulings in his favour, while the Wolesi Jirga often looked to the Constitutional Oversight Commission).

There is also a view that the current president holds a grudge against the Constitutional Oversight Commission and that the broad mandate he has given to the government’s evaluation is aimed at discrediting the Commission and undermining its decisions – or at least bringing it back into line. In the recent past the Commission has in particular angered the president with its opinions on the peace agreement with Hekmatyar and a report it prepared on violations of the Constitution (more on that below). A source within the Commission told AAN that it seemed that the president wanted to ensure an “obedient commission.”

Why was the chairperson of the Constitutional Oversight Commission removed in the first place?

As discussed above, the commission members in their decision claimed that, among other problems, Hashemzai was suffering from old age and weak memory which rendered him unable to lead the commission. They argued based on paragraph one of article six of the Commission’s law – which states that an incurable disease preventing the performance of duty can lead to the depriving of membership – that “old age and the [ensuing] inability to perform duty is a disease that cannot be cured” and should therefore cause the loss of membership. They also argued that, since based on paragraph three of article four of the Commission’s law, the deputy chairperson and the secretary can be dismissed in circumstances of incompetence and inability to perform their duty or to perform their duty on a timely basis, “it can be inferred that this is [also] applicable to the inability of the chairman in performing their duties, as these are more important.”

The commission members in their decision also accused Hashemzai of the failure to observe “the principle of impartiality and independence of the commission” (more on this below).

Privately, a commission member talking to AAN accused Hashemzai of corruption, including selling the Haj quota and doling out the scholarships allocated to the commission to his relatives, and that when it was disclosed, Hashemzai had claimed that his signature had been fabricated.

Hashemzai responded to these allegations by accusing the other members of corruption. On 17 April 2017, he told the BBC that he considered the decision by the commission members illegal, arguing that article six of the Commission’s law stipulated the conditions under which members could lose their membership and that none of these conditions applied to him. In an interview with Kabul News television on 20 April 2017, Hashemzai claimed that the six members had formed an “unholy alliance” and had launched an “internal coup.” He provided a detailed account of the disputes that had arisen between him and the other members, for instance due to his strict attitude with regard to attendance. He noted that some of the commission members, due to conflicting engagements, rarely showed up to the meetings – for example, his deputy (now the acting chairman), he said, was a PhD student in Germany and taught in several universities in Afghanistan and rarely came to the commission. He had also, he said, rejected demands from the commission members that he considered excessive, for instance to receive rent allowances of one hundred thousand Afghanis (around fifteen hundred dollars) per member on top of the high salaries they already received, the appointment of their relatives to well-paid jobs, and the provision of armoured vehicles and police escorts (which were unnecessary, he said, since they rarely came to work). He concluded by saying that the members had acted against him because he had stood against corruption: “It is corruption. When you stand against corruption, you face a coup. This is the reason for it.”

How did the Parliament respond to the Commission’s decision?

The decision to remove Hashemzai from his chairmanship and membership of the Constitutional Oversight Commission was submitted to the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) and Meshrano Jirga (Upper House) on the same day as it was sent to the president’s office. The Houses did not discuss the decision in their plenary sessions, but their administrative boards both sent letters to the Commission separately. In the letters, they made a distinction between the commission’s decision to dismiss Hashemzai from the chairmanship and its decision to expel him from the Commission. They approved the former, but called for “legal processing” of the latter.

On 23 Saur 1396 (13 May 2017), Muhammad Alam Ezadyar, first deputy chairman of the Meshrano Jirga, in a letter (451/25) (a copy of which was obtained by AAN) wrote to the State Ministry for Parliamentary Affairs, that the Meshrano Jirga considered the commission’s decision to dismiss Hashemzai from his position as the head of the commission to be “within the Commission’s authority.” However, it said that the commission’s decision to deprive him of his membership of that commission altogether needed to be processed according to legal provisions. The Meshrano Jirga, in its letter, also mentioned an analytical opinion submitted by its Commission for Legislative and Judicial Affairs on 12 Saur 1396 (2 May 2017), saying that this was not the official view and position of the Meshrano Jirga and that any official position of this house had to be issued through the administrative board (AAN was unable to obtain a copy of the analysis, but the mention suggests a difference of opinion within the Meshrano Jirga).

