Defence`s Feeds

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel, Stanislas de Finance, Ralf Drachenberg

This 25-26 June 2015 summit witnessed an intense debate. While the agenda originally covered Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the digital single market and the European Semester, in addition to a presentation from David Cameron, United Kingdom Prime Minister to outline his vision on renegotiating his country’s relationship with the EU, the summit became a crisis Council. Many discussions again focused on the situation in the Mediterranean, with several lively exchanges. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel described the issue as the ‘biggest challenge’ Europe had faced during her time in office.

The Council’s conclusions nevertheless managed to address all issues on the agenda. The Heads of State or Government concentrated on three key dimensions of the European Commission’s agenda on migration: the relocation/resettlement of migrants; their return/readmission/reintegration; and cooperation with countries of both origin and transit. Clear differences in opinion persisted on the voluntary or mandatory nature of the relocation scheme, but agreement was reached on ‘the temporary and exceptional relocation, over two years, from the frontline Member States: Italy and Greece, to other Member States of 40 000 persons in clear need of international protection’.

Although the debate on CSDP fell short of its original ambition, the Council conclusions included a statement that the European Council ‘will keep security and defence policy on its regular agenda’, thereby clearly underlining the future importance of CSDP.

United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron’s presentation of his vision on renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU, did not outline any specific details, however, it provided an impetus for European level discussions on this issue, with Council President Donald Tusk seeing it as ‘the first step in a longer process that will also end at the European Council’. This issue is certain to reappear on the agenda for the Council meeting in December 2015.

The significantly shortened debate on the Commission communication on a Digital Single Market strategy for Europe, nevertheless led to Council conclusions calling for the rapid adoption of the Telecommunications Single Market Regulation, the Directive on Network and Information Security, and the Data Protection package. Heads of State or Government also stressed that action must be taken on key components of the Commission communication, such as eliminating mobile roaming charges. On this issue, on 30 June 2015, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, reached agreement to end roaming surcharges by 15 June 2017.

The EPRS publishes briefings on the European Council before summits, and European Council outcome briefings (next to be issued just after the European Council of 15-16 October 2015).

Read this Briefing on Outcome of the 25-26 June European Council in PDF
Filed under: BLOG, Institutional and Legal Affairs, Policy Cycle Tagged: briefings, CSDP, digital agenda, economic governance, EPRS briefings, European Council, migration, Post-European Council Briefing, Ralf Drachenberg, Stanislas de Finance, Suzana Elena Anghel Gavrilescu

EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq travelled to Spain yesterday to visit the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence (C-IED CoE), a multinational organisation with which the European Defence Agency is cooperating closely.

During the visit, Jorge Domecq received briefings from commander Colonel José Zamorano González as well as other C-IED CoE staff. Together they discussed the Centre’s missions and projects  as well as its current priorities in the field of information sharing, technology & development, and training.

In January 2015, a cooperation framework agreement was signed between the EDA and the C-IED CoE allowing for coherent progress in C-IED capability development initiatives and potential participation in joint projects. It will also avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts.

“The good cooperation we have in place with the C-IED CoE allows us to exchange lessons learned and enlarge the European C-IED community of interest, which ultimately benefits capability development in this crucial field with the aim of mitigating and/or preventing IED threats”, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq stressed during the visit. “I expect our cooperation to grow based on our Member States’ needs for robust capabilities to fight improvised explosive devices in operations as well as in the homeland”, he added.

More information

• C-IED CoE website
• EDA C-IED project page

Italian Alenia Aermacchi (SIAI MArchetti) SF.260 Trainer Aircraft

European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Christos Stylianides visited the European Defence Agency today to exchange views and cooperation opportunities with EDA staff and top management.

The Commissioner started his visit with a meeting with EDA Chief Executive as well as the Agency’s top management, with whom he exchanged views on the EDA’s way of working, especially its role of interface with wider EU policies, as well as on current workstrands that might contribute to support Humanitarian missions and initiatives.

After the meeting, Commissioner Stylianides met with EDA project officers who briefed him on some of the Agency’s ongoing initiatives in the field of operations support, satellite communications or medical. Current EDA projects focusing on maritime surveillance, personnel recovery or airlift support to humanitarian missions were also discussed.

