Aleksandar Vulin, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, visited the European Defence Agency this week for discussions with EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq.
The Republic of Serbia concluded an Administrative Arrangement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2013 enabling it to participate in EDA projects and programmes on a case by case basis. Mr Domecq welcomed the opportunity to discuss with Minister Vulin Serbia’s participation in EDA projects following detailed updates provided by EDA on a range of ongoing projects including on the EDA Helicoper Exercises Programme, its work on Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), medical, standardisation and airworthiness as well as the EU Satcom Market in which Serbia has been participating since 2016.
Minister Vulin expressed interest on Serbia’s involvement in areas such as Helicopter Exercises, standardisation, medical and ammunition. Other topics discussed during the visit was EDA’s role in the new European defence initiatives as well as Serbia’s defence planning and its priorities related to security and defence.
In April, Qari Hekmatullah, the self-proclaimed commander of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), was killed in a US airstrike. Under his command, a local affiliate of the Afghan-Pakistani Daesh affiliate, ISKP, had challenged both the government and the Taleban and established almost full control over two remote districts of Jawzjan province, Darzab and Qush Tepa. In this update of earlier reports on the situation in the area, AAN’s Obaid Ali takes a look at the latest dynamics there following Hekmat’s death and finds that his group is still in charge.
The killing of Qari Hekmat
On 5 April 2018, a US airstrike killed Qari Hekmat – as he was usually known – an ISKP-affiliated commander in northern Afghanistan. According to a statement released by US military headquarters, Hekmat was killed in Qorogh village of Belcheragh district in neighbouring Faryab province. General Faqir Muhammad Jawzjani, the province’s police chief, also confirmed that he had been killed in a US airstrike (media report here).
Sources close to Hekmat told AAN that he had survived a drone attack a day earlier, on 4 April 2018, while he and two of his bodyguards were en route to visit fighters in the village of Qorogh (where he was killed the following day). The attack that killed him along with one of his bodyguards was carried out as they attempted to return to his base in Sar Dara village in the district of Darzab. The second bodyguard was wounded.
Qorogh is a village on the Faryab side of the border between this province and his stronghold in Jawzjan. But it is surrounded by a number of villages that belong to Darzab district. For this reason, Qorogh’s inhabitants interact mainly with residents from Darzab. Hekmat’s presence there was due to the proximity of the village to his base and was not a sign that he was planning to expand his activities in Faryab.
Qari Hekmat was a former Taleban commander who, in 2015, joined the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a recognised branch of the Syria/Iraq-based Islamic State (IS) for Afghanistan and Pakistan, an area the IS calls Khorasan. Under the ISKP banner, Hekmat took over most of Qush Tepa and Darzab districts and established his own parallel administration (read more AAN background on Qari Hekmat here and here).
A new leader
After Qari Hekmat’s killing, the group’s decision-making council appointed Mawlawi Habib Rahman as his successor. Hekmat had established the council, which consists of 14 loyal commanders, although its exact composition is not known. With its military and administrative structures, the council serves as the core management body for the local ISKP branch (more AAN reporting here). It discusses and decides on military, public outreach, finance and security issues every month.
Unlike Hekmat, 31 year-old Mawlawi Habib Rahman is a relative newcomer to the Jawzjan insurgency and not a local. The Uzbek from Sholgara district in Balkh province joined Hekmat’s forces in 2016. Previously he had served as the head of the group’s shadow judiciary and as a member of the decision-making council (read AAN’s previous analysis here). He had thus demonstrated his capacity to serve in a relatively high position within the group under Hekmat’s command. Despite his young age, limited local knowledge and military experience, his appointment seems to have happened without dispute and largely due to the fact that he is a religious scholar and was Hekmat’s close aide in the early stages of the pro-ISKP formation.
Habib Rahman is also the brother in-law of a former Taleban shadow district governor in Qush Tepa, Mufti Nemat, who surrendered to General Abdulrashid Dostum in 2015. He later switched sides again to join the late Hekmat. Mufti Nemat continues to operate in Darzab and might also have supported the appointment of Habib Rahman to lead the group.
The consequences of Qari Hekmat’s death
The killing of Qari Hekmat has not led to a visible weakening of the military position of the group in either of the districts they control. This has been confirmed to AAN by various sources. In the eyes of Sher Muhammad, an Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander in Darzab district, the killing did not have “any negative impact” on the group or its grip over the two districts. He told AAN “The Daesh front line is only 500 metres away from the Afghan security force’s base in Darzab district centre.” The district governor of Qush Tepa, Aminullah Amin, confirmed this to AAN. According to him, Daesh continues to occupy most parts of Qush Tepa and Darzab. While the exact number of ISKP-affiliated fighters in Jawzjan is unclear, Amin further told AAN they were strong enough to defeat the local Afghan security forces. Local sources close to the group told AAN that Mawlawi Habib Rahman currently leads 300 to 400 fighters that include some Central Asians.
