European Union

Berlusconi and Fininvest
Freedom of establishment
The Court of Justice alone has jurisdiction to determine whether the legality of the ECB’s decision opposing the acquisition by Fininvest and Mr Berlusconi of a qualifying holding in Banca Mediolanum is affected by any defects vitiating the preparatory acts by the Banca d’Italia

Delegations

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

will take place on Wednesday, 23 January (09:00-12:30 and 14:30-18:30) and Thursday, 24 January (09:00-12:30) 2019 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
Watch the meeting
Access rights for interest group representatives
Eschange of views on 'Security situation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait'
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

The following report contains words and quotations that have been translated from German into English by Jolyon Gumbrell.

Secret political donations have allowed external actors to interfere with elections and referendums in EU member states, which is damaging the democratic process across Europe. Often the source of a political donation can be traced to a company or organization based in a tax haven such as the Isle of Man or Switzerland, but finding out who is really behind the source of these multi million euro or pound donations is more difficult.

In Germany an organization called the “Verein zur Erhaltung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und der bürgerliche Freiheit” – which translates as “club for the maintenance of the rule of law and citizens freedom”, also referred to in English as the “Rights and Freedom Club” – has supported the right wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party in several elections. The chaiman of the AfD, Jörg Meuthen denied in “ARD-Sommerinterview” the summer television interview with ARD of July 2018, that his party had ever worked with the Rights and Freedom Club. However the chairman of the Rights and Freedom Club, David Bendels is also the publisher of Deutschland-Kurier, a political newspaper that supports the AfD.

According to email and interview evidence presentented by the German television program “ARD-Politikmagazin Panorama”: David Bendels gave1500 free copies of Deutschland-Kuriers to the AfD’s regional association in Rosenheim. The copies of the newspaper were distributed by party volunteers to local mail boxes. This happened in July 2018 three months before the state elections in Bavaria for the “Landtag”, the state parliament in Munich.

According to a legal and constitutional expert, Prof. Sophie Schönberger interviewed by ARD-Politikmagazin Panorama: “the email evidence is a comprehensive connection between the club and the AfD, which means comprehensive proof that there was an agreement for election support between the AfD and the club. And this delivers plausible clues for the first time, that it concerns a type of illegal party financing.”

The AfD should have recorded the donation of the copies of Deutschland-Kurier in their accounts of election expenses. If the AfD had published and printed its own newspaper, then 1500 copies distributed in the Rosenheim area would have probably cost the party at least €3000 to produce. However Deutschland-Kurier did not pass this cost on to the AfD, and the newspaper has also been distributed in other locations in support of AfD election candidates. If the Rights and Freedom Club is funding Deutscland-Kurier, then the members of this club are in effect AfD donors.

Under German law political donations received from countries outside of the EU are illegal, unless they come from a German or other EU citizen, or a company which has at least 50 percent of its shares in German or EU hands. Anonymous donations exceeding €500, and anonymous donations passed on from a third party are also forbidden.

According to reports in the German and Swiss press from the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Wochenzeitung (WOZ), the secretive billionaire August von Finck is thought to be a donor to the Rights and Freedom Club. It is thought that Fink’s authorized representative Ernst Knut Stahl is one of the people behind the Rights and Freedom Club, who has in the past organized on Finck’s behalf, political donations to right wing parties and organizations.

August von Finck junior who is now 88, was heir to a fortune that came from his family’s business, the private bank Merck Finck & Co. His father also called August von Finck was the main shareholder of Merck Finck & Co., and sat on the supervisory board of several German companies in the 1930s. According to an article of 29th November 2018, published on the WOZ website entitled, “Ein schrecklich rechte Familie”, which translates as, “A right terrible family”: Finck senior was a member of a group of industrialists who met secretly with Hitler in 1933 and deceided to support the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) with a secret election fund of three million Reichtsmarks.

During the Nazi period Finck senior profiteered from businesses and property which had been stolen from Jews by the Nazis. He was also on the boad of trustees of “Haus der Deutschen Kunst”, an art gallery built between 1933 and 1937 in Munich, which used art for Nazi propaganda purposes. After the Second World War the Allies did not consider him as a serious Nazi War Criminal, even though he had helped fund Hitler’s rise to power. In 1949 he was able to re-establish the bank Merck Finck & Co. In 1973 Finck senior also known as “Freiherr” or Baron, bought a castle called Schloss Weinfeld in Switzerland. Finck senior died in 1980 and the castle has since then remained in the possession of his son August von Finck junior.

It has been estimated in the media, that August von Finck junior has a fortune of more than €8 billion. In 1990 he sold the bank Merck Finck & Co., to Barclays Bank PLC and moved the headquarters of his business group to Switzerland to avoid German taxes.

In 2010 Finck junior acquired the trading name of the precious metals company Degussa. This was at a time shortly after the financial crash, when gold and other precious metals were considered a safe investment option. Degussa Goldhandel retail outlets were opened in Germany, Switzerland, Spain and the United Kingdom in response to a revived interest in buying gold as an alternative investment.

If Finck had made large political donations to the AfD, then it would come as no surprise, that the AfD has a policy to reintroduce a gold standard for the Bundesbank in Germany. According to an article published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on 24th November 2018 entitle, “Die AfD und der Geheimnisvolle Milliardär”, which translates as “The AfD and the mysterious billionaire”: Finck was supposed to have supported a policy with good will – proposed by an AfD politician called Peter Boehringer – to bring gold reserves back to the Bundesbank in Germany.

This story is to be continued . . .

Sources

https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/afd-verein-103.html

https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afd-von-finck-1.4225837

https://www.woz.ch/1848/verdeckte-parteienfinanzierung/eine-schrecklich-rechte-familie

https://hausderkunst.de/en/history/chronical

https://www.merckfinck.de/unternehmen/geschichte.html

https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/parteispenden-faq-101.html

http://www.swisscastles.ch/Thurgau/weinfelden.html

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Democracy_in_the_Crosshairs_.pdf

©Jolyon Gumbrell 2018

The post Illegal political funding across Europe. Part I appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

AMENDMENTS 381 – 386 - Draft report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Development

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Commission v Poland
Principles of Community law
Poland must immediately suspend the application of the provisions of national legislation relating to the lowering of the retirement age for Supreme Court judges

Delegations

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Hamas v Council
External relations
The General Court dismisses the action brought by Hamas against the decisions to maintain the freezing of its funds as an entity involved in acts of terrorism

Plenay, Strasbourg

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Since I last blogged about how the EU’s Rule of Law Framework works and why Article 7 have been triggered against Poland and Hungary, a long list political developments took place both in Hungary and in Poland, as well as in the UK; some are positive and some are negative, but then this is relative to where you stand politically.

Theresa May introduced her long negotiated Withdrawal Agreement to the British in November. It was as affective as a bombshell. It even surprised those who were actively engaged in the process of negotiating this deal; like former Brexit Minister, Dominic Raab, who happened to resign immediately over the deal and  who said that he could not support the deal. It was a bewildering moment that the Brexit Minister resigns over the deal of which he was part. It did not make sense and still does not. However the subsequent resignations, and disunity among and within the governing and the opposition political parties over the deal not only have overshadowed Raab’s resignation, but have also made everything more complicated to follow.

At least there was one certain thing until 10th of December, which was the vote in the House of Commons on the WA on the following day, until Theresa May delayed that too another date, upon realising that she could not guarantee a majority in the Commons. What happens now is the pressing question.

Both the Irish backstop and disunited political parties have been the main cause of volatility in the British politics in relation to Brexit. Whether order and stability can be restored into British politics with a tweaked WA (if agreed by Brussels), I don’t see how that is happening, thus the point of delaying the vote does not make sense, unless she knows something we don’t. Is more than a tweak to the WA possible? As of now the officials say that they could issue a statement clarifying that the EU does not want to trap the UK under the bloc’s authority. Can she secure any concessions? We all have to wait and see, but I believe that is highly unlikely. 

Moving on to alleged Polexit, the local elections of October and the reinstatement of the Supreme Court judges have been the highlights of the last two months for me, as far as the Polish politics in concerned. Plus there seems to be a degree of causality between the results of the October local elections and having the ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) opting to take a step back from its judicial reforms.  

When the PiS lost the control of some of the municipalities to the opposition political parties during the local elections of October, they began to reflect on what might have gone wrong or what they have done wrong. Since 2015 the PiS administration have not been harmonious with the EU, they not only they stood against a EU common policy, that is being the EU’s migration quote scheme, but have also domestically introduced and passed laws that are against the EU’s core values, the judicial reform is being one of them, threatening independence of judiciary and giving more authority to the politicians. Thus there has been an ongoing tension between the Polish administration and the EU institutions, be that the European Commission and the European Parliament. This meant that Poland was no longer seen as the beacon of stability in the Central and Eastern Europe, but as a troublemaker.

Although I have never heard it from anyone from the PiS, during the election campaign it was however suggested by the opposition political parties, such as the Civic Platform (PO), that the PiS was inching towards Polexit. This is something Donald Tusk, a former Polish prime minister and the serving President of the European Council, have also reiterated by comparing the situation in Poland with the situation in Britain before Brexit, and claimed that Poland could end up leaving the bloc as a result of miscalculation. It is true that Polish administration’s Conservative and illiberal policy choices make Poland distant from the core values of the EU and this is why Article 7 was triggered against Poland. 

However I would not stretch it that far to claim that Poland is inching close to leave the EU as the membership to the EU is very popular among the PiS and the public. Since the most recent survey published by the newspaper Rzeczpospolita found that 84 per cent of Poles wanted their country to stay in the union, while only 8 per cent wanted to leave. It may be that the opposition political parties’ campaign about Polexit and the existing tension between Poland and the EU have played up to the fears of the people that Poland might leave the EU, which then have shaped their voting intentions, contributing to the PiS’s loss of votes in October elections. In response to this the PiS officials denied any intention to leave the EU and is working towards neutering this line of attack before Poland holds European and domestic parliamentary elections next year. Plus the PiS’s latest u-turn on the judiciary reform do demonstrate how much EU membership is important for the PiS; particularly after having to agree to reinstate Supreme Court judges.

Whereas situation in Hungary is now  more bleak and alarming than ever. Just after a week an independent University, the Central European University, had been forced to exit from Budapest, Orban’s government did not miss any time to pass another controversial law, tightening the control of the courts, despite the ongoing Article 7 procedure. 

Despite having to complied to the last year’s law that required that the foreign universities to have classes in their home countries in order to enroll students in Hungary by opening a program in New York, Orban’s administration refused to sign the  necessary paperwork for the CEU to be able to operate in Hungary.

Once it became official, yes there were criticisms from different EU circles and the US over the forced exit of the CEU. None however were affective enough to change the fate of the CEU. Silence from the European People’s party (EPP), of which Fidesz is part of, were the most  deafening. At one point in the past the EPP had set the closure of the CEU as a red line, but they did not take any action which would stop this forced exit, which meant that  Orban’s administration was once again able to behave as they wished. Since European elections are fast approaching, and so the short term interests of the agents involved in these elections are prioritised at the expense of the EU’s core values on which the EU was once established. 

Since Orbán did get away with the CEU-exit, on the 12th of December, his administration  approved a law that will further tighten his hold over the country’s court system by creating a new high court to deal with public-administration cases and brought it under the government’s oversight. The legislation strips the supreme court of its ultimate authority over so-called administrative disputes — cases involving everything from elections and corruption to taxes and police abuse — and creates a new court overseen by his justice minister. From now on the Justice Minister pick the new court’s judges and control its budget. This meant that Orbán  continues to shape the Hungarian state structure in his own illiberal image, threatening the EU’s liberal standing. 

Above three cases show that either membership to the EU is a cause of instability for all the three countries  including the UK, Poland and Hungary or these countries are cause of worrisome for the EU. While there are now two option in relation to UK’s position in the EU:(1) no deal Brexit and (2) no Brexit: at  least that is some clarity in some form, that will be something for the UK and the EU to decide. However the situation for Poland and Hungary are totally different, they do favour the EU membership and do like to remain as members. Yet they opt for policy choices that are in contradiction with the EU’s core values. When it is in their benefit they agree to make a u-turn on these policy choices, like we have seen it in Poland, otherwise they push their agenda as far as they can however radical it is, like Fidesz did in Hungary.  Thus we should be concerned about the current state of affairs.

The post Voluntary, Alleged and Forced Exoduses–Brexit, Polexit and CEU-exit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

DRAFT REPORT on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the new comprehensive agreement between the EU and Uzbekistan
Committee on Foreign Affairs
David McAllister

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

MEPs held an exchange of views with the representatives of the 2018 Sakharov Prize laureate, Oleg SENTSOV, in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 10 December 2018, Monday, to express their support for all individuals who like Oleg Sentsov struggle to protect human rights. MEPs also shared their strong hope for their quick release.
This exchange of views was held at a joint meeting of Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET), Development (DEVE), and Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) in association with the Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee and the Delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee.
Further information
Press release
Extracts from the meeting
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Report on the 2018 Commission Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina
Report on the 2018 Commission Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Amendment 53
Protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic
Recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the comprehensive agreement between the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic
Establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund
Establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the instrument for financial support for border management and visa
Report on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Rittinger and Others
State aid
The German broadcasting contribution is compatible with EU law

Hein
DFON
During their minimum period of annual leave guaranteed by EU law, workers are entitled to their normal remuneration, in spite of prior periods of short-time working

European Union v Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne
Law governing the institutions
The Court sets aside the damages imposed on the EU by the General Court on account of bank guarantee charges incurred by several undertakings in the context of excessively long proceedings before the General Court

Ville de Paris v Commission
Environment and consumers
The General Court upholds the actions brought by the cities of Paris, Brussels and Madrid and annuls in part the Commission’s regulation setting excessively high oxides of nitrogen emission limits for the tests for new light passenger and commercial vehicles

VG Media
Approximation of laws
Advocate General Hogan: the Court should rule that the new German rules prohibiting search engines from providing excerpts of press products without prior authorisation by the publisher must not be applied

Deutsche Telekom v Commission
Competition
The General Court partially annuls the Commission decision relating to anticompetitive practices on the Slovakian telecommunications market

Touring Tours und Travel
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
The Schengen Borders Code precludes Germany from requiring coach transport operators of cross-border services to check the passports and residence permits of passengers before entering or leaving German territory