“A lot of activities and projects developed under the framework of the Agency have a potential dual-use role, and thus can be as useful in humanitarian missions as they are in high-intensity conflicts”, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq commented during the visit. “As part of our close cooperation with the European Commission we stand ready to provide support  in areas of dual-use capabilities and dual-use research, while at the same time enhancing the pooling and sharing of capabilities”, he added.

More information

• Link to Commissioner Christos Stylianides' website
• Link to EDA Operations Support project page

Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA), and Massimo Garbini, Managing Director of the SESAR Deployment Manager (SDM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Its purpose is to establish efficient cooperation and support between the two organisations with regard to SESAR deployment.

“Europe’s military fleets include some 9,500 diverse aircraft accounting for more than 150,000 flights each year. In other words, they form the single biggest ‘airline’ operating in Europe today. The challenges of the Single European Sky programme and the modernisation of European air traffic management are manifold. However, it is the role of the EDA to ensure that the European air forces will continue to have free and safe access to European airspace for training purposes, air-policing, as well as air defence missions. The financial and technological impacts of the programme need to be mitigated to ensure that they do not adversely affect European defence capabilities. Only through constructive cooperation between military and civil stakeholders, our shared vision of an efficient, safe and flexible European airspace can be realised. It is in this spirit that we sign the Memorandum of Understanding today”, said Jorge Domecq at the signature ceremony. 

Massimo Garbini, “This MoU reflects the kind of relationship we aim for with all stakeholders. Only through efficient cooperation and mutual support between both civil and military stakeholders, we can deliver the modernisation of European Air Traffic Management technology together.”

Memorandum of Understanding

The scope of the MoU covers the SESAR deployment of sets of functionalities in accordance with the relevant regulations1. The EDA and SDM will work together to support the Member States in translating the regulation into projects to be deployed nationally with financial support from the EU. The EDA will ensure that military viewpoints and needs are captured in the SESAR Deployment Programme and support the bidding and execution processes of the projects. At the same time, the Deployment Manager will coordinate with the military through the EDA to avoid any adverse impact on national and collective defence capabilities. This involves inter alia enabling and exploiting military contributions as well as optimising the use of expertise and avoiding duplications. The EDA and SDM also agree to put in place effective coordination procedures to ensure efficient synchronisation and the timely exchange of relevant information. A Steering Committee will be set up to ensure the effective functioning of the Memorandum.

 

Single European Sky ATM Research

The Single European Sky (SES) aims at realising the optimisation of the airspace organisation and management in Europe through a combination of technological, economic, and regulatory efforts. SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) is the technical pillar of this. SESAR involves developing a new ATM system to handle more traffic with greater safety and at a lower cost. Its new technologies and procedures will also seek to reduce the environmental impact of flying. The resulting efforts will be deployed in a synchronised manner involving all stakeholders, civil and military.

 

About SESAR Deployment Manager

SESAR Deployment Manager (SDM) is the industrial partnership that synchronises and coordinates the modernisation of Europe’s air traffic management system under the political oversight of the European Commission. The main task of the SESAR Deployment Manager is to develop, submit to the European Commission for its approval and execute the Deployment Programme, a project view strictly drawn from the Pilot Common Project (PCP) set by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 716/2014, as well as any subsequent Common Projects in future regulations. Through the Deployment Programme, the SESAR Deployment Manager will ensure efficient synchronisation and coordination of implementation projects required to implement the PCP, as well as the related investments. The tasks of the Deployment Manager are described in Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 409/2013.

 

Role of the EDA

In order to ensure that the effects on military aviation are understood and taken into account, Member States entrusted EDA with the task of facilitating the coordination of military views from and in support of Member States and relevant military organisations and to inform military planning mechanisms of the requirements stemming from SESAR deployment. In 2014, EDA established a dedicated SESAR Cell to ensure that the military views and requirements are taken into account in the implementation of SESAR.

 

More information

• Single European Sky project page
• SESAR Deployment Manager website

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1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 409/2013 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 716/2014

American Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missile

#CCLKOW this week turns to the matter of confronting insurgency. Seemingly beaten to death, I would submit that the subject is in fact in need of some rigorous thought, especially as there are clearly two defined schools of strategic approach, broadly characterized by their different focuses. Where one is concerned to fight the insurgency as manifest, the other seeks to undermine the terms of its strength to vastly reduce the intensity of the conflict, or anti-insurgency and counter-insurgency. Understanding the difference between the terms and consequences of different strategic approaches is important given that with the geo-strategic landscape and the role of rapid communications we may find ourselves in a time when might, as expressed in destruction, no longer sufficiently or reliably translates to right. Rather, might applied to the resolution of root causes is an alternative path to right that deserves better and more serious attention against the changing landscape of conflict. So, read the piece and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.   

 

The subject of confronting an insurgency being less in favor these days seems to me to present the best opportunity to examine it with a bit more dispassion, and hence more rigor. In particular, here I would like to consider how we use COIN. As it stands, COIN is used broadly to describe all approaches to warfare against an insurgency. However, I find this unsatisfying as there is significant divergence in what people mean by this term. To rectify this problem, I propose new terminology to distinguish  between strategies which make the use of force against the rebellion the primary effort versus those that seek to undermine and eliminate the sources of support to the rebellion first thus reducing the scope of direct confrontation. Both envision scenarios which seek attrition, it is simply the means in each which differ. However, I believe there is an importance to this difference, and I think terminology which recognizes it is thus necessary. To describe these distinct approaches I use anti-insurgency and counter-insurgency accordingly, or AINT and COIN.

For clarification, a few points of terminology must be settled. (1) To begin, when I speak of insurgency, I mean a conflict within governed space against the standing order. Those in opposition are characterized by a committed cadre at center, are generally weaker than the forces of the prevailing order, and often resort to asymmetry and other alternative and low cost/low training means. While they may enjoy popular support, it is enough that the population simply be neutral to apathetic. With respect to the pivotal terms of this essay, I will offer that my understanding of this distinction between anti- and counter- goes back to an old lecture on terrorism in my early academic days that has stuck with me for its clarity and utility. In brief, it sorted the approaches to dealing with terrorism into the two categories depending on the focus of effort, whether at dealing with acts and actors directly by fighting terrorists in the act and seeking them when not, or at undermining their ability to organize and act to reduce frequency, efficacy and numbers of attacks.

If you were wondering about the title, this is where the odd construction becomes relevant. The “it” and “this” refer to two pieces written by others which illustrate the two models. They are important here because the first, on AINT, inspired the conceptualization, and the second motivated the writing in this moment. Very interestingly, they are both by British authors, representing two ends of the security spectrum and long traditions of service. The AINT article is a theoretical description of the model by William F. Owen, formerly of the British Army and currently active in the field of military affairs. (2) The second is a blog piece on neighborhood policing by an anonymous but currently serving British police officer of significant experience, Nathan Constable. (3) While it may seem unorthodox to use a policing example to describe a strategic approach insurgent conflict, the principle, parties and activities are similar enough for these purposes. Where the absolute scale of force and violence may differ, I believe that plotted relatively they are sufficiently comparable. Thus, as a good enough comparative, I will go further to add that in this case the conceptual box is safely, and I hope fruitfully, exceeded.

Turning to the first piece, in Owen’s “Seek and Destroy,” the AINT model is clearly explicated. As a counter-insurgency strategy, I cannot disagree with it more. However, under the AINT construct, while I may not agree with its utility, I must similarly recommend that it is an entirely correct construction. The opening sentence is unambiguous: “The purpose of this article is to argue that the destruction of the enemy’s forces lies at the heart of countering both terrorism and insurgency.” (p. 12) If the end is compliance with the status quo, this will be achieved by attrition, and more specifically by fighting the insurgent force in order to kill or capture its members. Elimination of the rebellion in arms will eliminate the rebellion. That is iconic AINT.

For COIN, the Nathan Constable blog on neighborhood policing includes a vignette fully describing the contours of the countering model. His piece deserves to be read in its entirety, but for our purposes here a brief synopsis of the relevant portion will suffice. The circumstances of the case were a local police force dealing with significant and recurrent problems of anti-social behavior (the “insurgency”) that demanded police resources without improving by their interventions. Watching this approach fail to do more than “stick a plaster on” the ritual disturbances (the “insurgent activity”), he shifted course.

This adaptation meant considering the problem in other terms. Using intelligence gathering to understand the nature of the disorder and its causes, who might be the ringleaders, and what motivated the presence of the larger numbers of participants, the author describes how he and his police force changed their approach to the problem. Learning that many of the participants in the trouble were at a loss for anything better to do on a Friday evening, the police reached out other agencies and organizations to create sport and other entertainments for local youth so that they had safe spaces to spend an evening. As well, to reduce the influence and draw of alcohol, they worked with local businesses to eliminate or reduce sales to those under 21. Although the cadre of troublemakers remained (the “committed cadre” who drive the insurgency), without the broader participation of other youths (the rank and file who give the movement its force) these numbers were more easily dealt with by traditional policing methods. More importantly, the broader results of this combined effort away from the point of conflict was a reduction in the number of calls to police for that area and an overall improvement in the quality of life for the community as previously unpleasant to unsafe spaces were reclaimed and the youth had positive attractions for their energies. That is, by countering the problem rather than continuing to fight the obvious manifestation it was more enduringly solved.

It should be clear these two approaches vary significantly in principle and in practice. As played out at the level of conflict and war when considering insurgencies these differences are important and manifest at every level, from political to tactical. While it is certainly not necessary in practical strategic terms to choose one at the complete absence of aspects of the other, representing as they do very different philosophical perspectives on the conflict and its proper resolution, the likelihood is that one or the other will dominate. That is, if presented with the same situation, Owen and Nathan Constable would, according to their models, design very different strategies to achieve the ends of peace and order. These differences matter in costs and consequences, and must be considered in detail in deciding which should be chosen, because despite Owen’s claim, the efficacy of one over the other, is not an “obvious and enduring fact.” Where force of arms has come to dominate Western conceptualizations of warfare, this preference is not necessary in war.

Given this, the question for this week’s discussion is broad, intended to drive consideration of the terms of each approach and debate their relative merits against historical or hypothetical cases. Simply, it is:

 

When and where is each the more practicable approach and why?

 

Add your thoughts on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

 

 

 

Notes:

(1) These are the product of a wide reading across history and military affairs. They are attributable to many and none. I can offer no real credit, but neither is there anyone else to blame. These are, simply put, my definitions.

(2) Owen’s piece was published in Infinity Journal, Issue 2, Spring 2011, “Seek and Destroy: The Forgotten Strategy for Countering Armed Rebellion,” pp 12-15. It is freely available to those willing to sign up with the journal.

(3) Due to my unorthodox interpretation and application of the case, I chatted with Nathan Constable regarding my use of the blog. He was curious to see the alternative application, and forwarded supporting public documentation of the events — news articles which provide detail on the circumstances and the steps taken by local police and naming the officers involved. I have no need or intention to identify him, but for the purposes of this essay the verification of the events only added weight to my thinking on it.

 

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Africa has been on something of a spending spree in the past few years, upping their stake in the global defence market while addressing urgent security challenges at home. For most states, reinforcing the reputation of a secure and civilised environment is the first step in encouraging

Africa has been on something of a spending spree in the past few years, upping their stake in the global defence market while addressing urgent security challenges at home. For most states, reinforcing the reputation of a secure and civilised environment is the first step in encouraging

Ahead of the Military Airlift conference (29 Sept-1 Oct, London, UK), Defence IQ has produced a guide to the what’s going on in the market. This interactive map reveals the key procurement programmes in place globally and details some of the current and future plans for tactical

This news digest offers a round up of all the latest military airlift news, including: Fourth C-130 touches down in Kabul, expands Afghan Air Force capabilities France budgets for C-130 transport plane as A400M delays continue Pentagon acquisit

Another Oxford Analytica brief, this one originally published in late February 2015.

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SIGNIFICANCE: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are leading other Central Asian governments in increased spending on military and security forces and the procurement of modern equipment. Regional governments have long-standing fears of potential Russian military interference and remain concerned about the situation in Afghanistan. The increase in military expenditures is expanding capabilities, although the degree and pace of improvement varies from country to country, and regional militaries still lag Russian and NATO forces.

ANALYSIS: Impacts

• Russian forces presence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will increase.
• Turkmenistan will place greater emphasis on modern weapons procurement and naval assets.
• Mobile and counter-terrorism focused forces will be seen as more important than conventional land forces.
• While Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will drive military reform, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will increasingly rely on Russia.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s military is Central Asia’s most capable, but it is far less capable than NATO or Russian militaries. Special forces will play a larger role as Kazakhstan looks to make a greater contribution to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s counter-terrorism capability.

A Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report estimates Kazakhstan’s armed forces at 30,000-45,000 troops — plus many thousands of other personnel attached to the Interior Ministry. In 2014, Astana said that it would be increasing defence spending by 36% over three years from around 2 billion dollars per annum to 2.7 billion dollars by 2017, according to a report by IHS Janes. However, this increase may have to be reduced slightly to fall in line with expected budget cuts due to low oil prices.

Astana is looking to trim all 2015-17 budgets to match a 50 dollars per barrel oil price, but President Nursultan Nazarbayev could authorise the government to support increased defence expenditure with oil reserves from the National Fund. The World Bank noted that in 2013 Kazakhstan spent the equivalent of 1.2% of GDP on defence.

Air force

The air force, which has a primarily air defence role, has between 11,000 and 13,000 personnel, according to SIPRI and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Combat pilots average 100 hours of flight time per year, which is lower than the NATO standard. On February 4, Major General Nurlan Ormanbetov, Commander in Chief of the Kazakhstan Air Defence Forces (KADF), said that Astana plans to acquire the Russian Sukhoi Su-30SM ‘Flanker’ from Russia. As noted by IHS Janes, the KADF currently uses the MiG-27 ‘Flogger’, Su-25 ‘Frogfoot’, MiG-31 ‘Foxhound’, Su-27 ‘Flanker’, and MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum’ aircraft. The SU-30SM has been developed by Russia as a stopgap unitl the MiG-35 and Sukoi T-50 PAK-FA fifth generation fighters become fully operational.

Navy procurement

The navy has been significantly expanded and modernised since 2010. It now has 3,000 personnel and has deployed new patrol boats and missile boats. By the end of 2015, it will have gained mine countermeasure (MCM) capabilities with the delivery of a Project 1750E inshore MCM vessel from Russia. The navy’s missions focus on territorial defence and protection of offshore oil platforms and tankers. Kazakhstan’s increased naval procurement follows a general trend of greater military activity on the Caspian. On February 16, as reported by IHS Janes, Kazakhstan and France are to work jointly on the development of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Astana will buy 10 UUVs to use in the Caspian.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s military is reckoned to be Central Asia’s second most capable with an army currently numbering 40,000 personnel. Total defence spending is approximately 2 billion dollars per annum, according to SIPRI. The military is focused on improving its capabilities to defeat asymmetric challenges to President Islam Karimov’s administration. However, in Uzbekistan, the National Security Service (SNB) has historically been seen as significantly more important than the military. This trend will likely continue. The SNB will be a key powerbroker in any Karimov succession crisis. This highlights Tashkent’s main security priority, which is to maintain internal stability as opposed to undertake foreign operations.

Air force disrepair

Uzbekistan’s air force is reasonably well-equipped, but ill-maintained. Pilots receive around only 10 hours of flight time per year. Uzbekistan’s primary air assets are SU-24, SU-27, SU-25 and MIG-29 fighters, with transport capabilities provided by Illyshin-76 and AN-26s.

Joint Russian training

Uzbekistan’s defence priorities include procuring modern military equipment, improving combat readiness and mobility, and increasing professionalism among the officer corps. In December 2014, defence and military cooperation were discussed during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Uzbekistan. Some 3,000 Uzbekistani military officers will reportedly study at military schools in Russia this year, which will increase Russia-Uzbekistan military interoperability.

Leaner fighting force

Uzbekistan aims to cut the overall size of its military in order to free up resources to create and train more mobile units. Heavy armour formations — using T-72, T-64 and T-62 battle tanks — and high-calibre artillery units are being reduced in favour of lighter infantry units with counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism and mountain warfare capabilities.

In January, the United States announced delivery to Uzbekistan of 328 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) military vehicles to be used for counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics operations, according to Radio Free Europe/Free Liberty (RFE/RL). Washington stressed that this was non-lethal aid.

Turkmenistan

Ashgabat’s military numbers an estimated 22,000-30,000, according to SIPRI. Despite being willing to spend money on modern weapons, Turkmenistan’s armed forces are considered weak with low operational effectiveness. Ashgabat has been unwilling to allocate spending to training and equipment maintenance. Meanwhile, the modern weapons it has acquired largely remain unused due to a lack of qualified personnel. The 2012 defence budget is estimated to be 210 million dollars, according to SIPRI. The army currently uses a lot of old Soviet era hardware such as T-72 tanks, BTRs and BMP infantry fighting vehicles.