Local elders told AAN that the local pro-ISKP group does not have a military base or any other permanent presence in the villages of both districts but that fighters visit villages on a weekly basis, distributing announcements to obey the ISKP’s instructions. But in contrast to this agency report, the ISKP fighters do not dwell “in caves” but occupy houses abandoned by the local population. This is also the case with their headquarters in Sar Dara, a wide valley used for agricultural purposes in Darzab. Despite the lack of a permanent ISKP presence there, neither government forces nor Taleban fighters attempt to enter these villages, for fear that they might be trapped by pro-ISKP fighters.
Following the killing of Qari Hekmat, neither the ANSF nor the local Taleban have attempted to carry out large-scale counteroffensive against pro-ISKP fighters in Darzab or Qush Tepa. The only operation conducted was one by Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and US Special Operation Forces (SOF) in Darzab. According to a statement released by the US-led Resolute Support mission on 11 April – six days after Qari Hekmat’s killing –, the ASSF and SOF killed 22 ISKP fighters in the district. The statement further said that since the beginning of 2018, 90 ISKP fighters had been killed, the majority in Darzab (full text here).
The Resolute Support figure, however, was not confirmed by AAN’s local sources. Speaking to AAN, local elders from Darzab confirmed the 11 April Special Forces operation there but said only “a few” pro-ISKP fighters had been killed and that the US and Afghan forces had left the area again. Local officials also told AAN that there had not been any attempt to carry out a large-scale counter-offensive against ISKP fighters in the province so far. Sher Muhammad, the ALP commander, and district governor Amin, however, insist that such an operation must be carried out in order to eliminate the ISKP threat. Speaking to AAN on 13 May 2018, Najib Danesh, spokesman for the Ministry of Interior, said the Afghan security forces would soon conduct clearance operations against Taleban and ISKP in Jawzjan.
The limited number of local Afghan security forces in Darzab and Qush Tepa hampers such an operation. They are stationed in only a few bases in the district centres and are only capable of protecting the centres as well as a few nearby villages. Deploying reinforcements and logistical supplies to Qush Tepa and Darzab is a serious challenge, as the highway connecting the provincial centre Shebarghan to both districts is mostly controlled and often blocked by Qari Hekmat’s fighters.
Neither have the Taleban yet responded to the pro-ISKP fighters in Jawzjan after their fighters retreated to the neighbouring provinces of Faryab and Sar-e Pul in January 2018 (AAN’s previous report here). This is largely due to the local Taleban commanders’ failure to recruit new local fighters as well as their fear of being targeted by ASSF or US SOF airstrikes. Therefore, the pro-ISKP network in Darzab and Qush Tepa continues to enjoy a monopoly of control in most parts of both districts.
Links with ISKP Central?
It is still not clear how strong the group’s connections are with the ISKP’s main foothold in Afghanistan, in eastern Nangrahar province. In June 2017, a delegation from Darzab visited Nangrahar province (see AAN’s analysis here) but further face-to-face contact has not been reported. In March 2018, a video clip that was apparently filmed by Uzbek fighters operating in Jawzjan under the ISKP flag and released by ISKP supporters on Facebook, featured fighters in Jawzjan pledging an oath of allegiance to the Islamic State. The video also showed a group of young Uzbek boys completing military training and expressing loyalty to the Islamic State, although the exact locations were unclear. Furthermore, it contained material showing an ISKP commander in Nangrahar appealing to IS fighters in Syria and Iraq to join the Afghan ISKP. This was – according to AAN’s knowledge – the first video featuring both ISKP fighters in Jawzjan and Nangrahar provinces.
The pro-ISKP network in Jawzjan does not have its own media wing to release its videos or statements. In most cases, material is distributed through individual Facebook accounts belonging to sympathisers.
