Defence`s Feeds

Exchange of views on "Security situation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait"
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

SEDE organised a public hearing on 'Russian influence in South-East Europe' on Monday 3r December, from 17.00 to 18.30, with external experts
Location : Altiero Spinelli Room 1G-2
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Draft programme
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

SEDE organised a public hearing on 'Russian influence in South-East Europe' on Monday 3rd December 2018, from 17.00 to 18.30, with three external experts
Further information
Draft Programme
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

President Ashraf Ghani updated peace plan, presented at the Geneva Conference on Afghanistan on 28 November, the 13th international Afghanistan conference since 2001, built on the February 2018 Kabul Process proposals. Ghani foresees a five-phase approach to consultations and five years of implementation. At the same time, these proposals represent an attempt to reassert the Afghan government’s role in a peace process that has barely commenced, not least due to the Taleban’s refusal to negotiate with Kabul, and when the process remains dominated by the US agenda. AAN’s co-director, Thomas Ruttig, analyses the document, while also considering the Taleban’s most recent statement at the Afghanistan conference in Moscow (with input by Jelena Bjelica from Geneva).

Afghanistan’s government is seeking a “peace agreement” with the Afghan Taleban, who, if they agreed “would be included in a democratic and inclusive society.” This is the key statement of an evolved plan, a “road map for peace negotiations” as President Ghani called it when he presented it to the Geneva conference’s main session, a minister-level meeting with representatives of 90 donor governments and multilateral organisations on 28 November 2018 (see an AAN primer on the conference here and the Afghan government’s official concept paper for the conference here). A three-page document, titled “Achieving Peace: The Next Chapter in the Afghan-led Peace Process,” was published summarising the proposals.(1)

Ghani’s Geneva peace proposals are not called a new plan, but rather a “new chapter” to an existing one. These build on and modify elements of earlier proposals and plans – including Ghani’s “unconditional” peace proposals as laid out in a speech at the second meeting of the “Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation in Afghanistan” held in the Afghan capital on 28 February 2018 and in its final declaration (full text here and AAN analysis here). The Kabul Process 2 meeting is was a senior officials meeting attended by donor and regional governments.

The plan’s main content

Ghani’s proposals for a “new chapter in the Afghan-led peace process” consists of three main elements: four ‘tenets’, in which main principles for peace are reiterated; five “phases” of consultations with various domestic and international actors involved in the current war, both or either militarily and politically; and a five-year implementation period. It also prominently speaks about the relationship between a peace process and the April 2019 Afghan presidential elections.

The president started the introduction of his updated plan with the reiteration of four “tenets” under which the Taleban would be included in a “democratic and inclusive society.” This, in itself, is already a ‘tenet’, as it is far from clear that the Taleban would agree to the term ‘democratic’ and how they would define ‘inclusive.’ Ghani emphasised that these tenets came out of “extensive consultations over the past eight months with diverse groups of Afghans.” He particularly referred to his own meetings: “For the past eight months, I have listened to men women from all strata and all over the country, in Kabul, but also the provinces in my trips. ”Actually, the tenets represent the much-debated ‘red lines’ or ‘conditions’ – although these terms are not used – behind which the government vows not to fall back in any future negotiations.

Ghani had already laid out these tenets in his speech at the February Kabul Process meeting (in its Pashto part, see here) – here in the Geneva version:

1. The Constitutional rights and obligations, of all citizens, especially women, are ensured.
2. The Constitution is accepted, or amendments proposed through the constitutional provision[s].
3. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and civil service function according to law.
4. No armed groups with ties to transnational terrorist networks or transnational criminal organizations, or with ties to state/non-state actors, seeking influence in Afghanistan will be allowed to join the political process.

Tenet no 3 is probably the only one which the Taleban would agree to without much discussion. They have made it clear in earlier track II meetings that they are interested in keeping Afghanistan’s security forces functioning and to avoid their breakdown (see in this AAN analysis). Tenet 4 is mainly a US demand (although surely widely shared among the Afghan population), namely that the Taleban guarantee to break all relations with al-Qaeda and associated terrorist groups. This does not seem to be unrealistic, although the Taleban have so far avoided in distancing themselves from those groups in public.

The focus on the constitution could prove more problematic, as the Taleban reject it. In their statement at the mid-November Moscow Conference on Afghanistan organised by the Russian foreign ministry (also known as Moscow format consultations; transcript here) they stated that the constitution had been

[…] copied from the West and has been imposed on Afghanistan’s Muslim society under the shadow of occupation. It can neither respond to the desires of the Afghans nor can be implemented, as its provisions are vague and contradictory with each other. […] So, the current constitution in its present version is a major obstacle to peace.

In the Taleban’s view, it needs to be substantially ‘reformed’ based on Sharia principles (read AAN analysis here) or even re-drafted (see Moscow statement).

Not really new is the idea off a “five-phase approach” of consultations of relevant domestic and international actors, ie with the Taleban and other relevant Afghan political (and social?) groups (“intra-Afghan dialogue”) ,“with Pakistan and the United States” as key players in the conflict, with “regional actors, the Arab-Islamic world,” and NATO and non-NATO countries, ie current and, hopefully, future donors. The latter two groups are required to work out an “implementation plan for a post-peace Afghanistan” and fund it, and to “secure the international and regional guarantees required to sustain peace.”

Ghani also said that there should be confidence-building measures in the first year, without giving more detail or saying who should start. The Taleban had their ideas about this laid out in Moscow, too, there called “preliminary steps for peace” that included: the removal of the UN (and possibly other) sanctions list against them; the release of Taleban detainees; a formal (re-)opening of their political office in Qatar (AAN analysis here), and a stop to what they call “poisonous propaganda against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”. This refers to incidents they see themselves being blamed for without proof, such as “blowing [up] bridges, spraying acid on school students, [plant]ing road side [bombs against] civilian vehicles, abducting people and committing other crimes.”

What was entirely new in Ghani’s Geneva speech was that he envisages that the “implementation of the peace process” will require “minimally […] five years.” This corresponds with the next president’s tenure (he will hope his own one).

However, the links between the three main elements in Ghani’s updated peace plan – the ‘tenets’, the five phases of consultations and the implementation period – remain unclear. For example, it is left open as to whether the implementation phase refers to Ghani’s peace plan, or a future peace agreement – and, if the latter, whether the president has an idea as to how quickly this can be achieved. Zalmay Khalilzad, the US special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation(about his role more below), for example, was more outspoken on this point in a recent radio interview where he said he would

[…] hope that the Taliban and Afghans would use the election date as a deadline to achieve a peace agreement before then.[…] Ideally, of course, it would be good to have an agreement with the Taliban first, and then have the presidential election, because then the Talibs will also participate in a possible election, or whatever road map the Afghans agree to.

The Afghan government’s message on its peace proposals had been carefully threaded in the readouts and bilateral statements at the Geneva conference. The readouts from side meetings and side events all included references to the peace process, mainly as a consideration on how a development agenda would accommodate it (see here the video recording of the readouts from side meetings, side events; as well as bilateral statements; statements by representatives of partner governments; as well as the Afghan civil society joint statement, see here and here). On 29 November 2018, the day following the conference, a meeting was held between representatives from Afghan non-governmental organisations (NGO), UN agencies, donors and international NGOs based in Afghanistan and/or Geneva on the so-called triple nexus approach, ie interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peace actors (for more background see here). This meeting aimed at kicking off a national dialogue on the triple nexus – tailored for Afghanistan and to include all relevant stakeholders.

Downgrading the High Peace Council

Furthermore, Ghani announced that “the required bodies and mechanisms to pursue a peace agreement” have been formed now. First, there is a new 12-member negotiating team led by presidential chief of staff, Salam Rahimi. It also comprises three women and a former deputy Taleban minister, Abdul Hakim Munib, He is also the highest-ranking ex-Taleb ever in a post-2001 government position, first as provincial governor of Uruzgan and, currently, as deputy minister for religious and Haj affairs. (2)

Secondly, a new “peace advisory board” comprising of nine committees will be established. It will “provide direction” to the negotiating team and “ensure consensus.”Nine committees will represent key political and social groups: political leaders, political parties; youth; women; religious scholars; provincial leaders (which might give a role to the elected provincial councils); civil society: the private sector; refugees and the diaspora. There seems to be a possible overlap between some of these groups, as most political leaders who are often consulted by the president are also party leaders; the same goes for some leading ulema.

At the same time, the role of the High Peace Council (HPC) has been significantly cut down. “On their own request […], it will be restructured to focus on public awareness and provide advice regarding post-peace scenarios.” Ie, there will be no HPC role in the negotiations itself. This controversial body, formally in charge of negotiations (see its role in the 2016 peace deal with Hezb-e Islami had been established by ex-President Hamed Karzai in 2010 and already had been significantly reorganised in 2016 (read AAN analysis here and here).

Two members of the HPC’s Executive Board of Advisors have made it into the negotiating team: Attaullah Ludin, a long-time commander of Hezb-e Islami (but currently not in Hekmatyar’s faction) and Hasina Safi, who went from director of the Afghan Women’s Network, to culture and information minister. The two other women are Shahgul Rezayi, a young Hazara MP from Ghazni, who did not run again this year, and deputy refugee minister, Dr Alema (one name only), who has a western education, both from the old East and now reunited Germany. Conspicuously missing from the negotiations team is the HPC’s vice chair, Habiba Sarobi, the most high-profile and senior woman there, so far (Rezayi and Safi are much younger). It remains to be seen whether she will stay on the reformed peace council instead and use her experience gathered on the body over the last years and contribute to working out post-agreement scenarios.

All members have leading posts in government, parliament, the Supreme Court or the Ulema Council. This ensures the government’s prerogative over any negotiations, although a continuing role of the Afghan intelligence service and the National Security Council can be assumed.

The context

Recent United States initiatives toward a negotiated end to the Afghan war and a withdrawal of its troops from the country had lent new urgency to the Afghan government’s peace efforts. These efforts had been given new impetus during the February 2018 Kabul Process meeting, after initial initiatives – immediately after his election in 2014 Ghani had sought China’s and Pakistan’s support. This resulted in the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and U.S. – AAN analysis here) and the 2015 Murree talks – had faltered (AAN analysis here).

In 2018, Ghani achieved a ceasefire over the Eid festival in mid-June, which the Taleban also joined in with. It was widely applauded, not least among Afghans of all sides. AAN wrote that it allowed them “to imagine their country at peace “for the first time after almost two decades of a new phase in its 40 years’ wars. However, nothing more followed. The Taleban rebuked an ambitious three-months’ follow-up ceasefire offer by the government, as they did not want to give the government carte blanche for the parliamentary elections in October. More generally, they continue to refuse to sit and talk, or even officially negotiate with the Afghan government that they label as “American puppets” and “impotent” in their reaction to Ghani’s proposals.

Khalilzad, the (not so) new US government’s special envoy (3), and other high-ranking US officials, including principal deputy assistant secretary of state in charge of South and Central Asian affairs, Alice Wells, held various rounds of direct talks with Taleban representatives at their political office in Doha, Qatar earlier this year (media reports here and here). Washington called these talks preliminary and vowed that they were designed to facilitate the entry into them of the Afghan government as a third party. (The Taleban used the word “ exploratory; see here.) US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in Kabul in July 2018 “we can’t run the peace talks.“Wells added after a meeting with Taliban representatives later that month in Qatar that “Any negotiations over the political future of Afghanistan will be between the Taliban and Afghan government,” and that the US was “exploring all avenues to advance a peace process in close consultation with the Afghan government” (quoted here). After her March 2018 trip to Kabul she already said: “We certainly cannot substitute for the Afghan government and the Afghan people.”

Envoy Khalalzad’s modus operandi, however, created concerns in the Afghan government that it might be sidelined and/or even left out of a bilateral US-Taleban deal. In October 2018, the New York Times quoted Afghan officials as saying that President Ghani had “repeatedly expressed concern and resistance to American officials about the prospect of talks that did not include his government” and reacted “furiously” when he learned about Khalilzad’s first meeting with the Taleban, not from him, but through a Taleban statement, although he just had visited Kabul before.

Indeed, there already seemed to have been talk about substance at Doha (and Khalilzad’s meetings elsewhere); namely, about the issue of the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan – the Taleban’s main demand – and a schedule for it (read the Taleban statement about their meeting with Khalilzad on 12 October 2018 here). Notably, the Taleban representatives at the mid-November Moscow Conference on Afghanistan in Moscow – the same group who met Wells and Khalilzad, from their Qatar office – had told Russian media in an interview there that before the so-called intra-Afghan talks (ie between them and the government)

[…] the American side should guarantee and they should fix a timetable for the withdrawal of their forces […], than it is possible [to hold talks] with the Afghan side also.

The Taleban also confirmed that the discussions also touched upon what they called an “end to the occupation” as well as removing their leaders from sanctions lists.

The Afghan government had misgivings about this meeting and reportedly insisted it must be in the lead while, in its view, the meeting would boost the international standing of the Taleban. It decided to not officially participate. The US initially concurred. This led to the postponement of the meeting originally scheduled for 4 September 2018 (media report here). Finally, however, the US sent Moscow-based diplomats, as “observers”, not participants. On the Afghan side, Afghanistan’s High Peace Council (HPC), which is formally independent, but acts based on guidance from the Afghan government sent a delegation. (It had, with its deputy chair, Habiba Sarobi, the only woman at the conference table.) Also, Kabul’s ambassador to Russia, Abdul Qayum Kochi, an uncle of the president, was seen in their midst during the conference (photo here).

Further misgivings in Afghanistan’s government were created by the intensive, weeks’ long discussion about a possible delay of the Afghan presidential election scheduled for 20 April 2018 in Kabul this autumn. This involved diplomats, the UN, as well as young generation leaders of Afghan civil society and political organisations that both overlap. The issue was reportedly also pondered by the country’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (media report here).

The Wall Street Journal had reported on 13 November that “[t]he Trump administration is discussing whether to press the Afghan government to suspend coming presidential elections, according to people briefed on the discussions” and that the idea had been “raised by U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad in talks with various stakeholders and intermediaries.” According to this report, he “has suggested that a postponement of the elections could be a component of the peace process.” Ghani, meanwhile, had repeatedly insisted that the election in which he has said he we will run again was held on time, according with the constitution (this would be the first such election in post-2001 Afghanistan). He highlighted this in his Geneva speech again, when he said the next presidential election was “key to successful peace negotiations“, as it would provide “the elected government with a mandate to obtain ratification, implement the peace agreement, and lead the societal reconciliation process.”

Khalilzad and others, however, had suggested that elections could create a fait accompli that would complicate a possible agreement with the Taleban and further harden their stance  – as they have consistently rejected to join the current political system, at least unless it is ‘reformed’ (see this AAN analysis). In order to circumvent a situation in which elections are postponed in breech of the constitution without an alternative, the option of an interim government or council was introduced into the discussion. In the best case, this argument went, Taleban representatives could join it, making it the premise of negotiations. (An interim government is also the choice of a large array of Ghani’s domestic political opponents, who do not trust the electoral institutions, but also eyeing a larger political role. This includes ex-President Karzai, who is blocked from becoming head of state again under the current constitution (more AAN analysis here).

Part of this equation is that the US – as Khalilzad confirmed in his 28 November 2018 radio interview already quoted above – is “in a hurry” for peace in Afghanistan. This is not least driven by a fear of US President Donald Trump’s short fuse, not only when it comes to Afghanistan. In 2013, he had tweeted that “Our troops are being killed by the Afghanis [sic] we train and we waste billions there,” and “We are building roads and schools for people that hate us. It is not in our national interests.” Once in charge, however, he has been forced to change his mind: “[T]he consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable… A hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum that terrorists, including ISIS and al Qaeda, would instantly fill, just as happened before September 11th” (AAN analysis here). However, after his election, in an announcement on 21 August 2017, he reiterated that his“original instinct […] was to pull out” (see the transcript of this speech here). AAN heard from a number of both current and former diplomats in Kabul that they fear that these ‘original instincts’ prevail in Trump’s thinking and might erupt into a pullout decision, if things did not go well in Afghanistan.

However, one day before Ghani spoke in Geneva, the country’s IEC drew a line under such discussions and declared 20 April 2019 as the final election date. This did not happen by accident, but can read as a clear statement by the Palace in Kabul, as the commission is independent only in name (it has been appointed by the president, although after input and consultation with various political groups, mainly the ‘Abdullah camp’ in the National Unity Government, the NUG – AAN analysis here). President Ghani was obviously concerned that the ‘Afghan-lead’ in the ‘peace process’ – often declared, but often overruled by other agendas – might even be further undermined, if elections are not held in time.

Domestic dissent…

One problem for Ghani is that there is no consensus about peace talks and a power sharing with the Taleban, at least in the political class. He indirectly admits this by giving the new peace advisory board the task to “ensure consensus” in the wider society. The range of issues starts from whether there should be ‘red lines’ for negotiations – for example, on democratic, minorities’ and women’s rights – or not, and, if so, which ones to the debate about, whether the Taleban represent parts of the Afghan society or are nothing but “terrorists” and a tool of Pakistan, meaning that talks should be held with Pakistan and not them.

Based on the latter reasons, there is a very articulate constituency that opposestalks with the Taleban in the first place. The most vocal among them is former NDS chief, Amrullah Saleh, who, on a podium at Kabul’s Afghanistan Institute of Strategic Studies (AISS) on 8 November, made clear he did not think there was a difference between the Taleban and the local chapter of the Islamic State and that negotiating with them was “connecting with terrorists.”Former Afghan deputy defence minister and Director General at the Afghan National Security Council Tamim Asey wrote in an op-ed for the Small Wars Journal that “the Afghan Taliban have not changed and […] still serves as an umbrella organization to many terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda and provide them an enabling environment to plan, train and equip for their next deadly missions in the subcontinent and beyond.”

Saleh also doubted that there was any unified “peace process”, nor that it was “Afghan led.” Instead, he said, there were “twelve different countries” running their own ‘processes’. He quoted another strong opponent of Taleban talks, former foreign minister and Karzai advisor, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, who helped set up AISS (and was in the audience) as saying there was only agreement “about one word, peace – everything else is disputed” (a video of his speech here). Former Afghan deputy defence minister and Director General at the Afghan National Security Asey also made his mistrust of the US and NATO’s role visible in his op-ed, writing that both were “in a rush to a graceful exit for its forces with political cover claiming a successful conclusion to the Afghan war.”

It is not clear how large this group’s support is amongst the population. (4) However, it has significant potential to mobilise and link up with other groups and sections of the population who reject the Taleban for their many years’ use of terrorist means and the still large number of civilian casualties inflicted by them as exemplified by the recent Taleban offensive in the south-eastern Hazarajat which involved alleged killings and mass displacement (AAN analysis here and here).

There is also no consensus about the often-heard posit that ‘there is no military solution,’ including in the government. Hamdullah Moheb, the new chairman of the Afghan National Security Council said as much at a reception for foreign media on 21 October 2018 (which was attended by AAN). This is also shared by a number of civil society activists. The Taleban offensive in Hazarajat has deepened both positions – ‘no talks’ and ‘military solution.’

The consultations mentioned by Ghani in Geneva have clearly not overcome the problem of the lacking consensus. This has not only been highlighted by Saleh, but also, for example, Helena Malekyar, an Afghan analyst, who had also been involved in the post-Bonn political process. In a co-authored op-ed for Turkish media she wrote that “to achieve a comprehensive and sustainable peace, first and foremost, all Afghans must feel ownership of the process“ – clearly doubting this was the case – and warned against an deal approved only by the “stamp“ of the “mostly irrelevant old guard.” In Geneva itself, the joint statement of Afghan civil society, presented by two delegates of a group of ten officially invited to the conference and elected in Kabul, sent a strong message by calling the “peace deal” envisaged by the US “a quick fix” and “not sustainable.” One of the ten official Afghan civil society delegates, Suraya Pakzad of Women’s Voice organisation, was quoted as saying “We are concerned that women [rights] will be sacrifices for peace.“

It is also not clear how inclusive those consultations have been. In his Geneva speech, Ghani only referred to his own meetings that are usually attended by handpicked participants. There are also widespread general doubts about how inclusive Ghani’s approach is. AAN heard from those involved in an earlier phase of consultations, immediately after his takeover as president, that it was mainly Ghani who spoke in such meetings. This left little time for those consulted who were then asked to provide their input in writing, which then remained without reply.

… and the issue of elections

Ghani’s hope for his new legitimacy through the April 2019 presidential election might be problematic. If those elections are as poorly organised and conducted as the October 2018 parliamentary polls were (read AAN analysis here) and end with a disputed result similar to that of 2014 (which led to the creation of the unbeloved NUG), the government’s legitimacy might suffer even further and weaken its position vis-à-vis the Taleban.

It would require a miracle if even only the most important shortcomings in the country’s electoral institutions could be sorted out in the extremely short time of under five months remains (for the many shortcomings, see AAN’s Election Conundrum series here). This includes an eventual reshuffle of the IEC that, as rumours in Kabul go, is under discussion, which would require consensus about new personnel in a highly disunited and mutually suspicious government led by two (possible) contenders of the elections this commission is to conduct. Experience shows that this could take many more months. Apart from this, the post-parliamentary elections process of counting and adjudication is still in full swing, its length exacerbated by a series of delays. It might well go on early into the new year 2019 and interfere with the necessary preparation of the April presidential poll.

Conclusion: It needs three to talk

There is one big gap in President Ghani’s ‘new chapter’ in the peace process: the Afghan government is nowhere in the lead, as yet, as the envisaged partner is lacking – the Taleban. So far, only the Taleban and the US are talking to each other. It does not lie in the hands of the Afghan government to overcome this hurdle.

The current constellation means only the US can make the Afghan government the third party to peace talks, but many Afghans – including President Ghani – do not trust the US and, particularly the hast, and way in which the new envoy Khalilzad operates. (To be sure, there are also many Afghans who believe he is just the right man for it.) These Afghans fear that the US might ‘sell’ them to the Taleban, or simply conclude a ‘deal’ that formally ends the war and allows the US to pull out its troops, preferably rather sooner than later, without thinking too much about the implementation, monitoring and financing of post-peace arrangements.

For example, it can be expected that, after a peace agreement, many of the current 350,000 government police and army soldiers, as well as tens of thousands of Taleban fighters need to be demobilised and reintegrated into civilian life. This need to happen in a sustainable way so that the ex-fighters do not see themselves compelled to take up arms again to ensure their livelihoods once the initial reintegration packages are petering out – and this in an economy that already lacks many permanent jobs for its large work force. Also, the experience of the post-Bonn DDR and DIAG programmes left behind a multitude of former fighters who have been readily recruited into new auxiliary forces or militia-like armed groups over the past 17 years (AAN analysis here).

Therefore, what Ghani has laid out in Geneva was more a declaration of intent, of principles, and of red lines (the latter, without calling them that), rather than a ‘road map’ or a ‘peace plan.’ With his proposals and the IEC decision a day earlier about the 20 April 2019 presidential election date, he tried to get a grip on the steering wheel of the peace process that has barely commenced and has not been Afghan-led, so far.

It could also be argued that none of the parties to the conflict actually should be in the lead of a peace process and that it would be better to have ‘third-party’ mediation or facilitation (here: fourth-party, as the US is the third party in the conflict and also cannot play that role). This does not mean that the government cannot take the initiative and push the process forward.The successful June 2018 ceasefire has proven this.

For some time now, a futile blockage has existed. It has been created, on the one hand, by the Taleban’s refusal to negotiate with the Afghan government and, on the other hand, the government’s repeated attempts to deny the Taleban the status of a recognised party to the process by preventing them from participating in peace-talks-related meetings and conferences. This blockage pervaded three meetings in late 2017 (AAN reporting here) and again for Tashkent in March 2018 (media report here), but not in Moscow in November 2018.  Other peace processes (as experienced in Colombia or the Philippines) show there is no way around accepting an entrenched insurgent group as a negotiating partner with a degree of support and/or hold over territory, if peace is to be negotiated. Negotiating does not mean their recognition as a second government. The Taleban, of course, can overcome this problem, if they agree to talk with the government.

It is unquestionable that there are three parties to the Afghan war, to end it and to organise the post-war Afghan society, namely: the internationally recognised and supported Afghan government; its largest donor and supporter, the US; and the Taleban. The Taleban, who also would be much less strong without their external support, both logistically and financially, need to understand and accept that the Afghan government will not go away soon – even though it remains almost totally dependent on foreign financial support (despite some increases in domestic revenue highlighted in Geneva) and, to a large extent, military support. It would soon run into trouble, particularly without US troops and money. (At the moment, it is unable to pay the salaries of its 350,000 policemen and army soldiers, before even talking about the various auxiliary forces.) Also, socio-economically the country is on a backwards path, so that a solution for the financial gap is still elusive. The poverty rate has relapsed back to levels at the immediate post-Taleban rate of almost 55 per cent (AAN analysis here). (5)

Although President Trump’s personal temptation to pull out of Afghanistan might be strong, it is difficult to see how he would do so before a peace agreement, as anything else would jeopardise the US’s last 17 years’ investment ‘in blood and money’. (Some US analysts also argue, by the way, that the Afghan war merely represents one per cent of the US military budget and pulling out would hardly lead to massive savings.)

There are also visible entry points around which the current mutual Kabul-Taleban blockade could be overcome, without forcing both parties to give up what they define as their individual main goals. First, there is the US offer, given at the Kabul Process meeting in February 2018, to put troop withdrawal and a timeframe for it onto the agenda of eventual peace talks. This would provide the Taleban with their main goal. The Taleban, in Moscow, said that, after a timeframe and guarantees, are given, ie before a peace deal is finally concluded, they could talk to the government. (Previously, they often said this would only be possible after all foreign troops had gone.) This would fulfil the government’s current main goal – namely direct talks with its involvement. On this, the Taleban can and should be taken by their word in all future talks. Finally, if the two Afghan sides start talking to each other on this basis, the way could be opened for the US to get their desired troop pullout.

Such a scenario still leaves for the government in Kabul plenty to do in a leading role. This would involve: creating consensus about peace talks with the Taleban that do not result in a sell-out on the key rights issues; developing ideas how a post-agreement Afghanistan and “societal reconciliation” (Ghani in Geneva) would look like; and, ensuring that there are resources – both domestic and external – for the implementation of such a peace process. Geneva was barely a beginning.

Edited by Sari Kouvo

 

(1) As this text was finalised, the full speech has become available, here.

(2) Added on 4 Dec 2018: Afghan news agency Ariana quoted Munib on 30 November that he had not been aware of his selection.

(3) Khalilzad, who was born as an Afghan, already played a key role during the first years of what was then called the Bonn process (full text of the Bonn agreement here), as President George W. Bush’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan (December 2001-November 2003) and US ambassador to Afghanistan (November 2003-June 2005).

(4) During the same event, AISS presented a study called “The Fallacy of [the] Peace Process in Afghanistan: The People’s Perspectives” based on 2,000 interviews with Afghans; the majority of them called the peace process so far (which included the current approach to talks with the Taleban) a failure. However, the study found that 80 per cent of respondents wanted peace with the Taleban, 83 per cent believed it was possible and 55 per cent were in favour of making concessions to them. At the same time, only 50 per cent believed the Taleban had the intention to make peace, 73 per cent doubted the Taleban’s ability to effectively govern the country and only 10 per cent found their policies acceptable.

The author of the study, Omar Sadr, also argued in his summary that one of the “fallacies” of the peace process so far was that it amount to “appeasement.” Respondents were not asked such a question though.

(5)  Ghani said 40 per cent in his Geneva speech; but his government had published the higher figure together with the World Bank earlier this year.

 

 

 

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EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq this afternoon closed the Agency’s 2018 Annual Conference on unmanned and autonomous systems in defence. Autonomous applications supported by Artificial Intelligence are already crucial capabilities whose importance for defence will further grow in the future but the challenges laying ahead are considerable, Mr Domecq said, reflecting a general assessment expressed throughout the conference.

 
Main takeaways

Mr Domecq singled out five key words which, in his view, will matter for Europe's future in relation to unmanned and autonomous systems:

• Action: Europe must catch up with the main global players dominating in this field, especially the US and China which invest much more in Artificial Intelligence and autonomous systems which are “game changers”, also in warfare. What Europe needs is a “Sputnik moment”: “We cannot afford to only talk about it, we have to do it”.

• Together: Cooperation is the only way for Europe to catch up: “We can only succeed if we do it together, in cooperation with governments, industry, the research community, tech leaders and civil society”;

• Speed: “Speed is of the essence” especially given that Europe is lagging behind considerably;

• Control: “Europe must stick to its values and principles”, keep Humans always in control of the use of lethal force and avoid becoming dependent on machines or robots;    

• Education: last but not least, “we need to get the buy-in of our citizens because we cannot provide security with tools which are rejected by the population we intend to protect”.  The benefits, challenges and opportunities of autonomous systems need to be assessed, explained and discussed in full transparency. “They cannot be simplistically reduced to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ tools”, Mr Domecq concluded.

 
More information:

• Federica Mogherini opens Annual Conference devoted to unmanned and autonomous systems
• Speech by Head of Agency Federica Mogherini at the EDA 2018 Annual Conference
• Speech Commissioner Mariya Gabriel on EDA Annual Conference
• Speech EUMC Chairman General Graziano

After the opening by the Head of Agency, Federica Mogherini (read news here), EDA’s 2018 Annual Conference taking place today in Brussels heard inspiring speeches from the new Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), General Claudio Graziano, the European Commissioner responsible for Digital Economy and Society, Mariya Gabriel, the Chief of Defence of Estonia, General Riho Terras, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence of Austria, Dr Wolfgang Baumann (representing the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the EU) and the Senior Vice-President and Head of Urban Air Mobility within Airbus Strategy and International, Eduardo Dominguez Puerta.

Conference attendees also witnessed interesting statements and lively exchanges of views between high-level experts in three different discussion panels.

The first panel, moderated by Carmen Romero (NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Public Diplomacy), looked at how today’s Armed Forces are adapting to tomorrow’s technologies, with a special focus on unmanned and autonomous systems. The list of high-level panelists participating in this debate included Frank Bekkers (Director of the Security Programme at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies), Dr Luisa Riccardi (Director of Technical Innovation and Secretariat General of the Defence and National Armaments Directorate at the Ministry of Defence of Italy), Lieutenant General Atanas Zapryanov (Deputy Minister of Defence of Bulgaria) and Benedikt Zimmer (State Secretary for Procurement at the Ministry of Defence of Germany).

The second panel - composed by Rear Admiral Nicolas Vaujour (Deputy Chief of Staff Naval Operations, France) and Giovanni Soccodato (Chief Strategy & Innovation Officer at Leonardo) and moderated by Brooks Tigner (Jane’s Defence Weekly) - discussed an assessed the current and future challenges and opportunities of unmanned maritime systems (UMS) from a technical and operational point of view.

The third panel, moderated by Dr Gustav Lindstrom (Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies), looked into the prospects for the use of Artificial Intelligence in defence.

EDA Deputy Chief Executive Olli Ruutu also handed over the newly-established EDA Defence Innovation Prize to the two winner companies of the first (2018) edition, Aitex and Clover Technologies (more information here).
  

More information:

• Federica Mogherini opens Annual Conference devoted to unmanned and autonomous systems
• Speech by Head of Agency Federica Mogherini at the EDA 2018 Annual Conference
• Speech Commissioner Mariya Gabriel on EDA Annual Conference
• Speech EUMC Chairman General Graziano

 

The European Defence Agency’s Annual Conference 2018 entitled 'From Unmanned to Autonomous Systems: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities’ was opened this morning in Brussels by the Head of the Agency, Federica Mogherini.

Addressing a 400-strong audience representing the whole European defence spectrum - governments, armed forces, industry, EU institutions, NATO, think tanks and media - Ms Mogherini welcomed that the Agency's annual conference "once again, is a place to talk about innovation, and to look at the trends that are shaping our world and our security environment".

Devoting this year's conference to unmanned & autonomous systems and artificial intelligence proved to be a very timely choice as "this is not a debate about some distant future, or about science-fiction" but about technological developments which are already part of our lives, Ms Mogherini said. Artificial intelligence is everywhere and its applications are expanding at incredible speed, "also contributing to our security – for instance, in building stronger defence systems against cyber-attacks".
 

Humans must always remain in control of the use of lethal force

Yet we also know that artificial intelligence poses new security challenges, and it is now starting to be weaponised, the Head of the Agency said. "We are entering a world where drones could independently search for a target and kill without human intervention. Artificial intelligence could take decisions on life and death, with no direct control from a human being. The warning about the dangers ahead is coming from the very people who are working on artificial intelligence: researchers, pioneers, and business people as well, who don't want to see their own discoveries exploited for malicious goals". 

Against this background, the EU has a very special role to play – as a promoter of new global rules to protect our citizens' security, and at the same time, as a force for innovation and progress at the service of human beings, she stressed.

"So first of all, we are working to build consensus on what should and should not be allowed in the field of autonomous weapons. We would like scientists and researchers to be free to do their job knowing that their discoveries will not be used to harm innocent people. Together we can define the boundaries of artificial intelligence applications, so that within those limits, scientists are free to explore the immense positive potential of artificial intelligence", said Ms Mogherini, adding: "Our position on this has always been very clear: all weapon systems should comply with international law, and humans must always remain in control of the use of lethal force". 

Work is currently ongoing at the United Nations to define a first set of guiding principles on autonomous weapons, and this work needs close cooperation between governments, the industry and civil society.
 

"No time to waste on Artificial Intelligence"

Supporting innovation and having a strong industry is essential for Europe's security, and this is also true with artificial intelligence, Ms Mogherini stated. "Almost 50 per cent of global private investment in artificial intelligence start-ups is happening in China. We Europeans cannot afford to waste time, and to be less innovative than other world powers. It is a matter of economic growth, and it is a matter of security". 

Our European defence industries and research laboratories are among the best in the world. And yet, investment from European national governments in research and technology in the field of defence continue to decrease, she underlined.

"We, as the European Union, cannot tell national institutions how much to spend on defence or on research. What we can do – and what we are doing, is to incentivize our Member States to join forces, create new economies of scale, to the benefit of our industry and of our collective security. This is the logic behind all the work we have been doing on security and research, with the European Defence Agency, with the European Commission and with our Member States".
 

EDA's essential contribution to recent EU defence initiatives

The revised Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) are all tools recently set up to allow and foster increased defence cooperation. The European Defence Agency, Ms Mogherini said, "provided an essential contribution in crafting these initiatives, to ensure their coherence and to help turn them into concrete action". 

The Europe of defence is taking shape, and in the years ahead, the role of the European Defence Agency will be even more important, she stressed. "This can be the hub where governments and the industry meet. A place for coordination among national defence policies, following the guiding light of innovation and of our collective security".

 

More information

• Speech by Head of Agency Federica Mogherini at the EDA 2018 Annual Conference

 

  

An interesting Cold War episode worth 4 medals. During the 1980s, the U.S. flew regular SR-71 Blackbird aircraft reconnaissance missions in international waters over the Barents Sea and the Baltic Sea, the latter known as [...]

The Taleban attacks on Hazara areas in Uruzgan and Ghazni were unprecedented in their reach and led to massive displacement. The attacks indicated a clear shift in the Taleban’s behaviour towards the Hazara areas, stimulating various hypotheses about their motives. In this second part of a series of two dispatches, AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili and Martine van Bijlert (with input from Thomas Ruttig, Fazal Muzhari and Ehsan Qaane) provide in-depth background and analysis of the attacks and their consequences. They conclude that the Taleban had long been planning to advance into the Hazara areas to expand territorial control and increase their revenues.

The Taleban attacks on the Hazara areas in districts within Uruzgan and Ghazni provinces were unprecedented – at least in recent times – in terms of the number of incursions, the number of casualties and the level of coordination (three areas at more or less the same time). The initial attack on the largely self-governing Hazara enclave in the northeast of Khas Uruzgan was in response to a visit by notorious commander Abdul Hakim Shujai (more about him below) – and possibly his behaviour towards Pashtuns while he was there. At the same time, it came in the context of increased pressure by the Taleban on the Hazara population in areas that had so far largely been left alone. Coming at a time when the government and the Taleban are talking about a possible peace process, the Taleban suddenly seemed keen to show their reach and to increase their local revenue streams. The attacks appeared to fly in the face of local agreements between Hazara populations and the Taleban to largely leave each other alone. The level of violence and the slowness of the government’s response have, moreover, fed into fears of ethnic targeting by the Taleban and ethnic bias from the government. In this second dispatch in a series of two, AAN unpacks the triggers of the attacks and analyses its consequences.

Shujai’s presence in Kondolan

Abdul Hakim Shujai is a notorious former Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander from Malestan (who headed the ALP forces in Khas Uruzgan until he was forced to resign). His visit to Khas Uruzgan on 27 October was the trigger for the first attack. As Rahmatullah Amiri from The Liaison Office (TLO) told AAN, “There are strong anti-Shujai feelings among [local] Pashtuns, who will try to attack him wherever he appears, even if they know that a hundred people will be killed.” This animosity towards him is a result of Shujai’s role as a member of the Afghan Security Guards, a militia recruited by US Special Forces outside the Afghan chain of command (from 2008 to early 2010; see AAN’s earlier reporting here) and, later, as one of the district’s ALP commanders (for more background see this April 2013 report by AAN about his case and the precarious Pashtun-Hazara relations in Khas Uruzgan). As described in AAN’s earlier reporting (see here and here) Shujai has been accused of numerous extrajudicial killings and abuses towards the local Pashtun population, both when he worked with the US special forces and as an ALP commander. According to TLO’s Amiri, “There were two types of operations: first, when Shujai joined the operations led by the US special forces, and second, when the special forces sent Shujai to carry out raids.” (1)

Although Shujai was not the only abusive ALP commander, and possibly not even the worst, he appears to have been particularly targeted by powerful Pashtun leaders and local MPs, who demanded that he be prosecuted for his abuses – most probably because he was a powerful Hazara commander. After sustained criticism he was relieved of his duties and an arrest warrant was issued against him, but for a long time he continued to move freely and was even rumoured to still be commanding his ALP forces. TLO’s Amiri told AAN that Shujai continued to visit his men who were mainly from Khas Uruzgan, seeking to still act as their “protector.”

There are conflicting reports as to why exactly Shujai was in the area this time and what he did while he was there. Former Daikundi governor Qurban Ali Uruzgani, who hails from Khas Uruzgan, as well as other sources, told AAN that there was a dispute between Pashtuns and Hazaras over the routing of an irrigation canal and water pipe. In the spring of this year, Pashtuns had apparently closed a water pipe that ran from the farmland of a man called Qurban Ali Akhlasi in Karez, a sub-village in the southwest of Kondolan, through their farmland. The Hazaras retaliated and closed the irrigation canal (this was also reported by Etilaat Roz). The Taleban had ruled that both sides should allow the water to flow, but the issue resurfaced recently, whereupon the Pashtuns turned to the Taleban and Akhlasi turned to Shujai. A local source told AAN that when visiting Kondolan, Shujai was accompanied by four elders from Payk and four elders from Sia Baghal, two Hazara-dominated villages in Khas Uruzgan – in addition to an unknown number of armed men – to help him solve the dispute. They indicated that the Taleban attack was unprovoked.

Other sources maintain that it was Shujai’s behaviour in the area that had provoked the attack, first towards the local population, who then called in the help of the Taleban. A Pashtun elder from Khas Uruzgan told AAN that Shujai had come to the area to solve the issues of a Hazara woman from Hussaini who had taken refuge in the nearby Pashtun village of Abparan (she was apparently fleeing abuse and she had hoped to be returned to her family). When the Pashtuns refused to return the woman, he said, Shujai went to Abparan where he searched and possibly burned several houses and took some sheep. This was also alluded to in a report by Pajhwok on 6 November which said that clashes had erupted over the case of a woman, after a number of local elders had gathered and that the Taleban had engaged in the fight later. A former Hazara official of Khas Uruzgan, however, told AAN on 17 November that the issue with the woman had been solved and had nothing to do with the Taleban’s attacks.

Villagers from Kondolan had a different story, saying Shujai’s men had run into a group of Pashtuns travelling from Hussaini to Kondolan bazar on 27 October and had killed three of them. Those who survived reported it to the Taleban. Others said the men had not been killed, but had been searched by Shujai when he encountered them on the road, after which they had reported the matter to the Taleban. According to a local source, the local Taleban first refused to take action, but after it came to the attention of the Taleban’s man in charge of military affairs for Khas Uruzgan, Mawlawi Rashed, he ordered the lower-level Taleban commanders to go after Shujai, and they attacked within the hour. (2)

The government mainly seems to have picked up reports of local Pashtuns responding to Shujai’s alleged misbehaviour – which could explain why the violence was initially treated as a local conflict. For instance on 29 October, the Dari service of the Voice of America (VoA) quoted Uruzgan’s NDS head, Abdul Qawi Omari, as saying that Shujai first attacked a Pashtun area and that “the Taleban with the help of local people started the fight against Shujai and his fighters.”

Others said Shujai had travelled to Kondolan for a security meeting (and possibly had meant to tend to the other – more minor – matters alongside the meeting). Khaleq Ibrahimi, who along with two other journalists had travelled to Malestan, told AAN on 18 November that the meeting had been called in response to the increasing influence of the Taleban’s commando-type ‘red unit (also known as ‘special sniper groups’; read AAN’s previous reporting on the shift in the Taleban’s strategy from a ‘front system’ to a ‘red unit system’ here) in Khas Uruzgan since the spring. Others mentioned that Mawlawi Rashed had been given a green light from the Quetta Shura to conduct more aggressive campaigns to collect zakat from the local Hazara population. According to an elder from Payk, the Taleban had recently sent two letters to Kondolan and Hussaini telling the population to decide whether they would cooperate with the Taleban – including the paying of ushr and the giving of young men to the jihad– or face the consequences. The elder said the people of Kondolan and Hussaini had invited Shujai to ask him whether he would defend them or whether they should surrender and agree to the Taleban’s demands. (3)

Shujai claimed something similar in an interview with VoA on 30 October, saying that he was engaged in a fight with the Taleban, not with the Pashtuns, and that he had wanted to set up a commission to resolve the increasing Taleban pressure on “our people in the area.” This, he said, was why he went there, but “the Taleban had plotted” and carried out an attack against him.

Deputy chief executive Muhammad Mohaqeq on 8 November criticised the Taleban for playing a double game: on the one hand “in coordination with local elements portrayed to the government that the fight with the Hazaras is an ethnic fight and conflict and that [the government] should not intervene” and on the other hand pretended to the world that their fight in Uruzgan and Jaghori or other Hazara-dominated areas was “not a systematic ethno-sectarian killing, but an attack against the bases and militias of Ashraf Ghani’s government.”

The Taleban expanding its reach into Hazara areas

Sources close to the Taleban told AAN that about three months ago, Mawlawi Rashed, the Taleban official in charge of military affairs for Khas Uruzgan, complained to the Taleban’s leadership council that the local Hazara population was refusing to pay ushr and zakat and received the green light for a more aggressive campaign to collect these taxes (including, reportedly, an additional land tax, calculated on the basis of acreage; ushr and zakat are calculated based on yield or income).

According to a former official from Khas Uruzgan, around 15 to 20 days before the fighting started, Rashed had already asked the people in Kondolan to pay 100,000 kaldars or Pakistani rupees (around 745 USD). The people could not afford it and had tried to reduce it to 60,000 kaldars. The Taleban including Rashed had also called to a meeting people from the other predominantly Hazara villages of Khas Uruzgan, such as Hussaini, Sewak, Ola wa Khawja Roshnayi, Sia Baghal, Haji Muhammad and Payk, in which they asked the people to pay ushr. The people told the Taleban that they would decide after three months during which the Taleban should not cause any trouble for them.

The population of Jaghori and Malestan had received a similar message from the Taleban. On 16 May 2018, the Taleban’s shadow governor of Ghazni, Haji Yusuf Wafa, sent a letter (AAN has seen a copy) to “all residents, respected ulema (religious scholars) and mujahedin of the districts of Malestan and Jaghori,” saying he had appointed three shadow officials for the areas. The letter introduced Abed as the military head (massoul-e nezami), Hafez Bashir as head of the military commission and Hamidi as civilian head of the two districts. The letter also said, “All mujahedin are duty-bound to obey [them] within the framework of sharia and the regulations of the Islamic Emirate and to continue the holy jihad.” (See also this report by Khabarnama).

On 25 June 2018, the Taleban in the Rasana area of neighbouring Gilan district sent a letter (AAN has seen a copy) to the elders of the Dah Murda area in Jaghori, saying they had been keeping their appointed officials waiting and asking the elders to come to Rasana bazar so “we can all come to an understanding.” On 27 June 2018, Muhammad Yunus Samim, head of the Association of Social Coherence of Jaghori, told AAN that some elders from Nawa, Anguri and Hutqul areas of Jaghori had indeed gone to Rasana to learn the details and had been told by the Taleban that if they did not surrender – that is, submit to the Taleban’s demands – they would be attacked. The Taleban warned them that they had 150–200 fighters ready and that other groups could come as reinforcements.

After several gatherings to decide on a response, the people of Jaghori, according to Samim, finally sent a message that they would be under the central government as long as it was there and that the Taleban should not wage war on a specific ethnic group.

Some sources claimed that agreements had already been in place between the Taleban and community elders in Khas Uruzgan, Malestan and Jaghori, including for paying ushr and zakat to the Taleban, in exchange for the Taleban not attacking the Hazaras. Such agreements also regulated access to local bazaars. On this basis, for instance, the Taleban were only allowed to visit or pass through Gandab bazaar unarmed when travelling between Malestan and Khas Uruzgan (Gandab is a ‘major’ local bazaar in Khas Uruzgan where goods from Ghazni city are on offer). (4) Based on agreements with elders in Jaghori, the Taleban had similarly been given free passage to the areas further west and north, sources said, if they promised not to attack the local population (although other sources dispute that this was ever the case). (5) (The International Crisis Group’s senior analyst Borhan Osman told AAN that the Taleban’s attacks on Jaghori had been triggered by the population’s refusal to continue to allow the Taleban’s movement through Jaghori.)

Such deals would not always hold, as illustrated by the kidnapping of Hazaras on the roads between Jaghori and Ghazni city and also other places in Ghazni and Zabul; sometimes the hostages were released, sometimes they were killed. Whenever kidnappings occurred, Hazara elders would try to contact local Pashtun elders for their release, which might have led to indirect contacts with the local Taleban leaders, which in turn may have resulted in more unwritten deals. Khadim Hussain Kartimi described such deals to AAN as “good neighbourhood agreements” which meant that the people on both sides would not allow a third force (the Taleban or the government) to carry out operations that would harm the local people.

Strong reactions from Hazara communities

Reactions from the Hazara community – within Afghanistan, online and internationally – to the Taleban attacks on the three districts were swift and fierce. There were spontaneous demonstrations, social media campaigns (some rather extreme) and sustained pressure on the government to take action.

Uprising forces from other areas in Hazarajat travelled to Jaghori and Malestan to bolster the local resistance and morale. For instance, on 10 November, Etilaat Roz reported that Abdul Ghani Alipur (also known as Qomandan Shamshir), the commander of the Jabha-ye Moqawamat (Resistance Front), an autonomous Hazara self-defence armed group in Behsud district of Maidan Wardak, arrived in Jaghori district of Ghazni to support the local “public uprising forces” and asked residents not to leave their areas and homes. The paper quoted Alipur as saying, “The enemy is not that strong and widespread, but unfortunately the enemy’s infiltrators have spread rumours among the people which have created fear and terror.” He called on the people to resist the Taleban and withstand the rumours (about their strength). (6)

AAN also observed efforts by Hazaras in Kabul to raise funds to buy weapons – especially sniper rifles and night goggles – to ensure that the resistance forces in Jaghori and Malestan were armed with the same kinds of weapons the Taleban were using against them. This seemed a clear signal that the Hazara community did not trust the government to come to the aid of the besieged communities.

When, in the evening of 11 November the district centre of Malestan was reportedly on the verge of collapse, hundreds of people marched to the Arg, the former royal palace and now home to the president, in a spontaneous protest (see media reports on the protests here). The protest that started around 10 at night was triggered by the Facebook post of a young social media activist, Ahmad Jawid Tasha, who wrote at 9:29 pm: “Guys, if possible, let’s march toward Arg just now.” A few minutes later, at 9:40 pm, he wrote: “I’m just 10 minutes away from Haji Nowruz’s square. Anyone who has the courage and guts please get out and we will get together along the Shahid Mazari road. Let’s march toward the Arg” (for more details see the Kabul-based news website Reporterly here). Tasha, from Qarabagh district of Ghazni, told AAN later that he had tried to call his friends in the area after he saw rumours about the fall of Malestan on social media, but had been unable to get through. Losing contact with his friends, who were inside the district centre’s compound, and remembering them saying goodbye (in earlier calls), led him to take to the street.

Haji Nowruz Square is in Barchi, a neighbourhood in the mainly Shia/Hazara area in the west of Kabul, which has been the starting point for several mass protests over the past years: from the Tabassum protest (AAN reporting here) in 2015 to the Enlightenment protests in 2016 (AAN background here). The call to march towards the palace coincidentally came on the third anniversary of the Tabassum protest against the killing of seven Hazara travellers, including two women and a child. (7) As during the earlier protests, the police tried to block the protestors from reaching the Arg, but they finally managed to get there. The security measures, however, created massive traffic chaos in the morning for Kabulis who wanted to go to work.

In front of the Arg, many protesters braved the night’s rain and stayed until the next day and on into the early afternoon hours, with more joining. Many had been irked by President Ghani’s quasi-election campaign visit to Daikundi and Bamyan provinces on 9 and 10 November, respectively. There he presented his current second vice-president, Sarwar Danesh, a Hazara from Daikundi, as his running-mate for the 2019 presidential election and had indicated that Jaghori district might be elevated to provincial status, but he had not commented on the on-going fighting in the Hazara districts in Ghazni. When given a chance to send a delegation to meet the president, the protesters instead insisted that the president go live – either on the palace Facebook page or national radio and television – to convey his message to the people in the three districts.

Latif Fayyaz, one of the protestors, told AAN on 12 November that the protesters had five demands: (a) dispatch military support for the uprising forces in the three districts, (b) carry out clearance operations in the border areas where the Taleban had mobilised and were threatening those districts, (c) secure the roads that connect the districts to the provincial centres and other provinces, (d) provide relief aid to the IDPs from those districts and (e) establish an army corps in the Hazarajat.

These demands were sent to the president and communicated verbally after the protesters finally agreed to talk to him by telephone (Asef Ashna, a former deputy spokesman for Chief Executive Abdullah spoke on their behalf). President Ghani in response said that the dispatch of commandos to Jaghori (they had been killed the day before) had been a demonstration of the government’s will and commitment. He also said he had: (a) ordered the use of the air force the night before (and that airstrikes from 11:30 pm to 03:00 am had led to a reduction in the intensity of the fighting in both Jaghori and Malestan), (b) instructed the army chief to travel to Ghazni and personally lead the fight, (c) commando forces from 201 army corps were on the way to Jaghori and Malestan, (d) the plan for large-scale operations would be presented to him in the commander-in-chief meeting and would be carried out from four sides and (e) basic food stuff had been prepared and there was a commitment to address the needs of the IDPs. The president said that what could not be done immediately was to establish a permanent battalion and that he would not promise something which was not immediately feasible. (8)

The demand to establish an army corps had emerged after the Taleban killed more than 20 local Hazara police personnel in Jalrez district of Maidan Wardak in July 2015 (see media report here). (9) Currently, the Tandar Corps, the Afghan National Army Corps 203 based in Gardez in Paktia, is responsible for Jaghori and Malestan (it is the ANA command centre for southeastern Afghanistan, Loya Paktia, Logar and Ghazni). It is deployed far from Jaghori and Malestan and had even not been able to come to the rescue of the much closer Ghazni city when it temporarily fell to the Taleban in August this year (see this media report here and also AAN’s report about the insecure spring in Ghazni here; a detailed analysis by AAN of the brief fall of Ghazni is forthcoming).

Hazara analysis of what might be behind the attacks

Observers appeared to have been taken by surprise by the Taleban attacks on the Hazara areas. For instance, Muhammad Nateqi, deputy leader of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Mardom, described on his Facebook page on 12 November how a year ago he had a conversation with Taleban representatives in Qatar. The first point he raised with them was that “our people [still] hold you responsible for the martyrdom of Ustad Mazari” (founder of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami who was killed by the Taleban in March 1995). The Taleban’s response had been that they were sorry, that the murder of Mazari had not been their work, and that something should be done so there would no longer be problems between the Taleban and the Hazaras. But the bloody events of Malestan and Jaghori, Nateqi said, showed “that the Taleban do not have memory. Just as they were responsible for the martyrdom of Ustad Mazari, they are exactly responsible for the killing of our defenceless people in Malestan and Jaghori.”

Others like Muhammad Amin Ahmadi, the president of private Ibn-e Sina University, tried to analyse the fact that the Taleban’s attacks continued even after Shujai had fled Khas Uruzgan. In a piece for Hasht-e Sobh on 3 November, he argued that “The Taleban want to expand their territory towards Malestan and Jaghori … and bring all these areas under their influence and control to pressure the central government more than before and strip the government of the support of the Hazaras and make the Hazaras disappointed with the support from the central government and force them to surrender to them [the Taleban].” Ahmadi warned that if the Taleban achieved this goal, “the legitimacy of the central government [at a time when] it is announced that the government controls only 50 per cent of the country’s soil will be undermined more than before, because even from a religious perspective, it will be argued that the government has lost its necessary shoukat [power] and authority and is unable to maintain order and security even for its supporters, so in old terms, it is no longer a zi-showkat [powerful] sultan against which fighting is haram [forbidden] religiously. Its position in peace negotiations will also be strongly undermined.”

In a separate post on 11 November, Ahmadi argued that the Taleban aimed to capture Hazara districts by “al-nasr bel ru’b (victory by scaring)”. He wrote, “The Taleban by the killings that they carried out in Uruzgan scared the ordinary people and made them understand that their slightest move would be responded to by widespread and heinous killing. They have announced and are announcing this policy of terror that the people should not intervene in their fight with the government or even [should not] come out of their homes, otherwise, they would be killed, so that they can easily capture the local administrations and rule the people.” Ahmadi also said, “The Hazara community and in a sense all proponents of the constitutional system and opponents of the Taleban’s rule have stood at a turning point of destiny. We should all answer this question whether to allow the Taleban [to] overthrow this system and as a result accept extremist and hard-line, exclusivist and non-participatory Taleban rule? Whether to not seek justice and equality [and] pay taxes and ushr just to survive? It is time for a right, unified and inclusive decision, tomorrow is [too] late.”

Threats and possibly violence towards Pashtuns in the affected areas

Violence and threats against Pashtuns in the affected Hazara areas have been reported since the Taleban left. Sources from Andar district in Ghazni, for instance, told AAN that some of the 80 to 100 Pashtuns from Nawa and Gilan districts who had active businesses in Anguri (fuel stations, pharmacies, car dealerships, well drills, etc.) had been unaware of the attack beforehand and were thus unable to leave the area. One source said that he was stuck in Anguri bazaar for one week during which, he said, the uprising people were giving him death threats every day. They told these businessmen that they would be killed very soon because the uprising people had lost 70 of their friends in the fighting with the Taleban. He also said some of the businessmen were beaten and that the businesses of some Pashtuns had been burnt during an attack by local uprising people – but the reports are somewhat inconclusive. (For example, the fuel station of Haji Ibrahimi, a rich man from Rasana area, was reported to have been burnt and Haji Ibrahim was said to have been missing since the day the attack started. Others however claim that Haji Ibrahim has since then reappeared and that people who travelled to the area have since found the fuel station intact.)

Journalist Karimi, quoted above, however, claimed that many Pashtun businessmen had in fact disappeared from Anguri with their vehicles and other important possessions the night before the attack, in response to the earlier Taleban threats and letters warning of a possible attack. He said that local people who had been taken by surprise by the Taleban attacks, later criticised themselves for failing to notice the departure of the businesspeople as a sign of an imminent threat.

AAN was told that on 18 November 2018, two airstrikes hit two civilian houses in Rasana in Gilan (the Taleban had attacked Hutqul from Rasana in Gilan). The first house was empty and only the building was destroyed. The second strike hit the house of Abdul Malik (see photos of the victims and Abdul Malik in this Facebook post) and killed his wife and his daughter and wounded another four family members. According the sources, the airstrikes continued on 19 November and as a result more than 1,000 families fled. They started returning on 20 November after the fighting reduced. BBC Pashto reported that 1,200 families had left the area.

Local residents told the BBC that they were leaving the Rasana area, chiefly due to indiscriminate shelling by the uprising people from Anguri area. They told BBC that two children had died due to cold weather while they were on the way to Aghujan, Shinki and Guha areas. One local resident told the BBC, “They fire rockets at our area because they say Taleban are living here.” The spokesman for Ghazni governor, Arif Nuri, confirmed the killing of one civilian in the bombing, but did not comment on the wounded civilians or the destruction of civilian houses. Ghazni police chief Daud Tarakhel told the BBC that the bombing had not killed civilians.

Conclusion: What to make of this new phase of Taleban assault?

Since the attacks started on 27 October, the Taleban have been pushing into Hazara areas in Uruzgan and Ghazni provinces. The Hazaras have been putting pressure on the government to deploy forces to protect them from the Taleban’s assault. They have also been mobilising public uprising forces to defend their areas. While the Taleban have now been pushed back from Jaghori and Malestan districts, they continue to pose a threat of renewed attacks on certain parts of Jaghori and Malestan.

The Taleban’s attacks on the Hazara areas in Uruzgan and Ghazni have an ethnic dimension; that is to say, the Taleban, a predominately Pashtun movement, has attacked areas inhabited by Hazaras – from areas dominated by Pashtuns. This has further strained the already precarious inter-community relations in those areas.

The Taleban’s attacks on the Hazara areas have been catching headlines, raising speculation and theories as to why the Taleban have attacked at the very time that they are also holding meetings with the US towards a possible political settlement.

First, the Taleban may have wanted to gain more territory before the start of any peace talks. This was one of the hypotheses that Zalmai Khalilzad, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, pointed to in a question and answer session with journalists. He said some alleged the Taleban wanted “to improve their relative position” as the country moved from “war to talk” and that in the areas where the defence was relatively weak, it was easier for them to strengthen their position. (10) This was echoed by Muhammad Ali Alizada, an MP from Jaghori, who told AAN on 15 November that the Taleban had already claimed in Moscow that they controlled “55 per cent of the territory and by spring might claim to be controlling up to 70 per cent.” Alizada said that the Taleban, in fact, wanted to “expand both their territorial control and power” before any peace talks.

Second, the Taleban seem to have wanted to expand their influence within all ethnic groups. This was highlighted by Amiri of the TLO who said that “the Taleban have influence among Tajiks and Uzbeks. The Hazaras are the only community that is not influenced by the Taleban yet. The Taleban want to try it with the Hazaras.” Observation from the north, however, shows that the Taleban mainly co-opted people from Tajik and Uzbek communities there, unlike their recent attacks on the Hazara areas, which led to widespread fear and displacement.

