Defence`s Feeds

On 10 and 11 April 2018 the kick-off meeting of the OCEAN2020 project is held at the European Defence Agency (EDA). More than 70 representatives from the 42 consortium partners participate in the meeting. OCEAN2020 is the largest of the three projects selected in the 2017 call for proposals for the EU Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR).

OCEAN2020’s main objective is to support maritime surveillance and interdiction missions at sea. In this regard the project will integrate enhanced air, naval surface and underwater unmanned systems into fleet operations to build up a recognised maritime picture of developing situations for military commanders.

The project is run by a consortium led by Leonardo S.p.A, bringing together 42 partners from 15 EU countries. The total amount of the grant is €35.5 million funded by the European Union. During his opening address, Jorge Domecq, EDA Chief Executive stressed the importance of the project to demonstrate the importance of cooperative defence research for Europe. 

The two-day meeting is dedicated to discussing programmatic and technical activities of the project. A large set of deliverables are foreseen to be prepared within six months and all the actors demonstrate a broad commitment to achieve this first milestone. The discussions are geared to consolidate a solid modus operandi in order to coordinate such a big group of experts from all over Europe and from different organisations. The second day is entirely dedicated to the presentation of the technical activities in the six work packages composing the project.

During the project two live demonstrations will be conducted in combination with operational military exercises – one in the Mediterranean sea led by the Italian navy in 2019 and one in the Baltic sea in 2020 led by the Swedish navy.
 

Background

The Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) is funded by the European Union. The PADR activities are run by  the European Defence Agency (EDA) following the mandate of a Delegation Agreement between the Commission and EDA signed on 31st May 2017. By this agreement  the Commission entrusts EDA with the management and implementation of the research projects to be launched within the PADR.
The PADR is a concrete step aimed at assessing and demonstrating the added-value of EU supported defence research and technology (R&T). The relevant results are expected to further deepen European defence cooperation, addressing capability shortfalls, and to strengthen European defence stakeholders.

The European Commission launched the PADR with a view of developing a future European Defence Research Programme (EDRP) as part of the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2027).
 

More information:

• Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) - EDA project page
• European Commission press release (16 Feb 2018) 

Americas

• The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced April 6, the successful linking of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot air defense missiles system following a successful software upgrade. Both systems were deployed to the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and successfully simulated engagement of a short-range missile target where both sets were able to track the target while exchanging information via tactical data links. No live interceptors were launched during the test. The Army hopes to have the two systems integrated within the next two years. Integration of THAAD and Patriot has become a more crucial capability need for the Army, especially on the Korean peninsula where both systems are currently deployed to counter potential North Korean attacks.

• New M1A1-SA Abrams tanks recently delivered to the US Army have been fired in training for the first time. According to a Department of Defense statement announced last week, soldiers with the 3rd Infantry Division’s Delta Tank Company, 6th Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) fired the main and support weapon systems on the M1A1-SA Abrams tanks during a field training exercise in late March. The 2nd ABCT converted from a light to an armored brigade combat team last fall and have subsequently been fielding and training on their new ground combat platforms since. “Today our crews are being evaluated on their proficiency to engage targets from various positions using the Abrams’ weapon systems,” said Army Sgt. 1st Class Jose Lopez, master gunner and platoon sergeant with Delta Tank. “Because the Abrams is a stabilized platform, it allows accurate fires even while advancing towards enemy positions.” The M1A1-SA is an upgraded version of the basic M1A1 model configured with additional mission-critical technologies to bolster crew situational awareness (SA).

Middle East & Africa

• France and Saudi Arabia have agreed on a new intergovernmental agreement to conclude weapons deals, a French defense ministry official said on Sunday. The announcement comes as the Gulf kingdom’s heir apparent and defense minister, Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman criticized the previous process. “In conjunction with the Saudi authorities, France has initiated a new arms export strategy with Saudi Arabia, which until now has been managed by ODAS,” the official said, referring to the organization that currently handles French defense interests in Saudi Arabia. “It will now be covered by an intergovernmental agreement between the two countries. The ODAS company will only provide for the termination of existing contracts.” Also known as MBS, the crown prince touched down in Paris on Sunday for a three-day state visit and charm offensive which comes at a time when French President Emmanuel Macron faces growing pressure at home from lawmakers and rights groups over France’s weapons sales to the Saudi-led coalition fighting Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. France, the world’s third largest arms exporter, consdiers Saudi as one of its biggest customers. In 2016, licenses potentially worth 18 billion euros ($22.11 billion) to Saudi were approved, with deliveries worth about 2 billion euros.

• Lockheed Martin’s F-35B Joint Strike Fighter will begin its first combat deployment later this year onboard the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Essex. Ahead of its deployment onboard Essex, aircraft VMFA-211 touched down at US Central Command (USCENTCOM) at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida on April 4 for a two-day visit that will inform CENTCOM leadership of the jet’s capabilities before it enters the CENTCOM area of responsibility. CENTCOM’s theatre of responsibility includes Egypt, the Middle East and parts of Central Asia that includes Iraq, Afghanistan, and former-Soviet republics.

Europe

• Germany is reportedly close to signing a deal that will lease five Heron TP unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Contracts for the $1.2 billion agreement are expected to be signed in the coming weeks, with the period of lease running for nine years. Airbus will also cooperate on the program and will use the skills learned to help develop a Euro-Drone with France, Spain, Germany, and Italy. The Heron deal had been initially planned to be wrap up by the end last year but was derailed at the last minute due to opposition from the Social Democratic Party. Since then, a German election, hung parliament, and subsequent horse-trading for a new coalition has broken the Heron deadlock—with a new coalition agreement signed between Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ruling CDU/CSU Party and the Social Democrats paving the way for smooth approval of the contract.

• The French Defense Ministry announced last week that a “first significant step” in the development of a new European fighter jet program will take place at the upcoming ILA Berlin Air Show. Speaking to French financial La Tribune, Defense Minister Florence Parly said that on a “political level, discussions between the French and German teams are intense. The industrial groups are working well together and now we have to ensure the two processes come together,” indicating that these “active talks” will result in the signing of a 10-page document that sets the jet’s operational requirements at the trade show. ILA Berlin Air Show will take place from April 25-29. It is expected that once these requirements are released the companies involved in the program—Dassault, MBDA, Thales and Safran on the French side and Airbus on the German side—would spend just under a year working separately on technical specifications before agreeing a common contract to work together. A new European warplane is expected to replace Eurofighters and Rafales from 2040.

