S-300 misfire:
In July 2012, the US military signed another huge contract with Sikorsky. With production of the Army’s HH/UH-60M, and the Navy’s MH-60S and MH-60R helicopters, all in full swing, there’s no question about the need for future orders. In that environment, multi-year contracts allow efficiencies in purchasing, and security of staffing, throughout Sikorsky’s supply chain. These new helicopter types are also available to Foreign Military Sales class customers, under the American contract’s advantageous pricing and terms. The UH-60M, MH-60S and MH-60R models have already inked export deals, and official requests indicate that more deals are in the pipeline.
The new multi-year 2013-2017 contract could be worth up to $11.7 billion, and follows a 5-year, multi-service “MYP-VII” contract in December 2007. Like its predecessor, it covers UH-60M Black Hawk troop transport and light cargo helicopters, Army HH-60M SAR (Search And Rescue) / MEDEVAC (MEDical EVACuation) helicopters, and the US Navy’s MH-60S and MH-60R Seahawk helicopters.
The US Army plans to order 956 UH-60M and 419 MEDEVAC HH-60M Black Hawks through 2026, a total of 1,375 H-60M models. By then, the US Army’s total H-60 Black Hawk fleet, including upgraded UH-60As and UH-60Ls, is expected to reach more than 2,100 helicopters. US Navy production will end much sooner, and beyond about 2018 the only Seahawks built will be for export.
MYP-VIII’s base award covers 653 helicopters from FY 2013 – 2017: 234 UH-60M and 120 HH-60M Black Hawks, 193 MH-60R/S Seahawks, plus 106 helicopters for Foreign Military Sales. Like its predecessor, The 5-year agreement also allows the Army and Navy to order as many as 263 more helicopters within the same contractual terms, either for the USA or for export sales. If exercised, the optional purchases could push the contract value from $8.5 billion to a maximum of $11.7 billion.
Note that this MYP-VIII contract is a price framework agreement, rather than a firm schedule. Orders are planned 5 years in advance at the Pentagon, but annual budgets can and do increase or decrease those numbers. Actual production orders will be determined year-by-year over the life of the program, based on American budgets and foreign orders. Under the terms of the contract, Sikorsky will provide helicopters, technical publications, and changes/upgrades within set terms, while its field service representatives provide technical guidance and on-site training.
The need for replacement is certainly clear. According to FY 2011 budget documents, the USA’s oldest UH-60As are now over 30 years old, and the average age of the UH-60A fleet is 23 years. New UH-60Ms have an 18 month lead time from order to delivery, while the more advanced HH-60M for SAR/ MEDEVAC duties has a 24 month lead time.
In the Navy, the helicopters being replaced by the MH-60S armed utility & mine-warfare helicopter, and by the MH-60R strike and anti-submarine helicopter, date from the Reagan years – or earlier. The MH-60S/Rs are replacing the US Navy’s remaining SH-60B/F Seahawks, HH-60 CSAR(Combat Search and Rescue), CH-46D Sea Knights, and HH-1N Huey SAR helicopters.
The minimum production rate to sustain the H-60 line is 18 helicopters per year, while the maximum is listed in FY 2011 US Army budget documents as 150 per year. American orders are large but don’t push that limit, leaving plenty of room for export production.
Contracts & Key Events UH-60MUnless otherwise specified, all order are placed by US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL to Sikorsky in Stratford, CT.
Note that a contract for helicopters is not the same thing as a contract for flying, ready-to use helicopters. Many contracts omit key “Government Furnished Equipment” items like engines, sensors, etc., which make the cost of a ready-to-use helicopter higher than the base contract. Sikorsky does sometimes buy items that are usually GFE when filling some Foreign Military Sales contracts. There are still some questions about FMS inclusions within MYP-VIII, and some buys whose structure is unclear. Australia’s Letter of Offer and Acceptance for the MH-60R, for instance, was signed in June 2011, and some contracts have begun. DID will attempt to resolve those questions and details going forward.
Finally, the naval MH-60R strike and MH-60S Seahawk utility/ specialty helicopters have a large array of unique features, and a central place within the USN. We will cover purchases under MYP-8 here, but full details regarding the helicopters, their foreign sakes opportunities, and all of their related contracts can be found in “MH-60R/S: The USA’s New Naval Workhorse Helicopters.”
FY 2015 – 2017Orders: US Army, US Navy.
December 6/16: Sikorsky has been tapped to provide technical and logistics services for variants of the H-60 helicopter operated by the US Army. Valued at $93.8 million, work carried out by the company includes the provision of engineering services in addition to other weapon system supplies. Helicopters included in the deal include the UH-60 Black Hawk.
March 18/15: Mexico. The DSCA notified Congress of the potential sale of three Sikorsky UH-60M Black Hawks to Mexico, in a deal potentially worth $110 million. That there are only three Black Hawks in the deal is surprising, as the application appears to have gone in with five requested.
March 18/15: Slovakia. Slovakia is also poised to receive nine of the same model.
March 18/15: Tunisia. Sikorsky saw a $93.3 million contract modification today for eight “Green” UH-60M helicopters for the Tunisian government.
Dec 15/14: Mexico. $56.4 million modification (P00217) to contract W58RGZ-12-C-0008 to exercise an option for 5 UH-60M aircraft for Mexican Navy’s foreign military sales case MX-B-UEU. Estimated completion date is May 30, 2016. Work will be performed in Stratford, Connecticut. Fiscal 2010 funds in the amount of $2,221,115 were obligated at the time of the award.
HH-60MNov 17/14: FY 2015 USA. The US military buys 102 helicopters for the Army and Navy for $1.302 billion, as its FY 2015 purchases.
A $772 million contract modification buys 41 UH-60M helicopters and 24 HH-60M helicopters, plus associated support functions. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2015 Army aircraft budgets. Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, and is expected to complete in June 30/15 (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0201).
At the same time, a $535.3 million contract modification funds 29 MH-60R and 8 MH-60S helicopters for the Navy, plus associated sustaining engineering, program management, systems engineering, provisioning, technical publications, other integrated logistics support. There’s also advance procurement funding for program years 4 and 5. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2015 Navy aircraft budgets. Work will be performed at Stratford, CT (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0202).
FY 2015 USA: 41 UH-60M, 24 HH-60M, 29 MH-60R, 8 MH-60S
FY 2014Orders: US Army, Mexico, Saudi Arabia; Requests: Austria, Brazil, Mexico, Tunisia; Unmanned UH-60MU tested; US Navy wants to cancel MH-60R buy without destroying MYP-8 – can they? UH-60M, Ft. Bragg
Sept 29/14: Mexico. An unfinalized $93.2 million not-to-exceed, undefinitized contract for 8 “uniquely configured” UH-60Ms and other support equipment and services for Mexico’s secretary of national defense. Mexico has now ordered 35 UH-60Ms, with confirmed customers in the Federal Police, Navy, & Air Force. This order didn’t mention the purchasing service, nor did the recent DSCA request (q.v. June 24/14).
