European Union

On 4 October, the Council (EU ambassadors) agreed on a negotiating position on a decision repealing the standardised reporting directive (directive 91/692/EEC) and amending 6 related legal acts. This decision is essential for ensuring legal clarity, enhancing transparency and reducing the administrative burden in the field of environmental reporting.

The standardised reporting directive is the main piece of legislation currently in place which aims at streamlining the reporting obligations of all EU environmental legislation. However, it does not set out all reporting requirements, and over the years most of its provisions have become obsolete.

Specifically, the directive refers to a total of 28 environmental acts. Other legislative acts make use of the directive as well. Of them, one regulation, 9 directives and 23 decisions remain in force despite lacking any legal effect.

"This is an important step towards making environmental reporting clearer and more efficient. Reducing the administrative burden is one of our overarching goals and outdated legislation has no place in the EU legal system. We must ensure that all our legislation is "fit for purpose" and to that end, will move swiftly together with the European Parliament to reach an agreement on this file."

Siim Kiisler, Minister of the Environment of the Republic of Estonia

This decision is part of the standardised reporting directive “repeal package” presented by the Commission in 2016. It includes two other initiatives which will also contribute to the clean-up of unnecessary legislation. 

Overall, the Council supports the proposed decision and agrees on the main elements put forward by the Commission. In terms of content, the proposal aims at adapting the comitology provisions of a number of acts to the Treaty of Lisbon and the current interinstitutional agreement.

The positions of the two co-legislators are very close, and the Council looks forward to negotiations with the European Parliament with a view to reaching a quick and smooth first reading agreement.

Next steps

Negotiations will start in the near future given that the European Parliament already agreed its position on the file during the plenary of 13 September 2017, following the vote of the ENVI Committee on 11 July 2017. A trilogue is likely to be scheduled for November.

Upon the deal's closure and its acceptance by both institutions, the decision will enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, as specified on its provisions. Nevertheless, in order to ensure full consistency and avoid legal gaps, the actual publication of this decision will be put on hold so that it enters into force at the same time as the legislative acts of the Waste package, which are currently being discussed by both legislators.

Background

In its 2014 communication on the regulatory fitness and performance programme (REFIT), the Commission pledged to work on concrete proposals to remove obsolete legislation related to environmental reporting. 

Over the next two years, the Commission adopted a communication on better regulation in May 2015 and launched a REFIT fitness check for environmental monitoring and reporting in its work programme for 2016, which is ongoing.

As a result of those commitments, the Commission proposed a standardised reporting directive “repeal package” on 15 December 2016, consisting of three initiatives, the third of which is this decision. The first takes the form of a Commission communication identifying a series of superfluous implementing acts and the second proposes the repeal of two implementing decisions.

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Meetings of Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with international organisations.

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Publication resulting from the UACES 2017 PhD and ECR Conference

The impact of an EU membership perspective on the national parliament of potential candidate countries is an important yet underexplored subject, writes Blerim Vela. Outlining some of the elements of his research, he suggests that the executive-legislature relationship and strength of the media and civil society are connecting factors in parliamentary development.

Federica Mogherini in Kosovo, EEAS, CC-BY-NC-2.0

The Western Balkans countries first expressed their wish to be part of the European Union in the early 2000s. To accomplish this goal, national executives were strengthened and additional resources were allocated to deal with complex EU accession negotiations.

However, such a realignment of powers and resources at national level did not include national parliaments. They have tried to emulate the parliaments of EU Member States by establishing EU integration committees to oversee the work of their governments during the EU accession process. In many cases, parliaments have been reduced to rubber-stamping institutions for government decisions.

Most of the existing related academic literature focuses on the institutional adaptation of EU Member State parliaments. It considers the various scrutiny arrangements (e.g. European affairs committees) and assesses their effectiveness.

However, it has largely neglected the involvement of other standing committees on EU affairs, differential empowerment of parliamentary actors/bodies, inter-parliamentary cooperation and the role of parliamentary staffers during the EU accession process and subsequently. Moreover, scholars disagree on how to measure or operationalise the impact of the EU integration process on national parliaments.

One unexplored aspect is the impact of the EU integration process on the parliaments of EU potential candidate countries (PCCs). My research seeks to explain changes to the way parliaments of EU PCCs – namely, Kosovo and Macedonia – conduct their business during their country’s bid to become an EU member. I intend to trace the impact of EU accession as a process, rather than an outcome, in two main parliamentary functions: law-making and oversight.

Given the relatively new nature of democracy in the Western Balkans and the lack of historical experience with parliamentarism (in comparison to older EU Member States), I expect to find that the EU accession process is a crucial opportunity to shape institutional structures and procedures in parliaments, including their relationship with the government.

Having said that, it is prudent to also expect that parliaments in EU PCCs, faced with a loss of legislative influence during the EU accession process, react through institutional adaptation and increasing parliamentary oversight.

