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A "new model of great power relations" sounds innocent enough. So why won't American policymakers say it?

Azerbaijan's Defense Minister, colonel-general Zakir Hasanov met ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of Belarus in our country Gennady Ahramovich on September 22.

FP contributor Elizabeth Dickinson and Yemeni activist Farea al-Muslimi on the reach of Riyadh and how the West could actually help.

KÉZILABDA

18.00, M4: Dunaújváros–Ferencváros (női NB I., 6. forduló).

LABDARÚGÁS

Angol ligakupa, 3. forduló: Tottenham–Arsenal (20.45, Arena Sport 1, Digi Sport 2), Walsall–Chelsea (21.00, Arena Sport 3).

Francia élvonal, 7. forduló: Troyes–Saint-Étienne, Lorient–Caen, Gazélec Ajaccio–Rennes, Nice–Bordeaux, Lyon–Bastia (19.00, Arena Sport 3), Toulouse–Marseille (21.00).

Német élvonal, 6. forduló: Schalke–Eintracht (F), Bayer (L)–Mainz, Borussia (M)–Augsburg, Hannover–Stuttgart, Hoffenheim–Borussia (D) (20.00, Eurosport2).

Olasz élvonal, 5. forduló: Capri–Napoli, Chievo–Napoli, Fiorentina–Bologna, Inter–Hellas Verona (Arena Sport 2), Juventus–Frosinone (Arena Sport 5), Lazio–Genoa, Palermo–Sassuolo, Sampdoria–Roma (20.45, Arena Sport 4, Digi Sport 1).

Spanyol élvonal, 5. forduló: Celta Vigo–Barcelona (Sportklub 3, Sport1), Levante–Eibar, Rayo Vallecano–Sporting Gijón (20.00), Athletic Bilbao–Real Madrid (21.00, Sportklub 1, Sport2), Las Palmas–Sevilla (Sport1), Málaga–Villarreal (22.00, Sportklub 3).

15.00, Arena Sport 2: Panathinaikosz–Levadiakosz (görög élvonal, 4. forduló).

18.30, Arena Sport 1: Partizan–Rad (szerbiai szuperliga, a 6. fordulóból halasztott mérkőzés).

TENISZ

11.00, Eurosport: ATP Szentpétervár.

14.00, Sportklub 1: ATP Metz.

VÍZILABDA

20.00, M4: Eger–Miskolc (férfi OB I., 1. forduló).

President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev has congratulated the people of Azerbaijan in occasion of Eid al-Adha.

September 22, 2015 (KHARTOUM) – The Sudanese government disclosed on Tuesday that it has been unable to raise its production of oil due to the global slide in crude prices.

FILE- A December 27 , 2012 file photo shows Sudan's President Omer Hassan al-Bashir (C) inaugurating the Hadida oil field located on the border between East Darfur state and South Kordofan, the country's main oil-producing area (AFP/Getty Images)

Sudan has been pushing hard to increase its oil production particularly after the secession of South Sudan in 2011 taking with it about 75% of the country's oil reserves.

The minister of oil Mohammed Zayed said that oil companies are reluctant to fix damaged wells in light of the dramatic decrease in world oil prices and the need for injecting more capital for repairment.

He said that the steep decline in oil prices from $110 a barrel last year to $47 has disrupted the economies of production for these companies.

Zayed declared that the government reached series of understandings with these companies on measures that would help raise oil production such as reducing production costs leading to improved profit margins.

"You can undertake simple processes to boost oil production by 10,000 barrels per day," he said.

Last May Sudan said it hoped to increase the daily oil production from 120,000 barrels per day to 150,000.

(ST)

Au Congo-Brazzaville, l'administration électorale a lancé mardi 22 septembre une opération de révision des listes électorales dans la perspective de la présidentielle de 2016. La durée de cette opération qui s'arrête le 26 septembre est jugée « trop courte » par l'opposition qui pense également que la matrice de ces listes, tirée du recensement spécial de 2013, est elle-même « fausse ». Dans le même temps, Denis Sassou-NGuesso a annoncé l’imminence d’un référendum pour modifier la Constitution afin qu’il puisse briguer un nouveau mandat.

September 22, 2015 (KHARTOUM) - European Union (EU) ambassadors in Khartoum called upon the Sudanese government to conduct an independent investigation into the deadly protests of September 2013.

People look on as cars are set alight during protests over fuel subsidy cuts in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, on 25 September 2013 (Photo: Reuters)

Demonstrations broke out in several Sudanese states that month following the government's decision to lift fuel subsidies. Rights groups said that at least 200 people were killed but the government put the death toll at 85.

Following a wave of criticism, Sudanese authorities said they formed a commission of inquiry into the protests which were the deadliest of their kind against the regime.

However, the findings of the investigation are yet to be revealed.

Last month, the Sudanese president Omer Hassan al-Bashir directed the Ministry of Justice to compensate the families of victims of the protests.

EU mission in Khartoum said in a statement Tuesday that envoys of EU countries in Sudan have recently discussed the protests which erupted in September 2013.

“Ambassadors of EU countries have welcomed the government decision to compensate families of the victims and noted that justice couldn't only be achieved by financial reparations”, the statement reads.

The statement added that Sudanese authorities are still far from conducting an effective and independent inquiry into the killings and other human rights violations which took place during the protests.

The EU ambassadors further renewed their call to the Sudanese government to conduct an independent investigation that holds the perpetrators fully accountable for their acts.

Earlier this month, the Chairman of the Security and Defense subcommittee in the Sudanese parliament and head of the investigation committee Ahmed Imam al-Tuhami, said that losses resulting from vandalism during the protests are estimated at 30 billion pounds (SDG).

He added that several cases have been filed by families of victims against policemen accusing them of opening fire on the protestors.

Al-Tuhami pointed out that the protests were carried out by students and ordinary citizens against lifting fuel subsidies, saying those protestors didn't involve in the looting and vandalism.

“However, some saboteurs [protestors] took advantage of the protests to carry out acts of looting and theft”, he said.

(ST)

Des militaires aidés par des membres d'un comité de défense ont déjoué mardi un attentat-suicide dans la ville de Mora. Une ville encore sous le choc du double attentat dont elle avait été la cible dimanche dernier, et qui avait fait 5 morts. Mardi 22 septembre toujours, et dans la même zone, des militaires camerounais ont repoussé une incursion d'éléments de Boko Haram dans la localité d'Amchide. Les combats ont fait une quinzaine de morts dans les rangs des islamistes.

September 22, 2015 (JUBA) – The death toll from last week's oil tanker fire at Maridi in South Sudan's Western Equatoria state has reached 203, the health minister disclosed.

Riek Gai Kok said more than 90 other people were nursing wounds in hospitals.

“We are providing the best medical assistance that we can and some of the wounded are being transferred to Juba,” said Kok.

The oil tanker veered off road while traveling from Juba to Yambio, some 250 km west of the capital, last week. The leaking fuel attracted huge crowds of villagers to siphon oil.

South Sudan observed three days of national mourning to remember the victims while the national assembly set up a committee to investigate the cause of the explosion.

Kok, who met president Salva Kiir this week, described the inferno as a “national tragedy.”

(ST)

September 22, 2015 (JUBA) - South Sudanese army (SPLA) has announced on Tuesday that the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF), which have been fighting alongside forces loyal to president Salva Kiir against opposition faction led by former vice president, Riek Machar, will start to withdraw from the country next week.

A contingent of soldiers from the Ugandan People's Defence Force (Photo courtesy of New Vision)

“It has been agreed that up to the 10th of October, the UPDF forces will be out of the country. The timeline of their withdrawal is stated between 27th, up to 10th of October,” Lieutenant General Malek Ruben, deputy chief of general staff for logistics,” announced on Tuesday.

According to the recently signed peace agreement to end the 21-month long civil war, all foreign forces allied to both the government and the opposition sides are supposed to leave the country within 45 days after the signing of the peace agreement.

Besides UPDF, Sudanese rebel forces inside South Sudan will be demobilized and repatriated back to Sudan in accordance with the peace deal.

UPDF came to the country in December 2013 when political differences over reforms within the leadership of the governing Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) turned violent.

The initial objective on deployment of the Ugandan troops was to evacuate Ugandan nationals in South Sudan from the country and provide protection to key installations and institutions, including the airports in Juba and other hot spot areas of the country. However, UPDF later on directly interfered in military combat against the rebels.

The foreign troops' withdrawal from the country was always one of the contentious matters at the start of negotiations, but General Ruben told reporters on Tuesday that the issue was resolved during the discussions at the ceasefire workshop attended by the commanders from the warring sides last week in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. This is also in accordance with implementation of the security arrangements as provided for in the peace agreement.

Ugandan forces for the past 21 months of the war have been providing partial defence of the national capital, Juba, and the neighbouring Jonglei state's capital, Bor, and have used superiority of their military hardware including air force in which it has been accused of dropping cluster bombs on rebel forces.

The military officer, however, pointed out that Ugandan troops deployed in Western Equatoria state will not be removed, because they are under a separate arrangement.

“The ones of Western Equatoria are not affected within this agreement; it's a quadruple arrangement connecting Central Africa Republic, South Sudan, Uganda and Congo plus the American forces,” he said.

“These are in pursuit of the Regional Alliance Strategic Agreement to pursue the LRA [Lord's Resistance Army],” he added.

(ST)

September 22, 2015 (KHARTOUM) - President Omer Hassan al-Bashir Tuesday has pardoned rebel leaders who participate in the national dialogue conference, and declared a two-month ceasefire in war areas.

Sudanese President Omer Hassan al-Bashir (Photo AFP/Ashraf Shazly)

According to the official news agency (SUNA) Tuesday, Bashir issued a republican decree granting general amnesty for the leaders and members of the armed movements taking part in the national dialogue conference. Also, he issued another decree declaring a two-month cease fire in the battlefronts.

The national dialogue conference is scheduled for 20 October 2015.

Several rebel members and leaders including the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/North (SPLM-N) chairman Malik Agar and secretary-general Yasser Arman have been sentenced to death by Sudanese courts.

The two decrees come after a pledge al-Bashir during the opening session of the national dialogue's general assembly last August in which he expressed readiness to declare a two-month cease fire in order to hold the dialogue in a healthy atmosphere and high patriotism.

The Sudanese army has been fighting SPLM-N rebels in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states since 2011 and the armed movements in Darfur since 2003.

Bashir launched the national dialogue initiative in January 2014 but the process suffered major setbacks after the withdrawal of the opposition National Umma Party (NUP) and the non-participation of the rebels as well as leftist forces.

