Defence`s Feeds

Defence engineering firm Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik ve Ticaret (STM) and other Turkish companies have won a tender to provide four Ada (MILGEM)-class corvettes to the Pakistan Navy (PN). “This will be largest single export [deal] in the history of the Turkish defence

Key Points Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 highlights emerging risks for New Zealand Defence priorities include maritime awareness, space, and cyber capabilities The New Zealand government published a Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 on 6 July, outlining its defence and strategic

Singapore Technologies Engineering (ST Engineering) has invested in Israeli cyber security firm Radiflow, as part of its continuing emphasis on building capability in advanced technologies. In a press release on 5 July, ST Engineering said the investment, the value of which was not disclosed, would

Here’s some cool BRRTTTTT….. Taken on Jun. 21, 2018 the following video shows A-10 Warthogs from the 190th Fighter Squadron and 25th Fighter Squadron fire 2.75″ rockets and 30mm ammunition during a live fire exercise at Red Flag Alaska June 11-21, 2018 near Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. The video is pretty short and along […]

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

The EDA Single European Sky Military Aviation Board (ESMAB) met on 3 July at the EDA premises to discuss the challenges and opportunities related to the integration of military aviation into the “Digital European Sky”. 

This 5th ESMAB policy level meeting was attended by General Mikhail Kostarakos, Chairman of the EU Military Committee, Mr. Filip Cornelis, Aviation Director at the European Commission (DG MOVE), Mr. Eamonn Brennon, Director General of Eurocontrol, as well as representatives from a wide range of key aviation stakeholders, notably the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the SESAR Joint Undertaking (SJU), the SESAR Deployment Manager (SDM), NATO, the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE), the Performance Review Body (PRB) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Also present were representatives from NATO and countries the Agency has concluded Administrative Agreements with. The ESMAB Policy Level is comprising Member States’ Military Aviation Authorities or equivalent.

The objective of the 5th ESMAB policy level meeting was to provide for informal high-level exchanges between the main civil and military actors involved in the implementation of Single European Sky with the following overarching theme “A new digital ATM system: which opportunities and which challenges ahead for Military Aviation?”.

This topic was addressed from 3 different perspectives:

• the first panel was dedicated to the potential opportunities offered by the digitalization in the operational domain, both on Civil and Military sides, with a specific focus on the optimization of the management and use of the Airspace and how Military Mission Effectiveness could be improved thanks to digitalization;
• the second panel aimed to identify how industry could support Civil & Military Aviation in facilitating operations in a digital Single European Sky, notably through dual use solutions;
• finally, the third panel pointed-out how an appropriate regulatory framework could contribute to maximizing the opportunities of digitalization while reducing taking into account contingencies and risks deriving from the use of new technologies and new devices.

In his opening speech, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq welcomed that, thanks to the joint efforts of many stakeholders involved, “the military are now considered as a key partner in aviation and in single European Sky”, adding that “working closely with civil aviation stakeholders should allow the military to remain innovative, notably taking advantage of recent European security and defence initiatives such as CARD, PESCO and EDF”.
 

Joint activities on SES/SESAR: 2019-2020 work programme

In the margins of the meeting, EDA Chief Jorge Domecq and Eurocontrol Director General Eamonn Brennon signed the 2019-2020 Work Programme for the two organisations’ joint activities on SES/SESAR. This document is updated every two years in the frame of the exchange of letters between EDA and EUROCONTROL in 2013 and 2014. It details the SES and SESAR related activities on which EUROCONTROL provides technical ATM expertise in support of EDA’s role to facilitate the coordination of military views and act as interface with EU institutions and related bodies.
 

More information:    

• EDA in Single European Sky (project page)
• The Military In SES / SESAR

 

Americas

• The Army is procuring fuses for its artillery shells. Action Manufacturing and Amtec Corp. are set to compete for each order of the firm-fixed-price contract worth $250,7 million. The contract provides for the manufacture, inspection, testing, packaging, and delivery of M739A1 Point Detonating and Delay fuses. The M739 series fuses are the latest improved version of the selective impact fuses. The fuse body is a one-piece design solid aluminum and has a standard 2-inch threaded base to match projectile nose and fuse cavity. The M739A1 fuse contains an Impact Delay Module (IDM) assembly. The IDM provides fuse initiation delay based upon the completion of mechanical actions caused by projectile deceleration and will function immediately after passing through the target. Function occurs when a spring-loaded firing pin is released. There are no explosive components contained within the IDM. The M739A1 is a selective super-quick auto-delay impact fuse designed for use in all standard HE artillery 4.2-inch Mortar, 105mm through 8-inch Howitzers and 175mm Guns. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of June 28, 2023.

• Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), is being awarded an indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee contract valued at $116,2 million. The contract provides for sustainment support of integrated afloat and ashore tactical networks. This three-year contract includes one two-year option period which, if exercised, would bring the overall, potential value of this contract to an estimated $196,5 million. The Navy has a number of tactical networks that support its warfighting capabilities, they all depend on a well-maintained IT infrastructure. One of those systems is CANES, or the US Navy’s Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services program, which is designed to streamline and update shipboard networks to improve interoperability across the fleet. Work will be performed aboard Navy ships and Department of Defense installations and facilities worldwide by Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Systems Center Pacific and Center Atlantic. Work is expected to be completed June 27, 2021. If the option is exercised, the period of performance would extend through June 27, 2023.

• The US Air Force will prematurely end its A-29 Super Tucano experiment program. The US Air Force will not conclude the flying portion of its light-attack experiment after a June 22 aircraft crash resulted in the death of a pilot. Last month’s mishap involved the A-29 Super Tucano, made by Embraer and Sierrra Nevada Corp., that was being flown in a training mission over the Red Rio Bombing Range, which is part of the White Sands Missile Range north of Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico. Lt. Christopher Carey Short, a naval aviator, died in the accident while a second pilot was airlifted to the hospital with minor injuries. The suspension ends a flying evaluation of the Super Tucano and the Beechcraft AT-6 Wolverine two weeks before a scheduled public demonstration. The Air Force plans to use data gathered from the experiment to decide whether to buy potentially hundreds of light attack aircraft. The hope is these fighters could be cheaper alternatives for certain missions to using aircraft such as the Lockheed Martin F-35.

Middle East & Africa

• The government of Qatar is adding several Hawk advanced jet trainers to its order of Eurofighter Typhoons. BAE Systems has announced that the emirate has amended the contract it signed in late 2017 for 24 Typhoons to include nine Hawks. The Hawk family of aircraft, manufactured by BAE Systems, has been made famous by the Red Arrows Royal Air Force Aerobatic Team. Since entering service with the Royal Air Force in 1976, over 800 Hawk aircraft have been delivered and it has been exported to several nations. The Hawk 100 is an advanced two-seat weapons systems trainer with enhanced ground attack capability. The aircraft provides fighter lead-in training and navigator and weapons systems operator training. Hawk deliveries will commence in 2021, with the first of the Typhoons following in 2022. No financials pertaining to the details of the Hawks were disclosed.

Europe

• The Belgian Navy is testing Schiebel’s Camcopter S-100 drone as part of the service’s search for new maritime-surveillance and search-and-rescue equipment. Belgium sports a relatively straight coastline measuring close to 70 kilometers, roughly equivalent in length to that between Fort Lauderdale and West Palm Beach in Florida. The European nation is joining a growing trend among navies worldwide to employ UAVs to act as the eyes and ears of military and coast guard vessels. Earlier this year, the government of Australia chose the heavy-fuel variant of the S-100 as its new maritime UAV. According to Schiebel’s spokeswoman, the S-100 has performed “thousands” of takeoffs and landings from aboard more than 30 ships by a host of international customers. Based in Vienna, Austria, Schiebel plans to focus on developing next-generation sensors to further expand its portfolio in the areas of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance.

Asia-Pacific

• China is continuing its determined naval buildup. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is now in possession of two new destroyers. The Type 055 vessels are designed long-range air defense, anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare. They are kind of a mix between Ticonderoga – Arleigh Burke – and Zumwalt class destroyers. The Type 055 could just as easily be classified as a cruiser than as a destroyer. It’s 590 feet long and displaces between 10,000 and 12,000 tons. That is 81 feet longer and up to nearly 2,500 tons greater than America’s latest Arleigh-Burke class destroyers. The ship is likely to be primarily armed with a sea-going version of the HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile, as well as the HQ-16 medium-range SAM, and possibly quad-packed DK-10As. The DK-10A is based on the PL-12 air-to-air missile and would act as an intermediate-range air defense missile roughly similar to the US Navy’s RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). The two 10,000-tonne Type 055 destroyers were launched simultaneously by the Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Company in a move that reflects the rapid pace at which China is building this new class of warship. The latest ships are the third and fourth to be launched, with all four entering the water in a little over a year. The recently launched vessels are equipped with multifunction phased array radars similar to the U.S. Navy’s Aegis system and could accompany future carrier battle groups as China continues to expand its carrier program.

Today’s Video

• NASA will bring one of its F/A-18 to Galveston to test quiet sonic boom

Protests continue in front of the Independent Election Commission’s office in Ghazni, though it was able to reopen on 27 June following a 63-day sit-in protest at its gates that shut it down, stymying election preparations throughout the province. This comes despite the IEC’s legally problematic about-face to split Ghazni province’s electoral constituencies for the upcoming polls, according to the protestors’ wish. Protests are now taking place over the issue of which areas will be allocated to the new constituencies while others deem the split to be illegal. The original protest was motivated by the outcome of the 2010 parliamentary elections, when all seats in the province went to Hazaras following a low Pashtun turnout. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili looks at Ghazni’s protestors’ demands as well as the IEC’s reactions to them, and concludes that both the government and the IEC face a dilemma about how to hold an inclusive election.

