Defence`s Feeds

In early February 2018, US forces conducted airstrikes in Afghanistan’s north-eastern province of Badakhshan, supposedly targeting ‘support structures’ of the ‘East Turkistan Islamic Movement’ (ETIM), allegedly a group of Uyghur extremists hailing from China’s far west said to be focused on attacking the Chinese state. (1) United States Forces – Afghanistan claimed the strikes targeted direct cross-border threats to China and Tajikistan emanating from the ETIM in Badakhshan. AAN guest co-authors Ted Callahan (*) and Franz J. Marty (**) show that such US claims are questionable, as there is no evidence that the few Uyghur extremists in Badakhshan, about whom there is only scarce and ambiguous information, pose any direct cross-border threat.

Latest Airstrikes in Badakhshan

On 6 February 2018, US Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) command stated that “over the past 96 hours” air assets operating under its authority had conducted “a series of precision [air] strikes” in the north-eastern province of Badakhshan. While US airstrikes in Badakhshan were not unprecedented (2), the intensity of the latest airstrikes was unusual and USFOR-A touted them as a demonstration of the stepped-up US air campaign in Afghanistan and its expansion to the northern parts of the country. (3)

The authors were unable to determine how many airstrikes were conducted and what exactly they hit. USFOR-A as well as the Afghan Ministry of Defence declined to comment. (4) US Air Force Major General James B Hecker, Deputy Commander-Air for USFOR-A, confirmed that a US B-52 conducted three strikes on three separate targets in Badakhshan on 4 February 2018, all in the same sortie, without giving exact locations. (5) However, there were reports of additional US and Afghan airstrikes in Badakhshan around the end of January and beginning of February (see below).

USFOR-A vaguely referred to having targeted “Taliban fighting positions” and “Taliban training facilities” that allegedly also supported “operations conducted by ETIM in the border region with China and Tajikistan,” “ETIM training camps” and “support networks,” “defensive fighting positions that [USFOR-A] have previously witnessed the Taliban and ETIM to utilize,” “other fighting positions” and “stolen Afghan National Army vehicles that were in the process of being converted to vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.” (6) But Major General Hecker later backtracked on the claim that they had hit the ETIM, saying USFOR-A “didn’t actually strike ETIM terrorists when we were doing this. We were strictly striking the training camps that both the Taliban as well as the ETIM use.”

Information (albeit not definitively confirmed) from various sources, including on the ground in Badakhshan, indicated the following strikes, locations and targets:

• On 15 January, some reports claim Afghan Airforce A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft conducted airstrikes, hitting insurgent positions in Khostak, a reported safe haven for foreign fighters in Jurm district, as well as in the area of Dara Khol in Yamgan district;
• On the night of 30-31 January, USFOR-A allegedly hit a target in Bashand village, located in central Warduj, a district that has been under complete Taleban control since 1 October 2015 and reportedly also hosts a significant foreign fighter presence. “Foreign fighter positions” and a captured Humvee were mentioned as possible targets. Local sources reported that a mosque located close to the home of the Taleban’s deputy provincial shadow governor, Mawlawi Amanuddin, was damaged in the strike;
• On 4 February, a US B-52 hit a target in Hawasah-e Yakhshira (also known as Bazparan locally), located near Chakaran, the district centre of Warduj. According to some accounts, the target was a former Afghan National Army base. This was reportedly the airstrike shown in a video USFOR-A released;
• On 4 February, the same B-52 hit a second target in Abjin, also near Chakaran. According to some accounts, the target was a former Afghan Local Police base and was shown in another video USFOR-A released;
• On 4 February, the same B-52 hit a third target also in Warduj. Details remain unclear; Sar-e Pul-e Ab-e Jal and Zer-e Chenar Chakaran were reported as possible locations;
• On 4 February, but around 20 hours after the US B-52 strikes, the Afghan Air Force reportedly hit a target near Abjin, with some accounts indicating that this strike only damaged some barns and did not cause any casualties;
• On 4 February, the Afghan Air Force reportedly hit more targets in Ab-e Raghuk and Furghamiro, both in the district of Jurm neighbouring Warduj.

While several sources indicated that the strikes destroyed at least two Humvees and other military vehicles and materiel (see here), the same sources also indicated that they caused no or only a few casualties.

US officials, in their prepared remarks and when specifically asked, declined to offer casualty figures. Major General Dawlat Waziri, spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Defence, stated the airstrikes had killed six Uzbek nationals in Warduj. Major Nasratullah Jamshidi, Deputy Public Affairs Officer of the Afghan National Army’s 209th Corps also reported six fatalities, but referred to ‘Tajikistanis’. Asked about Uyghur casualties by the authors on 14 February 2018, Waziri explicitly said there were no reports of such casualties. Furthermore, no other source mentioned any Uyghur casualties.

All this raises questions about US allegations that Uyghur ETIM fighters are present in Badakhshan and that they pose a threat to neighbouring countries.

Presence of Uyghur Extremists in Badakhshan

Until 2014, most claims of foreign militant activity in northern Afghanistan referred to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which had a significant presence in the region during Taleban rule. There were few, if any, reports of Uyghur militancy in the north post-2001, though Uyghurs were sometimes mentioned as one ethnic group among many believed to have fighters in the IMU. A Reuters article from 2014, citing Taleban sources, claimed there were 250 Uyghurs in Nuristan and Kunar (the article made no reference to a Uyghur presence in any other Afghan province), in addition to another 400 in Pakistan. Speaking on background, an active-duty member of the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) with multiple deployments to Afghanistan, including in 2014, stated the number of Uyghurs in Afghanistan in 2014 was never more than 100 at any given time and often less as they frequently moved across the Afghan-Pakistani border to avoid US strikes.

With the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission due to conclude at the end of 2014, concerns appeared to increase among Afghanistan’s neighbours, including China, that foreign militants would take advantage of the expected security vacuum to move into Afghanistan and from there attempt to infiltrate into China or Central Asia. The Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, visited Kabul in early 2014 to discuss security cooperation and was assured by his Afghan counterpart that Afghanistan “would never allow the ETIM to take advantage of the Afghan territory to engage in activities endangering China.”

As far as the co-authors of this report could determine, the only subsequent concrete incident involving Uyghurs in Afghanistan was the extradition of 15 Uyghurs to China in February 2015. But these individuals were reportedly arrested in Kabul City and Kunar, not Badakhshan. Furthermore, alleged links of the extradited men to violent extremists remained vague at best and were, in one case, not even mentioned. (7)

In general, Badakhshan did not host any significant population of foreign fighters until the latter half of 2014 following the displacement of several hundred Central Asian militants from North Waziristan as a result of the Pakistani Army’s Zarb-e Azb Operation launched on 15 June 2014. According to one former high-ranking Taleban member in Badakhshan, in autumn of 2014 the Peshawar Shura issued orders for Taleban groups across the north to receive and settle between 200 and 500 militants, most of whom were non-Afghan Uzbeks and Tajiks, with smaller numbers of Kazakhs and Uyghurs. It is unclear how these militants reached Badakhshan. Some reportedly crossed from Pakistan directly into Badakhshan, despite the more than 600 kilometres separating North Waziristan from Chitral, which borders Badakhshan on the Pakistani side. According to the same JSOC source quoted above, they had been tracking the movement of other such fighters as they came across the border in other places. But those militants started to disperse, travelling mainly by road in small groups, assisted by smugglers experienced in getting through Afghan government checkpoints.

At present, Afghan sources in Badakhshan estimate that there are around 250 foreign fighters and 60 non-combatant family members of such fighters in the province, almost all of them in Warduj and Jurm districts, where the latest airstrikes took place (a handful are allegedly in the district of Raghistan; see also earlier AAN research here). Most of these foreign fighters are apparently from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but Uyghurs are said to be among them. A former United Nations employee stated that, as of the end of 2016, between 50 and 100 Uyghur extremists were residing in Afghanistan or nearby Pakistani areas. Roughly 75 per cent of those Uyghurs were believed to be in Chitral or neighbouring Badakhshan. This source estimated that there are currently about 70 to 80 Uyghur fighters in Badakhshan itself (the rest of the tracked Uyghurs are reportedly the remaining extremists who were pushed out of Waziristan into Zabul in south-eastern Afghanistan, where many of them were killed in fighting with the Taleban in November 2015, according to the same source). (8)

Reliably identifying and tracking foreign fighters is virtually impossible though. Specific names obtained by sources on the ground could not be corroborated by the former UN employee. Although this might partly be due to constant changes of noms de guerre, the simplest explanation – that information is unreliable, if not incorrect – is also possible. Determining those fighters’ actual origins is equally difficult. For example, while a local source described one militant, Haji Furqan, as perhaps the most important Uyghur commander in Badakhshan, the former UN employee indicated that Furqan is originally from Kazakhstan (but possibly of ethnic Uyghur background).

No reliable information on ETIM

Although Afghan officials and local sources attributed the radicalisation of the insurgency (9) and the dramatic increase in successful insurgent attacks in Badakhshan in 2015 (particularly the capture of the district centres of Warduj on 1 October 2015 and Yamgan on 18 November 2015) to the presence of foreign fighters, there was never any specific mention of Uyghurs, let alone a separate Uyghur group such as the ETIM, being responsible for this shift. The former UN employee mentioned above asserted that whenever the Uyghurs in Badakhshan fight, they do so embedded in Taleban formations, not in exclusively Uyghur units. He also stated that the Uyghurs primarily serve as trainers for other insurgents and that, compared to the about 2,000 Taleban fighters in Badakhshan as estimated by local sources, Uyghur combat power is not a decisive factor on the battlefield.

Hence, allegations about the presence of a Uyghur extremist organisation in Badakhshan (whether ETIM or any other) are questionable. ETIM itself is shrouded in mystery. Though recognised as a terrorist organisation by some nations and organisations (including the US (10) and the United Nations), the situation is not as straightforward as this implies. In fact, the term ETIM is an external designation that was never used by the extremists themselves, who (at least originally) called themselves Shärqi Türkästan Islami Partisi (the East Turkistan Islamic Party or ETIP), which was later listed as an alias of ETIM by the United Nations). Some scholars also point out that reports portraying ETIM as a well-established Uyghur extremist group with links to other international terrorist organisations are dubious. They argue that such reports are based on biased Chinese government information, as there are indications that China deliberately designated any Uyghur opposition movements as ‘terrorist’ (11) and inflated alleged threats in order to garner international support – or at least acquiescence – to repress such groups and Uyghur dissent in general (see also endnote (1)). The US designation of ETIM was allegedly mainly based on the same questionable Chinese and similarly doubtful Central Asian intelligence (for more detail on scepticism about the ETIM, see here and here).

Other sources often cited as evidence of a militant Uyghur organisation are propaganda videos released by a group calling itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). According to the former UN employee, the name TIP was originally employed during Taleban rule as an umbrella designation encompassing various Central Asian Islamist movements, including the IMU in Afghanistan and Uyghurs organised under the banner of the ETIP. This incarnation of the TIP broke up during the initial phase of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in November-December 2001. However, in 2006 some Uyghur groups using the name and logo of the TIP in their online messaging reappeared, which is why the current TIP is regarded as the successor of the ETIP.

Experts cautioned that it is often hard to substantiate where exactly these videos were filmed and whether they accurately depict actual ETIM/TIP capabilities. Furthermore, videos claiming responsibility for specific attacks inside Xinjiang (China) have often been contradicted by facts on the ground (see also here). However, the former UN employee cited above indicated that videos showing the training of fighters appeared genuine and to depict fighters who speak Uyghur Turkic. He added the footage, seemingly originating from Pakistan or Afghanistan, never showed more than two dozen fighters, which – as propaganda videos usually try to boast size and strength – corroborates the assessment that the number of such fighters in the region is relatively low.

Overall, the former UN employee acknowledged that the ETIM is rather a ‘legal’ umbrella term to refer to an array of Uyghur extremists who often and rapidly change the names of their groups.

Despite the terrorist designation, there has not been a single confirmed incident of an attack conducted or planned by the ETIM in or from Afghanistan. For example, while the “UN Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities” (hereafter the UN Sanctions Committee) alleged that ETIM used bases in Afghanistan to launch attacks in China in May 1998 as well as February, March and May 1999, these claims were described as “impossible to confirm through other sources” and as dubious. (12) Perhaps tellingly, the summary of the UN Sanction Committee’s reasons for listing the ETIM as a terrorist group include only one unspecific reference to Afghanistan. Similarly, in the aftermath of their latest airstrikes in Badakhshan, USFOR-A cited only one concrete example: the extradition of just two alleged ETIM members from Kyrgyzstan to China in May 2002 who were accused of plotting to attack the US embassy in Kyrgyzstan; the case had no visible link to Afghanistan. USFOR-A declined to clarify how the attack in Kyrgyzstan was related to their claim that ETIM militants “enjoy support from the Taliban in Badakhshan and throughout the border region.” (13)

Researcher Sean Roberts has also corroborated the apparent lack of substantiated ETIM/TIP activity inside Afghanistan. He compiled a comprehensive list of 45 alleged Uyghur terrorist attacks conducted between 1990 and 2011, none of which had any visible Afghan connection. Additional research by Raffaello Pantucci and Edward Schwarck argued that prior to 2013 and the documented Uyghur involvement in the Syrian civil war, hardly any Uyghur terrorist activity could be confirmed worldwide, and none with a significant link to Afghanistan.

The former UN employee confirmed that ETIM has been fixated on Syria in recent years and most Uyghurs who went to Syria left China for Southeast Asia (where counterfeit identification documents are easier to get) and then travelled via Turkey into Syria. A much smaller number of Uyghurs reportedly left China via the Central Asian states or Pakistan. Despite the changes in Uyghur militancy, mainly driven by the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, there has been no corresponding rise in the number of Uyghur militants in Afghanistan. Nor has there been any evidence of Uyghur militants moving from the Middle East to Afghanistan following the recent ‘defeat’ of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

There is also no credible evidence that Uyghur extremists use Badakhshan as a training ground or a base to plan attacks. In March 2018, the TIP’s media branch, Islam Awazi, posted two videos, one dated December 2017 and the other dated February 2018, (14) showing Uyghurs, along with Afghan insurgents, involved in combat against Afghan forces. Much of the footage does appear to have been filmed in different parts of northern Afghanistan. The authors were able to confirm through local sources in Badakhshan that some segments show combat in Jurm and Warduj districts, and that one of the fighters pictured in the films is the reported Uyghur commander mentioned earlier, Haji Furqan. As in general with such videos, the exact source is unclear and it is difficult to say whether or to what extent it shows actual Uyghur/TIP capabilities and operations; in some sections, the fighting almost appears staged. Compared to TIP videos archived by the SITE Intelligence Group, this video appears to be the first TIP footage from Afghanistan or Pakistan since 2014, which corroborates the assessment that violent jihadist Uyghur activity remains focused on Syria, not Afghanistan. In this regard, it is also noteworthy that the topography and vegetation visible in almost all of the previous TIP propaganda videos from the region strongly suggests they were filmed in the Pakistani tribal areas or in the Afghan provinces of Kunar or Nuristan, not Badakhshan. Furthermore, well-placed sources requesting anonymity asserted there have been no signs of increased activity among Uyghur fighters in Badakhshan during the past two years, suggesting they use the area mainly as a safe haven rather than as a facilitation zone.

No cross-border threats

USFOR-A further claimed that the recent US airstrikes prevented “the planning and rehearsal of terrorist acts near the border with China and Tajikistan” and targeted “the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a terrorist organization operating near the border with China and Tajikistan.” However, there are no past or on-going insurgent or terrorist activities anywhere near the Afghan–Chinese border. The same is true for the immediate vicinity of the Afghan–Tajik border in Badakhshan (the closest the insurgents have got to the Tajik border in Badakhshan was an unsuccessful attempt to advance on the border village of Eshkashem at the beginning of May 2017). The Taleban, who are themselves accused of hosting transnational terrorist groups such as the ETIM, have reassured neighbouring countries on numerous occasions that their goals are limited to Afghanistan and that they will not allow Afghanistan to be used for cross-border attacks (see for example here). However, these claims have not mollified neighbours such as Tajikistan and China.

The short 76 kilometre Afghan–Chinese border runs along an almost impassable mountain range with peaks at 5,698 metres above sea level and is crossable only via two rarely-travelled mountain passes: the Tegermansu, 4,872 metres above sea level, and the Wakhjir, 4,927 metres above sea level, both of which are simple footpaths (the latter crosses a glacier). The border is located at the end of a sparsely populated area known as the Wakhan Corridor (the panhandle of Afghan territory wedged in between Tajikistan to the north and Pakistan to the south, abutting China to the east). The seasonal camps of approximately 600 semi-nomadic Kyrgyz living in the Little Pamir, a high-altitude valley at the end of the Wakhan, are usually a day’s walk or ride from the uninhabited border zone (there are no roads).

Aside from the remoteness and daunting physical geography of the Little Pamir, additional factors would make any attempt to cross into Xinjiang exceedingly difficult for Afghanistan-based insurgents. The only way east through the narrow Wakhan runs through or past dozens of villages inhabited by the Ismaili Wakhi, followers of the Aga Khan who are unlikely to be sympathetic toward Sunni militants. There are also at least three checkpoints manned by the Afghan Border Police. From the end of the only drivable road in the Wakhan, travellers would then have to start a four-day, 100-kilometre trek to the nearest cross-border pass, the Wakhjir, traversing areas patrolled by more border police and local Kyrgyz acting as a frontier constabulary. Finally, Chinese forces closely monitor their side of the border, where they have a nearby military base. They too employ the resident (Chinese) Kyrgyz to keep informal watch over the area, as one European discovered in 2007 when he and his Afghan guide were swiftly arrested by the Chinese after having strayed across the border – possibly the first foreigner to cross it since the British explorer Bill (HW) Tilman in 1947. (15)

In aggregate, these factors explain why there have not been any reports of any insurgent activity in the Wakhan Corridor and along the remote and inaccessible Afghan-Chinese border. The few security incidents that do occur are typically related to drug trafficking and criminality, and happen in the villages along the road, not the seasonal camps near the border. This further strains the credibility of USFOR-A’s claims that the insurgents targeted in the latest airstrikes in Badakhshan had any connection with the AfghanChinese border given that Bashand, the location of the airstrikes closest to the Afghan–Chinese border, is about 300 kilometres away in a straight line.