The SPLM-N, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM) recently expressed willingness to sign a cessation of hostilities with the government for six months if the government commits itself to the pre-dialogue meeting as provided in an African Union's roadmap to facilitate the internal process.

Besides the end of war, the African roadmap includes the implementation of other confidence building measures such as ensuring political freedoms, humanitarian access and release of political detainees and prisoners.

(ST)

September 22, 2015 (WAU) - The health ministry in South Sudan's Western Bahr el Ghazal state has distributed protein foods to more than 300 malnourished children.

The new women's maternity ward at the Wau teaching hospital in South Sudan's Western Bahr el Ghazal state was officially opened by president Salva Kiir on 15 July 2014 (ST)

Thomas Gabriel, the outpatient's program manager at Wau teaching hospital, said five distribution centres were established in Lokoloko, Hai Dinka, Jeb Kheer and Bazia Jadid.

The centres have been earmarked to cater for over 300 children lacking food nutrition.

“We at the hospital here are controlling malnourishment, which occurred to children under 6-59 months with an initiative of giving plumy and milk to the children,” he said.

Wau hospital alone, Gabriel further disclosed, currently hosts 154 malnourished children.

He also said that the health ministry was currently introducing health education to the mothers handling children to ensure they handle the distributed items responsibly.

“Plumy nut is an unmixed food, but mainly a multi treatment [administered] to children facing malnourish. We want to tell our people that we are not giving out food but we are giving out treatment to such children. This is because many people are coming in look for plumy nut as food and this is not a case,” Gabriel told Sudan Tribune.

He advised mothers not to sell the plumy nut in markets and instead feed their children.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) funded the program in collaboration with the state government.

(ST)

Pope Francis may be the people’s pontiff. But he’s also here on a mission to evangelize.

A feltételezhető késésről a NASA illetékesei beszéltek ezen a héten szerdán, miután az űrügynökségnél az elmúlt hetekben részletesen áttekintették a projekt állását. Bár a 2021. augusztusi céldátumot hivatalosan még nem adták fel, nagyobb (pontosan 70%-os) esélyt látnak arra, hogy az Orion első emberes próbarepülése csak 2023 áprilisában valósul meg. A A cikk folytatása …

Tovább….: http://www.magyarszo.com/hu/2836/Kozelet_Tudomany_es_technika/133007/K%C3%A9t-%C3%A9vet-k%C3%A9shet-az-Orion.htm

      

Brazzaville - Le président de la République du Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, a annoncé mardi soir son intention de soumettre à référendum un projet de nouvelle constitution susceptible de lui permettre de briguer un nouveau mandat.

Americas

• Lockheed Martin unveiled its bid for the Marines’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle 1.1 program on Tuesday. The USMC released an engineering & manufacturing development (EMD) Request for Proposals in April, with the program intended to supply the next generation of armored ‘connector’ vehicles for the Marine Corps. Two designs are to be down-selected later this year, with five companies (ADVS, BAE Systems, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin and SAIC) currently offering up designs.

• Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is reported to be planning a purchase of a dozen Su-30 fighters, along with equipment from China. The Venezuelan Air Force operates 23 Su-30MK2 multirole fighters, following a crash of one of these last week. Speaking at a ceremony to mark the loss, Maduro stated that he would talk with Vladimir Putin to acquire a replacement for the lost Su-30 as well as the twelve new fighters. The aircraft in service were procured from Russia as part of a $3 billion arms sale, following a refusal by then-President George Bush to sell replacement parts for the country’s fleet of F-16s.

Europe

• The Dutch Defense Ministry has penned an agreement with engine-manufacturer Pratt & Whitney for a Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul & Upgrade workshop in the south of the country to support future F-35 operations. The company’s F-135 engine powers the F-35, with the new workshop at the Royal Netherlands Air Force’s Woensdrecht Logistics Centre set to become a dedicated engine support facility from 2019. The country was selected by the DoD in December to support F-35 heavy engine maintenance, along with Norway and Turkey, and placed its first order for eight F-35A fighters in March.

• The Norwegian government announced on Monday that the country has partnered with Australia to finance the development a new RF seeker for the Kongsberg Joint Strike Missile (JSM), with the long-range air-to-ground missile scheduled for integration with the F-35. BAE Australia will design and integrate the new seeker, which will provide the JSM with a dual-seeker capability alongside its current imaging target seeker. The agreement plans for the cost of this integration to be split if Australia decides to purchase the Joint Strike Fighter. The two countries have been developing the JSM for a while, announcing in February their intention to adapt the JSM to fit into the F-35A’s slim internal weapons bay.

• Meanwhile, Norwegian defense officials reiterated their commitment to the procurement of up to 52 F-35s, citing Russian power projection in Northern Europe as a reason to press ahead with the acquisition. The first F-35 deliveries to Norway are expected in 2017, with Initial Operating Capability expected two years later. The Norwegians opted to buy the F-35A in 2013, after the Lockheed Martin jet beat off competition from an upgraded version of Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen. The first F-35 manufactured for the Norwegian Armed Forces was rolled out by Lockheed Martin on Tuesday.

• The UK’s Ministry of Defence is reportedly set to launch a tender for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) robots, with this estimated to value up to $124 million. The tender, covering a base of 56 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and an option for a further 30, will see an Invitation to Tender (ITT) released by the end of 2015.

• MBDA and BAE Systems have agreed to a marketing partnership for the latter’s advanced precision kill weapon system (APKWS) in an aim to flag the system to European customers. MBDA will lead the marketing charge for the APKWS in Europe, with the system developed by BAE Systems’ US subsidiary. The system bolts onto unguided 70mm rockets to transform them into a low-cost laser-guided weapon, which has been integrated with several platforms in the US inventory, including the Cobra and Huey helicopters, Apache AH-64D and A-10.

Middle East North Africa

• With the number of Russian fixed-wing aircraft thought to have been deployed to Latakia, Syria now reaching 28, (including Su-24s, Su-25s and Su-30s), reports emerged on Tuesday that Russia has also supplied the Assad regime with at least five new aircraft. It is also thought that Russian forces have begun to operate from other areas, establishing two new forward operating bases according to the WSJ. Reports from last week indicated that the Syrian air force has also begun using more precise weapons, also the likely result of an arms transfer from Russia. Syria has operated Russian platforms for years; in August Turkish media reported that six MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors had been delivered to the Syrian regime, as part of a 2007 contract.

Asia & Pacific

• India’s Cabinet Committee of Security has cleared the procurement of 22 AH-64E Apache and 15 CH-47F Chinook helicopters in a deal estimated to value $2.5 billion. Headed by Prime Minister Modi, the CCS’ clearance paves the way for a contract within months, following years of delays to the deal owing to disputes over offset arrangements. The price quoted for the helicopters by manufacturer Boeing was extended for a tenth time in July, with this price guaranteed to the end of September. The Apache and Chinook helicopters beat out the Russian Mi-28N and Mi-26 respectively, with India currently operating an aging fleet of Hind helicopters.

• Indonesian officials will meet their Russian counterparts later this month to discuss a possible acquisition of Su-35 multi-role fighters. The country has been looking to buy the Russian fighter for a while, with the Indonesian Air Force already operating earlier Su-27 models. Reports in the Indonesian press indicate that the government is planning to acquire half a squadron of Su-35s initially, with further orders planned to phase-out ageing F-5 Tiger fighters.

Today’s Video

• Fast-roping with a GoPro:

SU-30, armed
(click to view full)

There have been a series of reports from a number of sources that Venezuela has finalized a deal with Russian arms manufacturers. Those reports have now shifted the total from $1 billion to around $3 billion, and expand its focus beyond SU-30MK2 (Mnogofunktzionniy Komercheskiy 2-seat) long-range multi-role fighters and various Russian helicopters to include other equipment as well. The final deal is reportedly still being negotiated.

Russian deals are extremely non-transparent, and often there are conflicting reports with no official confirmation of announced reports or additional details released. Based on news reports from various sources, however, here’s what DID can tell you about the likely shape of the deal and the nature of the equipment in question, aside from the USA’s predictably futile requests that Russia not go through with the sale.

DID’s coverage today includes updated information regarding the deal, and adds sources that have emerged sicce this article was first published on July 24, 2006. The latest news is the claimed crash of a Mi-35 – but DID explains why that story may be problematic…

• Venezuela-Russia 2006: Deal, Updated
  
• The Fighters: Sukhoi’s SU-30MK2s
  
• The Helicopters: Plans for 33 Coming to Fruition?
  
• Venezuela-Russia 2006: Follow-on Events & Milestones [NEW]
  
• Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (July 31/06)
  

Veneuela-Russia 2006: Deal, Updated “You want WHAT!?!”

The Vedomosti business daily quotes Rosoboronexport’s CEO Sergei Chemezov claiming that Venezuela would sign deals worth $3 billion. On top of an expected deal to buy at least 24 Russian Sukhoi-30 jets, reports said Chavez will buy helicopters (up to 53 helicopters has been suggested), surface-to-air missiles and possibly even a submarine.

Kommersant’s hilarious July 28, 2006 article “The Kalashnikov Buyer” is an instructive tale of cultural mismatches at the highest levels of diplomacy. It also includes additional details re: the structure of Venezuela’s weapons purchases:

• 38 Russian military helicopters for $484 million, deal signed on July 15 (38 + 15 previously-ordered = 53). Types not broken down, but a RIA Novosti article on July 31 cited them as Mi-17V5 and Mi-35Ms only – no more Mi-26s;

• 24 Su-30MK planes, deal signed on July 17 (RIA Novosti would later say SU-30MK2 on July 31).

Kommersant adds:

“A high Kremlin source said that new shipments of weapons were discussed at yesterday’s talks. “Work in that direction is continuing,” the source said.

It can be suggested with great confidence that they are now talking about medium-range ballistic missiles. In addition, Venezuela dreams of conquering space. Chavez considers it his duty to launch the first Venezuelan into space (as if he wouldn’t go himself). Russian specialists understandably want it to be a commercial launch but, unfortunately, it will be a political decision.”

While DID respects Kommersant’s superior local sources, we would suggest that armored vehicles, surface-air missiles, and submarines are far more likely buys. Russia has learned a thing or two about medium range ballistic missiles and Latin American countries over the last century, and is unlikely to repeat the experience. Nor is it wise to sell a potentially lucrative repeat buyer the defense procurement equivalent of a hara-kiri kit.