Similarly, on 22 Jauza 1396 (12 June 2017), Abdul Qader Zazai, the secretary of the Wolesi Jirga, in a letter (493/466) (a copy of which was obtained by AAN) to the State Ministry for Parliamentary Affairs said that the Wolesi Jirga’s Commission for Legislative Affairs had discussed the issue (based on the instruction of the administrative board of the Wolesi Jirga) and was of the opinion that the dismissal of Mr Hashemzai as head of the commission was “within the internal authorities of that commission” and that this decision of the commission members was considered “plausible and legal.” He added that “regardless of the reasons provided by the commission members for their decision, the chairmanship of one member without consultation with other members disrupts and even renders impossible the operation of the bodies where decisions are taken collectively and based on the principle of equality (every member has one vote).” This seems to refer to complaints by the commission members that Hashemzai did not believe in teamwork and tried to impose his views on others and that he controlled all six specialised departments of the commission, each of which, according to the rule of procedure, should have been led by one of the members.

Regarding depriving Hashemzai of his commission’s membership altogether, the Wolesi Jirga’s secretary also stated that this required that the “clarity of laws be taken into consideration” and that the issue should be processed based on that (without clarifying who should do this ). It also recommended that the Commission prepare draft amendments to its law to clarify the issues relating to the suspension of membership and to propose them as the government’s draft law to the National Assembly.

What about the commissioners’ claim that the president’s move was driven by a grudge?

There have been a few moves by the Constitutional Oversight Commission that have angered the president. The first one was on 29 May 2016 (9 Jauza 1395), when the Commission issued a legal opinion about the final draft peace agreement between the Afghan government and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan (see an AAN’s previous reporting about the draft agreement here). The peace agreement was signed on 29 September 2016 (see AAN reporting here and Hekmatyar returned to Kabul on 4 May 2017. In its legal opinion, the Commission argued that articles eight (last line) and eleven (part 1) of the agreement were against the Constitution. The last line of article eight stipulated that the presence of Hezb-e Islami would be ensured in the electoral structures in accordance with the law. The commission argued that the paragraph was against article 156 of the Constitution and was “invalid” because based on the Constitution the electoral bodies should be “impartial and not be traded off in political bargaining.”

The Commission was also critical of the government’s commitment to guarantee the judicial immunity of Hezb-e Islami’s leader and members (article 11) and said that this guarantee should not include Haq-ul Abd (the victim’s right to pursue a case – see AAN discussion here). Finally, the Commission called for clear mechanisms under the agreement “to demilitarise and stop the military and paramilitary activities of Hezb-e Islami, including the collecting of weapons and the disarming of the party’s forces, so that article 35 of the constitution is respected.”

Later, a member of the evaluation committee told the remaining Constitutional Oversight Commission that the president had been furious about their opinion regarding Hezb-e Islami and that they would be made to pay for it.

A member of the commission also told AAN that the president had also been angered by a report (a copy of was been obtained by AAN) that the commission had prepared on cases of violation against the Constitution that it had meant to publish during Constitution Week (from 21 to 27 January 2017):

We had prepared a report on cases of violation of the Constitution. We held a meeting with the president. He told us to send him the report so he could read it. The report also includes cases of violation of the Constitution by the president. After that, the president summoned the chairman of the commission. The chairman told the president that the deputy chairman and members had prepared the report. The president then reprimanded the deputy chairman in the presence of second Vice-President Muhammad Sarwar Danesh. We said that we had not [yet] published the report. Danesh then intervened and asked us not to publish the report. After the Constitution Week, Hashemzai refused to issue approvals.

The member mentioned this incident as an example of Hashemzai’s failure to observe the impartiality and independence of the Commission, saying, “When President Ghani critically asked Hashemzai about the report, instead of defending the work of the commission he told the president that he [Hashemzai] was not involved in the preparation of the report.”