In contrast to the short Afghan–Chinese border, the 1,357 km Afghan–Tajik border (about 820 km of which is in Badakhshan) is Afghanistan’s second-longest international border after its border with Pakistan. Demarcated by the Panj River rather than a mountain range, the border has two characteristics making it an unlikely thoroughfare for insurgents. First, there is very little infrastructure on the Afghan side, making much of the border in Badakhshan logistically difficult to reach.

Second, like the Wakhan Corridor, the Afghan-Tajik border in Badakhshan is mainly inhabited by Ismailis, whose presence on both sides of the border acts as a sort of cordon sanitaire. Reinforced by the Tajik border police, who patrol most of the border, these Ismaili communities are alert to the presence of any outsiders. Though security on the Afghan side varies because of limited security capacity, difficult topography and a lack of infrastructure, the Tajik side is comparatively well monitored, as they have maintained the Soviet practice of vigilant policing and are especially suspicious of Afghans, mainly due to concerns about narcotics trafficking.

As a result, the few security incidents that occur usually involve clashes with armed smugglers, producing occasional casualties (see latest example from February 2018). However, such incidents pose a criminal – but not a terrorist – cross-border threat, and in any case would have been unaffected by the USFOR-A strikes. Various NGOs and a knowledgeable local source (previously a senior official in the Afghan Border Police) confirmed the absence of insurgent activity along the border. In the border districts of Afghan Badakhshan, such as Raghistan, insurgent presence and activity is limited to the mountainous central regions and not the riverine border areas.

Real, but exaggerated consequences of misperceived cross-border threats

Despite the absence of credible cross-border terrorist threats to neighbouring countries in northern Afghanistan, the official narrative of insecurity espoused by the Afghan government and its neighbours is often paranoid, credulous and replete with greatly exaggerated figures of active insurgents. Such narratives, typically involving a massive insurgent presence in border provinces such as Badakhshan, are often put forth by China and Russia with the apparent collusion of Afghan officials who are regularly quick to hype any supposedly destabilising threat posed by foreign militants. Afghan motives are not difficult to understand: the graver the perceived threat, the more funding they are likely to receive to address it. (16) But why neighbouring countries have come to accept the idea of a serious terrorism threat from Badakhshan is more puzzling.

For example, considerable media attention has focused on increasing Chinese involvement in Badakhshan. Despite official denials from both the Afghan and the Chinese side, there is evidence (including photographs) showing that Chinese forces were – at least during 2016 – conducting joint border patrols with Afghan forces in the Little Pamir. While such patrols were reportedly suspended in late 2016 after they became public, another article indicated that they resumed in 2017. Given the steadfast official denials, the circumstances that led to such joint border patrols remain unclear, but they were likely caused by unwarranted Chinese concerns about illegal border crossings and at least initially were based on informal arrangements between provincial-level officials.

Whatever the nature of this Sino-Afghan cooperation, Chinese patrols in the Wakhan have had no impact on security, according to local Kyrgyz sources. They have mainly been useful in coordinating efforts among Afghan, Chinese and Tajik forces (as the joint patrols include vehicles, they have to enter the Little Pamir via an old Soviet-era track coming from Tajikistan, as the Little Pamir can only be reached on foot or on horseback from the Afghan and Chinese sides; hence, some accounts assert that the patrols also include Tajik forces). However, different sources contradict each other as to whether these patrols are based on an existing border cooperation agreement; as the alleged agreement is not publicly available, this cannot be independently verified.

More recently, there have been reports about the construction of a Chinese-financed Afghan military base inside Badakhshan (which has sometimes been incorrectly portrayed as a Chinese base). As with the joint border patrols, these reports were denied by both Afghan and Chinese officials. However, there is a proposal for a Chinese-financed Afghan National Army mountain brigade that would also include a base. Unlike the joint border patrols, this proposal has not gone beyond the discussion phase and neither the location for a base nor the schedule for its construction have been agreed. This was explicitly confirmed by Major General Waziri, the spokesman of the Afghan Ministry of Defence, in an interview with one of the authors on 14 February 2018, as well as other sources. Hence, reports that “preparations for the construction of [such] a military base (…) have already begun” or that the base would be located in the Wakhan are incorrect, probably as a result of misunderstanding, misquoting poorly formulated official statements or unfounded assumptions. (17)

The idea of a Chinese-financed Afghan National Army mountain brigade in Badakhshan dates back to at least February 2017. According to several sources, there has been no visible progress on this front since then, which casts serious doubt over the plan’s viability. Although China’s supposed willingness to finance an Afghan mountain brigade is a clear indication of how concerned they are about purported cross-border threats, the amount of media attention the issue received misleadingly suggested something along the lines of an international Chinese base akin to the one in Djibouti, rather than mere funding for a base that would be manned by Afghan – not Chinese – soldiers.

Tajikistan, which, given its longer border with Afghanistan, is more vulnerable than China, sometimes expresses its concerns about deteriorating security (see for example here) and on several occasions has closed its official border crossings to Afghanistan. (18) However, such reactions usually have no broader impact, though they can cause serious problems for Afghans in the sparsely-populated border districts who depend on trade with Tajikistan. One explanation may be that Tajik reactions, unlike those of the Chinese, do not garner major headlines or have much effect upon external funding (19). But Tajikistan, though concerned about alleged Tajik extremists in Afghan Badakhshan, appears to assess unlikely cross-border threats more soberly and realistically than either Russia or China.

Conclusion

The impression given by USFOR-A press releases of airstrikes targeting a Uyghur terror organisation threatening to launch cross-border attacks from Badakhshan does not accord with reality and amounts to tilting at windmills. There is no indication that the latest airstrikes wounded or killed any Uyghurs. Furthermore, information about the few Uyghur extremists in Badakhshan, as well as whether they have any affiliation with either the ETIM, TIP or any other group, is scarce and ambiguous. But even if there is some organisational affiliation, given the near-impossibility of any insurgents making their way across the border into China and the absence of insurgent activity along the Afghan–Tajik border in Badakhshan, it is hard to take seriously any claims that they pose a credible cross-border threat.

Why USFOR-A nonetheless chose to adopt the narrative of striking ETIM remains unclear. In an e-mail from the Resolute Support Press Desk to co-author Franz J Marty, dated 13 February 2018, USFOR-A declined to comment. Several diplomatic sources in Kabul mused that it might have been to demonstrate that the US is addressing (empty) concerns of a spill-over from Afghan Badakhshan into western China and Tajikistan to pre-empt any possible Chinese or Russian meddling in Afghanistan. Or it might has been some quid pro quo move to gain Chinese or Russian support in other theatres. More cynically, it may simply have been an attempt to justify striking Taleban targets in a remote area few Americans have ever heard of (and where no US or NATO troops are deployed) by tying it into a narrative of transnational counterterrorism efforts.

Despite USFOR-A describing the latest operations as an expansion of their air campaign to Badakhshan and the north, there have been no reports about further airstrikes in Badakhshan. It therefore remains to be seen whether the latest US airstrikes were an anomaly or indeed the start of a broader campaign across the north.

* Dr Ted Callahan is an anthropologist and a Donald R Beall Fellow in the Defense Analysis department at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has travelled extensively in the Tajik, Chinese and Afghan Pamirs, including nearly two years spent living in the Wakhan Corridor carrying out his PhD research. From 2014-17, he was based in Faizabad, Badakhshan as a risk management advisor to the German government.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

** Franz J Marty is a freelance journalist based in Kabul, Afghanistan, and focuses on security and military issues. He has visited Badakhshan (on the Afghan and Tajik sides) several times, including a one-month stay in the Wakhan Corridor. He can be followed @franzjmarty on twitter.

Edited by Thomas Ruttig and Sari Kouvo

(1) Uyghurs claim to be the original inhabitants of what is today the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in the far west of China, which is sometimes referred to as East Turkistan. Uyghurs, speaking a Turkic language and being predominantly Sunni Muslims, are linguistically, ethnically and culturally distinct from the Han Chinese, the largest of China’s 56 officially recognized ethnic groups (minzu, 民族). The fears of Han Chinese domination, combined with the strictures imposed by the Chinese state, have bred resentment and sometimes violence in Uyghur communities. However, labelling all such violent acts ‘terrorist’ would be an oversimplification, as researchers note that many violent incidents appear “to be spontaneous acts of frustration with authorities, rather than premeditated, politically motivated violence [ie terrorism].” The same researchers also state that disaffected Uyghurs inside Xinjiang and Uyghur jihadists who have left their homeland seem to be distinct groups. This dispatch solely focuses on Uyghur extremists in Afghan Badakhshan and not on Uyghur extremism in other places.

(2) According to one unpublished report, there were only two US airstrikes in Badakhshan during the whole of 2017, but already at least three such strikes alone as of early February 2018. There have also not been many Afghan Air Force strikes in Badakhshan in the past, with the mentioned report only indicating three such strikes during the whole of 2017.

(3) The mentioned communiqué released by USFOR-A stated that “[d]uring these strikes, a U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress dropped 24 precision guided munitions on Taliban fighting positions, setting a record of the most guided munitions ever dropped from a B-52. The aircraft has played a leading role in Air Force operations for decades, and was recently reconfigured with a conventional rotary launcher to increase its reach and lethality.” USFOR-A have significantly increased their air campaign in Afghanistan in the wake of the new US South Asia strategy that was announced in August 2017 (see here).

(4) E-mail reply from Resolute Support Press Desk to co-author Franz J Marty, dated 13 February 2018; Interview with Major General Dawlat Waziri, spokesman of the Afghan Ministry of Defence, conducted by co-author Franz J Marty on 14 February 2018.

(5) The US B-52 Stratofortresses are stationed at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

(6) USFOR-A press releases dated 6 February 2018 and 8 February 2018; e-mail reply from Resolute Support Press Desk to co-author Franz J Marty, dated 13 February 2018.

(7) Al Jazeera quoted sources as describing one of the extradited men, Israel Ahmet, as a honest businessman. An official of the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan’s intelligence service, reportedly said that Ahmet “was detained for lacking legal documentation and carrying counterfeit money.” Elsewhere the article states that Ahmet was “flagged as a spy,” though there is no information given that would link him to violent extremist.

(8) The majority of the Central Asian militants displaced from North Waziristan to south-eastern Afghanistan had reportedly joined Mullah Dadullah and the self-declared Islamic State (Daesh) in Zabul province, where most of them were swiftly crushed in fighting with the Taleban in November 2015 (for the fighting in general see here and AAN analysis here and for further information paragraphs 33 and 34 of the Seventh Report of the [UN] Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, dated 5 October 2016, found here).

(9) In one incident in April 2015, insurgents reportedly beheaded at least 28 members of Afghan government forces after they had been taken prisoner (see here).

(10) On 3 September 2002, the US State Department added the ETIM to the list of “foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism” and whose “financial support network” can therefore be targeted under Executive Order 13224. The ETIM is not designated by the US as a Foreign Terrorist Organizations; ie it is designated as a terrorist organisation that is subject to sanctions, which are, however, less strict than sanctions against Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

(11) In fact, after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, when China began to push for the designation of the ETIM as a terrorist organisation, it indicated an amalgamate of over 40 “Eastern Turkistan” organisations that “have engaged themselves in terrorist violence to varying degrees, both overtly and covertly,” but the same Chinese report mentions that only eight of them (one of which is ETIM) “openly advocate violence in their political platforms.”

(12) These examples all pre-date the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and would have little, if any impact on the current situation. In this regard, allegations that ETIM militants had fought alongside al-Qaida and the Taleban during the initial phase of the US-led intervention in 2001 are ambiguous (see here and here).

(13) E-mail reply from Resolute Support Press Desk to co-author Franz J Marty, 13 February 2018.

(14) The mentioned videos were obtained by the co-authors; they are no longer online.

(15) See HW Tilman, “Two Mountains and a River”, Cambridge University Press, 1949. Tilman was also arrested as a ‘spy’.

(16) For example, a New York Times article from late 2014 noted that, given Chinese security concerns, “the Afghans have sensed an opportunity to secure a new, rich benefactor.” And indeed in October 2014 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani returned from China on his first official trip abroad as president with a pledge of 330 million US dollars in aid to the end of 2017 (in the previous 13 years, China had given a total of 250 million US dollars in aid to Afghanistan).

(17) For example, an AFP report stating that the alleged base will be built in the Wakhan does not give any specific source for this location but seems to speculate that because of the joint patrols and the temporary presence of Chinese patrol troops in the Wakhan, a ‘Chinese’ base will also be constructed there. Even if a Chinese-financed base should actually be constructed (which is, as explained in the main text, uncertain), it is unlikely that it will be in the Wakhan, as Major General Waziri and other sources confirmed that the base would be for a unit of the Afghan National Army (which has no presence in the Wakhan) and not the Afghan Border Police (which has a small presence in the Wakhan). Other unconfirmed reports suggested Zebak district, among others, as a possible location.

(18) For example, at the end of December 2017/beginning of January 2018, Tajikistan (at least partially) closed its main border crossing in Panj-e Poyon (in the Tajiki province of Khatlon) with Sher Khan Bandar (Afghanistan, province of Kunduz) (see here for the closure; and here for the re-opening) (it could not be determined, whether the closure also included other Afghan-Tajik border crossings). In general, Tajik border closings sometimes appear rather random with unclear or questionable reasons.

(19) Tajikistan is considered the poorest of the former Soviet Republics. As an example of its reliance on outside funding in security matters, reports from September 2016 indicated that China financed the construction of new border guard bases and outposts.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) today, 15 March, published the three 2018 calls for proposals for the EU’s Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR).

The work programme includes 3 topics:

• European high-performance, trustable (re)configurable system-on-a-chip or system-in-package components for defence applications;
• European high power laser effector;
• Strategic technology foresight, tackling the issue of the critical defence technological dependencies for the EU.

Details about the calls and participation conditions can be found here. 

The Preparatory Action on Defence Research is funded by the European Union. On 9 March 2018, the European Commission adopted the decision on the “work programme for 2018 and on the financing of the 'Preparatory action on Defence research', and authorising the use of unit costs under the preparatory action ”.

After a first successful edition in 2017, EDA and the European Commission will organise a second Information Day & Brokerage Event on the PADR on 12 April 2018 in Brussels. 

Registration will be possible via this webpage as of 21 March 2018.

The event aims at providing industry, research entities and other interested defence stakeholders with first-hand information on the 2018 PADR calls for proposals published on 15 March 2018.

EDA and Commission experts will provide attendants with detailed explanations on the 2018 PADR topics as well as the rules and conditions for participation in the calls for proposals. Furthermore, in the afternoon, a brokerage session with b2b meetings will allow participants to exchange views with potential future consortia partners. 

• Preparatory Action on Defence Research (EDA project page)
• PADR Info & Brokerage Day (EDA event page)
• European Commission financial decision on PADR 2018 

The European Defence Agency supports the first Central and Eastern European (CEE) Armaments Cooperation Course which takes place in Prague from 13-16 March 2018, gathering some 30 delegates from 10 CEE Member States. Sponsored and led by the Czech Republic and delivered by Cranfield University’s Centre for Defence Acquisition, the course will strengthen the practical skills of staff from CEE Ministries of Defence (MoDs) and related agencies in defence procurement procedures, with an emphasis on multinational collaboration.

The 2013 European Council stressed the need for a balanced access to defence industry in Europe, as a result of which EDA conducted an internal analysis of the specificities of the CEE countries’ defence industries and commissioned a study from RAND Europe to better understand  the barriers to defence cooperation across Europe. The study identified several areas of concern and noted that the CEE countries face a common challenge in accessing the skills needed to pursue defence collaboration opportunities, with identified shortfalls in areas such as project and programme management, marketing and networking, market intelligence and business planning.

The course represents a tangible and tailor-made opportunity for CEE Member States to improve their capacity in all these areas . It comes at a time of transformational change across the European defence landscape with the advent of several new initiatives such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). It will serve as a springboard for the CEE countries to participate more effectively in collaboration efforts and will underpin an alumni network that will provide on-going advice on best practice and longer term networking opportunities.

The course is designed for military and civilian officials working on defence acquisition issues.
 

• EDA education and exercise programme (video)

Agustín Conde Bajén, Secretary of State for Defence of Spain, met with Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA) today. Discussions focused on EU defence initiatives as well as Spain’s current and potential future contributions to EDA projects and programmes.

During the meeting with the Secretary of State, discussions included the general state of play of the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence of the EU Global Strategy including the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund, with focus of the discussions on EDA's role in all three initiatives.

State Secretary Conde and Chief Executive Domecq also exchanged views on EDA’s further development in view of the long-term review (LTR) and discussed Spain’s involvement in ongoing EDA projects and activities with focus on the EDA GovSatCom programme where Spain has a leading role. The State Secretary was also briefed on EDA’s support to Member States in the framework of SES/SESAR.

Spain, as the Secretary of State underlined, supports the principles of action of EDA and promotes collaboration with other Member States to improve defence capabilities. Mr. Conde pointed out that “the EDA is the framework provided by the EU for those Member States willing to develop common military capabilities, while acting at the same time as the key enabler in the development of the capabilities required to support the CSDP of the EU”.

The Secretary of State for Defence emphasised “the enormous interest of Spain and of its defence industry in the initiatives promoted by the EDA”. Mr Conde appreciated “the essential impulse provided by this Agency to the process of construction of a real Common Security and Defence Policy”.

Jorge Domecq thanked the State Secretary for his visit and Spain’s involvement in the Agency’s activities. “The EDA GovSatCom programme has made good progress over the last years, due in no small part to Spain’s engaged role as lead nation. I am looking forward to the next step in the programme, which will be the signing of the GovSatCom Pooling & Sharing Demonstration project arrangement before the summer”, said Jorge Domecq.

will take place on 21 -22 March 2018 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

An intense battle is under way near the city of Maimana, the capital of Faryab. In this northern province, the Taleban gained control over a majority of districts over 2017, including all of those close to the provincial capital, which is practically under siege. They also threaten the national ring road and important provincial roads. Government and international troops are currently trying to push the insurgents away from the city, in order to deny them the propaganda victory of taking it over. Obaid Ali and Thomas Ruttig, looking at the situation on the ground, conclude that a lot of prestige is at stake for both sides on one of the major Afghan fronts.

Government forces and their international allies have started a counter-offensive against the Taleban in Faryab, one of the most contested provinces in the country. For the first time since 2014, those deployed, Janat Gul Karokhel, a spokesman of the local Afghan army corps, told the BBC Persian service included “dozens” of foreign soldiers. Karokhel said the first group already on the ground consisted of 60 soldiers but that their total number could soon reach 300. Those soldiers, he said, would both “take part in combat and advising.” This indicated that both forces under Resolute Support and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel are present. Karokhel also said that ten out of 15 district centres of Faryab were under “serious threat” from insurgents.

The counter-offensive came after alarm calls were sounded, including from the provincial council, which even warned that the provincial capital Maimana, whose population (according to several sources) is between 75,000 and 150,000, could fall to the insurgents. However serious the Taleban threat actually is, the fact that the Afghan government and NATO are rushing extra troops to Faryab is a sign that the general security situation in this Uzbek-majority province is critical and that they worry the capture Maimana – according to the Afghan government’s 2015 “State of the Afghan Cities” report one of the 12 most important urban areas in the country – could hand the Taleban a propaganda victory.

Current fighting

Fighting has been raging in various districts in February and early March, such as Shirin Tagab and Khwaja Sabzposh, both adjacent to Maimana, and along the road linking Maimana with Andkhoi, the second largest city in Faryab. Government forces claimed on 6 March that they had killed the Taleban shadow district governor of Shirin Tagab, to the immediate north of Maimana. At the same time, insurgent activity was reported as stepping up in Khwaja Sabzposh, Daulatabad and Qurgan districts. On 15 February, government forces recaptured several police posts outside of Qaisar district centre that Taleban had overrun earlier that day.

On 7 March, local government security officials and a spokesman for the provincial police claimed that Zabih Ghazi, the Taleban shadow governor for Faryab, had been killed during an operation in Shirin Tagab district. The Taleban quickly denied this statement on the same day.

At least since January 2018, the Afghan Air Force has intensified airstrikes in the province (see media report here). The province had already seen a large number of Afghan forces air strikes with significant numbers of civilian casualties in 2017 (more about this below).

How the Taleban spread in 2017

The Taleban have gained significant ground against the government in almost each of the 15 districts of the province over the past one and a half years. Currently, they control large parts of nine districts, according to local journalists: Shirin Tagab, Khwaja Sabzposh, Dawlatabad, Pashtun Kot, Almar, Qaisar, Belcheragh, Kohistan and Gurziwan. There, according to local journalists, government forces only control the district centres and a few nearby villages in each of these districts. A tenth district, Ghormach, which originally belonged to Badghis province, has been under their full control since August 2017. It has changed hands several times in recent years (see AAN reporting here). The remaining four districts in the province – Andkhoi, Khan Chahr Bagh, Qurghan and Qaramqul – are relatively calm and Taleban activities limited to far-flung areas. The fifteenth district is the contested provincial capital, Maimana. (1)

Shirin Tagab, Khwaja Sabzposh, Pashtun Kot and Belcheragh almost fully encircle the provincial capital Maimana, while to the east, Darzab and Qush Tepa districts in neighbouring Jawzjan province are fully controlled by a former Taleban and now self-declared pro-ISKP commander, Qari Hekmat (see the latest AAN update on him here). Hekmat’s armed group, however, has not shown any sign of planning to expand beyond Jawzjan’s borders.

Around the provincial capital, the Taleban have ousted the Afghan security forces from several strategic locations after intensive attacks from August 2017 onwards, according to local civil society activists. They say the Taleban presence is apparent just three kilometres outside the provincial centre. As a result, a large number of pro-government militia forces and Afghan Local Police (ALP) are under a quasi-siege in Maimana. This situation puts the city under immediate threat.

The largest Taleban presence is in Pashtun Kot, a district to the immediate south of the provincial capital. It is strategically important as it holds a hydro-electric power dam that also provides drinking water to Maimana. The presence of pro-government security forces – including commando forces – is limited to the area of Sar-e Hawz, which they have been besieged for the past two months. Afghan media reported that there were 40 commandos there who were without food and water (here).

The Taleban have also established a strong presence along the crucial northern highway that is part of the national ring road (see AAN report here), which connects Mazar-e Sharif in the north with Herat in the west. There, the insurgents regularly establish mobile check points searching vehicles and seeking out government employees and members of the security forces. In late November 2017, they blocked the highway in Khwaja Sabzposh district for several days, before local elders successfully persuaded them to reopen it. The road between Maimana and Andkhoi has also repeatedly been disturbed (see media report here). Local civil society activists said that the last time a Taleban checkpost was reported there was on 5 March 2018.

Some conflict history

Over the past two years, Faryab has become one of the most active fronts in the countrywide war between the Taleban and the government and its allies. However, the Faryab conflict has been brewing for more than a decade. Ingredients adding to the unstable mix include, initially, factional conflicts between Jamiat and Jombesh, later, conflict between Jombesh and the central government, and a rearming of local commanders; corruption and a lack of coordination among the local security forces; the growing influence of conservative local madrassas fostered by certain factions, particularly among the Uzbek population and; insurgent infiltration from Badghis, with Taleban commanders exploiting local land and water conflicts as leverage to try to persuade elements of the population to join them. As early as 2007, Taleban training camps and assassinations of pro-government figures were reported in Qaisar district.

More recently, according to an article by Deedee Derksen, who is watching irregular armed forces in Afghanistan, the Taleban have also found “willing recruits among Uzbek madrassa students and men that had fought with [the Taleban] in the 1990s.” According to her, the Taleban have been reinforced by commanders who were mobilised by First Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum in 2015 and 2016 for anti-Taleban popular uprising groups and whose funding dried up after he fell into dispute with President Ashraf Ghani (background in this AAN analysis). Derksen writes that “in five of Faryab’s districts, former Jombesh commanders reportedly fight in the Taliban’s ranks” and gives examples from Qaysar, Kohistan and Almar.

Civilians have, of course, paid a heavy price for this conflict. In its annual civilian casualties report for 2017, UNAMA ranked Faryab as the province with the fifth-highest civilian casualty rate. The total numbers killed and injured increased in 2017 compared to 2016, bucking a nationwide downward trend. UNAMA also reported that Faryab was among the three provinces that recorded “significant increases in civilian deaths and injuries from ground fighting“ (by 27 per cent, following an increase in 2016, again contrary to the trend nationally). UNAMA also said it was among the five provinces (no other ranking) with the highest total in this category (having been third-highest in 2016). It also suffered “the highest number of aerial operations by the Afghan Air Force causing civilian casualties” in 2017. UNAMA also recorded that “most of the civilian casualties attributed to pro-Government armed groups” occurred in Faryab in both 2016 and 2017.

In 2016, UNAMA had reported that Faryab was also among the three provinces most affected by conflict-related displacement and suffered the highest number of abductions of civilians by irregular pro-government armed groups.

In 2018, the suffering of Faryabi civilians continued. The Kabul-based Pajhwok news agency which compiles monthly statistics on the conflict said that in February it was among the six most badly war-effected provinces of the country and suffered the fourth-highest casualty rate (not specified, but apparently including civilians and fighters from all sides).

Conflict among local pro-government forces

Recently again, the presence of nominally pro-government armed groups in the provincial centre, and outbreaks of violent conflict between them, local journalists told AAN, has further weakened the defence of the province. Rival commanders make mutual accusations of assassination plots and targeted killings. This has increased the fear among locals that the provincial centre might fall into Taleban hands.

The latest of such incidents was reported on 18 February 2018, when around a hundred fighters belonging to Nezamuddin Qaisari, the head of the provincial popular uprising (khezesh-e mardomi) forces and a member of Dostum’s Jombesh party besieged those loyal to a rival commander, MP Fathullah Qaisari, who belongs to Jamiat-e Islami, at Maimana airport and tried to detain him over an alleged assassination plot. Eventually, after local elders and the Faryab governor mediated and the Afghan military stepped in, both sides calmed down (read media report here). The Jombesh-related group also belongs to those forces mobilised to take action against Taleban in 2015 and 2016 by Dostum.

Dispute among the Taleban

At the same time, there have also been tensions within Taleban ranks. Their recruitment policy – since 2009 – has been to allow Uzbek fighters to lead the militancy in this Uzbek-majority province (see AAN’s previous analysis here). This, however, has created tension between Pashtun and non-Pashtun commanders in some parts of Faryab, according to sources close to Taleban, even though the provincial Taleban leadership is mixed. Shadow governor, Mufti Muzafar, is an Uzbek from neighbouring Sar-e Pul province while his deputy Mullah Jawed, is a Pashtun from Qaisar district.

According to an Uzbek Taleban commander in Faryab, “some Pashtun Taleb commanders ignore the Uzbek shadow provincial governor’s instructions.” To prevent further tensions, Mufti Muzafar, the shadow provincial governor, has instructed the fighters under his command to operate only in their own areas and not carry out joint, large-scale offensives against government security forces. This may prevent the Taleban from pulling together large numbers of fighters in any single operation, but also has strategic benefits as it aims at spreading the fight over as much of the province at the same time as possible.

As well as local Taleban, and operating in alliance with them, a small group from the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) also fights in Faryab. IJU regularly releases high quality videos through its official Facebook pages, known as al-Sadeqin.

Conclusion

The province of Faryab continues to feature as one of the most active battlefronts in Afghanistan. It is also the most active one in the northwest of the country. It has an astonishingly widespread Taleban presence, including near the provincial capital Maimana, which is under a quasi-siege. If, as some locals fear, the Taleban managed to capture this important commercial hub, even if only temporarily, it would hand them a new propaganda victory. This would be not much less important than their temporary capture of Kunduz in 2015 (see AAN analysis here).

This threat would explain the latest government forces’ counteroffensive in the province. This offensive has also brought western troops back to this battlefield and is apparently designed to relieve Maimana of the immediate threat. The fighting, that had already been intensifying over 2017, has had a severe impact on the civilian population, including forcing substantial numbers of people to leave their homes. The presence of unruly paramilitary pro-government forces with unreliable loyalty only contributes to the population’s feelings of insecurity, while, at the same time, those groups’ unreliable loyalties contribute to strengthening the insurgency.

Edited by Kate Clark

(1) The latest US military assessment for Faryab, published by the US Special Inspector of the Government for Afghanistan’s Reconstrution (see here) and reflecting the situation in October 2017, categorises Almar, Kohistan and Qaisar districts as under “INS influence” (ie Taleban-dominated); Belcheragh, Gurziwan, Khwaja Sabz Posh, Pashtun Kot and Shirin Tagab are called “contested”; and Andkhoi, Dawlatabad, Khn Chahr Bagh, Maimana, Qaramqul, Qurghan, are counted as under “GIRoA influence” (controlled by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).

Also Ghormach is labeled as under “INS influence” but still listed under Badghis province.

The July 2016 EU-NATO Joint Declaration focused on 7 areas of cooperation and set out 42 actions for implementation. In December 2017, the EU and NATO agreed to an additional 34 new actions, with the third Progress Report assessing the implementation of the 76 actions expected in June 2018.  Activities in the area of cyber security and cyber defence are an important element of EU-NATO cooperation, of which a key objective is to ensure coherence and complementarity between EU and NATO efforts and to avoid duplication.

In this context, Antonio Missiroli, Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO, visited the European Defence Agency on 8 March for first time after his appointment, as part of ongoing high level and staff to staff cooperation, where he met with EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq.

The two discussed recent developments on EU and NATO on areas of common interest, and the impact of emerging security challenges on the activities of the two organisations. They focused in particular on ongoing efforts in cyber defence, a key chapter of EU-NATO cooperation, including on training and exercises as well on research & technology. 

“EU-NATO competition is a thing of the past,” said EDA Chief Domecq. “A stronger European Union is a stronger NATO, and I am grateful to ASG Missiroli for an engaging discussion on areas of common interest such cyber, which I am confident will yield concrete results and lead to closer EU-NATO cooperation.” 

Merle Maigre, Director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, visited the European Defence Agency today for a meeting with EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq.
 

Merle Maigre (Director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence), Jorge Domecq (Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency)

 
Ms Maigre and Mr Domecq discussed cyber defence and the EDA Chief briefed the CCDCOE Director on recent development in EU cyber defence, notably on the launch last month of the Cyber Defence Education, Training, Exercise & Evaluation Platform,  led by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and building on the support already provided by the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission. EDA played an important role in developing the design proposal of this platform, following the results of a relevant feasibility study which were properly adapted to the actual Member States’ needs.

The EDA Chief Executive declared “Improving our cyber defence is a challenge for the EU, NATO and their Member States. Cooperation between EDA, NATO and the CCDCOE must continue to deliver the best possible training and exercises to our Member States.” 

“In the coming days, CCDCOE and EDA will celebrate five years of formal cooperation. On this occasion I would like to recognize the tangible results we have achieved together in training European cyber defenders, from international law lectures to operational issues, from strategic level cyber defence exercises to the world’s biggest international technical exercises,” said Merle Maigre, Director of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.

EDA is committed to equality, one of the fundamental values on which the European Union is built. This includes equality of opportunity and treatment and zero tolerance towards all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment and any form of gender-based violence in the workplace. 

EDA achieves its mission through the contribution of its diverse workforce, men and women, civilian and military, from different national and cultural backgrounds and tolerates no discrimination on the grounds of age, race, political, philosophical or religious conviction, sex or sexual orientation disability, marital status or family situation.

A group of influential political parties have called for a change to the electoral system. This emerged out of the ongoing dispute between one of the parties, predominantly Tajik Jamiat-e Islami, and the presidential palace over the contested dismissal of Balkh Governor Atta Muhammad Nur. The group wants political parties to have a greater role in elections. Previous attempts at getting this have failed due to a lack of consensus, and the electoral system remained unchanged. Moreover, this new attempt at changing the electoral system has come very late. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili takes a close look at the political parties’ demand and its impact on preparations for the upcoming elections (with input from Thomas Ruttig). 

This is part five of a series of dispatches about preparations for the elections. Part one dealt with political aspects and part two dealt with an initial set of technical problems: the date, the budget and the debate regarding the use of biometric technology. Part three dealt with the dilemmas over electoral constituencies. Part four dealt with controversies around the appointment of a new member of the Independent Election Commission, following the president’s dismissal of its chairman.

Leaders and officials of 21 political parties and groups came together at a conference in Kabul on 24 February 2018. They are coalescing around the demand for a change to the electoral system that would give political parties more weight in the upcoming parliamentary ballot. The group includes major parties such as Jamiat-e Islami, which is predominantly Tajik, predominantly Pashtun Hezb-e Islami (both factions of the party) (1), mainly Uzbek Jombesh-e Melli Islami and two major factions of the Hazara-dominated Hezb-e Wahdat. The 21-party group called in particular for parties to be allowed to field party-based candidates list and votes cast for these lists being transferable in each constituency in order to “prevent wastage of people’s votes.”

There are currently 74 registered political parties in Afghanistan, according to the list on the Ministry of Justice’s website. The group of 21 parties (see their full list in footnote 2) includes almost all of the former mujahedin factions, but none of the smaller pro-democratic and formerly left-wing parties.

The group’s 24 February “Statement of Political Parties and Currents about the Parliamentary Elections” (full text here) and under footnote 2) also included a number of other demands, that: parliamentary elections should be held before early Mizan 1397 (late September 2018) at the very latest; measures be taken to allow refugees, IDPs and those who live in insecure areas to use their right to vote; a room to accommodate political party agents be established within the IEC headquarters and provincial offices to allow for effective monitoring of political parties of all ‘elections processes’; and that the polling centres in different provinces that the IEC recently removed due, it said, to security reasons, but without any details beyond that, should be reassessed carefully and the IEC’s report should be shared with political parties.

The demand to strengthen the role of political parties in the electoral system is based on a proposal by the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) that was established by the government in 2015 to come up with proposals for electoral reform. In December 2015, the SERC mainly suggested shifting from SNTV to a multi-dimensional representation (MDR) system (more on this below).

This new motion to introduce an electoral system more conducive to political parties was initiated and driven by Jamiat. On 25 February 2018, Muhammad Nateqi, deputy leader of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardom Afghanistan (led by Second Deputy Chief Executive Muhammad Mohaqeq), told AAN that the idea stemmed from the negotiations between Jamiat and the Palace over President Ashraf Ghani’s contested dismissal of Balkh governor Atta Muhammad Nur, who is also the head of Jamiat’s executive council (shura-ye ejra’iya). According to Nateqi, Jamiat had already, among other things (see AAN’s previous report about its demand on e-tazkera here), demanded a stronger role for political parties in elections during those negotiations. The Palace told Jamiat that it was not representing political parties in general, whereupon Jamiat reached out to other parties. Nateqi further said that, at first, there were eight political parties which agreed on the proposals reflected in the 24 February statement.

On 26 February 2018, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) released a statement to the media in response to political parties’ demand (see the statement here in English), saying that it “is committed to conducting the Wolesi Jirga and District Council elections in 1397 (2018-19), provided that the required budget for the process is provided within due time, and security of the process is maintained. Changing the electoral system at this sensitive time would seriously affect the preparations for the upcoming elections, and probably may [sic] result in delaying the conduct of these elections in 1397 (2018-19).” (3)

The Free and Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA), a major domestic election observer group, also issued a statement on 27 February 2018 calling the SNTV system “old and unresponsive,” and that it results in wastage of “a substantial percentage of votes.” It also said that changing the electoral system “must not be an excuse for postponement of forthcoming parliamentary elections.” In this context, it emphasised that the next parliamentary elections must be held in the Afghan year 1397, ie before March 2019.

The Palace has so far not reacted publicly. Only President Ashraf Ghani’s deputy spokesman, Dawa Khan Minapal, in a conversation with AAN on 5 March 2018, suggested that the political parties could raise their demands with second Vice-President Sarwar Danesh, who is heading the law committee of the government within the framework of the electoral law.

The political parties responded to the IEC’s reaction on 5 March 2018 with another statement, calling it “muhaseba na-shuda” (unconsidered) and threatened to reconsider their cooperation with the IEC if it continued to take “unconsidered stances.” Nur Rahman Akhlaqi, a member of Jamiat’s leadership council, and Nateqi of Wahdat-e Mardom in conversations with AAN argued that the current electoral law had been enforced through a presidential legislative decree without being approved by the parliament. The government had not sent the decree to the parliament, they said, because the government had counted all the years since the expiry of the original five year term of the parliament (ie 2015) as (repeatedly) the ‘last working year’ of its legislative term. According to the constitution, the parliament cannot amend the electoral law in its last working year. According to them, the president could just issue another decree saying that parties could introduce lists and their votes could be transferable.

This exchange of partly unfriendly arguments between the IEC and the 21 political parties, who are among the main stakeholders in the elections, does not augur well as there had already been an absence of trust between them. In October last year, for instance, another political grouping called the Shura-ye Tafahum-e Jeryanha-ye Siyasi Afghanistan (Understanding Council of Political Currents of Afghanistan) demanded the complete replacement of the members of both commissions (see AAN’s previous report about its members and demands here). At that time, some other parties such as Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami faction supported the IEC. This time, however, Hezb is one of the signatories to the parties’ statements and its spokesman Nader Afghan confirmed to AAN on 5 March 2018 that the party was in full concurrence with the statements.

The Jamiat-Arg negotiations

As mentioned above, Jamiat has taken the lead in this initiative by reaching out to other political parties. This came after the conflict between Jamiat and the Palace over President Ghani’s contested dismissal of Governor Atta Muhammad Nur in December 2017. Both Atta (see here, the Jamiat statements here and here) opposed Ghani’s decision to remove Atta. Following this, Jamiat entered into negotiations with a delegation representing the Palace in late December, although Atta himself was not a member of this negotiating team. On the Palace’s side, National Security Advisor Muhammad Hanif Atmar, the head of the National Directorate of Security Masum Stanekzai, Minister of Finance Eklil Hakimi and Salam Rahimi, head of the administrative office of the president, were involved. Jamiat’s demands in those negotiations included the issue of Atta’s dismissal, changes in the electoral law, and the roll-out of the e-tazkera (see more on the controversies about e-tazkera here)

Jamiat’s Akhlaqi confirmed, when talking to AAN on 5 March 2018, that the demand for a stronger role for political parties in parliamentary elections was indeed the second item on Jamiat’s list of demands in the negotiations with the Palace. However, he refused to confirm Nateqi’s account that it was stimulated by Jamiat’s negotiations with the Palace, saying rather that it had originated from SERC’s 2015 proposal and, therefore, reflected an older general demand by all political parties. He insisted that the alleged lead role of Jamiat was “Palace propaganda” and a bid to alienate other political parties.

It also might be the case that Jamiat is trying to distance itself from being the initiator of the motion, because it has already been criticised by electoral allies such as the Hezb-e Islami faction led by former minister of economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal and Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardom Afghanistan for allegedly acting on its own behalf in negotiations with the Palace and ignoring other parties’ desire to have a share in government (see media report here).

A flash from the past: discussions about the electoral system

Afghanistan’s electoral system has been a topic of debate since the first parliamentary elections in 2005. Prior to them, the then-50 registered political parties demanded a proportional representation (PR) system (see AAN’s previous reporting here). The United Nations initially also proposed an electoral system based on PR that would be applied in province-wide, multi-member constituencies which would be approved by the cabinet. However, former president Hamed Karzai rejected the system, partly to militate against the emergence of strong parties, and opted for a system based on a single non-transferable vote (SNTV). In SNTV, voters select a candidate rather than a party. (See also this AREU’s report). The debate continued before the 2010 parliamentary elections. In March 2008, dozens of parties with various ideologies demonstrated outside parliament, calling for an amendment to the electoral system. They wanted a ‘parallel system’, ie 60 per cent of the Wolesi Jirga seats to be distributed to party lists on the basis of proportional representation and 40 per cent on the basis of a ‘majority vote’ (SNTV). This system, they argued, would “uphold democratic norms and minimise the number of invalid ballots in elections.” This did not happen. (See AAN’s previous analysis here).

In 2012, the IEC drafted a new electoral law in which it proposed shifting to a mixed electoral system. The IEC did this based on a request from the Ministry of Justice, which had asked the IEC to review the existing electoral law after an initiative by the Wolesi Jirga disappeared following changes to its administrative board. According to the IEC’s proposal, after the ten seats for the kuchis (nomads) were subtracted, one third of the remaining 239 Wolesi Jirga (lower house) seats would be allocated to political parties and the remaining two thirds would continue to be distributed among individual candidates on the basis of SNTV. The provinces would serve as the constituencies for both party and individual seats. (See AAN’s previous analysis here, the draft electoral law in Dari here and the IEC’s statement in English here).

Those proposals, however, were deemed to further complicate the electoral system for a still widely illiterate or semi-literate electorate. Meanwhile, the SNTV system has continued to be widely criticised by various political groups for, among other issues, producing a high number of wasted votes, not encouraging the development of political parties and producing a fragmented parliament (see also AAN’s previous reporting here).

The NUG’s failure to choose a (new) electoral system

The debate about the need for changing the electoral system restarted after the disputed 2014 presidential elections. When the current president, Ashraf Ghani, and chief executive, Abdullah Abdullah, formed the National Unity Government (NUG) in September 2014, they agreed on the need for “fundamental changes” to the electoral laws and institutions with the objective to “implement electoral reform before the 2015 parliamentary elections.” The political agreement (see full text here) also said the president would “issue a decree to form a special commission for the reform of the electoral system.”

Pursuant to this agreement, the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) prepared two batches of recommended reforms. The first batch was submitted on 30 August 2015 and the second on 21 December 2015 (see AAN’s previous reporting here). The SERC members were unanimous in their desire to change the SNTV system, but failed to agree on what should replace it (see AAN’s analysis here). As a result, three proposals came out of their work:

First, in its first batch of reform proposals, the SERC recommended that the SNTV system be changed into a parallel system, that is to say, one third of the seats of the Wolesi Jirga should be allocated to the political parties on the basis of PR, with a country-wide constituency, and the rest would be distributed to independent candidates through SNTV in provincial-level constituencies. (The SERC also introduced a three per cent threshold and open list for political parties’ quotas. In its final batch of recommendations, the threshold was reduced to two per cent and the open list was changed to closed list.) Meanwhile, the SERC also recommended that the current province-wide, multi-member constituencies be divided into smaller one to five-member electoral constituencies for the independent candidates for the Wolesi Jirga which should be “approved with consensus).” The proposal was not unanimous as two SERC members disagreed with it and thus boycotted the meetings. As a result, the president referred the issue of electoral system and constituency back to the SERC for further studies. (4)

Second, as a result of further study, the SERC, with advice from the UN, developed a Multi-Dimensional Representation (MDR) system with multi-member constituencies (mainly provinces, but if necessary, some provinces could be divided in such a way that each constituency should at least have five seats), which it presented to the government in late 2015. Under the MDR system, in theory, there could be four categories of candidates: 1) independent individuals; 2) list of ad hoc alliance of individuals; 3) list of party candidates and; 4) list of a coalition of parties. The list would be open and voters would still vote for individuals, but the determination of the winners would be done in two steps – first counting how many seats the best-performing lists had earned and then awarding seats to the individuals on these lists with the most votes (see here)

Third, the two boycotting SERC members presented their own favoured system to the government, which was the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, a plurality system applied in single-member districts. According to their proposal, the quota seats reserved for women (65) and Kuchis (10) and the tiny Sikh and Hindu community (1) would be subtracted from the total 250 Wolesi Jirga seats and the rest (174) would be elected in single-member districts.

The debate over the choice of an alternative to the current SNTV has been polarised, as proponents of the different options have weighed how particular changes might impact the balance of power in the parliament. Other considerations have been the future parliament’s ethnic make-up, its factional and geographical representation, whether the changes would and should contribute to strengthening political parties or not, and what they would mean for the women’s quota. In a climate of heightened suspicion, it has been difficult for the government and different sides to unite around an alternative to the SNTV.

The government, therefore, did not incorporate any of these proposed systems into either of legislative decree which amended the electoral laws and which were rejected by the parliament in December 2015 (see AAN’s previous reporting here) and June 2016 (AAN report here).

In preparation for a third legislative decree, the cabinet focussed on only changing the electoral constituencies, without making any mention of the electoral system. It discussed single-member constituencies (which would, by extension, also mean the first-past-the-post system, a system that had been proposed by the two, dissenting SERC members) as an alternative to the current, province-wide, multi-member constituencies and tried to include them in the current electoral law. This law was passed by legislative decree in September 2016 and has not been submitted to the parliament for approval and has since been effective, governing electoral processes and institutions. However, the cabinet did not reach a consensus on electoral constituencies for either parliamentary and provincial council elections and deferred that decision to the IEC. In effect, it made no change to the electoral system: everything stayed as it was. (See AAN’s previous reporting about the discords on the proposed single-member districts here and here and about the status of decision about electoral constituencies here ).

Conclusion: an overdue but late demand and lack of consensus

The demand for a change to the electoral system is not new. SNTV has been criticised from various sides ever since it was introduced, but has proven impossible to remove. What is significant now is that this is the first time that major political parties have called for a specific, list-based electoral system. Their demand also indicates that electoral reform has been incomplete and has not addressed major issues around holding elections in Afghanistan, particularly the disenfranchisement of political parties.

The demand is valid, but has come too late for this electoral cycle. It is valid because, based on the constitution and the Political Parties Law, parties are entitled to a stronger role in elections, while the successive electoral laws, and the electoral system laid down in them –SNTV – prevented political parties from fielding party-based candidates lists. The SNTV favours individual candidates who are only allowed to mention their party affiliation on the ballot paper and election handouts. (In previous elections many did, while others preferred to label themselves as ‘independent’.) The move is late because coming to an agreement on the details of the proposed system could trigger a new round of open-ended debate and prove to be time-consuming. The proposal by some to solve the problem by a presidential decree (at the same time as they criticise the lack of involvement of the parliament on related issues) seems too simplistic. Given all this, the issue has the potential to further disrupt (the already far from smooth) preparations for parliamentary elections, which are still officially planned for this year. (The IEC has cancelled 7 July 2018 as the election date, but not given a new one yet.) At the same time, as suggesting a change to the election system which is bound to cause delays, the same 21 parties also insist that the elections be held on time.

It is also not clear yet how the reported “imminent breakthrough” in the Atta-Palace conflict might affect this initiative. It is possible that Jamiat will continue to pursue it, but also that it will take more of a back seat, and that, if it does, other parties will continue the push for change. A similar all-party initiative sought to promote the role of parties in elections before the 2014 presidential election – the so-called Coordination Council of Political Parties and Coalitions of Afghanistan – forwarded a ‘Democracy Charter’ (more here), but disintegrated in the run-up to that poll, when different member-parties joined opposing camps.

Edited by Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark

Photo source here.

(1) As seen in footnote two, there is only one Hezb-e Islami on the list while, in political reality, there are two Hezb factions that claim to be the one and only Hezb. One led by the party’s historical leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was in the insurgency until recently, while the other, led by former minister of economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, has operated as a political party in Afghanistan since 2005 (more background in this AAN analysis). Arghandiwal was seen at the parties’ 24 February conference. Nateqi said there were representatives from Hekmatyar’s faction, too.

(2) Full text of 24 February 2018 statement and the names of the political parties and groups that signed it (AAN’s translation):

Statement of political parties and currents about the parliamentary elections

We call for the holding of transparent and fair elections, which result in the establishment of a credible parliament, [which will be] the real representative of the will of all the nation and supported by a majority of the people. We emphasise that the next elections must be held on the announced date without any delay or procrastination. We are determined to turn these elections into an effective instrument for resolving the crisis. Ensuring transparency of elections and [making sure that] no faction opposes their results requires the monitoring and supervision [eshraf] by parties and electoral coalitions of the entire process of the elections, from the beginning to the end, so that [the transparency of the elections] is guaranteed and the shortcomings and violations of previous elections are not be repeated.

Considering these things, we political parties and currents emphasise that:

1. The parliamentary elections should be held at the latest in early Mizan 1397 (late September 2018).
2. In order to prevent the people’s votes for political parties and coalitions being wasted, the votes of lists in each constituency should be transferable.
3. For all residents of Afghanistan including refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and those who live in insecure areas, the way for them to use their right to vote should be paved.
4. Every eligible Afghan should be able to run as a candidate independently or from the address of their favourite party and coalition.
5. Through establishing a room for political party monitoring within the IEC headquarters and provincial offices, the way for political parties’ effective monitoring of the entire process of the elections be paved and no decision and action by the Independent Election Commission and Electoral Complaints Commission be taken, away from the party observation.
6. The polling centres which have recently been removed by the Election Commission in different provinces, due to security reasons, should be reassessed carefully and [the Commission’s] report be shared with the political parties.

We, political parties and currents, once again call on the National Unity Government and the International Community to take action as soon as possible to implement these demands [so that] the right of millions of people who are members of political parties are not wasted by depriving political parties of their right to participate in the elections.

We stand firm by our legitimate and reasonable demands and reserve the right to use all of our civil and legal rights to realise these demands.

Kabul – 5 Hut 1396 (24 February 2018)

Names of political parties and currents in alphabetical order [in Dari]

1. [Hezb-e] Eqtedar-e Melli
2. Afghan Mellat
3. [Hezb-e] Paiwand-e Melli
4. Jabha-ye Nawin-e Melli Afghanistan
5. Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli Afghanistan
6. Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan
7. Jombesh-e Melli Islami Afghanistan
8. Herasat-e Islami Afghanistan [previously known as Hezb-e Wahdat-e Melli Islami-ye Afghanistan]
9. Harakat-e Islami Afghanistan
10. Harakat-e Islami-ye Mutahed Afghanistan
11. Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami Mardom-e Afghanistan
12. Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan [both Hekmatyar and Arghanidwal factions]
13. Hezb-e Islami-ye Mutahed Afghanistan
14. Hezb-e Etedal-e Afghanistan
15. [Hezb-e] Haq wa Adalat
16. Rawand-e Hefazat az Arzeshha-ye Jihad wa Muqawamat
17. Hezb-e Qeyam-e Melli Afghanistan
18. Mahaz-e Melli Islami Afghanistan
19. Nahzat-e Hambastagi-ye Melli Afghanistan
20. [Hezb-e] Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan
21. [Hezb-e] Wahdat-e Islami Mardom-e Afghanistan

(source here)

Both Nateqi of Wahdat-e Mardom and Akhlaqi of Jamiat told AAN that there had been meetings with other political parties which might join the call for change to the electoral system. In the political parties’ second (5 March) statement, the list did include four more parties: Bedari-e Mellat-e Afghanistan; Refah-e Melli Afghanistan; Solh-e Melli Islami Afghanistan; and Mellat-e Mutahed Afghanistan. This increases the number to 25.

(3) The IEC, in its statement, also addressed some of the other demands by the political parties. For instance, on the demand for laying the ground for all residents of Afghanistan including refugees, IDPs and people in insecure areas, the IEC said that based on its legal obligation, it was “committed to providing the opportunity for exercising the right to vote to all persons eligible to vote throughout the country, and that will definitely include IDPs as well.” On the demand for a room for political party agents to be present in the IEC, it said that it had already established the National Election Forum as a continuous consultation mechanism with stakeholders, including political parties and “would [still] welcome their permanent representatives to the Commission.” On the demand for a reassessment of the polling centres, the IEC said that:

The IEC conducted a comprehensive program of the polling centers assessment at the secure areas of the country. The list of the polling centers including the areas, the polling centers of which were not assessed, was approved during the several open sessions of the Commission and was published on the Commission’s website. The PCs list will be finalized after adjudication of complaints received by the Electoral Complaints Commission. It is worth mentioning that in case security of those areas are maintained, where the polling centers were not assessed, the Commission is committed to assess the polling centers in there before the elections. It is also to be mentioned that, the polling centers of those districts where the PCs assessment cannot take place, will remain as per the past.

(4) In response to the concern that changing the electoral system would delay the elections, both Akhlaqi of Jamiat and Nateqi of Wahdat-e Mardom in conversations with AAN argued that the current electoral law has been enforced through a presidential legislative decree without being approved by the parliament, as the government has counted all the years since the expiration of the original five year term of parliament (since 2015) as the last working year of its legislative term, in which, according to the constitution, the parliament cannot amend the electoral law. According to them, the president could just issue another decree saying that parties could introduce lists and their votes could be transferable. However, it seems too simplistic and the agreement on the details of the proposed system (even if it is a consensus one) could prove to be time-consuming.

(4) The first batch of reform recommendations by SERC read:

Taking into account that the existing Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system in Afghanistan; it does not meet the needs of this country, therefore SNTV is an outdated system and shall be changed. In the SNTV system, majority of the votes of the voters are wasted; as we see that the current members of the Wolesi Jirga have received votes from 38% of the voters.

The electoral system shall change in a way, which shall result in participation and development of the political parties, and which shall provide for an effective role of the political parties in the governance system of Afghanistan.

The SNTV system shall change into the Parallel system in a way, that one third of the seats of Wolesi Jirga shall be allocated to those political parties, which are exactly established and function in accordance to the provisions of the political parties’ law and other legislative documents in this regard. The political parties shall provide open list with preference of candidates for the Wolesi Jirga elections. Electoral constituency for the members of the political parties shall be the whole country. The political parties that receive at least 3% of the overall vote cast, shall be included in the electoral competition.

On electoral constituency for the independent candidates competing under SNTV, the recommendation said:

For the independent candidates of the Wolesi Jirga, the electoral constituencies within the province shall be divided to smaller 1 to 5 member electoral constituencies (approved with consensus).