The Fighters: Sukhoi’s SU-30MK2s FAV SU-30MK2
(click to view full)

DID has covered Venezuela’s thwarted $100 million attempt to upgrade its 1980s-vintage F-16s with more modern systems, which failed thanks to US pressure on Israel to abandon the sale. Long before that setback, however, Venezuela had also been talking about buying Russian fighters. Most speculation concerned the MiG-29, but some reports mentioned the much larger, longer-range, and more expensive SU-30s. There was even some talk about Chinese J-10s. Meanwhile, as DID pointed out, spare parts were still being delivered to keep its F-16A/B fleet operational.

While reports vary, it seems apparent that Venezuela has now bought between 24-30 SU-30MK2s, a multi-role 2-seat variant with substantial air-air and air-ground capabilities. The SU-30MK2 is not the most advanced Russian fighter developed; it lacks the canard foreplanes or thrust vectoring of more advanced variants like India’s SU-30MKI, or Sukhoi’s new variants the SU-34 strike aircraft or SU-37 fighter that are waiting for procurement orders. Having said that, SU-30MK2s as a base platform are the equal of China’s most advanced SU-30MKKK2s, and equal to or better than most SU-30 variants currently serving in Russia.

DID would add that the likely contract value is over $1 billion, as these aircraft traditionally sell for about $60 million per aircraft, and support deals also factor in. A sale of 24 aircraft at $60 million each is $1.44 billion all by itself. Hopefully, future reports will bring some clarity to this aspect [N.B. They are beginning to, suggesting that the purchase will be more like $3 billion].

SU-30MK2 Ordnance –
from Sukhoi
(click to view full)

One-one-one, and with other things being equal (both of which rarely apply in tactical situations), the SU-30s match up well against US aircraft. Where the US “teen series” fighters like the F-16, F-18 and F-15 are built around 1970 designs, the Sukhoi jets are late 1980s designs that apply many of the lessons from America’s teen series aircraft, plus some of their own twists. The result is an improved airframe with a large and capable radar and a higher-performance design; one capable of unique maneuvers and remarkably adaptable to modernization via canards, thrust vectoring, and other advanced features. Indeed, Sukhoi’s fighters have become the baseline against which most twin-engine western fighters are measured. Their only major weakness is the design’s inherent lack of stealth.

In air-to-air combat, many observers[1] consider the SU-30 to be superior to both the F/A-18 and F-15 variants, on even footing with the Rafale, outclassed by the Eurofighter, and very much outclassed by the stealthy F-22A. In terms of air-ground combat, however, their range, payload, and performance means their only western equal may be the F-15E+ Strike Eagle variants, with the F-22A excelling the SU-30s in specific missions like air defense suppression but unable to carry their weight or versatility of armament.

With that said, one should add that the fighter sale is only the first part of any military capability. Venezuela’s SU-30 fleet will depend on advanced missiles like the short-range AA-11/R-73 Archer and long-range AA-12/R-77 ‘AMRAAMski’ to give it real air-air punch – modern SU-30s include the ability to fire the R-77s in addition to the older R-27/AA-10 Alamo. In the strike role, possession of smart bombs and missiles (esp. antiship missiles) will make a significant different to the fighters’ full striking power. Paying attention to whether or not Venezuela buys those “ancillaries,” therefore, is as important as the aircraft sale itself.

The Helicopters: Plans for 33 Coming to Fruition? AEV Mi-17V5
(click to view full)

In 2005, Venezuela signed a $201 million contract for 15 Russian helicopters. According to Novosti, the deal consisted of 6 Mi-17 (probably Mi-17v5) “Hip” armed troop transports and 8 Mi-35M2 “Pirana” armored helicopter gunships. The Piranas are a modernized version of the “Mi-24 Hinds” used by the Soviets in Afghanistan, with a Venezuelan name and improved day/night capabilities, avionics, and weapons. One super-giant Mi-26T “Halo” transport and cargo helicopter was also included.

According to MosNews, Army commander Gen. Raul Baduel said in April 2006 that the military planned to buy a total of 20 Mi-17s, 10 Mi-35s and 3 super-giant Mi-26T helicopters from Russia. “This year, we should have 15 helicopters of the 33 that are expected in our country,” Baduel reportedly told state television. This was close, but Moscow Defence Brief would later report that:

Mi-35M Pirana
(click to view full)

“[On the eve of a July 2006 state visit] a new contract for 18 helicopters was signed, including 14 Mi-17B5, two Mi-35M and two Mi-26T. In addition, it appears as though another contract for the delivery of 20 Mi-17, including two VIP versions, was agreed upon. The cost of all 38 helicopters amounts to $484 million. Thus, the total size of Venezuela’s helicopter programs, which includes the delivery of 40 Mi-17, 10 Mi-35M and three Mi-26T amounts to $685 million.”

With many reports of the fighter deal also referring to “30 helicopters” and only $1 billion given as the deal figure, DID considers it likely that the deal actually involves buying the additional 14 armed Mi-17V5s, 2 Mi-35 gunships, and 2 Mi-26T machines to round out Venezuela’s purchase target [N.B. newly-reported deal figures of $3 billion may change this assessment, and there are reports of 38 new helicopters in the deal].

AEV’s Mi-26T
(click to view full)

The Mi-26T is the world’s largest helicopter, with a 20-tonne (44,000 pound) capacity that matches a C-130 Hercules medium transport plane. It is excellent for handling oversize loads, and some Russian and Ukranian Mi-26s have even been contracted by US CENTCOM to perform missions that need their unique capabilities. Venezuelan Mi-26Ts could well find infrastructure-related employment in the country’s oil and gas industry, or on the 6,000-8,000 mile Latin American pipeline that occupies Chavez’ fancies.

Of course, a quick conversion also allows this helicopter to carry up to 80 troops, or a mix of troops and small armored vehicles. It just can’t carry them to the same kinds of ranges managed by smaller American choppers like the CH-47 Chinook, because a helicopter its size with Russian engines drinks fuel like there’s no tomorrow. The addition of up to 4 external fuel tanks can offset this problem, however, and if there’s one thing Venezuela has in abundance, it’s oil.

Veneuela-Russia: Follow-on Events & Milestones Mi-35M
(click to view full)

September 23/15: Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is reported to be planning a purchase of a dozen Su-30 fighters, along with equipment from China. The Venezuelan Air Force operates 23 Su-30MK2 multirole fighters, following a crash of one of these last week. Speaking at a ceremony to mark the loss, Maduro stated that he would talk with Vladimir Putin to acquire a replacement for the lost Su-30 as well as the twelve new fighters. The aircraft in service were procured from Russia as part of a $3 billion arms sale, following a refusal by then-President George Bush to sell replacement parts for the country’s fleet of F-16s.

May 4/09: A helicopter crash, kills all on board, leaving a death toll of 18 Venezuelan soldiers that includes Brig. Gen. Domingo Alberto Feneite. Reports describe the helicopter as an Mi-35, and say that the local military base lost contact shortly after mid-day. The military helicopter crashed near the town of El Alto de Rubio, near the Colombian border. Associated Press.

The problem with the story is that 18 troops would be far, far above the Mi-24/35 type’s generally understood troop capacity of 8. It would be around the maximum for the Mi-17V5 model in hot conditions, however, and photos clearly show that Venezuela has armed those machines as well. If reports referred to an “attack helicopter,” and unwarranted assumptions were made, the mistake is conceivable.

In a country like Venezuela, of course, darker explanations for such mistakes are also possible.

Aug 3/08: AHN reports that “At least 24 Russian-made Sukhoi-30 fighter jets were delivered to Venezuela on [this day] as part of the country’s defense capability build-up.”

Dec 21/06: A Rosvertol release appears to confirm the figure of 10 Mi-35s and 3 Mi-26s:

“A batch of helicopters consisting of four combat Mi-35M and one multi-purpose transport Mi-26T helicopters is ready to be sent to Venezuela. Four Mi-35M helicopters (upgrade of Mi-24(35) type helicopters which have perfectly recommended themselves in more than 30 countries of the world) were delivered to this Latin American country in July 2006…Helicopters produced by Rostvertol Plc (Rostov-on-Don, Russia) will be sent to the Republic of Venezuela according to the earlier signed contracts. In total, ten Mi-35M and three Mi-26T helicopters will be delivered. Also, Venezuelan specialists passed flying and technical training and obtained appropriate certificates.”

Nov 30/06: According to MosNews, the first 2 Venezuelan SU-30s are delivered on this day to the Luis Del Valle Garcia naval base in Barcelona, some 230 km (145 miles) east of Caracas. Hat tip to DID reader Vincent van neerven.

Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (July 31/06) COPE India 2004: SU-30K,
F-15C, Mirage 2000
(click to view full)

Russia and Venezuela had already signed earlier contracts for Russian helicopters, and a $54 million contract for the supply of more than 100,000 AK-103 rifles (an AK-47 Kalashnikov variant), and on licensed production in Venezuela of the rifles and ammunition. With this new procurement, however, Chavez is taking his relationship with Russia to the next level while acquiring a suite of capabilities expressly designed to intimidate neighbouring states.

The San Francisco Chronicle quotes Carlos Mendoza, who was Venezuela’s ambassador to Russia until last year and is now an adviser to Venezuela’s Central Bank. He noted that Russia is investing $1 billion in an aluminum plant in southeast Venezuela, that Russian companies are investing heavily in Venezuelan oil and gas fields, and that if Chavez dream/fantasy of a 5,000 mile pipeline through South America were to become a reality, Russia’s expertise with long-distance pipelines would likely play a role. In terms of the broader strategic relationship:

“There is no ideological affinity, because Russia nowadays certainly embodies capitalism at its most savage… But Putin is one of the spokesmen for the cause of multipolarity, and Venezuela hopes that Latin America becomes one of those poles… I don’t know the secrets of the (bilateral) military negotiations, because those are conducted through other channels, but Russia is a key element of Venezuela’s ambitions to become a global player on many levels.”

The question is what “global player” means, not only in larger geopolitical terms but also on the regional level.

MiG-29OVT, aka. MiG-35
(click to view full)

The order provides some answers via its choice between MiG-29 and SU-30 aircraft. A posture that sought to defend Venezuela above all else would arguably have been better served by buying a larger quantity of MiG-29 lightweight fighters – perhaps even the new thrust-vectoring, multi-role MiG-29OVT/MiG-35 – for the same amount of money. This would still have given Chavez the best combat aircraft in Latin America, with the ability to carry the same sophisticated air-air armament as the SU-30s, and greater air-air combat capabilities than any carrier-borne US fighter. The ability to conduct precision attacks locally would be retained, but MiG-29s have an operational range that would restrict their ability to carry out long-range attacks, as well as limiting their carrying capacity on missions outside of Venezuela’s territory. This would have made for a more clearly defensive and hence regionally stabilizing force.

Instead, Chavez chose to buy fewer aircraft, but with the capability to launch long-range strikes carrying much larger amounts of ordnance. The SU-30MK2 has up to 6 hardpoints for strike weapons (each of which can potentially hold more than one weapon, depending on type), and the Russians claim that its range is 3,000km/ 1,800 miles on internal fuel. This will not be a stabilizing force in the region, especially given many of his neighbors’ complaints of hostile Venezuelan meddling in the region’s internal affairs, and efforts to export revolution to their countries.

AEV Mi-17V5 & Paras
(click to view full)

The helicopters are also an important factor, but their importance lies inward. Even after this purchase, Venezuela lacks the transport capability and combat punch to conduct ground operations at a distance that go beyond guerilla warfare. Nor would helicopters serve well against a full-fledged opponent like the USA. Helicopters’ mobility and versatility make them a critical component of counter-insurgency operations, however; and when its 33 aircraft buy is complete, Venezuela will have what is arguably the best and most heavily-armed helicopter force in the region.

This is a two-edged sword: on the one hand, it can provide a welcome capability to a major oil exporter that allows it to protect its infrastructure with rapid-reaction forces. On the other hand, this assortment of Russian helicopters (and especially the Mi-35s) make it nearly perfect as a pocket force for the violent and decisive crushing of civil unrest. Much depends on one’s evaluation of Chavez and his intentions, and on how he has dealt with dissent in Venezuela and met his obligations to democracy and liberty.

SU-30MK2 on runway
(click to view full)

With other concerns preoccupying the USA, however, Latin America is no longer seen as important strategic terrain. Which means that many of these issues are likely to be left to the region itself to sort out.

Whether Chavez’ moves will trigger regional counter-moves, or even a local arms race, remains to be seen. Brazil’s military is showing growing concern over Chavez’ moves, especially given his meddling in Bolivia where Brazil gets a significant percentage of its natural gas. Brazil’s temporarily-shelved fighter modernization program in particular may represent an excellent bellwether in terms of regional reaction – giving observers one more reason to follow that competition closely.

UPDATE: Brazil went on to revive its F-X fighter program, and double its defense budget. Colombia also undertook significant modernization, and spending in the region generally is on the upswing.

FOOTNOTES

fn1. Many of these assessments are based in part on a mid-1990s British DERA(Defense Evaluation Research Agency) study, though the performance of SU-30s against US aircraft in COPE India 2004 and COPE India 2005 has tended to strengthen those general views. In all cases, however, one must stress again the sheer number of variables involved, the imprecision of any estimate, and the importance of situation and other factors beyond just the aircraft themselves when attempting to determine relative advantage.

Additional Readings & Sources

• Sukhoi Company – The Su-30MK2 Double-Seat Fighter

• Sino Defence – SU-30MKK/MKK2 Multirole Fighter Aircraft. SU-30MKK2s are the most modern fighters in China’s arsenal, and have improved anti-ship capabilities that include the ability to carry the supersonic Kh-31/Kh-17A Krypton anti-ship missile.

• GlobalSecurity.org – SU-30MK

• Air Force Technology’s “Projects” section is also good place to go for data on various fighters, including the SU-30MK… but DID believes some of their information confuses India’s unique version with the class as a whole, and is wrong.

• Air force Technology – Mi-24P (Mi-25 and Mi-35) Hind Attack / Transport Helicopter, Russia

• Sino Defence – Mi-17 Multirole Helicopter. Unlike other summaries, it includes details re: the newer Mi-17V5 version.

• SAORBATS – Proyecto “Pemon,” Mi-17-V5 del Ejercito de Venezuela. In Spanish; has lots of good photos of the Venezuelan Mi-17V5s.

• Rostvertol – Mi-26t Transport Helicopter

• DID – Brazil Embarking Upon F-X2 Fighter Program. And doubling its defense budget, including an Mi-35 buy of their own.

• DID – Colombia’s Defense Modernization

• DID (Nov 11/07) – Russia Looks to Triple Arms Exports to Venezuela. To about $12 billion; other deals are said to be in the pipeline.

• Moscow Defense Brief #1 (7) 2007 – The Venezuela Contracts. Includes Algeria in the overall Russian arms & policy overview.

• RIA Novosti (July 31/06) – Weapons for Venezuela: Nothing personal. Cites the 38 helicopters as Mi-17V5 and Mi-35M, and the fighters as SU-30MK2s.

• Kommersant (July 28/06) – The Kalashnikov Buyer. Very illuminating and at times quite funny in its personal profiles of Chavez & Putin’s interactions. MRBMs?!? Uh, ask the Cubans about that one…

• Reuters (July 27/06) – Russia’s arms sales to Venezuela may total $3 billion

• Novosti (July 27/06) – Venezuela’s Chavez hopes for Russia aid to build $20bln pipeline

• Voice of America (July 25/06) – US Urges Moscow to Reconsider Venezuela Arms Deal

• M & C News (July 25/06) – Venezuela’s Chavez pursues arms deals in Russia, Belarus (Roundup)

• RIA Novosti (July 24/06) – Russia signs $1bln aircraft contract with Venezuela-Ivanov

• Brazil’s DEFESA@NET (July 23/06) – Brasil-Venezuela: Relaciones peligrosas. “Babelfish” translation available via a link on the page. Brazilian defense planners and various political sectors are beginning to take notice of Venezuela’s new arms purchases and activities, and concern is growing.

• San Francisco Chronicle (July 23/06) – Chavez forging his own links: Venezuelan president makes arms deal with Russia, strengthening his agenda to counterbalance U.S. influence

• Agence France Presse (July 20/06) – Russia Breaks Into Venezuela with Fighter Sales: Newspaper. Places the deal at 24 SU-30MK2s.

• Interfax (July 19/06) – Yesterday in Brief for July 19, 2006

• MosNews (April 4/06) – Venezuela to Buy 30 More Russian Helicopters, Eyes Combat Fighters

• DID (Feb 14/06) – Love on the Rocks: CASA’s $600M Venezuelan Plane Sale In Heavy Turbulence

• DID (Jan 19/06) – US Tech-Transfer Laws Freeze Spain-Venezuela Aircraft Deal. They would also freeze Brazil’s planned sale of Super Tucano aircraft, which can be used as trainers but also make fine counter-insurgency aircraft – for instance, in Colombia’s battles against FARC narco-terrorists et. al. Columbia accuses Chavez of supporting FARC, a charge he naturally denies.

• DID (Nov 22/05) – F.I. Looks At Latin American Arms Market, Sees Venezuelan Buildup. That’s their forecast for the next decade, anyway; the rest of the market is forecast to be relatively quiet during this period, unless things change.

• DID (Oct 26/05) – US Roadblocks re: the Venezuela-Israel F-16 Upgrade: Politics or Protectionism?

• Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 24/02) – Su-30MK Beats F-15C ‘Every Time’ In a set of USAF simulations, using a specified set of tactics that include taking a shot with a BVR missile and then turning into the “clutter notch” of the F-15’s radar.

A hétvégén Nagykárolyban, a Károlyi kastélyban tartották a Magyar Újságírók Romániai Egyesületének idei díjátadó ünnepi rendezvényét, amelyen a MÚRE a területi megbízottaktól beérkezett jelölések alapján osztotta ki az elismeréseket.

A cikk folytatása …

Tovább….: http://www.magyarszo.com/hu/2836/kulfold_magyarsag/132987/%C3%81tadta-szakmai-d%C3%ADjait-a-M%C3%9ARE.htm

      

F-35: takeoff.
(click to view full)

Back in 2006 Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Lightning II team were facing difficulties and controversies in Norway. Since then, there have been some successes. The next milestone MoU was signed on Jan 31/06, amidst industrial and missile deals designed to bring Norway on board – but even that signing came with express statements that the country was keeping its options open.

Norway had threatened to back out of its Tier 3 partnership in the JSF program, but a Kongsberg JSM/NSM missile deal helped, and a subsequent conditional composite structures deal shored up support. Norway’s JSF production MoU was signed on December 31/07. On June 17/11, Parliamentary opposition caved and endorsed an initial buy of 4 F-35As. Now, Norway is moving into the full procurement phase.

Norway’s Plans (click to view full)

With Dassault’s Rafale’s removal from the competition and EADS’ Eurofighter’s withdrawal, the battle came down to the F-35A vs. an upgraded JAS-39NG derivative. WikiLeaks documents suggest that it was never a real competition, with the F-35A ordained from the start.

The official figure for the program is NOK 62.6 billion in adjusted 2013 currency value, which is around $10.7 billion as of April 2013. That figure has remained stable since 2008, despite Pentagon adjustments that have seen official F-35 prices rise by well over 30%.

The current plan is for 4 training & transition F-35As to arrive at Eglin AFB, FL in groups of 2: 2 in 2015 and 2 in 2016. A steady set of orders would then see F-35As arrive in Norway beginning in 2017, with Parliament approving and budgeting for the purchases annually, 6 at a time. This approach offers Norway more flexibility than the previous plan of a 42-plane order to begin arriving in 2018, with the last 6 aircraft as a separate and optional purchase. If costs become a problem, course correction is possible – but at that point, their only real option will be to reduce their fighter fleet size.

Most RNoAF F-35As will be based at Ørland Main Air Station in south-central Norway, near Trondheim. The airfield at Evenes in northern Norway, near Narvik, will host a small Forward Operating Base that will be upgraded to offer Quick Reaction Alert. It will hold about 10% of overall RNoAF F-35 flights.

Kongsberg’s stealthy Joint Strike Missile (JSM) is technically separate from Norway’s participation in the F-35 program, but the Norwegians aren’t treating it that way. It’s currently the only long-range strike weapon that’s slated for carriage inside the F-35A’s weapon bays, and Norway has high hopes for export success. To them, it’s a cornerstone of their industrial participation. The JSM is scheduled for full F-35 integration in Block 4. Block 3 is the final F-35 version that will emerge from development in 2018 – 2019, which means Block 4 would be ready around 2021 at the earliest.

Contracts & Key Events 2013-2015

F-35 & JSM
(click to view full)

September 23/15: Meanwhile, Norwegian defense officials reiterated their commitment to the procurement of up to 52 F-35s, citing Russian power projection in Northern Europe as a reason to press ahead with the acquisition. The first F-35 deliveries to Norway are expected in 2017, with Initial Operating Capability expected two years later. The Norwegians opted to buy the F-35A in 2013, after the Lockheed Martin jet beat off competition from an upgraded version of Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen. The first F-35 manufactured for the Norwegian Armed Forces was rolled out by Lockheed Martin on Tuesday.