The report in question documents fourteen cases in which the Commission believes certain articles of the Constitution have been violated. For instance, in case study three, the report says that the delay in holding the Wolesi Jirga elections in accordance with the calendar specified in article 83 of the Constitution, and the failure to hold district council and village council elections according to article 140, and municipal and municipal assembly in accordance with article 141, not only violates the abovementioned articles of the Constitution, but also harms the future of the political system based on the people’s vote and undermines the legitimacy of the system. It also described the failure to complete the quorum of the Meshrano Jirga, as enshrined in article 84 of the Constitution (which stipulates that one third of the Meshrano Jirga should be elected from amongst the district councils – which do not yet exist; instead these members have been elected from the provincial councils), and to convene the Loya Jirgas according to article 110, as obvious violations. The report lists the government, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and other relevant agencies as violators.

In case study four, the report states that the failure to specify the fundamental lines of the country’s policy violates paragraph two of article 64 of the Constitution which lists the president’s authorities (including: “determine the fundamental lines of the policy of the country with the approval of the National Assembly”). The report then notes that “the failure to specify the fundamental lines of the policy of the country by the president and to have them approved by the National Assembly not only is a violation of the provision of paragraph 2 of article 64 of the Constitution, but is also a failure to ensure people’s participation through their representatives in specifying fundamental policies of the country.” It lists the former president and current president, and the National Assembly as violators.

In case study 13, the report lists articles one, two, six and eight of the October 2015 Dand-e Ghori Memorandum of Understanding – an agreement between the government and local elders, assuring them that no military operation would be conducted without prior consultation with the elders in that district of Baghlan province – as violating the Constitution. It says that these articles first of all “restrict and undermine the sovereignty of the government of Afghanistan in Dand-e Ghori area, which is part of the territory of Afghanistan. In addition, it can pave the ground for the disintegration of the territory and the division of the sovereignty of the state of Afghanistan. In this case, it is considered a violation of article one of the Constitution of Afghanistan.” (For more background on the events in Dand-e Ghori, see here).

What are the legal complications of the case?

Afghanistan’s Constitution was drafted in the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) over several days in late 2003 and early 2004. In the last days of the CLJ, a possible source of conflict was introduced into the Constitution. Article 121 already provided the Supreme Court with the task to, at the request of the Government or the courts, “review the laws, legislative decrees, international treaties and international covenants for their compliance with the Constitution and their interpretation in accordance with the law.’ Article 157, which was later added (to placate opposition to the strong constitutional role of the president), called for the establishment of a Constitutional Oversight Commission, without specifying its tasks. (3) On 31 August 2008, more than four years later, the Parliament approved a law establishing the Commission, its mandate and rules of procedure. The new law, in article eight paragraph one, gave the Commission, among other tasks, the authority to “interpret the provisions of the Constitution” which up till then had been the mandate of the Supreme Court. (4)

President Hamed Karzai sent the law to the Supreme Court to review its compliance with the Constitution. On 14 April 2009, the Supreme Court issued a judicial decision, declaring that parts of the Commission mandate (the right to interpret the Constitution) conflicted with the Supreme Court’s mandate (art 121), and that the mechanism for removing members from the commission was inappropriate. From its argument it could be inferred that the Supreme Court considered the Commission part of the executive branch and that its members could be dismissed only by the president. (5) When the Commission’s law was finally gazetted in July 2009, it was published together with the Supreme Court’s opinion, without clarification as to whether or not the judicial decision now superseded the law.

As a result of the history of the Commission’s law, there is now a legal gap on how its members can be dismissed. Although the commission members accept that the Supreme Court’s 2008 judicial decision overrides some articles of the law, they also believe that the part of the Supreme Court’s judicial decision that implies that it is the president’s authority to remove members of the commission does not have legal weight. And indeed, the Supreme Court can issue its opinion about the compliance of laws with the Constitution, but it cannot act as a legislator and give authority to the president when the Constitution is silent about it.