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, with an estimated completion date of June 7, 2015; this contract falls under the Foreign Military Sales program. One bid was solicited and one received. Fiscal 2010 other procurement funds are being obligated at the time of the award. With all modifications, the cumulative total of this contract is $7,035,259,311. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal (Aviation), Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0171).
Mexico: 8 UH-60Ms
Sept 15/14: Mexico. Sikorsky receives a $203.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 18 “green” UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters, plus their conversion to the Mexican Air Force’s designated configuration using contractor-furnished and government-furnished (and paid for) equipment. In other words, this is the entire FAM order mentioned in the April 21/14 DSCA request.
Estimated completion date is May 30/16 (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 00179).
Mexico FAM: 18 UH-60Ms
Sept 9/14: Brazil. The US DSCA formally announces Brazil’s export request for 3 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, equipped for search and rescue. Brazil already has the Army 4th squadron and Air Force 7/8 “Harpia” air group at Manaus, whose H-60L and S-70 Black Hawks/ Pave Hawks perform a SAR/ counter-narcotics role, and are well-equipped for disaster response. These would be Brazil’s first UH-60Ms.
The full request involves 3 UH-60Ms, 8 T-700-GE-701C engines (6 installed and 2 spares), 12 M-134D 7.62mm gatling guns, 8 H765GU Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation Systems, spare and repair parts, tools and support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, and other US government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $145 million.
The principal contractors will be United Technologies’ Sikorsky Aircraft in Stratford, CT; GE Engines in Lynn, MA; and Dillon Aero Systems in Mesa, AZ. Implementation of this proposed sale may require the assignment of 1 contractor representative to Brazil for up to 3 years to support fielding, maintenance, and personnel training of this new helicopter type for Brazil. Sources: DSCA #14-36, “Brazil – UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters”.
DSCA request: Brazil (3)
June 24/14: Mexico. The US DSCA formally announces Mexico’s export request for 5 UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters in standard US government configuration with designated unique equipment and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), 13 T700-GE-701D Engines (10 installed and 3 spares), 12 Embedded Global Positioning Systems/Inertial Navigation Systems (10 installed and 2 spares), 10 M134 7.62mm gatling guns, 5 Star SAFIRE III day/night surveillance turrets, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems, AN/ARC-210 RT-8100 series radios, 1 Aviation Mission Planning System, and 1 Aviation Ground Power Unit. Also included are aircraft warranty, air worthiness support, facility construction, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, tool and test equipment, and other forms of US Government and contractor technical and logistics support. The estimated cost is up to $225 million.
Mexico has previously ordered 9 UH-60Ms, with 6 going to Mexico’s federal police, and 3 to the Armada for use in land-based operations. These 5 would bring the Mexican Navy’s fleet to 8:
“Mexico intends to use these defense articles and services to modernize its armed forces and expand its existing naval/maritime support in its efforts to combat drug trafficking organizations.”
The principal contractors will be Sikorsky Aircraft Company in Stratford, CT; and General Electric Aircraft Company (GEAC) in Lynn, MA. Implementation of this proposed sale may require the assignment of 3 more US Government and 5 more contractor representatives in country, as full-time delivery and training support for approximately 2 years. Sources: DSCA #14-25, “Mexico – UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters”.
DSCA request: Mexico (5)
Aug 19/14: UH-60M. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $30.3 million contract modification for 12 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, on behalf of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. All funds are committed immediately. This appears to be an initial award, with a follow-on to come that will finalize the buy, modify the helicopters for Saudi use (q.v. March 25/13, Dec 20/13), and bring total announced SANG UH-60M sales to 24 of 72 requested (US DSCA, Oct 20/10) machines.
The estimated completion date is Aug 31/17. Work will be performed in Jupiter, FL and Stratford, CT. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the order on behalf of its Saudi client (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0072).
July 24/14: Tunisia. The US DSCA announces Tunisia’s official request for 12 UH-60M Black Hawk utility helicopters, complete with Battlehawk kits that allow them to be used as attack helicopters. these helicopters will include surveillance turrets with laser designators, laser-guided 70mm rocket capability, Hellfire missiles, various defensive and communications systems, and associated support that may include an infrastructure build-out. The estimated cost is up to $700 million, or about $58.3 million per helicopter with weapons and support. Sources: DID, “Armed & Versatile: Sikorsky’s ‘Battlehawk’ Helicopters” for full coverage | US DSCA #14-23, “Tunisia – UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters”.
DSCA request: Tunisia (12 + Battlehawk kits)
May 20/14: +13. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT receives a $143.4 million contract modification for 13 Army UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters.
All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 “other procurement” budgets. Work will be performed in Stratford, CT with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/15 (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0146).
13 UH-60M
May 29/14: A $24 million contract modification to “realign the funding between the fiscal 2014 advance procurement funds and the planned aircraft production funds for fiscal 2015, with no change to the UH-60 or HH-60 contract price.” All funds are committed immediately.
Work will be performed in Stratford, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/15. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0163).
April 22/14: MYP-8. Lockheed Martin ups the pressure on the US Navy, by reminding everyone that they also have a multi-year contract that involves termination fees. CFO Bruce Tanner says that work had already begun on cockpits, radars, and other equipment for the MH-60Rs. He recommends buying them and selling them to allies:
“That would probably be a better deal for the taxpayer than paying close to 100 percent and not getting anything for it…. The cost to terminate partially built helicopters is pretty significant relative to the cost to actually finish those helicopters.”
Sources: Reuters, “Lockheed says costly for Pentagon if it cancels MH-60 helicopters”.
Apr 21/14: Mexico. The US DSCA announces Mexico’s formal request for up to 18 UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters and associated equipment, at an estimated cost of up to $680 million. The order could also include up to:
The principal contractors will be Sikorsky in Stratford, CT; and GE in Lynn, MA. If congress doesn’t block the sale, and Mexico negotiated a contract, implementation may require the assignment of an additional 3 US Government and 5 contractor representatives, who would be in country full-time for 2 years to support delivery and training. Sources: DSCA #14-10, “Mexico – UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters”.
DSCA: Mexico request (18)
April 15/14: MYP-8. The Pentagon is trying to find ways not to break their MYP-8 multi-year contract with Sikorsky, given the likely effects on the Army’s Black Hawk fleet. Defense News goes a step further, and reports that Sikorsky officials are saying that any cancellation of the Navy buy would cancel the entire contract, destroying multi-year procurement for the US Army. Sources: Defense News, “DoD Looking for Ways Not To Break MH-60R Helicopter Deal”.
Apr 11/14: Unmanned UH-60M. Sikorsky successfully demonstrates autonomous hover and flight operations, using a UH-60MU from the US Army Utility Helicopters Project Office (UH PO). The project is called MURAL (Manned/Unmanned Resupply Aerial Lifter), and uses technology from Sikorsky’s July 2013 Matrix research program and an advanced Ground Control Station (GCS).
Sikorsky began this work in 2007, but they only signed MURAL’s CRADA (Cooperative Research & Development Agreement) with the US Army Aviation Development Directorate (ADD) in 2013. Sikorsky has also been flying its own SARA (Sikorsky Autonomy Research Aircraft) helicopter since July 26/13. The long-term goal is to avoid conceding the unmanned helicopter resupply market to Lockheed Martin’s K-MAX, the MQ-8C Fire Scout, etc. Making their core H-60 helicopters “optionally manned” is a strong competitive position, if they can pull it off. Sources: Sikorsky, “Optionally Piloted Black Hawk Demonstrator Helicopter Takes Successful First Flight”.
April 9/14: MYP-8. Sikorsky director of maritime programs Tim Healy points out that the US Navy’s proposed cancellation of 29 helicopters within the current multi-year deal has consequences. One involves the likelihood of higher prices for US Army Blackhawks, which are still being purchased. The other is more basic:
“This is not a legal issue. This is a confidence issue…. If multiyear contracts are negotiated and then not followed through … industry is back to making year-to-year calculations and investments because you never know when the next year’s contract is going to be canceled.”
That would be the rational approach, but industry enters into these contracts in order to reduce the odds of program cutbacks and cancellation in an irrational political environment. In other words, the contracts are primarily political acts. Our take: cancellation will dent industry’s credence in these contracts, but won’t make much difference. Companies will still rush to sign them, until and unless they see a behavior pattern that destroys their belief in this strategy. Sources: Reuters, “U.S. Navy move to ‘break’ multiyear deal worries industry-Sikorsky”.
March 4-11/14: FY15 Budget. The USAF and USN unveil their preliminary budget request briefings, but it takes another week to release detailed documents. FY 2015 orders are unaffected: 8 MH-60S will end production for the US Navy, and 29 MH-60R helicopters will be bought as planned. On the other hand, the planned FY 2016 close-out order for 29 MH-60R helicopters is gone.
The cut is linked to the planned removal of 1 carrier air wing (to 10) and cap in the number of LCS ships at 32. The problem is twofold. One, the air wing would have to be put back if the Navy does decide to fund USS George Washington’s mid-life RCOH in FY 2016. Two, the 20 subsequent LCS buys are supposed to be replaced by ships with frigate-like capabilities, and those ships will need ASW helicopters. Navy officials said that advance procurement funds for FY 2016 were still present in the FY 2015 budget, and the Navy could reverse course. They’re under a multi-year procurement deal, so unless there’s a resale of some kind that’s allowed within the terms, you’d have to think that the penalty fees for cancellations would be high. Sources: USN, PB15 Press Briefing [PDF] | Defense News, “US Navy Budget Plan: Major Questions Abound”.
Jan 9/14: FY 2014 USN. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $549.9 million contract modification, funding the base airframes and some integration for 18 MH-60S and 19 MH-60R helicopters, plus advance procurement for years 4 & 5 of the multi-year deal; and associated sustaining engineering, program management, systems engineering, and other support.
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, and will be complete by Dec 31/15 (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0126).
USN 2014: 18 MH-60S, 19 MH-60R
Dec 23/13: FY 2014 Army. A $724 million contract modification buys the initial set for program year 3: 33 UH-60M helicopters, 24 HH-60M helicopters, plus the associated associated program management, systems engineering, provisioning, technical publications, and integrated logistics support. Funding to buy long-lead material for the next year is also normal, but this modification includes long-lead funding for years 4 & 5 as termination liability. All funds are committed immediately, using US Army FY 2014 other procurement budgets.
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, and the contract runs until June 30/15 (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0127).
33 UH-60M + 24 HH-60M
Dec 20/13: Saudi Arabia. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $105.3 million contract modification to contract “to modify 8 UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters to a General Service Configuration in Support of the Saudi Arabian National Guard.” The contract number indicates that these machines are purchases under the MYP-8 multi-year deal. Essentially, they’re buying 8 UH-60Ms as an initial order under the Oct 20/10 DSCA request to export up to 72 machines.
One bid was solicited with one received. Work will be performed in West Palm Beach, FL and in Saudi Arabia. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL acts as the Saudis’ agent (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0089).
Saudi Arabia: 8 UH-60Ms
Dec 5/13: Austria. The US DSCA announces Austria’s formal export request for 3 UH-60Ms and associated equipment, worth up to $137 million. The principal contractor will be Sikorsky in Stratford, CT, with engines from General Electric in Lynn, MA. Austria already has 9 earlier model S-70A-42 aircraft in its inventory. The full request includes:
Austria won’t need any additional foreign support personnel in country. Sources: DSCA 13-69.
DSCA: Austria request (3)
FY 2013MYP-8 signed; USAF and US Army exercise options.
MH-60S
(click to view full)
Sept 27/13: Support. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a 3-year, $84 million cost-plus-fixed-fee indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for support services. They’ll provide incidental H-60 Black Hawk materials for foreign military sales and other government agency customers. Note that the award isn’t restricted to H-60M helicopters.
Funding and performance locations will be determined with each order. The contract was solicited via the Web, with 1 bid received by US Army Contracting Command – Redstone Arsenal (Aviation), Redstone Arsenal, AL, is the contracting activity (W58RGZ-13-D-0177).
Sept 27/13: MH-60M DVE. The Technical Applications Contracting Office in Fort Eustis, VA issues 3 contracts to develop and field “the degraded visual environments (DVE) system.” DVE will “integrate information from [MH-47E/G and MH-60K/L/M helicopter] sensors,” in order to help aircrews perm their missions through rain, fog, sand brownouts, etc. Dust-driven brownouts are an especially prevalent killer in many operating theaters, and the advanced sensors already on board US SOCOM’s helicopters offer an interesting option for cutting through the clutter. See also: US Army, “Army acquiring ‘brown-out’ assistance for helos” for additional context regarding this area in general. This area is being pursued by a number of US military programs, and by a number of private companies.
The 60-month SOCOM DVE contracts were awarded from 5 offers received in response to the FBO.gov solicitation, and they will run until Aug 31/17. Winners include:
Rockwell Collins in Cedar Rapids, IA wins a maximum $22.4 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity, cost reimbursement contract, with $1.3 million in FY 2013 research, development, test and evaluation funds committed immediately for task order 0001 (H92241-13-D-0008).
Sierra Nevada Corp. in Sparks, NV receives a maximum $22.6 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee DVE contract, with $624,013 in FY 2013 research, development, test and evaluation funds committed immediately for task order 0001 (H92241-13-D-0010).
Boeing in Philadelphia, PA wins a maximum $23 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee DVE contract, with $2.1 million in FY 2013 research, development, test and evaluation funds committed immediately for task order 0001 (H92241-13-D-0011).
Aug 21/13: No CVLSP. The US Air Force cut their planned UH-1 Huey replacement program from the FY 2013 budget. Now they’re planning to refurbish their existing UH-1N fleet for another 10 years of service in securing nuclear launch sites, and ferrying people around Washington. The Hueys will add night vision compatible cockpit lighting, crash worthy seats, a helicopter terrain awareness warning system, and traffic collision avoidance. The USAF will also pick up about 26 used UH-1Ns from the US Marines, and have begun with 3 helicopters already.
Even the 10 year horizon isn’t fixed, and the service could choose to keep the helicopters running longer. Bottom line: replacement with H-60s is a long way away, unless a Huey crashes with a prominent member of an appropriations committee on board. Defense News, “USAF Planning Decade-Long Huey Extension”.
June 13/13: Army FY13. Sikorsky Aircraft in Stratford, CT receives a $244.9 million firm-fixed-price modification to by an unspecified number of UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, using FY 2013 procurement funds.
It would appear that the $804.4 million Nov 16/12 buy didn’t fully fund FY 2013’s plan for 71 helicopters, which makes sense given Pentagon cost estimates of around $18 million per machine. $1,049.3 million / 71 = $14.8 million per, which is closer to the mark given the price of added engines, avionics, etc. (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0077).
May 8/13: Thailand. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT an $11.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, to buy 1 UH-60M base helicopter and related equipment for Thailand. The cumulative total face value of this multi-year contract is now $4.819 billion. US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract on behalf of their FMS client (W58RGZ-12-C-0008, PO 0055).
Thailand: 1 UH-60M
April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.
The UH-60M/ HH-60M budget line is interesting, because it plans for 64 more buys than the base multi-year deal. Instead of 318 helicopters over FY 2012 – 2016, the total becomes 382. The framework is obviously able to handle those planned options, and MYP-8 overall has a top limit of 916 helicopters for the US Army, US Navy and foreign customers.
March 25/13: Saudi. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $49 million firm-fixed-price contract. This modification will provide engineering and configuration services to 4 utility helicopters for Saudi Arabia. The contract number indicates a MYP-8 purchase, and the amount indicates that there’s a base helicopter order still to come. There are ways that could be done outside the purview of standard contract announcements.
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/16. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-12-C-0008).
Saudi Arabia: 4 UH-60Ms?
Dec 11/12: +37 Navy. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT receives a $563.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, which funds the Navy’s 2nd Program Year of the MYP-8 multi-year program. Sikorsky tells us that Year 2 buys 18 MH-60S Production Lot 15 helicopters for delivery in 2013-2014, and 19 MH-60R Production Lot 11 Helicopters for delivery in 2014. The contract also covers sustaining engineering, and the usual set of advance materials for the next production lots.
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/16. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0008).
Nov 16/12: +71 Army. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT received an $804.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification. Sikorsky confirms that this fully funds Year 2 of MYP-8: 47 UH-60M and 24 HH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, plus associated engineering, program management, provisioning, technical publications, and support.
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT with an estimated completion date of June 30/14. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0008).
FY 2012 MH-60RSept 25/12: +22 Army. A $242.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to buy UH-60M Plus-Up Helicopters, which are over and above the yearly baseline buys under MYP-8. Sikorsky confirms that the contract covers 22 helicopters, but doesn’t include support.
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT and will run until Sept 16/16. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0008).
Sept 25/12: +18 USAF. A $203.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, which Sikorsky confirms will buy 18 UH-60M helicopters for the USAF. This appears to be part of the USAF’s Operational Loss Replacement (OLR) program for their HH-60H Pave Hawk combat search and rescue fleet.
Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/16. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0008).
Sept 18/12: UH-60 CPTD. Sikorsky announced the award of a Combat Tempered Platform Demonstration (CTPD) contract from the U.S. Army’s Aviation Applied Technology Directorate (AATD). This program will builds upon previous work by Sikorsky Innovations to develop key technologies including: a zero-vibration system, adaptive flight control laws, advanced fire management, a durable main rotor, a more damage tolerant airframe, and better “full-spectrum crashworthiness.” Asked about the program, Sikorsky said that:
“We currently have nothing slated for the next two block upgrades that come from the Combat Tempered Platform Demonstration program. We are testing how components play together.”
Sikorsky Innovations will have more than 15 partnering companies, including Lord Corporation, Phyre Technologies, and Firetrace Aerospace.
July 18/12: #500. Sikorsky delivers the 500th H-60M helicopter since production began in December 2007, which divides up as 400 UH-60Ms (incl. 73 exported) and 100 HH-60M MEDEVAC helicopters. Most of those deliveries which were made under the MYP-VII contract, which ended this month.
Sikorsky adds that the US Army plans to order 956 UH-60M and 419 HH-60M aircraft through 2026, a total of 1,375 H-60M models. By then, the Army’s total H-60 Black Hawk fleet, including upgraded UH-60As and UH-60Ls, is expected to reach more than 2,100 helicopters. Sikorsky.
UH-60M #500
July 11/12: MYP-8. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. in Stratford, CT receives a firm-fixed-price umbrella contract to buy and provide initial support for up to 916 UH/HH/MH-60 Helicopters for the US Army and US Navy, with Foreign Military Sales options. The Pentagon announces the initial total as $2.828 billion, but Sikorsky puts the base contract’s total value at $8.5 billion. Sikorsky also breaks up the MYP-8 contract into an $8.5 billion base for 653 helicopters, plus options for up to 263 more that could push the contract as high as $11.7 billion. Interestingly, Sikorsky adds that:
“To reach the full baseline value of $8.5 billion, the services are ordering aircraft in the base agreement to be sold via the U.S. Government’s Foreign Military Sales program. These aircraft include Foreign Military Sale (FMS) UH-60M aircraft for several allied countries and MH-60R SEAHAWK anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare helicopters for the Royal Australian Navy… BLACK HAWK and SEAHAWK aircraft deliveries under the new contract will begin this month.”
