Defence`s Feeds

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the notorious leader of Hezb-e Islami, returned to Kabul today. After several years of on-and-off talks, between the Afghan government and envoys of the party’s leader-in-hiding, a deal allowing his return was finally signed in September 2016. Several months of negotiations on the finer details of the deal’s implementation followed. An overview of AAN’s past reporting on the winding road that led to the deal provides indispensable background to the questions that still surround Hekmatyar’s return to public life.

For AAN’s most recent analysis on Hekmatyar’s return read this dispatch (3 May 2017):

Charismatic, Absolutist, Divisive: Hekmatyar and the impact of his return

 For analysis on the practical impact of the recent deal – on the UN’s sanctions list and on the situation in Shamshatu refugee camp, long the de facto HQ of Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami – see these two dispatches (11 February 2017 and 14 April 2017):

Hekmatyar taken off UN sanctions list: Paving the way for his return – and Hezb-e Islami’s reunification?

Moving Out of Shamshatu: Hezb-e Islami’s refugee followers between hope of return and doubts about the peace deal

To see how the agreement with Hezb-e Islami features within the larger context of the issues facing Afghanistan this year, see here (27 January 2017):

What to Watch? Key issues to follow in Afghanistan in 2017

For background on why Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami is controversial, and how the past still reverberates today, read this dispatch (14 December 2016):

Afghan War Criminal Zardad Freed: No protection for witnesses

For AAN’s analysis on the importance and impact of the deal, as it was being negotiated and signed, see these two dispatches (21 May 2016 and 29 September 2016):

Almost Signed? The peace agreement with Hezb-e Islami

Peace With Hekmatyar: What does it mean for battlefield and politics?

AAN’s paper on the influence of radical Islamic groups – other than the Taleban – among Afghanistan’s youth, includes an in-depth look the role of the Hezb-e Islami youth, including at Afghanistan’s universities (23 June 2015):

Beyond Jihad and Traditionalism: Afghanistan’s new generation of Islamic activists

The following dispatches trace the emergence and development of the negotiations with Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, both under president Karzai and president Ghani (most recent first):

19 February 2014:

Bomb and Ballot: The many strands and tactics of Hezb-e Islami

6 May 2013:

Adding the Ballot to the Bullet? Hezb-e Islami in transition

7 June 2012:

Another Hezb-e Islami U-Turn – with more to follow? (amended)

26 April 2012:

The second line of talks: Hezb-e Islami in Kabul

 6 November 2010:

Gulbuddin ante portas – again (2)

22 March 2010:

Gulbuddin ante portas – again (Updated)

Finally, see this dispatch for more background on Afghanistan’s ‘Amnesty Law’ that allows the search for peace to take place through blanket amnesty (22 February 2010):

After two years in legal limbo: A first glance at the approved ‘Amnesty law’

The larger a military operation is in size (Member States, troops, equipment involved), the more sophisticated and complete the medical support tends to be. The military medical support options in Europe used to be designed and optimised for military operations of a larger scale. For some of the current missions conducted in the context of the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), such as antipiracy or training missions, a far smaller number of personnel has to be deployed than in the operations mentioned above.

Against that background EDA carried out the study “Medical Support to Light Footprint Operations” which involved EDA’s ‘Project Team Medical’ and other Ad Hoc Medical Working Groups. The key issue investigated by the study was to keep the quality of medical support at the highest possible level for missions of smaller scale.

The overarching goal was to provide participating Member States with the analytical means to identify new ways of providing effective medical support to so-called ‘Light Footprint Operations’ (LFO) in the context of CSDP. As LFOs are not formally described in current EU or NATO doctrines, there is no agreed set of principles or best practices to tailor medical support to this type of missions.

The study commissioned by EDA analysed key elements of LFOs provides recommendations on a way forward on how to tailor and improve medical support for LFOs, namely:

• EU Medical Concept - requirements for medical support for LFOs and best practices for the provision of medical support must be introduced into the current EU Medical Concept;
• Further harmonization of qualification, material and concepts – based on lessons identified in recent CSDP missions, including difficulties and major obstacles, the study describes options for improved interoperability between units providing medical support, including to facilitate harmonisation and standardisation;
• Categorization of Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) - based on lessons identified in recent CSDP missions, the study analyzed that the concept of allocation roles should be revisited to consider modularization of medical units as a cost-effective way;
• New technologies and research activities - the study indicates opportunities for multinational cooperation in development and research activities for new technologies, that could be used for both reduce the footprint of medical support in LFOs and the improvement of medical care;
• Engagement between military and civilian medical community - the study identified a number of crossovers in the domains of training of medical professionals and the make-up of deployed medical staff, medical practices of information sharing and medical technologies. To address the synergies and concerns, the study suggests that EDA should seek opportunities to serve as a forum to build trust between the consumers of the technology, the developers and the manufacturers.

 

More information:

• Medical support (EDA project page) 
• EDA symposium discusses EU deploy capabilities for CSDP operations (EDA webnews, June 2016)

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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

ROKS Dokdo
(click to view full)

Australia isn’t the only Pacific Rim country looking to modernize its Navy these days. China’s rapid shipbuilding program and work on its aircraft carrier project gets a lot of attention – but just to the east, South Korea is fielding its own AEGIS-equipped “air warfare destroyer,” while picking up new capabilities via a new class of amphibious assault LHD ship. Sound familiar? Hobart and Canberra Class, meet the KDX-III King Sejong Class AEGIS destroyer (launched May 2007) and the new “LPH” Dokdo Class LHD (commissioned July 2007).

The 199-meter, 18,860-ton Dokdo Class officially has the less aggressive designation of LPH (landing platform, helicopter), but its well deck and amphibious assault capabilities place it within the LHD category…

The Dokdo Class/ LPX

Dokdo launches AAV7s
(click to view full)

The Dokdo Class can carry up to 720 troops, plus a mix of helicopters, tanks/armored vehicles, and wheeled vehicles. Transport to shore is accomplished via landing ships or LCAC hovercraft. The Dokdo Class is only 2/3 the size of Australia’s new Canberra Class, and just over 1/3 the size of the USA’s Wasp Class; but Dokdo is the largest ship in the South Korean Navy.

For defense, they will rely on a combat system from the Samsung Thales Corp. joint venture. It will rely on Thales’ SMART-L long range 3 dimension search radar, with a detection and tracking range of 400 km/ 240 miles. For defensive responses, it can coordinate a SeaRAM guided missile system, 2 Thales “Goalkeeper” 30mm CIWS systems, and various decoying systems. Even so, support from Korea’s frigate-sized KDX-II destroyers and new KDX-III King Sejong Class AEGIS destroyers will be essential.

ROKN Goalkeeper
(click to view full)

There has been media speculation that the Dokdo Class is in fact a light aircraft carrier, citing the ability to install a ski jump and operate V/STOL Harriers or STOVL F-35B Lightnings from its deck. America’s 42,000 ton Wasp Class LHDs are used in this manner, and it would be possible from Australia’s Canberra Class LHDs as well.

The smaller size of the Dokdo Class, however, means that using the ship in this way doesn’t make much sense. It would get one very few fighters, while sacrificing most of the ship’s total carrying capacity. Fighter aircraft require a lot of space below-decks, and so does their fuel and weapons storage. South Korea’s prime focus remains North Korea, and aerial cover for amphibious operations a la Inchon can easily be supported from land bases. Meanwhile, international operations featuring Korean LHDs would need Korean helicopters far more than they’d need Korean fighters.

Circumstances can change; but Korea’s Ministry of Defence has stated that they have no plans to operate fighter aircraft from these ships, and military logic makes this a believable assertion. This is not to say that offensive fixed wing aircraft will never operate from Dokdo. It’s just that they’re far more likely to be UAVs akin to the MQ-9 Reaper, rather than supersonic fighters.

LPX: Future Plans for the Class

The Dokdo Class ship ROKS Marado was scheduled to enter service by 2010, but its budget was canceled. That budget was restored in 2012, and recent regional tensions are making high-end ships like LHDs and Aegis destroyers more attractive to Korea. Marado commemorates a small southern island that is commonly thought of as both the ending and beginning point of Korea, depending on one’s perspective.

Up to 4 ships of class were originally planned, but doctrine has shifted toward 2-3 “rapid response fleets,” each built around 1 Dokdo Class ship and a number of destroyers. If there’s a 3rd ship of class, previous plans involved naming it after Baengnyeong Island, which is located in the Yellow Sea near the disputed Northern Limit Line (NLL) with North Korea.

Contracts and Key Events

ROKS Dokdo, docked
(click to view full)

 

May 4/17: South Korea has announced that it has started construction of its second Dokdo-class Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) amphibious assault ship. The milestone was marked by a keel-laying ceremony at the shipyard of Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction Co. in Busan, and it is expected that the vessel will be launched in April of next year. It will be delivered to the South Korean Navy in 2020, following sea trials. Seoul’s undertaking in constructing such vessels has been noted as its most major naval transport project in over a decade.

April 13/09: Samsung Thales Corp’s senior vice president, Byun Seung-wan, is quoted by Defense News as saying that Dokdo’s combat system is drawing regional interest:

“Southeast Asian countries have shown interest in one developed for the… Dokdo…. About two years ago, STC completed the five-year Landing Platform Experimental (LPX) combat system, in cooperation with the ADD, based on expertise gathered from its development of combat systems for the South Korean Navy’s KDX-I/II destroyers, frigates and patrol ships…. STC was the prime contractor for the integration and development of the command support and the command and fire-control system.”

The article also traces STC’s growth as a global developer of naval and land combat and battlefield management systems.

July 3/07: The ROKS Dokdo is handed over to the Navy in a ceremony. KOIS report.

Note that the name Dokdo is politically significant, referring to a set of islands whose territorial claim is disputed with Japan. The Korean perspective on Dokdo/Takeshima may be found here. Unsurprisingly, Japan filed a diplomatic protest over the name back in 2005. Asian countries tend to have civilization confidence, however, and the Korean reply was rude.

Additional Readings & Sources

• ROK Navy – Landing Platform, Helicopter (LPH). It certainly sounds more low-key than “LHD amphibious assault ship.” Even if that’s what it is.

• Navy Recognition – Dokdo class LPH – ROK Navy: also known as LPX, Landing Platform Helicopter, Amphibious Assault Ship

• GlobalSecurity.org – LP-X Dokdo (Landing Platform Experimental) Amphibious Ship

• Wikipedia – Dokdo-class amphibious assault ship

• KBS “News in Zoom” – Asia’s Largest Landing Ship-LPX, “Dokdo”

News & Views

• Defense News (April 13/09) – Automating Naval Warfare: Samsung Thales Making Name in Combat Systems [dead link].

• Information Dissemination (April 24/08) – Observing the ROKS Dokdo (LPH 6111)

• ‘Manoeuvre’ in Maritime Asia (April 22/08) – ADD Naval Weapons Arm to Develop UAV’s? [dead link]. They seem to be interested in UAVs that can take off and land in 200m. Which happens to be the size of the Dokdo Class’ flight deck.

DDG-110 Construction
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In April 2009 Bath and Ingalls agreed to the Navy’s surface combatant plans, thus heralding a significant restructuring within the American naval shipbuilding community. Under the agreements, the USA would end production at 3 Graf Spee sized DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class “destroyers,” but shift all production from the Congressionally-mandated joint arrangements to General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Maine, which had already made program-related investments in advanced shipbuilding technologies.

Northrop Grumman (now Huntington Ingalls Industries) would retain its DDG-1000 deckhouse work, but their main exchange was additional orders for DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers. Their Ingalls yard in Pascagoula, Mississippi would continue building the DDG-51 destroyers, beginning with 2 ordered in FY 2010-2011.

The US Navy’s Revised DDG-51 Plan

DDG-1000
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With the DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class ended at 3 ships, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class ships will become more important to the future navy. The Navy’s FY 2011 budget also terminated the planned CG (X) cruiser program as unaffordable. Instead, the US Navy would field an updated DDG-51 Flight III version, starting in FY 2016.

That date has been pushed back, owing to technical issues with the Flight III ships. Under the current plan, the DDG-51 Flight IIA Restart version would remain in production from FY 2010-2017, buying 13 ships in total (DDG 113 – 125) under a multi-year buy program. Huntington Ingalls Industries ships ordered to date are both named after Congressional Medal of Honor recipients, and include:

• DDG 113 John Finn
  
• DDG 114 Ralph Johnson

Both Bath Iron Works and HII will continue to build ships of class, but lead yard status for the “DDG-51 restart” ships shifted to Northrop Grumman (now HII) during the restructuring. GD Bath Iron Works is currently contracted to build DDG 115 Rafael Peralta and & DDG 116 Thomas Hudner, as the DDG-51 follow-yard.

Beyond the Flight IIAs, US Navy plans once called for buying an undetermined number of DDG-51 Flight IIIs from FY 2016 through at least FY 2022, and perhaps until FY 2031. The follow-on DDG-51 Flight IIIs are expected to carry a smaller version of the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR-S) dual-band active array that was slated for the canceled CG (X), along with the upgraded power and cooling systems required to support it. Other enhancements will be fleshed out as detailed design work on the Flight III commences, reportedly in FY 2012-2013. Unfortunately, there have been early reports that integration of the AMDR radar could prove to be a problem. The new radar will need to have a power draw that the ship can handle, cooling needs that the ship’s design can meet, and a size that can fit within the ship’s available space, all without changing the destroyer’s balance and stability. That is, to put it mildly, a challenge. So, too, are growing cost estimates that are edging the DDG-51 Flight III toward the price of larger and more advanced DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class ships.

Flight III buys now appear set to start no earlier than FY 2018, if indeed they start at all. Current plans do call for an interim step, however, as part of the proposed 2012-2017 multi-year buy.

Under the current multi-year proposal, 1 of 2 FY 2016 ships (DDG 123), and both FY 2017 ships (DDG 124-125), will “incorporate Flight III capability,” but not the new radars themselves. The addition of the AMDR-S radar and other associated systems would be funded as an engineering change proposal (ECP), so it doesn’t look like it’s affecting multi-year pricing. Otherwise, the Navy wouldn’t be able to show enough savings [1] to justify a multi-year buy under US laws. The Flight III ECP won’t be awarded until the Flight III Milestone Decision Authority approves the configuration, and the greatest risk would be changes that involve significant retrofits of DDG 123-125, beyond adding the AMDR radar. Those kinds of changes are always much more expensive than installing systems during ship construction.

Contracts & Key Events

Article coverage essentially terminated in FY 2013, as the USA moved to a multi-year block-buy from both shipyards to finance remaining Flight IIA destroyers, and the initial Flight III ships.

One thing to notice while reading these is that ship construction contracts do not include important equipment like guns, radar, combat systems, missile launchers, etc. Those are bought independently as “Government Furnished Equipment,” though ship construction contracts do pay to have that equipment installed in the ships. Many of those contracts are not publicly announced, or not broken out specifically by ship. As such, any ancillary contracts covered here are suggestive and informative, not comprehensive. Indeed, those “ancillary” contracts make up the largest portion of the ship’s total cost.

FY 2013 – 2017

May 4/17: Raytheon has received a $327.1 million US Navy contract for the low-rate production of the Air and Missile Defense Radar system. Known as the AMDR or AN/SPY-6(V) , the order calls for the procurement of three initial systems, including the equipment and engineering systems needed to produce, and will be mounted on Flight III Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. The Air and Missile Defense Radar is part of the ship’s AEGIS system, and is 30 times more sensitive than the search radars on the Flight II Arleigh Burkes. Work is expected to be completed by October 2020.

February 23/17: Huntington Ingalls Industries has marked a production milestone for the USS Frank E. Petersen during a keel authentication ceremony. The company was contracted by the Navy in March 2016 to produce the Arleigh Burke-class Flight IIA guided missile destroyer which is named after Frank Emmanuel Petersen Jr., who served as the USMC’s first African-American pilot and general officer. During the ceremony, Petersen’s window, Dr. Alicia Petersen said, “He wasn’t a man who wanted a lot of praise or recognition; however, if he could see this great ship being built for other young men and young women to see and look up to, he would be very proud.”

July 22/15: The Chief of Naval Operation Adm. Jonathan Greenert wants to buy ten Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDGS) to the tune of two a year, according to his Navigation Plan announced this week. This will bring the total number to be procured by 2020 to seventy-two. The Plan also calls for the procurement of the Navy’s Small Surface Combatant frigates by 2019, as well as investment in deterrent and attack submarines. The latter would involve boosting the fleet of Virginia-class boats to twenty-two within five years, in addition to the maintenance of the Ohio-class ballistic missile boats, with a replacement eyed for 2031.

April 15/15: The future Flight III Arleigh-Burke Class destroyers are making good progress, with an order scheduled for 2019. The Navy recently told Congress that the program would take the shape of a ten-ship multi-year procurement contract.

Nov 4/13: DDG 113. HII officially lays the keel for DDG 113 John Finn. She’s the 1st ship of the DDG 51 program restart, and will become the 29th Arleigh Burke Class ship built by HII. Sources: US NAVSEA, “Keel Laid for Future USS John Finn”.

Sept 12/13: DDG 114. The Navy marked the start of fabrication for DDG 114, the future USS Ralph Johnson. Keel laying won’t take place until Q3 2014. Sources: US NAVSEA, “Future USS Ralph Johnson starts fabrication”.

FY 2012

 

Mk 45 firing
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June 7/12: Lead vs. Follow Yard. Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. in Pascagoula, MS receives a $17.3 million cost-plus-award-fee/ cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with performance incentives, for DDG 51 class follow yard services. The firm explained that they remain the follow-yard behind General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works for previous Arleigh Burke Class destroyers in the US Fleet (DDGs 51-112).

As the follow yard, they offer many of the same services as the lead yard, when required. That includes engineering, technical, material procurement and production support; configuration; class flight upgrades and new technology support; data and logistics management; lessons learned analysis; acceptance trials; post delivery test and trials; post shakedown availability support; reliability and maintainability; system safety program support; material and fleet turnover support; shipyard engineering teams; crew training, design tool/ design standardization, detail design development, and other technical and engineering analyses for the purpose of supporting DDG 51 class ship construction and test and trials.

In addition, DDG 51 class follow-yard services may provide design, engineering, procurement and manufacturing/ production services to support design feasibility studies and analyses that modify DDG 51 class destroyers for Foreign Military Sales programs. Japan’s Kongou Class, and South Korea’s KDX-III destroyers, are both examples of that phenomenon.

Work on this contract will be performed in Pascagoula, MS (98%), and Washington, DC (2%), and is expected to be complete by February 2013. This contract was not competitively procured by US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC, as these relationships were set a long time ago (N00024-12-C-2312).

Feb 15/12: Naming. The US Navy names DDG 113-115.

DDG 113: John Finn, who retired as a lieutenant, received the Medal of Honor from Adm. Chester Nimitz for displaying “magnificent courage in the face of almost certain death” during the Japanese attack on military installations in Hawaii during Pearl Harbor.

DDG 114: Marine Corps Pfc. Ralph Henry Johnson was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for shouting a warning to his fellow Marines and hurling himself on an explosive device, saving the life of one Marine and preventing the enemy from penetrating his sector of the patrol’s perimeter during the Vietnam War.

Nov 16/11: Jane’s Navy International is reporting that DDG-51 flight III destroyers with the new AMDR radar and hybrid propulsion drives could cost $3-4 billion each.

If that’s true, it’s about the same cost as a DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class ship, in return for less performance, more vulnerability, and less future upgrade space. AMDR isn’t a final design yet, so it’s still worthwhile to ask what it could cost to give the Flight IIIs’ radar and combat systems ballistic missile defense capabilities – R&D for the function doesn’t go away when it’s rolled into a separate program. Indeed, if the Flight III cost estimate is true, it raises the question of why that would be a worthwhile use of funds, and re-opens the issue of whether continuing DDG-1000 production and upgrades might make more sense. DoD Buzz.

FY 2011

 

Sept 26/11: The US Navy releases the totals for the June 15/11 contract: $783.6 million in shipbuilding costs for DDG 113. Note that this is just the shipbuilder’s share. It excludes key items like radars, electronics, weapons, and other “government-furnished equipment.” For the recent DDG 1001/1002 contract, Bath Iron Works’ shipbuilding costs were a bit more than $2 billion for 2 ships, each of which is expected to cost a bit less than $3 billion when all is said and done. The actual cost of DDG 113/114 would work out to around $2 billion each at a similar ratio. Equipment for an Arleigh Burke Flight IIA ship has a long production history, is less sophisticated in some ways than DDG 1000’s, and does not include extras from other shipbuilders – like the Zumwalt’s composite deckhouse from HII. As such, DDG 113’s furnished equipment is very likely to be less expensive in absolute terms. The question is, would it be more than 30% less expensive, which is required in order to be lower relative to shipbuilding costs?

The Navy also announces a $697.6 million fixed-price-incentive contract for DDG 114 construction. For DDG 114 construction, significant amounts of work will be performed in Pascagoula, MS; Cincinnati, OH; Walpole, MA; York, PA; Charlottesville, VA; Erie, PA; and Burns Harbor, IN; and is expected to be complete by July 2018. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was procured via a limited competition between Huntington Ingalls and Bath Iron Works, run by US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC (N00024-11-C-2305). See also HII.

August 17/11: Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors, Moorestown, NJ, is awarded a $6,986,478 option exercise modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-03-C-5115) for management and engineering services to maintain and modify the design of DDG 51-class combat system compartments and topside arrangements. Required services include program management and operation support, quality assurance, configuration management, ship design integration, fleet lifecycle engineering support, installation support, firmware maintenance, combat system test and evaluation, Navy-furnished material support, special studies, and future-ship integration studies.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, N.J. (37%); Bath, ME (25%); Pascagoula, MO (22%); San Diego, Calif. (6%); Washington, DC (5%); Norfolk, VA (3M); Port Hueneme, CA (1%); and Syracuse, NY (1%). Work is expected to be completed by September 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, DC, is the contracting activity.

June 15/11: Huntington Ingalls, Inc. in Pascagoula, MS receives a fixed-price-incentive contract for DDG 113 construction, engineering change proposals, and design budgeting – in other words, the main ship contract. The US Navy just won’t tell anyone what the cost is. They’ll only say that “significant work” will be performed in Pascagoula, MS; Cincinnati, OH; Walpole, MA; Burns Harbor, IN; York, PA; and Charlottesville, VA. Work is expected to be complete by July 2017. This contract was not competitively procured by US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC (N00024-11-C-2309). And yet:

“As this award represents the first DDG 51 class ship to be awarded for the continuation of the DDG 51 class program, and there is a competitive solicitation for [3] additional DDG 51 class ships, the contract award amount and percentages of work to be performed in each location for DDG 113 are considered source selection information (see 41 U.S.C. 2101, et seq., FAR 2.101 and FAR 3.104) and will not be made public at this time.”

We’ve seen a similar pattern recently in the Littoral Combat Ship program, and the net effect is to obscure the program’s major costs from public view. Depending on how long the Navy decides to define the program as competitively solicited, and it has been built in 2 shipyards for a long time now, this could obscure costs for many years. All for a critical component of the American fleet. See also H.I.I. release.

June 15/11: Defense News reports that Saudi Arabia may be shifting their focus away from a fully armed variant of the Littoral Combat Ship, carrying the smaller AN/SPY-1F radar and AEGIS combat system. In its place, they received May 2011 briefings concerning full DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers displacing about 3 times the tonnage, with ballistic missile defense capability upgrades. The cost trade-off would be about 4-6 modified LCS ships, in exchange for about 2 DDG-51 Flight IIA BMD ships.

The unspoken threat here is, of course, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The unspoken concern is the security of a top-level defense technology, which is critical to defending the USA and its allies, in Saudi hands.

To date, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class has never been exported per se, though their AEGIS combat system and accompanying AN/SPY-1D radars have. Japan is the only foreign country with full AEGIS BMD systems, on board their natively produced Kongo Class destroyers. Spanish F100 frigates have participated in US missile defense tests, and are eligible for the full BMD upgrade; Australia’s forthcoming Hobart Class “destroyers” are a close derivative. South Korea’s large KDX-III destroyers could be upgraded to add BMD capabilities, but the smaller SPY-1F radars on Norway’s Fridjhof Nansen Class frigates don’t have that same upgrade path available.

Another possible option for Saudi Arabia would be used US Navy DDG-51 Flight I ships, upgraded with AEGIS BMD. That would allow the Saudis to field more ships for the same money, if an agreement was reached. The costs would lie in questions about hull life and length of service, and the Flight Is’ lack of a helicopter hangar. Helicopters have been shown to be essential defenses against speedboat threats, of the kind that Iran fields in the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Defense News | Information Dissemination.

June 12/11: Looking ahead, Aviation Week reports that DDG-51 Flight III may be hitting design growth problems. Power, cooling, and weight distribution have always been seen as the most likely stumbling blocks to fitting next-generation radars like AMDR on the DDG-51 hull, and:

“As the possible requirements and expectations continue to grow for the proposed DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class Flight III destroyers, so is the concern among defense analysts and contractors that the U.S. Navy may once again be trying to pack too much into one ship… And yet it is the need to field [AMDR] that is driving some of the additional requirements for the Flight IIIs… “Sometimes we get caught up in the glamour of the high technology,” Huntington Ingalls Industries CEO Mike Petters says. “The radars get bounced around. They get changed. Their missions get changed. The technology changes. The challenge is if you let the radars drive the ships, you might not get any ships built.”

June 3/11: BAE Systems Land & Armaments, LP in Minneapolis, MN wins a $54.6 million firm-fixed-price sole-source contract for MK 41 Vertical Launching System mechanical modules and related equipment and services. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring its cumulative value to $55.5 million.

A June 22/11 BAE release reveals that the equipment will be installed in HII’s DDG 113 & 114, and Bath Iron Works’ DDG-115. Each ship will receive 2 sets, for a total of 6. Production on the missile launchers will begin in June 2011 and run through 2013, though the contract runs to September 2015. Work will be performed in Aberdeen, SD (45%); Aiken, SC (25%); York, PA (20%); Louisville, KY (5%); and Fridley, MN (5%). Work is expected to be complete by September 2015 (N00024-11-C-5301).

June 2/11: Northrop Grumman spinoff Huntington Ingalls Industries in Pascagoula, MS receives a $25.3 million not-to-exceed contract modification for DDG 113 long lead time materials, which must be bought early to keep the ship on schedule.

Work will be performed in Cincinnati, OH (60%), and Pascagoula, MS (40%), and is expected to be complete by June 2011 (N00024-10-C-2308).

Feb 25/11: Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $26.7 million contract modification, exercising an option for DDG 114’s Aegis weapon system, including a multi-mission signal processor, and associated special tooling and special test equipment.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (87%), and Clearwater, FL (13%), and is expected to be complete by November 2013. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract.

Dec 20/10: Raytheon Co. in Sudbury, MA receives a $45.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising options for the production of 2 AN/SPY-1Dv transmitter groups and 2 MK 99 Mod 8 fire control systems, for installation on DDG 114 (Northrop Grumman) and DDG 115 (GD). See also May 3/10.

Work will be performed in Andover, MA (88%), and Sudbury, MA (12%), and is expected to be complete by April 2013. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington Navy Yard, DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5111).

Oct 14/10: Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ received a $97 million contract modification t finalize production of the DDG 113 Aegis weapon system (including a multi-mission signal processor [MMSP]); plus an additional MMSP for the Surface Combat System Center on Wallops Island, VA; DDG 114-115 advanced procurement efforts; and associated technical services. Note that DDG 115 is being built by General Dynamics Bath Iron Works.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (87%), and Clearwater, FL (13%), and is expected to be complete by October 2014 (N00024-09-C-5110).

FY 2010

 

Sept 29/10: BAE Systems in Louisville, KY receives a $7.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for engineering services and supplies to convert and upgrade one 5-inch/ 127mm MK 45 MOD 4 gun mount for the future guided missile destroyer DDG 113.

Work will be performed in Louisville, KY (80%), and Minneapolis, MN (20%), and is expected to be complete by February 2013. $282,340 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/10. The contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center’s Port Hueneme Division in Port Hueneme, CA (N00024-07-G-5438).

Aug 23/10: Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA received a $46.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, finalizing a deal to produce an AN/SPY-1D-V radar transmitter group, MK 99 Mod 8 fire control system, and other engineering services in support of DDG 113’s Aegis weapons systems ship set.

Work will be performed in Andover, MA (88%), and Sudbury, MA (12%), and is expected to be complete by February 2014. The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington Navy Yard, DC manages these contracts (N00024-09-C-5111).

June 21/10: Philadelphia Gear Corp. announces an $80 million contract to provide main reduction gears for 3 new Arleigh Burke Class destroyers (DDG 113, 114, and 115). Options for additional ships could bring the contract’s eventual total to more than $425 million.

Philadelphia Gear has supplied supplied gears, sprockets and transmissions for US Navy ships since the First World War, and the firm now specializes in the design and manufacture of Main Reduction Gears (MRGs) for front line combat and support vessels. Main reduction gears are used to turn the very fast rotational speed of an engine, such as a DDG-51 type destroyers’ LM2500 turbines, into efficient slower speed rotation of the ships’ propellers. The entire assembly weighs over 100,000 pounds, is rated at at 51,550 shp, and uses a reduction ratio of 21.3746 to 1.

Note that this contract will supply both Northrop Grumman (DDG 113/114) and Bath Iron Works (DDG 115). Earlier this year, Philadelphia Gear announced plans to move its West Coast operations from Lynwood, CA to a renovated facility in Santa Fe Springs, near Los Angeles. The new 120,000 square foot facility is slated to open in Q3 2010, and will house all assembly and test, plus more than 80% of the manufacturing work for the US Navy’s DDG program. Philadelphia Gear Corp. | FedBizOpps solicitation, which explains the exact structure of these main reduction gears.

May 3/10: “Government-Furnished Equipment” remains a substantial share of any warship’s cost. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $91.3 million firm-fixed-price not-to-exceed modification to a previously awarded contract for advance procurement of the consolidated bill of material and associated labor to support beryllium oxide resistors, phase shifters, surface mount work center production and engineering services support of production of the DDG 114 and 115’s Aegis weapon system.

Aegis refers to both the SPY-1 radars that equip these ships, and the combat system that integrates the ship’s radar and weapons into a single coordinated defensive system. It is so integral to this and related ship classes that they are frequently described in common parlance as “Aegis destroyers/ cruisers/ frigates.”

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (85%), and Clearwater, FL (15%), and is expected to be complete by December 2011. The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington Navy Yard, D.C. manages these contracts (N00024-09-C-5110).

April 22/10: Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc. in Pascagoula, MS receives an $114 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-10-C-2308), exercising an option for long lead time materials. This includes propulsion gas turbines, generators, controllable pitch propeller, and other components to support construction of DDG 114, the firm’s 30th DDG-51 destroyer.

Work will performed in Cincinnati, OH (32%); Walpole, MA (30%); Charlottesville, VA (11%); Erie, PA (7%); Anaheim, CA (7%); Warminster, PA (2%); and various locations (11%). The effort is anticipated to start immediately, with a base period of performance ending 37 months after contract award. The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington Navy Yard, DC manages the contracts. See also Northrop Grumman release.

Dec 2/09: Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc. in Pascagoula, MS receives a not-to-exceed $170.7 million letter contract for DDG 113 long lead time materials under the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyer program. Funds will be used to buy things like propulsion gas turbines, generators, air conditioning systems, controllable pitch propeller and other components, so they’ll be ready in time when construction of DDG 113 begins.

Work is expected to be performed in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Alabama, Indiana, Louisiana., Mississippi, New York, Texas, Virginia and Washington, to be completed by January 2013. This contract was not competitively procured by The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington Navy Yard, DC, since Northrop Grumman had already been picked to build the ship (N00024-10-C-2308).

The formal award of the DDG 113’s main construction contract is expected in 2010. See also Northrop Grumman release.

FY 2009

 

April 7/09: Rep. Gene Taylor [D-MS, Seapower subcommittee chair] announces that the Pentagon has reached agreements with General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works in Maine, and with Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls Shipyard in Mississippi. Read “Bath, Ingalls Agree to Navy’s Surface Combatant Plans” for details of the arrangements.

April 6/09: US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announces his recommendations for the FY 2010 defense budget:

“…in this request, we will include funds to complete the buy of two navy destroyers in FY10. These plans depend on being able to work out contracts to allow the Navy to efficiently build all three DDG-1000 class ships at Bath Iron Works in Maine and to smoothly restart the DDG-51 Aegis Destroyer program at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi. Even if these arrangements work out, the DDG-1000 program would end with the third ship and the DDG-51 would continue to be built in both yards.

If our efforts with industry are unsuccessful, the department will likely build only a single prototype DDG-1000 at Bath and then review our options for restarting production of the DDG-51.”

Additional Readings

• US Congressional Research Service (Feb 26/10 update) – Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

• DID – AMDR Competition: The USA’s Next Dual-Band Radar

• DID – US Destroyers Get a HED: More Power to Them! Hybrid-Electric drive modifications might solve the class’ power problems.

• DII – Serious Dollars for AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense Modifications (BMD)

• USNI Proceedings Magazine (May 2008) – Where Are the Ballistic-Missile-Defense Cruisers?. The DDG-51s, which would have been called cruisers in a previous age, are becoming that answer. Is that a good response? it could cost to give the Flight IIIs’ radar and combat systems ballistic missile defense capabilities – R&D for the function doesn’t go away when it’s rolled into a separate program. Indeed, if the Flight III cost estimate is true, it raises the question of why that would be a worthwhile use of funds, and re-opens the issue of whether continuing DDG-1000 production and upgrades might make more sense. DoD Buzz.

Additional Readings

• US Congressional Research Service (Feb 26/10 update) – Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

• DID – AMDR Competition: The USA’s Next Dual-Band Radar

• DID – US Destroyers Get a HED: More Power to Them! Hybrid-Electric drive modifications might solve the class’ power problems.

• DII – Serious Dollars for AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense Modifications (BMD)

• USNI Proceedings Magazine (May 2008) – Where Are the Ballistic-Missile-Defense Cruisers?. The DDG-51s, which would have been called cruisers in a previous age, are becoming that answer. Is that a good response?

• Naval Technnology – Arleigh Burke Class destroyers

FOOTNOTES

fn1. The FY 2013 budget’s multi-year buy proposal estimates total savings of $1.538 billion, or 8.7% savings over buying the 9 ships with annual contracts. Current destroyers have a hardware cost of $250-350 million each for their Aegis radars and weapons systems, of which “major hardware” is an overwhelming percentage. Even if we use the low-end estimate for current systems, and assume no cost for retrofitting, 3 x $250 million would cut the projected total savings in half, dropping the proposed multi-year buy below the 5% savings threshold. [return]

Americas

• Raytheon has received a $327.1 million US Navy contract for the low-rate production of the Air and Missile Defense Radar system. Known as the AMDR or AN/SPY-6(V), the order calls for the procurement of three initial systems, including the equipment and engineering systems needed to produce, and will be mounted on Flight III Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. The Air and Missile Defense Radar is part of the ship’s AEGIS system, and is 30 times more sensitive than the search radars on the Flight II Arleigh Burkes. Work is expected to be completed by October 2020.

• The US Navy has awarded Lockheed Martin a $64.6 million contract—with the potential to increase to $94.1 million—for engineering on the Common Compartment Strategic Weapons System. The contract includes testing of a special test vehicle, maintenance and the integration of the Trident D5 II SLBM to the system. Britain will contribute $1.9 million to the program in order to continue their collaboration on the Trident missile, despite the issue causing some controversy there over the missile’s cost and questions as to whether Britain should keep it’s undersea nuclear deterrent. However, with future upgrades, the Trident II is likely to remain both Washington and London’s main SLBM onboard both the US Ohio-class and the British Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines until 2040.

Middle East & North Africa

• Israeli UAV manufacturer Meteor Aerospace has secured its first customer for its Impact 700 system. Measuring at 7m (22.9ft) in length and with a 12m wingspan, the UAV has an endurance of 24 hours and is currently being test-flown. While the buyer of the Impact 700 is unknown, the firm’s main investor, Hezi Bezalel, is known to be very active in Africa. The firm also announced that they are working on a larger version of the UAV, named the Impact 1300, with company president Itzhak Nissan stating that the new design “will be a much bigger UAV in the MALE [medium-altitude, long-endurance] category.”

Africa

• The US State Department has cleared the sale of 12 MD 530F Cayuse Warrior light attack helicopters to the government of Kenya. At an estimated cost of $253 million, the sale includes the provision of 24 HMP 400 machine gun pod systems, 24 M260 rocket launcher systems, and assorted ammunition. Also provided are communications and navigation equipment, contractor logistics support, training, US Government technical assistance, airframe and weapon system spare parts support, Contractor Field Service Representative (CFSR) support, and Special Assigned Airlift Mission (SAAM) flight delivery support. The sale goes towards helping Kenya modernize its rotorcraft fleet in order to improve border security, undertake operations against the Somalian jihadist group, al-Shabaab, and as a troop contributor to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The helicopter has been used for a similar mission scope by the Afghan Air Force.

Europe

• BAE Systems Hägglunds, the Swedish subsidiary of BAE, has entered into partnership with Czech firm Ray Services to deliver parts for the Mjölner mortar system to the Swedish armed forces. The move comes as BAE looks to boost its cooperation with Czech firms as part of preparation to bid for the Czech government’s replacement of its aging BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles. The team of several companies led by BAE and including firm VOP CZ will come together to offer the CV90 IFV as part of Prague’s competition. The CV90 has over 1200 units in service in seven countries, including several NATO members.

• Slovakia is waiting on US Congress to approve the potential sale of nine Bell 429 light utility helicopters, after the sale was cleared by the US State Department. Valued at an estimated $150 million, the DSCA said the order would enable Slovakia to “strengthen its homeland defence and deter regional threats.” Also included in the sale are WESCAM MX-10 cameras, training, spare parts, and logistical support, mission equipment, communication and navigation equipment, special tools and test equipment, ground support equipment, airframe and engine spare parts, technical data, publications, maintenance work order/electronic change proposals, technical assistance, repair and return, quality assurance team, and transportation of aircraft. At present, the Slovak air force’s rotorcraft inventory includes three Mil Mi-2s and 14 Mi-17s, with nine Sikorsky UH-60M Black Hawks already on order.

Asia Pacific

• South Korea has announced that it has started construction of its second Dokdo-class Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) amphibious assault ship. The milestone was marked by a keel-laying ceremony at the shipyard of Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction Co. in Busan, and it is expected that the vessel will be launched in April of next year. It will be delivered to the South Korean Navy in 2020, following sea trials. Seoul’s undertaking in constructing such vessels has been noted as its most major naval transport project in over a decade.

• The Australian Royal Navy has commissioned the first of two Austal-built Cape-class patrol boats. Constructed in a $47.4 million contract, Austal says the ADV Fourcroy was officially named in a recent ceremony at a base in Western Australia and will help “secure and protect Australia’s extensive maritime borders, with eight operated by the Australian Border Force and two to be operated by the RAN.” Austal are currently preparing a bid in collaboration with German designer Fassmer to design and build 12 new Offshore Patrol Vessels for the Australian Navy.

Today’s Video

• South Korea’s Dokdo-class Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) amphibious assault ship:

American C-5 Galaxy Strategic Airlifter

The Ivan Papanin (Project 23550) class is a fleet of two multipurpose patrol icebreakers being built by JSC Admiralty Shipyards for the Russian Navy.

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has presented its report on the competitive evaluation process to select a successful international partner for the country’s Future Submarine programme.

CBG Systems is pleased to announce that it has secured a contract for the manufacture and supply of Moonraker's antenna systems for the Italian Naval law programme.

Raytheon has secured a $327.14m fixed-price incentive (firm target) modification to a previously awarded contract to begin low-rate initial production of AN/SPY-6(V) air and missile defence radars (AMDRs).

US Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) sailors have developed a new use for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to maintain a visual on the sailors at sea, especially during man-overboard situations.

UK MoD negotiates £1.4bn contract for Royal Navy's sixth Astute-class submarine, and Australian Government releases RFT for $35bn Future Frigate project. Naval-technology.com wraps up the key headlines from April, 2017.

On 3 May, Members of AFET and SEDE will hold an exchange of views with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. The debate will primarily focus on the strategic cooperation between the EU and NATO-EU, including the implementation of the 2016 Joint Declaration, and on how the two organisations can jointly face complex security threats emerging globally and in our neighbourhood.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Extracts from the debate
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

As I mentioned in my last post, I was once again at the Moscow Conference on International Security last week. I will post my overall impressions in the next few days, but first the traditional posting of the slides from key speakers. First up, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov. The conference organizers have posted the Russian transcript of his speech as well as Russian and English language videos. Apologies for the poor quality of a few of the images.

Today (3 May 2017) Chief Executive Jorge Domecq welcomed Mr. Øystein Bø (State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence of Norway) to the EDA for productive talks focused on further enhancing EDA-Norway cooperation. As a non-member of the European Union, Norway signed an Administrative Arrangement with the EDA in 2006, and is now actively involved in a range of EDA projects and programmes. The meeting provided an excellent opportunity to access progress on EDA-Norway cooperation as well as investigate areas where cooperation could be expanded. 

Mr. Domecq welcomed State Secretary Bø  by expressing his deep appreciation for Norway’s involvement and support to the EDA through Norway’s overall commitment to cooperation with the agency. As an example of this cooperation, Mr. Domecq highlighted that almost all the actions agreed between the EDA and Norway during his meeting with the Norwegian Minister of Defence Ine Eriksen Søreide in January 2016 have been concluded. One of the most concrete actions has been the successful secondment if a Norwegian expert to EDA who leads EDA’s work on CBRN R&T.   

Before the meeting began, EDA Project Officers presented State Secretary Bø with selected EDA capability development projects, offering an opportunity to demonstrate the work that the EDA is currently undertaking in CBRN, SESAR and Cyber. 

Norway has a long standing and deep participation in EDA activities, most notably in Air-to-Air Refuelling (Norway signed in February 2017 together with Belgium and Germany a Declaration of Intent confirming that it will sign the MMF MoU in 2017), GOVSATCOM which Norway is now officially participating in, also equally involved in projects and programmes related to C-IED such as JDEAL and CBRN. Furthermore, as a full member of the European Tactical Airlift Center (ETAC), Norway will participate in EAATTC (Tactical Airlift Training) 17-4 in Zaragoza this September. However most prominent involvement of Norway in EDA’s work is its active participation in projects and programmes in the field of research and technology.

Speaking at the conclusion of the visit, Mr. Domecq commented; “I am delighted to have welcomed State Secretary of Norway Øystein Bø to the EDA for positive and forward looking discussions. I am particularly grateful for Norway’s participation and contribution to the EDA. The cooperation we have built has been very fruitful and also serves as a model for EDA’s cooperation with partners. I believe we can look forward to developing new ways to enhance cooperation with Norway.”

 

More information:

• EDA Chief Executive and Norwegian Minister of Defence discuss defence cooperation
• Administrative arrangements with non-EU members
• EDA programme launched to improve IED Detection
• Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF) takes shape

One of the anti-Soviet mujahedin leaders, Mawlawi Yunus Khales, famously likened Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to a pair of trousers that had caught fire: get rid of them and be naked or keep them on and burn. Hekmatyar, Khales appeared to be saying, is too necessary to throw away and too problematic to keep close. So, what happens to a government that signs a peace accord with this man, who is both charismatic and divisive, especially a government which already suffers from internal discord? As celebratory billboards with his picture are being raised – and immediately defaced – in Kabul, AAN’s Borhan Osman takes a look at the implications of Hekmatyar’s return to Afghan politics.

A peace deal with a party – or with an individual?

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hezb-e Islami (often abbreviated to HIG: Hezb-e Islami-ye Gulbuddin) is due to return to Kabul in the wake of the peace deal he signed with President Ashraf Ghani on 29 September 2016. The agreement, hailed by the Afghan government as the first major peace achievement of the last fifteen years, was the climax of six and half years of negotiations, which had been fraught with interruptions and breakdowns. The accord became possible after Hekmatyar dropped his most substantial pre-condition for any deal, the withdrawal of foreign troops.

The agreement contains a commitment by HIG to stop its military activities and fully respect the laws of Afghanistan. The government in return, committed itself to requesting the delisting of HIG leaders and members from sanctions by the United Nations and others. The government also declared an amnesty for the HIG leader and his followers for their past crimes and agreed to recruit HIG fighters into the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and provide townships for 20,000 refugee families affiliated with HIG and living in Pakistan to settle in. The government said, as well, that it would free security and political prisoners detained for their links to HIG. For Hekmatyar himself, the government pledged to provide him with several homes and an honorary status, as it says in the agreement, in appreciation of his struggle “for peace and freedom of Afghanistan.”

This deal is basically about reconciliation with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar personally. Most provisions of the agreement were designed to make his return look prestigious and enable him to sell the agreement to his followers by demonstrating that it was also beneficial to them. Since Hekmatyar himself is at the centre of the deal, his return to the Afghan capital has been seen as the main manifestation of the peace agreement. HIG negotiators have kept insisting his return could only come after various aspects of the deal were implemented; implementing the deal has, so far, not gone smoothly.

The UN Security Council took Hekmatyar off its sanctions list on 4 February this year. Other Hezb leaders and Hezb-e Islami itself were never on it. The United States still has Hekmatyar and Hezb-e Islami on its proscribed list, but this is a lot less serious as it only bans their funds going into the US. America also still has a bounty on the heads of two Hezbi commanders accused of terrorist crimes in Afghanistan (including the attack on the Finest supermarket in Kabul in January 2011 which killed all the members of an Afghan family). As to prisoners, the government has only agreed to release those convicted of less serious crimes – to the fury of HIG negotiators. The release of some of the prisoners came on 2 May, days after Hekmatyar’s coming back to Afghanistan, although before his entry into the capital. Both sides have also been haggling over the distribution of plots of land to refugees associated with the party. They have also been wrangling over the nature of the welcoming ceremony which the government will hold.

HIG representatives have frequently taken to the media to accuse the government of not upholding the agreement. They have particularly accused circles around Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah (who belongs to Hezb-e Islami’s old rivals, Jamiat-e Islami) of trying to sabotage the peace accord. According to diplomats and sources in the government that AAN has spoken to, HIG negotiators even threatened to withdraw from the agreement if the government failed to meet their demands. However, bargains have now been struck and Hekmatyar is coming back. The first official ceremony – a welcome by government leaders including Second Vice-President Sarwar Danish and National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar – took place in Jalalabad on 30 April 2017. Hekmatyar made a long speech, mostly dedicated to defending the peace deal against possible Taleban criticism. The Taleban have not officially commented on the deal or on Hekmatyar’s return, but on social media, Taleban members have consistently denounced Hekmatyar’s signing of the peace accord as surrender, a submission to the government.

Hekmatyar has yet to arrive in Kabul itself, a city which, during the civil war of the mid-1990s, he ordered ruthless bombardments of, regardless of the extreme harm done to the civilian population. He was not alone in this – and many of the commanders and leaders of the other factions fighting over Kabul at that time took senior government positions, fifteen years ago, in 2001. However, Hezb-e Islami was considered ‘first among equals’ among the various factions who together left a third of Kabul destroyed and tens of thousands of people dead. One example of Hezb-e Islami rocketing came in August 1992 when, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which was providing emergency health care to the city at the time, 1000 to 2000 people were killed and eight to nine thousand left injured (cited here).

Even before that, Hekmatyar, has been accused of carrying out large numbers of assassinations, particularly in Peshawar, where he targeted those who, like him, were also anti-Soviet and anti-PDPA. There are detailed accusations of him ordering the assassination of monarchists, women’s rights activists, intellectuals and mujahedin from other factions. As noted in a previous AAN dispatch, one of the most notorious assassinations was that of Sayed Bahauddin Majruh in February 1988. Majruh was the publisher of the highly respected magazine, which, a few months before his murder, had published the results of a survey that found that 70 per cent of Afghan refugees supported the former king, Zahir Shah, over any of the mujahedin leaders. Hekmatyar got very few votes. Asia Watch reported that Majruh had received death threats from Hezb-e Islami before his murder.

Hezb-e Islami already part of the state’s fabric

Hekmatyar will come to Kabul as head of a rather unusual party. Hezb-e Islami, taken as a collective political force, has been difficult to classify in the years since the fall of the Taleban as either pro- or anti-government. One part of the party, which has slowly become the largest, has supported the state and become part of the fabric of government in the post-2001 political order. Some senior Hezbi leaders, such as Wahidullah Sabawun, who once served (among others) as Hekmatyar’s head of intelligence, started their political activities in Kabul in early 2002. Others, such as Khalid Faruqi and Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, joined later, establishing the largest Hezb-e Islami party in 2005 in Kabul; Arghandiwal became one of the several Hezbi ministers in the cabinet. The other part of the party continued an ‘armed struggle’ against the government until the signing of the September 2016 peace deal, although the effects of this struggle had become increasingly difficult to discern. Both of the factions have identified themselves as Hezb-e Islami, an undivided party. Both have taken pride in Hezb-e Islami’s legacy and called Hekmatyar their uncontested supreme leader.

The loyalty to Hekmatyar from both parts of Hezb-e Islami has continued, tacitly by one part, explicitly by the other. On paper, the party might have appeared to be fighting itself, given that Hezbis were on both sides of the ‘frontline’. However, many Afghans quoted a line about members of this party: “Once a Hezbi, always a Hezbi.” In other words, many Afghans believe Hezbis remain committed to their brand of Islamist politics and to their leader, regardless of changing circumstances or how they may present themselves.

Some analysts have gone further, reading the division of Hezb-e Islami along pro and anti-state lines as a tactic by Hekmatyar aimed at distributing his men on both sides of the ‘frontline’. However, the fact that Hekmatyar, at times, explicitly excommunicated those in the government casts doubt on this reading. His tone towards the pro-state segment was particularly harsh during the initial years of their joining the government, between 2005 and 2010.(1)

By the time Hekmatyar signed the peace deal with the government in September 2016, the overwhelming majority of Hekmatyar’s followers were living under the Afghan government. Given that the bulk of Hezbis were already on the side of the Afghan state and that Hezb-e Islami’s ‘armed struggle’ has dwindled to close-to-nothing, the significance of the Hezb peace deal is mainly reconciliation with Hekmatyar himself. It is his return to Kabul that makes this agreement important. Given his centrality to the peace accord, it is worth looking at the man himself and his personality traits and what impact they may have as he tries to fit into a new political environment. 

Hekmatyar, a charismatic leader? But divisive

President Ghani, in an interview with AAN during the presidential campaign of 2014, counted Hekmatyar as one of the five charismatic modern Afghan leaders (along with Ahmad Shah Massud, Abdul Ali Mazari, Abdul Rashid Dostum and Mullah Muhammad Omar), meaning a leader who inspired – or inspires – devotion in his followers by force of personality (and not implying that the leader is either a good or a bad person). Charisma is one of the qualities many mention about Hekmatyar. According to his followers, it arose through his closeness to them. Unlike other mujahedin leaders who were accessible only to the highest of the party hierarchy, they say, Hekmatyar preferred sharing meals with his fighters, would personally attend funerals and observe the ranks closely. His intellectual and writing skills and oratory were other elements of his personality that made him attractive to Hezbi members.

However, Hekmatyar’s strength lay not just in charisma, but in his capacity to organise. He created a party which, in the words of the Afghanistan Justice Project, “maintained a reputation as a highly organized and centralized faction. It had a complex leadership structure, with successive tiers in its decision-making body, and a powerful party leader.” Its ideology was also much more coherent than most of the other mujahedin tanzims (factions) and, until the mid-1990s, as Pakistan’s favoured mujahedin leader, Hekmatyar also got the biggest share of Western, Arab and Pakistani largesse. This helped him ‘grow’ his party and following. Loyalty to the leadership and to the organisational brand, a well-defined party structure and the vitality of its ideology, made Hezb-e Islami stand out as a strong organisation.

Hekmatyar has had an absolutist leadership style, based on building a small clique of loyalists around him, although those in this clique who questioned him or become too powerful were side-lined. An example of this is the constant reshuffling of his chiefs of intelligence (at least five people held this position during the years of anti-Soviet jihad). Compare that with Ahmad Shah Massud’s decades-long association with his chief of intelligence, Qasim Fahim. Hekmayar still has a grand vision of himself and his party. In his writings and interviews, he depicts himself as a visionary leader, an Islamic thinker and an authoritative theologian. In one book entitled Khubuna aw Taʿbirona (Dreams and Interpretations), Hekmatyar even published his interpretation of one of an Arab fighter’s dream as suggesting he could be the Mahdi, the divinely-mandated spiritual leader expected in the end times, at least for Afghans.(2) In conversations this author has had with Hezbis over the years, many have painted their leader as a man who is beyond reproach and whose decisions are above criticism.

To add to the mix of personality traits, his irritability is also frequently mentioned. People say he is easily irritated and ready to use extreme measures when angry. Making U-turns in alliances and using emotionally-charged rhetoric towards his foes during his years of anti-Soviet jihad and the insurgency are given as examples of this.

Hekmatyar’s absolutism has at times made him a divisive person, even within the inner circle of his party and even within his family. He favoured one son, Habib Rahman (from his younger wife), at the cost of another, Jamaluddin, his older son from his older wife. Habib Rahman has been acting in recent years as the spokesman and political representative of Hekmatyar, while Jamaluddin has been virtually removed from his position as head of the youth chapter of HIG. That made Jamaluddin turn against negotiations and throughout 2016 he accused his father of selling out the values of jihad for the sake of power, according to people close to him in the youth branch. He only got back on board with his father months after the signing of the agreement, and is now back leading the youth chapter. Hekmatyar also at times favoured one of his sons in-law over another, triggering competition between the two. Humayun Jarir has ended up with no specific portfolio within Hezb, while Ghairat Bahir is head of the political committee of the party. According to people close to the family, the two men vied to influence Hekmatyar’s decisions on details of the peace deal.

How much of Hekmatyar’s capacity for strong leadership and how much charisma he still has after being two decades away from day-to-day politics of Afghanistan will be seen. We simply do not know how strong he might still be or what control he may have over the party. In recent years, most of what has kept him in the public gaze has been noisy rhetoric, rather than actions, controversial statements rather than successful military operations. Examples here would be his Eid message from August 2013 threatening Hazaras for “encroaching on the rights of other ethnicities” and a year later, in April 2014, his declaration that he was prepared to send fighters to Yemen to fight in support of Saudi forces against the Shia Houthis. He also made headline news in August 2009 when he mocked the presidential elections and asked for an interim government to be set up but then, in January 2014, called on Afghans to vote, albeit for Hezbi candidates in the provincial elections in order to make Hezb dominate the provincial councils (3).

Adding Hekmatyar to the fragile mix of Afghan politics?

Hekmatyar is, then, a fractious and polarising leader, dividing Afghans between his staunch followers and those who detest him outright. The return of such a political leader, it would seem, should have an impact on the current situation on several fronts, particularly given the already fragile landscape of politics in Afghanistan. These include:

• Religious legitimacy (for some): This is probably the asset the government would most likely try to utilise. Hekmatyar is dubbed by his supporters as the ‘emir of twin jihads’, referring to his struggle against the Soviets and then against the Americans. Such outsized ‘jihadi credentials’ could present a challenge to the legitimacy of the Taleban insurgency. So far, the leader of Dawat-e Islami (formerly Etihad-e Islami) Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf dominated this discursive struggle. He has been vocal in rejecting the Taleban’s ‘jihad’ against the Afghan state as void of Islamic legitimacy, and thus an Islamically-illegal ‘rebellion’.

• Ethnic and sectarian tensions: Hekmatyar has a following among all the major ethnic groups, including Tajiks, Uzbeks and even Hazaras, but the backbone of his base has always been Pashtun. He has also not been afraid to play the sectarian, anti-Shia card, something which Afghan politicians and ordinary people have generally shied away from. Hekmatyar began his call to arms in 2002, for example, with a declaration in which he lamented the marginalisation of Pashtuns. In more recent writings, he imagined himself as a powerful Islamist who could unify the Pashtuns behind him and become their ‘Saladin’. His writings and interviews in recent years have also included diatribes against Hazaras. He has attributed their growing power to Iran, which he accuses of working to spread Shiism in the region.

Against this backdrop, his coming to the fold of the state brings a prospect of heightening ethnic debates in the Afghan politics. This tendency is already present – witness recent elections and political movements.(4) Some critics of Ashraf Ghani view the deal as a personal scheme by the president to bolster his Pashtun base in the government (his camp led the peace efforts, whereas Dr Abdullah’s camp remained suspicious of it) (see for example here, and here)

• Factionalism: Hekmatyar has long lamented the dominance of his old enemies, Jamiat-e Islami/Shura-e Nezar, (5) over government positions and economic resources during the post-Bonn era. If he continues his decades-long antipathy to Jamiat, this could undermine the recent rapprochement between it and many pro-government Hezbis. (In 2014, they came together in the presidential elections team of Dr Abdullah and Muhammad Khan, another former head of Hezbi intelligence.) Enmity from Hekmatyar could trigger a backlash from Jamiat, a still powerful political force in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar’s pre-recorded video message for the peace deal signing ceremony on 29 September suggested he has not yet backed down from his harsh hostile tone towards his former foes. His speech was dotted with what appeared to be coded references towards Jamiat, (6) veiled threats against “those who invited foreign forces to invade Afghanistan, and then joined these forces in a war against their own nation” and those “bought by foreign force” for whom the “war is a tool for obtaining power and resources.”

• Unification of Hezbis? Despite Hekmatyar’s reputation as a strong leader, there seems to be a considerable cleavage between him and what has become his increasingly diversified political base. One issue is an apparent difference in ideology and attitudes towards doing politics. The Hezbi heavyweights who, during the past decade, have participated in civilian politics (elections, parliament, appointments, running ministries and provinces), have adopted a realpolitik attitude: preserving their interests has mattered more to them than ideology. Unlike Hekmatyar, they have been muted on ideological discussions. They have also partnered with those political forces that their supreme leader has long lambasted as enemy number one: Jamiat/Shura-e Nezar.

Secondly, possible conflict over political and economic interests may make many Hezbis reluctant to fully integrate under Hekmatyar’s leadership. Although Hezbi leaders of all factions, including the largest one led by Arghandiwal, have said they consider Hekmatyar their supreme leader (Muhammad Khan in April 2014 told AAN that Hekmatyar remained the emir, the overall leader of all Hezbi factions and that nobody could contest this status), it is unlikely they will risk the political gains they have earned over the past decade for what might be Hekmatyar’s non-pragmatic positions. Indeed, indications of a discord between Hekmatyar and Arghandiwal have already emerged in statements issued by the two men in early April. Arghandiwal in a statement sent to the media asked Hekmatyar not to introduce people from the Kabul-based Hezb as cabinet ministers to the government (as part of negotiations for distribution of some seats to HIG). Hekmatyar responded by implicitly accusing Arghandiwal’s Hezb of treating the current distribution of power “by John Kerry” as untouchable and said, “We consider it a shame to partner with those devoid of popular support and dependent on others…who oppose appointment of competent people…who does not like our friendship and are afraid of us.”

Another early sign of the division came in mid-March 2017 when Hekmatyar ordered internal Hezb elections in all provinces to re-organise the provincial branches. The order left the election of the head of the provincial departments pending on consultation with Hekmatyar. This was seen by many of those in Arghandiwal’s Hezb as a coup against him as he already had provincial department structures in place.

Expecting unquestioning obedience from party members may well be a tall order in 2017. Hekmatyar will find a political environment that is strikingly different from the days of the anti-Soviet jihad. Then, he was the distributor of the resources which poured into his tanzim for fighting the Soviets; those who won his confidence received the biggest share. In today’s Afghanistan, he may be seen by those Hezbis who have already become part of the state as a competitor for resources, both power and money. Most of the Hezbi notables have made their mark on politics in the absence of Hekmatyar. Unlike him, they have moved a long way from the ideological slogans of the jihad era and are mainly interested in what brings in the money.

No easy integration

Hekmatyar’s return marks the beginning of his integration into Afghan civilian politics, not the end of it. Given his self-aggrandisement, that integration may not be smooth. The peace agreement has already been a source of dispute between his team and the government, with the two sides bickering over various issues: how and at what level should Hekmatyar’s welcoming ceremony be organised; what kind of residence should be rented for his accommodation and; how many bodyguards should he have and who should they be? The share in power, provision of government jobs and recruitment of Hezbis into the ANSF, the allocation of land for returning refugees allied with Hezb-e Islami all also remain sources of contention between Hekmatyar and the government. Some in government are unwilling to give much to him at all. Hekmatyar’s representatives have already accused Jamiatis in the government of trying to derail the peace accord in the government, both during the negotiations period and after signing of the deal. One area that may be thorny is the enlisting of Hezb-e Islami’s fighters and commanders into the ANSF; the process of integrating them seems unlikely to be smooth, especially given the appointment of Amrullah Saleh, a key Jamiat/Shura-ye Nezar figure as senior minister on ANSF reforms and appointments.

Then there are the coming elections in which Hezbis will participate. Some have interpreted the peace deal as Ghani attempting to realign Afghan political forces ahead of the next presidential election. If that was so, the prospect of a well-organised, largely Pashtun party ‘on-side’ would make sense. However, given the history of Hekmatyar’s obsession with national leadership, it is difficult to imagine him wanting anything but the presidency itself or deigning to campaign for anyone except himself.

Hekmatyar’s over-confidence in the popularity of Hezb-e Islami has, in the past, made him talk of elections more than any other mujahedin leader as the favoured path to power. Before and during the civil war, he would often call on other mujahedin factions to hold public elections, so that the nation could decide its leader and thus settle the perennial disputes over power. However, his first experience of quasi-public elections puts into question any actual claims to favour democracy. In early 1990, Hezb-e Islami was fighting over areas of Kunar with a Salafi group led by Jamil al-Rahman. Hekmatyar called for elections as to determine who should rule Kunar. When the results favoured the Salafis, Hekmatyar rejected the validity of the votes and escalated his attacks against the Salafi group. (For some details about the election, see here), although the full picture is yet not there).

While Hekmatyar’s stated passion for electoral politics at the national level has yet to be tested in any poll, his record is already enough to make many wonder if he is genuinely ready to accept pluralistic politics. If he has really embraced the founding principles of the post-2001 political order, as many of his followers have done, this would be a marked evolution. On the other hand, if he fails to play by the rules of Afghan democracy, that could be a risk to the country’s already delicate political set-up.

Edited by Sari Kouvo and Kate Clark

 

(1) This is based on statements and interviews published by HIG, most of which are no longer available online, but have been archived by AAN.

(2) In some Islamic narrations about the end times, the Mahdi (guided one) is the prophesied redeemer of Islam who will emerge to rid the world of evil. The Mahdi’s tenure, according to a doctrine shared by Sunnis and Shias, albeit in different variations, will coincide with the Second Coming of Jesus Christ (Isa), who will assist him against Dajjal (the Antichrist).

Here is the relevant excerpt from the book translated from Pashto:

Let me share with you the story of a meeting with the martyr Osama (bin Laden) and Ayman al-Zawahiri. In the first year of the American invasion when I was living in Shigal (district of Kunar), Osama, Ayman al-Zawahiri as well as Hamza and Osman the two sons of Osama and Abu al-Ghaith al-Kuwaiti were also with me. We were sitting around a dining table when Osama recalled a dream seen by an Arab brother….He saw that “we (Arab fighters) take shelter in an area resided by the Shinwari tribe. When living there, we received the news that Mahdi has appeared. People are carrying on their shoulders a person standing on a throne, in a position higher than us. They have tied his hands to his body with a rope. We are told this person is Mahdi…when we asked who are the people in this area (Shigal) by tribe. They said they are Shinwaris. I was puzzled to know there are Shinwaris in Kunar.” (Osama said) all parts of that dream has materialised, but that he did not know what was the interpretation of Mahdi with his hands tied.

In those days, comrades have provided me with an accommodation a bit higher than Osama and his friends. I was told to avoid meetings, interviews and contacts with strangers. I was feeling those days as if my hands were tied. With regard to that situation, I clearly understood the interpretation of the dream. I told them (Osama and others around the table): According to Quran, there is a hadi and mahdi (both meaning spiritual guide, but the latter also referring to the Islamic messiah) for each nation. It is possible that God has bestowed me with the honour to become the hadi for this nation, but they have tied my hands here.

Hekmatyar, Khubuna aw Taʿbirona , pp. 87, Adobe Digital Edition)

(3) Examples of the few Hezb attacks that made it into the headlines include: a February 2014 attack which killed two contractors for the US-led military coalition and wounded several Afghan civilians in Kabul; and a suicide attack which killed fifteen people, nine Afghans and six foreigners again in the capital in May 2013.

(4) The mapping out of political and military organisations onto ethnic communities has been seen in Afghan politics and the conflict since at least the 1970s. See, for example, the original Hezb-e Islami/Jamiat-s Islami split within Afghan Islamists and within Afghan communists in the 1970s (which mapped out onto differences between Pashto and Tajik speakers) or the way mujahedin groups emerged, again with ethnicity as one factor in their make-up, or the way members of the failing government of Dr Najib defected to mujahedin groups based on their ethnicity, with Khalqis tending to join Hezb and Parchamis joining Jamiat, or the bitter way that factional control of neighbourhoods in Kabul during the civil war played out in ethnic violence directed at civilians associated with ‘enemy’ factions.

(5) As noted in previous AAN dispatches, Shura-e Nezar was the most powerful sub-group of the broad ‘Jamiat family’. It was basically a network of Jamiat-related military commanders established during the anti-Soviet guerrilla war by Ahmad Shah Massud to make the military struggle more effective and in not-so-open opposition to Ustad Rabbani’s political leadership. Although officially disbanded, it is still a powerful network. Massud’s brothers (Ahmad Zia and Ahmad Wali) as well as Dr Abdullah and former interior and defence ministers Yunus Qanuni and Bismillah Muhammadi belong.

(6) Hekmatyar’s message was replete with veiled references against those he chastised as “a small clique” (tolgey in Pashto) whom he accused of having clung to power with the support of foreign troops. He left little doubt as to whom he was referring to. Hekmatyar has used the same term in past messages, interviews and articles to refer to his longstanding political rivals Shura-e Nezar/Jamiat-e Islami.

For an overview of AAN’s past reporting relevant to Hekmatyar’s return, see this overview. 

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