Defence`s Feeds

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

“Green Tops” MV-22 osprey tilt-rotor aircraft fly the President’s supporting staff and Secret Service agents. On May 23, Donald Trump traveled to New York City in one of the Presidential VH-3D helicopters operated by the U.S. Marine Corps HMX-1 (Marine Helicopter Squadron One). Here’s a video of the Marine One helicopter flying over NYC the […]

The Remarkable Exploits of Three Thunderchief Pilots Are a Must-Read on Memorial Day. It’s Memorial Day in the United States, part of a long three-day weekend where people in the U.S. reflect on the high cost of freedom and liberty as they remember those who sacrificed their lives for it. While it is a somber […]

Americas

• The US Army is currently acquisitioning mortar rounds for its troops. American Ordnance LLC and General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems have been selected to compete for each order as part of a $511 million firm-fixed-price contract. Orders will be made for 60mm, 81mm and 120mm mortar propelling charges. The US Army inventory has a variety of different mortar types. Equipped with different fuses and cartridges each type fulfills certain operational requirements. For example, the M720, M720A1, M768 and M888 High Explosive cartridges come with either a Multi-Option Fuse or a Point-Detonating Fuse and are designed to be effective against personnel, bunker and light material targets. General Dynamics produces a special kind of mortar propellants that are both flash-suppressed and clean burning resulting in minimum residue, flash and blast overpressure. Work is scheduled for completion by May 2023. Work locations will be determined with each order.

• The Navy is contracting Lockheed Martin for a number of support activities as part of the F-35 Lightning II program. The company is being awarded a $558 million contract that provides for sustainment support, equipment, training devices, training facilities, Autonomic Logistics Information System hardware and software, and facilities in support of low-rate initial production of Lot 11 F-35 Lightning II aircraft. This contract combines purchases for the Air Force, the Marine Corps and Foreign Military Sales customers. The F-35 II fighter program is considered the most expensive of its kind. The jet comes in different variants making it a versatile piece of equipment. The F-35A or Conventional Take-Off and Landing version is being flown by the Air Force, whereas the F-35B Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing version that is part of the Marine Corps aircraft fleet. Work will be performed at multiple locations, including Orlando, Florida and Redondo Beach California, and is scheduled for completion by February 2023.

• Boeing is being tapped to provide the Navy with three additional P-8A planes under a $416 million contract. The Poseidon is a multi-mission maritime aircraft that will completely replace the old P-3 fleet. The P-8 uses the same 737 airframe as the US Navy’s C-40 Clipper naval cargo aircraft. The base model is Boeing’s 737-800 ERX, with “raked” wingtips that improve performance for low-level flight. The P-8A has 11 weapon hard points: 5 in the rotary weapon bay, 4 under the wings, and 2 under the fuselage. Weapon load can exceed 10t/ 22,000 pounds, and all hard points have digital weapon interfaces. The aircraft is designed to work in conjunction with the MQ-4C Triton and essentially provides the Navy with an anti-submarine, anti-ship and anti-smuggling platform that can sweep the area, launch sensors or weapons as needed, and remain aloft for many hours. Work will be performed at a number of locations in- and outside the continental US, including Seattle, Washington and Cambridge, United Kingdom. The contract is expected to be completed in October 2020.

Middle East & Africa

• The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is set to receive eight CH-47F transport helicopters from Boeing. The contract modification is valued at over $25.7 million. The contract is funded through of the Fiscal 2017 foreign military sales fund. The CH-47F Chinook’s load capacity has made it the world’s most popular heavy-lift helicopter. The USA expects to be operating Chinooks in their heavy-lift role past 2030. The CH-47F looks similar to earlier models but offers a wide range of improvements in almost every aspect of design and performance. The CH-47F Chinook and MH-47G Special Ops version are the latest variants in a family of helicopters that first saw service in 1962 during the Vietnam War. New “F/G” models feature numerous upgrades over the old CH-47Ds, including more powerful engines, reduced vibration, upgraded avionics and self-defense systems, and manufacturing advances designed to improve both mission performance and long-term costs. Work will be performed in Ridley Township, Pennsylvania, with an estimated completion date of July 2021.

Europe

• The UK has taken delivery of the first of an eventual 25 AW101 Merlin HC4 helicopters. The delivery is part of the Royal Navy’s effort to modernize its fleet of transport helicopters. The entire effort approaches $3 billion for a final total of 55 refurbished helicopters, and these refurbishments will be carried out as part of the AW101 fleet’s long-term maintenance plan. After being upgraded and marinized under a $517 million contract, the Merlin HC4 heavy-lift transport helicopter will be operated by the RN’s Commando Helicopter Force. The Merlin HC4s replace the fleet of existing Sea King Commando Mk.4 helicopters, their updated configuration includes the same cockpit modernizations and redesigns as for the Mk.2, plus standard naval changes like a folding rotor head, strengthened landing gear, deck lashing points, and a fast roping point for the Royal Marines. The next milestone for the Merlin HC4 will be embarkation aboard the RN’s new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth.

• Jane’s reports that the Slovakian defense contractors Incoff Aerospace and Compel Industries recently presented their Predator AX-1 loitering munition. Loitering munitions can hover over the target for a long period of time and then strike it at the precise moment chosen by the operator. In the event that the preconditions for the attack have not been fulfilled, the strike platform may be returned to base, to be launched again on another day. The Predator AX-1 project started in May 2017 in response to a Slovak Ministry of Defense requirement for an expansion of its unmanned systems inventory. The AX-1 is manufactured from carbon fiber composites and features a mid-body wing set unfolded mechanically after launch. Powered by two electric motors with slewed push turbine propulsion, the loitering munition system offers both PG-7VM HEAT-T or TB-7V thermobaric warhead options. The Predator AX-1 is similar to AeroVironment’s Switchblade system.

Asia-Pacific

• The Australian Army has announced that it will soon roll out the PD-100 Black Hornet Personal Reconnaissance System. The rollout and sustainment of the micro unmanned aircraft systems $13.6 million project marks a key milestone in the technological advancement of the Australian armed forces. The PD-100 Black Hornet is produced by the American company Flir Systems. The system is a surveillance micro drone that can be easily started from the palm of a soldier’s hand. The drone can fly horizontally and look on a suspected area or hover beside a building and look into a window, giving soldiers on foot patrols an advantage of seeing what’s there from a safe distance. The Black Hornet is a “flyable robotic video camera” that bears a resemblance to a helicopter and is small like a hummingbird. Its small size and electric motor makes it virtually inaudible and invisible beyond short distances. The Australian Army operates several UAS platforms, ranging from the rotary-wing Black Hornet PRS to large, nine-hour endurance surveillance systems such as the RQ-7B Shadow 200.

Today’s Video

• Sea Ceptor firing trials from HMS Argyll

Merlin & HMS Sutherland
(click to view full)

As part of Britain’s fiscal rebalancing, The Royal Navy is set to inherent the RAF’s Merlin HC3/3A medium-heavy battlefield helicopter fleet, while simultaneously upgrading its existing set of Merlin HM Mk1s. The entire effort approaches $3 billion for a final total of 55 refurbished helicopters, and these refurbishments will be carried out as part of the AW101 fleet’s long-term maintenance plan.

The navy’s existing fleet is being progressively upgraded and returned to service, adding a range of technological improvements to the helicopter’s avionics, control systems, sensors, and radar. The Royal Navy received 44 EH101 Merlin HM1s between 1998-2002 for training, surface attack and anti-submarine warfare duties, and has since lost 2 in accidents. The remaining 42 helicopters are now expected to remain in service until 2029, though only 30-38 will be upgraded. Another 28 EH101 Merlin HC3/ HC3A medium support helicopters currently serve with the UK Royal Air Force, and they will join the Navy to succeed the Sea King Mk.4 Commandos as the Royal Marines’ battlefield helicopters.

The Navy’s Merlins: Support and Upgrades

Team Lockheed’s Role: Merlin Mk.2

Merlin Mk2
(click to view video)

EH101 Merlin HM Mk1 helicopters will undergo GBP 1.15 billion ($2.04 billion at milestone conversion) in upgrades from original manufacturer AgustaWestland and Lockheed Martin UK. Originally built in the 1990s as an anti-submarine and search-and-rescue aircraft, the Merlin has taken on an increasingly wide range of roles. This extensive upgrade program is designed to give the Royal Navy upgrades in current capabilities, far greater operational flexibility, and reduced lifetime maintenance costs.