 This is part nine of a series of dispatches looking at the preparations for the parliamentary elections. Part one dealt with political challenges; part two with an initial set of technical problems, including the date, budget and use of biometric technology; part three with electoral constituencies; part four with controversies surrounding the appointment of a new IEC member after its former chief was sacked by President Ghani; part five with a demand by political parties to change the electoral system; part six with the date of the polls and with voter registration; part seven with a deficient polling centre assessment, and; part eight with controversies over voter registration.

The IEC has decided to split Ghazni province into three separate electoral constituencies for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 20 October 2018. The IEC ‘s decision came on 25 June in which it said that “considering the recent problems in Ghazni province and given the protests and repeated demands of people of Ghazni province, the Independent Election Commission after sending an authorised delegation [referring to the 28 May delegation it had sent to Ghazni] and listening to comprehensive views of the people of the province on solving the existing problem and in consultation with relevant government agencies and civil [society] organisations, decided in accordance with paragraph two of article 35 of the electoral law that Ghazni be exceptionally divided into three constituencies and voter registration and candidate nomination be carried out in the province as soon as possible in order to ensure justice in representation.” (See here and here). With this, it revoked its 20 May decision (here and here) not to change the previous practice of using the country’s 34 provinces as unitary, multi-seat constituencies in the upcoming parliamentary polls.

The IEC’s decision is another U-turn. In late 2016, it was actually tasked by President Ashraf Ghani, through a presidential decree, to come up with a solution that would prevent the repetition of ethnically unbalanced elections outcomes such as the one in Ghazni in 2010, and suggested in February 2017 to split up a number of populous provinces into smaller constituencies. The proposal did not pass the cabinet, though. On 20 May, the IEC finally announced, based on a legal opinion from the Palace, that there would be no changes to the constituencies (see AAN’s previous report on the background discussion on the debate about electoral constituencies here).

The second U-turn – of only splitting the Ghazni constituency – only came after dozens of people, mainly Pashtuns but also some Tajiks and Sayyeds, had forced a shutdown of the IEC provincial offices in Ghazni city for more than two months, from 26 April to 27 June. They were protesting that insecurity in this multi-ethnic province in south-eastern Afghanistan might lead to lopsided participation in the districts – high in the Hazara areas, low in the Pashtun areas – if the IEC left electoral constituencies unchanged. This raises the chances that the divisive outcome of the 2010 parliamentary election in Ghazni could be repeated. That year, all 11 Wolesi Jirga seats in the province went to Hazaras, with no Pashtun representation. Then-President Hamed Karzai intervened and tried to broker a deal that would have partly revoked the results but failed (see AAN’s reporting here and here). Both groups make up almost half of the province’s population according to a UN provincial profile, with Pashtuns’ numbers slightly higher. (1)

The recent protest led to almost a complete halt of electoral operations in that province.The ‘how’ of the IEC decision, however, is still opposed by some of the original protestors but, more importantly, has also produced further backlash. This came from the Hazara residents of the province who started their own protest against the decision on 28 June and shut down the IEC office on 2 July once more. They argue that the IEC decision to split the province is illegal.

Who are the original protestors?

13 days into the first phase of voter registration in the provincial capitals (see AAN’s previous reports here and here), on 26 April protestors shut down the IEC provincial office in Ghazni city by pitching a tent at its gate and starting a sit-in. They called for dividing the province into smaller electoral constituencies in order to ensure balanced ethnic representation. (It has been difficult to verify the exact number of the protestors; an Afghan media report put their number at some “dozens.”).

The demand (and similar demands raised in other provinces such as Maidan Wardak) (2) had previously been dampened by the IEC 20 May decision (here and here) not to change the constituencies for the 2018 Wolesi Jirga election.

Mawlawi Muhammad Ismail Ruhani, a Pashtun protest leader, Islamic scholar and potential parliamentary candidate from Giro district of Ghazni, told AAN on 30 May that the reason for the sit-in was to “see ourselves [represented] in the framework of the system and parliament.” He added that over the last eight years, local Sunnis did not have any representatives in parliament, “because our areas and districts are under the Taleban’s influence [or] threat, and therefore our people could not participate in elections.” He referred to the fact that most of the Pashtun-dominated districts are either controlled or contested by the Taleban. (3) Ruhani insisted that the protest was not Pashtun-only. According to him there was a leadership council of 22 people – four Tajiks, one Sayyed and 17 Pashtuns – which led the sit-in tent and organised the protestors. (4)

Abdul Razeq, the second protest leader, a Tajikfrom Ghazni centre, also claimed that the protestors include ordinary Pashtuns, Tajiks and Sayyeds from various parts of the province. A source from the IEC Ghazni provincial office told AAN on 30 May that the demonstrators also include a number of potential Pashtun and Tajik candidates. Among them, according to the source, were two Tajiks from the provincial capital, Dr Ismail Khanjar and Mualem Razeq, and 12 Pashtun candidates from the rural districts. Ruhani admitted that some, including himself, would likely be candidates, too. Still, he estimated that more than 180 candidates would be nominated from the Pashtun, Tajik and Sadat communities and not all of them were part of the protests.

What are the protestors’ demands?

The protestors’ main demand was to divide Ghazni into 11 electoral constituencies, corresponding with the 11 seats the province has been allocated in parliament. This, in effect, would result in single-member constituencies and break with the multi-member constituencies under the prevalent SNTV electoral system.

The protestors’ reasoning is that if the whole province is used as a single, multi-member constituency, candidates in insecure districts will not get enough votes as had happened during the previous parliamentary elections in 2010. Then, Pashtun candidates were disadvantaged in relation to Hazara candidates who mainly live in secure districts. But if the province is divided into 11 constituencies, there will be a candidate elected from each of those constituencies, regardless of varying voter turnout in the districts.

The government, however, rejected this demand. On 13 June, the president’s deputy spokeswoman, Durani Waziri, told AAN that the law must apply to all provinces equally, that there would be no exception for Ghazni province and that it was legally impossible to divide the electoral constituencies at this late stage. She ruled out any separate Ghazni ‘solution’ “hundred per cent”, calling such a thing “irrational.” The government, she said, was instead “trying to ensure security.”

The protestors also have a number of other demands. Firstly, they are calling for an extension of voter registration and distribution of tazkeras. This emanates from the fact that the IEC office in Ghazni has been closed during almost the entire registration period affecting all electoral activity in the province. Secondly, they demand that the IEC bring ethnic balance to its provincial office. Ruhani claimed that among 15 key provincial IEC positions, only two are occupied by Pashtuns, one by a Tajik and another by a Sayyed. The remaining positions are occupied by Hazaras, whom he described as dominating the IEC office. Nazer Hussain Nabizada, the acting head of the IEC Ghazni office, rejected this claim. He said there was a mix of Hazara, Pashtun, Tajik, Sayyed and Bayat employees in the office, hired based on tests conducted under the supervision of an authorised delegation from the IEC headquarters in Kabul. (5)

Gender issues also appear to have played a role in the recruitment dispute. The local IEC official claimed that protestors refuse to allow women from their communities to work, and therefore wanted men recruited in place of women on the employee roster. The provincial IEC office said this was not possible.

Thirdly, the protestors want a rebalancing of polling centres and reopening of some polling centres that they claim have been closed by the IEC. Ruhani claimed in conversation with AAN that “14 districts plus the provincial centre had 85 polling centres while three Hazara districts alone – I mean the overall Shia population – had 174 polling centres.” The list of polling centres that AAN has received from the IEC Ghazni provincial official, however, contradicts this claim and shows 164 polling centres allocated to Pashtun dominated districts (see overview in footnote 6). Ruhani also questioned the location of some of the polling centres, saying that the IEC closed a polling centre in Khenyan village of Qarabagh district, which is the site of an Afghan Local Police headquarters but opened a polling centre in the remote village of Barla, which is a hotbed of the Taleban. Ruhani said that they wanted the polling centre in Khenyan to be re-opened. IEC member Hafizullah Hashemi told AAN that this was a legitimate complaint and the IEC was considering it. He added that the polling centres were assessed over a long period of time and “ghost polling centres were removed” but that security conditions could have changed in the meantime.

Nabizada said that the IEC allocated the polling centres fairly, but whether those centres were secured or not (and thus opened or not) was a different question. “Neither the IEC nor the Hazara residents could ensure their security,” he said. According to him, there are 406 polling centres in Ghazni in total, with 55 of them allocated to the provincial capital. Zaher Akbari, the head of IEC’s Paktia office who has been seconded to Ghazni as acting head to replace Nabizada following the protest, also said that the protestors had not been able to distinguish between the IEC’s polling centre assessment and the security review of the polling centres, but he admitted that there were some problems with the IEC assessment. (AAN previously reported that the assessment had been deficient.) Akbari also blamed the security forces for planning to secure only 260 out of the total 406 polling centres spread across the province. He claimed that this issue was soluble, but this does not seem to be a realistic promise given the very complicated security situation in the province. (7)

The problem of ethnic representation

The situation in Ghazni boils down to the issue of ethnic representation, which in turn stems from the persistent insecurity in most of the Pashtun-dominated districts. However, the protestors try not to frame the problem in ethnic terms. Ruhani told AAN, “We never say that our Shia brothers have taken our rights. We say that the president and the system [of government] have taken our rights.”

However, occasionally, the grievances are expressed in ethnic terms, including complaints that the current Ghazni MPs did not do anything for Pashtuns or Tajiks. These sentiments are occasionally expressed more directly, as on 5 May when protestor Mawlawi Rahmatullah Andar said that Ghazni MPs belonged to a single “tribe” and had been imposed on them. “They violate our rights instead of serving us,” he said. Even Ruhani, who claimed there was not an issue with the Hazaras, said that he argued with the IEC delegation that if the Pashtuns and Tajiks were not able to elect their representatives, then it would be a corrupt election and they would not participate in that as it would be assistance to the corruption, which, he said, “is not allowed by the holy Quran.”

The suspicion is mutual: Aref Rahmani, an MP from Ghazni, in a conversation with AAN, alleged that the government was plotting a conspiracy against Hazaras. He noted that when he was elected, the governor, provincial NDS director, and head of the IEC provincial office were all Pashtun. He further said that Ghazni MPs were shunned by the executive branch during the Karzai administration, meeting the Ghazni MPs only once and speaking to them dismissively.

It is difficult to judge these claims. However, they are used as a basis for arguments and as a departure point that now the Pashtuns want to get assurances ahead of the upcoming elections that not all the seats will go to the Hazaras, who, in turn, want to ensure that any political assurances do not tip the balance to their disadvantage.

The fallout of the protest

The sit-in and closure of the IEC office has stymied electoral operations in the province. The IEC launched the first phase of voter registration on 14 April, covering provincial capitals. It was supposed to end on 13 May but was extended until 12 June countrywide. The second phase started on 15 May and was supposed to end on 28 May in district centres, but was extended for ten days until 7 June (see the IEC’s decision here). A third phase was supposed to be carried out from 30 May to 12 June in rural areas, but was postponed until the end of the second phase. It started on 9 June and is supposed to end on 6 July. (See the IEC’s decisions here and here). The first phase was hampered by the protest in Ghazni, and the second and third phases have not started in the province at all.

Voter registration statistics released by the IEC on 14 June, covering the period between 14 April when the exercise was launched and 12 June when the first and second phases ended, show that only 57,951 people have registered to vote in Ghazni. The IEC Ghazni’s Nabizada told AAN that due to the closure of the Ghazni office, they were only conducting voter registration in the provincial capital. He said that most of the polling centres there were running out of registration materials and could not resupply because the additional material was stranded in the central provincial office. Nabizada further said that out of 55 polling centres in Ghazni centre, six were under high security threat and security agencies have declared in advance of voter registration that those centres would not open. According to him, as the voter registration started, IEC officials realised they could not open six more centres because of security problems.

Similar problems occurred during candidate nomination for both parliament and district councils, which started on 26 May and ended on 12 June (with nomination of district council candidates extended until 14 June). This activity has not yet been carried out in Ghazni at all. The candidate nomination statistics released by the IEC on 13 June show zero nominations in the province.

How the IEC tried to solve the problem

The IEC sent a two-member delegation to Ghazni on 28 May to talk to the protestors. (8) From the beginning, the IEC had emphasised that it wastrying to address the demands that fall under its authority but could not address two main demands: security and dividing the province into constituencies, which are the responsibility of the government. (As mentioned above, the government had already said there was no chance of dividing electoral constituencies but promised to provide additional security in the protestors’ areas.) Still, there are no indications that the government can actually secure those parts of Ghazni that are controlled by the Taleban. As a result, the IEC has addressed only one of the protestors’ demands, namely dividing the province into three constituencies.

When the IEC announced its decision to divide the province into three constituencies on 25 June, it emphasized, in order to prevent similar demands from other provinces, that this was “exceptional.” It further said that the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) in cooperation with the Central Statistics Organisation (CSO) and other relevant agencies, in accordance with article 36 of the electoral law, and in understanding with the IEC, would be duty bound to draw the boundaries of the constituencies in the province in a balanced way, as stipulated by paragraphs four and six of article 83 of the constitution.

The IEC and IDLG have not explained publicly how exactly the three constituencies would be delineated and based on which considerations and criteria. Kabul daily Etilaat Roz, however, claimed it had obtained the documents. According to those, it reported, the province would not be divided fully along ethnic lines: one constituency with four parliamentary seats would consist of the two Pashtun-dominated districts of Ajrestan (majority Pashtun and some Hazaras) and Rashidan (Pashtun and Tajiks) as well as the three Hazara districts of Jaghori, Malestan and Nawur along with the mixed majority Hazara (along with Pashtuns, Bayat and Sayyeds, sometimes also called Sadat) district of Jaghatu. The second constituency, withfour seats, will bring together(a more diverse) Ghazni centre of Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazaras, Bayats, Sayyeds, Sikhs and Hindus, the five Pashtun districts of Waghaz, Khugyani (both have Tajiks), Andar, Zana Khan and Deh Yak, along with the ethnically mixed district of Khwaja Omari (with a majority of Hazara along with Pashtuns, Bayats, Sayyeds and Tajiks). The third constituency, with three seats, will comprise the five Pashtun districts of Muqur, Gilan, Nawa, Ab Band and Giru along with the mixed Pashtun/Hazara district of Qarabagh. The three women seats of the province will also be divided among the three constituencies. (9)

A source from the IEC confirmed this proposed delimitation to AAN on 26 June.

Reactions to the decision

The decision has been criticised by some election observers as illegal (see Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan here). Yusuf Rashid, executive director of Free and Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan has also said that splitting the province into three constituencies is not “a simple question” and that it might not be implemented within one or two weeks.

In Ghazni itself, Mawlawi Rohani, the protest leader, told AAN on 26 June that they would continue their sit-in until there was a fair division of the Ghazni provincial constituency. He said that the province should be delimited differently. He argued that Ajrestan and Rashidan should not go with the secure districts of Jaghori, Malestan and Nawur as the two districts could not compete with them given their security situation. He also said that an earlier census undertaken in ‘Daud Khan’s time’ – the president between 1973 and 1978 – should be used for any redrafting of the constituencies (in fact no census ever took place in that time; he was very likely referring to the one started – and never completed – in 1979; see here). Rohani also worried about Pashtun women who, according to him, have mostly not obtained tazkeras,which would additionally negatively influence a possible turnout. However, a day later on 27 June, the protestors removed their sit-in tents and allowed the IEC office to reopen. Following this, Ismail told AAN that they would still continue to push for fair delimitation.

On the other hand, all 11 Ghazni MPs held a press conference on 26 June voicing their opposition to the IEC’s decision. (See the video here). Two days later, on 28 June, a number of Hazara residents in the province waged another protest and sit-in close to the IEC office, calling the IEC’s decision “totally illegal” and demanding that the commission revoke it. In a resolution (AAN has received a copy of it), they argued that given the social and ethnic fabric of the province, the decision to split the province was technically challenging and could cause social problems. Bashir Ali Shafaq, a protest organiser affiliated with Hezb-e Wahdat-e Mardom led by deputy chief executive Mohammad Mohaqeq, told AAN on 1 July that the protestors had moved their tent close to the IEC office gate the day before and that they would talk to the acting head of the office once he was back from Kabul. He said that if the IEC’s decision is not rescinded, the protestors would make their next move which could include shutting down the IEC office in Ghazni, which they did the following day.

These protestors are supported by Hazara political leaders. Karim Khalili, head of High Peace Council and head of another faction of Hezb-e Wahdat, on 28 June also called “the exceptional division of Ghazni into constituencies as illegal, unfair and not applied on all provinces (ghair-e sarasari).”  A day later, Mohaqeq also criticised the decision as “against the electoral law” and “indicative of undue discrimination among brotherly ethnic groups of Afghanistan as well as an organised effort for countering the legal presence of some ethnic groups in the highest decision-making authority, the Wolesi Jirga.” The Hazara-dominated Enlightening Movement also joined in this opposition, saying the IEC’s decision could be accepted only if the province was divided into three or at least two provinces, not constituencies.A source from the office of Vice-President Sarwar Danesh – the highest-ranking Hazara politician in the government – had earlier told AAN that his position was that the entire Ghazni province, like all other provinces, should be used as one electoral constituency.

Conclusion: The problem of inclusive elections in war

If implemented the latest IEC decision will allow the Ghazni population to elect their representatives in a way that better reflects the province’s ethnic composition. But the devil is in the detail. Its concrete on proposal how to divide the province – which is not even officially public yet – has still to fully convince the original protestors. Furthermore, it has produced a new backlash from the Hazara residents of the province, backed by Hazara political leaders like Khalili and Mohaqeq at the national level.

On the other hand, the IEC’s bending to the protestors’ will – regardless of whether their demands are valid or not – has created a number of legal problems. First, the commission’s statement that this was “exceptional” for Ghazni is not very convincing, as it breaks with the general rule that could (if implemented – and the delineation of the new constituencies is still pending and fought over) open Pandora’s box, as people in other provinces have already made similar demands and might increase political pressure, too, if they see that the Ghaznawi people get their way. Secondly, the decision came more than two months after the legal deadline for any re-drawing of constituencies. If it is challenged in the courts, it might open up another legal battle that could drag on and impact the preparations for the elections.