April 26/13: Parliament. The Norwegian government submits a formal Parliamentary request to authorize 6 F-35As for delivery in 2017. That would place them within Lot 9 production, in US FY 2015. The NOK 12.9 billion ($2.18 billion) request includes the fighters, plus advance training for operators and maintainers, simulators, and integration work. That total could rise as high as NOK 15.9 billion ($2.71 billion), if the full “uncertainty allowance” is also spent.

These aircraft would be the 1st F-35s to fly in Norway; the RNoAF’s first 4 F-35As will be based at Eglin AFB, FL for training purposes. This year’s announcement also includes a shift in plans to 6 fighters submitted for approval each year, for arrival in Norway from 2017-2024.

In other news, Kongsberg’s stealthy JSM anti-ship and land strike missile now has a firm slot for integration: F-35 Block 4. Norwegian MoD.

March 12/13: Issues & allies. JSF PEO Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher C. Bogdan, USAF, offers a number of important pieces of information at the Credit Suisse/McAleese defense programs conference in Washington, DC. One is that he hopes to have unit cost, including the engine, down to $90 million by 2020 – about 10% lower than current Pentagon estimates beyond 2017. Allies “need to know where their money is going”, especially since orders after LRIP-8 (2014) are expected to be about 50% allied buys. Unfortunately there’s an issue with IOT&E processes, which has been left unaddressed until the issue became a source of buying uncertainty:

“Adding insult to injury, the JSF program office classified all documents as “U.S. only,” which upset partner nations. Even if they are all buying the same aircraft, each country has its own air-worthiness qualification processes and other administrative procedures that require they have access to the aircraft’s technical data. JSF officials are working to re-classify the documentation, Bogdan said.”

Regarding Operations & Support costs, which are over 2/3 of a weapon system’s lifetime cost: “If we don’t start doing things today to bring down O&S now, there will be a point when the services will see this aircraft as unaffordable.”

Most of those costs trace back to design, so changes at this point are possible, but difficult. One design and support issue is that the 80% commonality between variants envisaged at the program’s outset is now closer to 25-30%. That means more expensive non-common parts due to lower production runs, larger inventories for support of multiple types in places like the USA and Italy, more custom work for future changes, etc. Information Dissemination | National Defense.

Feb 28/13: Block 8 long-lead. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $333.8 million fixed-price-incentive (firm-target), advance acquisition contract, covering early equipment buys for 35 LRIP Lot 8 planes: 19 USAF F-35As ($155.2M/ 46%), 6 USMC F-35Bs ($85.4M/ 26%), and 4 USN F-35Cs ($27.5M/ 8%); plus 4 F-35B STOVLs for Britain ($45M/ 14%), and 2 F-35As for Norway ($20.7M/ 6%). All contract funds are committed immediately.

This would be Norway’s 2nd set of training aircraft. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to be complete in February 2014. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-13-C-0008).

2011 – 2012

RNoAF F-16
(click to view full)

Sept 27/12: Engine lead-in. United Technologies’ Pratt & Whitney Military Engines in East Hartford, CT receives an estimated $89.2 million for long-lead components, parts and materials associated with the 37 engines in LRIP Lot 7. The rest of the contract will follow, but initial purchases include $4 million from Norway (4.5%) for 2 F135 standard engines.

Work will be performed in East Hartford, CT (67%); Bristol, United Kingdom (16.5%); and Indianapolis, IN (16.5%), and is expected to be complete in September 2013. This contract was not competitively procured (N00019-12-C-0060).

June 20/12: Initial contract. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $20.1 million advance acquisition contract to provide long lead-time parts, material and components required for Norway’s first 2 F-35As, to be ordered in the LRIP-7/ FY 2013 production lot.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%). Work is expected to be complete in June 2013. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-12-C-0004).

June 15/12: First 2 authorized. Norway takes the next step, and formally authorizes the purchase of 2 F-35A fighters, which are intended for delivery in 2015. They will be based in the United States as part of a joint partner training center, which almost certainly means Eglin AFB, FL. The 2 aircraft authorized today are expected to be joined by a second pair in 2016. They are to be followed by up to 48 additional aircraft orders from 2017, which will be based at Orland AB and Evenes FOB in Norway. The overall cost of the F-35’s procurement phase is estimated at NOK 60 billion/ $FY12 10 billion.

This is not a contract yet, but one can be expected fairly soon. Meanwhile, American support for internal F-35 integration of the JSM strike missile allows Norway to begin preparing it for deployment. This is very good news for Lockheed Martin, which is working through a 2-month long extended strike by its machinists, and a harsh US GAO report concerning the F-35’s progress. Norwegian MoD | Business Insider | Fort Worth Star-Telegram | WFAA Dallas.

1st 2 approved

June 15/12: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $489.5 million advance acquisition contract to provide long lead-time parts, material and components required for the delivery of 35 low rate initial production Lot VII F-35. The order involves 19 USAF F-35As, 3 F-35As for the government of Italy, 2 F-35As for the government of Turkey, 6 USMC F-35B STOVL(Short Take-Off Vertical Landing), 1 F-35B for Britain, and 4 F-35Cs for the US Navy.

This contract also funds long lead-time efforts required for the incorporation of a drag chute in Norway’s F-35As. Drag chutes are especially useful when landing in cold climates, where runways and tires may fail to provide the same level of traction.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%); and is expected to be complete in June 2013. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to US FAR 6.302-1, by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-12-C-0004).

June 14/12: Norway’s Storting (parliament) approves a significant increase in defense spending, with the F-35 purchase playing a central role. The country will also be making investments in modernizing and adding CV90 tracked armored vehicles, and purchasing UAVs.

Overall, Norway will see a budget increase of 7% by 2016. Monies spent of the Afghan deployment will be continued and redirected, while “significant” supplementary funds will be added for the F-35 purchase. Source.

June 14/12: US GAO Report. Congress’ Government Accountability Office delivers a report on the F-35 program. Key excerpts from GAO-12-437: “Joint Strike Fighter – DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks” :

“The new program baseline projects total acquisition costs of $395.7 billion, an increase of $117.2 billion (42 percent) from the prior 2007 baseline. Full rate production is now planned for 2019, a delay of 6 years from the 2007 baseline. Unit costs per aircraft have doubled since start of development in 2001… Since 2002, the total quantity through 2017 has been reduced by three-fourths, from 1,591 to 365. Affordability is a key challenge… Overall performance in 2011 was mixed as the program achieved 6 of 11 important objectives… Late software releases and concurrent work on multiple software blocks have delayed testing and training. Development of critical mission systems providing core combat capabilities remains behind schedule and risky… Most of the instability in the program has been and continues to be the result of highly concurrent development, testing, and production activities. Cost overruns on the first four annual procurement contracts total more than $1 billion and aircraft deliveries are on average more than 1 year late. Program officials said the government’s share of the cost growth is $672 million; this adds about $11 million to the price of each of the 63 aircraft under those contract.”

March 23/12: Norway releases its new Defence Plan. Their goal is still 52 F-35As: 48 operational and 4 for training, but 6 planes can now be considered options. Basing will be at Orland in mid-Norway, with a secondary forward base at Evenes in the north.

The plan is to buy the 4 training aircraft in 2015, instead of 2016. That’s later than the originally-envisaged full buy of 48 from 2014-2018, but the F-35’s schedule has changed, too.

The rest of the buy would be stretched. Norway is considering 2017 as the start date for orders of the remaining 42, and the final procurement year could be as late as 2023-2024. That makes for an average buy of 5-6 planes per year, though Norway could also choose to buy fewer in early years and more in the later years, if that means lower prices. The final 6 operational aircraft would be a separate decision, after the main set of 4 training + 42 fighters had been ordered. That effectively turns them into a financial buffer, making them vulnerable to budget cuts or fighter cost increases. Norwegian MoD | Fort Worth Star-Telegram Sky Talk.

March 5/12: After a meeting of the existing F-35 partners at the Canadian embassy in Washington, Norwegian Defense State Secretary Roger Ingebrigsten says that Norway was finalizing its plans to buy “approximately 50 fighters.”

Even though Lockheed Martin has said that it expects F-35 prices to rise, Ingebrigsten said that does not expect any significant cost increases to its order. At the same time, he declined to provide details ahead of the Norwegian government’s mid-March submission to parliament. A hint may be provided by the fact that the government’s original plan had a range of NOK 52 – 72 billion (vid. June 6/11), so a NOK 20 billion hike could be claimed as meeting the original plan. Reuters.

Nov 24/11: $50 billion? Norwegian MP Roger Ingebrigtsen [Troms, Labour Party], and Rear Admiral Arne Røksund, head of their Department of Defence Policy and Long-Term Planning, visit Canada. They respond to Canadian MP Christine Moore [Abitibi–Temiscamingue, NDP], who asks about Norway’s planned budgets:

“Mr. Roger Ingebrigtsen: It’s about $10 billion U.S. That’s for 51 or 52 air fighters. That’s $10 billion today…

RAdm Arne Røksund: …The life cycle costs will be, I think, about–this is not public yet, so I have to be careful – $40 billion U.S. over 30 years. So that’s life cycle costs over 30 years, all included.

Ms. Christine Moore: …So the $10 billion is simply to purchase the aircraft themselves.

RAdm Arne Røksund: That is for the planes, initial logistics included, repair kits, and so on, for the first few years.”

The purchase figures are consistent with accounts of NOK 61 – 72 billion, but the 30-year sustainment costs are new. Ottawa Citizen Defence Watch.

June 17/11: Opposition caves. The initial buy of 4 F-35s has been approved in Norway, as opposition parties cave. The resolution gets unanimous approval. While a decision on the full F-35A buy isn’t expected until 2014, this vote effectively seals the buy.

In the aftermath, the governing coalition’s Socialist Left party is calling for a probe to be carried out by state auditor Riksrevisjonen. Former Labour Party defense minister Jorgen Kosmo will comply in his current job as State Auditor, if a Parliamentary majority requests it. Continued opposition divisions make that unlikely, however, as the Conservatives (Hoyre) say an audit into a decision process would violate parliamentary practice. If Labour and Hoyre vote against, a majority resolution is impossible. VNN | F-16.NET | Reuters | Stortinget Prop. S110 [Nynorsk, PDF].

4 approved

June 6/11: Defense Minister Grete Faremo is called in to an open Parliamentary hearing about the F-35A. She maintains the NOK 1 billion ($180 million) cost increase figure, but the Aftenposten newspaper reports that actual cost estimates won’t be available until 6 months after the first 4 aircraft have been ordered. The government’s long-term plan, which will include fewer air bases, and F-35 lifetime cost estimates, isn’t due until well into 2012.

That “costs only after commitment” delay has drawn complaints from the opposition Conservative party (Hoyre), whose representatives complain that total cost estimates now vary from NOK 145 billion – 200 billion for the program. The government insists that the 1st 4 training jets must be ordered by the end of 2011 (Q1 of FY 2012 for the Pentagon), in order to arrive by 2016. On the other hand, the Conservatives, plus the Socialist Left, Progress, and Christian Democrats, would be a Parliamentary majority in Norway if they all voted together, and there is talk of voting against the initial 4-plane order.

What the Defense minister will say is this (translated from Norwegian):

“With the revised assumptions, the estimated cost of the acquisition of 56 aircraft now estimated at about [NOK] 52 billion [present value 2011 figure]. Without discounting the expected cost (P-50) for the entire combat aircraft purchase 61 billion 2011-NOK. Including uncertainty deposition (P-85)… 72 billion 2011-NOK.”

That’s a range of $9.7 – 13.43 billion, or about $173 – 240 million per plane. The entire program would, of course, include other costs beyond flyaway purchase. Norway’s Forsvarsdepartmentet statement [in Norwegian] | VNN.

April 18/11: VNN reports that the government’s Socialist Left party coalition partner (SV), and opposition parties the conservative Progress Party (Frp) and the Christian Democrats (Krf), have joined together to demand a detailed accounting of the F-35’s costs. The demands are connected to the government’s April 7/11 announcement of its intention to spend NOK 4.5 billion on 4 F-35As as a training and transition squadron, followed by 52 operational fighters.

A final decision from Parliament is due in May 2011, but the nature of that decision is contested within the government. That matters, because SV has 11 seats, and the margin between the governing coalition and all opposition parties is 86-83. The SV maintains that the Parliament has not granted final approval to actually buy the jets, and its Parliamentary leader Bard Vegar Solhjell says:

“I think it’s right that we stop and go carefully through the numbers… We need to debate whether we are where we should be, or someplace else.”

Labour Party State Secretary Roverg Ingebrigtsen has a different point of view, saying that:

“Norway has decided to buy the F35… That decision has been made.”

April 7/11: Norway’s current government, known as Stoltenberg’s Second Cabinet, makes a Parliamentary announcement of its intent to buy 4 F-35As as operational training aircraft, for delivery in 2016. That means a FY 2013-2014 order, in advance of the full 52-plane order a couple years later. The goal is to ensure that Norwegian pilots are prepared to use the operational F-35As when they begin arriving in 2018.

The government is also required to update their cost estimates, compared to the 2008/09 estimate in St.prp. nr. 36. The official estimate raises acquisition costs by NOK 1 billion (about $180 million now), which is only a 2.5% increase. The reason is cited as delayed US buys, which is true, but Pentagon estimates have also been raising the expected cost of the fighters, and that is not reflected here. Norwegian Forsvarsdepartementet [in Norwegian], and their updated cost structure [PDF, Nynorsk].

Jan 6/11: Norway’s government reacts to the news with reserved non-commitment, saying that it will seek more information, and adding that the program changes may change the timing of its F-35 purchase submission to the Stortinget (parliament). Norwegian Forsvarsdepartementet [in Norwegian].

Jan 6/11: F-35 program shifts. As part of a plan detailing $150 billion in service cuts and cost savings over the next 5 years, Defense Secretary Robert Gates states that he is placing the Marine Corps’ F-35B on the equivalent of a 2-year probation, extends the program’s development phase again to 2016, and cuts production of all models over the 2012-2016 time period, including 47 fewer F-35As. During the low-rate initial production phase, cuts in the number bought mean that the price for each plane doesn’t drop as quickly, making purchases more expensive. Pentagon release re: overall plan | Full Gates speech and Gates/Mullen Q&A transcript | F-35 briefing hand-out [PDF] || Aviation Week | Fort Worth Star-Telegram’s Sky Talk blog.

2009 – 2010

Loaded for bear…
(click to view full)

Dec 8/10: Industrial. The Labour Party’s Minister for Defense Grete Faremo addresses the US-Norway Defence Industry Conference. Among her remarks:

“Through the best value system, which entails strong international competition, Norwegian companies have already won contracts for about 350 million USD. This demonstrates that Norwegian companies have the skills, competence and production facilities to meet the very demanding standards of the aerospace industry.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence and Norwegian industry have put substantial effort into developing products to enhance the operational capabilities of the F-35: The Joint Strike Missile and 25mm ammunition (APEX), – products which should generate interest in the other F-35 partner nations, the United States included… We also eagerly anticipate the results of the US Analysis of Alternatives for future Offensive Anti Surface Warfare. I expect that this joint effort and the Analysis will pave the way for a successful integration of the JSM on the F-35.”

Dec 3/10: Sham competition? Wikileaks documents reveal that the Norway’s F-16 replacement competition was a sham, and that the USA used its weapons export laws as a way of hindering competition.

The contents of the leaked cables include a 2008 meeting between Sweden’s defense minister Sten Tolgfors and US ambassador Michael Wood, where Tolgfors asked for permission to buy an American-made Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar system for the Gripen. In response, US diplomatic cables included a recommendation that the USA use its weapons export laws. A July 8/06 cable reportedly reads:

“Given this potential impact of AESA releasability on the Norway competition, and possibly the Denmark competition… we suggest postponing the decision on AESA releasability for the Gripen until after Norway’s decision in December.”

Not content with that hindrance, the USA added political pressure on Norway to buy F-35s. Subsequent cables reportedly state that “other contacts, primarily in the MoD, have reassured us that the MoD will recommend the F-35.” Deputy Minister Espen Barth Eide (which other cables say is “regarded as the force which steers the defense ministry”, though “very senior US officials… characterized Barth Eide as ‘weasily’ “) is reported as telling USAF Europe commander Gen. Roger Brady to “trust the process, do not overplay your hand.” Before any decision was formally made, the cables describe success, with the caveat that “We must continue to act like an honorable and elegant competitor [even though the decision is already set].” Sweden’s Aftenposten [in Swedish] | Sweden’s The Local | Stockholm News | Swedish Wire | Aviation Week Ares | Flight International | Fort Worth Star-Telegram Sky Talk blog (incl. Cablegate URLs).

A Sham?

Sept 29/10: Delay. Norwegian defence minister Grete Faremo informs the Norwegian parliament that the F-35 buy will be delayed. Instead of receiving 48 fighters from 2016-2010, Norway will buy 4 training aircraft in 2016 instead of 2014, and the arrival of operational aircraft has been shifted to 2018 instead of 2016. The delay in fielding its new fighters may force the ministry to reconsider upgrading at least some of Norway’s F-16s, in order to cover the gap.

Norway has said it will stick with the F-35, citing $350 million in contracts to date, with a potential for up to $5 billion depending on the eventual number of F-35s produced worldwide. The RNoAF’s F-35 operating base is still scheduled to be picked in 2011. Defense News | Flight International | Fort Worth Star-Telegram | Key Publications.

2008 and Earlier

Eurofighter (lost)
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Dec 23/08: Aviation Week reports that the Norwegian government has taken the next formal step, and submitted a formal legislative bill to parliament. The document reportedly lists 2016-2020 as the dates for F-35A phase-in.

Dec 10/08: “Say what?!?” Saab’s CEO Ake Svensson holds a press conference and presentation that challenges the fairness and legitimacy of the Norwegian selection process. His objections are specific and detailed (Transcript | Presentation [PDF]). Excerpts:

“The claim that Gripen does not fulfil the operational requirements required by the Norwegian air force is important to understand. It also turns out to be founded on simulations previously unknown to us. To our understanding those simulations must be based on incomplete performance information, simply because such information about Gripen has neither been communicated to us nor requested from us or the Swedish government. The Norwegian evaluation committee has thereby not had access to the parameters required to reach the announced results.”

“…A key argument for Gripen is its extremely competitive life cycle cost… If the claimed estimates are correct it would be cheaper for Norway to obtain JSF, even if Sweden would have developed and given 48 Gripen Next Generation (NG) as a gift to Norway… It is Saab’s assessment that only 20% of the Norwegian evaluation committees cost estimates are based on the facts presented in the Swedish offer… The number of aircraft has been changed from 48 to 58 and the operational life cycle has been extended from 25 to 35 years. These are two new conditions entirely decisive for the calculation. That these calculations to a large extent have been conducted without dialogue is most unusual…

Saab’s own calculations of upgrade costs are based on 50 years of experience of developing and upgrading fighter aircraft… Norway has applied its experiences from the F-16 to these costs – a very different and in important aspects non-comparable aircraft. Upgrade costs according to the Norwegian calculation are several times higher than the costs Saab and Swedish authorities have calculated and provided. Our estimated value of fuel consumption is based on experience from 120,000 flight hours with Gripen… the evaluation committee chooses to raise the values we have provided, adding further additional costs. The cost for replacing aircraft is part of the estimation, with the assumption that almost half of the aircraft fleet will crash in 35 years. This is completely unfounded if applied to Gripen’s [operational] statistics. This also adds further billions to the calculation.

Further to this is a number of questions that the Norwegian evaluation group has chosen not to respond to, such as what specific currency rate was used, what price was used for calculating purchase of further aircraft, what other considerations in the calculation that had the procurement price as basis for the calculation and how much the weapon procurement was estimated to.”

“…We now move on and gather strength on markets where there is a real interest to evaluate Gripen based on our offers and a genuine and mutual interest to establish long-term industrial cooperation.”

Dec 6/08: Defense-Aerospace reports admissions from Norwegian government and industry officials that “Norway did not obtain a firm price from Lockheed Martin for the Joint Strike Fighter, and the price it was quoted will change substantially before the contract is signed in 2014”.

The report adds that reports of a $2.57 billion fly-away (i.e. no weapons or spares) cost for 48 aircraft are wrong because the NOK 18 billion figure must use January 2008 exchange rates rather than November 2008’s – raising the cost to about $3.27 billion. Maj. Jarle Ramskjaer of Norway’s Project Future Combat Aircraft Capability office explains the complex calculations:

“Conversion between NOK and USD is somewhat more complex than multiplying with the exchange rate. The net present value is then derivated as follows: First, we periodize expenses according to the payment plan and adjust for the escalation indices. Then we create a “currency future” based on the money marked interest rates in the two currencies, as advised by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. Those “currency futures” are then used for each period, converting foreign currencies to NOK. Last, we discount with a factor to get real time yearly cost.”

Using the same January 2008 baseline, the NOK 145 billion life cycle cost of 48 F-35As over 30 years works out to $26.3 billion, rather than the reported $20.7 billion. Unless various forms of financial lock-in are used, these prices will obviously fluctuate as the respective currencies fluctuate. Defense-Aerospace adds that:

“Ramskjaer says, for example, that Norway did not receive, nor did it expect, a firm price at this stage, and that contractual prices, escalation clauses and penalty clauses for late delivery “will be addressed in the [2014] contract.” “

Nov 21-30/08: Reactions. Reactions to the decision continue; the question is whether they will gather enough momentum to affect the final choice. Questions are being raised by the Norwegian and Swedish media, and by Saab, about the simulations used to evaluate the fighters, Norway’s procurement math – and, in an unusual development, ongoing veiled accusations of bad faith.

While the JAS-39 has a long flight history, the upgraded JAS-39NG does not, and neither does any version of the F-35. The Norwegian Defense Institute’s simulations must therefore rely on a wide set of assumptions. Those assumptions are being questioned, and NyTeknik notes the interesting presence of the Russian (and possibly Russo-Indian) Sukhoi PAK-FA next-generation fighter those simulations. PAK-FA is still in development, but if the project succeeds it would be fielded during the next fighter’s service life. After a post Cold War break, Russian military activities in and around Norway have risen sharply in recent years. Norway’s unease with Russia’s intentions appears to be returning.

Speaking of assumptions, a huge difference between Saab’s figures for through-life support, and the Norwegian government’s, is emerging as a live issue. Norway calculates the through-life cost of a 44-plane Gripen NG fleet as NOK 165 – 175 billion (about $23.5-25.0 billion), while Swedish calculations based on over 100,000 hours of flight experience with JAS-39 A-D versions give a NOK 55 billion figure (about 7.85 billion). A 300% plus difference is hard to explain. The fact that the discrepancy came to light at the end of the competition, and that no effort appears to have been made to resolve such a crucial figure, make it appear that the explanation may involve political engineering rather than aerospace engineering.

On which topic, earlier coverage has noted inflammatory statements by Norway’s defense minister. Aftenposten adds an unprompted mailing to the Croatian government from the Norwegian embassy, bearing the official press-release of Norway’s decision. Croatia is in the middle of a fighter choice of its own involving the JAS-39 Gripen, and Saab rightly considers this to be an “unneccessary and unfriendly” act. Posting Saab’s final offer on the government’s we site, a detail which is generally kept secret in order to avoid affecting other negotiations, has not helped either. Aftenposten adds that a member a Danish parliamentary defense committee has said that “this reduces Gripen’s chances to zero” in Denmark’s own competition.

All of this might be a tempest in a teapot, except for the international stakes involved – and the fact that Sweden and Norway recently embarked on an extensive defense cooperation plan, with elements that include both military and industrial integration. Aftenposten [Norsk] | Aftenposten re: defense cooperation [Norsk] | Aftenposten re: Danish fallout [Norsk] Dagbladet [Svenska] | NyTeknik [Svenska] | NyTeknik re: PAK-FA [in Swedish].

F-35A #AA-1
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Nov 20/08: F-35A picked. Norway’s Ministry of Defence releases its decision in favor of the F-35A as Norway’s F-16 replacement, though Parliament still needs to approve the deal to buy up to 48 aircraft. At this point, the immediate cost is expected to be NOK 18 billion (about $2.54 billion – later revised to $3.27 billion based on currency exchange), and the total cost of the deal over a 30-year life span is expected to be about NOK 145 billion ($20.7 billion, later revised to $26.3 billion) for the fighter, weapons, maintenance, infrastructure and operations. Norway’s MoD:

“The JSF is the only candidate which fulfils all the operational requirements specified by the Norwegian Government and is furthermore offered at a lower price than the Gripen NG… Both candidates’ performance have been evaluated against a number of different scenarios. The scenarios used in this evaluation are the same as the ones used in the Long-term Defence Plan, says Minister of Defence Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen… The Joint Strike Fighter is considered to be the better of the two candidates regarding intelligence and surveillance, counter air, air interdict and anti-surface warfare, says [Minister of Defence Anne-Grete] Strom-Erichsen.”

Strom Erichsen ratcheted things up a step further when she told Norwegian news agency NTB that “The JSF is considered to be better than the Gripen in every major requirement for a combat aircraft.” StrategyPage claimed that:

“What changed Norwegian minds was a series of computer simulations by the Norwegian Defense Institute, which concluded that the Gripen could not provide much of a fight against the Russian advanced Su-30 fighters, or the new Russian fifth generation fighter.”

In a paper exercise, of course, assumption are everything and may not correspond to battlefield realities. At present, Norway’s Labor and the Center Parties are backing the decision to choose the U.S. fighter, while a 3rd coalition member (the anti-NATO Socialist Left party) wants more time to discuss the decision and said the party would make its decision in early December. Opposition parties also wish more time to study this conclusion. Since Norway does not expect to sign contracts for the F-35 jets until 2014, the delays create no urgency, though the MoD naturally wishes to begin negotiations with Lockheed Martin as soon as possible.

Across the border, Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt called Norway’s decision “a setback” for Sweden, but stressed their right to make that decision. Saab’s CEO expressed disappointment, while pointing out that “Many [Swedish-Norwegian] industrial ventures we had planned were tied to selling Gripen, so if Gripen doesn’t happen, neither do they.” Behind the scenes, however, the reaction is stronger. Former Saab VP Jan Nygren had this to say in a Swedish newspaper article:

“We have tried to treat our Norwegian friends as serious and thorough… For which reason was it necessary to call a press-conference and then reveal that that the Gripen is lacking in a number of operational abilities? We are amazed that our neighbour Norway feels entitled to make these kind of claims of an aircraft that’s currently operative in our air-force… This will most likely mean that Saab will demand to have a look at the underlying assumptions. And I imagine that the government and the FMV are equally interested. For this is no small infringement, to use a blunt expression… Yesterday, we were all just dumbfounded. Today the mood’s more irritated, putting it lightly.”

As for the F-35 being cheaper, Nygren said that was “out of the question. Unless Norway’s fighter procurement is courtesy of the U.S taxpayer.” Norwegian MoD | Lockheed Martin | Associated Press | Bloomberg | The Guardian re: costs | Reuters, re: costs | StrategyPage | Dagens Nyheter [in Swedish, DID thanks translator Per Bjorkland] | The Local, Sweden | Reuters Blog op-ed.

F-35 picked

FSi/LO/NITO conclusion
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Oct 16/08: Industrial. The Norwegian Defence and Security Industries Association (Forsvars og Sikkerhetsindustriens forening/ FSi) and 2 of Norway’s largest unions, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge/ LO) and the Norwegian Society of Engineers and Technologists (Norges Ingenior og Teknologorganisasjon/ NITO) publish a report comparing the industrial benefits of the F-35 and the JAS-39NG for Norway.

Their conclusion favors Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen. The short synopsis of their report is that the F-35 would be more attractive to a few select firms, but that Gripen offsets would have greater value to Norway as a whole, and spread industrial benefits into more regions. Industrial offsets are important to Norway, and the source of the report adds weight to its political implications. EuropeanDefence.co.uk report | FSi release [Norsk] | Full FSi/LOP/NITO report [PDF, Norsk].

April 28/08: Gripen International delivers its bid to the Norwegian government. Dagbladet reported, and Gripen’s release confirmed, that Norway added a new wrinkle – a guarantee that it would not be the only operator of this fighter type:

“An integral part of the Swedish offer to Norway, is a commitment on the part of the Swedish Government to operate the same advanced version of the Gripen fighter aircraft as offered to Norway, in the event that Norway selects Gripen as its future combat aircraft. This offer creates a win-win situation for both countries, as they would not only share the development costs for the new fighter but would also share future enhancements over the future operational life of Gripen fighter aircraft for the next 30-40 years.”

Read “Gripen Delivers Norwegian Bid – With a Twist” for more coverage and analysis.

Dec 21/07: No Eurofighter. EADS pulls its Eurofighter out of the Norwegian and Danish competitions, leaving both future fighter programs as a straight-up competition between the JAS-39 and the F-35. The rationales given are vague and make little sense, but many sources believe the key objection is official favoritism toward the F-35. The government-to-government nature of the F-35 deal, it seems, wouldn’t require the same industrial offsets, though the F-35 program has pledged significant production contracts with Denmark’s Terma and with Norwegian firms.

The Motley Fool, on the other hand, wonders if the same dollar devaluation that’s hammering EADS in the passenger jet market is also creating a price chasm for the Eurofighter. Which was already a significantly more expensive aircraft before dollar devaluation, at $100-120 million per aircraft vs. $50-70 million for its Gripen and Lightning II competitors. Bloomberg | Financial Times | Flight International | Motley Fool.

May 21/07: DID – Norway Renews Eurofighter Development Agreement.

May 2/07: DID – Norway Signs Development Agreement for JAS-39N Gripen

Feb 2/07: DID – Lockheed & Kongsberg Partner to Bring NSM to JSF

Jan 31/07: US Department of Defense and Norway Sign Joint Strike Fighter Agreement.

Jan 26/07: DID – Norway Signs on to JSF Production Phase, But Keeps Options Open

Jan 26/07: DID – Kongberg Wins F-35 Contracts – Maybe

Jan 12/07: Jas Gripen jubler over norske signaler. DN.no article headline translates as “Gripen jubilant over announcement of “Compensating Measures”

Additional Readings & Sources F-35: The Joint Strike Fighter

• DID FOCUS Article – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Events & Contracts

• DID Spotlight – The F-35’s Air-to-Air Capability Controversy. A controversy in Australia goes global, and claims are being made for and against the F-35. What’s going on, what do we really know, and how is this issue likely to affect prospective customers?

US GAO (June 14/12, #GAO-12-437:) – Joint Strike Fighter – DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks

The “Competition”

• “Odin,” the Norwegian Government Online – Conceptual Framework for the Fighter Purchase [MS Word format, Norwegian]

• Norwegian Ministry of Defence (Jan 26/07) – Industripakkane i søkelyset. Includes presentations from the contenders. The Ministry now has an English translation of Espen Bareth Eide’s speech to this “Combat Aircraft Seminar.”

• Wikileaks (Dec 16/08) – cable 08OSLO670, LESSON LEARNED FROM NORWEGIAN DECISION TO BUY JSF.

• DID FOCUS Article – The JAS-39 Gripen: Sweden’s 4th Generation Wild Card

• DID – Eurofighter’s Future: Tranche 3, and Beyond

• Eurofighter official site

• DID – France’s Rafale Fighters: Au Courant In Time?

• Dagbladet (Nov 19/06) – Dropp amerikanske kampfly na [in Norwegian]. Second commentary by John Berg, defense analyst with Jane’s Defense. The title doesn’t need much translation.

• Dagbladet (Nov 2/06) – Bestemmer Stortinget eller Luftforsvaret norsk sikkerhetspolitikk? [in Norwegian]. First commentary by John Berg, defense analyst with Jane’s Defense. He believes Norway should pull out of the F-35 program, and explains why.

• Dagbladet (Nov 10/06) – Framtidas fly: Jacob Borresen Flaggkommandor og seniorradgiver ved Institutt for strategiske studier [in Norwegian]. Commentary by Jacob Borresen, former Commodore of the Norwegian Navy.

• DID (Aug 31/06) – Rafale Out for Norway

• DID (May 11/06) – Norway’s Future Fighter Competition: A Norwegian View . By Endre Lunde.

• Eurofighter GmbH (June 15/05) – Norway ups budget to increase Eurofighter industry funding (from EUR 23.2 million to EUR 35.7 million).

Other News & Developments

• Aftonbladet (Dec 3/10) – Här blir vi blåsta [in Swedish]. Relates in part to the Wikileaks cables.

• Flight International (Jan 1/07) – Forecasts 2007: Pressure will be on the F-35 project team to secure firm orders from its European partners

• Gripen International (Dec 22/06) – Gripen in the race for future fighter replacement in Norway

• Nordlys (Dec 12/06) – SAAB oppdaget nordomradene [in Norwegian]. Saab International visiting Tromso.

• Flight International (Dec 12/06) – Nordic Special: Buying Power. “Two of the Nordic states are weighing their options for new fighters, while all four are seeking to access strategic airlift. What’s on their shopping list?”

• Norway 24 (Dec 4/06) – Vil stoppe jagerflykampen: Norge skal bruke seks ganger mer pa utvikling av JSF-jagerflyene enn Eurofighter [in Norwegian]. Norwegian Progress Party expressing their wish to end participation in JSF.

• Roglands Avis (Nov 24/06) – SV-nei til jagerfly [in Norwegian]. Socialist Left announcing their opposition to the fighter purchase.

• DID (Oct 11/06) – Norway’s Proposed FY 2007 Defense Budget

Appendix A: The Play of Politics The Griffon in Winter…
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The recent MoU has not discouraged Mr. Burbages’s competitors. The Saab/BAE partnership Gripen International has been especially diligent in its lobbying campaign, and may finally be seeing some results. On Nov 22/06, the members of parliament of the Socialist Left party, one of 3 parties in the Norwegian coalition government at the time, and outspoken critics of both the United States and NATO, proclaimed that they were opposed to any Norwegian fighter purchase. Instead, they wished to see the service life of the current F-16 fleet extended for another 10 years. As a secondary option, however, their spokesman explicitly said that they would prefer the procurement of the JAS-39 Gripen, due to the prospects of improved Swedish-Norwegian industrial relations.

Given the F-16s’ lifespans, a 10 year postponement seemed very unlikely, though by 2010, it was acknowledged that delays to the F-35 would end up keeping the F-16s in service to 2018 or later anyway. A joint “Conceptual Framework” for the fighter acquisition was accepted by the Norwegian government on Dec 14/06, and it included an option of postponement as a likely nod to the wishes of the Socialists. The report itself deprecated this option, however, on the grounds that it would lead to much higher overall costs than buying new aircraft now. Despite this defeat, the Socialist Left Party retained control of Norway’s powerful Ministry of Finance, and remained in a prime position to affect the final choice.

JAS-39N concept
(c) Gripen International
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Lockheed Martin’s potential problems did not end there. Socialist Left Defense Spokesman Bjorn Jacobsen confirmed in a media comment that their opposition to further Norwegian participation in the JSF program is fueled by their dislike of Lockheed Martin itself. This makes it unlikely that any measures will win them over. More ominously for Lockheed, the traditionally US-friendly Progress Party stated in December 2006 that they wanted Norway out of the F-35 project, as Lockheed Martin had “not in any way” fulfilled the set requirements. In contrast, Gripen International has won political support by playing the Nordic, neutrality, and industrial cards, while the Eurofighter explicitly aligns itself with enthusiasm for the broader EU project.

This political hostility brings up the question of how the competition would be conducted. Following the decision to sign the most recent JSF memorandum, The Norwegian government has also announced “compensating” measures for the other 2 candidates, to offset Norwegian investments in the F-35 as a Tier 3 partner. Norway was formally a member of both the JSF and Eurofighter consortia, and decided in the end to offer financial support all around, which was a first for Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen in an international competition.

When Norway’s decision was released in November 2008, however, the Eurofighter consortium had already bowed out almost a year hence. They may have known something Saab did not. Sweden was surprised by the decision, and also by Norway’s derogatory comments about the Gripen’s performance and costs, comments that did not reflect the experience of other air forces flying the aircraft. With the November 2010 release of the Wikileaks cables, the USA’s maneuverings to secure the deal were laid bare – along with their clear belief that the competition’s results were determined long before the competition ended.

Appendix B: The Defense Debate: Strike-Fighter or Interceptor? Norwegian EEZ

Another important factor in this recent face of debate has been public statements from several former high-ranking members of the armed forces. Their main arguments have not been connected to the politics or the money, but to if the F-35’s capabilities and their fit (or lack thereof) with Norway’s requirements. It is pointed out that the F-35 is primarily designed as a strike aircraft, with air defense and air-to-air combat as a secondary role. As such, its abilities to function as an interceptor and to operate within the air policing role have been questioned due to limitations in the F-35’s speed and agility when compared to its 2 competitors. Even its stealth advantage has been questioned, as several commentators say they expect it to be negated during the plane’s service lifetime by future developments in radars and sensors.

Range and over-water performance are also entering the capabilities debate. Recently, there has also been a renaissance of attention to the security challenges of its oil and fishing-rich Exclusive Economic Zone in the North Sea and Barents region. In November 2006 Norway even announced that it was considering a request to station fighters and Maritime Patrol aircraft in Iceland, following the closure of the US Naval Air base at Keflavik. Negotiations detailing this future cooperation are currently underway.

Apparently aware of the development, Saab International’s vice president Jan Nygren visited the Northern Norwegian town of Tromso in December 2006, and stressed then the potential of expanded investments from both SAAB and other Swedish businesses, particularly in the north, should Norway choose the Gripen. What he didn’t mention was the JAS-39’s short range, which would hamper its odds of selection if policing the air lanes from Norway to Iceland became a significant requirement. Reports that Saab is offering a version of the JAS-39 that carries more internal fuel, and can carry more external fuel tanks as well, may be able to mitigate this disadvantage.

All of these considerations are currently being aired in the Norwegian press by former high-ranking members of the armed forces, and by other defense experts.

F-16 of 338 skv
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A preference of the air policing role, increased pressure to focus on the northern seas, and an expanded area of operations over water would all bode ill for the F-35. Indeed, the latter 2 requirements would work to exclude any single-engined aircraft, given the need for high reliability and the potential for tragedy should an engine fail.

They would, however, be good news for the Eurofighter Typhoon. EADS’ presentation refers to US figures that showed the difference between single-engine F-16s and twin-engine F-15s who had “Class A” engie failure incidents. Both fighters had Class A engine problems as 38-39% of total Class A serious incidents. Every one of the F-16s to experience Class A engine failure was lost. Rate of aircraft loss for the F-15s in similar situations was 8%.

Eurofighter boasts by far the most engine power and agility range among the three competitors. Its main handicap is that it boasts the highest sticker price, and would very likely remain the most expensive option even if the F-35As were to experience a moderate-sized increase in price [DID: EADS later withdrew from the competition].

The Gripen’s new “next generation” JAS-39N version is a single engine fighter, which may be able to offset some of the existing Gripen model’s range issue. It has already garnered key political support, however, and is considered to be superior to the F-35 in speed, agility, likely sticker price – and possibly even in jobs.

Appendix C: 2006 Analysis – Could JSF Really Lose in Norway? F-16B & X-35
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Despite all this, it would be highly surprising if Norway would decide to pull out of the JSF program now that the production MoU is signed. Although the Norwegian government stresses that no final decision will be made before 2008, there is little doubt that any Norwegian withdrawal after signing this latest MoU has significant potential to become a political scandal. Tom Burbage has previously stated that should Norway choose to withdraw, it could trigger demands of reparations from Lockheed Martin in the range of almost $1 billion. While this is an expected negotiating tactic, it’s a demand that would be backed by contract provisions that could not simply be ignored.

The effects a withdrawal could have on the JSF program as a whole are unknown, but they could be significant despite the small number of aircraft involved (approximately 48). With F-35 costs rising and still uncertain, and political opposition from an anti-American Left that is often an important political force in Europe, there is no desire to give a potential “domino effect” of withdrawals any breathing room. The seriousness of this scenario to Lockheed Martin is illustrated by the repeated visits by high level corporate officials such as Mr. Burbage to Oslo, as well the extensive industrial efforts made to secure continued Norwegian partnership. In this respect, Norway’s decision to sign the Production MoU is a significant victory for the F-35 program.

Fortunately for Lockheed, the anti-American coin has a flip side. One concern that has also been lurking in the background all along has been the possible effect of a withdrawal on the overall relationship between the US and Norway. The current Norwegian government withdrew all military support for the US presence in Iraq when it took office in 2005, which has affected the relationship between the two administrations ever since. The government has attempted to make amends by making Afghanistan their main foreign policy priority; but even there, they refuse to get involved in the more troubled areas in the south alongside The Netherlands, Britain, Canada, et. al. This is in sharp contrast to neighboring Denmark, which has long been involved in combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A Norwegian withdrawal from the F-35 program could add insult to injury, and bring the relationship to a new all time low. While some Norwegian parties do express an ingrained hostility to the United States, most treat the relationship as a serious foreign policy matter and will factor such things into their decision making.

Finally, the F-35 enjoys systemic preference, in that it reportedly has the support of the Air Force and the military bureaucracy, while the JAS-39 Gripen for instance enjoys predominantly political and some industrial support. The final choice will greatly depend on Gripen and Eurofighter’s ability to play and capitalize on their political attractions to key segments within the Norwegian parliament, and any lingering or ingrained resentment of Lockheed Martin. In Eurofighter’s case, their chances also rest on their ability to widen Norway’s defense debate in ways that suit their strengths in air-air combat and long-distance maritime overwatch.

If they fail to do so, however, and the military gets to forward their own preference, then barring a surprise development, Tom Burbage can be confident that the process will take its course – and the F-35 Lightning II will replace the F-16 as the Norwegian Air Force’s next fighter.