The Merlin Capability Sustainment Plus (MCSP) program will target 30 helicopters, with an option for a further 8. They will be progressively upgraded to Mk.2 status from 2010 at AgustaWestland’s Yeovil, UK facility, with Full Rate Production slated to begin in 2012. The new AW101 Merlin Mk2 helicopters began delivery in July 2013, with Full Operational Capability scheduled for 2014.

Merlin Mk.2s
(click to view full)

Lockheed Martin UK is the lead integrator for MSCP, and it received a GBP 750 million contract to help implement an open systems electronics architecture in the helicopters; improve the mission systems processing capabilities; add new capabilities for the Merlin’s Blue Kestrel Radar and Sonar system; broaden datalinks; and upgrade the aircrew console and avionics, including large flat panel touch screens. On a tactical level, these improvements will enable 40 times the number of targets to be tracked compared to the Merlin Mk.1, improve submarine detection in shallow water, and enhance night operations.

While improved capabilities will flow from these upgrades, the primary goal is to resolve electronics obsolescence issues in the current Mk1 variant, and reduce through life support and operating costs. The UK already has an IMOS through-life support contract with AgustaWestland, but a different structure for the support contract will not, by itself, solve problems with the underlying technology.

Overall, this Mk.2 Merlin technology upgrade is expected to reduce pilot workload, cost of ownership, maintenance and weight while giving improved survivability, safety, aircraft handling and agility.

Lockheed’s team includes AEI, BAE, CAE, Selex, Smiths, Thales, and QinetiQ. The firm estimates that this order creates or secures around 1,400 jobs across the UK’s defense industry.

AgustaWestland: The Merlin Mk.4 Commando

Sea King Mk.4
(click to view full)

The RAFs 28 Merlin HC3 battlefield helicopters are also due for conversion, in order to replace existing Sea King Commando Mk.4 helicopters used by the Royal Marines. Around 25 AW101s are likely to be updated to the Merlin Mk.4 configuration, which will include the same cockpit modernizations and obsolescence/ minor redesigns for the Mk.2, plus standard naval changes like a folding rotor head, strengthened landing gear, deck lashing points, and a fast roping point for the Royal Marines.

The contract wasn’t issued until early 2014, and the Sea Kings are all expected to retire in 2016. The 1st fully-converted Mk.4s won’t even be available for trials until Sept 2017, and IOC won’t take place until 2018.

To bridge that gap, an initial 7 Army Merlins will receive only the folding rotor head that’s required for shipboard use. These Merlin Mk.3i will serve as an interim bridge before the arrival of the full Mk.4 conversions.

AgustaWestland: The HEAT Is On

AgustaWestland EH101
(click to view full)

An independent but closely related GBP 400 million contract was issued to AgustaWestland, who will design, produce and integrate the new avionics suite. The most visible feature will be the new cockpit primary flight displays, incorporating touch screen technology to deliver increased crew efficiency. An updated communication and navigation system will be a less visible but equally important set of changes.

The changes are an opportunity to incorporate more of an Open Systems Architecture (OSA) into the helicopter, using standard electronics components to make adaption faster and easier, instead of requiring expensive and time-consuming efforts to design proprietary circuits.

Mechanically, the MCSP program will also see AgustaWestland introduce its Helicopter Electro Actuation Technology (HEAT) onto the EH101 Merlin HM Mk1. HEAT introduces a cutting edge 3rd generation fly by wire system that uses electrical actuators to provide the control inputs to the helicopter’s rotor systems, instead of using hydraulic units. Unlike other fly-by-wire systems developed for helicopters, the AgustaWestland HEAT system uses electro-actuation for both the main and tail rotors. The brushless electric motor actuators incorporate quadruplex 4-lane architecture with fail technology, allowing the system to function safely even after failure of 2 of the systems. The electrical actuators are maintenance-free and, unlike mechanical systems, do not require the same rigging checks to be made post maintenance.

In naval operations, these systems will allow flights in poorer weather than was previously possible, while the improved handling gives the helicopter more agility and better handling in nap-of-the-earth flights.

The HEAT system’s components underwent extensive testing in 2005 that covered system performance, durability, vibration, environmental, high-intensity radiated fields and lightning strike protection. Results were positive.

Britain’s Bottom Line(s)

Britain’s government actually has 2 bottom lines here. One is cost. Another is industrial.

The UK MoD expects AgustaWestland and Lockheed Martin’s upgrades to deliver cost reductions of around GBP 575 million by removing obsolete, hard to buy parts, and lower support costs. The project will “enable the cost-effective management of obsolescence on an aircraft which has components and design features that are becoming difficult to support…”

These deals also reflect the objectives of the UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy white paper, which seeks to safeguard national capabilities across strategically important industry sectors – including rotorcraft manufacturing and support.

Merlin IOS and associated programs are part of that drive. AgustaWestland’s managing director of military programmes, Alan Johnston, has noted that:

“The EH101 is the first helicopter in the world to utilise this advanced technology [HEAT] which will bring significant operational and cost benefits to customers. We are pleased that, by adopting the partnering principles being developed between AgustaWestland and the UK MoD, we will be able to introduce this important technology into the EH101 Merlin HM Mk1 fleet”

As Mr. Johnson alluded, The HEAT programme is being funded through an innovative contracting strategy which builds on the partnered principles outlined in the UK’s recent Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) Draft. AgustaWestland will offset the HEAT system production costs against future cost of ownership savings that in future Merlin support contracts.

EH101 Cockpit
(click to view full)

Just as politics has 2 bottom lines, so does the military. The difference is that instead of overall costs and industrial considerations, the military confronts the twin lines of overall costs and available capability.

Unfortunately, the Merlin has been problematic for the military’s 2nd bottom line. British Merlins have displayed low readiness rates, and this has been consistent over a number of years.

New technologies may help there. On the other hand, the 2006 announcements offered no indication of whether the planned modifications would address the structural issues that have already led to the loss of one British Merlin, or the issues that led Canada to ground its CH-149 Cormorant search and rescue fleet for several months. As DID’s coverage of the USA’s CSAR-X competition noted:

“Canada has grounded its EH101/CH-149 Cormorant search-and-rescue fleet due to persistent cracks in the tail rotor hub (cracks believed to have caused the crash of a British EH101 Merlin as well), and reassigned smaller “twin Huey” Bell 412/ CH-146 Griffon helicopters to that role. The Canadians are also experiencing EH101 maintenance requirements and costs about 200% higher than originally forecast.”

Contracts & Key Events

1st deliveries

Although the AW101 is an AgustaWestland product, Lockheed Martin UK was awarded the original Merlin Mk1 contract for the 44 Navy ASW/ASuW helicopters in 1991, with AgustaWestland acting as sub-prime. That structure has remained consistent for the Merlins, and Lockheed Martin UK is also one of AgustaWestland’s strategic partners providing support and training services under the IMOS through-life maintenance program. In practice, MCSP and IMOS are linked, because through-life maintenance milestones are the Navy’s preferred time to install capability upgrades.

May 28/18: Royal Navy receives HC4 The UK has taken delivery of the first of an eventual 25 AW101 Merlin HC4 helicopters. The delivery is part of the Royal Navy’s effort to modernize its fleet of transport helicopters. The entire effort approaches $3 billion for a final total of 55 refurbished helicopters, and these refurbishments will be carried out as part of the AW101 fleet’s long-term maintenance plan. After being upgraded and marinized under a $517 million contract, the Merlin HC4 heavy-lift transport helicopter will be operated by the RN’s Commando Helicopter Force. The Merlin HC4s replace the fleet of existing Sea King Commando Mk.4 helicopters, their updated configuration includes the same cockpit modernizations and redesigns as for the Mk.2, plus standard naval changes like a folding rotor head, strengthened landing gear, deck lashing points, and a fast roping point for the Royal Marines. The next milestone for the Merlin HC4 will be embarkation aboard the RN’s new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth.

October 20/15: The Royal Navy has received the first of seven AgustaWestland HC3 Merlin helicopters, forming the first tranche of 25 helicopters as part of the Merlin Capability Sustainment Program. With the seven helicopters expected to reach initial operating capability next spring, they will replace Sea King HC4s from March.

September 16/15: The Royal Navy’s fleet of Mk2 Merlin anti-submarine helicopters has achieved Full Operating Capability (FOC), with 24 of 30 helicopters now delivered. A part of the $1.2 billion Merlin Capability Sustainment Programme, the upgrading of the 30 helicopters follows a GBP750 million contract with prime contractor Lockheed Martin, with the first five helicopters delivered back in July 2013 after work began in 2010.

Merlin HC3
(click to view full)

Oct 1/14: All Navy. RAF Benson in Oxfordshire hosts the official ceremony that transfers the British Army’s 2 Support Helicopter Force squadrons to the Naval Commando Helicopter Force.

RAF 78 Squadron is disbanded at the ceremony, and 846 Naval Air Squadron stands up. It will remain at RAF Benson until Spring 2015, when the helicopters will finish their transfer to Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton in Somerset. RAF 28 (Army Cooperation) Squadron will remain in its current role for a little while, in order to ensure that enough helicopters are in place while the Army’s CH-47 Chinooks and AS332 Pumas are upgraded, RAF 28 squadron will formally disband later in 2015, and stand up as 845 Naval Air Squadron before it also moves to Yeovilton. Sources: RAF, “Royal Air Force Hand Over Merlin To Royal Navy”.

Full handover to Navy

July 14/14: Mk2. UK Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology Philip Dunne announces that the Merlin Mk.2 has already entered service with the Royal Navy, 4 months ahead of the original schedule. Sources: UK MoD, “Navy’s sub-hunting helicopters enter service early”.

Jan 28/14: Mk4/4i. The Navy’s long-expected “Mk.4” upgrade (q.v. Jan 18/11) to the Army’s transferred Merlin HC3 helicopters is signed as the GBP 330 million (about $545 million) Merlin Life Sustainment Programme, which is a lot less expensive that the GBP 454 million originally reported by Aviation Week. MLSP will modify the helicopters, but they will remain within the AW101 fleet’s IMOS support framework.

The Navy will take command of the RAF’s Merlin HC3 fleet late in 2014, and both RAF squadrons will formally disband in mid-2015. The Mk4 Phase 1 program to add folding rotors and make basic changes to 7 interim (Mk.4i) helicopters will start immediately, for delivery during 2015-2016. The Sea Kings will retire in 2016, but the full Mk4 Phase 2 helicopters won’t really be ready until 2018. Sources: UK MoD, “Helicopter investment secures 1,000 UK jobs” | AgustaWestland, “AgustaWestland Awarded UK MoD Merlin Life Sustainment Programme and Apache Integrated Operational Support Contracts Valued at £760 Million” | Aviation Week, “U.K. To Spend £454M On Merlin Modernization Program”.

Mk.4/4i conversion contract

July 24/13: Mk2 Handover. The first 5 of 30 planned Merlin Mk.2 helicopters are handed over to the Royal Navy’s 824 Naval Air Squadron based at RNAS Culdrose, in Southwest England. Deployment is expected in summer 2014, and all deliveries are expected to finish in 2015. Royal Navy | AgustaWestland.

April 11/11: Thales announces a renewed contract with Lockheed Martin UK for the next phase of IMOS, from 2011-2016. The undisclosed contract continues the availability-based support package for the Merlin Mk1 and Mk2’s acoustic sub-system: the popular, multi-platform Folding Light Acoustic System for Helicopters (FLASH) Active Dipping Sonar, and the parallel sonics sub-system for sonobuoy processing.

Thales will support the fleet by providing service management, supply support, technical support and equipment performance analysis. The will also replace the sonobuoy-related sonics sub-system with a phased introduction of a new Thales acoustic sub-system, including a new common acoustic processor incorporating the latest processing technology. That work will be done under the Merlin Capability Sustainment Programme.

Merlin IMOS, Phase 2

Jan 18/11: Aviation Week reports that in parallel with the Navy’s Merlin Mk.2 program, the UK MoD is planning for upgrades to the RAF’s 28 HC3 and HC3A variants in 4-6 years. Those “Mk.3” plans seem to involve moving them into the Navy, including the addition of the naval version’s folding rotors and tail, tie-downs, and the Mk.2’s cockpit avionics upgrade. The RAF is still fighting to retain the machines, operating them from land or off of ships as needed.

The article adds that full-rate Mk.2 upgrades are slated to start in 2011, reaching up to 10 rotorcraft at one time, with a 9 month modification cycle for each machine. While full-rate production would begin in early 2012, therefore, the 1st production delivery would come near year end.

Although the main focus is life extension, capability upgrades also are being introduced, including new radar modes (such as inverse aperture radar) and improved acoustic processing.

Oct 25/10: Lockheed Martin UK – Integrated Systems and AgustaWestland announce that MCSP01, the first upgraded Royal Navy Merlin Mk2 helicopter, has performed a successful maiden flight at the AgustaWestland facility in Yeovil, UK. It marks the start of an intensive MCSP flight-test program.

Four trials aircraft will be dedicated to test and evaluation of the new aircraft, avionics and mission systems at AgustaWestland’s Yeovil site through to late 2011. The helicopters will then transfer to QinetiQ at Boscombe Down to perform further mission system performance evaluation, and Release to Service trials. Aircraft conversion will be undertaken at AgustaWestland’s Yeovil facility, with full rate production in early 2012. The Merlin Mk2 is scheduled to enter service in 2013, and achieve Full Operational Capability in 2014. Lockheed Martin UK.

Mk.2 first flight

March 6/06: British Merlin fleet’s IMOS through-life support contract announced. See “AgustaWestland Lands GBP 450M Through-Life Support Contract for UK EH101s” for more.

Merlin IMOS support contract

Jan 12/06: The UK MoD announces the Merlin Capability Sustainment Plus (MCSP) program, with Lockheed Martin as the lead firm. It involves GBP 1.15 billion in upgrades from original manufacturer AgustaWestland and Lockheed Martin UK. The program will target 30 helicopters, with an option for a further 8. They will be progressively upgraded to Mk.2 status from 2010 at AgustaWestland’s Yeovil, UK facility, with Full Rate Production slated to begin in 2012. UK MoD | Defense-Aerospace.com (Jan 13/06) – Lockheed UK & AgustaWestland corporate releases

MSCP upgrade contract

Additional Readings & Sources

Note that the helicopters’ original designation was “EH101”. This was shifted to “AW101” in 2007, but the UK has always used designations of “Merlin xxxx”. Future naval designations will be Merlin Mk2 for the naval version, and Merlin Mk4/4A for the Royal Marine Commando version.

Background: Helicopters

• DID – AgustaWestland’s Through-Life Support for UK Merlin Helis. IMOS.

• AgustaWestland – AW101.

• Royal Air Force – Merlin HC3. The HC3As are 6 former Danish helicopters; Britain did a deal with Denmark to buy the 6, in exchange for 6 later AW101 production slots. In exchange for not having those AW101s for a few years, Denmark gets newer helicopters to replace them, plus money.

• Army Technology – AW101 (EH101) Transport Helicopter, Italy / UK.

• Royal Navy – Merlin ASW.

• Lockheed Martin UK – Merlin HM MK1 (Merlin).

• Naval Technology – Merlin ASW / Transport Helicopter, United Kingdom.

• Royal Navy – Sea King Mk4.

News & Views

• Defense News (Nov 20/13) – AgustaWestland Poised to Win Helo Conversion, Sustainment Work.

• Royal Navy (Sept 12/13) – Future commando helicopters join Royal Marines in the field for the first time. Former Army Merlin HC 3s.

• Aviation Week (Jan 14/11) – Merlin’s New Look. Discusses the 30 Merlin Mk2s.

• AgustaWestland (Dec 1/06) – AgustaWestland launches HEAT programme for EH101.

As the Independent Election Commission (IEC) struggles to prepare for parliamentary and district council elections due to be held on 20 October 2018, one key prerequisite – voter registration – is not going well. Registration turnout, so far, has been very low, in part, due to security fears stemming from a new system aimed at reducing fraud: fixing stickers onto Identification cards after voters have registered. The problem is that the Taleban then know, who has registered. A proposal to increase turnout by fixing stickers to a copyof people’s IDs, has proved controversial and led to an open dispute between President Ashraf Ghani and two members of the IEC on the one hand, and the majority of IEC members and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah on the other. The proposal has subsequently been rescinded. Yet, say AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili and Thomas Ruttig, it has left a strong impression of chaos and lack of forethought. This dispatch also examines the debacle surrounding the appointment of a new chief electoral officer and translates the newly-published electoral calendar into English.