What is the relevance of these legal conflicts?

On 30 April 2017, the six commission members issued “justifying reasons” for their decision to deprive Hashemzai of his membership (AAN has obtained a copy). In these justifying reasons, they argued that they could not invoke article seven of the Commission’s law, because of the Supreme Court’s 2008 judicial decision, but they could also not invoke the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s decision, as the Supreme Court’s opinion was issued solely to provide an explanation for the cancellation of article seven in this case, but had no legal weight of its own.

The six commission members acknowledged that as a result the Commission “faced a legal silence and gap in implementing articles six and seven of its law.” They then argued that in their decision to oust Hashemzai as a member they had followed a practice established by the Supreme Court, namely that in the absence of a relevant law guiding its work, the Supreme Court still compared laws with the Constitution and solved conflicting issues through judicial decisions. The Commission could have questioned the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to, at the time, review the compliance of the Commission’s law with the Constitution, which might have been an easier path. Article 121 of the Constitution states that Supreme Court’s reviewing of laws for their compliance with the Constitution has to be based on a law, but that law did not exist at the time (and still does not exist). But instead of rejecting the Supreme Court’s legal decision, the Commission chose to argue that if the Supreme Court can issue legal decisions based on no law, the Commission can do the same.

Hashemzai, on the other hand, unsurprisingly, believes that the Supreme Court’s judicial decision overrides article seven and that the authority to dismiss a commission member rests with the president. For instance, in his interview with Kabul News following his dismissal by the members, he said:

We have a law called the law of the Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution, which is effective since six years ago. There was one article in this law, article seven. Article seven stated that under certain circumstances – the circumstances were also specified – members, the majority of the members, can together oust [a member]. When the law went to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court provided a special explanation about this and rejected three articles of the law. You understand that the Supreme Court is the final authority for disputes and conflicts. No one can say anything after it. The Supreme Court said that instead of giving the members a chance to oust each other, it is not a business corporation to grant some members a right to remove each other, that is why it [the Supreme Court] rejected it [article seven]. This also casts shadow over article six. Article seven was never included into the law.

He called the decision to dismiss him an infringement on the president’s authority and provided an analogy saying that just like the speaker of the Wolesi Jirga cannot be dismissed [from parliament] by the members after he/she is elected, the head of the commission also cannot be dismissed by the members. He argued that giving such authority to the members could cause hostilities and disputes, which in turn could lead to “an internal coup.” (6)

What might happen now?

The lack of a specific provision on who has the power to remove or approve the dismissal of a commission member has created a space for the President to stand against the decision of an independent commission. On the other hand, although the decision was unanimous, the commission members are now struggling to find a legal basis to back up the decision to both depose Hashemzai as chairman and to divest him of his membership of the commission altogether.

The president tasked the review committee he established to submit its findings within one month, but they have been unable to do so, largely because of the Commission’s refusal to accept the evaluation, especially of its substantive decisions.

Meanwhile, the commission members have been meeting the second Vice-President Danesh to discuss the proposal of an internal reconciliation, as well as Chief Executive Abdullah. One member, in conversation with AAN, claimed that they had not been able to meet the president, despite their repeated requests for a meeting.

So far, the commission members have agreed to a ‘reconciliation’ on the condition that Hashemzai, after he is reinstated as member and head of the commission, would within two weeks resign from his position as the head of the commission (privately, a commission member told AAN that they hoped that his resignation as chair would lead him to leave the commission altogether).

Two things seem to have prompted the commission’s members to accept this compromise. First of all, although they have put forward a legal basis for their decision to deprive Hashemzai of his membership, it does not seem to have been very convincing. Even the two houses of parliament, who are usually more on the side of the Commission, issued letters affirming the Commission’s internal authority to dismiss the head of the commission, but questioning its decision to also deprive him of his membership.

Second, after the intervention by the president and the decision to launch a review, the members seem concerned about possible actions that could be taken against them personally. One member expressed suspicion to AAN that the real objective behind the review committee could be to compile dossiers against the six members of the commission. They also fear that the legal gap could be exploited to further undermine the Commission’s authority. Hashemzai, in the meantime, seems to be counting on the president. In his earlier interview, he said that whatever the president or the law said, he would obey.

Edited by Martine van Bijlert

(1) According to Article 10 of the Commission’s Law the quorum for the commission’s meetings is complete with presence of five of the commission members; decisions shall be taken by majority votes of the present members. The commission’s normal meetings shall be held once a week.

(2) Theoretically it could be argued that this line of article eight does not violate the Constitution as it also contains the provision “in accordance with the laws” as a condition, which precludes the implementation of anything that goes against the Constitution or any other law. Incidentally, the new election law, as a presidential decree issued on 1 August 2016 (a month and half before the signature of the peace agreement), banned members of the electoral commissions from being a member of any political party while serving in the electoral commissions. It is possible that the President Ghani included this article as a tactical move – to promise a privilege that the applicable laws prevent him from providing. It is also possible that he intended to find ways to fulfil his promise. Either way, the whether the article itself violates the Constitution or not, its implementation probably would.

(3) Article 15 of the Constitution reads:

The Independent Commission for supervision of the implementation of the Constitution shall be established in accordance with the provisions of the law. Members of this Commission shall be appointed by the President with the endorsement of the House of People.

(4) The Commission’s law, as approved by the Wolesi Jirga, in article eight, gave the Constitutional Oversight Commission the authority to:

• Interpret the provisions of the Constitution based on the request of the President, the National Assembly, the Supreme Court and the Government [ this never came into force, as the Supreme Court determined it against article 121 of the Constitution];
• Supervise the observance and application of the Constitution by the President, Government, National Assembly and other state and non-state organizations;
• Provide legal advice on Constitutional matters to the President and the National Assembly;
• Review the effective laws to find contradictions with the Constitution and submit them to the President and the National Assembly to adopt measures to address them [this never came in force as the Supreme Court determined it against article 121 of the Constitution];
• Make suggestions to the President and the Legislative on laws that, according to the Constitution, would be needed;
• Report to the President any violations of the Constitution;
• Approve procedures and regulations.

(5) The mechanism in article seven of the Commission’s law to remove commissioners and deprive them of their membership was that the proposal should come from at least five members of the commission and should be approved by the Wolesi Jirga; the president would then appoint a new member within one month after the resignation or dismissal date. This mechanism was considered “inappropriate” by the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court argued that:

The Commission is not a business corporation or organisation so that one member can be dismissed by a majority of the members. The Wolesi Jirga is not the executive branch to approve the dismissal of members of a commission that is part of the executive branch. The constitutional method is clear even about the dismissal of ministers; despite the fact that their appointment is endorsed by the Wolesi Jirga, the authority to dismiss them directly rests with the president. The mechanism, based on which members of the Commission [can] propose depriving a member of membership and the Wolesi Jirga approves it, is a strong blow to the independence of the Commission and it is feared that the Commission will be strongly influenced by the Wolesi Jirga.

(6) Article 2 of the Commission’s law foresees it as an independent body. With regard to the possible authority of the president to dismiss members of independent bodies, it is useful to look at similar institutions. The Constitution contains two more independent commissions: the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). While the president has a greater say in the appointment of the members of the IEC and AIHRC – they are appointed by the president, while the members of the Constitutional Oversight Commission are introduced by the president to the Wolesi Jirga for a vote of confidence – the laws governing the AIHRC and the IEC do not allow the president to evaluate their professional work or to remove members of these commissions by his own initiative. Moreover, comparing the Constitutional Oversight Commission with these two other independent commissions, the Constitution predicts a greater limitation to the president’s authority in the appointment of its members. With regard to the review of the Commission, if the president cannot intervene in the professional work of the IEC and the AIRHC, it will also not be easy to convince the members of the Constitutional Oversight Commission to be evaluated by a governmental committee.