Air Force struggles

Despite having received a large number of aircraft at the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan has struggled to maintain these, and pilot training has suffered. Currently it has MiG-29 and SU-25 fighters along with a handful of Mi-24s and Mi-8 helicopters. The air force lacks a heavy lift capability and would struggle to support the army on out-of-area operations or on Caspian patrols, which it is officially tasked to do.

Navy new ships

The navy was reformed as an independent force in only the past two years. Previously it was a department in the general staff. The navy’s missions include defending the Caspian coastline and protecting energy assets. Ashgabat has focused on improving naval capabilities through building new bases, procuring new ships and setting up a naval officer training academy.

As reported by Eurasianet in 2011, Turkmenistan bought two 12418 Molniya-class missile corvettes armed with the Uran-E missile system. These vessels are among some of the most powerful ships on the Caspian, although Ashgabat still trails Moscow and Tehran in naval capability. In 2013, Turkmenistan reportedly procured eight naval vessels which will be made at the Turkish shipyard Dearsan.

Military reform

President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov has made military reform a central aspect of his policy platform. In 2010, the government adopted a five-year military modernisation plan. However, reports indicate that the programme focuses on rearmament objectives, rather than structural reforms. In November, Berdymukhamedov reportedly told his national security council that Turkmenistan must procure the most advanced modern military equipment.

With the country having a long, porous border with Afghanistan, Ashgabat will increasingly look to procure unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance. However, despite buying modern arms, absent reforms and greater training of personnel, Turkmenistan’s military will remain an impressive military on paper but will lack the capabilities to defend the state.

Kyrgyzstan

In 2013, according to World Bank data, Kyrgyzstan allocated the equivalent of 3.2% of GDP to defence spending. This represents a gradual decline over the last four years from 2010 (3.8%) and 2011 (3.4%). The Kyrgyzstani armed forces are weak overall with gaps in command and control. Total spending on military and security services is estimated by SIPRI at 234 million dollars per annum.

Morale is assessed to be low. Declining funding means that Kyrgyzstan is increasingly dependent on external assistance for equipment and training. Bishkek’s main goal is to improve readiness and mobility in order to let the military respond to both border and internal events.

Army

The army’s total strength is 8,500 personnel, according to SIPRI. The army is looking to become a more agile force focused on mountain warfare. Mirroring a common theme across the region, the army is equipped with T-72 tanks, BMPs and BTR armoured vehicles.

Air force

Poor pilot and personnel training hinder Kyrgyzstan’s air force which is considered to be one of Central Asia’s weakest. Given limited resources, the country’s leadership has chosen not to upgrade the air force’s capabilities. Instead, Bishkek relies on assistance from Russian air forces based at Kant, where Moscow has rights until 2032 ( see CIS: Unstable Central Asia will drive Russian ties – January 23, 2015). In February, Russia announced intentions to reinforce the combat capabilities at Kant.

Tajikistan

With its 1,300 kilometre border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan’s military would be pressed to halt any incursions from militant groups. To boost security, Tajikistan is planning a new military base on the Afghan border.

Total spending on military and security services is estimated at 164 million dollars per annum, according to SIPRI. Dushanbe’s military forces developed out of irregulars that operated during the 1992-97 civil war. In recent years, the military has sought to increase mobility by establishing airborne and mountain infantry units. Tajikistan is dependent on Moscow for its security. Russia has 7,000 troops in Tajikistan that are set to remain in the country until 2042 ( see CIS: Unstable Central Asia will drive Russian ties – January 23, 2015).

Tajikistan’s army has only 7,000 personnel, and uses a variety of Soviet era equipment. Air forces are divided among various ministries, and have only a handful of Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters. With GDP of 8.5 billion dollars (World Bank 2013), Tajikistan’s military and security forces are likely to remain constrained for the foreseeable future. Dushanbe lacks the spending power to boost the military significantly.

CONCLUSION: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan appear to be building reasonably capable military forces. In Uzbekistan, the security service (SNB) will likely remain pre-eminent and enjoy the best access to the president. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are struggling to maintain even small rapid reaction forces; Bishkek and Dushanbe would likely need Russian military support in the event of a security crisis. Turkmenistan has the wealth to formulate a major military force, but Ashgabat has been unwilling to spend on training and maintenance.

The European Defence Agency has just launched a €1 million, 18-month feasibility study to prepare a future cooperative governmental satellite communications (Govsatcom) programme.

The study will be delivered by a consortium led by Euroconsult with Airbus Defence & Space, CGI, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Hisdesat and SpaceTec Partners working as subcontractors. This work is expected to be complemented by other studies funded by the European Space Agency (ESA). Some synergies are also expected with the work currently performed by the European Commission.

“This study will help us to find new ways to cooperate in a complex institutional setting”, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq stated upon signing the study contract. “Considering that Govsatcom capabilities are inherently dual-use, one of the main objectives will be to identify an efficient, innovative and sustainable cooperation model in particular by implementing synergies with the Commission. This will certainly be reflected by a genuine governance of the system”, he added. 

“Government satellite communications are evolving, due to changes in operational requirements and to the availability of innovative and cost effective solutions serving these,” stated Euroconsult CEO Pacome Revillon. ”The international consortium combines expertise across the full satellite communications value chain, while the project governance will guarantee the independence and neutrality of the results. All partners are fully committed to delivering a study that lays the groundwork for future European capability,” he added. 

Govsatcom was identified in December 2013 by EU Heads of State and Government as one of four priorities for capability development, along with air-to-air refuelling, remotely piloted aircraft systems and cyber defence. 

Under the lead of Spain, a common staff target harmonising the needs of military users was adopted by all EDA Member States in 2014. Based on this commonly-agreed document, a preparation phase started ahead of the launch of a full-scale cooperative project. By the end of 2016, a business case including more detailed technical requirements as well as a through-life management plan should allow Member States to assess various options in terms of cooperation models and system architectures. These findings will be to a large extent supported by the outcome of the feasibility study.

 

More information:

• EDA Govsatcom capability programme 
• "Filling the gap in space capabilities", article in European Defence Matters, issue 8, p. 30

EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq travelled to Portugal yesterday to attend a Distinguished Visitors Day held during this year’s edition of the European Air Transport Training (EATT), a multinational training event gathering 15 military transport aircraft from 11 different European nations: Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

Initiated by EDA, run by the European Air Transport Command and hosted by Portugal, EATT 15 takes place in Beja from 14 to 26 June. The EATT series of events aims to pool resources and share knowledge in order to develop comprehensive airlift training opportunities in Europe. Activities are based on national requirements and are designed to make the best use of multinational training opportunities.

“Exercises organised under the framework of the European Air Transport Fleet (EATF) keep proving their value over the years, with an increasing number of Member States and aircraft types taking part – for instance, we have six of the eight European military air transport aircraft types participating in EATT 15”, Jorge Domecq stressed during the DV Day. “Since 2011, more than 70 crews have benefitted from the training delivered during EATF live-flying events, effectively increasing interoperability between European armed forces”, he added.

“I also wish to underline the good cooperation between EDA, the European Air Transport Command as well as host nations – Portugal in this case – who all work very hard to enhance airlift capabilities in Europe and to make these events possible”, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq stated.

The EATT series of training events form part of a wider ecosystem of EATF events that all converge towards the same objective of increasing the European Union’s airlift capabilities. In 2015, two editions of the European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course, or EAATTC, have already taken place in Bulgaria and France, with a third one planned for September in Spain. In the meantime, four European Advanced Tactical Instructor Courses (EATIC) will be organised in Italy this year.

More information

• EATT 15 dedicated website (Portuguese Air Force)
• EATT 15 Factsheet
• European Air Transport Fleet project page
• Exercises & training project page
• European Air Transport Command website

Investment in battlefield situational awareness capabilities is a priority for military commanders with ever more advanced and accurate surveillance technologies bei

At a NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels, the Defence Secretary announced the UK will step up its programme of training the Ukrainian armed forces. The move will build on an existing programme of medical, infantry, logistics and tactical intelligence training which

Investment in battlefield situational awareness capabilities is a priority for military commanders with ever more advanced and accurate surveillance technologies bei

At a NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels, the Defence Secretary announced the UK will step up its programme of training the Ukrainian armed forces. The move will build on an existing programme of medical, infantry, logistics and tactical intelligence training which

Chinese A200 Multiple Launch Rocket System