This is part eight of a series of dispatches looking at the preparations for the parliamentary elections. Part one dealt with political challenges; part two with an initial set of technical problems, including the date, the budget and the use of biometric technology; part three with electoral constituencies; part four with controversies surrounding the appointment of a new IEC member, after its former chief was sacked by President Ghani; part five with a demand by political parties to change the electoral system; part six with the date of the polls and with voter registration, and; part seven with a deficient polling centre assessment.

Voters – but not that many – start to register for the October elections

On 14 April 2018 (25 Hamal 1397) the IEC launched the first phase of voter registration, covering provincial capitals. It was supposed to end on 13 May (23 Saur) but has been extended for another month. The second phase is scheduled to take place between 15 and 28 May (25 Saur to 7 Jawza) in district centres, and a third phase from 30 May to 12 June (9 to 22 Jawza) in rural villages.

As AAN wrote in a previous report, the need for a completely new voter register came from a provision in the 2016 Electoral Law (articles six and eight) that requires the IEC to prepare a voter list by linking each voter to a specific polling centre. This means that, for the first time, people will only be allowed to vote in the polling centre where they are registered. It also means that voter registration is being done from scratch and will not simply be an exercise in registering those never previously registered or who had come of voting age since the last election.

This provision was an attempt to stem the massive fraud of previous elections, which had been facilitated by the lack of a reliable central voters list and the highly inflated number of voter cards in circulation. This, in turn, was a result of massive over-registration in the past: a total of 21 million voter cards were distributed throughout the various previous registration and top-up exercises for an estimated maximum total voting population of 15 million people (see AAN’s previous report here). This enabled multiple voting, among other forms of manipulation.

Article six of the Electoral Law states that voters should be registered based on their tazkeras or other identification documents specified by the IEC (the law was cautious because some Afghans, especially women in rural areas, do not have tazkeras). (1) The IEC, however, in its decision of 26 November 2017, specified that “only” tazkeras could be used for registration, to limit multiple registrations. This made it necessary for prospective voters who did not possess a tazkera to first obtain one. Therefore, the IEC signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Afghanistan Central Civil Registration Authority (ACCRA) to issue around ten million tazkeras in a bid to include and enfranchise those who did not yet have them.

The IEC developed a voter registration procedure whereby eligible voters present their tazkeras at a registration centre. The voter’s information is then recorded on a registration and a confirmation form. Confirmation of registration – in the form of a sticker – is then separated from the registration form and fixed onto the reverse side of the voter’s tazkera; the voter is asked to use this same tazkera to vote.

The voter registration confirmation sticker includes the province and district where the voter lives, the name and code of the polling centre to which she is now linked, whether he is a Kuchi (because Kuchis are not tied to a specific polling centre) and a unique eight-digit serial number which, as former head of the IEC Secretariat Shahla Haque told AAN on 17 May 2018, was to identify individual voters. There are also various anti-counterfeiting features, including a hologram and a watermark and the use of what is called optical variable ink to prevent people making fake duplicates. The registration forms with the same features, along with additional information which remain in the registration books, are scanned and transferred to the national data centre. The scanned data is entered into the database by IEC employees and at the end of voter registration, a voter list will be developed for all polling centres and stations.

This new voter registration method will be able, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah promised a meeting of elders, influential people and youth on 15 April 2018, to “seriously prevent large-scale and organised fraud.” He said that, this time, the voter registration would be different from what they had been in the past.

Low turnout

The IEC has been releasing voter registration statistics, albeit not on a daily basis, and they are not looking good. The latest data from 22 May 2018 (English here and Dari here show that over the course of just over a month (14 April to 21 May), a total of 2,461,488 voters (1,688,676 male, 718,409 female, as well as 53,961 Kuchi and 442 Hindu and Sikh) registered to vote in 34 provincial capitals and districts. (The IEC does not provide a gender breakdown of Kuchi, Hindu and Sikh voters.) These figures does not represent the actual number of voters who have successfully registered as there has yet to be a verification process of voters, intended to exclude multiple registrations. Media reports from various provinces have described the turnout as low, with security threats highlighted as a major reason. (2)

Two domestic election observer organisations have mentioned another reason – the lack of public awareness about voter registration – as being behind the low turnout; see statements by the Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA) on the first day of registration (14 April) and Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), on 15 April.

Stickers on tazkeras

From the outset, there were warnings that the registration confirmation stickers on paper tazkeras were discouraging voters from registering. On 15 April 2018, a day after the first registration phase began, FEFA, said that, according to observations conducted by 700 volunteers, the turnout on the first day of registration was very low, highlighting, it said, that the stickers on the back of voters’ tazkeras were a “deterrent.”

Similarly, on 28 April 2018, Tolonews blamed the stickers as one reason for low turnout. It quoted MP Nazir Ahmadzai as saying that those living in insecure areas could not have their tazkeras labelled for fear that the Taleban – who have called for an election boycott (more details below) – might punish people with documents showing their willingness to vote.

Broader security dilemmas

The Taleban have threatened anyone who registers to vote. On 14 April 2018, President Ashraf Ghani, while launching the voter registration campaign, called on the Taleban to participate in the upcoming elections or act as a political party as per the government’s peace offer. A day later, on 15 April 2018, the Taleban rejected this offer in a statement published on their website, saying the country was under occupation and their “first priority was how to protectthe country and people from occupation.” They called on “Muslim and Mujahed people to boycott the cosmetic and fake process under the name of election[s].” (3) Tolonews also reported, on 28 April, that it had been told by the Taleban that the elections were about deceiving people and that they would use all options available to stop any election-related activity.

Media also reported that the Taleban have been warning people in certain regions not to participate in the elections. For instance on 28 April 2018, Reuters reported that the Taleban had threatened villagers in Balkh province that they would “burn down the house of anyone” who voted. A resident of Rahmatabad village, in Balkh told Reuters that the Taleban, during a visit to his area, had assembled the villagers in the local mosque and warned them that if they went to registration centres and voted, the Taleban would burn down the village. Shams, a resident of Balkh’s Dowlatabad district, said, “’The most recent visit by Taliban tax collectors levying ushr (land tax) and zakat (an Islamic tax) included an explicit warning to stay away from the elections.” Taleban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, while denying that any warnings to burn down houses had been made, admitted that the Taleban were telling people to stay away from the elections. However, one Taleban commander was quoted as saying that “[b]urning a house is a small punishment if they are caught in supporting this U.S. operation to prolong their stay in Afghanistan.” The Taleban’s position regarding the upcoming elections and the overall deterioration in security seems to be the chief reason for the low turnout in voter registration in provincial capitals which tend to be more secure. Phases two and three of voter registration, in districts and villages, will also likely see low turnout given many of these more rural areas are more vulnerable to insurgent attack.

The Taleban have already backed up their threats with violence. On 10 May 2018, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released a report verifying 23 election-related security incidents since voter registration started on 14 April 2018. Not all attacks were claimed by or attributed to the Taleban. They had resulted, said UNAMA, in 271 civilian casualties (86 deaths and 185 injured) and the abduction of 26 civilians (read the report here).

The vast majority of those casualties, reported UNAMA, occurred in one incident on 22 April 2018, when a suicide attacker detonated his improvised explosive device (IED) in a crowd outside a tazkera distribution centre in a Hazara-dominated neighbourhood west of Kabul city. 60 people were killed and 138 injured (198 civilian casualties in total). The aim of the attack appeared to be two-fold, disrupting the elections and, in particular, trying to stop Hazaras from voting. This was the conclusion of Muhammad Karim Khalili, head of High Peace Council, former vice-president under President Hamed Karzai and leader of one of the Hazara mujahedin factions; he said the attack was aimed at “preventing participation of a specific segment of society [eg the Hazaras] in the process of determining their future political destiny and preventing their presence in decision-making structures.”

The 22 April attack also prompted the Shia Ulema Council to issue a statement on 25 April 2018 calling on people not to register or apply for a tazkera until the government could ensure the security of voter registration centres. Its head of cultural affairs, Rezwani Bamyani, told Tolonews that it did not mean the council was boycotting the elections, but rather was setting preconditions for participation. However, the council does not represent all Shia Ulema. Many consider the voter registration process too important to boycott. The Bamyan Provincial Centre’s Ulema Council (Shura-ye Ulema-ye Markaz-e Bamyan), for example, issued a counter-statement on 27 April encouraging people “to appear at the voter registration centres and make yourselves eligible voters.” It said that anyone who opposed the elections or somehow prevented people’s participation in this national process was striking “an irreparable blow to the collective destiny of the people” and was “intentionally or unintentionally aligning themselves with the enemies of peace and progress of the country.”

Political leaders from the Hazara community also called on people to go to voter registration centres. For instance on 7 May, Muhammad Mohaqeq, leader of one of the larger Hazara political parties and Deputy Chief Executive, urged religious scholars during a meeting to support voter registration “since the enemy considers election as a factor of stability [and] tries to prevent our people from [participating in] elections by carrying out violent operations. Therefore, the people should take voter registration seriously, for the sake of their destiny.” However, earlier in the wake of the 22 April attack, he also cautioned that “today a big question on people’s mind” was “if today the security of people is not ensured during registration and distribution of tazkera, how will security be ensured on election day when millions of people should turn out?”

UNAMA confirmed in its 10 May 2018 report that putting stickers on tazkeras was only one of a number of security concerns. It said that “In some areas, the Taliban have reportedly threatened election-related staff with death or cutting off their fingers if they continue their work on the elections, and teachers have been warned that their schools will be targeted if they are used for voter registration purposes, resulting in school closures.” On 19 May 2018, Pajhwok reported that local residents had closed a school a month ago, after it was designated as a voter registration centre in a refugee township in Pul-e-Alam, the provincial capital of Logar, as they feared Taleban attack. The school closure came after students stopped attending classes. About 1,100 students have been deprived of education.(4)

Another incident which may have been linked to the elections has been brought to the attention of AAN. An eyewitness described seeing the bodies of two travellers who, he said, had been stopped and killed by the Taleban in the Ziwallat area of Jalrez district in Maidan-Wardak province on 10 May 2018. The eye-witness said he believed that one, from the Chap Dara area of Bamyan, was killed because he had had a voter registration confirmation sticker on his tazkera. (The other was from Ghorband valley and, he said, worked transporting injured government forces.) Whether the killing was election-related or not, this eye-witness and others believed it was – and that, in itself, is significant.

Taleban threats come in a context: in much of the country, they have the potential to act on them. According to the most recent quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) published on 30 April 2018, only slightly over half of the country’s 407 districts were either under the government’s control or influence, ie 229 districts (56 per cent) as of 31 January 2018. The remaining districts were either under full “insurgent control” (13 or three per cent), under “insurgent influence” (59, or 14 per cent) or “contested” (119, or 29 per cent), indicating security problems that influence the preparation and carrying out of the elections.

Defense Minister Tareq Shah Bahrami and Interior Minister Wais Ahmad Barmaktold the Wolesi Jirga in early May (media report here) that they considered 216 districts to be insecure and that security forces would launch clearing operations there before the start of the second phase of voter registration. Bahrami said that 7,183 army personnel would be involved in the voter registration process across the country. (Barmak also announced that 10,000 police would be tasked with election security, with four to eight police posted at each polling centre.) However, the recent trends have not been promising. There is no sign that the government has been expanding its control or influence since the two ministers spoke to MPs. On the contrary, between the start of the Taleban’s annual military campaign announced on 25 April and 17 May 2018 , they had overrunat least five district centres in Badakhshan, Badghis, Faryab, Ghazni, and Kunduz, (as observed by the Long War Journal).

Initial incentive and coercion measures by government to boost turnout

The government has tried to help government employees and their families to register. It called on ministries to give a day off to their employees for registration, as family members of AAN staff working with ministries reported. President Ghani instructed 34 provincial governors in a video conference on 19 April, to ask government employees to accompany their eligible family members to voter registration centres to register. He also instructed the Minister of Hajj and Religious Affairs to ask ulema to speak about the importance of voter registration in their Friday sermons and encourage people to participate.

There has also been some coercion. The media has reported government agencies refusing services to clients who did not have registration stickers on their tazkeras: see for example this report by Tolonews report from 6 May 2018 which featured two people, one from Kabul and one from Jowzjan complaining about this. Kandahar police chief General Abdul Razeq said when he registered on 17 April 2018 that he had instructed all government agencies not to accept applications from citizens who did not have a tazkera or a voter card (see media report here and here). A relative of an AAN staff member who is a teacher at a Kabul high school was told by the school principal to register to vote, or her salary would not be paid.

AAN also received reports that many citizens had come up with their own strategy to avoid being punished by the Taleban for having registration stickers on their tazkeras: obtaining new tazkeras and claiming, falsely, they had either lost their old one or did not have one. This would enable the voter to use the new, marked tazkeras for both registration and voting only and the old ‘clean’ ones for day-to-day business, thereby making it less likely that, should they be stopped by the Taleban, they could be identified as registered voters.

A controversial solution for low turnout

As registration continued to be low, the IEC and the government came up with two solutions: firstly, on 10 May 2018, the IEC announced it would extend voter registration in provincial capitals by a month, until 12 June (22 Jawza 1397). Secondly, the IEC came up with the idea of allowing registration stickers to be put on copies of voters’ tazkeras, not on the original. This, it said, would enable voters fearing encounters with the Taleban to use their original tazkeras for normal business, and the copy with the sticker only on election day.

This idea, however, became highly contentious, dividing both the IEC and government leaders, and threatening to trigger the collapse of the entire IEC. The dispute came to a head on 10 May 2018 when four IEC members rejected the proposal in an internal vote, while two others, including chairman Gula Jan Abdul Badi Sayyad, supported it. Those opposing the ‘sticker-on-copy’ proposal argued it could undermine safeguards against multiple registrations and thus facilitate fraud. Later in the afternoon of 10 May, according to sources privy to this discussion, the president – who supported the idea of using a copy of the tazkera in order to boost registration turnout – called in IEC members to a meeting. He questioned the IEC’s authority to decide on the issue and told those IEC members who had voted against it to resign. This unfolding of events was also reported by social media activists (see for example here as well as the media the following working day (see here). (IEC deputy head for administration and finance Mazallah Dawlati confirmed during a television debate about elections on 22 May that President Ghani had indeed told those IEC members who disagreed with the proposal to resign (see full video here).

The Palace reported later that evening (see here and here) that the IEC had decided that staff could fix stickers onto copies of tazkeras “if applicants [potential voters coming for registration] want [this].”  This stance was backed up by an IEC press release issued later that night (here and here) The IEC statement said that people “living or travelling in insecure areas” had shared their concerns about putting stickers on original tazkeras and as safety was “extremely important for the IEC,” it launched a widespread consultations with stakeholders, in particular political parties, tribal elders and civil society. The result, it said, was a consensus that “eligible voters would be able to go to voter registration centres with copies of their tazkeras” and have stickers labelled on them. However on election day itself, eligible voters would have to bring their original tazkeras along with the copy of their tazkera in order “to enjoy their right to vote.”

The IEC also said, without going into detail, that it would “take necessary measures to prevent duplicate registrations.” It warned that those who registered more than once would be deprived of their right to vote on election day and perpetrators would face prosecution.

Three days later, on 13 May 2018, a document was leaked to the Afghan media (see here and here bearing the signatures of the four commissioners who had resigned. The document said that “the IEC, through its decision number 30-1396, dated 18 Jaddi 1396 has approved the regulation for voter registration and the preparation of the voter list according to which voter registration confirmation [stickers] are stuck on the back of original tazkeras” The document said that no changes had been brought to this regulation and cited article 19 of the electoral law according to which the IEC “cannot amend relevant regulations and procedures during the electoral process.”

Those who signed this decision were IEC deputy chair of operations, Wasima Badghisi (a Tajik from Badghis), deputy for finance and administrative affairs, Abdul Qader Quraishi (an Uzbek from Balkh), Mazallah Dawlati (an Aimaq from Ghor), and Maliha Hassan (a Hazara, born in Kabul). Those who did not sign the document were IEC chair Gula Jan Abdul BadiSayyad (a Pashtun from Kabul), Rafiullah Bedar (a Pashai from Nangrahar) and Sayyed Hafizullah Hashemi (a Pashtun from Laghman) (see AAN’s previous report on the IEC members’ profiles here and here). (According to an AAN source privy to the IEC’s internal voting on the issue, as well as media reports, Hashemi had been travelling when the decision was made. Media reports)  also quoted IEC deputy heads as saying that they took the decision in the presence of United Nations representatives, including UNAMA chief election officer Grant Kippen, and acting IEC CEO Shahla Haque.

