European Union

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Apart from protection from hostile forces, security also refers to a wide range of other issues, such as the absence of harm, the presence of an essential good, quality or conditions in which equitable and sustainable relationships can develop within political systems, institutions and states.

 

There are various hazards, faced by the Ukrainian state in the region of Transcarpathia (Zakarpattya), rich in cultures, ethnicities, political preferences and bordering Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. The challenges of insuring constitutional order, prevention of separatism by co-opting and locking-in, surprisingly, could be done by promotion of neopatrimonial ties, clientalism, patronage and policies of controlled corruption and other informal mechanisms.

 

In the December 1991 referendum 78% of the region´s voters approved a proposal for Transcarpathian autonomy. Rather than employing force, the Ukrainian state exerted other kinds of control on local officials. Regional movements were defused through co-opting and brokeraging mechanisms, in which local politicians were included into the political networks with the center, whereby the voices demanding autonomy were stifled.

 

Dissatisfaction and high aspirations for separate identity recognition and redistribution of resources and power present obstacles for stability internationally and successful nation-building/consolidation domestically. Various political groups thus tend to vigorously compete for their right to influence the level of societal (in)security. Since 1991 Ukraine demonstrated an easily identifiable polarization along regional and cultural lines. These cleavages attained political dimension through regionally based political parties. This polarization often led the country to the brink of political confrontation. An examination of this regional case shows the importance of the actual control means in the ability to defuse separatist movements.

 

Regionalism is the constant factor in Ukrainian political life, and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. The country’s principal regional cleavages are result of a historically separate political development under heavy foreign domination. In this context, unconstitutional establishment of autonomy structures may inflame tensions and raise various hazards, as groups may mobilize different ethnicities around the issue. Furthermore, once an autonomous structure has been established, it can easily serve as an institutional foundation for separatist movements and inflate claims. Region´s elites advancing their own political careers may use autonomy as a vehicle for the mobilization of ethnicity, thus producing violent conflict.

 

Authoritarian governments often view autonomy claims as a zero-sum game, responding harshly and provoking further resistance. Violent conflict may also be more likely under authoritarian regimes because minority groups often fear that extreme action will be the only way to produce a response from such a government. More democratic regimes, however, are more likely to deal with demands more pragmatically, with a strategy resulting in non-violent compromise. In the state hierarchy, based on the Weberian legacy, the center is stronger than the periphery and commands the local agents, who entertain control on the exercise of power in the region. The exceptions to this model may include the situation, where local actors hold stronger de facto control, often by informal means.

 

Ukraine´ state leadership successfully exercised informal mechanisms of control in relation to the periphery. It allowed and even encouraged corruption by local elites. But the state also collected information on illicit activities of local elites and carefully stored it. When directives from the center were given to local elites for implementation, the locals had nothing but to comply in order to avoid criminal prosecution.  Another means of control was the promise of jobs and positions to individuals who support central policies of elites. These types of patronage control are quite effective and inexpensive, compared to direct coercion.

 

Hub-and-spoke pattern of a network with little connection between subunits is a more effective way of control, compared with other. This type of structure balanced the power in favour of the center, as regional actors had to go through the center in order to communicate with each other, and “blackmail state” could effectively forbid collusion between regional actors.

 

The elite that emerged in independent Ukraine came out of the old Soviet-era nomenklatura bred in a neo-patrimonial culture. Thus in Ukraine emerged the system of party of power, characterised by dependence on state, rather formal ideology, barely realized in practice, and strong linkage to specific interest groups, who increasingly took control of political power. The parties were not meant to become autonomous political forces in their own right, but were utilised by the center. They also served the regime in upholding a network of patronage relationships with the major socio-political, economic and administrative actors.  At the same time Ukraine has not managed to achieve a level of national consolidation where regional and national identities could be complementary rather than competitive.

Alexander Svetlov

 

The post Regional application of the (in)security concept: a case study of Ukraine´s Transcarpathia region appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

SEDE is organising a public hearing on 'Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security' on Wednesday 10 October 2018, from 09.00 to 11.30, with four external experts
Further information
Draft programme
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

SEDE is organising a public hearing on 'Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security' on Wednesday 10 October 2018, from 09.00 to 11.30, with four external experts
Further information
Draft programme
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

SEDE is organising a public hearing on 'Artificial intelligence and its future impact on security' on Wednesday 10 October 2018, from 09.00 to 11.30, with four external experts
Location : Paul-Henri Spaak, room 5B001
Further information
Draft programme
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

In view of the upcoming review of the EU Common Position 944/2008/CFSP on arms exports, the aim of the workshop was to provide an overview of the context in which this process will take place together with a set of possible outcomes the review could produce.
The speakers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), first defined the context by describing how, since the EU Common Position was adopted in 2008, EU member states performed in terms of military expenditure, arms production and arms transfers. Recent measures adopted at the EU level to boost defence industrial cooperation were also indicated as part of this framework. The speakers also highlighted the divergences in member states' export policies which emerged in the last decade, most recently during the conflict in Yemen. They then provided a number of options that could be taken into consideration during the 2018 review, covering both adjustments to the language of the criteria and the user's guide and measures to improve the implementation of the EU Common Position, the quality of reporting and to increase coherence and coordination of the EU export control regime.
Further information
Workshop report
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

The next AFET meetings are scheduled to take place on:

Monday, 8 October, 15:00-18:30, room JAN 2Q2
Tuesday, 9 October, 09:00-12:30, room JAN 2Q2
Tuesday, 9 October, 14:30-18:30, room JAN 2Q2

Further information
Information for visitors
Draft agendas
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

France v Parliament
Law governing the institutions
The European Parliament may exercise some of its budgetary powers in Brussels, instead of Strasbourg, if that is required for the proper functioning of the budgetary procedure

DRAFT OPINION on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on the amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Anders Primdahl Vistisen

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 253 - Draft report Human rights concerns in private military and security companies’ operations affecting third countries
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

DRAFT OPINION on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on the amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Anders Primdahl Vistisen

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Publication resulting from the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018

Perceptions of vulnerability within small states can lead to stronger national identity, but also to affiliations with bigger organisation, such as the EU, which grant external shelter. Using Scotland as an example, Alastair Mackie asks whether these dynamics can impact European identity among citizens of small states.

Scottish parliament building at Holyrood, Edinburgh © TheStockCube/AdobeStock

‘Chèrs collègues, do not let Scotland down!’ Scottish MEP and member of the Scottish National Party Alyn Smith received a standing ovation for his speech in the European Parliament on the 28th of June 2016.

He was eager to point out that 62% of Scottish voters had chosen to remain in the European Union. Smith also mentioned that he considers himself to be both Scottish and European. The Brexit vote marked the beginning of a new argument being used by those seeking Scottish independence: that Scotland will be taken out of the EU against its will.

Two years earlier, in the run-up to the referendum on Scottish independence, continued EU membership was still used as an argument against independence. Clearly, the role of the EU within the debate has changed.

Although the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence resulted in a strong wish to remain in the United Kingdom, a large number of people in Scotland continue to support independence and hope for a second referendum. In this second independence referendum campaign, Brexit and the European Union would inevitably feature heavily.

I am interested in the role of European identity in this debate. How have the independence and EU membership referendums influenced the perception of European identity in Scotland? Will Europe’s role in the formation of local identity change?

In January 2018, I started a PhD project which is to be an ethnological study on small state perception of European identity. Here, I present the framework I will use for my study.

An independent Scotland would be a relatively small state in Europe, and as other small states, it would have to work around the consequences of its size. It has been argued that small states are more vulnerable than larger states due to their limited (natural, human, military, etc.) resources. Such states therefore need to find strategies to counteract this vulnerability. There are two common strategies: (1) the building of an internal buffer by focussing the interests of the state and remaining flexible; and (2) by taking external shelter with a larger state or international organisation, such as the European Union.

Small state studies have predominantly focussed on these political and economic consequences of state’s size, not as much has been done on how size influences identity within the state. It has been argued that a perception of vulnerability within small states might contribute to a stronger sense of national identity. If we follow that argument, a vulnerable small state with a strong national identity should seek political and/or economic shelter by joining the European Union. However, it is unclear what the impact of such perceived vulnerability is on the formation and perception of European identity within small states.

Identity can be understood as being created by the stories we tell ourselves and others. These stories form the boundaries that define us and our communities (the Self), and those outside them (the Other). European identity, like other collective identities, can be understood as a shared narrative that controls the boundaries of a network of actors, as argued by Klaus Eder. Different understandings of European identity are based on differences in how this narrative is constructed in relation to Europe. By researching narrative networks, we can learn the role of Europe in people’s identity construction and how it might relate to perceptions of size and vulnerability. To conduct such a study, a bottom-up, ethnological approach is necessary, which focusses on people’s personal narratives of Europe.

In his speech, Alyn Smith emphasized progressive values shared by Scotland and Europe: ‘I want my country to be internationalist, cooperative, ecological, fair, European.’ By doing so, Smith used Scotland’s ‘Europeanness’ to make a clear distinction between it and the majority of the UK which voted for Brexit. In other words, his European identity was supporting his vision for an independent Scotland. It will be interesting to see whether this attitude is widespread among Scots.

Scotland is of course not a state, even though it already functions as one because of the devolved status of its parliament. But the possibility of it becoming one while its relationship with the EU is being questioned at the same time has put into focus the questions I would like to research: (1) what role does Europe play in the identity formation of small state’s citizens, (2) how do perceived size and vulnerability influence the perception of Europe and (3) how is the perception of Europe used to counteract the perceived vulnerability of the state’s citizens?

These research questions will form the basis of ethnographic fieldwork I will be undertaking during 2019. By means of participant-observation and ethnographic interviews in a variety of communities around Scotland, I aim to learn about how people’s narratives of Europe are used in connection to their local narratives.

Although I will start by focussing on Scotland, the findings of the research may be applied to other small European states at a later stage. The results of the project will offer a new perspective on how Europe is understood in small states.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Alastair Mackie is a PhD candidate at Heriot-Watt University investigating how European identity is perceived in small states, with a particular focus on Scotland.

The post The Perception of European Identity in Scotland appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In her new book, based on long-standing research on the politics of nuclear energy in the European Union, Pam Barnes, associate researcher at the EU-Asia Institute (ESSCA School of Management) retraces how public perceptions and political discourses on nuclear power have evolved since the signing of the EURATOM treaty in 1957.

Researching developments in EU environmental and energy policies from the early 2000s I became increasingly aware that the EU’s evolving energy and climate strategy included the use of nuclear energy. But I was confronted by a riddle. How could something that seemed to have so much early promise have created so many controversies? Indeed the use of nuclear fission technology to generate electricity in the European Union is arguably the most controversial of all the available electricity generating technologies: nuclear energy deeply divides public opinion both within and between the EU’s member states.

In the early 2000s civil use of nuclear as an energy resource had been portrayed by the European Commission as ‘a less than perfect energy option…’ linked as it was to military use of the technology. At that time, levels of support for the sector still suffered from the widespread devastation caused by the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986. As the 2000s advanced, however, a number of factors combined to lend a new credibility to nuclear energy.

I began to question why this change had taken place and what the implications of the change might mean for the future of the nuclear energy sector in the European Union. Today, the peak periods of reactor development in the EU European states have clearly ended but this does not mean the demise of nuclear energy in the EU. As a consequence, the structures that have been developed within the EU for safety and research cooperation and collaboration, supported by the often over-looked 1957 European Atomic Energy Community Treaty [Euratom], continue to have value and must be maintained.

The economic, political and social environments for the nuclear sector in the EU are very different in the twenty-first century from those of the mid twentieth century when European governments began to support the use of the technology to generate electricity. There has been no significant large-scale reactor building programme since the 1990s in the EU, with many currently operating reactors being at risk of closure before the end of their operating licenses. At the end of 2017 only 4 reactors were under construction in EU countries with major controversies surrounding a small number of planned developments.

Some EU states evidence a long standing and deeply held opposition to the use of the technology [Austria, Denmark]. Germany’s energy transition programme the ‘Energiewende’ is based on twin objectives – to move from fossil fuels to a largely carbon free sector and at the same time to phase out nuclear generation of electricity by 2022. Even in France, second only to the US as a producer and user of nuclear energy globally, a decision was taken in 2015 to cut back on the use of the technology from 75% of electricity generated to 50% by 2025, although more recent debates in the French government suggest the target year will rather be 2035.

This does not however signal the end of use of nuclear technology to generate electricity in the EU. The process of enlargement from 2004 to 2013 increased the number of EU member states where nuclear energy was generated and used. Enlargement of the EU also increased the challenges of EU energy dependency and the search for indigenous energy resources. Nuclear energy relies on small amounts of imported uranium and with the potential for re-processing nuclear energy could arguably be included as an indigenous resource. As such, nuclear energy has a role to play in providing energy security at a time of high import dependency.

But the most important factor gathering support for continued use of the technology has been the questionable identification of nuclear energy as a sustainable, low carbon, and thus desirable, energy resource in the transition to a low carbon economy in Europe.

Despite spectacular growth in the use of renewable technologies, green technologies are portrayed as incapable of reducing fossil fuel consumption in European countries in the short to medium term. Indeed in most policy scenarios the search for an environmentally and economically sustainable energy resource to replace fossil fuels includes consideration of nuclear generation of electricity.

The longer-term future for nuclear energy in the EU appears to be as a resource in an increasingly diversified energy mix as more use of renewable technologies is made. The outcome may bring a new dimension to the European nuclear sector with a focus on more limited electricity generation but with increased levels of employment in a range of varied technology developments associated with small modular reactors, fusion technology and the growth of de-commissioning and waste management programmes and facilities.

In any event using nuclear technology will be reliant on a combination of consensus in the political discourse and acceptance in the public discourse. It depends on the credibility of emerging storylines in the narrative that portray nuclear energy as capable of making a significant contribution to curbing greenhouse gas emissions and providing energy security, both of which are contested arguments. Public attitudes to the use of nuclear technology remain divided but re-framing the discourse in terms of the threat from climate change has brought with it an element of acceptance and some of those previously vehemently opposed to nuclear energy are ‘thinking again’. The discourse presents a ‘win-win’ situation from using nuclear electricity as it is depicted as a significant provider of volume base-load energy that limits greenhouse gas emissions and enables access to electricity at a stable price. But this political discourse would appear to have been captured by a narrative that represents ‘cynical idealism’ [global warming and environmental protection need the use of nuclear technology, irrespective of economic costs and public concerns] and pragmatic acceptance [energy demands may only be met by the use of nuclear technology], rather than unconditional and enthusiastic public support.

The post Between ‘Cynical Idealism’ and ‘Pragmatic Acceptance’ – The Politics of Nuclear Energy in Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Opinion on Establishing the Connecting Europe Facility - 2018/0228(COD)
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

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Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Length of video : 54'
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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

It’s not because the messenger is particularly unpleasant that the message is necessarily wrong. And its not because many of his messages are plain lies, narcissistic bragging or whining paranoia that each and every message is automatically beside the point.

This may be, in an admittedly crude nutshell, one of the main lessons for Europeans in its dealing with Donald Trump. Almost two years into the Trump presidency, the research seminar on the current state of transatlantic relations held on 21 September at the Paris campus of ESSCA School of Management (and which I had the pleasure to attend) was an excellent opportunity to bring together again some of the authors of the excellent special issue on transatlantic relations put together by Anna Dimitrova in spring 2017 for L’Europe en formation, the bilingual quarterly on European Integration and Federalism studies.

Kristian Nielsen

As Kristian L. Nielsen from Copenhagen Business School rightly reminded the audience, ‘Trump is a fact of life’ and Europeans in general (and European political leaders in particular) would be well advised to ‘keep their emotions’. In the field of security and defence policy, for instance, it was under Barack Obama’s presidency that European NATO members committed to reach the 2% of GDP threshold in defence spending. Trump may be wrong in many details about the functioning (and actually the purpose of NATO), but he definitely ‘has a point’ in reminding Europeans that they are currently not assuming their responsibilities.

And fact-checking Jean-Claude Juncker’s argument according to which EU member-states are so much more generous when one includes development and humanitarian aid in the equation reveals the embarrassing truth that the figures don’t quite add up in his sense.

As for Germany – who is certainly not short on money – Angela Merkel’s growing awareness that ‘the times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over’ and that ‘Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands’ has so far not been followed by really significant measures to upgrade the Bundeswehr, whose equipment is reportedly in a pitiful state. For Kristian Nielsen, blaming the traditionally pacifist German public opinion or a lack of absorption capacity for inactivity in this field boils down to an increasingly objectionable pretext for not being up to one’s own commitments.

Thomas Hoerber agreed. As he pointed out in his paper, ‘the peace dividend of the 1990’s is no longer there, and the world has become a more dangerous place.’ Trump-style populism, with its high dose of anti-intellectualism, and his utter lack of reliability, does not contribute to making it safer again. Trust, once lost, is not so easy to obtain again. I guess that much will depend on how the US institutions and political class will digest the Trump years (whenever these will be over…).

In the meantime, as Thomas recalled, history shows that the Trump administration’s translation in financial terms of ‘the return of realism in international politics’ – the permanent request for a ‘Return-on-Investment’ – is nothing essentially new: ‘John Foster Dulles, in the 1950s, was even more serious on this point’. What strikes Thomas as new, however, is the rather permanent rhetoric battle against European integration. A very worrying trend indeed – who needs an enemy when you have a best friend like this?

Anna Dimitrova

Worrying, but explicable. According to Anna Dimitrova’s meticulous analysis of the four major facets of American foreign policy strategy, Trump’s ‘MAGA’ mantra is not just a baseball cap slogan, but can be understood as a ‘resurgence of Jacksonianism’, a 21st-century update of the seventh president of the United States. Trump’s mix of ‘neo-isolationism-sovereignism-unilateralism-protectionism’ is not all of his own making but strikes a chord in US foreign policy history.

What did I take home from this thought-provoking exchange?

Mainly that now is a moment to keep calm. But also one to worry on. Focusing on transatlantic relation, on how they are currently suffering under Trump and how their deterioration may actually provide a welcome push for Europeans to intensify their cooperation on security and defence issues, turns our eye away from the greatest damage that Trump may be causing in the long run: the harm he is doing, day after day, to democracy itself. By shredding truth to pieces and creating ‘alternative facts’, by turning other powers than the executive into ‘enemies of the people’, by polarising and radicalising a political debate that no longer deserves this name.

Transatlantic relations always had their ups and downs. In the long run, even major disagreements can be fixed, that’s what diplomacy is for. But these relations always have included various forms of cultural transfer, too. It’s in the spill-over of what is currently happening to liberal, pluralistic democracy in the United States that the real reason to worry lies.

The post Keep calm and worry on – transatlantic relations in the Trump era appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

President Donald Tusk addressed the leaders gathered for a High-Level event on Action for Peacekeeping held in the margins on the UN General Assembly in New York City.