Those totals compare to $7.4 billion for 537 helicopters in MYP-7, plus 263 additional options that Sikorsky said could push the contract to $11.6 billion for 800 helicopters. Orders ended up falling well short of that total, but the options were there.
Recent DSCA requests indicate that interest in Sikorsky’s helicopters is rising, so MYP-8 looks set to produce more machines. Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, but the helicopters themselves are made on 4 separate production lines located in West Palm Beach, FL, and in its Stratford, CT final assembly facility. The contract is announced by the Pentagon as running until Sept 30/16 (end of FY 2016). Sikorsky, on the other hand, cites December 2017 as the end date. Subsequent Pentagon documents continue to insist on FY 2012 – 2016, even though MYP-7 technically ended on Dec 31/12.
The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 1 bid received by US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-12-C-0008). Since only Sikorsky can make those helicopters, it isn’t surprising that only 1 firm responded. See also Sikorsky.
MYP-VIII Framework
Feb 13/12: The USA’s FY 2013 budget documents include a proposal for the next multi-year deal. Helicopters bought will be in basically the same configuration as MYP-VII machines, and overall savings vs. single year buys add up to $850.3 million:
“This proposed Multiyear Procurement (MYP) covers the purchase of 318 UH-60M/HH-60M BLACK HAWK aircraft and 193 Navy MH-60 helicopter airframes in FY 2012 through FY 2016 under a single, five year fixed price type contract. The MYP strategy is structured to achieve $850.3 Million (TY$) in cost savings over the five year period with $502.9M realized in the Army Aircraft Procurement Appropriation and $347.4M in the Navy Aircraft Procurement Appropriation. This proposed Joint Service multiyear contract for the procurement of Army UH-60M/HH-60M aircraft and Navy MH-60R/S aircraft follows a currently executing (FY 2007 through FY 2011) Joint Service MYP between the Army, Navy, and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation for H-60 helicopters. The UH-60M/HH-60M,MH-60S, and MH-60R aircraft .being procured on the proposed multiyear contract are essentially the same configuration as those being procured on the current FY07-11 multiyear contract. The MYP will include a Variation in Quantity Clause allowing for minor fluctuation of aircraft quantity and provide baseline pricing for potential Foreign Military Sales. The U.S. Army and Navy met SECDEF certification requirements on March 1, 2011.”
Additional ReadingsReaders with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.
Tags: myp-viii, myp-8
The 9th edition of the Personnel Recovery Controller and Planner Course (PRCPC), a project initiated and supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA), was organised and hosted for the third time by the European Personnel Recovery Centre (EPRC), a close partner of the Agency.
The course was successfully conducted from 21 November to 2 December in Poggio Renatico Air Base (Italy). 21 students from 11 countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Cyprus, Ireland and the United States) benefitted from the knowledge and experience of a team of instructors coming from Belgium, France, Germany, UK, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and Canada.
The main objective of the course was to train Personnel Recovery (PR) staff working in tactical operation centres (TOCs), personnel recovery coordination cells (PRCCs) or joint personnel recovery cells (JPRCs) in supporting their commanders in any future PR activities.
Personnel Recovery is a vital element of modern operational planning as it provides a security net for deployed personnel. Most importantly, it boosts morale and acknowledges national as well as European Union responsibilities to effect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel deployed in the context of Crisis Management Operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
The next EU PRCPC will take place in Karlsborg (Sweden) from 27 March to 7 April 2017 and will be organised by the Swedish Armed Forces.
Background
The EDA PRCPC project was established on 30 May 2013 as an EDA Category B project under the lead of Sweden. As of today, it includes six contributing EU Member States (cMS): Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden. On 31 May 2015, the cMS agreed to extend the PRCPC Cat B project until 30 May 2017. The EPRC is a potential candidate for the continuation of the project.
The EPRC closely cooperates with the EDA. It was created on 8 July 2015 by seven nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Great Britain) with the aim of improving the four phases of Personnel Recovery (Preparation, Planning, Execution and Adaptation) by developing/harmonising the Personnel Recovery Policy, Doctrine and Standards through clear lines of communications with partners/stakeholders (nations and international organisations), and providing assistance in support of education and training, exercises and operations.
More information:
Maiden flight of the Certifiable Predator B:
Targeting pods are a very affordable way to upgrade existing aircraft with precision strike and surveillance capabilities. As such, their popularity in the modern age is likely to remain very strong for the foreseeable future. At present, the top offerings on the market include the Northrop-Grumman/ RAFAEL LITENING series (vid. the recent Dutch order), Lockheed’s Sniper XR/Pantera, and Raytheon’s ATFLIR. All are 3rd generation offerings, successors to the early 2nd generation LITENING all-in-one pods and the first-generation LANTIRN (Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night) twin-pod set.
LANTIRN pods may be first-generation technology, but they still fly with a number of air forces and were included as the pods specified for Greece’s new F-16Ds. As such, Lockheed’s announcement that it is selling upgraded LANTIRNs to Denmark offers an interesting look at potential opportunities at the lower end of the global market.
As noted earlier, LANTIRN is a system of two pods. The AN/AAQ-13 navigation pod provides high-speed penetration and precision attack assistance in all flying conditions, using a terrain-following radar and a fixed infrared sensor to display an image of the terrain in front of the aircraft on a heads-up display of cockpit viewscreen. This helps the pilot maintain a pre-selected altitude above the terrain and avoid obstacles, while flying at high speed and using mountains, valleys and the cover of darkness to avoid radar detection.
The AN/AAQ-14 targeting pod is just what it says: a laser and infrared targeting pod to assist in the delivery of precision weapons like Paveway laser-guided bombs, AGM-65 Maverick missiles, et. al.
(click to view larger)The Royal Danish Air Force will pay Lockheed Martin $20 million for the latest round of upgrades to their 13 LANTIRN targeting pods, and also requests another 3 LANTIRN ER (extended range) pods. The 26-month contract includes organizational-level spares, maintenance training and pilot familiarization training.
As part of Lockheed’s 8-year partnership with the RDAF, its LANTIRN targeting pods were upgraded in a previous contract to include a CCD TV, a 40,000-ft. laser and a laser spot tracker. LANTIRN ER adds a third-generation mid-wave forward-looking infrared (FLIR), an infrared pointer, an inertial measurement unit to assist with positioning fixes guided weapons, and extended range software. It also simplifies the original pod design and eliminates many parts in an effort to increase reliability and reduce operation and support costs. See Lockheed press release.
While the LANTIRN ER is significantly less capable than the LITENING AT pod recently ordered by the Dutch for their F-16s, the deal’s economics are worth noting: $20 million for 13 upgrades of existing systems plus 3 pods (16), vs. just over $40 million for 20 LITENING AT 3rd generation targeting pods and spares.
UpdateDecember 5/16: Egypt is to receive 65 LANTIRN targeting pods under the US Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. Manufactured by Lockheed Martin, the navigation and targeting pod systems will come from existing USAF stocks and are most likely to be used on Cairo’s fleet of F-16 Fighting Falcons. Some of Egypt’s F-16s already operate LM’s AN/AAQ-33 Sniper targeting pod, LANTIRN’s successor.
Ghor province, in western Afghanistan, has been in the headlines in the past few years. Not only was the appointment of its first female provincial governor overturned, there has also been a series of extreme cases of violence against its women. In this unsettling provincial case study, AAN’s Salima Ahmadi takes a closer look at how conservative attitudes and customary practices, combined with insecurity and a failing justice system, result in an environment of near-constant violence against Afghan girls and women, where perpetrators literally get away with murder. (Written in cooperation with Ehsan Qaane and Sari Kouvo).
Women’s leadership: too soon for Ghor?
On 28 June 2015, Sima Joyenda (1) was appointed governor of Ghor province. Joyenda was one of two female governors introduced by the National Unity Government (the other one being Masuma Muradi, governor of Daikundi). On 4 July 2015, a week after Joyenda’s appointment, the Ulema Council in Ghor sent an official letter demanding her resignation. The letter was written and signed by Ghor’s former Ulema Council Head, Mawlawi Esmatullah Nadim, and stated: “Considering Sharia provisions, the current chaotic situation in Ghor and the will and opinion of the people, the governor of Ghor should step down from her position and respect the will of Ulema. The Ulema will not be obedient to a female governor.” (The letter can be found here). The council’s spokesman, Mawlawi Haidari, on his social media account, called women “incomplete” (see here and here). Tolo News quoted another of the Ulema Council members, Mawlawi Muhammad, saying: “We expect the government to introduce a male governor, noting that a woman cannot be a prayer leader for men,” from which he concluded that neither could women govern a province. Senator Muhammad Dawud Ghafari from Ghor province also opposed her appointment and said that: “A woman cannot manage one million people. There is conflict in Ghor; no one listens to a man, much less to a woman.” In response to these positions, there was also pushback by activists and certain clerics who described the opposition to the female governor’s appointment as being “against Islam and against the will of the people.”
The aggressive protests and pressure from religious figures, local officials and armed groups continued, and, on 17 December 2015, Joyenda was replaced by Ghulam Nasir Khaze, a man with close connections to Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah (see here). Joyenda told AAN that she had been removed because she was a woman and “the conservative people in Ghor do not want a woman in a leadership role” (although she later hinted that the opposition may have also been due to her stance vis-à-vis land grabbing). After her removal, she was reappointed as deputy governor of the country’s capital, Kabul, but she refused the post.
Increased reporting of violence against women in Ghor
Joyenda’s appointment and her subsequent removal did result in increased attention on the plight of women in Ghor province. According to Latifa Sultani, gender coordinator at the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), this increased attention resulted in more reported cases of the violence faced by women in the province.
Masuma Anwari, who heads Ghor’s Department of Women’s Affairs (DoWA), said that in 1394 (2015) her department registered 90 cases of violence against women, 30 cases more than during the previous year (see here). The rise in reported cases seems to have continued into this year: in the first five months of 1395 (corresponding roughly to April-August 2016), 50 cases had already been reported to the DoWA, 17 of which were of suicide, rape or self-immolation (see here). More cases may have also been reported to the departments of the interior ministry, the judiciary and the local office of the AIHRC (although the extent to which the reports to the different institutions overlap is unclear).
An increase in reported cases does not necessarily signify an increase in cases of violence, as there has been – and continues to be – considerable under-reporting of violence against women. But it does suggest an increased awareness that violence against women is a crime that needs to be addressed by the state authorities. This trend is likely to continue now that a female attorney general, specifically responsible for violence against women, has been appointed to Ghor province. Nagina Ghori is the first senior female attorney general in Ghor’s history. Women’s rights activists welcomed her appointment in July 2016. As noted by Farida Nasiri, a women’s rights officer at the provincial office of the AIHRC: “A female attorney increases our hopes that cases of violence against women will be properly addressed in the future” (see here). Like former governor Joyenda, Ghori will face many challenges, including widespread reluctance to see her bring to light extreme cases of violence against women. Several recent high-profile cases illustrate how a conservative culture, insecurity and the failure of the formal justice system often force girls and women to live with extreme violence and allow their perpetrators to literally get away with murder.
Recent cases of violence against women: The stoning of Rukhshana (25 October 2015)
On 25 October 2015, 19 year-old Rukhshana was stoned to death for alleged adultery (see here ) in Ghalmin, a village not far from Feroz Koh, the provincial capital of Ghor (previously named Chaghcharan – see here). Tolo News reported that Rukhshana’s father had married her off to a disabled man at the age of 13. She had not accepted the marriage, however, and had run off with her childhood love to Saghar district. There she was arrested by security forces and handed over to her parents. Her father then married her off to another man but she ran away again, this time to Murghab district.
A local commander, Mullah Yusuf, who had apparently asked Rukhshana’s hand for his brother several times, allegedly captured her and handed her over to a group that was identified by the media as Taleban (see here). (2) According to Tolo News, the men told her father: “If you give us five million afghani, we will give back your daughter. Otherwise we will kill her.” When her father refused to pay the amount, one of the members, Mullah Hashem, ordered the stoning.
The two-minute video of her death went viral on social media, showing a teenage girl placed in a hole in the ground and surrounded by a group of men who hurled stones at her until she died (a link to the video can be found here and here). After Farkhunda’s murder in March 2015 in Kabul (see AAN’s reporting here, here and here), this was another brutal murder of a woman, to which the public reacted with outrage.
During the parliament’s plenary session on 4 November 2015, female MPs strongly condemned the stoning of Rukhshana. They said that, given the presence of the Afghan judiciary, no one should be tried in an arbitrary court (mahkama-ye sahrayi, lit: desert court). Fawzia Kufi, the head of the Wolesi Jirga’s Women’s Affairs Commission, criticised conservative male MPs who had opposed the passing of the Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) law in 2013. Kufi said, “If parliament had approved the EVAW law, the culprits would have feared punishment and Rukhshana would not have been stoned to death.” She argued that MPs who had called the EVAW law anti-Islamic should be held responsible for the increase in cases of violence against women. Another female MP, Gulalai Nur Safi from Balkh province, noted:
The stoning of a young woman in Ghor province in such a barbaric way is an inhumane act and is against Sharia law. Forced marriages compel our women to escape from their houses. When the EVAW law was on the parliament’s agenda, most of our male MPs were against it and said that this law was against Islam. I do not think that killing a woman in such a barbaric way is according to Sharia. I wonder how Sharia and conservative MPs would interpret this act of barbarism.
In response to the demands of the predominantly female MPs and women’s rights activists, the government sent a delegation to Ghor to investigate the case. The delegation, however, was led by Mawlawi Balegh, a prominent member of the National Ulema Council and adviser to President Ghani on religious affairs, who, according to a New York Times article, had justified Rukhshana’s stoning in a Friday sermon. He said: “If you are married and you commit adultery, you have to be stoned … the only question is whether this was done according to Sharia Law, with witnesses and confessions as required.” The other members of the delegation were representatives from the Attorney General’s Office, the National Directorate of Security, AIHRC and the interior ministry. The delegation and local authorities assured the victim’s family that justice would be done and the perpetrators would be arrested. The committee did not release a formal report, and, despite the fact that the police reportedly identified 28 suspects related to her murder, none of them has been arrested at the time of writing. Joyenda, the former governor of Ghor, told AAN that the government had been unable to arrest the men who killed Rukhshana, as it has no control over the area where the stoning took place.
The victim’s family has since received death threats from the armed group who carried out the killing and has moved to Feroz Koh, after the government proved unable to protect them.
Recent cases of violence against women: The burning alive of child bride Zahra (12 July 2016)
On 12 July 2016, in an unusually shocking case, Zahra, a 14 year-old girl who was four months pregnant, was tortured, stabbed and finally set on fire by her in-laws, after she refused to work in a poppy field. When she was taken to the central hospital in Ghor, doctors found that 90 percent of her body had burn wounds. She needed serious treatment, which was not possible in Ghor. The AIHRC and women’s rights groups, with the help of the newly appointed female attorney, Ghori, urged the government to help transfer her to Kabul; Ghori made all the arrangements and Zahra was transferred to Esteqlal Hospital in Kabul, where she died on 17 July 2016.
Zahra had been married off a few years earlier, at the age of eleven, to settle a dispute about a bride price payment. Wida Saghari, a women’s rights activist, told AAN that after Zahra’s mother had become paralysed, Zahra’s father, Muhammad Azam, took a new wife. At the time, he promised his new in-laws 500,000 afghani as the bride price (see here for more background on the customs surrounding bride price). Since Azam was a poor man and could not afford to pay this sum, his in-laws demanded that he settle the dispute by giving three of his daughters as well as a (smaller) sum of money. According to Saghari, “the victim’s father had no other option but to give his daughter to settle the matter through the practice of baad.”
Baad, or the giving of a girl to another family to settle a dispute, is a common practice, particularly in the more remote and rural areas of Afghanistan. Girls who are given in baad often face a lot of violence and hostility from their new families. A survivor of baad from Nangarhar told AAN: “From the day a girl is given as baad, she is given into slavery and is never treated like a normal member of the family. She is often abused and beaten by the in-laws. Zahra was also the victim of baad. She could not withstand the abuse and died.” (There are also men who oppose the practice of baad. For instance Khan Wali Adel, a civil activist from Paktia province, protested against the practice by putting up a tent on the Darulaman Road near the parliament. He kept up his protest for six months (until 19 October 2016). His protest stemmed from the fact that years ago two of his sisters had been exchanged in the practice of baad and that recently his father had wanted to take ten girls from another tribe in revenge for the killing of his brothers (see here). He told AAN that his own sisters were treated badly by their in-laws and he did not want to let his father ruin the future of ten other innocent girls.)
After losing his daughter, Zahra’s father pledged to seek justice in Kabul. On 17 July, supported by women’s rights activists, he set up an advocacy camp for Zahra and other victims of violence against women, in Allauddin Park, in the Karte-ye Seh area of Kabul. (see here) The group put forward three key demands to the government: the transfer of Zahra’s case from the provincial court to Kabul, the arrest and transfer of the culprits to Kabul, and a public trial. They said that until the government arrested the culprits, no funeral would be held for Zahra. The fact that the case received extensive coverage from both the national and international media put pressure on the government to respond to the protestors’ demands.
According to one of Zahra’s relatives, Zahra’s father in-law and mother in-law have indeed been arrested and are being detained in Pul-e Charkhi prison in Kabul. However, the main culprit, Zahra’s husband, is still at large. A local source from Ghor told AAN that the governor, Ghulam Nasir Khaze, and the provincial council head, Fazl-ul-Haq Ehsan, are not cooperating with the husband’s arrest: “Zahra’s husband is at home; he has not escaped anywhere because he is being protected by the local authorities.” According to the local source, when civil society activists from Kabul approached the governor, he said that no one had issued an arrest warrant, so how could he, the governor, arrest the husband. On 10 August 2016, twenty-five days after Zahra’s death, she was laid to rest on Bibi Mahro Hill (see here).
Earlier, Zahra’s father had told Tolo News: “They [the victim’s in-laws] have power. The court works in their favour. The police headquarters and the provincial council office are also in their favour. Whatever they say will be done by the judicial organs.” The fact that provincial courts are often directly influenced by prominent warlords or local government officials explains why a victim’s family would demand the transfer of their case to the capital. Moreover, according to a representative of AIHRC: “Five districts of Ghor province are insecure and the government’s presence is weak, so delivering justice and guaranteeing a fair trial there is hardly a possibility.” The attorney general, Ghori, also wanted Zahra’s murderers to be prosecuted in Kabul. She was certain that due to family ties, local officials would prevent Zahra’s in-laws from being punished.
Victims’ families thus demand the transfer of cases to the capital in the hope that law enforcement will be better there and women’s voices will be heard. The transfer slows down the prosecution process, but increases hope for justice to be delivered.
Other reported cases of violence against women from Ghor province
On 31 August 2015, Ghor’s primary court ordered the public lashing of a woman and a man for committing adultery. The couple received 100 lashes after the primary court of Ghor had ruled that the young couple were unmarried and had had unlawful sexual relations (see here and here). When asked later, Atta Muhammad Faruqi, a primary court judge, said that the penalty was in line with article 130 of the Constitution and article 1 of the Penal Code. (3) Moreover, he said, “the couple confessed four times before the court that they had a sexual relationship” (see here). Abdul Hai Khatib, who was the governor’s spokesperson at the time said: “They had relations a long time ago, but were arrested only early this month. Their punishment is based on Sharia law and will teach others a lesson” (see here).
On 20 November 2015, a 26-year old woman named Shirin Gul, who was accused of running away from home, died after a public lashing (see here). Shirin Gul was originally from Herat province; she had gone to Shahrak district in Ghor to visit her uncle’s family. There, she was accused of running away from home. Details are scarce, but the former governor of Ghor, Sima Joyenda, said that the girl had received the lashings from armed men in public, after which she died of her injuries: “Although the police chief of Shahrak district denies this, the victim’s father says his daughter died of the lashings.” The interior ministry launched an investigation into the crime (see here).
In late July 2016, Gharib Gul, a 6-year old girl was reported to have been married off to a 60-year old imam in Obeh district of Herat, in exchange for a goat (see here). This was such an extreme example of child marriage that it caused a public outcry. The people of Gehr village in Herat, where the wedding took place, asked the imam to leave the place; he was eventually arrested in Feroz Koh, in neighbouring Ghor province (for more details see this report). Women’s rights activists in Kabul and Ghor demanded justice for Gharib Gul and called for the prosecution of the old man, saying that “an example has to be made of a 60-year-old cleric who marries a six-year-old girl.” After the outcry by women’s rights activists, Sayed Abdul Karim, the cleric, was sentenced by Ghor’s provincial court to seven years in prison while the victim’s father received a four-year term (see here).
On 25 August 2016, Reyhana, an 18 year-old girl originally from Feroz Koh district in Ghor, was killed by her in-laws in Badghis province. When Reyhana was only three years old, her father had found her a spouse named Abdul Ghafur. “Ba naam kardan-e dukhtar” is another customary practice of early marriage, where a girl is promised in marriage at birth, or at an early age, to a specific man. She is not sent to her in-laws until she reaches a certain age (sometimes the girl is the legally required age, which is 16, sometimes she is married off well before that). Reyhana’s father died when she was fourteen years old. At the age of 17, she was sent to her in-laws in Jund district in Badghis. During the nine months of her marriage, her in-laws abused her badly because she did not become pregnant, according to the women’s affairs department head in Ghor who told AAN the details of the case. When Reyhana went to Feroz Koh to visit her mother, her family tried to file a case against her in-laws with the local courts, but they were told they had to go to the court in Jund district. When Reyhana tried to stay with her parents in Ghor, her powerful in-laws took her back to Jund. Here she was left helpless, as she had no relatives to help her register her case. Unemployment and poverty prompted Abdul Ghafur, Reyhana’s husband, to travel to Iran and seek employment there. “Seven days after Ghafur left for Iran, Reyhana was decapitated by her in-laws and her dead body was sent to Feroz Koh,” according to the head of the women’s affairs department. Reyhana’s mother in-law, sister in-law and brother in-law were the main suspects in this murder (Dari report here). The case was registered with the AIHRC and the DoWA’s office, but there has so far been no attempt to prosecute the in-laws.
The limits and importance of trying to change the law
This provincial case study from Ghor illustrates the challenges women and women’s rights activists face when trying to promote equality and increased respect for women’s rights in Afghanistan. Women’s active participation in society and girls’ rights to decide about their own bodies and lives remains fiercely contested. Legal changes that seek to promote equality and women’s rights, although they often remain on paper only, are still important tools for those who want to fight for equality and rights, as they can contribute to gradual changes in the justice system, institutions and in people’s minds. But these laws are also vehemently – and sometimes violently – contested.
The challenges are compounded by ongoing conflict and poverty: conflict enables those with power to intimidate and kill with impunity, while poverty contributes to the upholding of customs that treat girls and women as commodities. These challenges demand an intense struggle by the government and women’s rights groups to expand awareness programmes – to educate women, and their families, about their basic rights and protections under the law – to more remote places. Such awareness programmes, on women’s rights and the laws that protect women, should also focus on local mullahs who are influential at the community level.
On a positive note, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, together with the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, took the initiative in January 2016 to demand that all marriages be registered in the family courts and that marriage certificates be provided. According to Delbar Nazari, the Minister of Women’s Affairs, registration will start in Kabul city and its four provincial zones, from where it will expand to the provinces (see here). It is meant as a measure to help decrease, and ultimately overcome, violence against women in Afghanistan (see here). Based on statistics released by AIHRC in 2012, “Eighty per cent of Afghans have marriage certificates that are not registered in any court.” It is hoped that marriage registration in the courts will help push back the proportion of forced marriages and child marriages (in which women and girls are often particularly vulnerable to violence and mistreatment). This may be a small step forward, but it is another step towards providing women and girls with greater legal protection against violent exploitation and abuse.
Edited by Sari Kouvo and Martine van Bijlert
(1) Sima Joyenda, an ethnic Aimaq, was born in 1971 in Feroz Koh district of Ghor province (at the time it was still called Chaghcharan), where she attended primary and secondary school. Joyenda was a delegate to the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002 and the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003. She was a candidate in the parliamentary elections in 2005, but did not win a seat in the Wolesi Jirga. After her unsuccessful election campaign she got her Bachelor degree in Law and Political Science at Kateb University in Kabul. In 2010, she ran again in the parliamentary election and was elected as MP for Ghor province. In June 2015, President Ghani appointed Joyenda to replace the former governor of Ghor, Sayed Anwar Rahmati. She was replaced on 17 December 2015, after continued protests by the religious figures and reappointed to the position of deputy governor of the capital, Kabul, which she refused (see here ).
(2) For more details on the complicated background of this group, see recent AAN reporting here. AAN’s Borhan Osman has found that the perpetrators of this and other acts of violence was an armed group that has been alternately linked to the Taleban and the Afghan government, and has been largely operating as a criminal gang:
[The group] had previously been referred to as Taleban, a pro-government force or merely an illegal armed group. For example, when the Murghabi network fought Mullah Ahmad Shah’s men in the Gorken area of Charsada district in July 2015, local officials hailed them as an uprising loyal to Shah Wali. The ANSF joined the Murghabi network in the battle for Gorken, an important Taleban stronghold. However, in another incident in the same year, in October 2015, when Faruq, Taj Muhammad and Abdul Rahman Muzammil stoned to death a 19 year-old girl named Rokhshana for alleged adultery, local people and officials said they were members of the Taleban. This description was then picked up, largely unverified, by both the local and international media.
(3) This means the primary court chose to try the case based on legal articles that allow a judge to turn to Hanafi jurisprudence in cases where there is no specific applicable law. In this case, however, there was an applicable law: Article 427 of the Penal Code, which applies to adultery and has a more lenient sentence.