The issue became more dramatic when Shahla Haque, acting head of the IEC Secretariat, resigned in protest against the proposal on 13 May 2018 and, a day later, on 14 May 2018, during the weekly Council of Ministers meeting, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah weighed in on the issue and spoke publicly against putting pressure on IEC members. There have been conflicting reports as to who proposed the ‘stickers-on-copies solution’. Chief Executive Abdullah suggested that the solution had been proposed by the Afghanistan Central Civil Registration Authority ACCRA. President Ghani’s spokesman, Harun Chakhansuri, however, said on 14 May it had been the Chief Executive’s own proposal (see media report here). (5)

Shahla Haquespoke to AAN on 14 May. She said that, aside from any legal arguments against fixing the sticker on a copy of voters’ tazkeras, it also made fraud easier because it is far easier to produce a copy – or multiple copies – and use them to register in various voter registration centres than to try to get multiple tazkeras. Secondly, she said, it would not solve the issue of low voter registration turnout, as stickers were only one security concern. Other, more serious concerns, she said, had also “led to low turnout.” She said that many voter registration centres had not even opened. The IEC had planned, she said, to open 1,419 registration centres for the first phase of voter registration, but security agencies had told the IEC that 44 would not open for security reasons. As registration had got underway, Shahla said, a further 87 centres had also remained closed (131 in total or about nine per cent).

According to media reports, in Uruzgan alone, 53 of 65 registration sites remained closed, as did 77 of an unreported total in Paktika and 7 out of 20 sites in Logar’s provincial capital Pul-e Alam (see here; here and here).

Moreover, even in Kabul voter registration had been low according to Haque, despite the fact that people in Kabul do not often travel to provinces and generally do not have the same security concerns about having a stickers on their tazkera.

She suggested that, even for those who do travel to insecure areas, there could be a solution, which, according to her, was to carry a copy of their tazkera when travelling to reduce their vulnerability to the Taleban threats.(She in fact echoed a solution that was later on adopted, see below)

The four dissenting IEC members reportedly contemplated resigning collectively. This apparently led to a diplomatic intervention. (6) In the end, the decision to fix stickers onto tazkera copies was overturned and the threat of the IEC falling apart was averted. The IEC confirmed this on 16 May 2018, announcing that voter registration would take place “based on original tazkeras” (see statement here). IEC member Maliha Hassan told AAN on the same day that the press release regarding the decision to put stickers on tazkira copies had been taken down from both the IEC’s website and Facebook page. She also said that ACCRA had been told to issue duplicates of tazkeras for those who travel (so they could carry the duplicates and not those original with stickers). This compromise  throws the country’s national identity tazkera system into disarray while also providing a backdoor for those who do obtain duplicate copies, who fear for their security as a result of registration. (7)

Although the controversy was resolved after six days, it tarnished the credibility of the IEC (as their internal voting based on majority rule was not respected and appeared to have been influenced by an external source). It also raised questions regarding interference by the government, in particular the presidential palace, especially as this is not the first reported interference by the president in the IEC’s work. For instance on 21 April 2018, Afghan media reported that during a video conference,President Ghani had ordered provincial electoral officers (‘PEOs’, also known as heads of the IEC provincial offices) not to release voter registration details to the media but only to IEC headquarters. FEFA executive director Yusuf Rashid criticised the president’s move, saying it would pave the way to fraud. He added that FEFA’s observers had been prohibited from “taking pictures at registration centres” which, he said, would “question the credibility of the process.” Rashid told AAN on 22 May 2018 that FEFA’s observers had begun to face this problem four or five days after registration began, and that IEC employees at voter registration sites were still being inconsistent in providing information regarding registrations.

No head of the IEC Secretariat

One immediate impact of the sticker dispute was the resignation of the acting head of the IEC’s secretariat. It came, not only when the IEC is trying to ensure smooth voter registration, but as another key activity was starting – candidate nomination. It began on 26 May. Now, there is no leadership in the secretariat at all. This particular debacle should never have arisen. The vacancy at the head of the secretariat has been there for more than seven months.

On 21 October 2017, the previous chief election officer or CEO, Imam Muhammad Warimach, was dismissed by President Ashraf Ghani on 21 October 2017 (see AAN’s previous reports here and here. He continued to serve as CEO until 16 January 2018 when Shahla Haque, until then head of the IEC’s training department, was appointed as the acting head.

Like the IEC commissioners, the chief election officer is a very important appointment, which, according to article 22.3 of the electoral law, is made by the president from among three candidates proposed by the IEC. After Warimach’s sacking, the IEC advertised the position on 20 February 2018. Within the six-day deadline, 29 people applied according to an IEC press release. The IEC started shortlisting on 12 March.

Shahla Haque had told AAN before she arrived that she had not applied for the position as she lacked certain legal requirements for the post (the applicant should have a degree in certain fields, which did not include hers – medicine). A UN election specialist expressed concern to AAN that, if Haque were replaced, things could unravel – especially if a new chief election officer with no experience was appointed. According to this source, things had been moving well with election preparations since Haque had served as the CEO. (See also AAN’s previous report.

On 21 May 2018, the IEC announced their selection of candidates: Ahmad Jawed Habibi (former deputy head of the IEC Secretariat for operations and currently an adviser with the Ministry of Finance), Abdul Basir Azemi (former deputy minister of water and energy) and Ahmad Khaled Fahim (head of the Swedish Committee in Afghanistan). They put forward their choices to the president for him to then appoint one of them as the head of the IEC Secretariat (see the IEC’s decision here and media report here). There are accusations against two of these candidates. Multiple sources told AAN that a corruption case had been brought against Habibi about actions he had taken during the 2014 elections in his capacity as then deputy chief election officer. They said he had close allies within the president’s camp. The same sources said that Azemi, who is Herat MP Qazi Hanafi’s son-in-law, also has a corruption dossier against him. He is affiliated with Jamiat and is in the Chief Executive’s camp. AAN is not in a position to confirm these corruption accusations against either man. The final candidate, Fahim, is affiliated with and supported by Hezb-e Islami. He ran the Nasrat English and Computer Course in the Shamshatu camp in Peshawar around 1995-2002.

The appointment of the chief electoral officer may take some time. Warimach was appointed by a panel that included President Ghani, Vice-President Sarwar Danesh and Chief Executive Abdullah. A likely disagreement among the government leaders cannot be ruled out given the backgrounds of the three candidates. This important appointment has yet to be finalised. Meanwhile, the date of the election, 20 October,creeps ever closer.

Conclusion: Saving the 2018 election?

The IEC began registering voters in mid-April. It is an important step in preparing for October’s parliamentary and district council elections and for next year’s presidential and provincial polls. Threats by the Taleban and actual violence by it and ISKP have helped dampen turnout. The decision to put voter registration confirmation stickers on voters’ tazkeras made many people vulnerable if they travelled to or through rural areas where Taleban checks were likely. Attempts by the government and the IEC to find a solution ended in controversy, as is so often the case on Afghanistan’s bumpy ride before an election. Sensible arguments and legal provisions collided. Diplomatic intervention was required to prevent the process from derailing, as the IEC was close to disintegration. Actually, neither of the options on how voter registration stickers should be applied – on original tazkeras or copies – could solve the fundamental security threats facing Afghan voters.

(1) For instance, on 6 May 2018, Pajhwok reported that 80 per cent of residents in Pato district in Daikundi province did not have a tazkera. According to the report, Haidar Ali Dawlatyar, a civil society activist in Daikundi, said people in Pato were ready to pay money from their pockets to finance mobile tazkera distribution teams.

(2)For instance on 20 April 2018, Tolonews reported that Muhammad Zaher Akbari, the head of the IEC provincial office in Paktia, warned of threats against a number of voter registration centres in the province. Akbari also complained about low voter registration turnout, calling on security agencies to “boost their cooperation with us in order to move the process forward.” A day later, on 21 April 2018, Tolonews reported that Badakhshan activists and elders had started a campaign to encourage people to register and that people there hadcomplained that insecurity was one of the reasons stopping people from registering.

Similarly, according to a Pajhwok report on 21 April 2018, Ahmad Shah Sahebzada, Helmand’s provincial IEC officer, while citing insecurity as a major reason for public distrust in voter registration, complained that despite the fact that security officials had assured full security, people remained scared and were not coming to registration centres in large numbers. Pajhwok also reported, on 22 April 2018, that, according to Sahebzada, elections were impossible in five out of 14 districts in Helmand province: Baghran, Musa Qala, Nawzad, Khanshin and Dishu, all of which are under Taleban control.

On 7 May 2018, Salam Watandar reported that Abdul Ali Faqiryar, district governor of Pusht-e Koh in Herat province, had said that, despite the fact that there was security in most parts of the district, 14 voter registration centres allocated to the district had been cancelled by the IEC for unknown reasons. Herat provincial electoral officer, Muhammad Daud Sediq Zad, reportedly said that the decision had been taken due to security threats. A number of people in Pusht-e Koh district warned that they would be disenfranchised if the centres were not reopened soon. On 7 May 2018, Tolonews reported that officials from the IEC provincial offices in Khost, Paktia and Paktika had said that turnout for voter registration in these provinces was low and that women’s participation was insignificant. They also listed terrorist threats and growing insecurity as reasons for low turnout in registration. On 9 May 2018, Tolonews reported IEC provincial officials as saying that 113 voter registration centres in the eastern region of the country faced high security threats. According to the report, these centres included: 48 out of 157 voter registration centres in Nangrahar; 38 out of 124 voter registration centres in Laghman province; seven voter registration centres in Kunar and 20 voter registration centre in Nuristan.

Diplomats in Kabul have also noted the low turnout in voter registration. For example, on 6 May 2018, Canadian ambassador Francois Rivest, in an interview with Tolonews, said that the people’s reluctance to register was a challenge and that the ‘international community’ was providing advice to the government and the IEC which, he said, was “looking at steps to improve the level of registration.”

(3) Below is AAN’s working translation of the Taleban’s statement:

Yesterday, during the launch ceremony of the voter registration for elections, the head of the Kabul Regime Ashraf Ghani called on the Islamic Emirate to participate in it and we clarify our position as below:

The Islamic Emirate believes that our dear homeland, Afghanistan, is under occupation. Thousands of foreign soldiers are based in the country and the occupiers are making important civil and military decisions. Considering this, the first priority of the Islamic Emirate is how to protect the country and people from occupation and besides [upholding] other rights, retake the right of deciding political leadership and elections from the occupiers.

If [the questions of] who leads the people [presidency] or [who sits on the] council [Wolesi Jirga and/or district or provincial councils] are decided under the occupation, this will be a big disloyalty to the country and the Muslim nation and it will be only cheating fellow citizens and internationals. It is because we saw how, in previous elections, the people were cheated under the name of ‘election’. The final decision was made by US foreign secretary John Kerry and the National Unity Government was set up at the US embassy by American officials.

Nothing else can be expected from the forthcoming elections. Authority will be given to those who are already accepted by the White House or elected by the Pentagon. Therefore the Islamic Emirate asks its Muslim and Mujahed people to boycott this cosmetic and fake process under the name of election, instead of participating in it and to deliver on their religious and national obligation to fight the occupiers and Americans for the independence of their country and bring about an independent and legitimate system and spend all their talents in fighting the evil of the disbelievers and bring about a pure Islamic system.

(4) The IEC conducted a polling centre assessment in 2017 (see AAN’s previous reporting here, as  result of which it moved the majority of the polling centres to schools. The IEC proposed 7,355 polling centres across Afghanistan. 11 additional centres were added after a complaints procedure, bringing the total to 7,366. A security assessment of the centres by the security agencies showed that 3,190 of them (43 per cent) faced either a medium or high threat, or were in areas not under government control. Stickers on copies or on originals of tazkeras would not make much difference to the threat facing people in many areas, as long as the Taleban threatens or controls close to half of the polling centres.

(5) Abdullah’s spokesman Mujib Rahimi, however, contradicted his boss on 23 May 2018, as he told Ariana News that though the proposal had first been made by Abdullah, he opposed it after a number of IEC members opposed it. He also said, “The IEC was compelled [by president] to issue a statement without the desire of the majority of them [IEC members] [and] against [their] approval and the IEC members were complaining and objecting to this and it was there that the Chief Executive announced [his] position and explained that the decision is taken by the IEC, not by the government.”

(6) For instance, Etilaat Roz reported on 21 May 2018 that Tadamichi Yamamoto, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, in a meeting attended by IEC members, called the president’s decision “regrettable and dangerous” and stood by the IEC.

(7) It is not clear who told ACCRA to issue duplicate tazkeras to those who travel, but the IEC’s 16 May statement said: “…the commission carried out technical consultations with ACCRA for addressing the security concerns of citizens and has finally reached this understanding that those citizens of Afghanistan who suspect that they face threat due to having stickers on their tazkera scan go to ACCRA and obtain duplicate tazkeras. ACCRA will issue duplicate to those applicants if they have [their] original tazkera with a sticker with them.”

Annex: The Electoral Calendar

Based on the electoral law, the electoral calendar should be prepared and published by the IEC 120 days before election day. The IEC did publish this on time (see here and here), on 22 April 2018. It looks as follows– AAN has translated it into English and added the Gregorian dates, with important dates in bold):

Number Activity Start date End date Gregorian dates 1 Announcement of Election Day 11 Hamal 11 Hamal 31 March 2018 2 Voter Registration 25 Hamal 22 Jawza 14 April to 12 June 3 Filing of objections and complaints regarding voter registration and addressing them 25 Hamal 1 Sartan 14 April to 22 June 4 Publishing the voter list 23 Asad 23 Asad 14 August 5 Publishing the electoral calendar 2 Saur 2 Saur 22 April 6 Registration of candidates for the Wolesi Jirga and district councils 5 Jawza 22 Jawza 26 May to 12 June 7 Reviewing candidates’ registration information 6 Jawza 6 Sartan 27 May to 27 June 8 Publishing the preliminary candidate list 7 Sartan 7 Sartan 28  June 9 Filing challenges to the preliminary candidate list, as well as corrections 7 Sartan 9 Sartan 28 to 30 June 10 Addressing challenges to the preliminary candidate list 9 Sartan 11 Asad 30 June to  2 July 11 Final date for candidate withdrawal 8 Sartan 10 Asad 29 June to 1 August 12 Publishing final list of candidates 12 Asad 12 Asad 3 August 13 Finalising polling centre list in terms of security 2 Sartan 2 Sartan 23 June 14 Establishing a Media Commission 6 Sawr 28 Hoot 26 April 2018 to 19 March 2019 15 Campaign period for the Wolesi Jirga election 6 Mizan 25 Mizan 28 September to 17 October 16 Campaign period for district council election 11 Mizan 25 Mizan 3 to 17 October 17 ‘Silence period’ (no campaigning) 26 Mizan 27 Mizan 18 to 19 October 18 Filing complaints about the campaign period 6 Mizan 27 Mizan 28 September to 19 October 19 Voting day 28 Mizan 28 Mizan 20 October 20 Tabulation of the Wolesi Jirga 28 Mizan 19 Aqrab 21 Filing complaints about voting and the count and addressing them 28 Mizan 29 Aqrab 20 October to 20 November 22 Announcement of the preliminary results of the Wolesi Jirga elections 19 Aqrab 19 Aqrab 10 November 23 Filing complaints about the preliminary results of the Wolesi Jirga elections 20 Aqrab 21 Aqrab 11 to 12 November 24 Addressing complaints about the preliminary results of the Wolesi Jirga elections 21 Aqrab 14 Qaws 12 November to 5 December 25 Sending the final decision(s) of the ECC to the IEC 14 Qaws 21 Qaws 5 to 12 December 26 Announcing final results of the Wolesi Jirga elections 29 Qaws 29 Qaws 20 December 27 Tabulation of votes of the district council elections 20 Aqrab 17 Qaws 11 November to 8 December 28 Announcement of preliminary results of the district council elections 18 Aqrab 18 Aqrab 9 November 29 Filing complaints about the preliminary results of the district council elections 18 Qaws 20 Qaws 9 November to 11 December 30 Addressing complaints about the preliminary results of the district council elections 20 Qaws 22 Jaddi 11 December 2018 to 12 January 2019 31 Sending decision(s) of ECC to IEC 23 Jaddi 28 Jaddi 13 to 18 January 32 Announcing final results of the district council elections 4 Dalw 4 Dalw 24 January 2019

 

TSgt. John Chapman May Have Fought Desperate, Solo Battle to Safeguard Rescuers. Alone, abandoned, outgunned. USAF Tech Sgt. John Chapman wakes up on a freezing mountaintop in Afghanistan to realize a special operator’s worst nightmare: he is trapped by himself behind enemy lines. Now he must fight for his life. He is wounded, exposed and […]

Americas

• The United States government is continuing to supply some of its key international allies with further Patriot support. Lockheed Martin is being awarded a contract valued at $282 million as part of the US Foreign Military Sales program. The contract sees for the delivery of Patriot PAC-3 support services. The Phased Array Tracking Radar Intercept On Target missile system is a mainstay in many military inventories. At present, 12 nations have chosen it as a key component of their air and missile defense system. Lockheed Martin produces the PAC-3 missile, including the hit-to-kill interceptor, the missile canister 4-packs, a fire solution computer, and an Enhanced Launcher Electronics System. The modification includes a number of not predefined orders to be delivered to the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of South Korea. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order. All work is expected to be completed by May 2019.

