Defence`s Feeds

The Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) Canberra-class landing helicopter dock (LHD) ship HMAS Canberra has welcomed two Eurocopter Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters (ARHs) for first-of-class flight trials.

Austal has successfully completed the detailed design review (DDR) for Australia's A$306m ($234.4m) Pacific patrol boat replacement (PPB-R) project.

Americas

• Lockheed Martin subsidiary Sikorsky and their Polish affiliate PZL Mielec are in the final stages of planning a tour of the M28 Skytruck short takeoff and landing aircraft. The tour will involve a transatlantic flight from Poland to the Caribbean and Latin America, with key stops in Trinidad & Tobago and 12 other cities in Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and Panama. Built for transporting passengers and cargo, the M28 is being marketed for both civilian and military applications as a platform that can operate in extreme weather conditions and fly very different mission profiles.

• The USAF is expected to green light a study into a potential low-cost, light-attack fighter fleet to augment the A-10 Warthog and other close-air support (CAS) platforms in Iraq and Syria. The service will abandon plans for a more long-term replacement of the Warthog, which is expected to keep flying well into the 2020s. $100 million has already been earmarked for the study, scheduled to start in the Spring, and will look at the capabilities of the existing commercial designs such as Textron’s Scorpion light-attack fighter before calling out to industry.

• Leonardo and its Team Spartan partners have mounted a legal challenge with the Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) over the decision to award Airbus the Fixed-Wing Search-and-Rescue (FWSAR) program. Leonardo’s C-27J Spartan lost out to the C295W, however Team Spartan stated that “the C295W is a slower aircraft and will have difficulty covering the required search-and-rescue regions in a way that is compliant with the request for proposal [RfP]. The inclusion of a 5th Main Operating Base in the Airbus proposal would be the only way to be compliant, and that was not submitted. As it stands, this will significantly increase operating times in the north of Canada.” The team also criticised the C295W’s ability “to safely perform all missions without the presence of an auxiliary power unit [APU]” because it would not have the necessary Extended Range Twin Engine Operations rating.

Africa

• The UN has been notified that the German military’s Heron I UAV has achieved Full Operational Capability in Mali. Deployment of the UAV in Mali is planned to initially last until February 2018 when German operators will undergo intelligence gathering and surveillance missions after taking over from the Netherlands last July. The aircraft has been leased from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and has undergone maintenance and overhaul work by Airbus Defence and Space Airborne Solutions GmbH (ADAS).

Europe

• Germany’s Jenoptik has been contracted $13.8 million to provide components supporting the Patriot air and missile defense system. The manufacturer has been a long-term supplier for the Patriot program, offering power-supply units and sub-systems for the platform. The latest deal follows on earlier contracts in 2016 and will see the company deliver electrical generators, spare parts packages and testing equipment.

Asia Pacific

• Lotte Group has signed an agreement with the South Korean government to move ahead with a land swap that will see the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system on a golf course owned by the firm. Seoul said that the system will be in place by the end of the year with a South Korean military official indicating that the system could be in place as early as August. While the reasoning for the system making its way to the Korean peninsula comes amid North Korean ballistic missile testing, the deployment has received protests from China, concerned over THAADs powerful radar penetrating Chinese territory.

• India’s Ministry of Defense has rejected a plan to procure British Advanced Hawk trainer aircraft. The decision was made after revelations that British engine-maker Rolls-Royce bribed officials of India’s state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited between 2005 and 2009 to secure orders for engines to power the Hawk 132 advanced jet trainers destined for the Indian Air Force. An IAF official stated, “this is because the MoD does not want [to] give additional orders for engines to tainted Rolls-Royce for the Advanced Hawk program.” New Delhi had initially contracted BAE for 123 Hawk Mk-132 advanced jet trainers for the IAF and the Navy.

• It’s been reported that a North Korean spy agency has been illegally selling defense equipment through a front company out of offices in Malaysia. Glocom sells battlefield radio equipment in violation of United Nations sanctions and advertises over 30 radio systems for “military and paramilitary” organizations. Last July, an air shipment of North Korean military communications equipment, sent from China and bound for Eritrea, was intercepted in an unnamed country. The seized equipment included 45 boxes of battlefield radios and accessories labeled “Glocom”, short for Global Communications Co. Malaysia is one of few in the international community with strong ties with Pyongyang, but these have been put under strain in recent weeks following the assassination of the older half-brother of dictator Kim Jong-un by North Korean agents in Kuala Lumpur Airport.

Today’s Video

• PZL M28 demo:

UH-60 Blackhawk

Helicopter-maker Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. has agreed to acquire aircraft and helicopter maker PZL Mielec from the Polish government. Under the agreement Sikorsky will acquire a 100% stake in the 1,500-employee Mielec, Poland firm; a Reuters report placed the deal at 250 million zlotys (currently about $84.3 million). Polskie Zaklady Lotnicze (Polish Aviation Factory) Mielec is a government holding company and manufacturer of fixed-wing aircraft under the Ministry of Treasury’s ARP (Industrial Development Agency); the transaction is subject to regulatory approval and pre-closing conditions. Sikorsky’s parent company UTC and its subsidiaries currently employ more than 7,000 people in Poland in the aerospace and building systems industries.

Janes Defense Industry observes that:

M28 Skytruck
(click to view full)

“The US group’s relationship with PZL was cemented in September 2006 when the Mielec site was selected as a strategic partner and assembly center for the International Black Hawk programme… Sikorsky has previously said, however, that it will look to maintaining production of the PZL M28 Skytruck [link added] passenger, transport and surveillance aircraft at the site, improving it with new technologies and creating a stable and efficient customer support network worldwide.”

Sikorsky’s release confirms:

“In 2006 Sikorsky announced plans to develop an International BLACK HAWK helicopter variant for global customers that would be manufactured using a global supply chain. Upon completion of this acquisition Sikorsky plans to aggressively modernize the factory and tooling at PZL Mielec to support International BLACK HAWK production and continue the current capability for aircraft design, manufacture, flight test and delivery… PZL Mielec will form the foundation of Sikorsky’s European operations.”

Sikorsky is currently facing serious challenges within its American operations, following an unusual Level 3 warning/CAR from the US government concerning the UH-60 Black Hawk program.

Update

February 27/17: Lockheed Martin subsidiary Sikorsky and their Polish affiliate PZL Mielec are in the final stages of planning a tour of the M28 Skytruck short takeoff and landing aircraft. The tour will involve a transatlantic flight from Poland to the Caribbean and Latin America, with key stops in Trinidad & Tobago and 12 other cities in Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and Panama. Built for transporting passengers and cargo, the M28 is being marketed for both civilian and military applications as a platform that can operate in extreme weather conditions and fly very different mission profiles.

Using drones to carry out targeted killings has become an integral part of the United States’ ‘war on terror’. Afghanistan in the late 1990s was the laboratory where the US developed armed drones as it searched for a way to deal with Osama bin Laden who was then ordering attacks on American targets from his safe haven in Kandahar. At that time, Washington was uneasy about ordering an assassination, especially one likely to result in civilian casualties. After 9/11, such doubts disappeared and it embraced drones, using them to carry out targeted killings of Islamist militants in many countries. In this first of two dispatches, AAN’s Kate Clark looks at armed drones in Afghanistan.

A second dispatch will look at the expansion of America’s targeted killing by drone programme in the war on terror and asks whether Afghanistan might in the future see a US ‘drone-only’ or ‘drone-mainly’ mission of the sort seen in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Bin Laden and the birth of drone warfare

The project to create armed drones grew out of the need felt by Washington to eliminate the threat posed by bin Laden. In the late 1990s, he was orchestrating attacks on American targets while living under Taleban protection. US options were limited by a presidential standing order banning assassinations (1) which meant the CIA was legally bound to plan an operation with detention as its sole aim. Additionally, CIA officials were worried about the women and children living in bin Laden’s compound – visible on satellite footage – who would be harmed if the capture operation turned into a firefight. “[CIA officers,” reported Steve Coll, “found themselves pulled into emotional debates about legal authorities and the potential for civilian casualties…” (2) (p 393)

In 1998, bin Laden ordered attacks on two American embassies in east Africa and Washington responded with Cruise missile strikes on training camps in Khost (which it said was an act of self-defence, not an assassination attempt). Even after that, however, Washington hesitated about making another attempt to kill the al Qaeda leader. The CIA insisted on definitive legal cover from the White House that officers would not later be charged with having carried out an ‘illegal’ assassination. Uneasiness was exacerbated by the fact that officials could never identify bin Laden with enough confidence to go ahead with a missile strike and they were still worried about killing women and children. Ahmad Shah Massud’s intelligence aides scorned this hesitation, reported Coll, portraying it as the US insisting on “capturing the king without disturbing the pawns.” (p535)

It was the need for accurate, absolutely up-to-date information about the target that drove the development of armed drones. They had already been used for surveillance in the Balkans, but now the decision was taken to increase their range and reliability and to arm them. Shortening the wait between target identification and strike, it was thought, would reduce the possibility of a precise strike with minimum ‘collateral damage’.

In the end, killing bin Laden by drone became feasible just as al Qaeda launched its attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. The US responded with a full military assault on al Qaeda and its hosts, the Taleban, and the first armed drone strike came that autumn, in Afghanistan, with an attempt to kill Taleban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar (see here). This time, there was no debate about legality: this was not now an assassination, but the lawful killing of a combatant during wartime.

Armed drones have been used ever since by the US in its ‘war on terror’, for both targeted killings and air support for troops on the ground. They have been deployed in Afghanistan, in Iraq after the 2003 invasion and more recently in Libya, and against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (for information about strikes in these three countries, see the Airwars website). Drones have also been used for targeted killings of al Qaeda and what the US calls ‘associated forces’ in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Targeted killings by drone have become, former director of the CIA Michael Hayden said, “part of the American way of war.”

Since 2001, the US has asserted its legal right to kill hostile non-state actors if their host government is “unwilling or unable” to deal with the threat. The concerns which agonised the CIA and the White House over killing bin Laden, before 9/11 – whether targeted killings were legal and the danger of civilians being harmed in an assassination attempt – are now dismissed or downplayed by Washington. (This will be looked at in more detail in the second dispatch in this mini-series).

Drones in Afghanistan

Armed drones have been flown for more than fifteen years in Afghanistan. Yet data about them is scarce. Statistics for all aircraft flown by the United States, which, since 2014, has been the only foreign state carrying out combat operations in Afghanistan, are not disaggregated; we know only the numbers for the total air sorties flown and munitions dropped by all US aircraft. It had been believed that the statistics – even though not disaggregated to distinguish drones from other aircraft – were good. The US Air Force has been collating and publishing them for several years. (Note for anyone following this issue: the URL has recently been changed slightly; this one works.) However, the Military Times recently revealed that data for aircraft operated by the army in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria has been excluded from these statistics. The discrepancy is large: in Afghanistan, in 2016, for example, 615 strikes had been reported, but including strikes from army aircraft, the number rose to 1,017. Still, although some of those extra strikes will have been by drones – the Military Times reported that the US army was flying MQ-1 Gray Eagles to help provide “lethal support” (3) – it seems the bulk of the extra airstrikes came from Apache helicopters.

Working out who flies what and under whose command is difficult. Generally, air strikes can be ordered, according to a military spokesman for US forces in Afghanistan who spoke to the Military Times, for “self defense, counter terror and strategic effects, which may be required when senior commanders believe U.S. firepower could help turn the tide in regions deemed vital to Afghanistan’s broader stability.” Senior commanders have told AAN this, for example, might be preventing a district or provincial centre falling to the Taleban. Those who have access to airpower, including drones, on the US side are: the US Air Force, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which is the key player in counter-terrorism and particularly US targeted killings operations in Afghanistan, and the army. The CIA has a close working relationship with JSOC; in the past (and possibly still?), this included pooling intelligence and drawing up lists of targets for kill/capture operations. (4) The CIA also flies drones across the border to carry out targeted killings in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The use of covert Agency drones was important because of Islamabad’s claims to be hostile to the US strikes. (There will be more detail on this in AAN’s second dispatch on armed drones.)

Josh Smith, former Kabul correspondent with the independent US military newspaper, Stars and Stripes, and now with Reuters, has reported that the US Air Force flies MQ-9 Reapers and MQ-1 Predators out of American bases in Kandahar and Jalalabad. He told AAN that pilots and operators on the ground guide the drones in and out for take off and landing, but unless the mission is very local, for example, base protection, once a drone is in flight, control is handed over to other operators, almost all in the United States. The main hub is Creech Air Force Base in Nevada, but there are also a small number of control stations in other locations. “Pilots at Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico, for example,” he said “flew most of the Air Force Special Operations Command missions.” Air force drone operators told Smith that they fly drones and conventional aircraft “for a range of customers.” That could include JSOC, the CIA (see also this piece) and the army, although all also have their own drones and pilots.

Between 2008 and 2014, before NATO’s transition to the non-combat, ‘train, advise, assist’ Resolute Support mission, the UK also flew armed drones in Afghanistan, with strikes made in 16 of the 34 provinces. These were “only,” said the Ministry of Defence, “in support of coalition ground forces”(see here). The Afghan Air Force now also has drones for surveillance. Members of the Taleban’s media branch recently posted pictures of what they say are their drones in action, carrying out surveillance in Afghanistan.

Drones and civilian casualties

Trying to determine the impact of drone strikes in Afghanistan is difficult. The scarcity of drone specific data and the sheer amount of other weaponry around makes singling out the effects of drones per se very difficult. Any air strike could have been carried out by a drone or another aircraft – it can be difficult to tell from the ground. Moreover, targeted killings have been carried out not only through airstrikes, but also in night raids (although here there is an aim to capture or kill). Both tactics proved controversial, but it was civilian casualties and the invasion of people’s homes that were upsetting, rather than the use of drones.

UNAMA, in its tracking of civilian casualties, does not separate those caused by drones from other aircraft. Indeed, it would not be able to disaggregate the figures without the US providing the information, if it wanted to.

There has been discussion about whether drones are or should be better than other aircraft in reducing the risk of killing civilians when making a strike. Supporters of drones and even some detractors point out that, because drones can loiter in ways that planes cannot, they allow for ‘tactical patience’ and more accurate targeting. All things being equal, therefore, there is less likelihood for civilians to be harmed. However, one study with access to classified military data which was able to compare strikes from drones and aircraft in Afghanistan (mid-2010 to mid-2011) found that drones were then causing ten times more civilian casualties. Co-author Sarah Holewinski of the non-governmental organisation Center for Civilians in Conflict, told The Guardian the disparity was a result of fighter pilots getting more training in avoiding civilian casualties: “‘These findings show us that it’s not about the technology, it’s about how the technology is used,’ Holewinski said. ‘Drones aren’t magically better at avoiding civilians than fighter jets. When pilots flying jets were given clear directives and training on civilian protection, they were able to lower civilian casualty rates.’”

There are other ways in which civilian casualties may be increased or reduced by the use of drones, although, here we can only speak speak about air power in general because the data for drones and other aircraft is not disaggregated. Reduction in international air cover generally since 2014, for example, has resulted, indirectly, in an overall increase in the number of civilians killed and injured in the Afghan conflict (see UNAMA report here and AAN reporting here. This is because the Taleban, no longer fearing attack from the skies, have been able to mass in ways that would previously have been suicidal. It has become possible for them to launch ground engagements and threaten Afghan towns and cities, pushing up the total number of civilians killed and injured in the conflict to new records.

However, the data also shows that having a ‘pro-government’ aerial capability does not necessarily safeguard civilians. In 2016, air strikes killed and injured more civilians than in any year since at least 2009 when UNAMA started systematic documentation. UNAMA attributed about 40 per cent of the 2016 casualties caused by air strikes to the Afghan air force and about 40 per cent to the US air force (with the other 20 per cent not attributable to either party, but caused by one of them) (See the UNAMA annual report here and AAN’s analysis here). The situation is grave enough for UNAMA to have called for an immediate halt to strikes by armed aircraft in civilian-populated areas and for “clear tactical directives, rules of engagement and other procedures” to be adopted. In many of those intervening years, far more sorties were flown and strikes made, so what is pushing the numbers up?

On the US side, successive military commanders had made it more difficult for air strikes to be ordered, putting in place new sets of precautions and conditions. These led to successive drops in the number of civilians killed and injured in air strikes (for detail, see here and here). It seems the sharp rise in civilian casualties caused by US air operations in 2016 was probably due to poorer intelligence (fewer ground troops means the US is not as knowledgeable as it used to be) and/or failure to follow procedures. The latter was the case with the strike on the Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in Kunduz in October 2015 and the strike on Buz-e Kandahari village, again in Kunduz on 2-3 November 2016 (in each attack, about 30 civilians were killed and another 30 injured). In both cases, UNAMA and others questioned whether the US had breached the Laws of Armed Conflict.

On the Afghan side, it seems casualties are coming from failures to distinguish civilian from military targets, including recklessly firing at Taleban despite the harm bound to come to civilians (again, both potential breaches in the Laws of Armed Conflict). On 9 August 2016 in Nawa Barakzai district in Helmand, for example, UNAMA describes how Afghan air force helicopters tracked Taleban into residential compound and fired munitions, killing and injuring women and children.

So, in 2016, we saw sharp rises in civilians killed and injured by the most sophisticated air force in the world and one of the least – Afghan air strikes are often from machine guns mounted on helicopters. It was not the weaponry itself that was the crucial factor, but rather, mission aims and guidelines, training and intelligence. As a factor determining the numbers of civilian casualties, at least currently in Afghanistan, whether armed drones are used or not, seems to be a minor consideration. Moreover, if they are causing any variation, the distinction is not visible to anyone outside the US military.

Living under drones

 Just one study has managed to delve at all into the impact of drones on communities in Afghanistan. In autumn 2015, field interviews were carried out for Durham University with people living in two (un-named) districts of Nangarhar which had seen a “surge” in drone use. It is a preliminary study (the authors are currently finishing a longer research paper), but nevertheless, gives some pointers to how Afghan civilians may experience drones. In the two districts, said the study’s authors, the population is largely Pashtun and has a “notable history of support and loyalties towards Kabul.” They found that:

Drone strikes receive widespread support, as long as they effectively and accurately target Taliban, Daesh and elements from Pakistan believed to create and perpetuate these groups. Indeed, these insurgent and terror-group elements are clearly seen by citizens in the fieldwork areas as their enemies – and enemies of Afghanistan.

Respondents believed drones were “supremely accurate” and praised them for instilling fear in Taleban and Daesh members, thereby disrupting their movement and activities. However, it was the simultaneous menace of both insurgent groups and drones on respondents’ everyday life which the authors of the study found revelatory:

Fear of becoming caught up in a drone strike as a result of running livestock, collecting firewood in the mountains or cultivating fields where insurgent groups hide and pass through is economically damaging and encouraging depopulation. Activities that manifest and reinforce important social ties and networks are curtailed by the presence and fear of drones. This includes: providing hospitality to strangers who visit homes and may turn out to be Taliban; gathering to celebrate weddings; observing funerals; discussing the day’s issues at night after subsistence work; and simply moving around the village after dark.

 In other words, even if drone strikes were successfully targeting Taleban and other combatants, and this was popular among civilians, this was not creating the conditions for anything like a resumption of ‘normal life’. Nor did the killings feel like a victory for those on the ground.

The character of drone use in places like Nangarhar, said the Durham University study “is becoming more like that across the border in FATA.” This refers to a model where drones are used for targeted killings in a narrow, counter-terrorism mission aimed not at stabilising Afghanistan, with an eye to “restoring and reinforcing viable and effective governance, social and economic structures,” but at “containing the ability of Afghanistan-based terror-related groups to commit acts of violence beyond its borders, especially in areas central to US and wider western interests.” These two aims have, since 2001, always co-existed in the international military mission in Afghanistan, but the authors of the Durham study believe that in places like Nangarhar the narrow counter-terrorism mission has become dominant.

Nangarhar is a particular case in Afghanistan, a province where the situation on the ground most closely resembles the tribal areas of Pakistan, with a widespread, but fragmented armed opposition, a relatively weak Taleban and a plethora of Afghan and foreign jihadist groups (see AAN reporting here. US military operations in Nangarhar are not particularly representative of how it operates elsewhere in Afghanistan. However, it may suggest what a narrow US counter-terrorism mission could look like.

Constraints on US combat operations were written into the US-Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (see here), signed in September 2014; they were limited to strikes on “al Qaeda and its affiliates.” This led to a concentration of US air strikes on Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan, especially Nangarhar, where foreign jihadists are most active. (The US was also still playing its part in the non-combat NATO mission to support Afghan National Security Forces.) In June 2016, President Barack Obama, with Afghan agreement, did broaden out US targeting, allowing for strikes on Taleban and in support of Afghan troops and air strikes have been used more widely since. Even so, there are worrying aspects to US air strikes in Nangarhar. One to watch in 2017 will be civilian casualties. In 2016 UNAMA noted, there were “considerable increases in civilian casualties caused solely by international military forces in Nangarhar province.” 89 civilians were killed or injured in 13 aerial operations in 2016 compared to 18 during 10 aerial operations in 2015.

Looking ahead

For the most part, the use of US drones in the Afghan conflict has not been visible or controversial. This is in sharp contrast to their deployment in FATA, and also in Yemen and Somalia. In those three countries, where the US has conducted a ‘drone only’ or drone mainly’ mission to carry out targeted killings, there has been a fierce debate about their legality, effectiveness and impact on civilians.

A second dispatch in this mini-series will look at why and how the US drone programme expanded after that first drone strike in Afghanistan in October 2001. It will also examine the experiences of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia and ask whether the ‘FATA model’ of drone use could be seen in the future in Afghanistan.

Edited by Sari Kouvo and Borhan Osman

 

 

(1) President Gerald Ford banned assassinations after various CIA scandals emerged after Watergate, including the Agency’s repeated attempts to kill Cuban president Fidel Castro. The ban was reinforced by Ford’s two successors. President Ronald Reagan’s version) said: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”

(2) Steve Coll Ghost Wars: the Secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Withdrawal to September 10, 2001, Penguin Books: London (2004).

(3) The military spokesman also included RQ-7 Shadows as one of the aircraft used by the army to provide “lethal support.” This model is actually used for surveillance, not targeting.

(4) In 2012, at the height of US kill or capture operations, the author wrote:

At the forward headquarters of the Joint Special Operations Command or JSOC at Bagram, where intelligence from multiple sources – the military, CIA, detainee interrogations, drone footage and intercepts – is collated, a joint targeting working group meets weekly. It has direct input from the Combined Forces Command and its divisional HQ, as well as lawyers, operational command and intelligence units, including the CIA and it places men deemed to be ‘insurgent leaders’ on the Joint Prioritised Effects List (JPEL) for capture or targeted killing.

 

At Euronaval 2016, the German bridge system integrator Raytheon Anschütz announces the next step forward for their Synapsis Tactical Command System (SYNTACS).

The Indian Navy's P-16A Brahmaputra-class guided missile frigate INS Betwa has been set upright on even keel at the Naval Dockyard in Mumbai.

American FGR-17 Viper Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher

Polish PM-98 Submachine Gun

To fully benefit from today's sophisticated weapon systems, maintenance and attendance are more important than ever.

The Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) has awarded follow-on production contracts worth $150m to Lockheed Martin for delivery of the target sight system (TSS).

Naval personnel from the US, UK, Oman and France have commenced the 22nd iteration of the annual multilateral mine countermeasures (MCM) exercise Khunjar Haad in the Gulf of Oman.

Lockheed Martin has secured a $150m contract for the lot 13 and 14 production of target sight systems (TSS).

Technology solutions provider Atlas Elektronik UK (AEUK) has been awarded a new contract to deliver its ATLAS remote combined influence minesweeping system (ARCIMS) mission system.

• A New Leader in International Support to Security Sector Reform: Exploring the Experience and Potential Role of Japan By: Christopher Sedgwick Few countries have undergone security sector reform more profoundly than Japan after World War II, yet Japan has not been a leading voice in this field, despite a foreign policy centered on human security and institution building. A new international SSR assistance platform would enable Japan to support enhanced governance, oversight, and professionalism of the security sectors of fragile states while further raising its profile in UN peacekeeping and the sustaining peace agenda. Article

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I. Security Sector Reform and Japan

Head to any major intersection or train station in Japan, and you will likely encounter one of the country’s 6,000 koban police mini-stations.  These police boxes, generally housing 2-3 officers on rotating shifts, go largely unnoticed by passers-by, except when they stop in to ask for directions or to look at the district map.  Yet these innocuous koban also play a key role in police vigilance, crime deterrence, community relations, and rapid response, forming a cornerstone of Japan’s successful postwar reform of its security sector.

This unobtrusive manifestation of community policing is a symbol of Japan’s larger potential as a leader of international support to nationally owned security sector reform (SSR) processes.  Indeed, perhaps no country has experienced SSR more profoundly than Japan after World War II, where the secret police and rampaging military of the war years gave way to community policing and a Self-Defense Force with strong civilian control and constitutional limits on the use of force abroad.  Japan has a powerful story to tell.

An expanded SSR support agenda focused on strengthening the professionalism, accountability, and governance of the security sector in fragile states fits neatly within Japanese policy priorities.  Japan promotes the rule of law as a pillar of its foreign policy,[1] strongly emphasizes institution building in its UN activities,[2] and vigorously backs the human security concept.  Many of these policies are realized through active participation in the UN, where Japan is the second-largest contributor to the regular budget and the third-largest provider of assessed contributions to peacekeeping.[3]

However, SSR as a discipline remains largely unknown in Japan.  While Japan has provided component-level support to international SSR-related activities based on the priorities described above, it has not yet engaged in transformative sector-wide approaches to bolster strategic governance and oversight.  Japan should align its experiences and priorities under a new SSR platform offering guidance, best practices, and technical and legislative assistance.  This would promote Japan’s diplomatic and UN policy objectives while simultaneously allowing it to assume a position of leadership as an authoritative, non-Western champion of SSR.

 

II. Building on Existing Experience and Capacities

Police and Justice
As mentioned above, Japan’s justice sector demonstrates the positive results of what was a massive postwar SSR process, albeit not labelled as such at the time.  Since then, the koban model has been successful enough to have been exported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the government’s international assistance arm, as well as by the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, to both developed and developing countries.  In January 2016, Atul Khare, UN Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, praised the effectiveness of the koban system and Japanese police manuals, both of which have been employed in Timor-Leste.[4]  Certainly, there are limitations to Japan’s justice model, including its overly powerful prosecutors, indefensibly high conviction rates, and overreliance by police on individual confessions.  Yet the positive aspects of the postwar reform of Japan’s justice sector constitute a model worth spreading.

Leadership through an international SSR platform with a major focus on koban/community policing and police accountability standards would greatly benefit recipient states, while also helping Japan to offer more effective police participation in UN rule of law and peacekeeping activities than through traditional patrols.  The Japanese public has been extremely sensitive to deaths on mission ever since the killing of a Japanese police officer dispatched to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993.  The Japanese police have not joined peacekeeping operations in meaningful numbers since then, despite their wealth of knowledge and experience.  Expanded Japanese support to local efforts to enhance police oversight, professionalism, and community relations could strengthen Japanese leadership in this field while also largely avoiding political sensitivities at home.

Defense
A Japanese SSR leadership role holds similar potential in the defense sector.  Japan’s constitution renounces war, and its highly capable Self-Defense Force (SDF) today is subject to full civilian control with an emphasis on public service.  It is increasingly associated domestically with disaster assistance, especially following Japan’s March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

At the same time, SDF contributions to UN peacekeeping face limitations under their current modality.  The SDF participates in peacekeeping by way of Japan’s 1992 Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (“PKO Act”), but with legal restraints that have traditionally curtailed the use of force except in self-defense.[5]  Even a 2015 reinterpretation of the constitution and corresponding new security legislation, which enable Japanese peacekeepers to come to the rescue of partners under fire (presumably by using force), do not enable robust protection of civilians tasks which are increasingly part of peacekeeping mandates.  Major political challenges exist as well.  Passage of the 2015 legislation was deeply unpopular domestically, putting conservatives who implemented the change in the curious position of trumpeting the SDF’s new rescue capabilities while simultaneously assuring the public that Japanese peacekeepers will be in safe locations and unlikely to use these very capabilities.[6]

Given this context, Japanese peacekeeping personnel have long been considered risk-averse.  Much of Japan’s role in peacekeeping has been in engineering and logistical support, together with a growing focus on providing training and technology to less capable troop-contributing countries through triangular partnerships with the UN.  This configuration alone is not ideal for achieving Japanese policy interests as they relate to the rule of law, institution building, and human security.  The ongoing deployment of several hundred Japanese SDF engineering personnel to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is a case in point.  Japan wishes to be seen as a proactive contributor to the UN and to peacekeeping, but UNMISS’ priorities have shifted from state building to protection of civilians since the dramatic deterioration of the security situation beginning in December 2013, leaving Japanese personnel facing dangers for which they are ill-prepared.

As a whole, Japan’s defense sector represents a positive model that demonstrates the results of governance-focused SSR efforts.  At the same time, changes in peacekeeping tasks, together with political and legal restrictions, make troop contributions a less compelling means of Japanese involvement despite the SDF’s achievements.  An SSR leadership role offers Japan a way forward. The SDF has much to offer in the SSR realm based on its own history and development.  This could include guidance on best practices and support aimed at improving the professionalism and command and control structures of the defense sectors in fragile states.

 

III. A New Support Platform

A new Japanese SSR platform would align closely with Japan’s existing diplomatic and UN policy priorities, maintaining its international engagement and avoiding the limitations described above, all as a compelling non-Western advocate.

While Japan is not well-positioned to oversee narrow train-and-equip exercises nor to deploy personnel to increasingly dangerous missions, it can be a prime implementing leader for sustained, sector-wide reform, as outlined in Security Council resolution 2151 (2014) on SSR.  Japan’s abovementioned experience, geopolitical alignment, and capacity would enable it to support fragile and post-conflict states in the security legislation drafting process, national security dialogues, security sector public expenditure reviews, enhanced civilian oversight, and community policing development.

This governance-focused SSR platform would promote people-centered security through more democratic and resilient institutions, all in support of a sustaining peace agenda.  These interventions could be made through long-term assistance to national security sectors, including through Japan’s membership on the Peacebuilding Commission, strong leadership in the UN Group of Friends of SSR and other international fora, and sustained bilateral engagement.  Japan should seize this leadership opportunity.

Author

Christopher Sedgwick [christopher.sedgwick@tufts.edu] is a researcher and analyst specializing in UN affairs, Japanese foreign policy, and security sector reform. He is a graduate of Princeton University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and was also a Japanese Ministry of Education Scholar at the University of Tokyo’s Graduate Schools for Law and Politics. He has authored case studies for an African Union-commissioned report on peacekeeping from the World Peace Foundation focusing on conflict drivers, peace processes, and SSR, and previously served as Special Assistant for Political Affairs at the Consulate-General of Japan in San Francisco.

Notes

[1] Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 2016, p. 155; available from: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook.

[2] Statement by Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida at the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on Peacebuilding (28 July 2016); available from: http://www.un.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/Kishida072816.html.

[3] See UN document A/70/331/Add.1; Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 2016, p. 202.

[4] Statement by United Nations Under-Secretary-General Atul Khare, “Fostering Future Leaders in International Peace Cooperation,” delivered at the 7th International Peace Cooperation Symposium (Tokyo: 22 January 2016); available from: http://www.shasegawa.com/archives/14082.

[5] The PKO Act established five principles for Japanese participation in PKOs, which include the need for a ceasefire, consent of parties to deployment, and strict impartiality, as well as caveats that weapons are to be used for a minimum level of self-defense and that Japan may withdraw if any of the first three conditions cease to hold.

[6] A 15 November 2016 government memo justifies the Japanese UNMISS engineering contingent’s new capabilities as enabling the rescue of partners and Japanese nationals in extremely limited cases, while simultaneously noting that the South Sudanese government and UNMISS infantry provide primary protection and that Japan’s contingent is not equipped for security tasks; available (Japanese) from: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/headline/pdf/heiwa_anzen/kangaekata_20161115.pdf.

The approach of the world’s largest air traffic management event (World ATM Congress, 7-9 March, Madrid) has placed one of the largest air traffic users, the military, in focus. With more than 11,000 military aircraft stationed in Europe, state air forces represent the biggest fleet operators and airport owners in Europe. Ahead of EDA’s participation at WAC 2017 (SESAR stand 889), EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq writes that the military represents a key and credible partner in SES/SESAR.

In the context of increased regional and global instability and given the evolving security challenges facing Europe, it is crucial for security and defence that any development in air traffic modernisation takes military requirements fully into account, in order to avoid any adverse impact on national and collective defence capabilities.

The implementation of the European Global Strategy (EUGS), the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) and the EU/NATO Joint Declaration, offer a window of opportunity to address and contribute to strengthening European Security and Defence. Military aviation is a key part of this. The EDA facilitates the coordination of military views related to the challenges of SES facing Military Aviation and acts as an interface between the military community and the European Commission. In doing so, EDA ensures coherence and complementarity across the military community through staff-to-staff coordination with NATO and EUROCONTROL, while actively developing its cooperation with key civil stakeholders. 

The Aviation Strategy for Europe defined by the European Commission and the revision of the EASA Basic Regulation provide opportunities for early involvement of the military.

Military aviation significantly contributes to ensuring the required secure environment in Europe. It is crucial for security and defence that any development in air traffic modernization takes military requirements fully into account, in order to avoid any adverse impact on national and collective defence capabilities. The changes brought about by technological solutions in terms of procedures, regulations, equipment and organisation need to be considered at the earliest possible stage and on the basis of a systemic approach, by relevant military organisations.

The Military Aviation Strategy in the context of Single European Sky reflects the shared view on military aviation as an integral part of the air traffic in Europe for the coming decades.

It establishes the strategic vision that European aviation will incorporate the security and defence dimension at a level that will ensure that Military Aviation continues to provide and further improve, effective security and defence in Europe in the changing context of the civil aviation sector, without prejudice to the safety of civil air traffic.

It includes fundamental principles related to safety, civil-military coordination and cooperation across the military community, as well as strategic objectives on security and defence, access to airspace and use of air navigation services, confidentiality, cyber security, and interoperability.

In supporting its implementation, the European Defence Agency contributes to ensuring that the military are recognised as credible and reliable partners for excellence in global aviation.

Jorge Domecq (EDA Chief Executive)
 

EDA will be at World ATM Congress 2017 

The World ATM Congress, the world’s largest air traffic management event, will take place 7-9 in Madrid. The Congress, now in its fifth year, gathers representatives from every segment within aviation to exchange knowledge about the latest air traffic management trends. This year EDA will be there as part of the SESAR stand (889) to represent the military aspects of SES/SESAR.   

“Partnering for excellence in global aviation” is the theme of the activities taking place at the SESAR stand. EDA is collaborating with the project hosts SESAR Joint Undertaking (SESAR JU) and the SESAR Deployment Manager (SESAR DM). Other European representatives from the European Commission, European Aviation Safety Agency Network Manager,and EUROCAE, make up the joint SESAR representation at the World ATM Congress. 

Our experts will be on the stand throughout the congress, so pass by and find out more about the EDA and its work on SES/SESAR.
 

More information:

• EDA SESAR Project Page
• The Military in SES/SESAR (Brochure)
• EDA and SESAR JU sign Memorandum of Cooperation (EDA news 19 December 2016)
• EUROCONTROL and the European Defence Agency consolidate their cooperation (EDA news 17 November 2016)
• Partners step up efforts to address the integration of drones into European airspace (EDA news 8 November 2016)

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