European Union

The newly elected European Parliament will hold its constitutive session from 16 to 19 July in Strasbourg.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2024 and is anticipated to be published in a journal article currently undergoing evaluation.

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has reignited interest in EU enlargement, presenting new opportunities for (pre-)accession candidates. While much attention is often given to the Council and the European Commission, the European Parliament’s role is frequently overlooked. Moreover, scholars mainly focused on the Parliament (EP’s) broader role in the domain of foreign policy, specifically its tools to potentially exert influence and the extent to which it does within CFSP/CSDP. In contrast, despite its clearly distinctive position within the institutional power balance of the Union, the capabilities of Parliament when it comes to enlargement policy are yet to be appropriately addressed in the literature.

This blog post explores how the EP can leverage both formal and informal sources of power to potentially influence EU enlargement policy, thereby identifying five key tools that stand out as most prominent in the literature: agenda-setting, the consent procedure, standing parliamentary delegations, budgetary authority, and parliamentary oversight. The findings reveal a notable disparity between the European Parliament’s formal powers and informal powers, thereby confirming its ‘self-empowerment’ strategy and simultaneously underscoring the consent procedure and the budget as the most powerful tools available for the Parliament.

By combining a document analysis (Treaties, Inter-Institutional Agreements and the EP’s Rules of Procedure) and an extensive literature review (using the iterative snowballing technique), the study provides a comprehensive understanding of the EP’s capabilities to potentially influence enlargement policy.

 

Unpacking the EP’s (Hidden) Powers

The findings highlight a significant disparity between the Parliament’s formal and informal capacities regarding enlargement. While the former are often sparse in this area (except its consent and budgetary powers), the Commission and the Council anticipate the EP’s position when making choices. Besides these politics of anticipation, the Parliament empowers itself through a maximalist interpretation of the Treaties and its engagement in IIAs and its own RoP. Among the five avenues of power, the consent procedure and the power of the purse stand out as the most prominent.

 

1.  Agenda-Setting

Although the EP’s formal role in setting the EU’s enlargement agenda is limited, it can informally shape the agenda through the adoption of reports and resolutions, debates about EU enlargement and speeches by its President, thereby raising the salience of an issue and foster public and/or elite support for EU enlargement.

 

2.  The Consent Procedure

The most clearcut avenue through which the Parliament can weigh on enlargement policy is the consent procedure. Art. 49 TEU grants the EP such veto power in the case of accession through the right to accept or block any application, since Council must consult the Commission and gain EP consent before taking action. In this way Parliament “de facto decides on enlargements”. However, when it comes to enlargement the power given to the EP through the consent procedure is a blunt tool as offers no room to bargain, let alone amend the final text.

Nevertheless, the EP’s threat of veto as well as increased awareness that the views of Parliament are directly legitimized by EU citizens has allowed it to also influence the specific contents of the agreements. By adopting resolutions that set so-called ‘conditions’ for consent and (threatening to) delay the approval of Association or Accession Agreements, the EP pressures the Commission and Council to consider its positions. This has allowed the EP to push for greater attention to political issues such as democracy and human rights in the candidate countries. A unified parliament (i.e., acting with a majority among the main political groups) is, however, essential for making this avenue of power an effective one.

 

3.  Standing Parliamentary Delegations

Parliament can also weigh on enlargement policy with its nine formal standing parliamentary delegations to the (potential) EU candidate countries, through which it can partake in ‘inter- parliamentary diplomacy.’ As such, the standing delegations tend to take on two main functions. Firstly, due to its (mostly) continuous nature, they could also act as ‘preparatory agents’ that offer foundational work for the eventual decisions by the executive as they have more space to maneuver as opposed to traditional diplomacy. Secondly, delegations also allow for potentially influencing the views of parliamentarians from candidate countries as ambassadors of the EU’s constitutional values, able to emphasize matters such as human rights and democracy. However, two caveats need to be made. First, their effectiveness relies on internal coherence between committees and delegations, which often have overlapping competences. And secondly, the unregulated appointment of delegation members can lead to biased representations, potentially undermining fair debate and transforming them into dialogues among the deaf.

 

4.  Budgetary Authority

The EP’s involvement in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the Annual Budget allows it to link funding to specific conditions related to enlargement. Concerning the MFF, the Treaties require

the EP to give consent by absolute majority before the Council can adopt the MFF. Additionally, sectoral regulations, which provide the basis for the funding of almost 40 EU spending programs over a seven- year period, are agreed upon under OLP, putting the EP on equal footing with the Council. This effectively makes the EP a co-legislator on the main external financing instruments regarding enlargement (i.e. IPA and NDICI) as the ceilings and overall amounts of these instruments are decided by the MFF, but not exactly how they are organized, i.e., their general and specific objectives and the size, form and rules of the funding.

Turning to the Annual Budget then, it is within the seven-year ceilings of the MFF that the Parliament’s power is most prominent, as it needs to agree with the Council following a special legislative procedure. The Annual Budget is often identified as a very important power-maximization tool that offers indirect leverage in the area of foreign policy and enlargement and allows for Parliament to steer the political direction of these policy domains. The EP often acts to defend the policies that the Council has under- funded, intervening to amend the sums that are being assigned to specific programs and projects. At the same time, shared concerns are also often promoted by acting together with the Council, as is the case with, for instance, pre-accession assistance. However, this power remains at all times constrained by the limited room for maneuver left by the MFF. Several authors therefore emphasize that one of the best strategy for the EP to still maximize its (potential for) influence, is aiming at a limited number of priorities in successive annual budgets (see f.e. 1999-2004 stabilisation programs in the Western Balkans). However, this strategy is once again dependent on internal cohesion, as conflict seems almost inevitable on a sensitive subject such as the budget, which basically covers all policy areas.

 

5.  Parliamentary Oversight

The European Parliament oversees the executive, primarily the Commission, and other EU institutions through several key functions. It consents to the appointment of the Commissioner for Enlargement, allowing it to influence portfolio allocation and even compel the withdrawal of a designated candidate. The EP also requires the Commissioner to participate in debates and respond to questions. Additionally, the EP must be fully informed at all stages of association and accession agreements, although the implementation of this requirement looks often different with the provisions unevenly implemented. Firstly, the provision of information relies on the quality of the relationship between the respective Commissioner or DG NEAR, and the AFET Committee (or its secretariat). Moreover, it seems that there exists currently no harmonized approach by the Commission’s services to provide information (concerning negotiations of international agreements) to Parliament in a coordinated manner. Finally, that the flow of information remains piecemeal and incomplete which in turn could have negative consequences for the Parliament’s consent and therefore increase the risk of tenuous relations between both institutions. Finally, apart from its role in establishing the budget, the European Parliament can also play a crucial role in assessing its implementation through the discharge procedure which is as much a power as a procedure.

 

Conclusion

The study identifies a significant disparity between the European Parliament’s formal and informal powers in the context of enlargement. While the former are often sparse in this area (except its consent and budgetary powers), the Commission and the Council anticipate the EP’s position when making choices. Besides these politics of anticipation, the Parliament empowers itself through a maximalist interpretation of the Treaties its engagement in IIAs and its own RoP. Among the five avenues of power, the consent procedure and the power of the purse stand out as the most prominent.

However, three caveats need to be made. Internal divisions and conflicting interests within the hemicycle can undermine its bargaining power, particularly during consent and budget procedures. Additionally, overlapping responsibilities among different committees and standing parliamentary delegations, along with voluntary delegation appointments, can hinder its strength. Streamlining roles and ensuring committed participation are necessary to enhance Parliament’s impact on enlargement policies. And finally, timely and complete access to information from the Commission and the Council is often challenging, hindering the EP’s ability to conduct thorough scrutiny and make informed decisions. Enhanced transparency and information-sharing are therefore vital for effective parliamentary oversight of enlargement policies.

The post The (hidden) powers of the European Parliament in EU enlargement policies appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Newsletter - 16-19 July 2024 - Strasbourg plenary session

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Spokespersons for Parliament and for the political groups will hold a briefing on Parliament’s 16-19 July constitutive session, this Friday 12th July at 11.00.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Spokespersons for Parliament and for the political groups will hold a briefing on Parliament’s 16-19 July constitutive session, this Friday 12th July at 11.00.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Plamaro
Approximation of laws
The collective redundancies directive also applies in the event of the employer’s retirement

WWF Österreich and Others
Environment and consumers
The prohibition of hunting wolves in Austria is valid

Hann-Invest
Law governing the institutions
Rule of law: only the judicial panel responsible for a case can decide its outcome

AFET Activity Report 2019-2024
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Preparing the constitutive plenary session

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1770 of 24 June 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1709 of 17 June 2024 amending Decision 2014/386/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1603 of 31 May 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

President of the Eurogroup, Paschal Donohoe, is travelling to Greece on 4 July and France on 5 July.

The representatives of member states’ governments appointed three judges and an advocate-general to the Court of Justice as part of its 2024 partial renewal.

President Michel welcomed President of Montenegro Jakov Milatović to Brussels today.

Weekly schedule of President Charles Michel, 1 – 7 July 2024

The Council adopted restrictive measures targeting the Belarusian economy, in light of the regime’s involvement in Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine.

Overview of the main subjects to be discussed at meetings of the Council of the EU over the next two weeks and upcoming media events.

The Council imposed restrictive measures against two individuals and four entities responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.