• The Air Force Sustainment Center is procuring spares and support services for its APX-114 and APX-119 systems. Under this $7.2 million contract, Raytheon will provide for repairs, spares and support services for line repairable units and shop replaceable units to support the aforementioned systems. Raytheon’s AN/APX-114 interrogator represents the most technically advanced, compact and lightweight interrogator available for airborne, long-range and shipboard IFF and is an integral part of the US Air Force’s F-15 modernization plan. It provides the advanced processing capability to rapidly identify friendly targets. The APX-119 is Raytheon’s Identification friend or foe (IFF) system that is currently installed on 50 different platforms of the US and international partners. IFF systems enable forces to recognize friendly aircraft, surface vessels, and submarines to avoid inadvertent firing on friendly forces. They consist of an interrogator, which ask the questions, and transponders, which provide the responses. Work will be performed at Raytheon’s primary locations in California and is expected to be completed by June 2020.

• The US Army is currently planning to renew its Aerial Target System. As part of its of Aerial Target Systems 2 program the Army is contracting Griffon Aerospace, Kord Technologies, Kratos Defense and Rocket Support Services and Trideum Corp. for research, development, testing and evaluation of the program. The four companies will be assigned different orders under a $93.4 million contract. Aerial Target Systems are unmanned aircraft that are used for simulation and training. They can also be used for the testing of equipment, particularly missiles. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of May 21, 2023.

Middle East & Africa

• Israel is the first nation to ever use the F-35 joint strike fighter in combat mission over the Middle East. On Tuesday the head of the Israel Air Force, Major General Amikam Norkin announced that the aircraft had already participated in two airstrikes. Operating over Syrian airspace, a country equipped with the S-400 Russian air-defense systems, requires careful targeting and maximum survivability, the F-35’s two strongest attributes. Israel is a Security Cooperation Partner in the F-35 II program and is allowed to integrate its own ECM defensive equipment and its own weapons like Rafael’s Python 5 short-range air-to-air missile and Spice GPS/IIR guided smart bomb. The F-35 ‘Adir’ is a key part of their IAF recapitalization plans, however it is yet unclear if the country will decide to expand its F-35 order beyond the 50 jets under contract or to buy more F-15s.

Europe

• The Italian defense manufacturer Leonardo Helicopters is currently conducting preliminary discussions with the Italian government regarding the possible acquisition of its AW169 and AW609 models. Rome is in pressing need to find suitable replacements to its ageing fleet of legacy Bell and Agusta-Bell types that are currently operated by the military and other governmental bodies like the Guardia di Finanza. The AW169 is a new generation multi-purpose twin engine light intermediate helicopter providing a multi-role capability and a high mission flexibility. The AW609 TiltRotor features a composite airframe, advanced touch-screen cockpit and full fly-by-wire digital controls. The platform is can be adapted for counter-terrorism, quick reaction force insertion/extraction, hostage rescue, incident management and law enforcement missions. The ability to operate more than 300 nm from the coast adds border and maritime patrol, long-range surveillance and anti-piracy. If Italy selects the AW169 for the army or air force, the country would become the launch customer for the military variant.

• The US is temporarily operating its MQ-9 Reaper drones out of Larisa Air Force Base in Greece. Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon said in an interview with Defense News that the aircraft are being stationed at Larisa while their usual base in Africa undergoes repairs. The drones are being stationed at Larisa under the aegis of an existing joint training order between the two nations. Staff handling the take-off and landing of the Reapers will be stationed at Larisa, with operators in the continental US handling normal flight operations via satellite. The Pentagon did not disclose where the drones are operating, however considering the Air Force Base’s location it seems likely that the UAVs are flown over North Africa and the locations in the Middle East. Stationing drones in Greece is a new move that has the potential to complicate US-Turkish relations. The US has long relied on the Incirlik military base to launch operations in the region, but the relationship between Washington and Ankara has been strained ever since a 2016 coup attempt by members of the Turkish military.

Asia-Pacific

• The Russian defense manufacturer Rostec has announced that it will supply China with 10 Su-35 fighter jets this year. The $2.5 billion contract for the delivery of a total of 24 long-range 4+ generation super-maneuverable aircraft was signed between Rostec and the Chinese government in November 2015. Four Su-35s were previously delivered to China in 2016, and 10 more were shipped in 2017. Su-35 is current on the top of Russian air-superiority inventory. It is equipped with a phased array antenna, advanced electronics and a variety of weaponry. The fifth-generation technology of the Sukhoi-35 is very similar to other fighters of the next-generation class. China is currently one of the top buyers of Russian arms.

Today’s Video

• Russia’s Borey-class strategic submarine Yuri Dolgoruky conducted a salvo-launch of 4 Bulava SLBMs for the first time.

Pakistan has formally signed for 30 TAI T129 attack helicopters from Turkey, it was disclosed on 24 May. The confirmation of the anticipated sale to Pakistan was made in the political manifesto that Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) has released ahead of the general

Event On 25 May 2018, the Indonesian parliament’s lower house amended the 2003 anti-terrorism law, now enabling security forces to take pre-emptive action against suspected militants. New measures include a legal basis to charge Islamic State-affiliated returnees from Iraq and Syria and an

Key Points Pompeo’s speech makes clear that the US seeks a fundamental change in Iran’s behaviour, emphasising that Iran’s failure to do so has the potential for internal collapse, not least given widespread public dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic’s economic

Slovakian companies Incoff Aerospace and Compel Industries presented a new lightweight loitering munition development at the IDEB 2018 exhibition in Bratislava on 16–18 May. Development of the new loitering munition, designated Predator AX-1, began in May 2017 in response to a Slovak Ministry

A Northrop F-5FM Tiger II combat aircraft of Brazilian Air Force’s (FAB) 1st Fighter Group crashed on 24 May, moments after taking off from its homebase in Rio de Janeiro for a combat training mission. Both crew members ejected and were rescued. An investigation has been launched by the

The North Atlantic Council agreed on 24 May to accept Japan’s request to designate its embassy to Belgium as its mission to NATO, the military alliance announced in a statement, adding that Japan’s ambassador to Belgium will thus be the head of the mission. The announcement comes after

Kazakhstan has ordered another batch of Sukhoi Su-30SM multirole fighters from Russia. A contract for the additional aircraft was signed by the Kazakh Ministry of Defence’s Kazspetsexport agency and Russian aircraft manufacturer Irkut Corporation on 24 May during the KADEX 2018 defence

Event President Faustin Taoudéra of the Central African Republic (CAR) held talks with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg on 23 May, during which Putin called for strengthening of bilateral relations. The meeting, on the sidelines of the International Economic Forum,

Rafael Advanced Defence Systems has unveiled the development of an advanced networked attack system designed to deliver multiple simultaneous selected precision effects on time-critical targets within seconds of their acquisition. Fire Weaver is an open-architecture target acquisition and precision

Raytheon has secured a US Army contract award worth nearly USD400 million to build Romania’s new Patriot missile defence system. Romania will join five other European NATO countries (Greece, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, and Spain) that are also Patriot users. NATO partner country Sweden has

Russia’s Borei-class (Project 955) ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Yuri Dolgoruky successfully test fired a volley of four Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from the White Sea to hit designated targets at the Kura test range, situated 5,000 miles away on the Kamchatka

North Korea destroyed several tunnels and other facilities at its only known nuclear test site on 24 May in a move described by the government in Pyongyang as an “important process” towards achieving global nuclear disarmament. The dismantling of the northeastern Punggye-ri test ground,