The impact of the EU accession process on the functioning of parliaments in my research is operationalised through review of formal and informal instruments. On the formal spectrum, this includes the EU’s conditionality and monitoring, based on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the European Commission’s annual progress reports; and the political dialogue with the EU institutions, such as the Joint Parliamentary Committees and European Parliaments reports. On the informal spectrum, this includes the EU’s technical assistance to parliaments – mainly through twinning projects with EU member states parliaments.

The institutional change of national parliaments that can be looked at on three levels. The first is through reviewing changes to parliaments’ rules of procedure based on amendments related to the EU accession process.

The second is through detailing institutional adaptations in parliaments that led to new processes (e.g. new oversight mechanisms or changes to law-making procedures), the establishment of new parliamentary bodies specifically tasked with overseeing the government work and performance on EU accession issues (such as committees and councils) and the creation of new professional support units in parliaments’ secretariats.

The third, following the above, is by observing any change in the nature and volume of parliamentary activities. This can be based on the number of amendments to draft laws, parliamentary questions and successful motions related to EU accession issues.

I aim to test whether the number of veto players constrains parliament’s institutional adaptation. Parliaments are highly formalistic institutions, often requiring procedural and structural changes to be instituted through amending its rules of procedure. In the cases of Kosovo and Macedonia, this requires a two-thirds majority of all MPs.

As such, attaining this majority is subject to the number of veto players involved and the type of political system (consensual or conflictual). Lower numbers of veto players and consensual politics enable the adoption of such amendments. Likewise, the actual implementation of new procedures in parliament is subject to meeting certain thresholds in terms of number of MPs supporting such initiatives and the ability to put items on the agenda.

Additionally, I will test whether free and vibrant media and civil society organisations have an enabling effect on institutional adaptation and level of parliamentary activity during the EU accession process. This proposition assumes that these media and civil society organisations can create motivating factors for both opposition and government MPs to introduce reforms.

Lastly, I predict that executive dominance over the legislature constrains institutional adaptation and the level of oversight. In cases of coherent governing majorities and party discipline in voting, one can expect that opposition parties will have a limited impact in introducing oversight initiatives. However, if the governing coalition is composed of many political parties and party discipline is weaker, the chances are higher that oversight initiatives will come about.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Blerim Vela | @Blerim_Vela
University of Sussex

Blerim Vela is PhD Candidate in Politics at the University of Sussex. His research focuses on the impact of Europeanisation on the functioning of potential EU candidate countries’ national parliaments. He previously worked for the UNDP and OSCE in a number of countries.

The post Measuring the Impact of EU Accession on Potential Candidate Country Parliaments appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Publication resulting from the UACES 2017 PhD and ECR Conference

The usage of the term ‘crisis’ when discussing the EU’s current challenges has become widespread in media reporting, writes Max Steuer. Drawing from his analysis of quality newspapers in several Visegrad countries, where calls for the EU to address problems have often been accompanied by opposition to EU-wide solutions, he calls for more careful referencing to crisis in wider public discourse.

European Parliament in Strasbourg, European Parliament, CC-BY-NC-ND-2.0

The EU is in crisis – hardly anyone could get a different impression when reading or listening to the news. From economics, through to foreign policy, up to the more recent issue of migrants/refugees, the EU is overwhelmingly judged to have failed to effectively respond to the challenges of our times.

But what does crisis, this heavily-loaded term, stand for? When does a series of developments qualify as a crisis? Are there any criteria that are distinctive to it? These questions are largely neglected in political discourse and, more surprisingly, in academic research as well.

The synthesis of some attentive analyses increasingly points to the strong evaluative dimension entailed in the crisis. The way this concept functions is far beyond its etymological origin. However, empirical research is needed to show how crisis is about labelling, framing certain events as detrimental to progress or upholding existing values, and the attribution of responsibility for causing the crisis to concrete actors.

The media is an important forum where the rhetoric about ‘crises’ can manifest in this way. Various actors, not only journalists themselves, present their opinions there. One would expect though, that quality newspapers as opposed to tabloids will publish more in-depth analyses, approaching crisis critically and not as ready-made. This applies in the Central European context as well, where there have been discussions about the Visegrad countries possibly preferring an ‘own way’ in the EU when it comes to policies towards refugees and migrants.

Yet, a closer look at six Central European newspapers – namely, Népszabadság (before it had been shut down through the influence of the Orbán government) and Magyar Nemzet in Hungary, Sme and Pravda in Slovakia and Lidové noviny and Mladá Fronta in Czechia – invites a deal of skepticism about such a claim. Even quality newspapers (and not necessarily only in the countries under scrutiny) tend to take up the rhetoric of the various crises, the three major ones being the economy, Ukraine and ‘migrants/refugees’. The popularity of this rhetoric manifests itself in three ways.

First, the sheer magnitude of articles which discuss the EU, its institutions or policies or its relationship with the Member States, in the context of crises, is remarkable. From late 2008 to days after the Brexit referendum at the end of June 2016, 1347 articles were published which have been identified and fulfil the above criterion. While there are others not portraying the EU in this way, the crisis talk seems to be enormously popular.

Second, there is no unified frame in which the EU in crises is being portrayed. Yet, when it comes to attribution of responsibility, ‘European elites’, ‘Brussels bureaucracy’ and the like is undeniably a major target of blame for the causes of the ‘crises’. This is not only embodied in the rhetoric of several key current or former politicians, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán (for instance, his claim that ‘the European political elite sits in an ideological bubble’) or former Czech President Václav Klaus, who, in his own words, ‘would not defend the EU’.

Third, there is a general preference for a ‘joint EU approach’ when it comes to dealing with the crises, but with hardly any detail of what this approach should be. Moreover, this call for joint action contrasts with opposition to EU-wide solutions, in case of the Visegrad countries particularly in the area of asylum and integration policies. In fact, such opposition seems to decrease the chance for a joint solution – whatever that may mean.

The danger entailed in the rhetoric about crises is the gradual diminishing of the EU’s positives in political discourse. More specifically, the EU institutions and their representatives come to be perceived as the originator of the ‘permanent crisis’ of the EU. A natural implication is that without the EU, or (from a Visegrad Member State’s perspective) without a particular state being an EU member, the harmful effects of the crises would disappear.

Without setting clear criteria that distinguish ‘crisis’ from everything else, the term remains an imprecise, unscientific label that does not offer any value on its own and can be exploited for populist goals to gain support for a certain (mostly anti-EU) set of ideas. To be sure, this does not mean that all criticism of the EU as it stands (and even of EU institutions and their representatives) is invalid or detrimental to the quality of political debate. However, when ‘crisis’ is used to make a negative emotional link to the ‘European elites’ and ‘Brussels’, it becomes a tool for (predominantly anti-EU) political campaigns.

Since June 2016 developments have increasingly pointed towards the option of an EU core being formed by those Member States which wish to join it and adhere to its rules. The ‘core’ argument has been reflected in domestic political debates, for example, in Slovakia. It might yet be another consequence of the crises discourse – if there is crisis, a solution is needed which can also be constructed as a solution and presented to citizens.

It is at this point when ‘de-crisising’ comes in as a recommendation for adjusting the rhetoric of all actors involved. This strategy entails discussing the EU’s challenges, but using ‘crisis’ only when there is a clear explanation of the benchmark for it. Secondly, it implies that there is a need to talk more about the EU’s benefits, and to do so in innovative ways. In order to achieve this, quality newspapers may admittedly offer only a limited forum, and new media, including social networks, should be the focus instead.

This article draws on a chapter by the author to be submitted for the forthcoming edited volume – Bátora, J and Fossum, JE (eds): The EU and its Crises: From Resilient Ambiguity to Ambiguous Resilience

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Max Steuer 
Comenius University in Bratislava

Max Steuer is PhD Candidate in Politics at the Comenius University in Bratislava. His researh interests include political institutions in Central Europe and political rights. He is the Head of the Academic Department of the International Association for Political Science Students (IAPSS).

The post Why the EU Needs ‘De-crisising’ appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Publication resulting from the UACES 2017 PhD and ECR Conference

The journey of connecting your research interests and questions as a PhD student with an effective means of exploring them can sometimes be challenging, writes Rachael Dickson Hillyard. Reflecting on her research critically analysing EU narratives on good governance and rights-based policies, she argues that it is important to recognise the different ways of studying the EU and to embrace more reflexive approaches.

Opening of Unity Dome, Estonian 2017 EU Presidency, CC-BY-2.0

Typically, for me anyhow, I submitted an abstract to the call for papers for the UACES Student Forum conference and, by the time I came to writing the contribution, I kind of changed my mind about what I wanted to talk about. Apologies. When it came to writing this article, I thought the topic actually has a lot to say to EU studies in general and those who research it, try to understand it and, for their sins, attempt to explain it to others.

The European Union is without doubt a complex, diverse, and vast entity. It can be frustrating, dense and is always changing. During undergraduate politics studies, it certainly piqued my attention and I became curious to know more about how it operates, how it uses its powers and how it affects the lives of those who come into contact with it.

When it came to designing my PhD research, I became somewhat frustrated by the ‘ready-made’ frameworks for researching, and thus understanding, the EU. In the early days, I received comments that EU studies was at best ‘a bit passé’ and, at worst, ‘over’. I couldn’t accept this to be true, particularly as the migrant crisis was surging, and the international media were looking to the EU for answers and solutions. And in the midst of other discussions on the future of the Eurozone, possible (now inevitable) Brexit, among many others.

I was grateful to find UACES and meet a bunch of like-minded people who not only continue to understand diverse and different aspects of EU law, politics, sociology, history, etc but fiercely defend and promote the discipline. At the 2013 UACES Student Forum conference, I listened eagerly to Nathaniel Copsey argue the need for a loyal opposition in the EU, to critique the institution from within.

I returned to my research plan having read Richard Whitman’s call for more dissenting voices in EU studies, and enthused to contribute to its reinvigoration. Essentially, I began searching for ways to research that would address the underperformance of critical reflexivity identified by Lucie Chamlian and Dirk Nabers. The drive to produce relevant research is a pressure for any PhD student, but it seemed even more pertinent in EU studies.

To help action this desire, my supervisor kept probing me to rework and narrow my research questions so as to specify what exactly it was I wanted to find out. Through this process I came to realise that my interest was not so much in what the EU was doing to tackle the migrant crisis or why the EU has developed an identity as an international human rights actor. Instead, I was interested in the how questions. How was the EU going about managing the crisis? How did this affect the practice of rights? How was solidarity defined in relation to this? And, most importantly, how could we better understand the EU’s actions?

Tazzioli’s view that EU studies is too EU-centric, and our understanding of it relies too heavily on the narratives and truths it creates for itself, resonated with my avenues of inquiry. My interest, therefore, became in questioning the knowledge these narratives establish and the assumed truths that underpin understandings of how the EU operates. Foucault saw this type of critique akin to curiosity; it is:

[…] a passion for seizing what is happening now and what is disappearing; a lack of respect for the traditional hierarchies of what is important and fundamental (Foucault, p 325).

In using his ideas to frame my research, I did not adopt a theory or methodology but instead used his ideas as a tool.

This tool has allowed me to do a number of things. Firstly, to offer a critique of the EU’s narrative of good governance and rights-based policies by questioning the relationship between knowledge, power and government. Secondly, using governmentality, to expose the tactics and technologies the EU has pursued. These seemingly mundane and often administrative practices expose subtle power relationships between the EU as a rights-actor and the migrants who are subjected to them. Thirdly, to be creative in cultivating lenses for analysis which offer nuanced and deeper contextualisation of the values underpinning EU policy.

There have been some challenges along the way. Both the ideas of Foucault and the literature on the EU can be difficult subject matter, so synthesis has involved in-depth, lateral thinking, often to the limits of my capabilities. In addition, studies based on Foucault also have their critics. His work might not provide an approach for everyone. He himself did not profess to provide all the answers, but rather shifted how we approach inquiry from restrictive theories to adaptable and flexible tool kits. However, there are a plethora of other critical scholars and lens worth considering. Critical studies based on the work of Jacques Derrida, Gilles Delueze, Wendy Brown and Judith Butler, among others, have provided different perspectives on law, politics and society.

To draw these thoughts together: my experience of devising and using a critical approach to understanding a particular aspect of EU governance shows there is more than one way to look at the EU. It emancipates the debate from dogmatic approaches about who is right and challenges to narratives propagated by the EU. The lessons of self-reflexivity and questions of how will, I understand, become more pertinent as we, the field of EU studies, navigate Brexit and a post-Leave research field.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Rachael Dickson Hillyard | @rdicko
Queen’s University Belfast

Rachael Dickson Hillyard is PhD Candidate in Law at Queen’s University Belfast. Her research focuses on the European Union’s response to the migrant crisis from legal and political perspectives. She was previously a Committee Member of the UACES Student Forum.

The post Taking an Alternative Approach to Doing EU Studies: Using Foucault’s Thinking to Better Understand the EU and Migration appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Freedom of expression is the right of every person to think as he wishes and to be able to express his opinions by any means he deems appropriate in the fields of politics, philosophy, religion, morals. Freedom of expression in a democratic country of the European Union is considered illegal. In a EU that never hesitates to give lessons in human rights and democracy, for example to African or Balkans countries.

According to Barcelona, the YES has won with 90% of the votes. Some 2.26 million people voted and 2.02 million voted in favor of independence. These figures represent a participation of almost 42.3%, Catalonia counting 5.34 million voters.

The referendum is quite illegal under the Spanish Constitution and the interpretation given to it by the Spanish Constitutional Court. ("It is not within the competence of the autonomies to hold consultations ... which have an impact on the fundamental issues resolved by the constitutional process.") But it is legal according to the Catalan law.

Tag: Catalunyafreedom of expression

The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

DRAFT REPORT on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, Commission and the the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning Hong Kong, 20 years after handover
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Alyn Smith

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Nicoline Frolich and Ivar Bleiklie chair panel on higher education policy

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hannah Moscovitz and Martina Vukasovic

This year’s ECPR (European Consortium of Political Research) General Conference took place at the University of Oslo between September 6-9. The conference included hundreds of panels on a wide array of topics and representation from close to 2,000 academics from around the world. The ECPR Standing Group on the Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation, for the sixth time in a row (following Prague 2016, Montreal 2015, Glasgow 2014, Bordeaux 2013 and Reykjavik 2011) organised a section with a total of six panels covering various themes related to knowledge policy governance.

 

The section opened with the panel European Integration in the Knowledge Domain –
Taking Stock and Forward Outlook. The panel was based on the research agenda presented in Maassen and Olsen’s (2007) seminal book “University Dynamics and European Integration”. Peter Maassen began by reflecting on the book’s contribution to empirical and theoretical work on higher education research. Mari Elken presented a paper outlining ideas for further developing the research agenda on European higher education and emphasizing the importance of considering the complex ecology involved. Jens Jungblut followed with a discussion of the political contestations involved in the implementation of European policy ideas at the national level. Finally, Meng-Hsuan Chou and Pauline Ravinet presented their research on higher education regionalism, discussing its potential for contemporary political research as well as the importance of comparing regions ‘beyond Europe’ to further develop this field.

 

The following panel – Policy translation, adaptation and complexity in higher education, research and innovation – explored the various conditions which shape knowledge policy design. Hila Zahavi presented her research assessing the manner in which the EU’s foreign policy interests are embedded in various EU funded higher education programs. Teresa Patricio’s paper explored the research and higher education policy implications involved in complex international collaborations through the example of Portuguese university partnerships. Davide Donina then presented his paper on the examination of New Public Management features in Portuguese and Italian higher education systems, through a comparative and multi-level analysis. Hannah Moscovitz’s paper addressed the role of territorial identity-related interests in the design of knowledge policy from a subnational perspective. Finally, Sandra Hasanefendic’s paper examined the different responses to a new research policy implemented in two Portuguese poly-technics, revealing that the heterogeneous responses can be attributed to unique organisational structures.

 

The third panel highlighted empirical and theoretical contributions to research on the Policy, Governance and Organisational Change in Higher Education. Martina Vukasovic opened the panel with a discussion of the term ‘loose coupling’ in higher education research – outlining how it has been used, discussing some lacunas in its empirical application and opening avenues for future use. Sara Diogo then presented her paper on the influence of the OECD on European higher education, highlighting the diffusion of educational trends in Portugal and Finland. Roland Bloch followed with a presentation on the role played by the German Excellence Initiative in the proliferation of doctoral programs and its impact on the overall structure of German higher education. Agnete Vabo’s paper assessed how university mergers affect institutional autonomy and strategic steering, shedding light on the diversification involved. The panel concluded with a presentation by Ivar Bleiklie on the potential for discussing a Scandanavian model for higher education through a consideration of the commonalities and differences between Scandinavian countries’ higher education models.

 

The panel on Research Executive Agencies – Independent Organizations or the Extension of Research Policymakers?, aimed to prompt a discussion on research executive agencies (REAs) and their implications for knowledge policy research. Sarah Glück introduced the panel by highlighting the importance of scrutinising REAs in order to understand the competing logics inherent in science policy systems. Rupert Pichler and Sascha Ruhland’s paper analysed the normative framework governing research funding agencies, focusing on a number of dynamics impacting Austrian government policies in this domain. Que Anh Dang’s presentation explored Nordic higher education regionalism revealing how regional research agencies have contributed to new forms of region-building and market making in the area. Thomas König and Tim Flink’s paper assessed the challenges of the ERC for European research policy which they attribute to both its organisational framework and discursive compromises it undertakes. Finally, Inga Ulnicane presented her work on the concept of ‘grand challenges’, assessing whether it represents a new paradigm in science, technology and innovation policy.

 

The panel Unbundling knowledge production and knowledge dissemination aimed to conceptualise the ‘unbundling’ of knowledge policy; examining the different actors involved, understanding the consequences of such processes and implications for the university’s perceived role in society. Farah Purwaningrum’s paper discussed the understanding of the university’s third mission in Malaysia, specifically asking how the idea of the third mission as perceived by the Malaysian Ministry of Education affects knowledge production in Malaysian universities? Joonha Jeon’s paper assessed how New Public Management has influenced the realization of universities’ ‘third mission’, highlighting university-industry links in South Korea. Finally, Janja Komljenovic presented her paper assessing the unbundling processes evident in university social media marketing strategies. Through the example of LinkedIn, the study shows an important connection between higher education, markets and digital platforms.

 

The topic of the last panel in the section was Quality and Effectiveness of Governance in Higher Education: Unpacking the Quality of Governance and Effects of Governance Changes in Higher Education Policies. The panel comprised five papers. First, Michael Dobbins presented a comparative study on German and Swiss higher education reforms which, in response to similar challenges such as globalization and competition pressures, took two distinct (and somewhat unexpected routes) – decentralization and centralization, respectively. Giliberto Capano presented the study he co-authored with Andrea Pritoni on whether increasing autonomy can account for changes in education performance in Western European higher education systems. Meng-Hsuan Chou presented the paper co-authored with Pauline Ravinet concerning effectiveness of inter-regional policy dialogues, in particular focusing on cooperation between EU and ASEAN in the form of EU-SHARE project. Beverly Barrett presented a paper on higher education in Latin America, Portugal and Spain. The panel concluded with a paper by Jens Jungblut and Peter Maassen focusing on quality of governance in sub-Saharan Africa, which, amongst other, provided also a conceptual contribution concerning two dimensions of quality of governance – autonomy and capacity.

 

Apart from the panels in this section, the members of the Standing Group also took part in other sessions, including:

-          Roundtable on the consequences of internationalization of political science education

-          Featured Panel: The European Research Council @ 10: What has it done to us?

-          Transformation of the Political Studies Profession: What does it mean to be an Active Academic in the Current Era?

 

Standing Group dinner at the Nordic Institute for Studies in Innovation, Research and Education NIFU

As has become tradition, the Standing Group also had its annual meeting focused on planning future activities, including ECPR 2018 which will take place in Hamburg. The meeting was also marked by the Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar to Que Anh Dang for her paper “The Bologna and ASEM Education Secretariats: Authority of Transnational Actor in Regional Higher Education Policy”. Standing Group members attended the keynote lecture by Johan P. Olsen “Democratic Accountability and the Changing European Political Order” and enjoyed the very generous hospitality of the Nordic Institute for Studies in Innovation, Research and Education NIFU, which hosted the traditional Standing Group dinner.

 

ECPR 2017 was another successful year for our Standing Group, gathering researchers from 20 different countries, currently based on three continents (Asia, Europe and North America). See you in the next ECPR General Conference in Hamburg in August 2018!

 

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Federica MOGHERINI, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, attends the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) Informal Ministerial Meeting, on 29 September 2017, in Brussels.

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Plenary session and committee meetings in Strasbourg

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The European Council will take place on 19 and 20 October 2017 in the Europa building in Brussels. The press centre remains located in the Justus Lipsius building.

Now open for last-minute accreditation requests (online only)
Procedure

Please note that due to the current security situation in Belgium, specific security measures have been put in place for last minute accreditation requests. Media representatives applying for the first time or who have not been screened recently will be the subject of a comprehensive and detailed verification by our security service. Considering the time and resources needed for these verifications, not all requests may be processed. Media are therefore advised to avoid sending representatives falling into these categories.

If this is your first registration, please make sure you have a recent ID-size photograph in JPEG format (.jpg) and the number of your passport or identity card ready before starting the online process.

You will receive an acknowledgement of receipt by email. Please read it carefully as it includes the list of original documents you will be asked to provide when collecting your badge. Depending on your profile, the requested documents will include: Passport or ID card, press card and/or an original letter in paper copy from your editor-in chief as well as the signed original of your authorisation for security screening (only for media representatives of Belgian nationality or resident in Belgium). The press centre may contact you to request additional information if necessary. No accreditation badge will be issued if you cannot provide all required documents. 

Trainees with media organisations who do not possess a press card are not entitled to request accreditation. 

Journalists holding a 6-month badge (01.07.2017 - 31.12.2017) do not need to register

6-month badges can be collected at the accreditation centre of the LEX building during summits. Please ensure that you have all the required documents when collecting your badge.

Collection of badges

Accreditation badges must be collected in person from the LEX building (145 rue de la Loi, Brussels)  

• Wednesday 18 October, from 09.30 to 13.00 and from 14.00 to 18.00
• Thursday 19 October, from 08.30 to 20.00
• Friday 20 October, from 08.00 to the end of the final press conference (max. 22.00)

Practical information on the press centre and the media programme will follow.

For more details on the meeting of the European Council,  see the meeting page.

Good evening. Let me start by thanking Prime Minister Ratas for hosting the Tallinn Digital Summit. It was indeed a very special event about the future of Europe. And many thanks to all the Estonians for your great hospitality and for inspiring Europe with your "digital" spirit.

We held this summit because Europe must use the opportunities created by huge advances, in everything from robotics to artificial intelligence. We need to actively shape our future and manage the risks posed by the digital revolution to our societies and democracies. That is why the leaders focused on how the EU could successfully navigate the opportunities, as well as the risks. We will now work together with Prime Minister Ratas to  prepare the conclusions for the October European Council, based on our discussions.

Now, let me make a comment on the last night's dinner. As you know, the leaders had an informal debate on the situation of Europe and on our future work in the European Council. I was mandated to translate this good debate  and the visionary speeches we have heard recently, into a concrete work programme. Therefore, I have already started bilateral consultations. In addition to my meeting with Prime Minister Ratas, today I also met the Prime Ministers of Bulgaria, Croatia and the Chancellor of Germany. And during the next two weeks I will consult all Member States.

Based on those consultations,  I will present a very concrete working plan with a number of decisions that need to be taken by the leaders in the next year. Something I could call the “Leaders Agenda 2017/18”. This means further development and enrichment of the programme that I have presented in my Tallinn letter. It will include, inter alia, the launch of the  permanent defence cooperation by the end of 2017, a Euro Summit in December to further deepen the Economic and Monetary Union, with a special focus on the completion of the Banking Union, or a Western Balkans' Summit during the Bulgarian presidency in the EU.

Our guiding principles are clear and I hope will not change. First and foremost, I will do everything in my power to keep the unity of the EU. Secondly, I will  concentrate on finding real solutions to real problems of our citizens, who are concerned about security, migration or unemployment. And finally, we will all make sure that Europe is making progress.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Good morning. Yesterday evening we had a good and constructive debate. I will use this debate to build what I could call the leaders' agenda 2017 and 2018, of course in consultation with all the Member States and I will present this political agenda in two weeks time.

In this process I will respect as always three key principles:

• one, the need to find real solutions to real problems,
• two, the need to make progress step-by-step, issue-by-issue
• three, and above all, the need to keep the unity of the 27 Member States, also in the context of the new ideas.

And there have been plenty. But even though some may think it is a kind of a Eurovisions' contest, and perhaps it is, I am personally convinced that together, we will make good use of it, if we sing unisono.

Prime Minister Theresa May’s speech in Florence was intended to move forward stalled Brexit negotiations. But as I argue in this post that first appeared on the Dahrendorf Blog, Britain has found itself running into numerous problems with Brexit because its strategy for exiting the EU has been a textbook example of failed strategic thinking.

It’s said that in the First World War the Germans viewed the British troops and their generals as lions led by donkeys. One hundred years on, to much of the rest of Europe it is Britain’s national leaders, bereft of any coherent unified strategy for exiting the EU, who are donkeys misleading a great country.

If things continue as they have been, Britain’s approach to Brexit will be studied by generations of strategists as an example of flawed strategic thinking. The rest of Europe and Britain’s key allies such as the United States should lament this. As the Henry Jackson Society pointed out in a recent report, Britain remains a country of immense power and potential. It is not a dwarf and Brexit does not doom it to become one. The British people, like the troops of the First World War, will soldier on. But Brexit does pose the biggest political, administrative, and economic challenge Britain has faced in a long time. If it is handled badly, Britain will suffer unnecessary pain and losses. In facing such a challenge, the British people deserve to be led by leaders with a grasp of what it is they want to achieve and an ability to direct Britain towards it.

Strategy is a balanced combination of ends, ways, and means, which incorporates an assessment of risk and an opponent’s likely behaviour. Successful implementation and adaptation of strategy depends on having leaders who are able and willing to react and lead the struggle. Britain’s approach to Brexit has not lived up to this definition.

Before we open this up further let us be clear that Brexit is not a simple one-off event. It is a series of overlapping multifaceted, multi-levelled processes, negotiations, and debates involving multiple actors in Britain, the remaining EU, Europe, and the rest of the world. Its wide-ranging nature and complexity make it one of the most important and difficult political issues to define and analyse. Finding a way through it, for all involved, was never going to be easy. As I’ll touch on in a future blog post, the EU’s own approach has not been without problems. But Britain has so far gone about it in a particularly poor way.

Ends

Britain has made the fundamental strategic mistake of not knowing what end it seeks from Brexit. “Brexit means Brexit” said Theresa May. But Brexit is a process with no clearly defined destination. It’s like saying “War means war”. War, after all, is a means to an end. Britain’s leadership has been divided, unsure, and left shell-shocked by the Leave vote in a referendum in which most of them had campaigned for Remain. But in voting for Leave what the British people wanted Leave to mean – and therefore what end they want the UK government to deliver – has never been entirely settled. Its why British politics since 23 June 2016 has been defined by a battle to define the narrative of Brexit. It was the need for a mandate to define such a narrative that led Theresa May to trigger an unexpected general election. She hoped it would empower her to pursue the Brexit she outlined in January. Instead, the hung parliament that emerged has only confused things further.

That more than a year on from the vote British politicians are still arguing about the nature of a transition deal points to how far there is still to go before Britain knows what it wants from what Theresa May describes as a “deep and special partnership” with the EU. And it has not been just the governing Conservative party that has struggled. Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and other opposition parties have either fudged the issue or offered unrealistic ends as part of electoral manoeuvring rather than an assessment of what is possible or in the national interest. The inability of British politicians to know what they want and whether they can get it has led to calls for the EU to take the initiative by explaining to the UK what its options are.

Ways

With an unclear end, the UK has been in no position to assess or prepare the ways to get there. Given that no plan survives first contact, the need to constantly plan and adapt is one of the key requirements of any strategy. As Former U.S. President and U.S. Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, “plans are worthless, but planning is everything”. It makes sense, therefore, to task the British civil service with planning for a range of possibilities, including a no-deal scenario. That sounds an ideal way towards a resilient strategy. But the planning only started a year ago, thanks to David Cameron’s refusal to contemplate a Leave vote in the run-up to the referendum. Since then, and as noticed by the EU’s negotiators, Britain’s negotiators have struggled to grasp the detail because there’s so much for them to do. This hasn’t stopped British Ministers from promising to achieve great things. They ignored that they lacked a way – and the time –to settle Brexit in the two-year timeframe provided by Article 50. They forgot that under-promising and over-delivering is a shining virtue; vice versa, a mortal sin.

Means

With no clear end and inadequate and confused ways, it should come as no surprise that Britain has been unable to prepare, configure, or effectively deploy the means it has available. The means are plentiful: staff, money (not least Britain’s budgetary contributions), legal positions, diplomatic support from allies, trade deals, military and security capabilities, the status of UK and EU citizens, Britain’s trade relationships with the rest of the EU, the power of the City of London, and so forth. One reason Britain has struggled is because its diplomatic means in Europe are not what they once were. Before the referendum, a great deal of EU business was conducted via Brussels. Large parts of Britain’s diplomatic resources throughout the rest of the EU were redirected towards areas of the world outside Europe, especially emerging powers. That now must be rebalanced.

Britain also needs replacements for EU regulators, additional civil servants to undertake new work, new facilities at ports, new IT systems to address changes in how trade is handled, and much more. None of this is impossible and work has begun, but it’s still in the early phases. The rest of the EU knows this. Those who compare Brexit negotiations to a poker game overlook how both sides know exactly what the others hand is. Threatening to walk away from the EU when you won’t have the means in place to deliver a ‘hard Brexit’ in a way that doesn’t inflict real and lasting damage is a bluff the other side sees straight through.

Assessment of Risk

Britain’s assessment of the risks involved in Brexit has been lacking. In triggering Article 50 when she did, Theresa May made time an ally of the EU and increased the risk of Britain not having a settlement in time for an exit it wanted. The British government forgot what the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu argued in the 5th century BC: ‘The victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory’. Having jumped headlong into Article 50 negotiations, Britain has come to realise over the past year that it needs to look for a way to victory.

Assessment of the EU

Assessment and understanding of the EU, the UK’s opponent in Brexit, has been limited. May’s speech in Florence was billed as a ‘re-engagement with Europe’. That will have perked up the ears of the rest of the EU, because, as the outgoing French ambassador in London recently noted, the UK has spent the past year talking to itself about Brexit. Leaders and decision makers elsewhere in the EU have routinely denounced talk such as ‘having your cake and eating it’, and done so to the point of ridicule. Yet with donkey-like stubbornness, some British ministers have continued to repeat and, even worse, believe their own rhetoric. Mrs May and the rest of the UK’s leadership need to recognize that the EU is changing and that Britain’s place in Europe will be shaped by this dynamic, and not only by its own hopes and plans for Brexit. Brexit is but one of several challenges and opportunities confronting the EU, among them the pressures facing the eurozone, Schengen, Russian relations, the future of NATO and ties with the U.S. How the EU responds to these pressures will determine its place in the world and frame its future relationship with Britain.

Does this mean Britain is doomed to lurch from one Brexit crisis to the next, resulting in catastrophic humiliation for Britain? Not necessarily. Britain might have over-reached in the first phase of Brexit negotiations, but it’s still too early to evaluate the full significance of Brexit and whether the old phrase holds that you can lose a battle but win the war. That, of course, depends on where Britain and the EU end up in the 2020s in terms of their relations and relative power in the world and in Europe. The rest of the EU has its own weaknesses. Strategies for saving the euro have sometimes been nothing more than glorified exercises in muddling through, with EU decision-makers often making donkeys of themselves. The only strategy that can realistically work is one based on mutual self-interest, where losses are minimised for both sides. However, it remains unclear whether Britain, or the EU, can find ways towards this.

This post first appeared on the Dahrendorf Blog.

The post Britain’s Brexit Strategy: Lions Misled by Donkeys appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In view of the continuing instability and gravity of the situation in Libya, the Council has extended the duration of the sanctions against Libya, targeting three persons for a period of six months.

On 1 April 2016, the Council imposed restrictive measures against Libya on three persons: Agila Saleh, president of the Libyan Council of Deputies in the House of Representatives; Khalifa Ghweil, prime minister and defence minister of the internationally unrecognised General National Congress; and Nuri Abu Sahmain, president of the internationally unrecognised General National Congress. These persons are viewed as obstructing the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) of 17 December 2015 and the formation of a Government of National Accord in Libya.

The Council last adopted conclusions on Libya on 17 July 2017. The Council reiterated its firm support to the Libyan Political Agreement and to the Presidency Council and Government of National Accord led by Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj established under it as the sole legitimate government authorities in the country. 

The Council reaffirmed its commitment to existing restrictive measures. It reiterated its readiness to repeal them if the conditions for their application are no longer met and to introduce new measures against individuals who threaten the peace, security or stability of the country by, for instance, impeding or undermining the successful completion of Libya's political transition. 

The EU called on all armed groups to refrain from violence, to commit to demobilisation and to recognise the authorities entrusted through the Libyan Political Agreement as the only authorities invested with the right to control Libya's defence and security forces. Violence threatens Libya's stability: the EU believes there is no solution to the Libyan crisis through the use of force.

The Council also warmly welcomed the appointment of Ghassan Salamé as the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, who will play a central mediation role helping to promote an inclusive political settlement based on the Libyan Political Agreement.

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The EU Digital Summit takes place on 29 September 2017 in Tallinn. It is focused on the essential topics of building a digital future for Europe: trust, security, e-government, industry, society and the economy.

Download this video here.

AMENDMENTS - Amendments 1 - 286
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The EU's Political and Security Committee has appointed Kauko Aaltomaa, a high-ranking official in the Finnish Ministry of Interior, as new Head of the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS). He will take up his duties on 1 October 2017.

EUPOL COPPS is a part of wider EU efforts in support of Palestinian state building in the context of working towards a comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a two-state solution. EUPOL COPPS has been assisting the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future state of Palestine in the areas of policing and criminal justice since January 2006. Through its contribution to security and justice sector reform, the mission supports efforts to increase the security of the Palestinian population and to reinforce the rule of law. EUPOL COPPS's current mandate runs until 30 June 2018. The headquarters of the mission are located in Ramallah.

Kauko Aaltomaa succeeds Rodolphe Mauget (of French nationality) who had held the post since 17 February 2015.