Third, the Taleban seem to long have been planning to attack Hazara areas in an attempt to establish their administration, a major part of which is the collection of taxes and ushr. This was confirmed by the government’s fact-finding delegation which found, as reported by Hasht-e Sobh, that the Taleban had asked residents of Kondolan, Hussain and Sia Baghal to pay taxes and hand over their weapons. The daily quoted Asadullah Falah, the head of the delegation, as saying that the Taleban had asked those villagers to “resort to jehad” against the government and that the Taleban intended to “collect taxes from the people and use them against the government.” AAN’s own research also shows that the Taleban long wanted to move their administration into these areas to expand their territory and increase their revenues. The timing for the attack may have been influenced by the fact that the Taleban had already captured large parts of the Pashtun areas in the two provinces of Ghazni and Uruzgan and, given the possible new momentum for peace talks, now wanted to expand their territory so they could negotiate from a position of greater strength.

It was against this backdrop that the Taleban seem to have used Shujai’s appearance in Khas Uruzgan as an opportunity to launch their attacks. It is not clear why they engaged in indiscriminate killing in the way they did, particularly in Kondolan and Hussaini. Some Pashtun sources claim these killings were done by individuals intent on revenge and that the Taleban has dealt with the perpetrators, internally. A former official of Khas Uruzgan told AAN he thought the Taleban had simply launched their attack on the two Hazara-dominated districts of Jaghori and Malestan, after their foray into Khas Uruzgan, when they realised how vulnerable and defenceless the two districts were.

 

 

(1) Accusations of killings by Shujai are documented in this Human Rights Watch report, published in March 2015. The report said:

Abdul Hakim Shujoyi, a militia leader in central Afghanistan’s Uruzgan province, became an ALP commander in 2011 at the insistence of U.S. forces. He personally murdered civilians, including a rampage in July 2011 when he shot dead 7 villagers and set fire to their crops. After a further attack in which he killed at least 9 civilians in 2012, the Ministry of Interior issued a warrant for his arrest. Nevertheless, he remains at large, apparently protected by senior government officials.

For more details, see also this AAN report.

(2) Sources told AAN that the Taleban had appointed Mawlawi Rashed as masul nezami (military in charge) for Khas Uruzgan about a year ago. He is said to be around 35 years old, an Achekzai Pashtun (Ardozai by sub-tribe) from Sheikha in Khas Uruzgan and a former lower-level Taleban front commander. The Taleban have been appointing three main officials for each district: in addition to the military in charge, they also appoint a masul mulki (civilian in charge) and masul kemisyun nezami (person in charge of the military commission). As reported above, they introduced the same structure for Jaghori and Malestan, jointly, in May this year.

(3) Over the years the Taleban have put pressure on the Hazara pockets of Khas Uruzgan. The first area to come under heavy pressure was Bagh o Char in the southeast of the district. The Hazara population was unable to withstand the Taleban’s demands and decided to vacate the area. More recently, the Hazara areas of Palan, Shashpar and Siro came under de facto Taleban control. The Hazara areas in the southeast of the district – Kondolan, Hussaini, Haji Mohammad, Gandab and Payk – due to their proximity to Malestan had until now been relatively protected against such pressure and incursions.

(4) Gandab bazaar is the main bazaar for five villages in the neighbourhood: Payk, Sia Baghal, Haji Muhammad, Abesto and Ola wa Khawaja Roshnayi. They are all Hazara villages. The two villages closest to Malestan are Haji Muhammad and Payk on the east.

(5) According to local sources, Bashi Habib – who was killed in the latest fighting – had first made a deal with the Taleban after they attacked his house in Jaghori in 2007. (According to this blog, his wife, two sons and two nephews were killed in the attack). A source from Autli, a village near Rasana in Gilan district, told AAN that according to this deal the Taleban would not cause problems to Hazaras and vice versa, nor for the security forces that passed through the Hazara areas. In exchange the security forces would not harm them and the Taleban would be allowed to seek refuge in Hazara areas, provided they came to the areas without weapons. As a result of this agreement, Taleban fighters would commute quite often to Anguri bazaar in Jaghuri, but without weapons. They would come to see doctors, fix their motorbikes and tend to other needs. Bashi is said to have also given weapons and money to the Taleban at the time (as Shujai is said to have done in the past).

(6) Alipur was arrested by security forces in Kabul on 25 November for having established “an illegal armed group … involved in illegal activities” such as ransom seeking, illegal extortions, arming and supporting criminal groups, harassing people, and carrying out an armed attack on security forces (see here for the NDS media report). His arrest sparked protests by his Hazara supporters in Kabul, Bamyan, Balkh, Daikundi and other places for two consecutive days. The protests in Kabul and Bamyan turned violent (see media reports here and here). He was released in the evening of the following day after committing, among others, to either registering all his weapons, ammunition and military equipment or handing them to the government; staying in Kabul until all legal phases of the investigations were completed; and to answer to the judicial authorities if there were any claims against him by the people (see media report here). Alipur himself said, in his defence, that he had left his transportation job and had “founded the resistance” after he witnessed “the disasters and misery of the people” in Maidan valley (see this document).

(7) There were further protests in the same night, including in front of the girls’ dormitory of Kabul University, in Mazar-e Sharif and in the morning on the campuses of the university and the Polytechnic Institute in Kabul. There, students blocked the entry gates, but allowed them to reopen when lectures started. Further demonstrations were reported from the provincial centres of Bamian and Daykundi.

(8) When the Kabul protestors dispersed after Ghani’s phone call, a suicide bomber blew himself up in the middle of a group of young people close to Zarnegar Park and Isteqlal Lycee, killing six people, among them three young women and a traffic policeman who was hit by shrapnel. Some 20 more people were injured. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for this attack.

Among the dead were three youth activists – Gulchehra Sadaf, Fereshta Akbari and Ismail Bashardost – who reportedly had been among the first who helped victims of earlier terrorist attacks and donating blood. One of them, Gulchehra, had been photographed carrying the casket of a student victim of the 15 August 2018 attack on the Mawud educational centre in West Kabul.

(9) In December 2016, Vice-President Danesh and deputy chief executive Mohammad Mohaqeq submitted a “Comprehensive Security and Administrative Plan for the Central Hazarajat Regions” to the National Security Council. They wanted to draw the government’s attention to the “existing dangers and threats in Hazarajat” so it would take measures to make people feel confident that the government would ensure their security. As part of this plan, they proposed that a lewa (an army brigade) comprised of six kandak (battalions) be established with its centre in Bamyan. They suggested the following distribution of battalions: (a) one in the centre of Bamyan, (b) one in Sheikh Ali district of Parwan, (c) one in Behsud district of Maidan Wardak, (d) two in Kejran and Nili of Daikundi, (e) one in Lal wa Sarjangal in Ghor. They also proposed that Jaghori and Balkhab, which are far from Bamyan, would be given battalions from, respectively, the Ghazni army brigade and the northern 202 Shahin corps. The proposal also said the people in Hazarajat demanded the establishment of three new provinces with their capitals in Jaghori (currently Ghazni), Behsud (Maidan Wardak) and Lal wa Sarjangal (Ghor). Until those provinces were created, the proposal said, the big districts in the central highlands should be split as follow: (1) Lal wa Sarjangal with an estimated population of 180,000 should be into two; (2) Waras of Bamyan with an estimated population of 160,000 should be split into into three; (3) Behsud district of Maidan Wardak with estimated population of 160,000 into three; (4) Nahur district of Ghazni with estimated population of 140,000 into two; (5) Jaghori with estimated population of 300,000 into three; (6) Malestan with estimated population of 140,000 into three; and (7) Miramur district of Daikundi with estimated population of 160,000 into two.

(10) Khalilzad also said he had heard another hypothesis:that “some Talebs who have developed some relations with Iran” were responsible for the attacks in order to justify the possible use of fatemyun– a brigade of Afghan fighters who fought in Syria – “to say those areas needed defence and therefore let’s deploy defence forces.” But he added that, based on his discussions with Mohaqeq, he had the strong impression that the central region, the Hazarajat area, does not want any fatemyun deployed and that they had confidence in the government and its partners to deal effectively with the security of the area.

On 15 November, the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies organised an event about a recent report by the Middle East Institute where speakers raised concerns about the use of fatemyun in Afghanistan.

 

Michael Kofman and I published a short analysis of the naval battle in the Kerch Strait on the Monkey Cage. Here’s a sampler.

The Nov. 25 skirmish between Russian Border Guard and Ukrainian navy ships in the Kerch Strait has escalated tensions not just between the two countries, but also between Russia and NATO.

Two Ukrainian navy small-armored boats and a tugboat attempted to cross into the Sea of Azov via the Kerch Strait. A Russian Border Guard ship rammed the tug. Russian forces eventually captured all three boats, holding them in the Crimean port of Kerch. 

This crisis kicked off months ago 

In March 2018 Ukraine seized a Russian-flagged fishing vessel, claiming that it had violated exit procedures from the “temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine.” Although the Russian crew was released, the boat remains detained in a Ukrainian port. Subsequently, Russia began to seize Ukrainian vessels for inspection, starting in May when a fishing vessel was detained for illegally fishing in Russia’s exclusive economic zone.

A new Russian-built bridge linking Crimea to southern Russia is at the center of Russia’s attempt to assert sovereignty over the entire Kerch Strait. The bridge opened in May, and its low clearance height cut off many commercial ships and reduced revenue at the Mariupol port by 30 percent. Russia has imposed an informal blockade on the remaining maritime traffic, with ships often waiting more than 50 hours to cross, and Russian authorities insisting upon inspecting the cargo. This has substantially raised transit costs — and has been slowly strangling the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk.

To read the rest, please click here.

In late October 2018, the Taleban pushed deeper into Hazara areas than they had ever done before. They first pursued Hakim Shujai, a notorious former Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander, into Malestan, then launched an assault on the district of Jaghori and thereafter attacked Malestan’s district centre, almost resulting in its collapse. The attacks were unprecedented in their reach and scope and led to massive displacement of local people. In this series of two dispatches, AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili and Martine van Bijlert (with input from Thomas Ruttig, Fazal Muzhari and Ehsan Qaane), first, look into the details of the attacks and, second, provide in-depth background and an analysis of the attacks.

The Taleban attacks on Hazara areas in districts in Uruzgan and Ghazni provinces were unprecedented – at least in recent times – in terms of the number of incursions, the number of casualties and the level of coordination (three areas at more or less the same time). The initial attack on the largely self-governing Hazara enclave in the northeast of Khas Uruzgan was in response to Shujai’s visit – and possibly his behaviour towards Pashtuns while he was there. At the same time, it came in the context of increased pressure by the Taleban on the Hazara population in areas they had so far largely left alone. Coming at a time when the government and the Taleban are talking about a possible peace process, the Taleban suddenly seemed keen to show their reach and to increase their local revenue streams. The attacks appeared to fly in the face of local agreements between Hazara populations and the Taleban to largely leave each other alone. The level of violence and the slowness of the government to respond have, moreover, fed into fears of ethnic targeting by the Taleban and ethnic bias from the government. In this first dispatch in a series of two, AAN provides a detailed account of the attacks.

The attack in Khas Uruzgan and incursions into Malestan

The attack on Khas Uruzgan started on 27 October 2018. On that day, by all accounts, Hakim Shujai, a notorious former Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander, arrived in the Kondolan area in the northeast of Khas Uruzgan in a convoy of several cars (Shujai is from Malestan, but headed the ALP forces in Khas Uruzgan until he was forced to resign). After refuelling his vehicles and moving around in Kondolan bazaar for a while, he went to an area called Dakhni in the centre of the area where he decided to spend the night. The Taleban, alerted to his presence, approached Dakhni around 7:30 pm and started shooting to find out whether he was really there. When they drew return fire, they attacked.

