European Union

Introduction 

1.           In accordance with the 15 December 2016 European Council Conclusions and guidance contained therein, the Council has reviewed progress in the implementation of its conclusions of 17 October and 14 November 2016. It welcomes the initial advances made, as set out below, in fulfilling through a comprehensive set of actions the EU's level of ambition derived from the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence. It calls for further work and guidance and agrees to revert to these matters in May, ahead of the June European Council. 

2.           The Council recalls that this should contribute to enhancing the Union's ability to act as a security provider and to enhance the Common Security and Defence Policy, as well as its global strategic role and its capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible. 

3.           The Council welcomes the ongoing work on the implementation of the European Defence Action Plan by the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States. It also welcomes the Commission's intention, included in its Communication dated 30 November 2016, to present further proposals in the first semester of 2017 for the establishment of a European Defence Fund including a window on the joint development of capabilities to be commonly agreed by the Member States, and a research window (whose first step is the launch of the Preparatory Action for defence-related research) to be examined under the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The Council recalls the invitation made by the European Council in December 2016 to the European Investment Bank to examine steps with a view to supporting investments in defence research and development activities.

The Council also reiterates, in line with its Conclusions of 14 November 2016, the need to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP and the development and maintenance of Member States' capabilities, supported by a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), which also contributes to jobs, growth and innovation across the EU and can enhance Europe's strategic autonomy, strengthening its ability to act with partners. The Council recalls that these efforts should be inclusive, with equal opportunities for defence industry in the EU, balanced and in full compliance with EU law. 

4.           The Council furthermore welcomes the swift action in follow-up to the Council conclusions of 6 December 2016 implementing all areas of the Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In this regard, it calls for further work, in full respect of the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and the autonomy of the EU's decision-making processes, and to report back on progress in June 2017.  

Improving CSDP crisis management structures 

5.           Today, the Council approves the Concept Note on the operational planning and conduct capabilities for CSDP missions and operations. Further to the December European Council Conclusions and in line with its Conclusions of November 2016, this Note contains measures to improve the EU's capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more seamless manner, building on existing structures and in view of enhancing civilian-military synergies, as part of the EU's Comprehensive Approach. On this basis, the Council agrees in particular: 

• To establish, as a short term objective, a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the EU Military Staff in Brussels which will be responsible at the strategic level for the operational planning and conduct of non-executive military missions, working under the political control and strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee. The newly created MPCC will work in parallel and in a coordinated way with the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).
• That the Director General of the EU Military Staff will be the Director of the MPCC and in that capacity will assume the functions of missions' commander for non-executive military missions, including the three EU Training Missions deployed in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia, in line with the agreed Terms of Reference.  
• To invite the High Representative to propose consolidated terms of reference of the EU Military Staff, as well as to propose a Council Decision reflecting the above arrangements and amending the Council Decisions of the CSDP missions concerned. 
• To bring together civilian and military expertise in key mission support areas within a Joint Support Coordination Cell at the Brussels level, in order to work on a daily basis to further strengthen and enable effective civilian/military coordination and cooperation in the operational planning and conduct of CSDP civilian and non-executive military missions. This would further contribute to the full implementation of the EU's Comprehensive Approach, while respecting the respective civilian and military chains of command and the distinct sources of financing. 
• To review the establishment of the MPCC and the Joint Support Coordination Cell one year after becoming fully operational, but no later than by the end of 2018, based on a report by the High Representative. This review should be prepared in full consultation with the Member States and would not prejudge any political decisions to be taken.  

The Council also agrees to proposals on strategic foresight and oversight contained in the Concept Note and requests the High Representative, in cooperation with the Commission as appropriate, to proceed with their implementation. 

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 

6.           To strengthen Europe's security and defence in today's challenging geopolitical environment, the Council agrees on the need to continue work on an inclusive Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) based on a modular approach. It should be open to all Member States who are willing to make the necessary binding commitments and meet the criteria, based on articles 42.6 and 46 and Protocol 10 of the Treaty. The Council recognises that PESCO could significantly contribute to fulfilling the EU's Level of Ambition including with a view to the most demanding missions and that it could facilitate the development of Member States' defence capabilities and strengthen European defence cooperation, while making full use of the Treaties. It notes that any capabilities developed through PESCO will remain owned and operated by Member States. It recalls that Member States have a single set of forces that they can use in other frameworks. Underlining the responsibility and competence of the Member States in the area of defence, it stresses that PESCO should help generate new collaborative efforts, cooperation and projects. 

