European Union

The largest and oldest Latvian perfume and biocosmetics producer Dzintars is on the verge of bankruptcy. The company's staff have launched a campaign on Facebook calling on Latvians to buy their products - with success. But can such short-term consumer commitment save the more than a century-old company?

European Council meeting will take place on 15-16 December 2016 in Justus Lipsius building in Brussels. 

 Application deadline: 25 November, 17.00
Procedure

• If this is your first registration, please make sure you have a recent ID-size photograph in JPEG format (.jpg) and the number of your passport or identity card ready before starting the online process.
• You will receive an acknowledgement of receipt by email. Please read it carefully as it includes the list of original documents you will be asked to provide when collecting your badge. Depending on your profile, the requested document will include: Passport or ID card, press card and/or a letter from your editor-in chief as well as the signed original of your authorisation for security screening (only for media representatives of Belgian nationality or resident in Belgium). The press centre may contact you to request additional information if necessary. No accreditation badge will be issued if you cannot provide all required documents.
• Under certain conditions it is possible to organise a group registration/collection of badges for journalists working for the same media. Select group registration at the beginning of the accreditation process and follow the instructions.
• Trainees with media organisations who do not possess a press card are not entitled to request accreditation

Journalists holding a 6-month badge (30.06.2016 - 31.12.2016) do not need to register

6-month badges can be collected at the accreditation centre of the LEX building during summits. Please ensure that you have all the required documents when collecting your badge.

Collection of badges

Accreditation badges must be collected in person from the LEX building (145 rue de la Loi, Brussels)  

• Wednesday 14 December - 9.30 - 13.00 and 14.00 - 18.00
• Thursday 15 December - 8.30 - 20.00 
• Friday 16 December , from 08.00 to the end of the final press conference (latest 22.00) 

Practical information on the press centre and the media programme will follow.

For more details on the European Council meeting, see the meeting page.

General : The free trade agreement between the EU and Canada and the future of the EU's trade policy will be debated by MEPs this week as committees are meeting. On the agenda are issues such as a data protection agreement between the EU and the US, aviation safety rules to meet new challenges such as drones and the ongoing investigation into the Panama papers.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

General : The free trade agreement between the EU and Canada and the future of the EU's trade policy will be debated by MEPs this week as committees are meeting. On the agenda are issues such as a data protection agreement between the EU and the US, aviation safety rules to meet new challenges such as drones and the ongoing investigation into the Panama papers.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

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The North Africa to Italy migration route remains highly dangerous to those who attempt it, even busier than last year and seemingly impervious to EU action.

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The EU is no stranger to inter-institutional repetition. As was made famous in the referendum debate, it has many presidents (for instance, leading the European Commission, European Council, European Parliament, European Central Bank and the Eurogroup). So it has also been in the EU’s preparation for the Brexit talks. Over the summer, Michel Barnier (Commission), Didier Seeuws (Council) and Guy Verhofstadt (Parliament) were all appointed as the EU’s Brexit negotiators.

Jean-Claude Juncker and Donald Tusk – Apr 2015, EEAS, CC-BY-NC-ND-2.0

The question arises then of who will actually lead the negotiations for the EU. In the initial period following the referendum, it seemed possible that the Council might in fact take a more active role. Historically, the main actor would be the Commission. Consequently, this would mark a major shift in institutional balance (and confirm the revived intergovernmental nature of the EU today).

However, some Member States have indicated in recent weeks that the Commission will indeed take the lead in the negotiations. In the media, as well, Michel Barnier has been elevated as the EU’s principal Brexit negotiator. In the politics of the EU, the institutional situation matters. If the European Commission does in fact end up leading Brexit, that will have implications for the negotiations. It’s worth reflecting on why things are moving in this direction and what it means for the outcome.

Direction of travel

The Commission usually negotiates most of the EU’s external agreements, based on a mandate from the Council. In the main sections of the treaties on international agreements (Articles 207 and 218 TFEU), the Commission is only partly named in writing as the negotiator, but the precedent has developed over the EU’s history. The minimalist Article 50 TEU does not specify who should conduct withdrawal negotiations (‘the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement’), though it does make a reference back to Article 218 TFEU.

There are clear advantages for the European Union in having the Commission lead the Brexit talks. It has a great deal of experience in negotiating deals, including complex substantive matters – many of these are certain to come up in the UK’s withdrawal. The sensible suggestion of taking Brexit as a ‘reverse enlargement’ – structuring the talks based on the chapters of an accession treaty – would demonstrably point to the Commission, which conducts such negotiations. The Commission also has the resources, in terms of the number of personnel required, by comparison with the smaller Council secretariat, at least.

More broadly, the EU27 likely won’t want the ‘Council’ (the European Council, the Council of the EU and the informal gatherings at 27) to be taken over by Brexit at every meeting for the next few years. Many other important issues are at hand and there are sound reasons to continue the normal work of the EU while Brexit is being negotiated. Delegating the detailed negotiations to the Commission would regulate how Brexit is dealt with in the Council/EU27, limiting the discussions to reports from the Commission and exchanges on key points of the negotiating mandate.

Implications for Brexit

Provided this direction of travel continues (the EU27 could change their minds or intervene more directly at some point), it compartmentalises the Brexit negotiations and minimises the (already substantial) impact on day-to-day EU business. It also brings together the EU27 behind the Commission, and serves to keep up the united front they have tried to maintain – such as the mantras on the indivisibility of the Single Market and on ‘no negotiations without notification’. If the UK was hoping to capitalise on relationships with individual EU members in the negotiations (which was already a tenuous proposition), that will be even more difficult.

As an organisation, the European Commission is quite fond of integration. Unless specifically obliged to do so, it is probably the last entity that would ever agree to picking apart the Single Market (either separating the four freedoms or negotiating differentiation for individual sectors), as the UK government seemingly wishes to do at present. Perhaps more than any other actor, it knows the details of the Single Market and all of the EU’s policies and programmes. It is extraordinarily unlikely that it will not be aware of all the facts and all the briefs going into the talks. The UK won’t be able to get by on fudging substantive points. The Commission’s collective knowledge, expertise and resources afford it an advantage in the negotiations.

The Council will still have an important role, of course, particularly on the major issues decided at the key summit meetings. The European Parliament will also have influence, with its approval needed on the withdrawal agreement. In that sense, the Brexit negotiations will be a hybrid of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ negotiations. We will see both the UK-EU negotiation process (external/third country mode) and landmark moments at the European Council, at which the UK will be present until its departure (internal/intra-EU mode). As a negotiation configuration, this will be a novel experience for the EU.

In shaping Brexit, the Council will take many of the big decisions for the EU. However, the Commission could be negotiating the details. And in the EU, the details matter. The European Commission is the ‘guardian of the treaties’, a role which it has always taken seriously. It will undoubtedly continue to do so throughout the Brexit negotiations and afterwards in future UK-EU relations.

This article was originally published on the LSE EUROPP Blog.

Please read the comments policy before commenting.

Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/25

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2016) ‘Why it Matters if the European Commission Ends up Leading the Brexit Negotiations’, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 6 November 2016, britainseurope.uk/25

The post Why It Matters if the European Commission Ends up Leading the Brexit Negotiations appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Monday 7 November 2016
14.00 Meeting with President of the Eurogroup Jeroen Dijsselbloem

Tuesday 8 November 2016
15.00 Meeting with the Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bakir Izetbegović (photo opportunity)
16.30 Presentation of letters of credentials of ambassadors

Thursday 10 November 2016
10.30 Presentation of letters of credentials of ambassadors
13.45 Meeting with the President of Finland Sauli Niinistö (photo opportunity)

As Theresa May and her new government prepare to trigger Article 50, many questions have been raised over how the UK’s exit will affect EU trade policy and the fate of ongoing external trade negotiations. These issues are intrinsically connected to the formation of the UK’s future trade relationship with the EU, so until the withdrawal agreement is finalised, there will be no change in the formal negotiating strategy of the EU. But despite this best intention, Brexit may have several unintended ill effects.

Initially, the European Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, sought to provide reassurance that everything will proceed normally. The UK is – and will for at least another two years formally be – an EU member state. It is, however, questionable whether negotiators can ignore the elephant in the room. A well-noted issue is the UK’s traditionally open and liberal approach to trade. Politically, it is unacceptable for the UK to continue shaping EU trade policy. But losing this voice will certainly have an impact, with the balance of power in the European Council shifted and the types of mandates the European Commission receives from member states altered. We should also take into account the possibility that the UK’s economic structure may change depending on what kind of economic and trade policies the British government seeks to pursue outside the EU. And this is on top of the broader EU trade issues such as the growing popular opposition to trade deals and the recent decision to make the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada a so-called “mixed” agreement. This, and several other issues, will diminish the confidence of external partners in the EU as a reliable trade and negotiating partner.

Talks on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are progressing, but with significant hurdles still to be overcome. The UK is, in general, one of the member states most willing to show openness in overcoming the many hurdles that block the way to a deal. Its absence may dampen hopes of concluding a more comprehensive agreement soon. The US trade representative has already indicated that the negotiations will need to be adjusted to account for Brexit. That could change the final agreement. The British market’s importance to the US is undeniable, so it’s difficult to imagine this issue not being addressed by American negotiators.

The EU may need to adapt its strategy accordingly. There may be options for including the UK in a future deal, such as by opening up TTIP for other countries to join. Another solution could be that the UK negotiates a parallel US trade deal modelled on TTIP.

“Britain’s withdrawal negotiations must start as soon as possible to remove uncertainty from current and future EU and UK trade negotiations”

The EU’s negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been suspended since 2009, but bilateral free trade agreements with individual ASEAN members are being pursued. Brexit or not, I don’t think this situation would have changed. ASEAN countries’ trade relations with the UK may alter, depending on the future EU-UK relationship and the fact that the UK is an important trading partner for several ASEAN members. The UK will prioritise free trade deals with ASEAN countries, so depending on the individual agreements, this may influence
future negotiations that the EU conducts. Free trade negotiations that have already been concluded are unlikely to be affected at this stage.

The UK’s withdrawal may have greater consequences for the eventual content of the EU’s bilateral deal with India. The negotiations have ground to a halt, and recent attempts to breathe new life into them seem fruitless. One of the sticking points – wines and spirits – may be influenced by the UK’s withdrawal due to the relevance of whisky for bilateral trade relations, as British producers
seek to tap into one of the world’s biggest consumer market for the spirit. But Brexit may also help the EU-India talks progress, as the UK’s concerns over “Mode 4”, covering the movement of skilled workers, could cease to be an obstacle.

The EU’s negotiations with Japan have similarly stalled of late. At this May’s G7 summit in Ise-Shima, leaders expressed their willingness to resume the negotiations, but ultimately we will have
to see how this develops, especially after Japan’s recent upper-house elections. Outstanding issues still need to be resolved, and as with other trade deals, the removal of UK interests in an EU trade deal with Japan could impact the way negotiations move forward, especially considering Japanese business interests in the UK.

At this stage, these questions revolve around a highly uncertain and theoretical issue. The key, in terms of impact on EU trade negotiations, will be the type of relationship negotiated between the EU and the UK. If the UK retains full access to the EU’s single market, the impact could be minimal as market access conditions for external trading partners wouldn’t change, or at most only to
a small degree. The EU would retain its negotiating power and its attractiveness as a partner. In my view, Britain’s withdrawal negotiations must start as soon as possible to remove uncertainty from current and future EU and UK trade negotiations. This will be instrumental in ensuring that the EU remains a credible, strong and reliable negotiating partner.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – European Parliament

The post The EU’s future trade hinges on Brexit terms appeared first on Europe’s World.

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/b863bf68-977e-11e5-b3f1-bc764e084e2e_98.05_thumb_169_1477321340_1477321340_129_97shar_c1.jpg

EU Finance Ministers of the eurozone meet in Brussels on 7 November 2016 to discuss national insolvency frameworks, an update on the implementation of Greece's aid programme, and post-programme surveillance in Cyprus and Spain.

Download this video here.

Europe’s demographic landscape shows a cluster of “fertility champions” – the north-western countries that have birth rates close to or slightly above population replacement level (and which also have some of the highest life expectancies in the world). But the post-communist countries to the east are enduring an unprecedented demographic collapse. These countries must critically re-think
their traditions of communist demographic policies, which are inadequate in modern times.

In the 1990s, eastern Europe went through a period of “lowest-low fertility” – below 1.3 children per woman. Countries in the region are gradually recovering, but the “demographic problem” persists in each of them. An ageing population, very low fertility, extensive emigration among young people, and emerging ethnic tensions related to the higher reproduction rates of minorities raise concerns in the media, among policymakers and in civil society.

Bulgaria is one of the countries in which the transition to democracy and a market economy has had some of the most negative implications for demographic development. As a country that was, until 1990, an example for an almost ideal two-child society, and that in the mid-1960s had one of the lowest mortality rates in the world, Bulgaria has turned into one of the poorest countries in the EU, with an extremely worrying demographic situation. Bulgaria has the worst population growth rate in the EU. When combined with a persistent trend of huge emigration, population decline becomes steep and irreversible in the short term. And while Bulgaria’s population not only shrinks with unprecedented speed, it is “greying” very quickly.

“The post-communist countries to the east are enduring an unprecedented ‘demographic collapse'”

Since 2000, Bulgaria has escaped from the “lowest-low fertility” group. In recent years, birth rates have approached the EU average of 1.58 children per woman, reaching 1.53 in 2014. But a one-child model prevails for 64% of families, with many couples also deliberately postponing marriage and childbirth. Half of young people surveyed in 2011 expressed a strong desire to emigrate, their values and preferences regarding family, marriage and children being more liberal and non-conformist. Life expectancy for men and women, although increasing, is one of the lowest in the EU. Crucially, infant mortality – especially among ethnic minorities (the Roma population) – is double the EU average, at 7.6 per thousand live births (although it has fallen from 17.5 in 1997).

These demographic tendencies provoke the question: why does the country show so little improvement in this area, given that the last decade has seen economic stability and significant increases
in living standards? One of the explanations – though not the only one – relates to the specific character of Bulgaria’s demographic policy, which is strongly biased towards fertility and reproduction,
and underestimates the importance of effective state intervention in public health and mortality.

This bias dates back to communist times, when coercive pronatalism was seen as the main tool for optimising the country’s demographic development. But health and survival reflect socioeconomic conditions far better than fertility. Several prosperous societies – Germany and Austria, for instance – have very low birth rates.

In recent times, Bulgaria has struggled with chaotic healthcare reforms. Healthcare organisation has been decentralised. Private healthcare has been introduced along with the general practitioner model of primary care, clinical pathways, co-payments and rationing of care. The resulting huge inequalities in access to high-quality medical services turned healthcare from universally accessible
under communism into a luxurious commodity affordable mostly by upper echelons of society. Guaranteed access for the most vulnerable social groups to adequate medical care and treatment is a must if Bulgaria is to have an effective demographic policy.

In 2007, Bulgaria’s EU membership was celebrated as an important milestone that would bring additional stability to the political and economic life of the country. But it also meant accepting many European states’ common vision of social policies and protections. The country’s financial resources, though, were insufficient to maintain the legacies of the quasi-communist welfare system and invest in social protection for vulnerable groups or high-quality welfare infrastructure like nurseries and homes for the elderly. The extremely low financial support for families and children – currently, family benefits are less than €20 per month distributed on a means-tested principle – meant that EU social policy principles were accepted only on paper.

“Guaranteed access for the most vulnerable social groups to adequate medical care and treatment is a must if Bulgaria is to have an effective demographic policy”

Very recently, Bulgaria has experienced a new challenge. The current refugee crisis, with its transient migration, found formerly “closed to immigration” countries like Bulgaria completely unprepared and unable to provide adequate facilities or financial help for refugees. The same Bulgaria that still experiences the huge emigration of ethnic Bulgarians today faces becoming a country of immigration – something for which the country is politically,socially and financially unqualified. In public discussions, the role of the EU is seen as supporting the protection of national security, since illegal migration is considered not only an economic burden for the “poorest state in EU” but also a demographic threat to “the most quickly depopulating country in Europe”.

One of the messages we can draw from these short reflections on Bulgaria’s demographic situation, which could be valid for the majority of the post-communist countries, is that recent policy interventions concerning demographic development should be critically re-evaluated. The persistent overlooking of health and mortality should be replaced by a multi-dimensional, comprehensive and sustainable demographic policy that takes into account the complexity of population development, and incorporates effective measures in all domains of social life relevant to people’s health, survival and reproduction.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Zaprittsky

The post An ageing Bulgaria must make some big choices appeared first on Europe’s World.

Committee meetings, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

“We are sorry – due to technical complications, your journey towards Brexit has been temporarily interrupted. Theresa May will get back to you as soon as possible.”

Normally, court judgements are meant to settle difficult questions, but yesterday’s decision by the UK High Court that Britain’s parliament must vote on Brexit has instead thrown up a lot of tricky new ones.

The shock ruling gave fresh hope to Remainers, annoyed leading government ministers, challenged a key plank of Ms May’s Brexit strategy, and left leaders across the continent wondering what happens next.

It was not only the ruling itself that had people scratching their heads. Britain is now apparently a country where, when the government is defeated, the pound gets stronger;when parliamentary sovereignty is upheld, some parliamentarians are unhappy, and when judges listen to legal arguments in a courtroom, they are “Enemies of the people”.

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On 4 November 2016, the Permanent Representatives Committee endorsed, on behalf of the Council, a decision to provide €200 million in macro-financial assistance to Jordan.

The EU assistance will support the country's economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda, helping to cover its balance of payments needs. It will supplement resources provided by the IMF, which has been discussing with Jordan a new support programme.

Agreement was reached with the European Parliament at an informal meeting on 27 October 2016. The Parliament is now expected to approve the decision at first reading. The Council will then adopt the text, as agreed.

Syrian refugees

The assistance will be available for two and a half years. It will be provided in the form of loans, to be disbursed in two instalments. The loans will have a maximum average maturity of 15 years.

In the light of the challenges Jordan faces in hosting more than 1.3 million Syrian refugees, the Commission will, if appropriate, make a proposal in 2017 to extend and increase the financial assistance.

Conditionality

The assistance will be subject to a memorandum of understanding (MOU), to be agreed by Jordan with the Commission. The MOU will lay down economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances. It will include a timeframe for the fulfilment of those conditions.

A precondition for granting the assistance will be that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system. It must also respect the rule of law and guarantee respect for human rights.

The Commission and the European External Action Service will monitor the fulfilment of this precondition for the duration of the macro-financial assistance.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

European Defence Union
Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy)
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

In a historic referendum, the majority of British voters decided to leave the European Union. The 23rd of June also marked the end of an intense campaign involving politicians, media and the public.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

In the face of a surge in the number of refugees arriving within its borders, Europe found itself in the midst of a crisis last year – one that tore at the fabric of the European Union. What we witnessed was not truly a European “refugee crisis”. Much less so a “migrant crisis”. It was a crisis of European policies; a crisis of solidarity. While governments demonstrated a lack of commitment to finding a truly European solution, the response from the general public to the influx of refugees ranged from warm welcomes to xenophobia. While the reasons behind this vary from country to country, a number of important contributing factors can be identified.

A small group of countries had to take much of the strain caused by the sudden increase in immigration – either as transit countries or final destinations. Greece, Italy and Hungary buckled under
the pressure of ever-increasing numbers of people entering their territory. Croatia and Slovenia followed. They faced difficulties in effectively processing asylum applications, as prescribed by the Dublin Convention, and struggled to provide immediate humanitarian relief. Attempts in the beginning to cope with the influx quickly gave way to a policy of waving people through to neighbouring countries, before finally turning to the (re)construction of fences. Just three countries – Germany, Sweden and Austria – were the target destinations for 95% of new arrivals. Each received large numbers of people within a few months. While other countries, such as the Netherlands, also saw an increase, it was nothing beyond what they had been able to handle in the past.

The unequal distribution of arrivals within the EU, whereby less than a third of all EU member states were countries of transit or destination, left certain countries under strain while others remained mostly unaffected. Yet the supposed threat of increased immigration was instrumentalised by populist politicians to bolster anti-EU sentiments, limiting the options for governments to find workable European solutions. There is little, if any, correlation between the number of immigrant arrivals and the degree of anti-immigrant sentiments, as the countries least affected by the crisis have displayed some of the strongest xenophobic rhetoric.

“Xenophobia has all too often merged with Euroscepticism, making support for pan-European cooperation all the more unpopular”

Fear-driven anti-European politics, amplified by the TV images of a seemingly endless stream of people, overtook much-needed cooperation and solidarity on a European level. With a few notable
exceptions, politicians from many mainstream parties refrained from correcting this narrative, and indeed often saw no other option than to adopt the same rhetoric in an attempt to prevent losses at the polls. This misguided strategy resulted in an even more reactionary stance towards immigration within societies. Few politicians chose to stand behind and strengthen the more open, but far less vocal and politically-unified, “refugees welcome” movement.

There has been an apparent lack of incentives for national leaders and governments to actually work together towards finding common solutions. Despite the existence of a powerful EU bureaucracy, politicians are accountable to their own national electorates, not Europe as a whole. In the political context of blaming Brussels for the many failures of national governments, there was little willingness to strive for a European solution to the crisis. The notion that immigration poses a threat to security, the labour market and national culture, and is an affront to the European way of life, became an effective rallying cry for mobilising the electorate. This has resulted in an unhealthy climate in which xenophobia has all too often merged with Euroscepticism, making support for pan-European cooperation all the more unpopular.

Finding a common European answer to last year’s crisis was made particularly difficult by the absence of a clearly-formulated and communicated European vision on migration. While the European Commission has, as a reaction to the developments of 2015, pushed forward proposals leading to the harmonisation of Europe’s migration, border and protection systems, these are not embedded within a wider framework of clear policy objectives. The absence of robust common policies has led to short-term restrictive measures and a race to the bottom, with member states trying to make their protection and social assistance systems less attractive to immigrants and refugees.

But a Europe in which each country only looks out for itself is a Europe that is doomed to fail. Nationalist populism cannot offer solutions for the future. It hampers progress and will prevent the development of effective approaches to dealing with the migration and protection challenges of the near future. The only way to guarantee a functioning migration management system is to implement future-orientated policies and structures at the EU level, embedded within the global objectives as set out by the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

To start with, there is a clear need to base Europe’s migration, integration and protection policies on understandable and actionable objectives. The European Commission should take the lead in formulating these objectives with the support of an advisory group comprised of migration experts, EU and member state officials, and representatives of both the private sector and civil society. This group’s work should include an assessment of demographic developments, an evaluation of future labour market needs, and consider various scenarios regarding the development of protection needs and systems. At the same time, there should be a careful examination of member states’ genuine absorption capacities and existing and expected integration challenges. There should be a sober evaluation of any potential security risks.

“There is a clear need to base Europe’s migration, integration and protection policies on understandable and actionable objectives”

More emphasis needs to be placed on explaining the EU’s functioning to the population – not just in the context of the migration discussion, but more generally too. The strengths, weaknesses and
responsibilities of national governments and European institutions need to be better understood if any healthy debate on Europe’s future is to emerge. European education systems, as well as
media organisations, should be used to bring Europe closer to the population, and provide for a debate based on facts instead of unfounded rumours or misguided criticism. With the possible exception of Euronews, the lack of a true European mass media currently limits the exposure to an alternative narrative on Europe, at a time when “experts” seem reviled.

Likewise, to develop sound migration policies, it’s important to depoliticise the topic of migration and arrive at a rational, fact-based discussion. Migration as a political issue has become inseparable from questions of security, integration and intangible values to such an extent that it has become difficult to coherently separate migration as a process and a debate from other, often unrelated, topics. Voters are mobilised around immigration as a hot-button topic – often without being exposed to the reality on the ground. Appealing to our humanitarian obligations is not enough; to move forward, Europe as a society needs an informed, honest and rational discourse on migration.

Politicians and the general public will need to accept that migration is an inextricable part of human development, and as such is unavoidable. Modern, open societies are best equipped to deal with this reality, whereas nationalist populism represents an illusion, tantamount to burying one’s head in the sand. Only once migration is an accepted fact, fully integrated along with globalisation into the political arena, can we start to devise functioning, democratically-legitimised and socially-accepted policies that are in step with broader global developments.

IMAGE CREDIT: hadrian/Bigstock.com

The post Europe’s failings start in national capitals. We need more solidarity and reason appeared first on Europe’s World.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part, on a Framework Agreement between the European Union and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria on the general principles for the participation of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria in Union programmes
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Pier Antonio Panzeri

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Today’s High Court ruling in Miller/dos Santos has provoked a flurry of reaction, across the board. To read the comments of some Remainers, this is the first step to reversing the referendum result and building a new, pro-EU consensus in the UK. For Leavers, it’s being called a travesty of democracy and justice.

As someone not (usually) prone to hyperbole, both positions strike me as unhelpful and wrong-headed. So let’s unpack a bit what’s what.

The case was launched on the basis that since leaving the EU would remove certain rights from the claimants, this needed the approval of Parliament, rather than just the executive submitting Article 50 notification. Both they and the Government took the position that starting Article 50 meant that the process was unstoppable (a view I’d disagree with).

The ruling has very much taken the line of the claimants and would seem to leave them with the whip hand when this goes to the Supreme Court, as the Government has indicated that it will appeal. A quick reading of the summary points to the limitations of royal prerogative powers and the centrality of Parliamentary sovereignty.

So what?

The case was only about the process by which Brexit happens: while some had talked in the immediate aftermath of the vote of taking the position that the referendum was only advisory, and that Parliament (with its large majority of pro-membership MPs) could overturn the result, that has very much faded…

There are various reasons for this. Most obviously, there has been a shift in political sensibilities now that there has been some reflection, and the idea that Parliament would sanction asking people for their opinion and then ignore it seems to fly in the face of popular democracy. Moreover, about 70% of constituencies had Leave majorities, so those thinking to be re-elected would be given a very big stick to their opponents.

Thus, even if the Government does lose its appeal, the result will be one where Parliament has to give its approval, which it will almost certainly so do. With a Supreme Court ruling possible by Christmas, that leaves enough time for a vote, even for an entire Bill. The latter would involve the Lords, who might delay a bit, but ultimately would be bound by the Parliament Acts, unless they wanted to shorten the path to their own reform.

There is a possible complication, should the Supreme Court decide to make a referral to the EU’s Court of Justice. This might be necessary if the reversibility of Article 50 became an issue, perhaps because the Government changed its position. However, even here the expedited process now available would allow for a three month turnaround, so the end-March deadline set by Theresa May is still possible. Which is good, because the thought of having to delay because of an ECJ ruling already drives Leavers wild with anger.

Of course, the irony in all this is that the entire case is about ensuring democratic oversight and control, the very agenda advanced by Leave. The key decision has already been taken, by the people in the referendum. Parliament cannot reasonably stand in its way, and the ECJ cannot do anything that impinges on the UK’s sovereign rights.

What might now change is the nature of the process.

Parliament might now get a vote, but it will also get a voice. It’s not hard to imagine pro-Remain Tories working with the opposition to demand much closer scrutiny and approval processes in the negotiations: the very ‘running commentary’ that has been so frequently held back. While the impact of that scrutiny might be weakened by the continued failure of the Labour party to work actively in holding the government to account, it is still something of value for the UK.

So the destination remains the same, but how we get there might be about to change.

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