Defence`s Feeds

German Heckler and Koch HK417 Automatic Rifle

OceanServer Technology recently participated in the first ever Unmanned Warrior (UW) in Loch Alsh, Scotland.

At the EDA ministerial Steering Board which met this Tuesday morning (15 November) under the chairmanship of HR/VP Federica Mogherini in her capacity as Head of the Agency, Defence Ministers tasked EDA to review the Capability Development Plan (CDP), approved the 2017 general budget and agreed to set up a working group to study the potential creation of a Cooperative Financial Mechanism.

Ministers agreed to the review of the Capability Development Plan (CDP), to improve the capability development process by taking into account R&T and industrial aspects, and tasked the EDA to present a new set of EU priorities for military capability development for Steering Board adoption by spring 2018.

The CDP review is a key element of the new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) which states that, in order to match the level of ambition set out in the strategy, Member States will need high-end military capabilities, i.e. full-spectrum land, air, space and maritime capabilities, including strategic enablers. The CDP serves as a reference for national capability planning by informing Member States about capability requirements over time, identifying areas for capability improvements and translating capability priorities into concrete collaborative programmes.

 

EDA 2017 budget: first increase since 2010

Ministers approved EDA’s general budget for 2017: €31 million compared to €30.5 million in 2016.

 

Cooperative Financial Mechanism (CFM)

Ministers were presented with EDA proposals for the potential establishment of a ‘Cooperative Financial Mechanism’ (CFM) the objective of which would be to overcome the lack of budgetary synchronisation between Member States and the problems that this causes for the launch of cooperative defence cooperation projects.

They agreed to set up a working group within EDA in view of submitting a legal and financial package and associated recommendations in spring 2017.

Experience has shown that one of the key factors that block or hinder cooperation is budget asymmetry or lack of synchronisation of budget availability. A potential Cooperative Financial Mechanism could alleviate this challenge by supporting the launch of projects (R&T, capability development). It would potentially incentivise cooperation by tackling the problem of absence of budgetary synchronisation, but also increasing the availability of common resources/ring-fencing budgets allocated to cooperation.

The CFM will have to respect the budgetary specialty principle as expressed in the national budgetary laws and ensure that Member States keep full control of their resources and on the use of the mechanism. These aspects will be dealt with in the EDA working group.

 

Implementation of EDA key taskings

Ministers welcomed the progress made on the implementation of the Agency’s ‘key taskings’ in the various capability programmes and the work carried out in relation to the Preparatory Action, and were briefed on the planned next steps, notably in the context of the taskings that emerge from the Council conclusions adopted yesterday (14 November) on implementing the EUGS in the area of Security and Defence.

The EDA was invited to develop a structured dialogue with industry, including not only prime companies but also national defence industry associations (NDIAs) and SMEs from Member States, in support of Key Strategic Activities (KSA) the first five test cases for which have also been welcomed.

More information:

• Council conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence (adopted on 14 November 2016)

As part of its ongoing efforts to improve Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) capabilities, the European Defence Agency (EDA) will shortly share a new C-IED tool with its participating Member States.

Under the umbrella of the existing Framework Cooperation Agreement with the C-IED Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Madrid/Spain, a new ‘Counter-IEDs analyst Interagency Unclassified Situational Awareness Tool’ (C-IUSAT) will soon enter into service in order to promote information sharing between C-IED operators. The application is expected to be released in December 2016.

The tool will help users to gain a better situational understanding by projecting, with several degrees of probability, the next actions that the enemy or other threat elements are likely to carry out. Thereby, further exchanges of information between military and other involved agents such as host nations, Law Enforcement, governments, NGOs, private companies, etc. can be ensured.

C-IUSAT will be a common information exchange tool, with restricted access, available to different services/agencies and private organizations. It will help them to collect information, show it on maps and generate models which can subsequently identify expected paths or ways of action.

C-IUSAT will be a web based tool, accessible by PC or mobile phone. It stores its own map data which can be used to generate different data layers for various events/activities/sources thereby enhancing situational awareness.

A meeting will be organized at the EDA in early 2017 to proceed with a live demonstration of the tool’s main features.

 

More information:

• Counter-IED (EDA project page)
• “C-IED proficiency needs to be improved and shared”, says Jorge DOMECQ (EDA webnews, October 2016)
• First C-IED workshop successfully completed (EDA webnews, June 2016)

 

The US Navy, Marine Corps (USMC), along with the Royal Brunei Navy and Armed Forces have started the 22nd Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise.

Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) has successfully completed the refit of the Indian Navy’s aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, one month ahead of schedule.

The US Navy’s Huntington Ingalls Industries-built Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, John Finn (DDG 113), has successfully completed its third and final round of sea trials in the Gulf of Mexico.

Americas

• The first US flight of the T-50A advanced jet trainer will take place on November 17 at Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Pilot Training facility in Greenville, South Carolina. Developed jointly by LM and Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI), the trainer is an upgraded version of the T-50 Golden Eagle and is being offered to the USAF’s T-X trainer competition. It was expected that RoKAF Chief of Staff Gen. Jeong Kyeong-doo and Vice Defense Minister Hwang In-moo would witness the flight, but due to the recent political turmoil at home, will not make the trip. South Korean President Park Geun-hye is under increased pressure to resign following allegations that she let her friend Choi Soon-sil, a shamanist cult leader, have extensive access and influence over government policy and decision making.

• Aurora Flight Sciences is to develop an unmanned Huey helicopter for cargo delivery. The company has already tested their aerial cargo/utility system (AACUS) on two other helicopters and are now looking to develop an unmanned UH-1H Huey with their Tactical Autonomous Aerial Logistics System (TALOS). Commercial applications being mulled over by Aurora include for civilian first responders flying in storms or nighttime.

Middle East & North Africa

• F-16C/D fighters from the Israeli Air Force 101 Fighter Squadron are being integrated with the Rafael Spice 1000 precision guided munition. The munition is a 453kg (1,000lb) bomb equipped with a guidance kit, with pop-out wings that extend its range to more than 100km (54nm). The IAF expects to reach full operational capability with the Spice 1000 in the coming weeks. Meanwhile, Israel’s Defense Ministry is looking to outsource testing the Arrow missile defense system and Shavit rocket to private companies with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Rafael both bidding for the tender.

Europe

• The Royal Navy is expected to be left without an anti-ship missile strike capability between 2018-2020. Such a gap is being caused by the planned retirement of the Sea Skua missile in early 2017 and the 2018 retirement of the SWS60 Harpoon. A limited anti-ship capability will only return when the Sea Venom/ANL lightweight anti-ship missile is equipped on the Wildcat HMA.2 helicopter in late 2020. No funded program is in place by the UK for a Harpoon replacement, however.

• Russia’s third-generation Ratnik (Warrior) combat gear will feature an active exoskeleton, which will significantly increase the physical power of soldiers wearing it. It will be introduced within the next 5-7 years. The active exoskeleton mechanism’s hinges are equipped with electric and hydraulic drives, to enhance the possibilities of the musculoskeletal system. A passive exoskeleton that does not contain wire and will not be connected to the body of the serviceman will also be included. It will serve to reduce the load on joints and will reduce the likelihood of injury. Designers will create systems to display information and target designation on the visor or goggles.

• US troops in Europe have received their largest ammo delivery in over 20 years. 600 shipping containers were delivered to the Miesau Army Depot in Germany late last month for storage and distribution to USAF and Army forces. The buildup is seen as a way of reassuring anxious European allies, especially in eastern Europe, against a believed security concern posed by Russia.

Asia Pacific

• While some commercial jet deals are slowly making their way toward Iran, a Russian diplomat has said that military acquisitions are not so simple. Tehran’s plans to acquire Russian fighters such as the Sukhoi Su-30SM may be difficult due to UN Resolution 2231, which would refer such defense deals to the Security Council. Levan Dzhagaryan, the Russian Ambassador to Iran, made the comments but also stated that Moscow is “ready to cooperate with Iran on this sensitive issue, but only under permitted areas.”

• A joint venture agreement has been finalized between Elbit Systems and Adani Enterprises to manufacture UAVs for the Indian market. The joint venture will pitch Elbit’s Hermes 450 and 900 systems in an effort to break the stranglehold currently held by fellow Israeli firm IAI. Having recently joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), New Delhi is forging ahead with procuring armed UAVs in order to tackle militants operating in areas such as the disputed region of Kashmir.

Today’s Video

GoPro Cockpit footage of a Croatian Air Force MiG-21:

ANL on NH90
(click to view full)

Britain needs to replace the old Sea Skua missiles carried by its Lynx naval helicopters. France could use a lighter missile than the 655 kg AM39 Exocet – one that could be carried by a wider range of helicopters, and offer a different attack profile. The answer to both needs may lie in a notional 110 kg missile under development by MBDA, as part of a broad 2006 “Team Complex Weapons” arrangement with the UK’s Ministry of Defence.

The tough part was getting Britain and France to come together and agree on the development framework for the Sea Venom / Anti-Navire Leger (ANL) / Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon – Heavy (FASGW-H) missile. Britain needs a strike missile to equip its new AW159 Wildcats, but France can already mount longer-range AM39 Exocets on its Super Puma helicopters, and didn’t feel a huge sense of urgency about its new NH90-NFH medium helicopters or AS565 Panther light naval helicopters. It took until 2013, but development is now underway.

Sea Venom / ANL / FASGW-H: The Missile MBDA video
click for video

The program’s goal is a 110 kg missile with a 30 kg warhead, one capable of sinking or disabling Fast Attack Craft (FAC) in the 50t – 500t ton range, and damaging corvettes or frigates. The choice of guidance modes should also allow it to be used for precision attack more generally. Boost and sustain rocket motors are both compliant with naval safety requirements, and steps have been taken to ease integration by minimizing changes to shipborne handling equipment, magazines, etc. that currently handle the Sea Skua and AS.15TT missiles.

The Sea Venom / ANL (Anti-Navire Leger) missile will rely on inertial navigation + Imaging Infrared (IIR) guidance, creating a fire-and-forget weapon that won’t alert its targets by broadcasting a radar signal. A radar altimeter looks down, to keep the missile skimming just above the waves and make it harder for defensive radars to pick up. ANL can be fired in either Lock-on Before Launch or Lock-on After Launch modes, and a bi-directional datalink allows updates and retargeting in flight.

As a comparative illustration, the semi-active radar homing AS.15 and Sea Skua aren’t fire and forget, while the Exocet’s active radar guidance will trigger a ship’s ESM defensive electronics.

Range isn’t given, but given its size, the ANL’s range is very likely to be shorter than the Exocet’s 70 km/ 38 nm. It’s said to be longer than the Sea Skua’s 25 km/ 13.5 nm, which represents the rough minimum in order to keep the launching helicopter beyond the reach of short range air defenses expected on FAC, corvette, and light frigate opponents.

Development will be led by European missile giant MBDA, who has branches on both sides of the English Channel and is owned by BAE, EADS, and Finmeccanica. They’re also the manufacturer of larger helicopter-launched anti-ship missiles like the AM39 Exocet and Marte Mk2, and shorter-range missiles like the FASGW-L/ LMM and laser-guided 127mm Zuni rockets.

Britain had been planning to replace its Sea Skua missiles by 2012 – 2014, but that won’t be possible. At best, there will be testing in late 2017 – early 2018. France’s timeline was more leisurely, aiming only to equip its NH90-NFH helicopters by 2020. Those timelines will force Britain to either extend the service life of its Lynx Mk8 helicopters and Sea Skua missiles, or do without a helicopter anti-ship capability until the new Sea Venom missile is ready for use from its new AW159 Wildcats.

Malaysian Sea Skua
click for video

Exports aren’t a major focus yet, but Sea Venom will be the standard strike missile option aboard future AW159 maritime helicopters, and will compete for every NH90-NFH naval helicopter customer. Customers for its predecessor missiles offer another opportunity. Saudi Arabia was the only AS.15TT export customer, but Sea Skua has been exported for helicopter and shipborne use to Brazil, Germany, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea, and Turkey.

Sea Venom’s competitors include MBDA’s own Marte Mk2/S, which will compete for NH90 orders, and Kongsberg’s popular Penguin missile. China’s TL-6 also sits in this category, but isn’t likely to compete because its integrated helicopters are unlikely to overlap.

Contracts & Key Events 2013 – 2017

Final Development contract; MoU with France and the UK; France puts ANL in their 5-year budget; UK faces a 3-year missile gap. Panther launch concept
(click to view full)

November 15/16: The Royal Navy is expected to be left without an anti-ship missile strike capability between 2018-2020. Such a gap is being caused by the planned retirement of the Sea Skua missile in early 2017 and the 2018 retirement of the SWS60 Harpoon. A limited anti-ship capability will only return when the Sea Venom/ANL lightweight anti-ship missile is equipped on the Wildcat HMA.2 helicopter in late 2020. No funded program is in place by the UK for a Harpoon replacement, however.

November 5/15: The United Kingdom and France have signed a technology-sharing agreement to develop a next-generation cruise missile. The two partners are expected to award MBDA a development contract in coming months, with the Intergovernmental Agreement covering several complex weapons programs, including the helicopter-launched anti-submarine missile known as Sea Venom.

Oct 28/14: Sub-contractors. Sagem DS announces a contract with their long-standing partner MBDA to develop and produce the ANL/ Sea Venom’s imaging infrared seeker. Sagem has picked Britain’s Selex ES Ltd. as a subordinate participant.

Sagem’s IIR seeker is based on uncooled detectors, based on work done for the FELIN infantry modernization and MMP anti-tank missile program. The missile will also have the ability to send back images to the helicopter’s cockpit. That will give Sea Venom a man over the loop (MOTL) firing mode that could change the assigned target during the missile’s flight, or choose a precise impact point. Sagem DS, “Sagem seeker chosen for MBDA’s new light antiship missile”.

July 17/14: Weapons. AgustaWestland signs a EUR 113 million (about GBP 89.3M / $153.1M) contract with the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) to integrate, test, and install ANL anti-ship missile and LMM light strike missile system compatibility onto 28 Royal Navy AW159 Wildcat HMA2 helicopters.

Note that the UK MoD has also signed a EUR 60.2 million contract with LMM missile maker Thales regarding broader integration of their missile onto the Wildcat fleet. Sources: Finmeccanica, “Finmeccanica – AgustaWestland signed a contract worth EUR 113 million with the UK Ministry of Defence”.

March 27/14: Development. MBDA receives the missile’s Anglo-French contract, a GBP 500 million / EUR 602 million / $830 million award to finish development. It will be managed by the UK DE&S (Defence Equipment & Support) on behalf of the French and UK ministries, as part of MBDA’s Team Complex Weapons Portfolio in Britain. This is the follow-on to the Sept 10/09 Joint Assessment Phase.

Work will take place at the Joint Project Office in Bristol, at MBDA in Lostock near Manchester, and at Stevenage. This makes 4 joint missile projects between the 2 countries: ANL AshM, Aster SAM, Meteor BVR AAM, and Storm Shadow cruise missile. Sources: UK MoD, “Multi-million-pound investment in Royal Navy missiles” | French DGA, “Le programme franco-britannique de missile anti navire leger (ANL) est lance” | MBDA, “MBDA to Develop FASGW(H)/ANL, Next Generation Anglo-French Anti-Ship Missile”.

Development contract

Feb 13/14: NAO Report. Britain’s National Audit Office releases their 2013 Major Projects Report, as well as their review of Britain’s 2013-2023 Equipment Plan. They place the value of the FASGW-H project’s Demonstration & Manufacture phase at GBP 452 million, and mention that:

“There have also been instances where project teams have relied too heavily on its industry partners, owing to resourcing problems. For example, the Department’s Scrutiny Team assessed in January 2012 that the teams responsible for implementing the heavy variant of the Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon appeared to have entirely relied on its industry partners to plan the weapon’s integration on to Wildcat and it was not evident they had the necessary skills and staff required to successfully manage the integration. While funding is in place, the team has had difficulty in recruiting and retaining staff. The project team is currently conducting a review of staffing requirements to deliver this project.”

Jan 31/14: MoU. Britain and France were expected to sign a EUR 500 million Memorandum of Understanding to build FASGW-H, among other products of a head-of-state summit. They did sign an MoU confirming joint FASGW-H orders, but unlike other items in the agreement, there was no financial figure associated with it.

Meanwhile, French sources express quiet reservations about the difficulty of securing program cooperation with British political counterparts who are already in campaign mode for 2015, and express reservations regarding British austerity measures and their potential effects on joint programs and endeavors. Sources: The Independent, “Britain to set up controversial drone development partnership with France” | UK MoD, “UK and France agree closer defence co-operation” | Defense Update, “UK, France to Invest £120 million in a Joint UCAV Study” | IHS Jane’s, “France and the UK sign defence co-operation agreements” | Le Monde, “La defense au coeur du sommet franco-britannique”.

British – French MoU

Nov 27/13: France go-ahead. French defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drian announces the end of “The End of History” in France’s Assemblée Nationale, and follows by heralding the launch of FASGW(H) and other defense programs. The 2014 – 2019 budget still needs to be approved, but the minister refers to development beginning by the end of 2013:

“D’ici la fin de 2013, pourront ainsi être engagés le missile moyenne portée MMP, qui prendra la succession des missiles MILAN, essentiel à la fois pour l’armée de terre et notre industrie missilière ; les travaux du nouveau standard du Rafale, améliorant ses capacités, avec entre autres l’intégration du missile Météor et d’un POD de désignation laser de nouvelle génération ; le missile anti navires léger ANL, que nous mènerons en coopération avec nos partenaires britanniques ; les nouveaux radars du programme SCCOA, conduit par Thalès, pour protéger le territoire national ; ou encore les bateaux multi-missions, lesB2M, destinés à l’outre-mer… Autant de contrats qui seront lancés, conformément au calendrier prévu.”

The delays will still present difficulties for Britain, which is very unlikely to get the missile in time to replace Sea Skuas by 2015. If 2018 is a more realistic date, Britain will need to either abandon the capability until ANL is ready, or extend the service life of its Lynx Mk8 fleet and Sea Skua missiles. Sources: Ministère de la Défense: “Allocution devant l’Assemblee nationale a l’occasion de l’examen du projet de loi de programmation militaire” | Naval Recognition, “French Minister of Defense Confirms Launch of ANL FASGW(H) anti-ship missile program”.

April 29/13: France. French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian offered the 1st official confirmation of France’s intent to develop the ANL missile with Britain, during a speech at the Ecole Militaire staff college. On the other hand, his confirmation isn’t exactly laced with urgency.

He talks about including the anti-ship missile in France’s planning, but Britain needs the program to start very soon, in order to be ready by 2015. Otherwise, Britain’s AW159 Wildcat will find itself handicapped in the global export market. Where it competes against machines from Eurocopter, which is partly owned by the French state. The French Navy already has Super Puma helicopters equipped with Exocets, and are reportedly comfortable with ANL delivery after 2020.

Estimates for the Demonstration & Manufacture phase are around EUR 500 million ($655 million/ GBP 422 million), with another EUR 150 million or so to add it to French NH90-NFH and AS565 Panther naval helicopters and conduct all of the required trials. A bilateral high-level working group is expected to thrash out the details by summer 2013. A 50/50 split is expected for the base funding, but negotiations are underway, and the competing timelines give France added leverage. On the other hand, a failure could damage the broader 2010 Lancaster House cooperation agreement between Britain and France. Defense News.

Jan 10/13: NAO Report. Britain’s National Audit Office releases their 2012 Major Projects Report. With respect to FASGW-H:

“There will now be at least a 19-month gap between the existing [Sea Skua] capability leaving service and the new missile being available. The Department may extend the life of the existing missile to mitigate the gap…. Interim Main Gate 3 was the third of the submissions and concerned approval for the Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Heavy) Demonstration and Manufacture Phase. The Business Case was presented to Equipment Capability Secretariat on 9 January 2012 and was considered by the Investment Approvals Committee on 18 January. On 31 January, Director General Finance approved the case, with a caveat that negotiations should be concluded with France before 31 March 2012. Bi?laterals continued, but by 28 March [2012] when Chief Secretary to the Treasury (CST) wrote to the MoD, discussions had not been concluded and as such Chief Secretary to the Treasury approved the case, subject to receiving French national approval.”

2009 – 2012

Joint Assessment Phase, Initial Team CW set doesn’t include FASGW-H. Early concept
(click to view full)

Sept 16/10: MBDA offers a progress report for the Joint Assessment Phase. Short version: they’ve got a final system design, and proven the technical maturity of key sub-systems.

Trials have included high speed wind tunnels using a representative scale model, gas gun firings to validate the warhead design, rocket motor firings “in various thermal environments”; and trials of the seeker, radar altimeter, data link terminal, and missile antenna. What they need now, is a contract for the Demonstration & Manufacture phase. MBDA.

March 29/10: Team CW. MBDA and the UK MoD sign a GBP 330 million interim Portfolio Management Agreement (PMA-I) contract, as the 1st step in a “Team Complex Weapons” partnering arrangement that could be worth up to GBP 4 billion over the next 10 years.

FASGW-H is a bit of a sideshow, as they aren’t As part of PMA-I directly. Its Assessment Phase will continue as part of the meta-program, while the PMA-I contract focuses on the Demonstration and Manufacturing phases for the ground-fired Fire Shadow Loitering Munition, and air-launched Selective Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR Capability 2, Block 1). It also funds Assessment Phases for SPEAR Capability 3 to equip the F-35, and the naval CAMM/ Future Local Area Air Defence System (FLAADS). EADS.

Team Complex Weapons PMA-I

Sept 10/09: Assessment phase. MBDA welcomes the announcement by the United Kingdom and France of a Joint Assessment Phase, funding initial development work on “a common solution for the next generation of a European helicopter anti-surface weapon.” They’re referring to FASGW(H) / ANL. MBDA.

Assessment Phase

Additional Readings

• French DGA – Le missile anti-navire leger : un atout de poids pour la marine.

• MBDA – Sea Venom / ANL. Also known as Britain’s FASGW-H program.

Background: Missiles

• MBDA – FASGW(H)/ANL. Slated for Lynx Wildcat, NH90-NFH, and AS565-SB Panther helicopters.

• MBDA – MARTE MK2/S. ANL competitor, uses active radar guidance. Integrated aboard NH90-NFH and AW101 helicopters.

• Designation Systems – Kongsberg AGM-119 Penguin. ANL competitor, uses INS/IIR guidance. Integrated aboard Lynx, H-60 Seahawk, and SH-2G Super Seasprite helicopters.

Background: Helicopters

• Naval Technology – AS 565MB Panther Mulitrole [sic] Naval Helicopter, France

• DID DII – AW159 Wildcat: The Future Lynx Helicopter Program

• DID DII – NH90: Europe’s Medium Helicopter Contender

News & Views

• UK Armed Forces Commentary (Nov 18/13) – The evolving budget situation: helicopters – UPDATE

• Think Defence (April 21/13) – UK Complex Weapons – Part 4 (Sea Skua and FASGW(H)). Includes a good recap of Sea Skua’s combat service.

The European Defence Agency’s 7th Helicopter Tactics Symposium, organised under EDA’s Helicopter Exercise Programme (HEP), was held in Athens/Greece from 7-9 November. As in previous years, the symposium offered a unique opportunity for European helicopter crews to discuss and share experience in helicopter techniques, tactics and procedures.

The symposium was opened by Brigadier General Iliopoulos (Hellenic Army Aviation Directorate) in the Greek Officers’ Mess in Athens. Over 40 helicopter tactics instructors and experts from 14 countries, with representatives of the Helicopter Tactics Course (HTC), of the Helicopter Tactics Instructor Course (HTIC) and of the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) gathered for this annual Helicopter Exercise Programme (HEP) event to analyse lessons learned and best practices identified in recent exercises, and to learn about new training opportunities offered by the contributing Member States of the HEP.

Briefings and discussions covered the tactical lessons learned from Dutch helicopter operations in Mali, the Czech Special Operations Aviation Task Unit (SOATU) training, the mentoring of Afghan aircrew by Hungary, the Belgium Mission Planning Process and the environmental training in extreme conditions experienced during exercise Cold Blade 2016 in Ivalo, Finland. In addition, host nation Greece presented its approach to Helicopter Aviation training, fire-fighting and MEDEVAC missions with their CH-47D Chinook helicopters.

The presentations were followed by panel discussions for both attack and support helicopter operators; they brought a useful insight into the latest developments in night vision goggles training, Electronic Warfare, landing zone tactics, use of sensors and technologies applied in Degraded Visual Environments, currency and proficiency challenges and helicopter self-defence aids used by the Member States. The discussions triggered new proposals for updating the HEP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) - the capstone tactics manual for multinational helicopter operations.

The academic sessions were followed by operational and planning discussions with a view to updating the HEP SOP, the HEP, HTC and the HTIC programmes as well as the NATO ATP-49. The aims and objectives of the upcoming HEP exercises were presented in detail, including Black Blade 2016 in Belgium (with a focus on helicopters and Special Operations Forces exercise) and Fire Blade 2017 in Hungary (helicopter live-firing and urban operations).

The next HEP event, Exercise BLACK BLADE 2016, starts today (14 November) at Florennes Airbase in Belgium and will last until 2 December.

 

More information:

• 4th EDA Helicopter Tactics Instructors Course (HTIC) successfully concluded (EDA news, October 2016)
• Helicopter Initiatives (EDA project page)

 

BAE Systems has been contracted by the US Navy to upgrade its San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship, USS New Orleans (LPD 18).

UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon has announced a new cooperation with Norway on maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and exercises, to enhance operational effectiveness and boost defence ties.

Aurora Flight Sciences is planning to implement and demonstrate its tactical autonomous aerial logistics system (TALOS) on the UH-1H Huey helicopter.

Americas

• Talks are being carried out between Lockheed Martin and President-elect Donald Trump’s transition team over a number of programs including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Trump had made disparaging comments about the F-35 last year on a conservative talk show, calling into question the fighter’s cost-benefit when compared to the capabilities of existing aircraft. Speaking on the talks, LM’s executive vice president for aeronautics Orlando Carvalho said, “We believe that in working with his transition team all the right information will get communicated and they’ll make the right decisions.”

• Shares in major US defense companies ended strongly last week, as news of a Trump presidency heralds good news for continued arms export growth. Investors, betting on higher Pentagon spending under Trump, spurred the growth with Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics share prices hitting lifetime highs last Wednesday. Under the Obama Administration, US arms exports, measured by production costs, grew 54 percent in 2015 from 2008, the year before President Barack Obama took office, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Middle East & North Africa

• AH-64 Apaches operated by Israel now have an anti-tank capability. Modifications to the attack helicopters now allow for the firing of the Rafael Spike anti-tank guided missile. The program began in 2014 following the halting by Washington of a shipment of Hellfire missiles to Israel during Operation Protective Edge. The offensive, which saw IDF forces conduct several weeks of operations in the Gaza Strip in response to Hamas rocket fire, has drawn international criticism on both sides.

• Israeli media have reported that Azerbaijan is interested in the Iron Dome missile interceptor system. If true, it will mark the first sale of the system to a foreign customer. The news comes as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu plans to visit Azerbaijan in the coming months amid growing ties with the region. Such a sale could, however, increase tensions between Azerbaijan and neighbor Armenia, who has been in conflict over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Europe

• Airbus has been slammed by French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian over the company’s delivery schedule of the A400M transport aircraft. In recently released minutes from a November 2 meeting of the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly, Le Drian stated “The problem is the company…Today, the A400Ms delivered are not operational – and the problem does not concern just France: that is the case everywhere.” Talks are now underway for a more timely delivery of tactical versions of the A400M which has seen issues with a lack of capabilities including parachute drops, self defense, and landing on short runways. In order to cover urgent operational requirements and fleet replacement, Paris has ordered four Hercules C-130J transport planes to fill the gap.

• Bulgaria has signed a deal with Russia to purchase ten engines for its aging fleet of MiG-29 jet fighters. The $23.75 million deal includes the supply of four new and six repaired engines. Last year Bulgaria signed an agreement with NATO ally Poland to repair six MiG-29 fighter jets, part of a push by Sofia to reduce its reliance on Russia. In an effort to move toward greater compliance with NATO standards, the Balkan country is also planning to buy eight new or second-hand fighter jets in 2017.

• Russia is prepared to commence delivery of six MiG-29 fighters to Serbia, as long as Belgrade pays the $50 million required for the aircraft’s repair and transfer. Discussions of such a sale have existed since January as both countries hold discussions on increased trade and economic cooperation. Speaking on such cooperation, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic said that any such acquisitions would not be used for offensive measures and only for the defense of the country and its people.

AsiaPacific

• The Indian Navy has been asked to clarify their need for US-2 amphibious aircraft before the government gives the acquisition the go ahead. It was expected that the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), headed by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, would approve the procurement from Japan last week but are now requesting more information on how the aircraft will be deployed. A detailed explanation is being prepared by the the sailing branch.

Today’s Video

Aurora Flight Sciences unmanned version of the Bell UH-1H:

Israeli AH-64D
(click to view full)

Israel’s attack helicopter fleet still flies AH-1 Cobras, but larger and more heavily armored AH-64 Apache helicopters began arriving in 1990, and have distinguished themselves in a number of war since. The country received 44 AH-64A helicopters from 1990 – 1993. Additional buys, conversions, and losses placed the fleet at 45 helicopters as of Flight Global’s World Air Forces 2013 report, split between AH-64As and more modern AH-64D Longbows.

The AH-64D Longbow’s sophisticated mast-mounted radar can quickly pick up tanks and other dangerous targets, but isn’t designed to distinguish civilians from combatants, or to hover close over the deck in highly populated areas. Confronted by asymmetrical urban warfare and budget priority issues, and faced with a lack of cooperation from the Obama administration, the IAF decided in 2010 to forego AH-64D upgrades for their remaining helicopters. On the other hand, the type’s consistent usefulness has led Israeli to make extensive improvements of their own, to the point where Israel has effectively created their own improved AH-64A configuration…

Contracts & Key Events Israeli AH-64s

November 14/16: AH-64 Apaches operated by Israel now have an anti-tank capability. Modifications to the attack helicopters now allow for the firing of the Rafael Spike anti-tank guided missile. The program began in 2014 following the halting by Washington of a shipment of Hellfire missiles to Israel during Operation Protective Edge. The offensive, which saw IDF forces conduct several weeks of operations in the Gaza Strip in response to Hamas rocket fire, has drawn international criticism on both sides.

March 14/14: AH-64Ai. Israel has reportedly upgraded its AH-64As to its own improved configuration, which approaches the American AH-64D standard in sophistication but isn’t the same. Improvements reportedly include Israeli electronic warfare and self-protection systems, improved avionics, compatibility with modern Israeli battle management & communications systems, and “several new” Israeli missiles.

Carriage of RAFAEL’s Spike-LR missiles as alternatives to AGM-114 Hellfires would be expected, along with Elbit Systems’ GATR-L laser-guided 70mm rockets. There are also reports that South Korea will be integrating the long-range Spike NLOS and its 25+ km reach onto its new AW159 Wildcat naval helicopters, and that kind of missile would be an equally excellent complement to Israeli AH-64s. All sources would say was:

“They are based on the huge operational experience of the force in using the Apache Longbow in a variety of combat scenarios,” an officer, identified only as Maj. Yonatan…. The upgrade has been developed amid the U.S. refusal to modernize Israel’s Apache fleet, employed in attacks on the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.

The sources said the administration of President Barack Obama blocked Israeli efforts to modernize the Apaches or purchase new helicopters from Boeing.”

Sources: World Tribune, “Israel upgrades Apache helicopters after U.S. blocked their modernization”.

Oct 8/13: AH-64A+. The commander of the IAF’s “Unit 22” says that Israel’s AH-64As are undergoing comprehensive upgrades in Israel. This includes replacing original wiring and some main computers, and a new unit-designed compartment beneath the fuselage that houses additional electronics.

Israel still flies a number of AH-64A models, after deciding not to upgrade the entire fleet to the AH-64D standard. Flight Global’s Ascend databases places the number at 26 / 48 helicopters, but it may not fully account for casualties. Sources: FlightGlobal, “Israeli Apache upgrade adds avionics pod”.

Dec 31/10: Weapons. Israel is reportedly looking to equip its AH-64 helicopters with guided 70mm rockets, and is reportedly considering whether tho use the American Hydra or Canadian CRV-7 as its base.

That’s an odd contention, because Israel’s Elbit Systems Ltd. partnered with America’s ATK on July 9/08 to create a 70mm GATR-L laser-guided rocket. It’s based on the Hydra, and reportedly had successful Israeli flight trials in June 2009. Sources: Jerusalem Post, “Rapid-fire rocket system aims to reduce civilian casualties”.

IAF AH-64
(click to view full)

June 30/10. Israel abandons plans to upgrade its entire AH-64 fleet to the AH-64D Longbow configuration, and will choose to improve the helicopters’ weapon options instead. They’ll also continue operating their CH-53D helicopters until the CH-53K is available to replace them. Sources: Flight Global, “Israel ditches Apache upgrade plan, commits to CH-53K”.

No more AH-64D upgrades

Aug 4/09: After analyzing their AH-64D fleet’s participation during Operation “Cast Lead” against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the IAF has decided to upgrade all of its AH-64As to the AH-64D configuration. That’s fine with Boeing, who has been urging customer to upgrade to AH-64D Block II standard before the US military stops supporting the AH-64A. Sources: Flight Global, “Israel, Boeing negotiate Apache Longbow upgrade”.

May 27/09: US blocks AH-64s. The Obama administration blocks Israel’s request for 6 more AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters, using the old “interagency review” gambit. Israel had lost 2 AH-64s during the 2006 war with Hizbullah. Sources: World Tribune, “Administration blocks helicopters for Israel due to civilian casualties in Gaza”.

US blockage

April 12/05: The left-wing Ha’aretz publishes an article debating whether or not new rotor aircraft platforms such as the AH-64 Apache Longbow – of which Israeli just bought 18 – are worth the cost. Their immediate security threats are widely considered to be terrorism-related these days, rather than the historic threat of Syrian tank columns. Given their cost, are the really necessary? The report says that the Israeli debate mirrors the U.S. debate that led to the shelving of Boeing and Sikorsky’s RAH-66 Comanche program. A cost of $600 million recently bought Israel the 18 Longbows, plus 9 new Apaches and newly-scheduled upgrades for previously purchased Apaches.

Israeli Longbow purchase opponents – many who would like to see the money put into land forces and ground security purchases – point to the expensive mission in Karbala, Iraq during the campaign that overthrew Saddam Hussein, where small arms managed to seriously hurt 28 of 30 Apaches as they hovered to acquire targets.

Among aviators, much of the Karbala damage has been blamed on intelligence that failed to alert pilots that the terrain south of Baghdad was so heavily populated. Apache and Longbow supporters have also used the Karbala incident to boost their case, pointing out just how much lead the craft were able to absorb while still remaining in the air. Sources: Ha’aretz, “The Longbow – yes and no”.

Additional Readings

• IAF – Boeing AH-64 Apache (Hebrew nickname: ‘Peten’ (‘Adder’), ‘Saraph’). AH-64As are Adders. AH-64Ds are Saraphs.

• Boeing – AH-64 Apache.

• DID – Boeing Remanufactures AH-64A Apaches to AH-64D Block II. Explains what’s involved in this now-standard AH-64D configuration.

• DID – US Hellfire Missile Orders, FY 2011-2014. Explains the different variants. In 1996, an Israeli Apache fired a Hellfire right into Hizballah’s Operational Headquarters in Beirut.

• RAFAEL – Spike Family. IIR or command-guided anti-armor missiles.

• DID – Hydra, Awakened: Guided Air-Ground Rockets. Includes GATR-L.

Beadwindow advises engineering design, project and business development teams on actual warfighting needs; something that the operator sitting in the chair and their command team really need.

will take place on Monday 28 November, 15:00-18:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply foraccess to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
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Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

On the 11th hour, of the 11th day, of the 11th month, the guns ceased. Today, the British Commonwealth countries remember those who came before, and those who came after, and all who have given in their nation’s service. Americans know this day as Veteran’s Day, and a number of European countries know it as Armistice Day.

On this day, DID offers background and worthy official sites related to Remembrance Day and Veteran’s Day. Readers may be interested in seeing the slight differences as well as the similarities – gaining new perspectives which may come in handy in project, liaison, or foreign posting situations.

Remembrance Day

Remembrance Day is generally celebrated throughout the countries that were part of the British Commonwealth during World War I. One notable wrinkle is that many Commonwealth countries include The Boer War, aka. The South African War, in their monuments and remembrances.

• Here’s an excellent audio rendition of The Last Post (QuickTime), traditionally played at the close of Remembrance Day ceremonies.

• The traditional poem that signifies this day is In Flanders Fields, first published in England’s “Punch” magazine in December, 1915. Flanders sits in Belgium, and there is a museum there with an interactive site.

• The symbol of the poppy on this day is nearly universal, reflecting the poppies that grew over the mass grave that Flanders Fields became. While John McRae got the tradition started, the wearing of the poppy to keep faith was a multinational effort that included an American named Moira Michael, the French secretary Madame Guerin, and the British Legion. Today, it is present as a symbol in America but not emphasized nearly as prominently as it is in the Commonwealth countries.

• The Royal British Legion’s Poppy Appeal

Veteran’s Day

Note that America has both Veterans Day and Memorial Day. The distinction is sometimes confusing for outsiders, but it’s simple. Memorial Day is specifically focused on those who gave their lives in the service of their country; Veterans Day honors all who serve or have served in America’s armed forces.

• Americans play Taps at the end of remembrance ceremonies and military funerals. Read an article at West Point Connection if you want to understand what’s behind these 24 notes.

• US Department of Defense: Veterans Day 2016.

• The US Library of Congress Veterans History Project collects and preserves stories of wartime service.

• US Department of Veterans Affairs: Veterans Day pages.

• Veteran’s Support Foundation

• Wounded Warrior Project

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

If Hillary Clinton had won Tuesday’s race for the White House, the world would now have a good sense of who her top officials would be and what her foreign policy would look like. With a Secretary of State-turned-president, Afghanistan could have expected business to carry on pretty much as normal. With Donald Trump coming into office in January, however, nothing is certain. The US is Afghanistan’s main backer in terms of funding and foreign troops and also has a substantial continuing influence on government policy. Whatever readers may think about the US role in Afghanistan, any major or sudden shift in US policy would be bound to have huge repercussions. So, despite AAN being the Afghanistan, not the America, Analysts Network, senior analysts Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark have had a first attempt at working out what the Trump presidency might mean for Afghanistan.

Foreign policy was not exactly a key issue in the election campaign and Afghanistan – where America is fighting its longest war ever – barely featured at all. It got one (factual, rather than policy) mention in the first Clinton v Trump televised debate (see video in this article) and failed to make it into the second and third  debates at all. Associated Press has tried to find a reason why this happened:

The next president will face a new set of tough choices on Afghanistan early in his (…) term, including whether to increase or reduce U.S. troop levels and, more broadly, whether to continue what might be called Obama’s minimalist military strategy. The difficulty of these choices may explain, at least in part, why Trump and Clinton have been largely silent on Afghanistan.

The most striking mention of Afghanistan probably came when Trump campaign spokeswoman Katrina Pierson appeared on CNN in October 2016 and, speaking about 2007, said: “Remember, we weren’t even in Afghanistan by this time. Barack Obama went into Afghanistan.” Perhaps, she mistook the ‘surge’ for the 2001 invasion. During a campaign event in September 2016, Trump also used Afghanistan rhetorically, comparing it favourably with US inner cities – said: “You can go to Afghanistan. You can go to war-torn countries and you will find that it’s safer than being in the middle of some of our inner cities.” (The numbers were unpacked and found wanting on the BBC’s programme on statistics in the news.) (1)

The president-elect and his camp’s lack of foreign policy experience and, apparently, knowledge or memory of the continuing US ‘mission’ in Afghanistan is frightening. He has not spoken about Afghanistan much, but what he has said is picked through below. There are a few caveats. Firstly, Trump has made some strong, but often superficial and sometimes contradictory, statements about a whole range of foreign policy or foreign policy-related issues. Some of these were also later retracted, or toned down – such as blocking Muslims from entering the US (see the BBC’s collection of “30 things Donald Trump believes”).

Also Trump will not be ruling alone, of course, and US presidents have far less direct power than leaders in many other systems (the constitution aims to check, balance and, in many cases, delay presidential powers). Also, although Senate, House of Representatives and president will all soon be Republican, many elected Republican politicians did not support his candidacy, so that may also curb his power to act. On the other hand, as Newsweek argues, for example, “the views of Congressional Republicans may not even be relevant, given the executive’s dominance of foreign policy.”

Much of what Trump does, as well, will depend on who he appoints to key positions. About this, there is, as yet, little clarity. The influential blog, Politico, has some names but says that, first, “Trump’s divisive campaign may make it difficult for him to attract top talent, especially since so many politicians and wonks openly derided the president-elect over the past year,” and, secondly, that his transition team has stepped up identifying candidates, but holds its cards very close to its chest.

Reading Trump

There is a compilation of the ‘positions’ of the Trump-Pence campaign on its official website (2) in bullet-point form, entitled “Foreign Policy and Defeating ISIS.” Under the sub-heading “Donald J. Trump’s Vision”, a number of principles can be found, culminating in the following: “Advance America’s core national interests, promote regional stability, and produce an easing of tensions in the world.”

Peace, the website says, would be “peace through strength.”

The title shows that the war against the Islamic State (IS, ISIS or Daesh) is Trump’s priority, apparently equal to all other foreign policy issues. Although the emergence of Daesh did galvanise Obama into getting involved more fully in Syria and (again) in Iraq, and to sign off (an increasing number of) airstrikes against the group’s Afghan-Pakistani chapter, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) (AAN analysis here), in Afghanistan again, the outgoing president’s foreign and Afghanistan policies have encompassed far more than just addressing the Daesh threat. Obama has also massively increased the drone war in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, (although not all targets are suspected Daesh fighters). Trump, however, has repeatedly said the US military under his presidency would “quickly and decisively bomb the hell out of ISIS.” However, Trump was also speaking more about the Middle East here, rather than Afghanistan; he linked bombing ISIS with stopping Syrian refugees entering America (elsewhere he has promised to kick out any Syrian refugees who were already in the US). Although military lawyers would be unable to sign off anything that broke Geneva Conventions, Trump’s sentiments are clear.

In general, Trump wants to “rebuild our military, enhance and improve intelligence and cyber capabilities.” The US media expects that military spending will increase under Trump, so much so that, in March 2016, the investment magazine Fortune was already recommending the defence industry as their best buy: “Here Are the Stocks to Buy if Donald Trump Becomes President.” On 11 September 2016, there were reports that the shares of large armament companies had risen by up to over ten per cent.

On the other hand, Trump also wants to save money on some other aspects of military spending. He finds NATO a “rip-off” because US allies pay too little of its budget, although, in general, he was “all” for the alliance. He also announced a desire to collect “reimbursements” from countries protected by US troops (he singled out South Korea, Germany and Saudi Arabia. He has also been quoted as saying that his government would not automatically come to the aid of the Baltic states in case of a Russian attack. (He, though, tried to reassure Poland.)

This brings us to Afghanistan. If Trump does not want to risk American soldiers’ lives even for NATO allies, then why for Afghanistan? There are indeed some tweets from his official account – some though from 2013 – suggesting he is in favour of dropping US support to the country:

Let’s get out of Afghanistan. Our troops are being killed by the Afghanis [sic] we train and we waste billions there. Nonsense! Rebuild the USA.

And:

It is time to get out of Afghanistan. We are building roads and schools for people that hate us. It is not in our national interests.

Interviewed live on CNN in October 2015, he again said completely different things in almost one go: “We made a terrible mistake getting involved there in the first place.” And: “I’ve never said we made a mistake going into Afghanistan.” He also asked whether US troops were “going to be there for the next 200 years?” – only to descent partly into incomprehensiveness: “At some point what’s going on? It’s going to be a long time.” And:

OK, wouldn’t matter, I never said it. Afghanistan is a different kettle. Afghanistan is next to Pakistan, it’s an entry in. You have to be careful with the nuclear weapons. It’s all about the nuclear weapons. By the way, without the nukes, it’s a whole different ballgame.

On his website’s foreign policy part, there is no trace of Afghanistan. ISIS is featured and “nuclear Iran,” which he called “the single gravest threat, national security threat” in a campaign speech (quoted here) and “the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism.” He said the 2015 international deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme could lead to a “nuclear holocaust” and, in a speech to the pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC in March, declared that his “Number-One priority” would be to “dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.” He later did concede it would be hard to destroy a deal enshrined in a United Nations Security Council resolution and, in August 2015, retracted his threat to “rip up” the deal, adding that he would “police that contract so tough they don’t have a chance.”

Although Afghanistan is, in the terminology used on Trump’s website, among the “fully operational” Daesh branches “in 18 countries,” ISIS in Afghanistan only gets a specific mention as the birthplace of both the father of the perpetrator of the June 2016 Orlando gay night club killings (the father was also said to have “supported the oppressive Taliban regime”) and the young Afghan refugee who attacked train passengers in Germany in July this year. In other words, Afghanistan features as a place where migrants come from who could have ISIS connections and might end up killing Americans in America.

‘Nation-building’, torture, Guantánamo

The Trump foreign policy ‘positions’ do contain an ambition to “end the current strategy of nation-building and regime change,” another hint – as in his tweets – that he sees a lot of the US spending in Afghanistan as futile. Whatever one might think of US spending in Afghanistan ­– and it can rightly be criticised for waste and its contribution to systemic corruption in the country – the US is by far the largest spender on the Afghan armed forces and government. Without US financial support, it is difficult to imagine the state, in its current form, surviving. The US also plays a political role, for example as wedding broker between Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah after the bitter Afghan presidential run-off, and mid-wife to their National Unity Government agreement in 2014. US ambassador Mike McKinley, Secretary of State John Kerry and occasionally Barak Obama by telephone have also continued to provide ‘marriage guidance counselling’ to the two Afghan leaders. Would the government still be standing without that pressure and cajoling?

Also likely to drop from any US agenda under a Trump presidency is support for democracy and democrats, and human rights and their defenders. For example, Trump told CNN that he believes the situation in both Libya and Iraq is “far worse” now than it ever was under Muammer Gaddafi and Saddam Hussain and that he would not pressure Turkey’s President Erdoğan over his crackdown on civil liberties. He has also praised the autocrat Russian president, Vladmir Putin, as a strong leader, “far more than our president has been a leader,” “a talented person” who had “great control over his country.” One hundred Republican ‘security leaders’ said, in an open letter published in March 2016 (more of whom below), Trump’s “admiration for foreign dictators such as Vladimir Putin is unacceptable for the leader of the world’s greatest democracy.”

On torture and the fate of the war on terror detentions camp at Guantánamo Bay, Trump has also taken extreme positions. Unlike Obama, he wants to keep the detention facility there, where there are five remaining Afghan inmates open and has even talked about adding to the inmates there, including US supporters of ISIS. He has praised the use of torture. He said, for example he liked waterboarding, eventually outlawed by President Bush in 2006 as potentially illegal and ineffective, “…a lot. I don’t think it’s tough enough.” Even if it did not work, he said, he would authorize it because “they deserve it anyway for what they do to us.”

In September 2016, a groups of former US military commanders, special representatives and ambassadors to Afghanistan as well as think tankers – including some with Republican and others with Democratic leaning – wrote to an open letter they called “Advice to the next U.S. president” to both candidates suggesting to stick to the “enduring partnership with Afghanistan” in the magazine The National Interest (full text and signatories here). They argued that:

The very enormity of that U.S. investment to date, and the value of Afghanistan in the broader struggle against jihadi extremism, argue strongly for trying to sustain—and build on—the progress we have collectively achieved so far.

The new president would have, they continue, “an opportunity to settle Afghan policy onto a more durable, more effective, and less demanding course… for a long-term American—and coalition—role in the country that avoids the recent pattern of nearly annual reassessments of whether the United States should stay, militarily and as a major donor,” “publicly-announced withdrawal timelines” and “unconditional” commitment – although referring to the 2015-2024 “decade of transformation.” At the moment, from what Trump has said, the experts’ thinking would seem to be a long way from his ‘natural’ response to the 16-year US involvement in the country.

Another collective statement, this time to the possibility of a Trump presidency from one hundred senior Republican ‘security leaders’, came in the already mentioned March 2016 open letter. They said Trump was unfit to be commander-in-chief and that he was “fundamentally dishonest.”

His vision of American influence and power in the world is wildly inconsistent and unmoored in principle. He swings from isolationism to military adventurism within the space of one sentence.

His advocacy for aggressively waging trade wars is a recipe for economic disaster in a globally connected world.

His embrace of the expansive use of torture is inexcusable.

His hateful, anti-Muslim rhetoric undercuts the seriousness of combating Islamic radicalism by alienating partners in the Islamic world making significant contributions to the effort. Furthermore, it endangers the safety and Constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of American Muslims.

Some personnel issues

Given Trump’s inexperience, The Washington Post and The Guardian suggest that the new president might just leave the job “to select personnel and coordinate policy” to his Vice-President Mike Pence whom the Post calls “at the very least a known quantity, [as] a former member of the House [of Representatives…] and a straight shooter” or “delegate foreign policy to Republican insiders such as Stephen Hadley, George W Bush’s national security adviser who is rumoured to be interested in reprising his role.” (3)

The Daily Beast has reported that when it comes to security positions in particular, Trump is already having trouble building a transition administration:

Team Trump is struggling to fill numerous key slots or even attract many candidates because hundreds have either sworn they’d never work in a Trump administration or have directly turned down requests to join, multiple current and former U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the transition efforts told The Daily Beast. Team Trump didn’t expect to win until the campaign’s internal polling a month before the election signaled a possible victory. That’s when senior Trump officials went into overdrive, trying to build a bench of experienced national security candidates with top secret clearances willing to work for a Trump presidency—and they met resistance across the landscape of experienced [Republican] national security professionals.

Those men who signed the anti-Trump letter, The Daily Beast contended, would not be offered jobs in the new administration.

Those who are known to be onside with Trump include retired Navy commander and campaign security adviser, Jeffrey D Gordon, who served for four years as a spokesman under Defence Secretaries Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates and General Michael T Flynn, a former Democrat who ran the Defense Intelligence Agency under Obama from spring 2012 to autumn 2014 and was Trump’s “top military advisor” during the campaign. Flynn had been a contender for the vice-presidency, although it finally went to Pence. Politico calls Flynn “Trump’s favorite general”; The New York Times writes that, “No one else on Mr. Trump’s national security team comes with the pedigree of General Flynn.“

This includes a number of tours in Afghanistan when he served as director of intelligence in the following units and organisations: in Combined Task Force 180 that directed all Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operations in the country (until July 2002), at the Joint Special Operations Command, US Central Command (CENTCOM; June 2007 to July 2008) and the joint staff of ISAF and the US Forces-Afghanistan (from July 2008 to June 2009) and for all ISAF (from June 2009 to October 2010) when he spoke out publicly about how poor US human intelligence in Afghanistan was. Since then, however, he has moved away from the mainstream. In 2014, he was sacked as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, according to the White House because of ‘leadership issues’, but according to Flynn himself because of “the stand I took on radical Islamism and the expansion of al-Qaeda” vis-à-vis a “politicized” intel system. He tweeted that “fear of Islam is rational” and has said, “We are at war with a radical component of Islam and the way I believe it is that Islam is a, is a political ideology based on a religion.”

Other names coming up for senior positions, according to Politico, include Republican politicians such as Tennessee Senator Bob Corker or current chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich for Secretary of State and Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions for Secretary of Defense. Jeff Sessions was in charge of talking to the media in Trump’s defence plans (see here). Trump is also reported to be eyeing former US ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, famous for his deep dislike of the UN.

There is also talk in Washington about a more familiar figure to Afghans (he introduced Trump at an event, but maybe that was because he was chair of the hosting board (a video of that here)…:

…Zalmay Khalilzad, an ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations under President George W. Bush, may be in line for a position. Khalilzad, who introduced Trump before a foreign-policy speech in Washington in April, did not rule out serving in a Trump administration in a recent CNN interview.

Afghan reactions

In Afghanistan, the country’s two leading politicians, President Ashraf Ghani and CE Abdullah (press releases here and here), have, as is diplomatically usual, congratulated the winner. Both, in not too different words, emphasised the US’ importance as a “strategic partner“ to Afghanistan, particularly, as the Ghani statement put it, in the development of the country and fighting terrorism. Two former intelligence chiefs, Amrullah Saleh and Rahmatullah Nabil, were a bit more open in expressing what many Afghans hope for – that, in Nabil’s words, the US would “tackl[e the] save heaven/supporter of terror [i]n Pakistan.“

Former president Hamed Karzai, who continues to speak out on political issues and is sometimes suspected of continuing to harbour political ambitions (see for example here), joined in the congratulations quickly, although Trump, in a 2013 tweet when Karzai was refusing to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement said, “Can you believe that ‘President’ Karzai of Afghanistan is holding out for more, more, more and refuses to sign deal. Tell him to go to hell!” After the Trump win, Karzai tweeted that he hoped for “change in the US policy towards Afghanistan and the campaign against ‪#terrorism. Focus on sanctuaries beyond #Afghanistan.”

Afghanistan has always also had a US Republican fan base which believed the Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld ‘war on terror’ was exactly what the country needed, only more of it – to smash the Taleban militarily and, even more so, make Pakistan give up supporting them. So, there also currently illusions might prevail.

The Taleban, unsurprisingly, asked Trump to withdraw “all US forces” from the country as the “most important” issue. Their statement continued (via direct quote from Pajhwok’s Pashto service):

Our message to America’s the new president is that he should draft government’s future policy in a way that does not mute the independence of other peoples in the world and does not seek [US] self-interest through other nations’ destruction and detention, so that the whole world can be in security and ongoing crises can find an end.

Hazards for Afghanistan

Issues that may rebound on Afghanistan from a Trump presidency would include his openly hostile attitude towards Muslims and Muslims coming to America and his dislike of the Iran nuclear deal. Whether or not he could or, in office would still want to dismantle that deal, is not clear, but if he did, that would constitute a real hazard for Afghanistan, increasing the danger of a war in the region.

Trump’s strong element of isolationism is deeply relevant to Afghanistan. If that element prevails, Afghanistan might lose both military support and financial transfers. This, as the ‘experts’ letter to the future president quoted earlier argues, would mean, in practice, that the 2001-16 one trillion dollar US investment in Afghanistan would have to be written off. That might be difficult, particularly as cutting support would be at odds with his criticism of Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq and if it looked like the US was turning tail and fleeing the Taleban. Trump, keen to promote an image of the US becoming “strong again” surely would not want that. However, given what he has said on ‘nation-building’ and ‘ungrateful’ Afghans, it is not impossible to imagine such a withdrawal of support. A reduction in spending looks even more possible. Given that Afghanistan is more dependent on US largesse than almost any other country, what Trump finally decides will be his Afghan policy will have a large influence on the country’s fate.

 

(1) Trump was not the first to pull off a bad comparison. In 2010, a high-ranking NATO official in Kabul stated that “Here in Kabul and the other big cities [in Afghanistan…], the children are probably safer (…) than they would be in London, New York or Glasgow or many other cities.“ He later said the comparison “wasn’t very well put.“

(2) Be prepared to prove that you are not a robot when accessing the website.

(3) The man serving as the Trump transition team director for presidential appointments, William Hagerty, does not seem to have any specific Afghanistan-related background. He was an economic adviser to President George H Bush and transition team director of Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign in 2012.