If, on the contrary, the decision is not implemented, the original protestors might return to the scene. And this is possible: the country’s Independent Commission for the Oversight of the Implementation of the Constitution (ICOIC) has now called the IEC’s announcement about splitting the Ghazni constituency “outside the specified period [legal timeframe]” and “a violation of article 36 of the electoral law” in a statement issued on 1 July. In this light, it will be very difficult to find a way to fully please all parties involved.

Additionally, there is a larger practical double-bind. Without establishing security in the areas dominated by Pashtuns, any political solution for enfranchising them remains theoretical. The Taleban’s behaviour so far in 2018 suggests that the insurgents may be generally less willing to allow voter participation than in previous elections. (The Taleban have both threatened and called on the people to boycott the elections and backed up their threats with violence, see AAN’s previous report here. This might well play out in the Pashtun-dominated areas of Ghazni. Holding elections without securing these areas and without any division or any political solution prior to the elections, however, will most likely disenfranchise them. The issue has the potential to evolve into deeper conflict between the two ethnic groups in the province, and beyond, which may manifest itself in different forms.

Finally, the Ghazni elections tensions are just the tip of the iceberg, a result of the unfulfilled election reform promises of the National Unity Government. To hold elections that produce ethnically and otherwise inclusive representation in the provinces, while parts of them are controlled or contested by the Taleban (a problem aggravated by strong ethnic feelings), continues to be an almost insoluble dilemma for both the government and the IEC.

Edited by Graeme Smith and Thomas Ruttig

 

 

(1) As a result of the incomplete 1979 census (and none carried out later), no precise statistics exist about the country’s population in general and its ethnic breakdown in particular. The Central Statistics Office (CSO) does not provide any ethnic breakdown of the population in general and of the provinces in particular. According to a provincial profile updated by UNAMA in July 2017 (AAN has a copy of it), the province has, in total, a population of approximately 1.25 million: about 50 per cent Pashtun, 44 per cent Hazara, and six per cent Tajik. A source from the CSO who did not want to be named, told AAN on 12 June that the UNAMA statistics do not reflect reality as they fail to account for minority groups such as the Bayat, Qezelbash and Sadat. In the absence of reliable statistics, people from different groups in Ghazni tend to inflate the size of their own ethnic group.

(2) A day before the IEC announced its decision to declare each of the provinces as an electoral constituency, on 19 May 2018 residents of six districts in the neighbouring province of Maidan Wardak gathered in the provincial capital, calling for a division of the electoral constituencies. (See media report here). According to their resolution (AAN received a copy of it from IEC’s Maidan Wardak provincial electoral officer on 21 May 2018), they demanded that Maidan Wardak province be divided into “small constituencies.” Maidan Wardak has nine districts, including the provincial centre. They are: Maidan Shahr (provincial centre), Nerkh, Jalrez, Chak, Sayyed Abad, Daimerdad, Hessa-ye Awal-e Behsud, Jaghatu and Markaz-e Behsud. It has five seats in the Wolesi Jirga. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, three of them (two female and one male) were won by Hazara candidates and the remaining two by Pashtun candidates. The result of the 2005 parliamentary elections was even worse for the Pashtuns in the province as it “returned four Hazara and only one Pashtun to the house” (see this AAN’s previous report here). Election observer organizations had also highlighted similar problems “in Ghazni, Maidan-Wardak, Kapisa and Baghlan” (see media report here).

(3) According to the Central Statistics Organisation’s (CSO) latest population estimate of the year 1397 (2018-19) (see here), Ghazni has a population of 1,315,041. It has 19 districts, including the provincial centre.  These districts can be divided into three categories: ten Pashtun-dominated districts (Andar, Waghaz, Khugyani, Zana Khan, Deh Yak, Muqur, Gilan, Nawah, Ab Band and Giro) with a population of 487,713; three Hazara districts (Jaghuri, Malestan and Nawur) with a population of 385,585 and ; ethnically mixed districts: two Pashtun majority districts (Ajrestan and Rashidan) with a population of 51,070; two Hazara majority districts (Jaghatu and Khawja Omari) with a population of 55,305; and Qarabagh and Ghazni centre where there is a lack of clarity about their ethnic balance and with a population of 335,361.Waghaz, Khugyani, Rashidan and Ghazni centre have varying numbers of Tajiks, while Jaghatu and Khawja Omari and Ghazni centre have a varying degree of Bayat and Sayyeds. A small number of Sikh and Hindu also live in the centre. This is a rough assessment of the spread of ethnic groups across the province and the AAN’s calculation of the district’s population above is based on the CSO’s population estimate.

According to the January 2018 quarterly report of the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), of these districts, six are contested: Ajrestan, Andar, Giro, Zanakhan, Waghaz, Qarabagh; 11 districts are under the government’s influence: Khugyani, Rashidan, Nawur, Muqur, Malestan, Khawja Omari, Jaghuri, Ab Band, Deh Yak, Gilan, and Jaghatu; one is under government control: Ghazni; and one is under insurgent control: Nawa. This assessment may not reflect the fluid security situation in the province. AAN research (forthcoming) shows that the government controls the three Hazara districts of Jaghori, Malestan and Nawur and central Ghazni city. The Taleban do not hold any part of Jaghatu or Khawja Omari but do threaten them. Nawa is fully controlled by the Taleban and the rest are largely controlled by the Taleban with only district centres under the government’s control.

(4) He provided the following list of leadership council members: 1) Mawlawi Muhammad Ismail Ruhani; 2) Zainuddin Bazaz; 3) Abdul Bari Khanikhel; 4) Muhebullah Khpelwak; 5) Ali Khan Andar; 6) Abdul Razeq; 7) Muhammad Ismail Khanjar; 8) Sayyed Obaidullah Sadat; 9) Khalilullah Hotak; 10) Muhammad Mirza Hemmat; 11) Mirza Andar; 12) Fariduddin Waezi; 13) Mawlawi Hakimullah Lailzai; 14) General Turan Tarakai; 15) Muhammad Sharif Amiri; 16) Naqibullah Tarakai; 17) Humayun Alikhel; 18) Muhammad Faruq Poya; 19) Ataullah Mujahed; 20) Naqibullah Khaksar; 21) Abdul Bari Shelgarai; 22) provincial council member Amanullah Kamrani (see AAN’s report here). At least two of them, Kamrani and Hotak have had connections with local anti-Taleban uprising forces (more on this in a forthcoming AAN dispatch about ALP).

(5) Earlier, on 24 May 2018, Aref Rahmani, one of the incumbent MPs from Ghazni, described the IEC recruitment as follows: the IEC recruited two Pashtuns but they turned out to be on the IEC blacklist for involvement in fraud during previous elections. Then the IEC recruited two people from the waiting list who happened to be Hazara. He claimed that the IEC provincial office did not have any role in their recruitment. He further claimed that the IEC members acknowledged this when the MPs from Ghazni met them on 20 May. IEC member Hafizullah Hashemi told AAN that he had also heard this, but added the IEC was reviewing it. On 13 June, IEC chairman Gula Jan Abdul Badi Sayyad said during a press conference that the protestors had complained about recruitment and the acting head of the IEC provincial office, adding that the IEC “sent a new acting head – who is competent and we are sure that he can solve the issue – a week ago. We fully authorised him to revise and correct the recruitments that were said to have taken place based on tastes.” (See the video here). The new acting head of the Ghazni office, Akbari, a Pashtun, told AAN that there had indeed been biased recruitment in favour of one ethnic group (Hazaras), adding that the recruitment had been carried out by the provincial office under the supervision of the delegation from the IEC’s headquarters. He said that the IEC was reviewing the recruitment and tashkil (staff quota) and would revise the staffing based on the IEC’s procedures and human resource procedure.

(6) In response to this, Nabizada said that polling centres had been determined based on population and geographical distance. He said it was unfair to compare, for example, Hazara-dominated Khwaja Omari district with Pashtun dominated Andar district, because, according to him, Andar was a first-grade district, which was both physically larger and had more people than Khwaja Omari. By the same token, comparing Pashtun-dominated Zana Khan district with Hazara dominated Jaghori was unfair. He provided the following breakdown of polling centres per district: seven for Ab Band; eight for Ajrestan; 40 for Andar; 16 for Deh Yak; eight for Rashidan; nine for Zana Khan; 19 for Giro; 17 for Muqur; 14 for Gilan; eight for Khugyani; eight for Waghaz; 10 for Nawa; 37 for Nawur; 46 for Qarabagh; 31 for Malestan; 22 for Jaghatu; 7 for Khwaja Omari; 46 for Jaghuri; and 55 for Ghazni centre.

(7) According to UN figures, Ghazni was among the five provinces with the most security incidents in 2016 and among the six most violent between 15 February and 15 May 2018 (no similar UN figures exist for 2017). In a map depicting ‘conflict severity’ in 2017 – a combination of three indicators: security incidents, civilian casualties and conflict-induced displacement – UNOCHA places Andar district in the highest category. Most of the districts along the Kabul-Kandahar highway, Deh Yak, Ghazni centre, Waghaz, Qarabagh, Giro, Muqur and Gelan, and the western district of Ajrestan were in the highest two categories of conflict severity. The western districts of Jaghori, Malestan and Nawur are in the lowest category. (p65- 66) According to a January 2018 BBC report based on research conducted between 23 August and 21 November 2017, the Taleban fully control 14 districts nationwide, including the district of Nawa in Ghazni. Further, they have a ‘high’ ‘active and physical presence’ (districts attacked at least twice a week) in Rashidan, Jaghatu, Khwaja Omari, Zanakhan, Ghazni, Dehyak, and Andar. The rest of the province saw ‘medium’ (districts attacked at least three times a month) or ‘low’ Taliban presence (district attacked at least once in three months) except for Malestan and Jaghori districts.

(8) On 28 April, two IEC members Sayyed Hafizullah Hashemi and Quraishi travelled to Ghazni. According to Hashemi, they talked to the protestors and collected their views. Mawlawi Ruhani told AAN that the delegation assured the protestors they would arrange a meeting with the president on the division of the provincial constituency as this fell within his remit. Ruhani added that the delegation said the IEC would meet other demands under the IEC’s remit. Ruhani said that the sit-in tent is at the IEC office gate and  would remain there until they had received a response from the president.

(9) According to the Etilaat Roz report, the proposal was discussed in a meeting attended by six IEC members (the seventh member, Wasima Badghisi, was absent), and ECC members, presidential representative Fazl Fazli, the chief executive’s representative Ghulam Faruq Majruh, IDLG representative Timor Sharan, NDS representative Ajmal Abedi, MoI representative Salem Ehsas, as well as representatives of ACCRA, CSO and the Land Authority. Sharan and Maleha both opposed the division and Maleha did not sign the IEC’s decision. (See here).

The Boeing-Embraer joint venture (JV) agreement announced on 5 July, while largely focusing on the two companies’ commercial businesses, also includes work for defence products. The two companies said they will create another JV to promote and develop new markets and applications for defence

Key Points GE is looking for the US Air Force to define the reliability requirement for its B-52 re-engining How reliability is defined could lean the company towards offering its new Passport or CF34-10 engines How the US Air Force (USAF) defines and quantifies the reliability requirement in its

The Tunisian Navy commissioned its second Damen Multi Service Offshore Patrol Vessel (MSOPV) 1400 and a third Istiklal-class patrol boat at the port of La Goulette on 25 June. Syphax (P 611), the second of four MSOPV 1400s on order for the Tunisian Navy, was delivered to Tunisia the previous month

The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has told parliament it is seeking to mitigate the effects of the US President Donald Trump administration’s 1 June imposition of a 25% tariff on steel imports from the European Union. Asked what the ministry was doing regarding the tariffs’ impact during

Americas

• Performance Aircraft Services is being contracted for repair work on the Navy’s fleet of E-6B aircraft. The $57 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract provides for the removal and replacement of sealant on fuel cells and aircraft surfaces, as well as on the internal surface of wing fuel tanks for up to 16 aircraft. The USA’s E-6 Mercury “survivable airborne communication system” airplanes support their Navy’s SSBN ballistic missile submarine force and overall strategic forces. The 707-300 derivatives have a range of about 5,500 miles and can easily carry 23 crew members. The E-6 flies independent random operations from various deployed sites for approximately 15-day intervals. Each deployed crew is self-supporting except for fuel and perishables, and the mission requires a 24-hour commitment of resources (alert posture) in the Atlantic and Pacific regions. Work will be performed in Waco, Texas and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. It is expected to be completed in May 2023.

• Northrop Grumman is being tapped for work in support of the Navy’s PMS 408. The firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee modification is valued at $96,5 million and provides for the production for the Joint Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare Increment One Block One systems. PMS 408 is the Navy program management office for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), counter radio controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare (CREW), and anti-terrorism afloat (ATA) systems. The modification is for Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) systems that provide combat troops protection against radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs). They are high-power, modular, programmable, multiband radio frequency jammers designed to deny enemy use of selected portions of the radio frequency spectrum. They come in 3 varieties – fixed, mounted, and dismounted. CREW systems are designed to provide protection for foot soldiers, vehicles and permanent structures. The Joint CREW Increment One Block One system is the first-generation system that develops a common open architecture across all three capabilities and provides protection for worldwide military operations. Work will be performed in San Diego, California and Sierra Vista, Arizona, and is expected to be completed by April 2020.

• BAE Systems Land & Armaments is being awarded a contract modification for the production of the Mk 38 mod 3 machine gun system. The modification is valued at $33,2 million and sees to fulfill specified requirements and technical performance requirements for the Mk38 mod 3 25mm MGS ordnance alteration. The Mk38 provides ships with defensive and offensive gunfire capability for the engagement of a variety of surface targets. Designed primarily as a close-range defensive measure, it provides protection against patrol boats, floating mines, and various shore-based targets. The gun is visually distinctive from previous versions with its stealthy housing, which also protects the gun from weather and allows for easier access to internal components through large access panels. The Mod 3 mounts a larger Mk44 II 30 mm cannon for a 500-meter range increase, as well as a coaxial .50 caliber machine gun. Elevation is increased to +75 degrees for engaging UAVs and helicopters, and ammunition storage is greater at 420 30 mm rounds. Work will be performed in Haifa, Israel and Louisville, Kentucky. It is expected to be completed by June 2020.

Middle East & Africa

• The government of Lebanon is set to receive several UASs as part of a US foreign military sale. The $8,2 million deal between the US DoD and Insitu provides for the production and delivery of six ScanEagle UASs to Lebanon. The contract also includes related support equipment, training, site activation, technical services, and data for the government of Lebanon. One UAS typically comprises up to 12 air vehicles as well as associated pneumatic launchers and Skyhook recovery apparatus, meaning that this latest contract could cover as many as 72 ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The ScanEagle is solidly based on Insitu’s original “Insight” platform, with different variants distinguished by their payloads and accompanying equipment rather than their aerodynamic design. These UAVs fill a niche between hand-launched mini-UAVs and runway-capable tactical UAVs. Lebanon is understood to have received an initial batch of ScanEagle UASs in 2015, although no details were disclosed at the time or since. Work is expected to be completed in June 2020.

• Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is adding a new missile to its Barak family. The Barak-MX is a modular and scalable networked air/missile defense system that links various sensors, launchers and Barak effectors in a single architecture that can be scoped and optimized to meet specific customer mission requirements. Barak MX is essentially a building block solution. It enables one to retain the central C2 capability but adds longer-range air defense sensors and Barak effectors to scale up the system. The Barak Battle Management Center (BMC), which creates and manages a unified multi-senor aerial picture, coordinates the force operation networks and manages the launch arrays. Barak BMC is available in mobile, transportable and stationary versions. The interceptors are vertically launched and support 360° coverage, quick reactions, short minimal ranges and active high-end RF seekers for targets with low radar cross sections and high maneuverability.

Europe

• The Czech Ministry of Defense intends to move ahead with the acquisition of two additional C-295 transport aircraft in support of its troops. The Czechs currently have four tactical transporters, they are flying since 2010. The new C-295 is a stretched derivative of the CN-235 transporter, with characteristic high-wing, rear-loader design. The aircraft is noted for its short take-off and landing capability on semi-prepared runways and for the large payload capacity of 20392 lb. The landing and take-off run of just 350 yd. and 732 yd. allow the aircraft access to runways close to operational or crisis areas or where supplies and troops are needed. The new C-295s are expected to replace two obsolete Russian-made Yakovlev Yak-40 jet airliners, deliveries are expected by 2020.

Asia-Pacific

• The government of Japan is selecting Lockheed Martin in support of its multibillion-dollar missile defense system. The Asian nation plans to deploy to Aegis Ashore batteries by 2023. The two Aegis Ashore sites will likely cost around $4 billion, almost twice the amount previously expected. Lockheed will provide a version of its Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in support of the defense efforts. LRDR combines proven solid-state radar technologies with proven ballistic missile defense algorithms, all based upon an open architecture platform. The radar provides precision metric data to improve ballistic defense discrimination. The missile defense upgrade is a clear message towards China and North Korea. Japanese military planners still see North Korea as an immediate danger. They also view China’s growing military power as a long-term threat.

Today’s Video

• A-10 Warthog prepares for combat patrol over Afghanistan.

Barak-8 concept
(click to view full)

Over a development timeline measured in decades, India’s indigenous “Akash” and “Trishul” programs for surface to air missiles have failed to inspire full confidence. Trishul was eventually canceled entirely. Akash had a a long, difficult development period, but seems to have found customer acceptance and a solid niche in the rugged terrain of the northeast. India still needed longer-range advanced SAMs to equip its navy and army, however, and decided to try to duplicate the success of the partnership model that had fielded the excellent Indo-Russian PJ-10 BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.

In February 2006, therefore, Israel and India signed a joint development agreement to create a new Barak-NG medium shipborne air defense missile, as an evolution of the Barak-1 system in service with both navies. In July 2007 the counterpart MR-SAM project began moving forward, aiming to develop a medium range SAM for use with India’s land forces. Both missiles would now be called Barak-8. In between, “India to Buy Israeli “SPYDER” Mobile Air Defense System” covered India’s move to begin buying mobile, short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems for its army, based on the Python and Derby air-to-air missiles in service with its air force and naval aircraft. These projects offer India a way forward to address its critical air defense weaknesses, and upgrade “protection of vital and strategic ground assets and area air defence.” This DID FOCUS article will cover the Barak-8 and closely related programs in India, Israel, and beyond.

The Barak, and Barak-8 Genesis: Barak-1

Barak Components
(click to view full)

Barak is a supersonic, vertically-launched short range air defense system, with an operational range of about 10 km/ 6 miles. That pushes it past the standard ranges of shoulder-launched options with naval counterparts, like the MBDA Mistral/SIMBAD or Saab Boofors’ RBS-70, but short of other small vertical launch options like the RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow. Its closest western competitors on the international market are probably Raytheon’s horizontally-fired Amero-German RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile, and MBDA’s flexible Crotale VT-1/NG. Key attributes include a compact 8-cell vertical launching system that weighs just 1,700 kg, coupled with an equally compact 1,300 kg fire control system. This makes it easier to install in small ships, and to retrofit into older vessels.

Barak-1 reportedly in service with at Israel, Chile, India, Singapore, and Venezuela.

Barak launch
(click to view full)

India bought over $300 million worth of these missiles as a substitute for the indigenous but long-delayed Trishul (“Trident”) missile project, and Barak systems now equip India’s lone aircraft carrier INS Viraat, all 6 Project 16/16A Godavari/ Brahmaputra Class 3,850t frigates, 2 of 6 Rajput Class 4,974t destroyers, and the 3 new 6,200t Shivalik Class frigates. Current missile stocks aren’t adequate to cover that, and readiness requires regular training launches against live targets. Barak-1 missiles are also supposed to be part of upgrades to India’s 3 Delhi Class 6,200t destroyers, in order to remove the hole created by the Russian SA-N-7C ‘Gollum’ air defense missile system’s limited firing arc.

Barak-1 missiles are also supposed to be part of upgrades to India’s 3 Delhi Class 6,200t destroyers, in order to fix the SA-N-7C ‘Gollum’ air defense missile’s limited firing arc. The missile’s fast response time, effectiveness against missile threats, and compact size are considerable assets, but they are currently offset somewhat by its short range.

Next-Gen: Barak-8

Barak 8 display
(click to view full)

The Navy’s Barak-NG/ LR-SAM project aimed to give India’s naval defenses a much longer reach, with the intention of eventually making it India’s primary naval SAM. The project was later renamed Barak 8, and aims to deliver 60-70 km/ up to 42 mile range, thanks to a dual-pulse solid rocket motor whose second “pulse” fires as the missile approaches its target. This ensures that the missile isn’t just coasting in the final stages, giving it more than one chance at a fast, maneuvering target.

The missile’s most important feature may be its active seeker. Instead of forcing its ship or land-based radar to “paint”/illuminate its target at all times, the Barak 8 can be left alone once it is close to its target. This is an excellent approach for dealing with saturation attacks using older ship radars, which can track many targets but illuminate just a few. It’s also very useful for land-based systems, which will survive longer against enemy anti-radar missiles (ARMs) if they can turn themselves on and off to confuse enemy seekers, without worrying that they will lose all of their effectiveness.

That kind of performance vaults the Barak 8 past widespread options like the RIM-162 ESSM, or entries like VL-MICA on land. Though the Barak-8 may compete globally with those systems, a better comparison would be naval missiles like Raytheon’s SM-2 Block IIIA and MBDA’s Aster-15, or land-based options like the Patriot. The Barak 8’s active seeker would even give it a performance advantage over the SM-2, and corresponds more closely to the SM-6 currently in development.

The naval Barak-8 reportedly maintains its principle of using compact launchers and systems. Its ancillary capabilities will always depend on the radar and combat system aboard its ship.

One wild card is the Barak’s potential use in a point defense role against ballistic missiles, a role that can be played by some of its more advanced competitors on land or sea. This capability is implied in the land-based system’s name, but hasn’t been discussed publicly, or validated in publicly announced tests.

The land-based Barak 8 Air and Missile Defense (AMD) system includes several components:

• RAFAEL supplies the Barak-8 interceptor missile, which remains vertically launched.

• The battle management, command, control, communication and intelligence center (BMC4I) is produced by the MBT Division of IAI’s Missiles, Systems, and Space Group; it offers both stand alone operation for a single fire unit, and joint task force coordination (JTC).

• IAI ELTA Systems Ltd. supplies the Land-Based Multi-Function Surveillance, Track & Guidance Radar (LB-MF-STAR), a rotating S-band digital Active Electronic Steering Array (AESA) Radar System that can deliver an accurate, high quality arena situation picture, and extract low radar cross section targets like stealthy cruise missiles, even in the toughest environmental conditions. The naval MF-STAR is expected to be part of Israel’s next-generation missile frigates.

In Israel, the Barak-8 is slated to equip its next-generation frigates, and may find its way to other roles. India expects to field the missiles on land and sea.

Beyond those 2 countries, export prospects beckon for a missile that may offer a value-priced naval alternative to Raytheon’s Standard-2 and MBDA’s Aster-15. According to Defense News, the Barak-8 project features funding from American military aid dollars, as well as Indian cooperation and private/governmental funding in Israel. An Israeli source, on the other hand, has told DID that the USA has no claim on the Barak-8’s intellectual property. DID has been unable to verify he exact situation; but if the USA has no IP or significant American-made components in the Barak AMD system, it would have implications for both procurement funding sources and export policy.

India’s Barak Programs The Navy: LR-SAM

Engagement profile
(click to view the rest)

India has 2 different programs that could use the new longer-range Barak missile. The naval Barak-NG, or LR-SAM deal, was the first. Signed in 2006, it’s worth INR 26.06 billion (about $591 million at then-conversion) as of December 2009.

India’s Navy has decided as a matter of policy that it will only mount medium-long range surface-to-air missile systems on future warships, as opposed to depending on short range systems that might protect a ship, but don’t offer layered defense for the rest of the fleet. This was an early sign of its transition to a more of a “blue water” navy that can reach into high-threat areas, and a logical complement to India’s establishment of a serious carrier force beginning with INS Vikramaditya (ex Admiral Gorshkov).

Hence the 2006 Barak-NG naval agreement, which gives India an upgraded version of a familiar system, extends India’s technological capabilities, fosters economic ties and integration at sub-component levels, and helps the Israelis build a new system that meets some of their own emerging requirements. The new system would reportedly have a range of 50-60 km.

Making that happen required some loosening of bureaucratic constraints on India’s defense industry. Based on projections of need and the high cost of air defense systems, India’s Ministry of Defence began initiatives under which Indian state-owned agencies can forge joint co-development and co-production ventures with foreign companies. The rationale is that under these partnerships, much of the underlying technology will remain in India. Israel has risen to become one of India’s largest defense industry partners, and may be on its way to surpassing Russia as India’s largest partner.

That rise, India’s previous positive experiences with Barak, and the opportunity to help develop new technologies instead of buying them, all led India toward Israel for its next-generation naval SAM partnership.

Israel Aerospace Industries will be the key partner, and will contribute most of the applicable technology, just as Russia did for the BrahMos by offering its SS-N-26 Oniks missile as the base platform. 2011 Barak-8 materials show Indian firms contributing the dual-pulse rocket motor, associated motor arming/safing mechanisms, and the pneumatic actuation system. On the other hand, India Defence reports that IAI and its Israeli partners have agreed to transfer all relevant technologies and manufacturing capabilities to India.

The LR-SAM project is now slated for completion by December 2015, which would be about a decade from its 2005 project approval to fielding. Israel will be ahead of that schedule, as they began steps to field Barak-8 in their navy in mid-2013.

Land-Based: MR-SAM

SA-3
(click to view full)

The Barak-8’s follow-on project involves a land-based system, intended to replace old Russian systems. Most reports place MR-SAM’s desired capabilities at 70 km/ 42 mile range effective range, with 360 degree coverage, plus the ability to engage multiple targets simultaneously. As The Times of India put it, in 2007:

“The project is crucial because, as highlighted by TOI earlier, there are still “many gaping holes” in India’s radar network and the armed forces only have near-obsolete air defence units like Russian Pechora [DID: upgraded SA-3], OSA-AK [DID: SA-8B, scheduled for interim upgrades], and Igla [DID: SA-16 shoulder-fired] missile systems.

Sources peg the MR-SAM project as an extension of the ongoing DRDO-Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) project, launched in January 2006 at a cost of $480 million, to develop a supersonic 60-km Barak-NG (new-generation) missile defence system for Navy.”

India Defence and the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz also reported that MR-SAM would be an extension of work done on the Barak-NG deal, and this seems to be the general consensus.

SA-8
(click to view full)

The DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) will be the ‘prime developer’ for the MR-SAM project, which will reportedly have a Rs 2,300 crore (INR 23 billion, about $445 million at signing in 2009) indigenous component within an estimated Rs 10,075 crore (INR 100.75 billion, about $1.95 billion at signing) total. The 4-5 year project aims to provide India’s military with 9 advanced air defense squadrons, each with 2 MR-SAM firing units. Each MR-SAM unit, in turn, would consist of a command and control center, an acquisition radar, a guidance radar, and 3 launchers with 8 missiles each.

MR-SAM’s total would therefore be 10 C2 centers, 18 acquisition radars, 18 guidance radars, and 54 launchers, armed with 432 ready-to-fire missiles. Some reports have placed total missile orders as high as 2,000, which would add a significant reserve stockpile to replenish missiles in any conflict.

Indian sources estimated a 4-year, $300 million System Design & Development phase to develop unique system elements, and produce an initial tranche of the land-based missiles. As of its approval by the Cabinet Committee on Security in July 2007, MR-SAM surpassed the BrahMos project in size, and may be the largest joint defense development project ever undertaken between India and any other country.

The MR-SAM project reportedly has a “probable date of completion” by August 2016, which would be around 7 years from its 2009 approval.

Contracts & Key Events 2014 – 2018

In service in Israel; DRDO challenges; Successful intercept test.

Empty
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July 4/18: New family member Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is adding a new missile to its Barak family. The Barak-MX is a modular and scalable networked air/missile defense system that links various sensors, launchers and Barak effectors in a single architecture that can be scoped and optimized to meet specific customer mission requirements. Barak MX is essentially a building block solution. It enables one to retain the central C2 capability but adds longer-range air defense sensors and Barak effectors to scale up the system. The Barak Battle Management Center (BMC), which creates and manages a unified multi-senor aerial picture, coordinates the force operation networks and manages the launch arrays. Barak BMC is available in mobile, transportable and stationary versions. The interceptors are vertically launched and support 360° coverage, quick reactions, short minimal ranges and active high-end RF seekers for targets with low radar cross sections and high maneuverability.

March 30/18: More missiles please Israel Aerospace Industries and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems have been contracted by the Indian Ministry of Defense to supply additional Barak-1 short-range surface-to-air missiles. The contract is valued at $70.5 million and includes 131 Barak-1 shipborne, point defense missiles to be delivered to the Indian Navy. The Barak-1 is a supersonic, vertically-launched short range air defense system, with an operational range of about 6 miles. That pushes it past the standard ranges of shoulder-launched options with naval counterparts, like the MBDA Mistral/SIMBAD or Saab Boofors’ RBS-70, but short of other small vertical launch options like the RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow. Its closest western competitor on the international market is probably Raytheon’s horizontally-fired Amero-German RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile, and MBDA’s flexible Crotale VT-1/NG. Key attributes include a compact 8-cell vertical launching system that weighs just 1,700 kg, coupled with an equally compact 1,300 kg fire control system. This makes it easier to install in small ships, and to retrofit into older vessels.

May 22/17: Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) has been awarded an additional contract by the Indian government to supply air and defense missile systems for four ships of the Indian navy. Valued at an estimated $630 million, the agreement will include local state-owned firm Bharat Electronics Ltd, who will serve as the main contractor on the project under New Delhi’s “Make in India” initiative. The deal follows a $2 billion one signed with IAI last month to supply India’s army and navy with missile defense systems. The Barak-8 system is a joint development effort between IAI, India’sDefence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), Israel’s Administration for the Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructure, Elta Systems, and Rafael, while Bharat produce the system’s missiles.

April 9/17: The Indian government has given the go ahead for the $1.8 billion purchase of the Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile (MRSAM) from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). A land-based version of the Barak-8, the MRSAM was developed by IAI and India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) in collaboration with Rafael and IAI/Elta, and worked with various Indian companies including BEL, L&T, BDL and other private vendors, and will be operated by the Indian Army. The company will also supply additional LRSAM air & missile defense systems for the first build in India Indian aircraft carrier.

March 2/17: Israel and India will co-develop and produce a medium-range surface-to-air missile for the Indian Army. Contracts for the deal are expected to be awarded later this month with the value of the project estimated at over $2.5 billion. Known as the MRSAM, development of the missile will be undertaken jointly by India’s DRDO, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), and will be produced by state-owned Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) in partnership with other state-owned and private defense companies. It does, however, remain unclear who will own the Intellectual Property Right (IPR) for the missile as well as the ownership of the data package for the technology.

July 5/16: India successfully tested the land version of its Barak-8 anti-air missile twice on Friday at India’s Integrated Test Range. Conducted by a team from India’s DRDO and Israel’s IAI, naval versions have already been fitted and tested aboard Indian Navy warships. The long-range rocket can identify and hit an air target within a range of 70 kilometers, or some 43.5 miles.

January 4/16: India has completed its first naval test of the Barak-8 long range surface to air missile (LRSAM). Developed jointly between the Indian Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO) and IAI Israel, the recent test follows November’s successful testing on board an Israeli naval platform. The maiden firing consisted of the missile intercepting aerial targets at extended ranges up to 70km. Apart from the missile, the system includes a Multi Functional Surveillance and Threat Alert Radar (MF STAR) for detection, tracking and guidance of the missile. When completed, the missiles will be fitted on board all Kolkata class destroyers and major warships in the Indian Navy.

November 30/15: The Israeli Navy has announced the successful first test of the Barak-8 air defense system. The interceptor missile was launched from a Sa’ar-5 Corvette against a UAV target representing a threat against a ship at sea. The system has been jointly developed with India and aims to cater for the long range missile defence for both countries with India also planning to test the system before the end of the year. It is hoped that the system will have reached initial operational capability within the next two years.

November 16/15: India’s Barak-8 will be test-fired between now and the end of the year after it was announced that preparations are being made on board the INS Kolkata for the test which the Navy hope to have installed on all future warships and retrofitted on its current Kolkata class destroyers.

Mar 2/15: Indian interest renewed for MRSAM. Defense News reports that an Indian Defence Ministry official confirmed that the medium-range (MRSAM) variant is a go for joint development with Israel, with an initial expected order of $1.5 billion. Rafale and IAI would work with Indian firms Bharat Dynamics Tata Power SED and Larsen & Toubro.

Nov 10/14: Testing. A successful test of the Barak-8 “Air & Missile Defense System” acquires an incoming target drone using the system’s radar, fired the missile to an interception zone, and had the missile successfully acquire and kill the target using its own seeker. Indian officials were there, including DRDO chief Dr. Avinash Chander, and Israeli and Indian releases both pronounced their satisfaction with all aspects of test performance.

The Israelis already have the missile deployed, so they’re happy. What the releases didn’t say, is whether DRDO’s rocket booster was used in the test (Aug 14/14). It’s likely that they did, and the next step is warship trials for India. DRDO hopes to begin deliveries by the end of 2015. Sources: IAI, “IAI Successfully Tested the Barak-8 Air & Missile Defense System” | India MoD, “Successful Flight Testing of LR SAM Missile”.

Aug 14/14: INS Kolkata. Media reports indicate that India’s new 7,500t air defense destroyer INS Kolkata, which is set to be commissioned on Aug 16/14, will be armed with Barak-1 missiles until the Barak-8s arrive. The article doesn’t explain whether the vertical launchers are compatible, or whether the Barak-1 has been integrated yet with the IAI Elta MF-STAR active array radar that equips the new destroyer class. With respect to the Barak-8s:

“The missile is ready, but [DRDO’s] boosters to propel the missile [upon launch]… have failed.”

Hence the importance of the forthcoming tests, if DRDO can get its rocket boosters to Israel (q.v. Aug 11/14). Meanwhile, India is likely to have 3 Kolkata Class destroyers ready to go by the time they’re done testing the Indian LR-SAM. They’ll need to do something in the interim. Sources: oneindia News, “INS Kolkata, the Biggest Naval Destroyer, is the weakest link in Defence”.

Aug 11/14: Force majeure. India’s Business Standard explains how the recent battles in the Gaza Strip are affecting the LR-SAM program, which was already 2 years late:

“The DRDO confirms that the rockets, filled with highly combustible propellant, were despatched [sic] on a commercial airline, Korean Air, for trials in Israel. After the rocket motors reached Seoul – Korean Air’s global hub, from where they were to be routed onwards to Tel Aviv – the launch of Israeli airstrikes on Gaza on July 8 caused Korean Air to cancel all flights to Tel Aviv…. Consequently, a crucial and secret sub-system of the world’s most advanced anti-missile defence system has been languishing in a Korean Air warehouse in Seoul.”

Actually, the cancellation came on July 20/14, after Hamas rockets struck near the airport. Note that Iron Dome is programmed to ignore rockets that don’t threaten its priority areas, and many airlines have already reassessed the situation and resumed flights. Korean Air, on the other hand, won’t begin flights to Tel Aviv again until Aug 28/14. India’s DRDO is “monitoring the situation,” and could choose to request help from India’s Air Force, whose IL-76 heavy jet transports could pick up and deliver the missiles.

Once the Premier Explosives Ltd. rocket motors are delivered, they will be integrated with the IAI-built front section, and then undergo full homing trials at an Israeli range. After that, warship trials will begin, and DRDO hopes to begin deliveries by the end of 2015. By then, 3 new Project 15A Kolkata Class destroyers, and the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, will all be waiting to receive their primary air defense weapons. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Indian missiles languish in South Korea due to Gaza conflict” | Israel’s Globes, “Korean Air cancels all Israel flights until August 28”.

May 13/14: Israel. A Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class corvette has already been outfitted with IAI Elta’s MF-STAR S-Band AESA radar, and Barak-8 air defense missiles. The other 2 are set to follow.

The MF-STAR, or “Adir,” has been bought by India for its new Project 15A Kolkata Class destroyers. They are also expected to employ the Barak-8. Sources: The Jerusalem Post, “The Israel Navy is quietly enhancing its capabilities for precision, long-range missiles”.

2010 – 2013

Barak-8 development & testing continues; Azerbaijan sale?; Akash missile expands Indian footprint; Indian RFI for immediate MR-SAM option.

Barak-8 concept
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Dec 23/13: DAC OK. AK Antony and the Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC) clear the Indian Navy’s intent to buy 262 more Barak-1 missiles, in order to replenish their fast-dwindling stocks. The paper adds:

“The naval LR-SAM, approved in December 2005, is now slated for completion by December 2015. The MR-SAM project, sanctioned in February 2009, in turn, has a “probable date of completion” by August 2016.”

Read “Indian Naval Air Defenses: Another Avoidable Crisis” for full coverage.

Dec 17/13: Update. India’s Ministry of Defense provides updates regarding a number of DRDO projects, including LR-SAM. The development program’s original delivery target was May 2011, but the Probable Date of Completion is now December 2015: 4 1/2 years late, and well after it becomes fully operational in Israel. Sources: India MoD, “DRDO Projects”.

Nov 14/13: Stall. India’s LR-SAM and MR-SAM projects are stalled, even as Israel moves to deploy the Barak-8 at sea. The Barak-8 was supposed to be delivered for LR-SAM by 2012, and is supposed to go to the IAF as MR-SAM by 2017. Unfortunately, drawings for components aren’t enough to let Indian firms produce them properly, and:

“Frankly speaking, right now, not much is going on in the joint venture due to various issues between the two sides. Expecting Israel to share its technology with India is unfair. But such things should have been clarified before the joint venture was entered into,” said an official…. DRDO officials are also attributing the delay to a complicated and long procedure involving shuttling between India and Israel for various stages of development of a system etc… [DRDO] also reportedly found itself helpless on problems in propulsion system and other related issues while a significant number of parts or systems are yet to be tested following a delay in manufacturing.”

So, to sum up: contract terms that didn’t provide clear mechanisms to enable Indian production from the baseline they’re actually at, Indian DRDO bureaucracy sitting in the way of development and not delivering on key items, and manufacturing issues that have created Indian testing delays. While Israel fields the missile. DRDO Director General Avinash Chander wouldn’t comment on LR-SAM, which is already late, but he said MR-SAM remained on schedule for 2017. Sources: Times of India, “India-Israel joint venture to manufacture missiles fails to take off”.

July 31/13: Israeli installation. India may give the Barak-8 LR-SAM’s date of probable completion as 2015, but Israel intends to have the missile installed on its 3 Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class corvettes before the end of 2013.

The move is reportedly being made in response to Syria’s deployment of SS-N-26/ P-800 Yakhont supersonic anti-ship missiles, with a range of up to 180 miles. Some of the missiles reportedly survived a major Israeli strike, and Hezbollah’s leading role in the Syrian Civil War sharpens concerns about a transfer to Iran’s 21st-century Condor Legion. Incoming supersonic missiles will compress the Barak-8’s range, but its 60-70 km base range remains a large improvement over the Barak-1’s base 10-12 km. Arming the Eilat Class with the navy’s first wide-area air defense technology is a good backup move while Israel looks to determine the true state of Syria’s P-800 missiles, and if necessary, to target them for a final strike. Israel HaYom | UPI | China’s Xinhua.

Israel deploying Barak-8

March 18/13: An India MoD release offers a list of late DRDO projects, along with a voluminous list of excuses. Credit of some kind is due for not using “the dog ate our blueprints,” but every other issue one normally expects in projects of this nature can be found. LR-SAM is one of the listed projects, and its Probable Date of Completion has slipped from May 2011 to December 2015.

Dec 18/12: LR-SAM. India’s MoD offers quick year-end reviews for a number of key programs. With respect to LR-SAM, it says that:

“Control and Navigation Tests (CNT) for LRSAM, a joint development Programme between DRDO and Israel Aerospace Industry (IAI), to develop an Advanced Naval Air Defence System for Indian Navy) were conducted on 16th and 18th July 2012. All Planned mission objectives were fully met in both the tests. The missiles showed good navigation and control performance. DRDO is the Prime Development Agency and IAI the design authority for supply, installation and final acceptance.”

Development was pegged at 5 years under the original 2006 LR-SAM deal, so they’re late. MR-SAM isn’t mentioned, but LR-SAM missile tests are also effectively MR-SAM missile tests.

Dec 5/12: LR-SAM MoU. Israel Aerospace Industries and India’s state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd. sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU), concerning their cooperation on future LR-SAM ship-defence system projects.

IAI already has a number of arrangements in place with Indian firms. Under this MoU, BEL will function as the Lead Integrator, ultimately taking over DRDO’s role once the missile is developed, and will produce major sub-systems. IAI will continue to act as the system’s Design Authority, and to produce sub-systems as a main sub-contractor of BEL. IAI.

Feb 26/12: Azerbaijan. Israel and Azerbaijan sign a government to government deal for a range of military equipment, including UAVs and “missile defense systems.”

The Caspian Sea’s gas and oil resources are increasing tensions in the region, and Russia’s recent hostility with Georgia has also roiled the waters. From 2008 to the present, SIRPI’s database confirms that Israel has become a significant supplier of military equipment to Azerbaijan, including artillery, UAVs, and anti-tank and anti-ship missiles. Russia and Ukraine are even more significant suppliers, transferring attack helicopters, artillery, missiles, armored vehicles – and long-range S-300 air defense missile systems.

Subsequent reports from SIRPI indicate that this $1.6 billion deal may contain up to 75 Barak-8 missiles, and an EL/M-2080 Green Pine long-range radar. That diversity of long-range systems would complicate planning for an attacker, and offers some insurance. Israel may even get more than just money from this. Depending on that Green Pine radar’s positioning, it should be able to see a long way into Iran’s airspace. Ha’aretz | News.Az.

Azeri deal?

SLAMRAAM test
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June 3/11: Industrial. Livefist shows an India DRDO presentation that helps break down technology responsibilities within the Barak-8. Indian firms will contribute the pneumatic actuator, dual-pulse rocket motor, and motor arming/safing technologies.

April 13/11: MR-SAM gap-filler RFI. IANS reports that India’s MoD has issued a request for information (RFI) from global and domestic missile manufacturers, asking them if they could supply the medium range air defense missile within a short time-frame to the Indian Air Force (IAF), for defense of vital installations. Submitted systems must be capable of all-weather, all-terrain, day/night operation with a 3.5 km altitude ceiling, and able to engage multiple targets that include a range of aerial enemies.

The RFI is ahead of a tender for the purchase of medium-range surface-to-air (MRSAM) missiles, and the emergency buy would reportedly be over and above the 18 MR-SAM units that India is buying from Israel in the 2009 deal. The near-term timeline would appear to disqualify the Barak-8, preventing tri-service acceptance. Obvious Air Force contenders would include India’s own Akash, and offerings from MBDA (VL-MICA), Kongsberg/Raytheon (SLAMRAAM/NASAMS, possibly Patriot PAC-3 as well), Russia (TOR-M2E, SA-20/S-300 PMU2 possible), and IAI/RAFAEL (Spyder MR-SAM variant, complementing the SR-SAM variant India has already ordered).

Akash SAM exhibit
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Aug 9/10: Defence Minister Shri AK Antony updates the status of various missile programs, in a Parliamentary reply to Shri SB Wankhede and Shri AP Shivaji. Trishul and Akash aren’t mentioned at all; the former presumably owing to its cancellation, the latter because it may no longer be a development program. LR-SAM’s ballistic flight trials was undertaken in May 2010. MR-SAM’s preliminary design has been carried out, along with “pre-tender briefing to all prospective vendors.”

Feb 2/10: Akash up, opportunity down. India increases its Akash SAM buy to 1,000, and will deploy them in the rugged terrain of the northeast as SA-3 replacements. The INR 42.79 billion (about $925 million) contract will buy 6 squadrons of Akash medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from state-run Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL). This 750 missile order follows an INR 12.21 billion (about $250 million) order for 2 initial squadrons with 250 missiles total, back in January 2009.

Delivery under this order is expected between 2012-2015, stabilizing Akash as a shorter-range complement to the MR-SAM and affirming the IAF’s confidence. That confidence doesn’t endanger the MR-SAM project, but it removes the expansion possibilities that would have been created by full cancellation, or a limited 2-squadron Akash program. The Hindu | Indian Express | Times of India | Times Now | Bloomberg | India’s Business Times.

2006 – 2009

LR-SAM and MR-SAM deals signed; Budgets; Competition by the back door?

VL-MICA test
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Dec 14/09: Confirmed. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony offers a program update, in a written Parliamentary reply to Shri Asaduddin Owaisi:

“Defence Research Development Organization (DRDO) has undertaken joint development of missiles, Long Range Surface-to-Air Missile (LRSAM) for Indian navy and Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MRSAM) for Indian Air Force with M/s Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), Israel. The cost of project for LRSAM is Rs. 2606.02 crore and cost of project for MRSAM is Rs. 10075 crore. Both the missiles being developed are comparable in performance and cost to missiles available in their class in the world market.”

Given conversion rates at contract time, that means $1.95 billion for MR-SAM, and $560.8 million for LR-SAM.

Indian deals & budgets

Nov 9/09: MR-SAM. Reports surface again that Israel and India have signed a deal for the Barak-8 missile system, which appears to be the Army’s MR-SAM project. Indian reports quote an Israel official, who says that India signed a $1.1 billion contract in April 2009, with delivery expected by 2017.

Islamabad’s The Daily Mail claim that the deal is $1.4 billion, and involves 2,000 Barak-8 missiles for land and naval forces. India has significant industrial offset laws, and The Daily Mail repo

Here’s a brand new special Phantom from JASDF. Japan’s Air Force 302 Hikotai (Tactical Fighter Squadron) of the 7th Air Wing of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force based at Hyakuri Air Base in the Ibaraki Prefecture of Japan plans to move to Misawa in February next year. At that time, the squadron, that has already […]

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This is something you don’t see too often: early deployment of the drag parachute. Last Saturday something unusual took place at the Polish Air Force’s 21st Airbase in Świdwin, during the airbase’s open day. As a part of the display routine a Su-22 Fitter jet intentionally overshot the landing: the pilot deployed the drag chute […]