7.           To this end, the Council invites the Member States, supported by the EEAS and the European Defence Agency (EDA), to continue working in order to further consider and develop: 

• An agreement on a shared understanding of the common commitments, goals and criteria on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Treaty, as well as the governance model. 
• The possible projects and initiatives that Member States are willing to pursue through PESCO including in a modular way and while making use of ongoing projects and making new commitments in the area of defence investment, with a view to tackling recognised shortfalls and addressing EU and Member States' priorities in the field of capabilities; improving the deployability and operational availability of their armed forces; and increasing their interoperability by pooling and sharing existing capabilities. 

This work would feed into the preparation of the notification to the Council and the High Representative and of the Council Decision establishing PESCO. 

8.           While noting that they are standalone initiatives, the Council underlines the need to reflect on the possible links between PESCO and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). The Council recognises that more work is needed to explore the potential link to the Commission's proposals to establish a European Defence Fund, including on how PESCO projects and initiatives could benefit from its mechanisms, which will be subject to further decisions to be taken on the setting up and final structure of the fund. 

9.           The Council agrees to revert in May 2017 in order to provide further political guidance on the possible decision-making. 

Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) 

10.        The Council welcomes the work launched to develop the principles and scope of a Member States-driven CARD to deepen cooperation in defence, including by fostering capability development addressing shortfalls, and ensure more optimal use, including coherence, of defence spending plans. It stresses the importance to develop through CARD a more structured way to deliver the key capabilities needed in Europe, based on greater transparency, political visibility and commitment from Member States, while avoiding any unnecessary additional administrative effort by Member States and EU institutions. The Council stresses the need to ensure coherence between the CARD and the NATO Defence Planning Process where requirements overlap while recognising the different nature of the two organisations and their respective responsibilities. The Council stresses that CARD, as an overarching tool, needs to build on and make best use of existing processes and tools and should draw as much as possible on available information generated through them. 

11.        The Council highlights that CARD would be implemented on a voluntary basis and in full respect of Member States' prerogatives and commitments in defence, including, where it applies, in collective defence, and their defence planning processes, and taking into account external threats and security challenges across the EU. 

 The Council stresses the importance of bringing greater transparency and political visibility to the European capability landscape. In this regard, it underlines that CARD should provide an overarching assessment on capability-related issues contributing to political guidance by the Council. The Council therefore underlines that CARD should help Member States deliver on critical capabilities notably on the basis of the capability priorities agreed through the EU's Capability Development Plan. It should also provide Member States with a forum for coordinating and discussing their national defence planning - including in terms of defence spending plans, taking into account the commitments made by the European Council in December 2016 - in a more structured way that builds on the voluntary measures set out in the Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation. While noting that they are standalone initiatives, the work on CARD should be undertaken in coherence with the implementation of the European Defence Action Plan. 

12.        The Council welcomes the idea of regular and dedicated meetings of Defence Ministers', initially every two years, and more frequently if so decided. The EDA should play a key role in CARD to provide the overarching objective assessment and supporting analysis in the form of a written report to Defence Ministers, while making full use of existing tools and acting also as CARD secretariat. 

13.        The Council agrees to the parameters of CARD set out above and invites the High Representative/Head of the Agency, in close cooperation with Member States, to develop more detailed proposals on the scope, methods and content of CARD by June, notably in terms of interaction with Member States, with a view to preparing the establishment of CARD by the end of 2017. The first full CARD should be implemented based notably on the revised Capability Development Plan priorities as well as other existing processes and tools as of 2018. 

Developing Civilian Capabilities 

14.        The Council underlines the importance of taking work forward swiftly on developing civilian capabilities. It agrees on the need to enhance responsiveness in order to ensure more effective, rapid and flexible deployment of civilian CSDP missions, which play an important role as a pillar of the EU's Comprehensive Approach. In this context, the Council notes ongoing discussions, including on a standing capacity, pre-configured specialised teams of experts and contingents of police and/or other professional categories, and revisiting the Civilian Response Team (CRT) mechanism. It requests the High Representative and, where relevant, the Commission, working together with Member States, to present concrete proposals to enhance responsiveness in view of their approval ahead of the June European Council. It also agrees on the need to further review the Feira priority areas of civilian CSDP missions. The Council underlines the importance of strengthened EU-UN synergies, compatibility and interoperability also in this field. It will revert to these issues in May. 

Implementation in various other areas 

15.        As an important contribution to allow the EU to provide capacity building in an effective, responsible and seamless way, the Council looks forward to the swift finalisation of legislative work on the proposal to amend the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The Council recalls its Conclusions of November 2016 about the need to fully cover all requirements to further support partner countries in preventing and managing crises on their own, including those in the context of non-executive CSDP missions. In this context, it calls to continue the ongoing preparatory work to identify the needs in the area of Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD). The Council reiterates the flexible geographical scope of CBSD and calls to identify and develop new projects. The Council further recalls its proposal to work on a dedicated instrument for providing capacity building. The Council will revert to CBSD in May 2017. 

16.        The Council welcomes the first reflections and looks forward to further work on strengthening the relevance, usability and deployability of the EU's Rapid Response toolbox including the EU Battlegroups - particularly to reinforce their modularity, their preparation and their effective financing. As part of this, further consideration should be given to the particular modalities and common costs and other financial provisions for rapid response operations in general and the EU Battlegroups in particular. 

The Council will revert to the issue in May based on consolidated proposals to be presented by the High Representative in close consultation with the Member States. Regarding their financial aspects, these proposals could contribute to the comprehensive review of the Athena mechanism foreseen by the end of 2017 and to be discussed in the relevant framework. 

17.        The Council reiterates the importance of working with its partners, in particular the UN, NATO, OSCE, African Union, League of Arab States and ASEAN, as well as strategic partners and other partner countries, within our neighbourhood and more globally, with due respect to the institutional framework and decision-making autonomy of the EU, and the principle of inclusiveness. In this regard, the Council recalls the need to take CSDP partnerships forward and invites the High Representative to present options before May 2017 for a more strategic approach to CSDP partners as set out in the November 2016 Council Conclusions. 

18.        The Council welcomes the review and organisational steps taken to promote an increased EU civil-military intelligence-based situational awareness to inform strategic foresight. It supports further steps to be taken in view of a future increase of staff, logistics and infrastructure, if deemed necessary, and will revert to the issue in June. 

19.        The Council, recalling the need for a timely implementation of the review of the Capability Development Plan by spring 2018, welcomes that the EDA is developing proposals on the improvement of the EU Capability Development process. In this regard, it also welcomes the ongoing work on the revision of the Requirements Catalogue. The work being taken forward by Member States within EDA on capability priorities, overarching R&T priorities and Key Strategic Activities will help to guide future investments and inform the implementation of the European Defence Action Plan. The Council further recalls the need for the expeditious implementation of actions taken forward within the EDA related to critical enablers and security of supply based on Member States' political commitments and programme/sector specific agreements. 

On 6 March the Council adopted conclusions setting out the progress achieved in implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence. The conclusions assess what has been done to implement  the various lines of action agreed by the European Council on 15 December 2016. They form the basis of a report for the European Council of 9 and 10 March 2017. 

"EU foreign and defence ministers meeting jointly today all gave a very clear message: we are progressing steadily towards strengthened defence cooperation and we will continue to do more. This is about protecting our citizens. The European Union has unique tools to help Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security, and to do more effectively.  This is what we are doing with our work in security and defence."

 Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

The Council also approved a concept note on the operational planning and conduct capabilities for CSDP missions and operations, which contains measures to improve the EU's capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more seamless manner, building on existing structures and in view of enhancing civilian-military synergies, as part of the EU's comprehensive approach. 

These measures include the establishment of a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC), within the existing EU Military Staff of the European External Action Service, for the planning and conduct of non-executive military missions. The Director General of the EU Military Staff will be the Director of the MPCC and in that capacity will assume command of non-executive military CSDP missions (currently, the EU military training missions in Somalia, in Central Africa and in Mali). This will allow the mission commanders in the field to concentrate on the specific activities of their mission, with better support provided from Brussels. 

The MPCC will work under the political control and strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed of EU member states' ambassadors and is based in Brussels. The MPCC will work closely with its existing civilian counterpart, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) through a joint support coordination cell. This cell will be able to share expertise, knowledge and best practices on issues relevant to  both military and civilian missions, as well as capabilities when civilian and military missions are simultaneously deployed in the same area, including  medical support or protective measures. 

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And yet. A few hours later Fillon was back on television, the most relaxed he has looked since the “fake jobs” scandal emerged. Withdraw? No way. He saw the difficulties, he said, but he was sure of one thing: “there is no alternative”. He would go on and on. The crowds were his validation. He had the primary votes, the legitimacy. His conscience was clear. Only he could decide to step aside; the party traitors could not force him out.

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On 6 March 2017, the Council adopted a decision on the signing of an agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Chile on trade in organic products. 

Thanks to the agreement, the EU and Chile will soon recognise the equivalence of their respective rules and control systems as regards organic production. In practice, this means that organic food that is produced in the EU and covered by the agreement will be able to be marketed in Chile without further controls. The same will apply to a number of Chilean organic products in the EU. 

The agreement will also provide for a system of co-operation, exchange of information and dispute settlement in organic trade. 

The organic sector is growing steadily and rapidly and is a great resource for European agriculture and the wider economy. This agreement with Chile will give a boost to EU organic production and exports, and so help generate growth and create jobs. The Council warmly welcomes it.

Roderick Galdes, Parliamentary Secretary for Agriculture, Fisheries, and Animal rights

This agreement with Chile aims at encouraging trade in organic products, thus contributing to the development of the organic sector in the EU. It also aims at improving protection for the respective organic logos, and enhancing regulatory cooperation between the EU and Chile on issues related to organic production. 

It will apply to EU organic products such as: unprocessed plant products, live animals or unprocessed animal products (including honey), aquaculture products and seaweeds, processed agricultural products for use as food (including wine), processed agricultural products for use as feed, vegetative propagating material and seeds for cultivation. 

On the other hand, the EU will recognise as equivalent the following products from Chile: unprocessed plant products, honey, processed agricultural products for use as food (including wine), vegetative propagating material and seeds for cultivation. 

The agreement with Chile is the first of the "new generation" agreements in trade in organic products and the first bilateral recognition with a Latin American country. 

Next steps 

On 6 March 2017 the Council adopted a decision on the signing of the EU-Chile agreement, and approved another decision on its actual conclusion.

The Council will now forward the draft decision on the conclusion of the agreement to the European Parliament for its consent, after which the Council will still have to formally adopt it.

The agreement will enter into force three months following the final notification of the completion of the necessary internal procedures by each contacting party.

The Council adopted EU Guidelines for the promotion and protection of the rights of the child. This 2017 version is a revision of the 2007 EU guidelines.   

The guidelines recall international standards on the rights of the child and provide comprehensive guidance as well as  concrete ways  to promote effectively  and protect the rights of the child. With these guidelines, the EU reaffirms its commitment to the comprehensive protection and promotion of the rights of the child in its external human rights policy. 

The Council adopted conclusions on EU climate and energy diplomacy as part of the implementation of the EU Global Strategy. The objective is to strengthen synergies and links between the relevant elements of EU climate diplomacy and energy diplomacy and to establish priorities for 2017. 

EU climate diplomacy focuses on the implementation of the Paris Agreement and climate security. EU energy diplomacy focuses on energy security and diversification. Energy and climate are closely linked: over 2/3 of greenhouse-gas emissions come from energy. Keeping the temperature rise well below 2°C depends on everyone making progress in global energy transition. 

As part of strengthening synergies between EU climate and energy diplomacies, the Council conclusions establish a number of actions, and set overall priorities for 2017.  

The year 2017 is widely seen as hugely important for European politics, with general elections in key European Union member states Germany and the Netherlands – and perhaps even in Italy – and presidential elections in France. Following the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote and the election of President Donald Trump in the United States, populist parties have a real chance of dominating the campaigns in all the aforementioned countries.

The country to kick of this string of elections is the Netherlands. General elections will take place on 15 March of this year and by the looks of it they may result in further fragmentation of the Dutch political landscape. Citizens can choose between no less than 28 parties, from established parties such as the Christian Democratic CDA, the Social Democratic PvdA, and the Liberal VVD, to relative newcomers such as the Party for the Animals, Jesus Lives and, of course, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom.

The Netherlands is one of the key examples of what political scientist Arend Lijphart has called a “consensus democracy”. Consensus democracies are characterised by multi-party systems and proportionate representation, with power being shared between different societal groups. The Dutch political process is shaped by broad agreements, consensus and coalitions, which should accommodate the wishes of political minorities. The period of pillarisation, lasting from approximately 1917 until halfway through the 1960s, represented the apex of Dutch consensus politics. During this period society was divided in four pillars (Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals) which had an impact on almost every aspect of life. Yet, even during the 1960s and 1970s, a period of de-pillarisation and increased polarisation, and later phases of more manifest political competition, a consensual approach has been at the centre of Dutch politics.

To this day, cabinet-formation as well as day-to-day politics requires coalitions. Collegial cabinets are responsible to and dependent on parliament. As a result, Dutch politicians have also been reluctant to consider the option of minority governments. One of the most prominent exceptions to this rule has been the CDA-VVD government, headed by Prime Minister Mark Rutte, which was dependent on support by Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom. The outgoing government is a coalition of PvdA and VVD, once again with Mark Rutte. This government has had a majority in the main chamber of parliament, the House of Representatives, but required support from other parties to reach a majority in the Senate which needs to approve legislation agreed upon in the House.

Voter turnout has always been quite high in the Netherlands: above 70% since the abolition of compulsory voting in 1970. Yet, as has been the case on other countries, electoral volatility has increased as ideology, class and religion have become less important and party membership decreased. The dominance of the traditional parties has declined since the 1960s and smaller parties, such as D66 (Social Liberals) and GroenLinks (Greens), have come to play a lasting role in Dutch politics. On top of this, new parties have entered the political scene since the early-2000s, typically characterised by more radical views and populist tactics that appeal to dissatisfied voters. Some newcomers, such as Pim Fortuyn’s populist-conservative LPF party, only managed to last a short time. Yet, Geert Wilders has enjoyed more or less continuous success since the mid-2000s.

Dutch coalition and consensus building – no piece of cake!

An extremely low electoral threshold of approximately 0.7% and a system of proportional representation in a single, nation-wide constituency explain why so many parties can achieve parliamentary representation. In addition, party splits and mergers have been numerous due to internal differences – since the 2012 elections, eight Members of Parliament left their party to form six new parliamentary groups, quite a few of which are now standing for election. The high number of parties with parliamentary representation is one of the main disadvantages of proportional representation, as it complicates political decision-making. Coalition governments are based on often very detailed coalition agreements. These agreements are often the result of lengthy negotiations, the longest having taken 208 days – nowhere near the Belgian record of 541 days, but still. The last one took 54 days.

This seems to make it more difficult for opposition parties to influence policymaking. Yet, they do actually have a say, for example in the drafting of legislation in parliamentary committees. Consequently, opposition parties regularly support government legislation. And even while the influence of some new parties has been modest, they may have a more lasting impact on the programmes of established political parties and on political discourse in general. This is due to the fact that throughout Dutch political history established parties often adopted the ideas of new parties. This then is the main draw of a system of proportional representation: it accommodates the views of a variety of groupings in a country that has always been one of relative minorities.

The latest polls suggest that 14 out of 28 parties may actually make it into parliament on 15 March. Polls also suggest a close race between PVV and VVD for the title of biggest party, with each now polling at approximately 17%. CDA, D66 and the Greens are all at 10-11%, followed by PvdA at approximately 8%. As nearly all parties have ruled out a coalition with Geert Wilders, it seems quite likely that the next government will be based on a coalition between 4 or more parties. So, expect to see a lengthy negotiation process in which parties with rather different programmes will have to come to an agreement. In the past Dutch politicians have proven to be able to tackle this challenge. And unless some parties withdraw on their pledges not to work with Geert Wilders, they have to.

The post Dutch coalition politics and the 2017 general elections appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The French take delight in pointing out that they are World Champions in producing political opinion polls (only to shake their heads in disbelief and despair about their own addiction). While the claim to this honorary title may not be corroborated by empirical data, it confirms the impression of saturation that a politically interested individual living in this country is inevitably bound to have at one point. There are not many democracies where you have, in addition to mainstream radio and TV, four full-fledged nation-wide 24/7 news channels, all available on free TV in all households, and all guilty of the deadly sin of poll gluttony.

These days, the avid consumption of all kinds of percentages and rates, figures and trends churned out by large variety of professional survey providers who virtually sit on each other within the small world of the Parisian media-microcosm, has something even more paradoxical than before. For having failed to predict several political results in the past, the polls are viewed with increasing distrust by the public, while in fact they have become more reliable than ever. As Gaël Sliman, long-standing pollster and founder-president of the dynamic newcomer Odoxa, pointed out to me recently, the whole industry has made tremendous progress not only in terms of methodology, but also with regard to sampling: ‘The samples have become much more representative of the population ; not only is there a lot less lying or holding back on the side of respondents, but in addition online paneling reaches the previously hidden groups’. So how does he explain the bad reputation of the surveys and the pollsters behind them? For him, it’s all a question of expectations:

Gaël Sliman, president and co-founder of ODOXA.

‘The French are extraordinarily interested in politics, more than other European populations. And they have extremely high expectations towards all things political. Which necessarily produces excessive disappointment at one point. In an ever more fragmented and unstable political landscape, they want to consult the polls as forecasts. But polls have never predicted the future! And they do so even less today, since the volatility of people’s opinion has increased dramatically’.

He is probably right. Take the presidential election, always held in April/May. The period of crystallization of the vote used to be around early February, when the campaign dynamics started to be clearly visible. This was the case for Hollande in 2012, Sarkozy in 2007, and even Chirac in 2002. Some may argue that in 2002 no one had seen Le Pen coming, but that’s only partly true: one of the pollsters had informed Jospin’s campaign staff about the danger of a perceptible movement, only to be willingly ignored…)

This being said, the reliability/distrust paradox is only one of the French polling paradoxes. Another one is that precisely at the moment where all candidates exhort the public not to trust the polls – which will never be able to capture the mood and the swelling dynamics ‘on-the-ground’, like Fillon repeated over and over again during the primaries campaign, before getting completely out of touch himself with the ‘on-the-ground mood’ once convicted of flagrant nepotism – the survey results are likely to have more influence on the elections than ever.

This paradox is due to both the electoral system and the emergence of the extreme right. Traditionally, as the saying went, the French voted, in accordance with their political ideas, in favour of a candidate at the first round of the presidential election, before voting against the bigger evil in the second round. Today, if three quarters of the population wish to avoid ‘La Présidente’ Marine Le Pen, citizens cannot help but think ‘strategically’ and give their vote to the candidate best placed to be sure to beat her.

Gaël Sliman has doubts about this theory. He believes that polls are ‘just one parameter in the decision-making among many’, though they may have a ‘stronger impact on those who hesitate between two candidates and cannot make up their mind’. One way or another, even those who use the polls to orient their own choice are likely to end up disappointed by the ‘false predictions’ they interpreted into the figures despite better knowledge.

But disappointment on every level is in the genes of the Fifth Republic. The hopelessly binary, antagonistic election campaign induces candidates to engage in promises both they and their electorate know they will be unable to keep. But given the aura of excessive power and prestige of the President, both the candidates and the electorate push each other invariably towards gross exaggeration in both promises and expectations. Once the inebriation with grand schemes is over and hangover sets in, both are set for five years of coexistence between a naked king and, as Gaël Sliman puts it very nicely, ‘a people of frustrated regicides’ (a formula I would have loved to invent myself…).

And as soon as the frustration sets in – at the latest in the autumn of election year – the only thing that brings comfort is the steadily decreasing popularity rates in these damned, beloved polls!

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 13 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: Polling paradoxes appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Albania is a candidate country following the Brussels European Council of June 2014. The country became a potential candidate country for EU accession following the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003. On 18 February 2008 the Council adopted a new European partnership with Albania. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)  with the country entered into force on 1 April 2009.

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REPORT on the 2016 Commission Report on Montenegro
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Charles Tannock

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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DRAFT REPORT on addressing human rights violations in the context of war crimes, and crimes against humanity, including genocide
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Cristian Dan Preda

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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EU Ministers of Employment, Social Affairs, Consumer Protection, Health and Equal Opportunities (EPSCO) meet on 3 March 2017 in Brussels to hold a policy debate on an amended regulation on the coordination of social security systems. Ministers are also holding a policy debate on European Semester 2017.

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The Informal Meeting of EU Trade Ministers takes place on 3 March 2017 in Valletta.

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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The Swedish government has decided to reintroduce military conscription, abolished in 2010. It means that 4,000 men and women will be called up for service from 1 January 2018, selected from about 13,000 young people born in 1999, who will be asked to undergo a military assessment. The 13,000 who undergo the military tests will be a mixture of volunteers and conscripts. The Swedish recruitment system will be modelled on Norway's. In September, a Swedish garrison was restored to Gotland, a big island lying between the Swedish mainland and the three ex-Soviet Baltic states.

The return to conscription was prompted by the security change in the neighbourhood, Russian "illegal" annexation of Crimea[in 2014, the conflict in Ukraine and the increased military activity in the area. Russian menace pushes Sweden towards NATO, Swedish officials say Russian military aircraft frequently infringe Swedish airspace. 70% of the Swedish parliament is behind the decision to strengthen the military and co-operation with the countries around. The closest co-operation is with Finland, she added. Sweden and Finland are not in NATO, but co-operate closely with the alliance. Their Nordic neighbours Norway and Denmark are in NATO. Sweden has about 52,000 full-time military personnel - 20,000 of them permanent staff and most of the others Home Guard members.

Which other European countries have conscription?
Most of the 28 EU member states abolished military conscription. France and the UK - the main pillars of NATO defence in Western Europe - made their armed forces fully professional (France in 2001, the UK in 1963). Germany suspended conscription in 2011, but provision for it remains in the constitution. There is a debate now about reintroducing some form of national service.
Turkey has the second-largest armed forces in NATO, after the US military. Turkey has conscription for all men over the age of 20. They must serve between six and 15 months.
Greece has compulsory military service (9 months) for men from the age of 19. Cyprus - a longstanding source of Greek-Turkish tension - also has conscription.
Denmark, Norway and Finland have limited conscription, but their forces are overwhelmingly professional. Estonia and Lithuania - small Baltic states wary of Russian moves near their borders - have similar recruitment policies.
Switzerland operates a militia system, whereby men have to serve periods in the armed forces from 19 to 34 years of age, and keep their equipment at home.
In Russia all men aged 18-27 have to spend a year in the armed forces and Ukraine brought back conscription in 2014, when tensions with Russia escalated.

Which other East or Nord European countries, near to Russia or Ukraine, will also choice the same u-turn like Sweden?

Source : BBC.com

Tag: Military conscriptionSwedenNATO

General : "Brexit will be a particular challenge for Ireland and its people," said Parliament President Antonio Tajani after welcoming Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny to the Parliament on 2 March. Tajani also expressed his "understanding for the deep political and economic ties that link Ireland and the UK”. Describing Ireland “as a small European country that has been transformed by its EU membership”, Kenny stressed the “fundamental role" that the European Parliament would play in any Brexit deal.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : "Brexit will be a particular challenge for Ireland and its people," said Parliament President Antonio Tajani after welcoming Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny to the Parliament on 2 March. Tajani also expressed his "understanding for the deep political and economic ties that link Ireland and the UK”. Describing Ireland “as a small European country that has been transformed by its EU membership”, Kenny stressed the “fundamental role" that the European Parliament would play in any Brexit deal.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : Ever since the Brexit referendum EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals living in other EU countries face uncertainty about their ability to stay where they are. The British government has so far refused to guarantee the rights of EU nationals. Following reports of administrative barriers, MEPs are increasingly concerned that EU citizens’ right to stay in the UK are not being fully respected. They held a debate on the issue on 1 March and will also organise hearings to gather evidence.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : Ever since the Brexit referendum EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals living in other EU countries face uncertainty about their ability to stay where they are. The British government has so far refused to guarantee the rights of EU nationals. Following reports of administrative barriers, MEPs are increasingly concerned that EU citizens’ right to stay in the UK are not being fully respected. They held a debate on the issue on 1 March and will also organise hearings to gather evidence.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP