Defence`s Feeds

The implementation of the Single European Sky is a topic of utmost importance for all airspace users in Europe. Coordination between the military and civil communities is a critical enabler in that process, as we explain in this interview with subject matter experts.

(This article first appeared in the latest issue of the EDA's official magazine, European Defence Matters)

"A bridge between two worlds"with Roland van Reybroeck "Airspace is a single resource" with Florian Guillermet
"SESAR... is a powerful catalyst" with Massimo Garbini
"Much greater focus on performance" with Philippe Merlo
"Higher civil /military interoperability" with Luc Lalouette

 

A bridge between two worlds

• What is the EDA’s added value when it comes to gathering military views on SESAR?

Roland Van Reybroeck
European Defence Agency Cooperation, Planning & Support Director

Since 2010, the European Defence Agency has been tasked to support Member States’ armed forces in the identification of the operational and financial risks associated with the implementation of the Single European Sky air trafficmanagement research programme (SESAR). This is no small feat: as is often pointed out, military fleets with some 9,500 diverse aircraft form the single biggest ‘airline’ operating in European airspace,with more than 150,000 flights each year.

The unique structure of the EDA,whose experts interact on a daily basis with Ministries of Defence, allows us to gather inputs and requirements very early on. A dedicated ‘SESAR Cell’ set up within the EDA early last year provides us with a strong platform for interaction with all parties involved in the implementation of SESAR. 

As an Agency of the European Union, we’re also in the best position to ensure smooth interactions with other EU actors, especially the Commission which needs a consolidated view of the defence community's specific needs regarding the Single European Sky. 

But the EDA is also closely coordinating with the EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff, especially with regard to operational implications and requirements, aswell as training aspects. This is all the more important now that SESAR has entered its Deployment Phase and newair traffic management functionalities will be introduced, some of whichmight have an adverse impact onmilitary operations.

• What process will you put in place to ensure a smooth interaction with Member States?

Civil and military general air traffic (GAT) flights in 2013
Jpeg file (363Kb)

The EDA is facilitating the coordination of military views on SES and SESAR. The idea is to analyse the technological projects submitted by other Single European Sky stakeholders ahead of their actual implementation, and to identify those who can impact the military community, from a financial or operational point of view. 

In support of this process a three step consultation mechanism was established with the aim of involving NATO and EUROCONTROL, who include military airspace users and navigation service providers beyond those of the European Union. The mechanism entails staff-to staff coordination and access to relevant expertise available in all three organisations, in order to develop joint military impact assessments of the SESAR deployment programme. These assessments are subsequently submitted to States for comments. The outcome of the mechanism is a consolidated opinion exported by the EDA as a collective view of the military. We have used this process for several initiatives: the adoption of EU Regulations, the development of the ATM Master Plan and now SESAR deployment.

The work with Member States also involves identifying potential mitigation actions as and when required. This involves avoiding duplication of effort and reducing potential investment burdens, by recognizing that certain military systems are sufficient and robust enough to face SESAR requirements, based on equivalent level of performance. On the other hand it may include effectively ensuring the incorporation of military requirements in future SES development and SESAR deployment and ensuring access to EU-funding for related military projects which are already part of defence ministry investment plans or newly planned. In the regulatory domain it may include obtaining exemptions for the military, but only when absolutely necessary. The military indeed strive to be ‘as civil as possible’ but also need to remain ‘as military as required’.

• In which areas do EU air forces have specific requirements that need to be addressed?

The defence community has always emphasized the prerequisite for air forces to have free and safe access to European airspace for training purposes, air-policing and air defence missions. There is also the need to safeguard their ability to deploy to external operation theatres from within the European airspace, as and when required. Let me clarify that by elaborating on a few examples. 

“The unique structure of the EDA, whose experts interact on a daily basis with Ministries of Defence, allows us to gather inputs and requirements very early on”

Preserving the capacity of the military to train properly means that military pilots need to reach dedicated manoeuvring areas that are often contiguous with airspace used by civil traffic. Access to these areas needs to be ensured in the context of a new SESAR environment which might induce some changes to current procedures or routes for military pilots. 

Safely operating across national and European airspace, including in the most dense and complex areas involves both operational and general air traffic, and ranges from logistic air transport to urgent military interventions in case of contingency situations. And, in the not so distant future, it may also involve safe and efficient integration of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), on a routine basis. 

The specific needs of state actors flying public-service missions such as search and rescue, airborne surveillance or firefighting also have to be taken into account. 

With all these requirements in mind, adverse impacts on both military and civil stakeholders should be avoided through systematic and enhanced civil-military dialogue at the earliest possible stage, first at national levels and then at a European level. Both parties should, side-by side, willingly engage in the cooperative development of harmonised solutions and common mitigation actions.

• Looking ahead, what do you expect will be the longterm benefits of this approach?

The European Defence Agency clearly recognizes and acknowledges the crucial importance of the Single European Sky initiative of the European Commission, which aims at achieving, in the foreseeable future, improved efficiency, increased capacity, enhanced aviation safety, diminished environmental impact of flights and reduced costs of air traffic services. It is after all in themutual interest of all airspace users, private and public, commercial and governmental, civil and military, to reach these objectives which will contribute to increased efficiency, flexibility and safety, for all. It is a shared vision

The highest priority for all stakeholders is clearly the safe operation of aircraft. The military fully support this objective and anything that can be done to make the airspace safer should be duly considered.

Another major benefit shall be the harmonization of procedures and interoperability of systems across Member States to ensure appropriate access to airspace for all, civil and military alike. This implies the development of harmonised and coordinated civilmilitary implementation roadmaps governing the introduction of new technology or organisational and structural change, to ensure sustained compatibility if not interoperability.

Furthermore, developing air traffic insertion solutions for RPAS, with a view to exploiting all potential synergies and developing common standards. But also, considering common education and training solutions for basic RPAS operations in non-segregated airspace, relying on existing experience and expertise from various operational environments.

The EDA is ideally placed to facilitate cooperation in all of these areaswith relevantmilitary stakeholders and to provide access to a number of existing cooperation platforms for the development of harmonised civil/military solutions. The Military Airworthiness Authorities Forum, the Material Standardisation Group and the Defence Test and Evaluation Base are just a few examples of such cooperation platforms.

The necessity to put into practice the legislative framework for the Single European Sky in a coherent and consistent way is fully shared, taking full account of economic necessities, but also of the requirements resulting from common and national security and defence policies. The shared vision of a Single European Airspace, delivering the benefits which are envisaged, can be achieved through constructive cooperation between civil and military stakeholders, based on the collective willingness to achieve the SES performance objectives, while at the same time enhancing military mission effectiveness. This endeavour should start at national levels between civil andmilitary airspace users, service providers and operators, through joint deployment projects that concretely will help building the Single European Sky piece by piece. It is clear that aviation industry as well can play a key contributing role in this perspective.

The European Defence Agency is reaching out and ramping-up its coordination with all relevant stakeholders, in order to be a strong and reliable partner for civil-military cooperation and harmonisation, with a view to jointly building a Single European Sky in which the views and needs of the defence community are duly taken into account.

 

"Airspace is a single resource"

• What is the timeline for the implementation of SESAR?

Florian Guillermet
SESAR JU
Executive Director
www.sesarju.eu

Thanks to a strong collaboration between its members, the SESAR Joint Undertaking is already delivering the needed operational and technological improvements (‘SESAR Solutions’) for industrialisation and deployment. Over the course of 2015 and 2016, our goal is to add many more to this catalogue of SESAR Solutions. In parallel, an extended programme (SESAR 2020) will address new challenges and evolutions in ATM and aviation necessary to reach the next level of performance. These activities will be fully aligned with the next edition of the ATM Master Plan, which will be finalised by the end of 2015.

• What are the specific requirements of the armed forces and how are they taken into account?

SESAR is founded on the principle that European airspace is a single resource shared by all airspace users, whose diverse needs are fully recognised and answered. Thanks to a very sound cooperation with our military partners from States and military organisations, we have been able to integrate and respond to the needs of the armed forces through a number of dedicated projects.

One area of focus has been the exchange of air-ground data messages between military aircraft and ATM systems. In response to concerns that SESAR Solutions could bring into the cockpit an assembly of costly avionics, SESAR members recently demonstrated how civil-military interoperability is possible on the principle of equivalence, using existing military capabilities thereby reducing implementation costs.

• What have been the most recent deliverables of the SESAR JU?

A number of recently-delivered SESAR Solutions have already been implemented, such as the world’s first Remote Tower Services (RTS) in Sweden supporting mobility and thereby economic sustainability for remote regions in Europe. Another significant milestone is the world’s first 4D flights, which allows for more efficient flight paths and traffic flows, and ultimately more predictable flights. But perhaps, the most convincing proof of SESAR’s readiness is the EU decision to deploy the first set of SESAR Solutions into the Pilot Common Project (PCP). This will allow for the crucial synchronised deployment across Europe (2015-2020).

 

"SESAR... is a powerful catalyst"

• What is the role of the deployment manager?

Massimo Garbini
Managing Director
SESAR Deployment Manager
www.sesardeployment
manager.eu

The SESAR project is a powerful catalyst to transforming Europe’s ATM network into a modern, cohesive and performance-based operational system. Proof of the readiness of SESAR research is the decision by the European Commission (EC) to package a first set of SESAR solutions into a Pilot Common Project (PCP), that are considered mature enough for synchronised deployment across Europe (2015-2020). This will be managed by the recently established SESAR Deployment Manager (SDM), an alliance of European ATM actors collaborating under a framework partnership agreement with the EC, who will ensure that new technologies and solutions that have already been tested and validated through the SESAR JU are delivered into everyday operations across Europe, delivering significant benefits to airspace users and the environment. This means that Europe now has all the blocks necessary to build the ATM system that it needs to increase the performance and sustainability of its aviation sector. 

• How is the coordination of military and civil views organised in that context?

The military is a very important stakeholders of the SESAR Deployment Manager (SDM). SDM will conclude a cooperative arrangement with EDA to formalise the exchange of information crucial for drawing up the Deployment Programme (DP).Also input from the operational military stakeholders shall be taken into account, through representation by the EDA, in the Stakeholder Consultation Platform. 

• What will be the main milestones of the SESAR deployment programme?

The Deployment Programme (DP) is not just another plan. The DP is direct input for the subsequent INEA-calls (Innovation & Networks Executive Agency) aimed at investing the CEF-funds (Connection Europe Facility). So there will be a sequence between the INEA-calls and the versions of the Deployment Programme. For now the first version of the DP should be delivered to DG Move by end of June 2015, as input for INEA-call expected by the end of 2015. Another INEA-call is expected by end 2016, so a second version (DP v2) is expected by mid-2016. 

 

"Much greater focus on performance"

• What impact does the military community have on European ATM – and vice versa?

Philippe Merlo
Director ATM, EUROCONTROL
www.eurocontrol.int

Europe has a single airspace shared between civilian and military airspace users. The military have a vital role to play, with specific needs for reserved airspace as certain times. They also have to be able to transit through airspace that is also being used by civilian traffic. There is today a much greater focus on performance – safety, capacity, cost efficiency and the environment. At the same time, civilian traffic is starting to increase again, with the latest forecast showing that 2021 will see nearly 1.8 million more flights than in 2014 – an increase of over 18%. So ATM has to evolve in order to maintain and even improve its performance. This will have implications both for how airspace is shared and also or for military aircraft flying in civilian-controlled airspace.

• How does EUROCONTROL take the specific needs of the armed forces into account?

EUROCONTROL is a civil-military organisation and has a long and unique record of fostering civil-military and even military-military cooperation. One good example of this is the fact that one of the first of our new Centralised Services (CS4) is the Advanced Flexible Use of Airspace service, which is being developed to help ensure that military missions can be carried out effectively while maximising the availability of airspace for civil users. Just as important is the work done to ensure that the needs of the armed forces are considered when developing new ATM technologies and procedures. Here we can see the focus on developing ground infrastructure, rather than more aircraft equipage and on performance-based regulation. So rather than specifying what equipment aircraft should carry, the emphasis is more on what that equipment should be able to do.

• How do you interact with SESAR in that domain?

We are a founding member of the SESAR Joint Undertaking, as well as being involved in a significant number of the SESAR projects including, in particular, the European ATM Master Plan. We are also developing our working relationship with bodies such as the European Commission, EASA, the new SESAR Deployment Manager as well as, of course, the EDA with whom we have a joint work programme.

 

"Higher civil /military interoperability"

• How are the industry’s interests represented within the SESAR endeavour?

Luc Lalouette
Head of SESAR Task Force with the ASD 
www.asd-europe.org

“All of us have to keep in mind that the European Air Forces are the biggest fleet operators and airports owners and as such have a key role to play in the SES developments”

The industry’s interests are both directly and indirectly represented within the SESAR endeavour. Directly, through the pro-active contribution of the key air traffic management (ATM) industrial stakeholders in the SESAR Joint Undertaking structure on the ground and in the air, more than 30% of the funding of the SESAR JU is provided by industry. Indirectly, and in a larger manner than the SESAR JU members, the industry’s interests are represented through its active involvement in SESAR deployment preparation in support of discussions with European bodies and, as recognized by the European bodies, at a later stage through the support of the Deployment Manager. The AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe is involved in the SESAR deployment phase in governance and financing and in the synchronization and interoperability between SESAR and NextGen deployment.

• What is the technological spillover effect of SESAR on the global ATC/ATM industry?

As the technical evolutions in the ATM market are strongly dependent on standardization and norms, SESAR is, in Europe, the key driver to facilitate and accelerate such evolutions due to its large scope and its consensus approach to functional and technical contents.

Potential benefits also exist outside Europe, pending SESAR capabilities to disseminate its outcomes and to be synchronized - both in term of planning and content – with NextGen. SESAR coordinates ATM research and development (R&D) activities in Europe, however the human and financial resources that SESAR asks of companies leads to questions about its remaining capability to create technological differentiators amongst them.

• Do you see potential specific developments linked to the military needs regarding the Single European Sky?

The Single European Sky, due to its nature, calls for higher ATM civil/military coordination and interoperability in order to increase the ATM performance while maintaining the military’s freedom to operate its various missions assigned by its national authorities. The degree of coordination will depend of the situation (peace/war), the nature of the fleet (transport/combat fighter/rotorcraft) and the operational concepts in place within European nations. 

However, we can already foresee the need for specific developments – both at the technical and procedural level – in the following areas:

• Command and control (C2) and military ATC systems to allow interoperability with civilian ATC systems (trajectory management, airspace management, etc)
• Non-radar surveillance due to its impact on military and governmental flight security (automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast [ADS-B], multilateration [MLAT] etc)
• Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) integration into non-segregated airspace (sense and avoid capability)
• Military fleet equipment to limit the need for exemptions

Those needs require fast progress in military cooperation within the framework of the SES. This could be achieved through a deep analysis of potential achievements through performance equivalence and experiments to validate the technological and procedural enhancements needed to fill the gaps.

All of us have to keep in mind that Europe’s air forces operate the largest fleets of aircraft and own the largest number of airport so they have a key role to play in SES developments. SES benefits for Europe’s citizens will not be achieved without the active role of Europe’s air forces.

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The airborne military radar domain has been particularly active over the last few years due to important ongoing programmes for Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (M

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Top 10 Self-Propelled Howitzers

Human Rights Watch is one of the driving forces behind the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, who make headlines from time to time in their current quest to get “lethal autonomous weapon systems” banned under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. I have no particular beef with HRW, it’s an admirable organisation, but since the newspapers are in full-on “reprint the press release” mode after the publication of an open letter calling for a ban on autonomous weapons signed by a lot of scientists, it’s probably worthwhile pointing out that HRW has choices to make. Like: choosing between a world where states can make (usually imperfect) interventions to prevent mass atrocity, and a world where they can’t. The TL;DR version of this blog post is: if you ban autonomous weapons then aircraft carriers become floating junk, next time someone starts massacring people don’t expect anyone to ride to the rescue. That’s not to say the “the West” has a particularly admirable track record in atrocity prevention, but most of the arguments that now happen usually pre-suppose that if Western political elites could be coerced or persuaded, then they would have the technical means to deliver military forces to some point on the planet where very bad things are happening to civilians.

“Reaction time is a factor in this, so please pay attention.”

The problem with the autonomous weapons debate as it currently stands is that, for the most part, it ignores the current bits and pieces of automatic and autonomous systems that are part and parcel of everyday military life. Like the Phalanx Close-In-Weapon-System (CIWS) and other bits of gear that are designed to shoot down incoming missiles. Because shooting down missiles is something that humans are physically incapable of doing, outside of Hollywood. If one would like the capability to shoot down a missile, then you need a largely autonomous system to do the heavy lifting of identifying, tracking and targeting that missile, and the human being “in the loop” is largely reduced to something to whom a weapon system says: “Hey, meatbag, press the button so that I can save your life.”

“Look Dave, I can see you’re really upset about this. I honestly think you ought to sit down calmly, take a stress pill, and think things over.”

In theory, you don’t even need the human. Phalanx, and like systems, are tied to command and control systems such as AEGIS, which can be set to an automatic mode with user-defined “If… then…” routines doing the work. Like “If a missile is heading towards this ship, then please shoot it down as soon as possible.” The reason this is necessary is that one doesn’t want to entrust the ability to protect a ship to a person who is, well, liable to die when the anti-ship missiles start flying. Having a system the keeps working despite casualties is a sensible design for a military system. “But wait,” cry the detractors, “We’re not talking about missiles, we’re talking about machines that can make the decision to select and kill human beings (insert lengthy disclaimer about drones being controlled by human beings here).” That may be true, but from a machine’s point of view (and this is perhaps the core of the problem) the means of identifying an object as a missile is not too different from identifying a human being. If someone does conjure up a weapon system to run around killing human beings, then the difference is likely to be most evident in the sensors designed to detect human beings (over, say, a supersonic missile) and the code that interprets the information derived from those sensors, than in the actual process of going from detection to destruction. The difference between “automatic” and “autonomous” is merely the capability of the system to sense different objects, and what to do with them once it senses them. A system designed to identify humans and avoid them is one rule-change away from a system designed to identify humans and kill them. Program an autonomous weapon system to shoot down missiles and it’ll carry that out to the best of its technical limits, just as if you programmed it to shoot readers of young adult fiction over the age of 29, which, I think, is why the ethicists (and adult Harry Potter fans) are correct when they point out that autonomous weapon systems are disturbing. So why not ban them? The problem, returning to the Phalanx CIWS, is that they’re here to help, and in certain situations, autonomous systems are impossible to replace.

“Come with me if you want to live.”

The problem with aircraft carriers is that they are quite expensive, relatively rare, and vulnerable to missiles designed to kill them. America has ten Nimitz class aircraft carriers. They are the cornerstone of American power projection worldwide. By way of comparison, Russia has one, and China has one. I’ll leave it to my colleagues in KCL’s Naval History Mafia (err, “Laughton Naval History Unit“)  to debate how good any of these actually are. America’s carriers are so expensive that it takes over half a billion dollars to de-commission one. Of course the alternate route to decommissioning an aircraft carrier is to hit one with enough missiles to sink it. Logically enough, this is China’s approach to America’s 10:1 advantage in aircraft carriers. For this reason, anyone seeking to deter America needs some kind of long range anti-ship missile capability. For America (or anyone else using an aircraft carrier) you need defensive capabilities mounted on your aircraft carrier and support ships that stand a chance of shooting down said missiles, otherwise they become a bit useless in contested areas.

Contested areas are important, partly because the kind of regimes that carry out massacres usually have powerful friends. Consider Syria. Way back when in 2013, when meaningful international intervention was still a possibility, Russia transferred advanced anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ship missile systems to the Syrian government in order to effectively forestall said intervention. In effect, Russia escalated the likely cost of international intervention by providing Assad with an asymmetric capability. Perceived costs are important because: politics matters. To return to HRW and autonomous weapons: there is a big difference between persuading America to intervene in a situation, and persuading America to intervene in a situation which puts one of its aircraft carriers at risk.

Alternate use for a Nimitz class carrier: attempt to save Pearl Harbor.

So here’s the issue as I see it: if you want to ban the military use of autonomous weapon systems, then you’re going to need to ban the kind of autonomous systems that are currently in service, and any that are being developed to combat anti-ship missiles in future. If you ban those kind of point defence systems, then any kind of power projection becomes very, very risky and costly for the country involved, so even though America has a poor track record, don’t expect them to help in future if a brutal regime is killing its citizens. This ushers in a world where states like China and Russia can effectively prop up any regime that they like, and, given the studied neglect-to-care about human rights in either country, this reduces the capability of states that purportedly care about human rights to intervene in the world at large. This lack of capability to intervene will reduce the incentive for would-be human rights abusers to adhere to the vaguest interpretation of compliance with human rights standards. This is a legal, political and technical issue – given the makeup of the UN Security Council – but at the moment Western states still have a technical means to intervene (if not the legal authority to do so, or the political will), forcing them to abandon the autonomous systems that they use to defend their prime military assets would deprive them of that. As disturbing as autonomous weapons are, is a world where dictators can massacre their populations without fear of reprisal better or worse?

Oh, and just to muddy the waters a bit: they already figured out how to point Phalanx at small surface ships that would probably contain human beings.

Israeli Pereh Anti-Tank Missile Carrier

Chinese A300 Multiple Launch Rocket System

A week or so ago, I gave a presentation at the Wilson Center on the current state and future development of the Russian Navy. Michael Kofman of the Kennan Institute was the moderator and Olga Oliker of RAND provided commentary. The audience was very well-informed and asked excellent questions. The Wilson Center has made a video recording of the event available on YouTube. For those interested in what the Russian Navy is up to, it’s worth watching.

This week’s CCLKOW discussion looks at leadership. In this case, however, we remove the individual as the arbiter of its quality. Instead, our piece today argues for a perspective that takes account of external factors which define the limits of leadership. Using the contrasting narratives of two officers from the Chosin Campaign, the role of influences beyond the control of the individual emerges. Read, ponder the questions, and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

 

In the cold — wickedly cold, really — days at the end of November 1950, the epic drama of the Chosin Campaign played out in North Korea near the Manchurian border with China. Within the larger story, two sub narratives of triumph and disaster, redemption and destruction, life and death were also unfolding. These are the individual travails of two Lieutenant Colonels awarded the Medal of Honor in the campaign, Raymond G. Davis and Donald C. Faith. Davis led his unit to the successful completion of an overland, nighttime march to relieve Fox Co. and secure key terrain in the evacuation route south to Hagaru-ri for 5th and 7th Marines. By contrast, Faith gained at best an operational Pyrrhic victory for X Corps: his Task Force slowed the PLA advance towards the 1st Marine Division as it was defeated in its attempt to withdraw from the reservoir to Hagaru-ri.

How can we reconcile the entirely disparate outcomes of the units led by Faith and Davis at Chosin? Leadership provides a unifying theme by which to explain events, although in this case we must understand leadership to go beyond the standard definitions and transcend the individual as either agent or arbiter of quality. The differences in leadership, and hence outcomes, can be attributed only to fortune or fatal ambition if the assessment is limited to the individuals, as these details provide too little information to make sense of the full scope of events. For their actions at Chosin, each man would be reckoned a hero of the highest order, although that heroism must be described as triumphant and tragic in turn. As field grade officers with previous combat and/or command experience, at campaign’s start they would have been considered equals in anticipated capabilities. In sum, these were two officers similarly qualified as leaders to meet the challenges of command on the battlefield. And yet, not only were the outcomes different for each – success for Davis and failure for Faith – but the narrative clearly points to different qualities of leadership as well. Thus, factors well beyond the individuals, beyond their heroism or competence, determined the quality of leadership each man brought to bear in his respective battle.

The Faith/Davis narratives suggest that leadership’s manifestation in combat is determined by the individual in situ by the influence of external factors. Absent obvious incompetence or particular genius, the environment within which an officer must act will define the quality or effectiveness of his leadership, and therefore, ability to command. Taking consideration of their environments fully explains the leadership outcome for each officer, success and failure, notwithstanding the heroism displayed by either. These conclusions can be made without undue attack upon Faith, for as this analysis suggests, others determined his failed leadership. The paradox of Faith’s simultaneous heroism and failure is reconciled because, while the bulk of the former is derived from within the individual, leadership in action is largely determined from without. This point is true as well in Davis’ case, for if it is to have more than mythical importance it, too, is best understood within its proper context.

While definitions of leadership abound, their focus traditionally has been limited to the individual. From one compilation of essays on the subject of leadership we find this characterization: “Effective leaders create an environment in which people motivate themselves.” [1] In another similar compilation, published in large part for the benefit of teaching leadership to future Army officers at West Point, we find this explanation: “Leadership is the art of inspiring the spirit and the act of following. The following must be voluntary. The individual and the group of individuals must want to be guided by that person for the latter to be called a leader…. Leadership is about trust….”[2] If most discussions of leadership – and for this sake of this analysis I will stick with Kolenda’ Leadership: The Warrior’s Art, as a solid example of the literature – are limited to the narrow scope of what the individual as leader must do,  then they operate from the assumption that the individual is the arbiter or agent of leadership. The problem is that such a formulation ignores the long, arduous, and mundane process required to get the leader to the point where he can lift his head and eyes to the horizon, to function as a leader and exercise effective command. He must, in effect, be able to do nothing but think sometimes. So, yes, a young officer, according to one essay in Kolenda, needs to know what to do with the opportunity and responsibility to lead. [3] He should also learn those factors external to his control that can shape the experience. He should know that no matter how well prepared, it is very hard to run a race if your legs are broken at the start. Even if Kolenda et al. are correct and leadership is the warrior’s art, the individual can only work with what he is given; he is defined by his context, good or bad. Thus, individuals may manifest leadership, and are certainly responsible for its quality, but a multitude of other individuals and circumstances determine that quality. In battle, the individual is not in control of his own leadership. He may do everything right, or may know, especially in retrospect, what he should have done right, he may be imbued with every talent, and still his attempts at leadership can be undone by factors beyond his control. As with all other matters military, the individual is bound up in the group, the organization, and the events.

Given this situation, I propose this revised set of standards that take account of the external factors that influence: chain of command leadership (superior and subordinate), followership, and circumstances. These criteria provide the most comprehensive and comprehensible explanation for the leadership outcomes in the Chosin campaign, and may offer a perspective that is useful to contemporary considerations of leadership. To understand their role in these events, here is a very brief sketch of the contrasting external circumstances faced by each man:

 

What was the quality of the superior leadership shown to Faith and Davis?

The view from the top offer the first significant distinction between the two. Davis enjoyed an operational situation that saw him ensconced within the warm embrace of two levels of leadership directly above him. His regimental and divisional commanders, Colonel Litzenberg and General Smith, were close at hand, available to provide guidance, strength, and a general sense of operational security. Alternatively, neither of his two commanders was the sort to meddle overmuch, thus allowing Davis to exercise his discretion in the planning and execution of his mission. By contrast, Faith came to command at Chosin when the 31st RCT commander, Colonel MacLean, was killed in early and confusing contact with PLA forces. This meant that on the ground at Chosin Faith enjoyed no superior leadership. At further remove, the divisional and corps leadership did not seem to grasp the enormity of what was facing the task force. Appleman’s point in East of Chosin that Generals Barr (7th ID CG) and Almond (X Corps CG) could have sent General Hodes, 7th ID ADC, to take command of the task force, is ironically sustained by the extension of that criticism in other literature to General Smith, who could have spared one of his senior colonels to the cause. Finally, by comparison Davis’ direct chain of command served him better than Faith’s because Smith’s proximity to the fight gave him a clearer picture of the threat posed by the PLA’s offensive, whereas it would take the Army commanders (7th ID, X Corps) critical hours to come to understand the changed circumstances. The relevance of this distinction bears out in the movements of X Corps towards the Yalu River, where Smith had taken a relatively conservative approach to the attack which maintained the integrity of the division as a whole, in contrast with the almost head-long rush 7th ID took to get to the reservoir. Whereas the Marine division would retain its ability to act as a coherent and supporting whole when the mass of the Chinese attack opened, 7th ID was dispersed to the point that the sum of the parts were weaker than the measure of the whole.

What was the quality of the subordinate leadership shown to Faith and Davis?

Moving to the supporting network below, the disparities remain. Davis enjoyed a strong subordinate command presence. Many of his NCOs had prior service in WWII, and his junior officers were capable if untested. Furthermore, throughout the campaign he did not suffer significant losses within these ranks, thus maintaining a sound subordinate chain of command. The strength of Davis’ leadership would be transmitted through this web to the Marines. At the start of the campaign, the units that would comprise Faith’s task force did have their fair share of good subordinate leaders. However, the task force suffered throughout the battle a steady hemorrhage of these leader. Their loss would weaken the leadership web supporting Faith degraded the unit’s combat cohesion at every level and critically handicapped his ability to maintain the integrity of the withdrawal.

What was the quality of “followership” shown to Faith and Davis?

How the troops responded to their leadership would vary significantly as well. There is no greater affirmation of the Marines’ followership than the constant refrain from the overland march that the strength of Davis’ example motivated and inspired the already strong extant “Marine spirit.” [4] Alternatively, the fragility of the task force’s followership is made manifest with the rapid disintegration of unit coherence with every challenge and setback to the withdrawal. Where once Faith was able to rally the troops via threats of severe punishment, the second attempt at the same tactic reaped insignificant results, primarily because the troops could no longer sustain their “faith” in his leadership to change the circumstance. Furthermore, there is some indication that Faith’s lack of combat experience worked to the detriment of establishing good followership from the start. Contrast this with the sense of security Davis’ experience must have given his troops.

What were the circumstances facing each?

Although they diverged in degree, both men faced essentially the same situation. The Chinese offensive made their current positions untenable and necessitated withdrawal. And, as aptly framed by General Smith, this would be no administrative march to the rear, they really would be “fighting in the other direction.” [5] The grand plan of the Marine division’s attack to the south planned for the constant defense of the column in its progress, by control of flanking terrain and key feature with all units in mutual and coordinated support. [6] Necessary to secure a key junction in the route, Davis’ mission to relieve Fox Co. and reinforce the position they held atop Turkey Hill was by no means going to be a walk in the park, was not guaranteed to succeed. It demanded of the Marines two efforts not a part of the campaign or standard practice: cross-country and by night. However, as part of a larger campaign, whose objective was entirely achievable by the division, Davis was given a manageable piece of a larger plan whose rationality he could appreciate. Other intangible effects of the mission context was the difference made in the Marine mentality of the aggressive, offensive nature of the mission – rather than waiting for the enemy to bring the battle to them in the withdrawal, they were moving pro-actively to gain the upper hand against the enemy. This they would achieve, successfully making their way south to Colonel Puller’s position further south to reform the division as a whole for its continued exfiltration to the port at Hungnam. Task Force Faith, on the other hand, was destroyed as a unit and nearly in detail attempting the very same. Lacking the support to generate a plan of any consequence, as well as the subordinate officers to execute it, Faith was left to collect his men, wounded, and vehicles and hope that they could fight their way south directly. Little would be done to secure the flanks or the way ahead, and these omissions would allow the Chinese soldiers to defeat the column. Harrying the vehicles and men from the high ground surrounding the road throughout, which slowly weakened Faith’s collected force, the Chinese were also able move ahead roadblock the progress of the march at regular intervals. Blooded throughout, there were only so many obstacles the task force could overcome and regroup from before it was simply too weakened by casualties to continue as a whole. In the final hours of December 1, only 5 miles from where the march had begun, both Faith and his task force died.

 

Considering the terms of this leadership framework, the discussion for this week is driven by a single request:

Obviously there is little that can be done when one faces the worst of circumstances across every factor. However, singly these deficits can be mitigated, if not overcome. Looking at each of Faith’s challenges, imagine yourself as his only and capable staff officer, what would you recommend to him? How would you improve the quality of the factors or counteract the negative effect of their weakness?

 

 

 

[I am happy to provide a bibliography of the campaign to those interested.]

 

Notes

1. Military Leadership, Taylor and Rosenbach, eds., p. 2.

2.  Leadership: The Warrior’s Art, Kolenda, ed., p. xix.

3. Dardis and Brower, “Teaching Combat Leadership.”

4. I had the opportunity to meet many of those Marines, to include General Davis, at the 1/7 1999 reunion of the Chosin Marines. I will write more about them in November at the anniversary of the campaign. As well as the pathos of battle, there will be consideration of such subjects as frozen turkey bombs, life-saving Tootsie Rolls, a silver service, cooks with rifles, and a reminder of the provenance of the Rule of 4/6ths.

5. The misinterpretation of this quote is one of the greater sins of history. It was always a simple explanation of the martial terms of the withdrawal.

6. I will reissue my perennial call: Colonel Alpha Bowser’s quickly designed plan was a thing to behold, and more should be written on it.

German LePzMrs 120 mm Mortar Carrier

It appears that things are picking up in the wonderful world of radicalisation. Following hot on the heels of David Cameron’s speech on extremism, the Evening Standard reports that a primary school has referred one of its pupils to the Government’s multi-agency Channel programme because a child that can’t be older than 11 was “deemed at risk of Islamic radicalisation.” Yes, folks, you heard that right, because “the behaviour of the child’s parents caused concern among staff” a kid is now the subject of government study. That’s because non-violent extremism leads to violent extremism, even in the case of primary school children. Except it doesn’t, or at least doesn’t work like a conveyor belt.

Here’s the resulting paradox in a nutshell: we live in a country that retains global power pretensions (even though we fudge on paying for it) and are committed to retaining a nuclear deterrent to bolster that self-image. At the same time, in a supposedly free and democratic society, we are referring under twelves to a counter-extremism programme because otherwise… bad things might happen?

Channel operates in “pre-criminal space”, which is a nice way of saying that a Channel referral doesn’t require an actual criminal offence. The Channel vulnerability assessment framework is particularly worth reading in full:

1. Engagement with a group, cause or ideology Engagement factors are sometimes referred to as “psychological hooks”. They include needs, susceptibilities, motivations and contextual influences and together map the individual pathway into terrorism. They can include:
• Feelings of grievance and injustice
• Feeling under threat
• A need for identity, meaning and belonging
• A desire for status
• A desire for excitement and adventure
• A need to dominate and control others
• Susceptibility to indoctrination
• A desire for political or moral change
• Opportunistic involvement
• Family or friends involvement in extremism
• Being at a transitional time of life
• Being influenced or controlled by a group
• Relevant mental health issues

2. Intent to cause harm Not all those who become engaged by a group, cause or ideology go on to develop an intention to cause harm, so this dimension is considered separately. Intent factors describe the mindset that is associated with a readiness to use violence and address what the individual would do and to what end. They can include:
• Over-identification with a group or ideology
• Them and Us’ thinking
• Dehumanisation of the enemy
• Attitudes that justify offending
• Harmful means to an end
• Harmful objectives

3. Capability to cause harm Not all those who have a wish to cause harm on behalf of a group, cause or ideology are capable of doing so, and plots to cause widespread damage take a high level of personal capability, resources and networking to be successful. What the individual is capable of is therefore a key consideration when assessing risk of harm to the public. Factors can include:
• Individual knowledge, skills and competencies
• Access to networks, funding or equipment
• Criminal Capability

Maybe it’s just me, but I’m pretty sure that any 10 year old fulfils: “A need for identity, meaning and belonging/A desire for status/A desire for excitement and adventure/Susceptibility to indoctrination/Being at a transitional time of life”. Cynicism aside, the basic problem with this vulnerability assessment framework is that it contains very ambiguous criteria that effectively makes being pissed off at the current state of things a red flag for authorities. This wouldn’t matter so much except that the latest Counter-Terrorism and Security Act put it on a statutory footing. From a not-quite-half-arsed grab bag of indicators that someone might (and could) commit a terrorist offence, to a statutory duty for Councils everywhere to assess people in this way. I have no idea whether a ten year old can develop the intent to cause harm, but I somewhat doubt that they have the capability to cause harm. The question for the rest of us is how well we’d fare if put under the microscope by someone who may, or may not, have any of the training necessary to differentiate between, say, a lonely person and a lone wolf nutcase. Just remember not to express “extreme” opinions to anyone official in future, just in case, like.

Identity? Status? Dehumanisation? That’s got Kafka written all over it.

High Representative and Head of the European Defence Agency Federica Mogherini paid her first visit to the EDA yesterday. She met with the Agency’s Management Board before giving an address to the staff.

During her visit to EDA, the High Representative was briefed on EDA activities including maritime surveillance, prioritisation and funding of research & technology, and support to CSDP operations.

“Today I was able to see first-hand some of the really important work you do. I am happy and proud to see how you are tackling the many challenges of European defence. In the current security environment, I want defence cooperation to be the rule, not the exception”, Federica Mogherini stressed in front of the European Defence Agency’s staff. “The EDA is providing the necessary impetus and means to make this a reality. Your collective role is vital. We are here for results and concrete achievements – and I know you deliver”, she added.

More information

• European External Action Service website
• More pictures of the visit on our Flickr gallery

EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq met today with Gerald Klug, Austrian Minister of Defence and Sports, to exchange views on cooperation opportunities and Austria’s involvement in EDA projects. 

”The European Defence Agency plays a significant role in the further development of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy. All Member States benefit from the Agency’s coordinating role in various defence matters such as capability development or the promotion of defence-related research and technology. Austria participates in numerous projects of the European Defence Agency to help reduce EU military shortfalls and enhance the EU’s defence cooperation. The added value for Austria especially lies in the transfer of know-how”, said Minister of Defence Gerald Klug.

“Austria is an active member of the European Defence Agency, with the country being involved in activities as diverse as European Air Transport Fleet exercises and events, the European Armements Cooperation Course or the successful collaborative work carried out in the field of Counter-IED”, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq stated after the visit. “We also welcome Austria’s participation in our Cyber Defence workstrand”, he added. 

The visit in Austria is part of a series of visits by Mr. Domecq to all EDA Member States following his appointment as EDA Chief Executive at the beginning of 2015. So far, Mr. Domecq visited Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus and Finland, Sweden, Italy and Slovakia.

More information

• News "Exchange of views with Slovak Minister of Defence" (4 June 2015)
• News "EDA and Italy discuss defence cooperation" (3 June 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq meets Maltese Minister of Home Affairs and National Security" (19 May 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq discusses defence cooperation in Finland" (13 May 2015)
• News "Sweden welcomes EDA Chief Executive" (12 May 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in Luxembourg to discuss cooperation" (5 May 2015)
• News "Defence cooperation talks in Cyprus" (23 April 2015)
• News "Chief Executive meets Hungarian Minister of Defence" (23 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Athens" (22 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in Poland for defence discussions"(20 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq meets Estonian Minister of Defence" (20 April 2015)
• News "Meeting with Croatian Defence Minister in Zagreb" (17 April 2015)
• News "Slovenia welcomes Jorge Domecq" (15 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Czech Republic" (13 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in Bulgaria to discuss defence cooperation" (8 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive travels to Romania" (8 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive meets French Minister of Defence" (30 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq exchanges views with Irish Minister of Defence Simon Coveney T.D." (25 March 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits The Netherlands" (23 March 2015)
• News "Discussions on European defence in Portugal" (19 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq meets German Secretary of State" (19 March 2015)
• News "Belgium and EDA discuss future defence cooperation" (18 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in the UK for cooperation talks" (25 Feb 2015)
• News "Latvia and EDA discuss cooperation opportunities" (19 Feb 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Lithuania" (17 Feb 2015) 

Scout SV (Source: General Dynamics UK)