Conclusion
Looking at the current dynamics within the ISKP militancy in Darzab and Qush Tepa, its fighters have remained unified and resilient enough to survive the death of their local supreme leader. The late Hekmat’s investment in these isolated and mountainous areas, building on his decade of military experience with the Taleban and his knowledge of the local dynamics, has ensured a strong and resilient pro-ISKP foothold in the southeast of Jawzjan. This is not to say that the killing of Qari Hekmat will not affect the group’s continued military success or its current hold over the two districts over time, particularly as Mawlawi Habib Rahman needs to show whether he can fully replace Hekmat and operate as successfully as he did. But so far there are – despite some losses – no significant signs of disunity or fragmentation within the pro-ISKP fighters in Jawzjan, and their territorial grip remains unchallenged and unchanged.
Edited by Sari Kouvo and Thomas Ruttig
Paveway II kits convert standard Mk 80 family free-fall bombs into laser-guided weapons. Each guidance kit consists of a computer control group (CCG) guidance system with a semi-active laser seeker and pneumatically-controlled guidance canards for the front-end of the bomb, plus an air foil group (AFG) on the back end that provides lift and stability. Once a target is designated, laser guidance is more accurate than GPS, but it can be foiled by obscurants like fog, sandstorms, etc.
At the beginning of August 2011, the US government issued a contract worth up to $475 million…
“Paveway” is actually a US government designation for laser-guided bombs, but the term has been the subject of global legal battles between Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, with Raytheon claiming it as a trademark, and Lockheed Martin claiming it as a generic term. A number of courts have ruled in favor of the generic argument.
UpdatesMay 11/18: A cheaper bang Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control is being tapped by the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division to produce more laser training rounds. The contract modification is part of a multi-year deal, it provides for the production of 7,501 BDU-59F/B LGTR and is valued at over $23 million. In October 2017 the Air Force had selected Lockheed Martin for follow-on production of Paveway II Laser-Guided Bomb Kits for the ninth consecutive year. The Paveway II consists of a computer control group guidance system with a semi-active laser seeker and pneumatically-controlled guidance canards for the front-end of the bomb, plus an air foil group on the back end that provides lift and stability. Once a target is designated, laser guidance is more accurate than GPS, but it can be foiled by obscurants like fog and sandstorms. The BDU-59F/B LGTR is used in tactical employment training and is a cost-effective alternative to expending on operational Laser-Guided Bomb assets. LGTR allows aircrews to practice delivery tactics in a real-mission environment and experience actual weapon characteristics within today’s range limitations. Work will be performed at multiple locations in the US and in Vaudreuil-Dorion, Canada. Work is scheduled for completion by December 2020.
October 30/17: For the ninth consecutive year, Lockheed Martin has been selected by the US Air Force for follow-on production of Paveway II plus Laser-Guided Bomb Kits. Valued at $131 million, the award also includes all available funding for the service’s foreign military sales and replacement kits. Paveway II Plus includes an enhanced guidance package turns free-fall, or dumb bombs, into laser guided weapons through the addition of a nose-mounted laser seeker and fins for guidance. Production is expected to commence in the first quarter of Fiscal year 2018.
April 23/17: An F-35C loaded with the latest F3 software configuration has successfully hit a moving target with a GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bomb in what was the munition’s first developmental release from the fighter variant. The successful test was made capable by the inclusion of Lead Point Compute logic in the software which enhances the effectiveness against moving targets, with the objective of reducing pilot workload. This works by delaying the release point of the weapon to ensure the weapon has the available kinematics to guide to and reach the target at its future location. The GBU-12 has now been tested on every variant of the F-35.
July 29/16: A growth in Paveway guided bomb sales has resulted in Raytheon posting better than expected quarterly revenues for 2016. The sales saw the company’s missile division posting a 6% increase in the second quarter. International sales accounted for a third of all guided munitions with half of exports coming from governments in the Middle East and Africa.
May 11/16: Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control and Raytheon Missile Systems have been awarded a combined not-to-exceed $649.7 million modification contract for Paveway II production. The modification provides a five year extension for Paveway II missile production with work completion expected for July 27, 2023. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of the munition in 2015 included a $1.29 billion sale of muntions to Saudi Arabia, which included 1,000 GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided bombs.
Aug 1/11: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Archbold, PA (FA8213-11-D-0008), and Raytheon Missile Systems of Tucson, AZ (FA8213-11-D-0007) receive a $475 million contract for Paveway II laser-guided bomb computer control groups (seekers), and GBU-12 air foil groups (tail kits) for 500 pound bombs. Both elements are needed, in order to create a GBU-12 laser-guided bomb. The Ogden Air Logistics Center/GHGKA at Hill Air Force Base, UT manages the contract.
Discussions with Hill AFB confirm that this is a single 5-year firm-fixed-price, multiple-award contract. The 2 firms will compete for purchase orders, as the USAF issues them.