• Reuters reports that a new helicopter tender will be kicked off by the Czech government this summer, with at least three bidders to be accepted. Taking to Twitter, Defence Minister Karla Slechtova said “We won’t go to a single company… We will address three bidders at least. We will complete the documentation and launch the tender in the summer,” she said. Both Bell Helicopter form the US and Italy’s Leonardo had submitted offers last year for the sale of the helicopters, but Slechtova scrapped the tender after taking office in December. Last October, the US DoD said that a purchase of 12 Bell UH-1Y utility helicopters would come at an estimated cost of $575 million.

Asia-Pacific

• Pakistan has come out with a shopping list of defense wares that it is seeking in ongoing negotiations with the Russian government. Speaking to Russian News Agency RIA Novosti, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khurram Dastgir Khan said talks were underway for the purchase of air defense systems, the Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker-E and potentially the T-90 main battle tanks (MBT). While Khan did not provide a timeline as to when these talks are to turn into contracts inked, the MoD was clear in stating that talks are in play and that announcements will be made once they are completed. While the exact air defense system was not mentioned by Khan, Quwa mentions that officials had previously expressed interest in the S-400 Triumf, most recently purchased by Turkey. Pakistan and Russia formally began building bilateral defence relations following a memorandum-of-understanding (MoU) in November 2014. In 2015, Pakistan signed an order for four Russian Helicopters Mi-35M assault helicopters in a $153 million deal which were handed-over to the Pakistan Army in 2017.

Today’s Video

• Short doc from 2017 on the KC-46 Pegasus:

Since the never completed withdrawal of NATO troops in Afghanistan, China has become more involved in one of its most conflictive neighbour’s affairs. It has offered to connect the country with its multi-billion dollar project, the Belt and Road Initiative, which includes the so-called Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor. AAN’s co-director Thomas Ruttig has found – after participating in a conference in Beijing, also appraising a public event with Chinese participation in Oslo, both in March 2018 – that, for economic and security reasons, Afghanistan is now higher up on China’s priority list but still far from being a top priority.

“China does not have a foreign policy. We only have a domestic policy, even in our relations with other countries”, said a Chinese scholar in the margins of a think tank conference the author attended in Beijing in October 2013. One aspect of it, he added, was to secure access to strategically important raw materials. He pointed to the copper deposits of Ainak, in the Afghan province of Logar, for which a consortium of Chinese state-owned enterprises had won a 30-year lease contract from the Afghan government in May 2008 (earlier AAN analysis here). The implementation did not go well, and the scholar blamed the Chinese state-owned companies. The companies, he said, take loans from the state to implement projects like these but do not expect that the state will demand that the loans be fully repaid. Such loans had accumulated and precipitated a small financial crisis. (See also these AAN dispatches about domestic Afghan problems within the project, here and here.)

“With my Afghanistan portfolio”, the scholar added, “I cannot even get close to the Zhongnanhai”, referring to the seat of the Communist Party and the government near Beijing’s Forbidden City. Afghanistan was only a fourth or fifth-rank problem, he said.

China forced into action

China’s foreign policy and the role it ascribes to Afghanistan have changed substantially since 2013. This became clear both during a conference in Beijing in late March 2018 in which the author participated, again as a member of a delegation of European think tankers, and on a panel some days earlier in the same month in Oslo. The first event was organised by the Asia programme of the European Council on Foreign Relations and the second one, titled “Chinese perspectives on Afghanistan“, was a part of the Afghanistan Week 2018, a collaboration between the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), all from Norway (you can hear a full podcast here). (1)

China sees itself developing into a “responsible regional power […] which moves closer to a position of global influence,” as Ji Zhiye, the president of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the influential think tank of the Ministry of State Security described in an article for his institute’s journal. (2) China does not yet call itself a “global power,” neither does it see itself matching the US on all levels. Ji calls his country a “world major country.” Other authors say that, at least in part, China is still “a developing country.” They also pointed out certain practical weaknesses that stand in the way of becoming more active on the world’s diplomatic scene. Insufficient “diplomatic capacity” was one example, as well as a lack of “understanding of the external world” that “think tanks should improve.”

The changing geopolitical situation has forced China to become more active, including in Afghanistan. In Oslo it was stated that this was “with some caution, in helping Afghanistan in reconstruction and peace and reconciliation, but in general under the UN framework and working together with other global and regional powers – in the hope that would help the Afghan people to work out a formula they feel that suits them the most.”

US scholar Barnett R Rubin said at the Oslo event, a “major reason for the China’s involvement in Afghanistan was its desire in identifying some common interest and potential cooperation with the US.” This motive has even become more important now with Beijing’s concerns about the ways in which a more isolationist US has started looking under President Trump. It is also clearly angered about new anti-Chinese measures, such as the new trade tariffs the US has imposed on certain export goods, a measure Beijing fears could result in a fully-fledged trade war harming everyone (see for example the Wall Street Journal here). The Chinese scholars participating in the Beijing conference said they were hoping the US “would not become a total trouble-maker”, also referring to the possibility that Washington might tear up the nuclear deal with Iran.

When it comes to Afghanistan, the scholars said “China wants to play a constructive role in Afghanistan.” Beijing became wary when the – never fully implemented and partly reversed – withdrawal of NATO soldiers from Afghanistan was announced while the security situation in the country was still far from resolved (this situation continues, see AAN analysis here). Urged by Washington under President Barack Obama to become more involved with Afghanistan, China joined the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) with Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US soon after President Ashraf Ghani took office in 2014 and visited Beijing on one of his first trips abroad (AAN analysis here). His aim was to pressure Pakistan into coercing the Taleban to the negotiating table. This initiative faltered, however (AAN analysis of this process here).

Since then, Chinese concerns have grown further. The scholars bluntly criticised the new US South Asia and Afghanistan strategy as “exclusive”, “misleading” and including “dangerous changes”, with its “increased emphasis on military means, less economic support and less nation-building”, despite lip-service to a “regional strategy.” It was “not smart […] to neglect the interests of regional countries” – a remark that could be both read with a view on Pakistan, on which the US is increasing pressure – and China itself. Also, as Rubin pointed out in Oslo, Pakistan itself is China’s “closest and most important ally, and this relationship is key to how China understands Afghanistan.” And likely also how China’s understanding of Afghanistan in the regional context and on its list of priorities should be understood. At the same time, as Prof. Wang Xu from Peking University’s Center for South Asian Studies added in Oslo, “we encourage the two countries to have at least crisis management” in their conflictive mutual relationship.

China’s security worries: “overspill”

The features of China’s Afghanistan policy are not so much dominated by the situation in the country itself, but of the potential for “overspill” of security problems in a number of neighbouring countries. (3) Officially, the government and the scholars speak of the threat of the “Three [Evil] Forces,” namely a combination of violent terrorism, ethno-national separatism and religious extremism. As laid out in another article in the CICIR journal, co-authored by Zhao Lei and Xu Huiying, professors at the Institute for International Strategic Studies associated with the Chinese Communist Party’s central committee, this includes South Korean Christian missionaries proselytising among China’s Korean minority, an overspill of illegal drugs from North Korea and of ethnic conflicts from Myanmar and northeast India, some of which are also spawning drug trafficking.

China’s gravest concern is Central Asia, including the five ex-Soviet republics and Afghanistan. This region is described in the CICIR article quoted above as “the forward position to launch separatist activities against China, to infiltrate into Xinjiang” – the region in China’s far west that has historically been dominated by Muslim ethnic groups – and “the frontline to split China.” (4) “Ideological infiltration” had intensified from “religious extremist forces of such Islamic countries as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as the Taliban terrorist groups from Afghanistan.” The local East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM), the article said, had extended its “scope” to other parts of China where it had carried out a number of terrorist attacks (see AAN’s recent analysis here). The movement’s headquarters and recruiting hub was located in Istanbul.

But, as two western scholars wrote in a report for the Carnegie Endowment (see here),

… China mostly appears concerned with addressing direct threats to Xinjiang province [by creating] a zone of stability around it, (…) rather than increasing its security presence in Central Asia more broadly. (…) Part of this policy obviously also includes gaining leverage in neighboring countries to help Beijing influence their approaches to Xinjiang and the diaspora Uighur minority populations across Central Asia. In fact, regional governments across Eurasia have become loath in recent years to resist Beijing’s requests to monitor local Uighur diaspora communities, to restrict activities of local Uighur civil society groups, and to extradite Uighurs suspected of links to extremist or secessionist groups.

Economic mega-projects and regional connectivity

Economics also play a central role in Afghanistan’s increasing importance for China. Since 2013, China has pushed forward an intercontinental economic connectivity strategy that is officially called the Belt and Road Initiative or Yidaiyilu in Chinese. (5) It consists of a land corridor and even digital connectivity networks linking China and Europe through Central Asia, a network of maritime trade routes through the Indian Ocean into the Mediterranean, as well as free trade areas with several countries, with the aim of supporting Chinese export flows. This is a Chinese version of the US idea to establish a ‘New Silk Road’ in order to solve the Afghan problem through regional economic integration and development. While the US version never really took off beyond diplomatic meetings under the ‘Heart of Asia’ label (AAN analysis here), China has allocated vast financial resources to it. The so-called Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor – only one of six planned corridors linked to the OBOR [One Belt, One Road] initiative – is a 62 billion USD project alone (media report here.

Of late, Afghanistan has come into sharper focus. After a first trilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan in Beijing in December 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that “China and Pakistan are willing to look at with Afghanistan, on the basis of win-win, mutually beneficial principles, using an appropriate means to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan.”

The Chinese scholars who met in Beijing were less optimistic. According to them, Pakistan was not really in favour of connecting Afghanistan to this initiative, given the strained ‘Af-Pak’ relations (see report about recent Pakistani cross-border shelling here), and was resisting Chinese ideas of expanding regional trade routes leading through Pakistan such as the road links via the two official border-crossings at Torkham (between Peshawar and Jalalabad) and Spin Boldak (between Quetta and Kandahar). Beijing is now planning to access Afghanistan’s northern border by roads and railroads leading through Central Asia all the way to Europe, forking off from a main connection leading through Tehran and Istanbul (media report here). This includes projects for a Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Turkmenistan (TAT) railway line (more here) and road links with Kyrghysstan and Uzbekistan which, according to Wang Xu speaking in Oslo, “would be perfect for Afghanistan.”

At the same time, the problem with Chinese state-owned enterprises seems to have been overcome, as they are apparently “better positioned to invest in Afghanistan as there was no need for “immediate returns.” (6)

Beijing’s Afghanistan policy and the economy-security link

According to the scholars, “stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan is regarded by China as a crucial issue for the future.” But it is seen more as a regional problem than an ‘Afghan’ one. “How does China rate Afghanistan as a problem?” one of the scholars asked, rhetorically. “We first are concerned about an overspill from Afghanistan to Pakistan, then about one from Afghanistan to Central Asia, and only then about Afghanistan itself. […] “If the Afghan government collapsed, this would be a problem; but if the Pakistani government collapsed, this would be a catastrophe.” The new US strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan was simply “wrong.” China would like to impress the view on Europe that “Pakistan does not want to be cornered by the US” and that “the EU should help on this, vis-à-vis the US.”

The scholars in Beijing formulated two main aims for China’s Afghanistan policy: “preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for international terrorists again, for example from those coming from Syria and Iraq” after the partial defeat of IS there; and to “stop terrorist financing.” The latter might indicate some doubts about the Taleban’s role in it, also with respect to what is left of al-Qaeda.

“The bottom line is: to prevent the worst-case scenario” – ie a collapse of the Afghan government and the disintegration of Afghan government forces – a repetition of the events after the Soviet withdrawal in the 1990s. “That’s why our foreign minister was in Islamabad and Kabul the last time” in June 2017 (media reporting here).

On aiding Afghanistan, the Chinese scholars opined that “although there is assistance fatigue, assistance to Afghanistan must be kept up. There cannot be a turning the back to Afghanistan.” China was ready to help, and now “follows the US and EU in its aid model.” In tandem with the Belt and Road Initiative, it has established financing institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and, more recently, a new National Development and Cooperation Agency (background here and here). Furthermore, “military pressure [on the Taleban] is still needed.” Therefore China has a more favourable view of NATO’s presence in Afghanistan. But a political solution was key, and that “needs to include the Taleban.”

The scholars saw three levels of dialogue necessary for a peaceful solution: between the Afghan government and the Taleban, between the US and the Taleban, and between the Afghan and Pakistani governments. But a “lack of consensus on peace on three levels on peace” stood in the way “within the Taleban, within the National Unity Government, and among the regional and international players.” The challenge was “how to reach minimal commonality” between them. And “if the Taleban insist on talks with the US first, why not?”

Any agreement reached between the Taleban and the Afghan government should be “endorsed or guaranteed by the US, the EU and/or China.” It was “not the time to bring on new actors,” but the Trump administration, with his new South Asia strategy, had given a stronger role to India.

There was clear scepticism about the feasibility of attempts to start peace talks being successful: “Without a capable Afghan government, there is no use to any initiative. […] How can a peace process be Afghan-led, when the Afghan government can’t provide for itself” and “only reacts” to proposals after it consulted with the US?” The scholars noted that “everything is controlled by the US from behind. […] We need to tell the Afghan government that it is time to stand on their own feet.”

At the same time, in Oslo, the Chinese scholars spoke about the country’s “advantage” that it never has “supported any specific group in Afghanistan to oppose another specific group. That gives China leverage… The main factions in Afghanistan do not view China as an enemy, and so China was in a position “to provide a platform for different factions to sit down” for talks.

There was also scepticism about another domestic Afghan policy issue. In the short-term, the scholars saw another “challenge in making the forthcoming elections more accepted” to the main players, “so that history does not repeat itself and there is no winner or loser” as was the case in the 2014 presidential poll. They were also sceptical about the possibility of parliamentary elections still being held in 2018 although the Afghan election commission had just postponed the date to 20 October, what is seen as the last feasible date before the onset of winter. They also stressed that efforts were necessary to prevent tensions between President Ghani and (former-) Balkh Governor Atta Muhammad Nur from “developing into a disaster.”

The scholars also raised some points shared by certain colleagues in the West and in Russia, but which over-emphasise the ethnic factor, for example about “tribal federalism” as an “Afghan tradition” and that “Afghanistan never had a strong central government since 1747.” The latter overlooks the relatively successful development-oriented, foreign aid-financed rule between 1953 and 1978. The scholars also suggested that Afghanistan should recognise the Durand Line as a “ground reality.” This reflects less understanding of Afghan sensitivities than of those of Pakistan.

The issue of “border management” was mentioned repeatedly, signalling China’s worries about Uyghur militants resident in border areas or (possibly) returning from the Middle East. The Syrian ambassador to Beijing claimed in mid-2017 that there were 5,000 Uyghurs fighting alongside the regime’s opponents (AAN is unable to say whether this is an accurate number), and China is concerned about their possible return to the Central Asian region “through different countries.” Allegedly, some had travelled through Tajikistan up until 2007, later through Pakistan and then through southeast Asian countries; an “Iran corridor” was also mentioned, which might lead through Afghanistan and Pakistan or directly through Pakistan.

The Chinese scholars were sure there were between several hundred and a thousand Uyghur militants in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province (a number which might include family members). But they said they were “lying low” and not involved in fighting. (At least two districts in Badakhshan are under Taleban control – Warduj and Jurm – as well as others, although only in part. There are also conservative madrassas in other parts of the province which could provide support (more AAN background here). The scholars added that Chinese activity in Badakhshan, which had generated some media attention, was linked to this perceived threat: “this is about counter-terrorism cooperation.” They said they did not think that China would send troops to Afghanistan permanently or establish a base of their own. This activity was about “capacity building of the Afghan government – even of the local government – and part of our military diplomacy.” Similar measures had earlier been reported in Tajikistan (see one media report here).

China has signed a number of bilateral security agreements with both countries (see here and here). The International Crisis Group reported a Chinese “security presence” and the existence of “an installation in a remote corner” of Tajik Badakhshan.

At the same time, they confirmed recent AAN analysis that direct infiltration of Xinjiang from Afghan Badakhshan was unlikely: “The Chinese-Afghan border [in the Wakhan] is very difficult to cross. There is only a narrow road. The Wakhan is not a corridor.” The scholars confirmed that some Uyghur militants had earlier crossed from Xinjiang into Pakistan (where subsequent leaders were killed in 2003 and 2010, see here) but not the other way around. (7)

All in all, “China’s ambitions in Afghanistan are very limited.” The country “should choose its own way of development. We do not care who rules Afghanistan.” But, as Rong Ying, Vice President and Senior Research Fellow, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) said in Oslo, China also thinks that outside powers “should not impose [on], not dominate and not manipulate Afghanistan.”

On the Taleban and Pakistan

The Chinese assessment of the general security situation in Afghanistan widely concurs with that of the West. The scholars summarised it by saying that despite the latest decline in the figure of civilian casualties and the fact that the Taleban had been unable, once again, to capture provincial centres in 2017, the situation was still “deteriorating.” They cited reports by UNAMA, the US Special Inspector of the Government for Afghanistan Reconstruction (better known by the acronym SIGAR) as well as the latest BBC research.

But China seems to be less concerned about potential threats to its current economic interests in Pakistan and its potential ones in Afghanistan by the Pakistani and the Afghan Taleban movements. One scholar remarked “We recognise now that there are some differences between the Afghan and the Pakistani Taleban” – the Afghan Taleban are allies of the Pakistani government, while the Pakistani ones want to topple it – “although there is some cooperation between them.” Another added, “the Afghan Taleban are no threat [for China], even the Pakistani Taleban are no threat.” If there was a security threat to China’s interests in Pakistan, then it would emanate from the Baloch movement in Pakistan. But even that threat was limited: altogether, they said, there were 320 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2017, with only five directed against Chinese interests or citizens. With respect to Afghanistan they said, “there are Taleban and Taleban; some Taleban are terrorists, some are a political entity,” even “an important political group in Afghanistan.” This overlaps with Pakistan’s position, and might even be the result of China’s view on Afghanistan shaped by what they described as “information sharing mechanisms with Pakistan.”

China’s interests are different from those of Pakistan, though: “We will do everything to prevent the Taleban from taking power by force, but if they gain power by political means, we would welcome this.” The scholars also described the Taleban as the lesser of two evils: “The Islamic State is the common enemy of the Taleban and the Afghan government. We should encourage the Taleban to defeat IS. There is a difference between the civil war [with the Taleban] and the anti-terrorism fight [against IS] in Afghanistan.” In Oslo, Peking University’s Wang Xu said “we should not exaggerate the Daesh factor” although it still was “a potential threat.” CICIR’s Li Wei wrote in an article on the tendencies of international Islamist terrorism after the defeats of the IS in the Middle East and its quasi-state “entity disintegrating,” that a reunification of IS with al-Qaeda was possible.

However, information sharing with Pakistan does not mean, according to the scholars, that China could easily influence Pakistan. “We have a leverage over Pakistan, particularly since [the large investments linked to] the OBOR initiative” but “China needs to be sensitive about Pakistan. Pakistan does not want China to become directly involved in Afghanistan.” Therefore, “China’s role [in persuading the Taleban to hold direct talks with the Afghan government] is overestimated.” At the same time, the scholars made no secret of the fact that China has maintained relations with the Taleban and continues to meet their representatives. No detail was provided but it seems that Xinjiang’s capital, Urumchi [Urumqi in Chinese], was a hub for such meetings.

Regional mechanisms: from multi- back to bilateralism?

The Chinese scholars were all but optimistic about existing multilateral regional mechanisms and peace initiatives. The latest Russia-initiated Moscow process “is not acceptable to US” while the US-China-Pakistani-Afghan Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) “has made Russia and India feel sidelined.” They even repeatedly called the QCG “a dying process,” despite latest attempts to revive it and China seeing “some potential” in it. (8) They also wondered whether it made sense to have Pakistan “representing” the Taleban in the group. The Istanbul Process (AAN analysis here) with its “confidence-building measures” was all “declaration, but no implementation.”

The same went for the Chinese-initiated Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established with Russia and the five Central Asian Republics in 2001 in order to create a joint regional security architecture independent of the West. The scholars said “China would like to promote the SCO’s engagement in Afghanistan, particularly in economic cooperation and the integration of Central Asia and Afghanistan” but “different perceptions on the US presence in Afghanistan” stood in the way. While China pragmatically considers it necessary to keep up “military pressure” on the Taleban, Russia was less positive, and since – on Russia’s initiative – rival south Asian powers India and Pakistan were brought in in 2017, all work has stalled as the organisation is based on the consensus principle and there was none on Afghanistan between the member-countries.

China also has pushed to create the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QDDM), a counterterrorism organisation consisting of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan—the first meeting of which occurred in Urumqi, Xinjiang in 2016 (see here). The scholars confirmed that joint Chinese-Afghan (also Chinese-Tajik) border patrols have taken place, but “not related to the Wakhan”, ie apparently elsewhere in Badakhshan. There was also “very good information sharing with Afghanistan on certain [militant] groups, such as the TIP [the Turkestan Islamic Party]”, and that they hoped “to extend this.” In Oslo is was said that China also has given Afghanistan “counter-terrorism equipment” since 2014.

Conclusion: A more important non-priority

Given the altered global balance of power, China sees itself on its way from regional to global power and, in its regional policy, moving “from the principle of non-interference to constructive engagement.” But, as one scholar put it: “What does this [constructive engagement] mean concretely, we don’t know.”

Bu Zhao Lei and Xu Huiying, quoted above, suggested that “[a]lthough China should abide by the basic principle of non-interference with other countries’ internal affairs, it must actively play the role of a major power [and] shoulder more international responsibilities.” But when it comes to peace initiatives, “for the most part, it only calls for restraint on both sides of [a certain] conflict and seeks resolution through peaceful means, rather then getting directly involved.”

The scholars confirmed that China’s role in Afghanistan has increased, but insisted at the same time that its “ambitions in Afghanistan are very limited.” In Oslo, it was stated that China still sees the US as the leading power in Afghanistan. They also said that it needed “some leverage in countries where it is investing.” This view will likely become more powerful when Afghanistan really becomes linked to the OBOR corridors through Central Asia. But the relationship with its ally Pakistan remains much more important than that with Afghanistan, and it will continue to look at Afghanistan from this angle.

For the time being, with what China sees as the failure of multilateral political stabilisation efforts, bilateral diplomacy on border management, security cooperation and information sharing is taking practical precedence again. Economic interests still dominate the agenda, both as an end for domestic development and a means, hopefully, for furthering regional integration and stabilisation.

Some hope and interest were expressed about concerted action with the EU, which had a “more realistic strategy” for Afghanistan than the US. China and the EU, as the “two forces to maintain world peace” as CICIR’s Feng Zhongping noted in another journal article, should work to “influence and persuade the US to modify its Afghanistan strategy. […] We want to work China and the EU in parallel, not jointly – then we sit together bilaterally [and compare notes].”

Edited by Sari Kouvo

 

(1) In the main text of this dispatch, the author focusses on the event he participated in himself (which was under Chatham House rules), with a few additional quotes and footnotes from the Oslo event and from Chinese think tank journals.

You also find the list of participants in the Oslo panel under the link given above.

(2) The article was published in the November/December 2017 of the journal of Contemporary International Relations (CIR) issue and is not available online.

In Oslo, the Chinese participants informed that a reorganisation of China’s think tank landscape was under way, so attributions of institutes to institutions given above might change or have already changed.

(3) China has 14 neighbours, and its border with Afghanistan is shortest with any of them, under 100 kilometers. The Chinese scholars in Oslo also stated that there were no bilateral problems between both countries, after the border was demarcated in a 1965 treaty.

(4) The largest of these ethnic groups are the Uyghur (who have, at various times in the past, declared independence for East Turkestan). Other, smaller groups such as the Kazakh, Kyrghyz and Tajik also live there, apart from the Han Chinese Muslims, called Hui. Due to China’s development and population policies, ethnic Chinese Han now constitute a majority in Xinjiang, which has contributed to tensions.

A (Mountain) Tajik Autonomous County is situated to the immediate east of the Afghan Wakhan corridor. It has less then 30,000 inhabitants, 84 per cent of whom are Ismaili Mountain Tajiks, mainly of the Sarikoli ethnic group. (Afghan Mountain Tajiks in Badakhshan include the Wakhi, Shughni, Munjani and others.) The ‘Afghan’ scenes of the movie The Kite Runner were shot in its administrative centre, Tashqurghan (Chinese: Taxkurgan). The Hui have their own autonomous region, Ningxia, in northern central China.

(5) Formerly also known as One Belt One Road (OBOR).

(6) Reportedly, China expects to lose up to 30 per cent of its investment in Central Asia, a margin that could also be assumed for projects in Afghanistan (quoted in this Carnegie paper).

(7) A new leader of the group in Pakistan vowed to take revenge in 2014 (read here).

(8) The rendering of this issue was somewhat more positive at the public events in Oslo where it was stated that the QCG had made “some kind of progress”, that there was an attempt to draft “a road map for a settlement” and that China was “still trying” on this front.

 

 

Chinese PF-89 Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher

The 5th European Air-to-Air Refuelling Training exercise (EART 2018) kicked off today 9 April at Eindhoven Air Base in the Netherlands. EART 2018 brings together tankers from Germany, the Netherlands, France and - for the first time - from a non-European country, the United States, for a two week training exercise ending on 20 April. 

The European Air-to-Air Refuelling Training (EART) concept was introduced in 2014 under the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) air-to-air refuelling initiative, and is run by the European Air Transport Command (EATC) from Eindhoven airbase. The exercise is supported by the host nation (the Netherlands), the Eindhoven-based Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) and EDA. 

EART is organised on a yearly basis in combination with the ‘Frisian Flag’ fighter training exercise, also organized by the Netherlands, that operates from Leeuwarden Airbase. The objective is to train air crews and engineers in planning and executing complex air-to-air refuelling (AAR) operations in a multinational and realistic COMAO (composite air operation) environment, with the overall aim of enhancing effectiveness and interoperability of forces. A particular focus is also put on facilitating the certification processes between tankers and receiver aircraft. The exercise director for EART 2018 is Colonel Andrea Massucci (Italian Air Force).

 

Eindhoven for two weeks “tanker town of Europe”

AAR is a significant force enabler and multiplier as it enhances combat effectiveness by extending the range, payload and endurance of receiver aircraft. It allows air power to be projected at greater distances or concentrated where and when it is needed mostly. “Air-to-air refueling capacity is the backbone of modern day air power. Without it, we don’t do much. Air power continuously needs fuel”, said Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Oostema, Head of Operations at Eindhoven air base. 

However, delivering a guaranteed, continuous coverage of air-to-air refueling capacity is challenging. “That’s why we need to train together. The European air-to-air refuelling Training (EART) at Eindhoven air base provides us with that unique opportunity”, Lieutenant-Colonel Oostema stressed. “For two weeks Eindhoven air base will be the tanker town of Europe”.

 

Background: EDA’s global approach on AAR

EDA has developed a global approach on AAR with three objectives: optimizing the use of assets, increasing the overall AAR capacity and reducing fragmentation of the fleet. This work has led to three complementary work-strands, on some of which EDA is cooperating closely with other agencies and organizations like OCCAR, the Movement Coordination Center Europe (MCCE) and the European Air Transport Command (EATC).

EART 2018 is part of the first work strand (optimization of existing capabilities), which is achieved by supporting training exercises. In this domain, EDA has also taken the lead to streamline the different certification processes leading to a clearance. By standardizing these processes the different aviation authorities can easily identify the differences between their own process and their counterpart. By working closely together, already fielded capabilities and future capabilities, can work more cost efficiently and increase their operational output.  

 

More information:

• Air-to-Air Refueling EDA project page
• Air-to-Air Refueling factsheet
• EATC website

 

Americas

• Air-framer Boeing received Thursday, April 5, a $54.3 million order for additional Super Hornet and Growler aircraft for the US Navy. The purchase order covers the provision of 11 Lot 38 F/A-18E aircraft and 21 EA-18G aircraft, and Boeing will be allocated and obligated monies from previously expired funds originally allocated in Navy fiscal 2013 and 2014 aircraft procurement funds. Work will take place across the United States.

• BAE Systems have announced that all five variants of its Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) have been delivered to the US Army to undergo testing. 29 vehicles were produced under a $383 million Engineering and Manufacturing Design contract awarded in December 2014, with all types—general purpose, mission command, mortar carrier, medical evacuation and medical treatment—produced during the phase. A company press release said that “The next phase of testing will help us to better understand the soldier/machine relationship and identify areas we can improve upon,” adding that it expects to pass the Army’s Milestone C review in 2019 ahead of preparation for low-rate production. It is expected that a total of 289 vehicles will beprocured during the $1.2 billion program, which will see the AMPV replace the Vietnam War-era M113 family of vehicles.

• Boeing has scored another milestone in its KC-46 Pegasus tanker program, several weeks after Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson criticised the firm for delays to the program. The announcement made by Boeing on Wednesday said that the Pegasus completed the fuel on-load testing portion required for the FAA Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) by refueling another KC-46A in mid-air. The fuel transfer took place during a 3h, 40min-long flight on an undisclosed date, successfully transferring 66,200kg (146,000lb) of jet fuel and achieved the maximum fuel off-load rate of 1,200 gallons per minute. The KC-46 now has demonstrated the ability to receive fuel from three tankers in the USAF fleet: KC-46, KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft, Boeing says. It also has demonstrated refueling with other aircraft including the F-16, F/A-19, AV-8B, C-17 and A-10.

Middle East & Africa

• The kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been cleared by US State Department to proceed with the purchase of M109A5/A6 Medium Self-Propelled Howitzers. Valued at $1.31 billion, the package calls for the supply of 180 155mm M109A5/A6 Medium Self-Propelled Howitzer structures—for conversion to 177 M109A6 Paladin Howitzer systems—as well as three Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainers static training, 180 M2 HB .50 Cal Machine Guns, and eight Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems Devices, along with other products and support services, including material to aid in upgrading the Howitzer systems. Outside of the United States, Saudi Arabia will be the only other operator of the howitzer’s Paladin variant, which offers increases survivability, RAM, and armament to its four-man crew. A lead contractor for the foreign military sale has yet to be announced.

Europe

• Both Germany and the United Kingdom have been cleared by the US State Department to proceed with foreign military sales that will boost their UAV capabilities. The sales were announced by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency last week. For Germany, a $2.5 billion order covers the potential sale of four MQ-4C Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), along with all the various systems, engines and equipment that caters for the US Navy’s Trion configuration. Northrop Grumman will act as lead contractor in regards to integration, installation and functional platform compatibility testing of the payload, while Airbus will take the lead for Germany on the development and manufacturing, and will be responsible for the functional test, end-to-end test and installed performance. The British package, valued at $500 million, covers articles and services for continues follow-on support to the MQ-9 Reaper program. General Atomics and MAG Aerospace will be prime contractors.

• The Pentagon announced Thursday, April 6, the award of a $116.8 million contract to Lockheed Martin to upgrade Dutch-operated AH-64 Apache helicopters. Under the terms of the deal, Lockheed will produce and integrate its Modernized Laser Range Finder Designators on Apaches owned by the Netherlands, and is a modification to a previous foreign military sales award contract. Work will take place in Orlando, Florida with an expected completion date of August 2020. First delivered in 2013, the advanced laser range finder technology provide Apache pilots with improved situational awareness and improved communications with ground forces, while also giving pilots color for their Apache cockpit displays

Asia-Pacific

• A $148 million howitzer ammunition package for the government of Australia has been cleared by the US State Department. The request called for the delivery of 2,504 rounds of M795 with Insensitive Munitions Explosive (IMX) 101 Explosive Fill 155mm High Explosive (HE) Projectile. Also were 155mm High Explosive, Illumination and White Phosphorous munitions, point detonating fuzes, electronic-timed fuzes, M231 and M232/M232A1 propelling charges, percussion primers, technical publications and books, technical data for operational maintenance, technical assistance and services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. Principal contractors will be announced at a later date.

• India has officially launched its competition to acquire 110 new fighter aircraft. Announced on Friday, the request for proposals kicks off a long delayed deal that could potentially reach as much as $15 billion. The competition is opened to both single and twin-engine fighters and an air force notice said that “85 percent will have to be made in India by a Strategic Partner/Indian Production Agency”. So far, both Lockheed Martin and Saab have offered the Indian government generous terms for building their aircraft—the F-16 and Gripen respectively—at facilities within India and have already teamed with local firms in anticipation for a engine only deal. However, in February the government asked the air force to open up the competition to twin-engined aircraft, in the latest flip-flop in policy that has delayed the acquisition process for years and left the air force short of hundreds of planes. Other alternatives now available include the Eurofighter Typoon, Dassault Rafale, Boeing’s Super Hornet, or a Russian offering.

Today’s Video

• Czech Mate: The L-39NG light attack aircraft:

North Korean Hwasong 12 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

The International Criminal Court has announced a delay in deciding whether or not to authorise an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity by American and Afghan government forces and Taleban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. A decision had been expected during the last month, but a routine changeover of the Court’s judges means a new panel of judges now has to start sifting through all the material gathered on Afghanistan before it can come to a decision. As AAN’s Kate Clark reports, Afghans will have to wait weeks or even months to hear what will happen.

The decision by the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on whether or not to authorise an investigation in Afghanistan will be political dynamite whichever way it goes. If authorised, the main task of the team of investigators would be to collect victim and witness statements and other evidence to build cases against specific individuals that could lead to their prosecution. (The ICC prosecutes individuals, not governments or armed groups or organisations.)

The most powerful country potentially under the spotlight, the United States, has robustly asserted that the Court has no jurisdiction over its citizens. (1) The Afghan government, as a party to the Rome Statute has said it will cooperate with the Court, but has consistently argued that now is not the time for an investigation because “stability” is the overriding need of the moment (see for example Ambassador Mahmoud Saikal’s speech to the UN General Assembly in late 2017. Kabul also does not want ICC actions to discourage US forces from staying in Afghanistan and helping fight the Taleban.

At the same time, the ICC, criticised for only ‘going after’ African countries (see for example, here), while avoiding the powerful nations of the world, would suffer further damage to its prestige if it was seen to be shying away from investigating Afghanistan, given the allegations against the CIA and US military. This could be particularly the case in Afghanistan itself where, as the ICC has admitted (AAN analysis here), it’s outreach had been considered poor and it, with no presence on the ground, has had not managed to have a “clear voice” in the Afghan media.

Whichever way the Pre-Trial Chamber decides will have political repercussions. However, there is nothing to suggest that the delay in making a decision was caused by anything other than for bureaucratic reasons. The three judges from the Pre-Trial Chamber had failed to come to a decision before routine personnel changes were due three weeks ago.

The ICC has eighteen judges, each of whom serves for nine years, and on 16 March 2018, six judges who had finished their terms left the Court and six new judges were sworn in. The Court had to re-assign the decision on Afghanistan to a new panel of judges (see details here). The new panel has had to start from scratch, wading through and considering all the material gathered on Afghanistan over the last decade. An ICC press release warned “it cannot be determined at present how many more weeks/months this process will take.”

The delay has come at a critical stage in proceedings. On 3 November 2017, ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda had requested (AAN report here) that the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber authorise an investigation into alleged perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Afghanistan and three other countries which she said had a ‘nexus’ with the Afghan conflict, Lithuania, Romania and Poland. The CIA had black sites in these three countries and Afghanistan, rendering detainees between the sites and torturing them. Bensouda had earlier reported, in November 2016, that the use of torture by Afghan and American forces and a wider range of war crimes by the Taleban and other insurgent groups, including murder and intentionally attacking civilians, did pass the thresholds set by the Court to determine whether an investigation was merited.

After Bensouda’s November 2017 request for an investigation, the Court sought the views of victims. They were given just two months, December 2017 and January 2018, to make their views and experiences known to the Court and, overwhelmingly, called for an investigation. They spoke about having suffered murder, rape, forced disappearance, pillage and attacks against themselves as civilians. They told the Court they wanted an investigation to end to impunity, prevent future crimes, to find out about the forcibly disappeared and for victims’ voices to be heard (see AAN analysis here and a redacted version of the victims’ responses published in February, here).

The old panel of judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber had then spent the weeks after the victims’ responses were collated weighing up whether or not to authorise an investigation. It had been hoped their decision would come by the start of March. It did not come in time, so that task has now fallen to the new panel. It is made up of the following three judges:

• Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua (Presiding Judge) from the Democratic Republic of Congo, who joined the ICC in 2015. He served as a legal officer with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania (1996 to 2001) and as a trial judge in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague (2006 to date) (see his biography here).
• Tomoko Akane, a Japanese judge with extensive prosecuting experience (see media reporting here and her official biography here). She has just joined the ICC.
• Rosario Salvatore Aitala, an Italian, also newly selected. According to his biography, he has specialist experience prosecuting cases of corruption against the Mafia and crimes against vulnerable persons, of transnational and financial investigations and international cooperation on criminal matters. Aitala has worked in Afghanistan as coordinator of the Italian Judicial Programme for Afghanistan (Italy was the ‘lead nation’ on judicial reforms in the early years of the post-2001 administration). The Italian Newspaper of the United Nations reported that he “drafted criminal legislation and established Sections for crimes against women and children in the Office of the General Prosecutor in Kabul and in Herat.” The Italian justice programme was not well regarded, but Aitala will, at least, bring his personal knowledge of Afghanistan to this task. (2)

If the new panel does not reach a decision by 20 July this year when the Court goes into its summer recess, there will be a further delay until it resumes work on 13 August. Sooner or later though, whether after weeks or months, the judges will come to a decision, to authorise an investigation in Afghanistan – or not. Either way, there will be both criticism and applause.

Edited by Thomas Ruttig

 

(1) The US is not a state party to the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court. However, according to the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over individuals not only if the “person accused of the crime is a national” of a state party to the Rome Statue, but also if “the conduct in question occurred” on the territory of a state party. In other words, because Afghanistan is a signatory to the Rome Statute, the Court has jurisdiction over citizens of any nationality who commit war crimes or crimes against humanity on its soil (quotes from Article 12 (2) of the Rome Statute).

(2) There are two Pre-Trial Chambers. This one, known as Pre-Trial Chamber II is also responsible for considering the following situations:

• Central African Republic I
• Central African Republic II
• Republic of Uganda
• Darfur, Republic of the Sudan
• Republic of Kenya
• Republic of Côte d’Ivoire
• Republic of Burundi

Pre-Trial Chamber I is considering the situations in :

• Democratic Republic of the Congo
• Libya
• Republic of Mali
• Georgia
• Gabonese Republic
• Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia

 

 

 

 

 

 

Belarusian MZKT-79292 Special Wheeled Chassis

Americas

• Indian media reports that both Chile and Peru are interested in procuring the Brahmos cruise missile, a joint development by both Russia and India. According to the Financial Express citing anonymous officials, “The Chilean armed forces are interested in buying the missile. There have been active discussions between the two sides.” Meanwhile, Peru has made several expressions of interest, with further inquiries following upon the successful trials of the missile aboard the SU-30 fighter jet. In preparation for the potential South American sales, the BrahMos Company is now registered with the government of Chile which will help in future sales in case negotiations culminate on a positive note, sources say.

• General Electric will provide engines for US Navy F/A-18 aircraft as part of a $91.5million contract modification awarded by the service on April 3. According to the deal, the firm will provide 24 Lot 22 full-rate production F414-GE-400 engines with work to take place in Lynn, Massachusetts (59 percent); Hooksett, New Hampshire (18 percent); Rutland, Vermont (12 percent); and Madisonville, Kentucky (11 percent). Contract completion is scheduled for February 2019.

• Embraer’s KC-390 tanker-transport prototype that recently returned to testing following an earlier test mishap has featured at the FIDAE air show in Santiago, Chile. The debut appearance in Chile comes eight years after the Chilean government committed to the KC-390 program, however, only Portugal has so far moved forward with plans to buy the aircraft. According to Flight Global, Gen Lorenzo Villalón Del Fierro, chief of the general staff of the Chilean air force, declined to answer any questions about fixed-wing aviation procurements during FIDAE. Damaged during a slow-speed stall test, the prototype had its aerodynamic wing-to-body fairing and the fuel sponsons on the fuselage replaced, returning to service last month.

• A Brazilian-made wide area and head-up displays for the Saab Gripen E/F will be offered to all customers of the single-engined fighter as a potential cockpit upgrade, the head of the program’s Brazilian unit has said. Mikael Franzén, head of Business Unit, Gripen Brazil, said Saab will “make them available for all Swedish air force customers.” The Brazilian air force’s $5.4 billion order for 36 Gripen fighters includes several changes from the Swedish air force version. Instead of three multifunction displays, the FAB selected a 19in by 8in wide-area touchscreen made by AEL Sistemas, an Elbit Systems subsidiary based in Brazil. The latest version both the wide area and head-up displays are now in safety-of-flight testing with Saab, according to AEL.

Middle East & Africa

• Czech firm Aero Vodochody has sold four L-39NG training fighter jets to Senegal, a company statement has said. It marks the once struggling firm’s first international sale of new aircraft in 20 years. The sale of the light attack version of the aircraft is the first of a series the company is seeking to close abroad after bringing in industry veteran Giuseppe Giordo as president in 2016 to help turn the company around. “The L-39NG aircraft is the new future of Aero Vodochody,” Giordo said adding, “We also have two additional contracts in a very mature state of negotiation.”

Europe

• The US State Department has cleared the sale of 17 CH-47F Chinook helicopters to the Spanish military. Valued at $1.3 billion, the foreign military sale comes with a host of associated parts and mission equipment including the AN/AAR-57A(V)8 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS). According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “The proposed sale of the CH-47F aircraft will improve Spain’s heavy lift capability,” adding that “Spain will use this enhanced capability to strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats. Spain will have no difficulty absorbing these aircraft into its armed forces.”

• Slovakia has been preemptively cleared to proceed with the potential sale of F-16 Block 70/72 fighters following clearance by the US State Department. According to a DSCA statement, the $2.9 billion package will also include 30 AIM-120C7 air-to-air missiles, 100 AIM-9X air-to-air missiles, 150 guidance kits for Joint Direct Attack Munition bombs, 400 MK-82 or BLU-111 500-pound bomb bodies and 400 fuzes. While Slovakia has yet to decide on an aircraft that will go towards replacing its Soviet-era fleet of MiG-29s, the eventual winner will give Bratislava a fourth generation fighter capability that is interoperable with the United States and NATO.

Asia-Pacific

• US Air Force CV-22 tiltrotor aircraft will deployed to Japan this week, a year ahead of schedule. Five aircraft are scheduled to touchdown in Yokota Air Base in Tokyo this week and the deployment aims to address “regional security concerns in line with the recently released 2018 National Defense Strategy and also provides a platform that can rapidly react to natural disasters or crises,” a US Forces Japan (USFJ) statement said. According to Defense News, the CV-22s will remain at Yokota for a short time before leaving to conduct training around the region for the next few months and will continue to operate from Yokota upon their return. A total of 10 aircraft are expected to be assigned to Yokota as part of a phased-basing plan over the next several years, according to USFJ.

Today’s Video

• Night-time, mid-air refueling of the MiG-31:

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