Shujai was injured in the attack, but managed to escape with his remaining men to Hamza, a hamlet at the edge of Kondolan. From there, he continued to Ochi (also known as Gerdai Chaman), which is in the Shirdagh area of Malestan district in Ghazni, just across the border. The Taleban pursued him into Shirdagh where they engaged in fighting over the days that followed. Taleban reinforcements arrived, first from other areas in Khas Uruzgan, later also from Ajiristan district in Ghazni, according to local sources. They were stationed in houses and mosques in the Hazara areas of Kondolan, Husseini, Haji Muhammad and Gandab – the northeastern corner of the district where the Hazara population had so far largely managed to keep their independence from the Taleban. In the days that followed, several civilians were violently killed, leading ever more families to flee the area out of fear of violence. (1)

On 28 October 2018, the Taleban claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that “the brutal commander Shujai had resorted to an aggressive attack for the purpose of looting in the Kondolan and Jaga Righ areas of Khas Uruzgan and had faced tough resistance.” The Taleban’s report claimed that eight of Shujai’s forces had been killed and injured and six more, including “a policewoman,” had been captured. (Local sources told AAN the woman was not a policewoman and had been captured because she had picked up a weapon to fight off the Taleban, being the only person in the house; the sources also said the Taleban later released the prisoners). According to sources AAN spoke to, the Taleban killed 11 people in the attack, including two of Shujai’s deputies, Fakuri and Khan Ali Ghulami (known as Shujai’s ‘minister of war’).

On 1 November 2018, President Ashraf Ghani issued a decree in response to the public outcry over the attack – although the wording of the text only made matters worse. The decree tasked a 12-member delegation “to investigate and resolve the recent conflict among the ethnicities of Uruzgan province.” (3) The fact that the president had referred to the violence as ‘ethnic conflict,’ was met with sharp criticism by many Hazaras who argued that this was clearly a matter of the Taleban attacking a pro-government area and it was the government’s responsibility not just to investigate, but to act. For instance, the head of private Ibn-e Sina University, Muhammad Amin Ahmadi, wrote on 4 November (under the title “A government that establishes peace between the Taleban and the local population”):

[It is such a] confused government whose ethnocentrism has rendered it unable to understand even the simplest issues. According to a report by [Kabul daily] Etilaat Roz, the president has appointed a delegation to find the root of the Taleban’s conflict with the local people in Uruzgan, as if the conflict is an ethnic-based one, or between the Taleban and a local commander. … The government should answer this simple question: does it agree with the Taleban’s advance into its sovereign territory? Does it want the people to surrender to the Taleban? Is it not concerned about the weakening of the government and the fall of the system?

The president’s own vice-president and chief executive also weighed in. Vice-President Sarwar Danesh said in a speech on 1 November 2018, “These people were under government rule and are supporters of the system and, for that very reason, have come under the Taleban’s brutal attack.” He criticised his own government saying, “for whatever reason, no practical action has been taken by the local administration or our security institutions in [Kabul] to defend the people.” Danesh also called on the local population “not to surrender … and to defend their dignity and freedom manly.” A few days later, on 5 November, Chief Executive Abdullah told the weekly meeting of the Council of Ministers that he had met with representatives from the (Hazara) central region who complained that the issue was presented as an “ethnic fight.” He admitted that the delay in the government’s response had led to civilian casualties and displacement of the people.

Former Daikundi governor Qurban Ali Uruzgani told AAN that he had met Vice-President Danesh, along with a number of other Hazara representatives, to discuss the decree’s three main problems: (a) it called the conflict “ethnic”, (b) the delegation included only two Hazaras and (c) the decree had tasked the governor’s office in Uruzgan – that is, the officials who had initially reported the conflict to the president as an ethnic one – with facilitating the delegation’s stay. Uruzgani said that it was as a result of these efforts that the decree was amended. (4)

On 5 November, Ghazni provincial council member Muhammad Naim Tawhidi, who according to media reports had been at the scene of the clashes, was quoted as saying that the Taleban’s so-called commando-type ‘red units’ had attacked the police forces in Shirdagh, Malestan, during the night of 4 November. (Read AAN’s previous reporting on the shift in Taleban strategy from a ‘front system’ to a ‘red unit’, also known as the Taleban’s ‘special sniper group’ system here). Tawhidi said that 13 policemen had been killed in the clashes and the security forces had withdrawn towards Meradina, Malestan’s district centre. Pajhwok quoted Malestan district governor Zamen Ali Hedayat, who added that scores of civilians had also been killed. (The possible presence of the Taleban’s red units was also mentioned by other local sources and repeated by Deputy Chief Executive Muhammad Mohaqeq here).

Provincial council member Tawhidi complained that more than 30 army soldiers had arrived in Malestan centre a few days earlier, but they had not yet been allowed to carry out operations.

Several sources told AAN that following the Taleban’s assault on Shirdagh, local people struck a deal with the Taleban and gave up the fight. Khaleq Ibrahimi, who had travelled to Malestan along with two other journalists to investigate the Taleban attacks, in a conversation with AAN, quoted a resident of Shirdagh saying that it had not been “a peace deal, but rather it allowed us to lengthen our survival (“dam-e khod ra daraz kunim)” and that it had come at the cost of schools and paying ushr (an obligatory charge on agricultural produce). (AAN’s conversations with different sources show that the fighting indeed stopped, but only until 10 November when the Taleban attacked Malestan’s district centre – more on this below.)

On 5 November, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) issued a press release on “the armed conflict in Uruzgan province,” saying that around 63 local people had been killed or injured in the Taleban attacks on the villages of Kondolan, Hussaini, Karez and Gerdai Chaman in Khas Uruzgan district, and that hundreds of families had been displaced.

On 6 November, Pajhwok reported that Asadullah Falah, the head of a government delegation, while visiting neighbouring Malestan and Jaghori (more on this below) had confirmed the killing of 40 civilians in recent clashes between the Taleban and an “illegal commander” in Khas Uruzgan and Malestan districts. The report also quoted Falah as saying that the Taleban had attacked residential buildings and villages and caused casualties to civilians and that around 500 families had been displaced. Later he told Hasht-e Sobh that 54 people had been killed: “After the people of these areas disobeyed the Taleban’s order, 25 people in Kondolan, nine people in Hussaini village and 20 in other villages of the district were killed by the Taleban. Eleven security forces were also killed in the fight in Khas Uruzgan. Six security forces were injured.” (5)

On 7 November, the president’s office reported that the commander-in-chief of the armed forces had reviewed the general security situation of Khas Uruzgan, Malestan and Jaghori (as well as other districts under threat, such as Qala-ye Kah in Farah and Chaharsada in Ghor). The statement said that the security forces had been instructed to present “a clear security picture and plan” and to take urgent action and that the US/NATO-led Resolute Support mission had promised air support.

The attack on Jaghori

On the same day, on 7 November, the Taleban went on the offensive in neighbouring Jaghori district. They attacked a number of posts in the Hutqul area, a village that borders Rasana in Gilan district, around 1:00 in the morning. The Taleban first attacked posts that were manned by Salam Akrami – a commander of around 30 local police (ALP) – in Awri Gardu. Then they moved to a post run by Habibullah Haidari, known as Bashi Habib, in Bazar-e Kohna Lashkarai, as well as posts in Ferozkoh manned by ALP and local uprising forces. (6) Khadim Hussain Karimi, a journalist from Hutqul, told AAN that the Taleban overran Salam’s posts – killing him and most of his men – as well as Bashi’s posts. They then moved to Bashi’s house where they killed him and two of his sons, in his home. (7) On the same night, the Taleban entered Daud village from Larga in Muqur district of Ghazni where they met no resistance.

Taleban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed issued a statement on 7 November saying that their attack on Jaghori district was “against military centres of the enemy and against the Kabul administration and servants of America.” The statement emphasised that the attacks were not against any specific qawm (ethnicity), qeshr (group) or mazhab (religious sect) and called on “our countrymen in Jaghori district, especially Hazara and Shia … to be mindful of the conspiracy by the corrupt few and America’s lackeys sitting in Kabul” who might try to portray the Taleban attacks “as against the people.” The statement reiterated that, as they would do everywhere else in the country, the Taleban would “carry out attacks against the servants and lackeys of America and punish them for their acts of treason to their religion and country” and would “continue such attacks in Jaghori and other areas that remain under the control of the Kabul administration.”

Following these attacks, Ghazni MPs and provincial council members met Chief Executive Abdullah and NDS chief Muhammad Masum Stanekzai to call for the urgent dispatch of reinforcements. Both promised to send air support before the end of the day, if the fighting continued (see here). A day later, on 8 November, Ghazni spokesman Nuri said that the Taleban had been pushed back after security forces enforcements arrived, that 39 of the Taleban had been killed, and that clearance operations were on-going.

The Hutqul area, from where the Taleban first attacked, remained quiet on 9 and 10 November. On 11 November, the Taleban carried out another deadly assault that started at 3 am and continued until 7 am. Media reports differed as to the number of casualties. Etilaat Roz reported (see here) that 25 commando soldiers and 15 civilians had been killed.  A New York Times team that later travelled to Sang-e Masha reported that it had seen the bodies of 20 commandos which had been airlifted in four days earlier (on 8 November: see media report here) “laid … on sheets on the ground, side by side on their backs.” It is not clear how the Taleban managed to kill so many commandos in a single attack.

Journalist Karimi, quoted above, told AAN that the local uprising forces had been left demoralised after the high rate of commando casualties. As a result, on 13 November around 10 am, the Taleban captured the public uprising posts in Balna Koh in Hutqul without a fight (see here). The Taleban then, Karimi said, proceeded to capture several villages, including Hutqul, Anguri, Daud, Zirak, and Kotal Lokhak. They advanced towards the district centre, reaching as far as Kotal Dala and Kotal Loman.

On 17 November, the Ministry of Defence finally announced that military operations led by Muhammad Sharif Yaftali, the chief of army staff, had been launched to clear Jaghori and Malestan districts. (See media report here)

On 19 November the Taleban attacked Baba village in western Jaghori, killing three people (one guard of a telecommunication antenna tower and two public uprising forces) and wounding three more (see also this breaking news on Etilaat Roz Facebook page). Local sources told AAN that, on 9 November, the Taleban had already given an ultimatum to the people of Pato, Baba and Hicha, villages in the western part of Jaghori, saying they would come to no harm if they allowed the Taleban fighters to pass through on their way to Jaghori’s district centre, Sang-e Masha. After meetings and consultations, the local people in Baba and parts of Hicha decided to resist the Taleban’s demands to allow them to advance.

The attack on Baba on 19 November came after the Taleban had already entered parts of Hicha and Pato on 16 November. The Taleban entered Pato village based on a deal with Ibrahim Abbasi, a local commander of Hezb-e Islami-e Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. According to this post by Etilaat Roz journalist Esmat Sorush, as well as AAN’s local sources, Abbasi had several rounds of meetings with the Taleban and finally called on the people of Pato not to stand against the Taleban, arguing that they did not have the capability to fight. Abbasi, according to the sources, agreed to allow the Taleban’s advance towards the district centre, in return for the Taleban not harming the people of the village.

The Taleban attacked the Baba front on 22 November for the second time, killing a member of the uprising forces who had arrived from a neighbouring village, Chehel Baghtu, and injuring a few more (see here).

Attack on Malestan district centre

In the meantime, on 10 November, the Taleban attacked the district centre of Malestan, Meradina.‌‌ BBC quoted local people as saying that Taleban forces had crossed the Siah Baghal and Zawli areas in Khas Uruzgan the night before, driving Humvees and ranger pickups they had captured from the government. Muhammad Ali Akhlaqi, an MP from Malestan, told AAN that a convoy of 100 to 150 Taleban fighters had departed from Gandab in Khas Uruzgan, five to six kilometres from the Malestan border, in the morning of 8 November. The Taleban stopped at Kotal Kharzar, only five kilometres from Meradina, for a reconnaissance likely out of fear they might be ambushed if they proceeded.

Etilaat Roz reported that fighting between the Taleban and the security forces started at around 10 am of 10 November, after the Taleban had taken positions a few kilometres from Meradina under the shelter of darkness, including in people’s homes in Dahan-e Bum and Qushang, as well as in Moklai village, close to the district headquarter of Malestan.

After people heard the Taleban were attacking the district centre, the bazaar of Meradina closed and hundreds of families fled, including from Dahan-e Bum and Moklai, Etilaat Roz and the BBC reported. The BBC added that only men stayed behind, to protect their property and belongings. The police forces stationed at the district centre went out to fight the Taleban, but the special forces said they were not allowed to do so. That night, the Taleban advanced to within 200 metres of the district centre and there was fighting in the surrounding villages.

District governor Hedayat wrote on his Facebook page on 12 November that the Taleban had been pushed back by the security forces and on 18 November the Ministry of Interior announced that Malestan district had been totally cleared of “terrorists.” This was confirmed by the Ministry of Defence on 19 November, which said that in the fighting, 31 Taleban had been killed and 15 others wounded.

The Ministry of Interior also said that it had established two tolai (companies) of an “urdu-ye mantaqawi” or territorial army (a new initiative to set up community defence forces – supposedly – under the Ministry of Defence with ‘community’ involvement in their establishment, recruitment and, possibly, oversight – AAN background here). The Ministry of Interior also said it had mobilised 600 locals within the framework of public uprising forces (see footnote 6 for a description) in the two districts, saying they would be equipped and assigned to maintain security in their areas after receiving training.

Although the Taleban have been pushed back from both Jaghori and Malestan, many of those displaced are wary about returning, as they fear that with the departure of additional security forces, the Taleban fighters will return to the area (see for instance this BBC report here). Several sources have told AAN that Taleban reinforcements, including the notorious red units had come from other areas to help with the fight in Jaghori and Malestan (including from  Ajirestan in Uruzgan and Gilan and Andar districts in Ghazni). Although they have now returned to their own areas, they could be called on again in the future. 

Conclusion: The local population pays the price for the conflict

The fighting in the three districts led to massive displacement, at a time when winter has already come. Presidential adviser Muhammad Aziz Bakhtyari, a member of the government’s fact-finding delegation told the BBC on 14 November that 60 to 70 per cent of civilians from Jaghori and Malestan had been displaced (the figure might be only from areas that experienced actual fighting, though). Most of those fleeing the violence, or threat of violence, travelled to Bamyan, Ghazni and Kabul, while smaller groups of IDPs from Khas Uruzgan, Malestan and Jaghori arrived in Tirinkot, the capital of Uruzgan province, and Daikundi.

Bamyan: During the fighting, the number of IDPs arriving in Bamyan rose rapidly. On 13 November, the head of Bamyan’s department of refugees and repatriation told AAN that his staff had counted 2,000 arrivals, mainly from Jaghori. The next day, Ismail Zaki, a human rights activist in Bamyan, told AAN that a total of 450 families (around 4,000 people, most of them women and children) had arrived. The night before, snowfall had closed the road and many cars had become stuck in Nawur district of Ghazni. According to a UNOCHA flash update of 21 November, “the unverified figures of IDP families in Bamyan Center rose from 930 families (6,510 individuals) to 1,208 families (8,456 individuals).”

Zaki said that around 50 families had been given shelter in the state-run Garzandoy Hotel; the rest had been hosted by local residents. He himself also hosted two families – 22 people, all women and children – who had arrived in Bamyan by car. The drivers, he said, had been 13 and 14 years old. Apparently, many of the drivers had been under-age and often not skilled enough for the long road, but they had had to drive because their fathers had either stayed back in the villages, to protect their properties, or were abroad. Zaki said that he himself had seen two young girls drive their families to Bamyan.

Ghazni: On 20 November, the BBC quoted the head of Ghazni’s provincial department of refugees, Abdul Khaleq Ahmadi, as saying that 2,511 families had been displaced to Ghazni, 70 per cent of whom were women and children (the figure was also reported by OCHA in its flash update, cited above). The IDPs had faced many problems on the way. The Taleban closed the Nawur-Ghazni city road on 13 November and many who had fled Jaghori and Malestan were forced to turn back. The road between Sang-e Masha and Ghazni city, through Qarabagh district, had also been closed since the day the Taleban attacked Jaghori, although it was not clear whether the Taleban had really blocked it or whether people had simply not dared to travel on it.

On 9 November, the Taleban cut off two major telecommunication networks (Roshan and Etisalat) in Jaghori and Malestan, which rendered many people unable to contact their family members there.

A person who travelled the Nawur-Ghazni road on 15 November told AAN that it was reopened but that the Taleban had stopped vehicles and checked passengers’ tazkeras (national ID cards). One traveller who had been stopped told AAN that he had been asked what his occupation was and whether he had gone to school, whether there was any fighting in Jaghori, whether he had a Facebook account, how many people in Jaghori had become Christian and how many churches there were. He said the Taleban also checked his hands (perhaps to see whether he was a white- or blue-collar worker) and had taken his Facebook address.

Kabul: OCHA’s flash update of 21 November said that in Kabul “the number of reported and unverified IDP families stood at 1,066 families (7,462 individuals). 123 families (861 individuals), out of the 642 families (4,494 individuals) that were verified, were identified as vulnerable and in need of humanitarian assistance.” OCHA suggested there was “a new trend” of IDPs moving from Malestan and Jaghori to Kabul and then to Bamyan.

People were also displaced within Jaghori and Malestan. Their numbers, according to OCHA, were estimated to be 500 and 600 families respectively. Moreover, a female teacher who had escaped the fighting in her village told AAN that all schools had been closed since 8 November, the second day of the attack on Jaghori (which according to this Etilaat Roz report has 105 schools – 62 high, 22 middle and 21 primary – where 50,686 pupils – 26,694 male and 23,988 female – are enrolled).

This high number of IDPs seems to indicate both a high level of fear of the Taleban and the atrocities they may commit when taking over the areas (especially after the reports of indiscriminate killing in Khas Uruzgan), and a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to effectively protect the population. Both points are reflected in this Washington Post article that says:

One militiaman who fled to Bamian, Habibullah Ahmadi, 48, said he had lost faith that the government would protect them. Several others said that Taliban representatives had told villagers they wouldn’t be harmed if they stayed indoors, but that nobody trusted them.

 

(1) A source from Khas Uruzgan provided the following details:

In Hussaini, five people were killed on the first day of the attack (including three people aged above 70): three people were made to disembark a vehicle and were then killed; two people were dragged out of their homes and killed outside. There was no fighting on the second night. On the third night, villagers returned to their houses to feed their livestock (cows, sheep and goats). Four people were killed: one of them was Ibrahim who was aged 84; two others were killed while trying to flee the village; one person who had visited his family in Kondolan was killed when he returned to Hussaini.

In Kondolan the following killings were reported: On the fourth day, Haji Abdullah, aged 69, who had just returned from hajj was killed when some Taleban fighters went to his house for tea (and possibly bread or food). He was providing the tea when another Taleban fighter arrived; as he stood to greet and hug him, the Taleban fighter shot him to death.

On the sixth day, one person called Ishaq Jaghori Gu (he was called Jaghori Gu because he had lived in Jaghori for a while) was taken out of his home and killed in front of his house. A young person, aged 18 or 19, was killed in a valley after he had been taken from his home. Two people who had been guests in Karez were killed with gun bayonets.

(2) One source who originally comes from Khas Uruzgan told AAN that the woman fought back the Taleban fighters, allowing Shujai to escape. The woman was later captured by the Taleban and taken away. He also said that three of Shujai’s men had been killed.

(3) The delegation that was tasked with “finding the root cause of how the conflict occurred, take action to solve it, and submit its findings to the president” consisted of the following people: Ustad Muhammad Akbari, a Ghazni MP; Mawlawi Muhammad Jora Taheri and Mawlawi Mohiuddin Baluch, both presidential advisers for religions affairs; Eid Muhammad Ahmadi, presidential adviser for social affairs; Muhammad Alam Rasekh, presidential adviser for scientific and social affairs; Mawlawi Sayyed Rahman Haqani Pashai, adviser to the Commission for Conflict Resolution and People’s Relation with the Government; authorised representatives of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior Affair and National Directorate of Security (NDS); Attorney General’s Office; Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and the Department of Defence and Security in the administrative office of the president.

(4) On 4 November 2018, the deputy presidential spokesman, Shah Hussain Murtazawi, posted a new version of the decree on his Facebook page (but still with the original date of 1 November). The new decree called for an investigation into “the civilian casualties of the recent incident in Uruzgan province” and added two new – Hazara – members to the delegation (Dr Muhammad Rasul Taleban, presidential adviser on social affairs, and Muhammad Aziz Bakhtyari, presidential adviser on social and cultural affairs). The head of the delegation, Asadullah Falah, when visiting the area later on 7 November, told the residents of Malestan that the fighting in Uruzgan had been “misreported” to the president as ethnically based.

(5) Most sources agree that well over 50 people were killed in Khas Uruzgan alone. A former official in Khas Uruzgan said 58 people had been killed. Former governor of Daikundi Qurban Ali Uruzgani told AAN he had received reports that 57 people had been martyred, 25 people wounded (some still under treatment) and six people captured who had subsequently been released.

A source provided the following list of 41 people killed in the fighting in Khas Uruzgan:

• Four from Hamza: Khan Muhammad, son of Ali Hamza; Mullah Daud, son of Mullah Baz Muhammad; Ahmad Shah, son of Haji Nabi; Muhammad Esa, son of Baz Muhammad
• Eight from Hussaini: Shir Mahdawi, son of Madad; Muhammad Ali, son of Qanbar; Salman, son of Aziz; Usta Salman; Ibrahim, son of Mami; Sultan, son of Sami; Rezwani, son of Tata; Amir Khan, son of Shah Hussain
• Eleven from Kondolan: Abdul Khaleq, son of Mullah Bustan; Eshaq, son of Juma; Jan Ali, son of Askar; Sakhidad, son of Khan; Abdul Samad, son of Arbab Haidar; Eshaq, son of Ghulam Hussain; Reza, son of Ghulam Hussain; Reza, son of Ghulam Sakhi; Amir Khan, son of Shah Hussain; Jan Ali, son of Ghulam; Khudad, son of Nawruz
• Five from Kariz: Abdul Khaleq, son of Eshaq; Qambar, son of Eshaq; Akhar Muhammad, son of Abdul Zawar; Shir Muhammad, son of Ghulam Ali; Malek Abdullah, son of Ghulam Reza
• One from Pashi: Fakuri
• One from Paik
• Three from Zardak: Haji Abdul Hussain Rahimi, son of Ali Rahm; Hamid Muradi, son of Muhammad; Karbalayi Amin Saadat, son of Haji Ghulam Hussain
• One from Jaghori: Ustad Muhammad Taqi Fazilat

He added that this was not a complete list, since many victims had not been identified yet. Several sources also said the Taleban had not allowed people to film or photograph the dead and those who buried them did not recognise some of them as they had been defaced with bullets.

(6) As AAN has written (in this background paper on militias), the ALP in its current form was created out of local militias in 2010. “Since 2012, it has become increasingly institutionalised within the Ministry of Interior. Another type of local force also emerged from 2012 onwards. So-called ‘uprising forces’ (patsunian in Pashto and khezesh in Persian) were supposedly spontaneous rebellions organised by locals against the insurgency, although they usually turned out to have been prompted by or were soon supported/co-opted by the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and/or Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG).”

The forces that fought back the Taleban in the Hazara areas in Khas Uruzgan, Malestan and Jaghori, and that have been referred to in as uprising forces in some media reports,  might have been part of these forces, but they may have also taken up arms spontaneously to repel the Taleban’s attacks.

(7) The Taleban released a video on 23 November that showed a cameraman talking with local residents and local Taleban fighters in the Anguri and Deh Murda areas of Jaghori. A Taleban fighter in Anguri told him: “We have been here for the last several days. When we first came here, there were eight security posts. We defeated the policemen and uprising people and several of them were killed. When we got close to the Anguri area, someone was wounded in front of his house. He was receiving several calls. After he was wounded, we took his weapons. Later when he died, we learned that he was Habibullah Bashi [Bashi Habib].”

 

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

SEDE organized a public hearing on 'The threats posed by drones to Europe's armed forces' on Tuesday 20 November 2018, from 09.30 to 11.00, with external experts
Location : Paul-Henri Spaak, room 5B001
Further information
Draft programme
Presentation of Colonel Christophe Michel, SGDSN
Presentation of Tal Inbar, The Fisher Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

SEDE organized a public hearing on 'Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security' on Wednesday 10 October 2018, from 09.00 to 11.30, with four external experts
Location : Paul-Henri Spaak, room 5B001
Further information
Draft programme
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP