Diplomacy & Crisis News

Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin in happier times, during a G-8 meeting in Ireland in 2013. (Photo: Pete Souza)

On June 23, the Washington Post published an article online about the Obama administration’s deliberations concerning Russia’s hacking of the U.S. electoral process last year. The article, which was fairly balanced, has yielded a considerable amount of discussion, much of which has been far less balanced.

A Rant (Please excuse me for a moment.)

Have you ever noticed how, after a decision is made, after the implementation is complete, after the consequences are in, everyone—and by everyone I especially mean TV pundits—is suddenly an expert on whatever question was involved. In fact, everyone suddenly has been an expert from the beginning. And they pretty much know the same things. They know the decision was wrong; they know the outcome was a disaster; and they know that if only the decision maker had gone with the other option—whatever that option might have been (and it is unlikely to be specified)—then everything would have worked out well. There would, in fact, have been no adverse consequences whatsoever, for there can only ever be two options, and obviously one of them must have been the perfect solution to the problem at hand.

Just imagine this scenario: Let’s say that George W. Bush decided at the last minute not to invade Iraq in 2003. To this very day, Dick Cheney would be going around saying, “If only we had taken out Saddam Hussein when we had the chance, they would have greeted us with flowers and the Middle East would be a beacon of peace, stability, and prosperity today.” And pretty much all of the pundits would believe him.

Now, Back to Our Story

The key take-away from the pundit discussion regarding Obama and the Russian cyber attacks is that Obama did nothing in the face of Russian aggression. The critics rarely if ever say what he should have done;* often neglect to mention what he did do; and completely ignore the reasons for not doing more. President Trump, seeing an opportunity to fault his predecessor, has picked up this theme and promoted it, blaming any ill consequences of Russian hacking on Obama’s lack of response while continuing to deny that the hacking occurred at all.**

With regard to timing, critics complain that the administration did not make a public announcement of the Russian hacking until early October when CIA director John Brennan had attributed the hacking to Russia in early August. This, however, disregards the fact that the rest of the Intelligence Community did not conclude that Brennan was right until . . . late September. (People often assume that the government knows something from the moment that one official believes it to be true, but government—or any collective decision-making process—does not work that way, which actually prevents a lot of irresponsible decisions.)

The complaint also tacitly dismisses the potential importance of Obama’s (ultimately unsuccessful) efforts to bring the Republicans into a joint statement in defense of the America electoral system. (He wanted to avoid any appearance that he was interfering in the election himself, especially considering that Trump—and Bernie Sanders—had already denounced the process as rigged.) Critics do not give any explanation for why the announcement would have made a bigger impact in August. (If people really believed that to be the case, then “August surprise” would be a perennial political cliché instead of “October surprise.”) In the end, the announcement received virtually no attention because Trump’s Access Hollywood video and the first dump of John Podesta’s personal emails were released the same day, and the press found them more intriguing, but the administration could hardly have anticipated that.

As usual, Obama’s approach was cautious and deliberative as he focused on ways to deal with the situation without making matters worse. Worse, in this case, would have meant direct interference in the voting or vote-counting process. Thus the task at hand was to avoid the Scylla of allowing the Russians to interfere with impunity while evading the Charybdis of provoking them into escalating. You don’t want to taunt them into some action that you cannot defend against. Also to be avoided was any action or announcement that could undermine the voters’ faith in the integrity of the election and thus further the Russians’ purpose of sowing confusion and distrust. Would the Russians really have escalated? There was no way to know then, and there is no way to know now. Some people have pointed out that the voting and tabulation processes are not connected to the Internet and are therefore safe from outside interference. That is a valid point; yet the computers that controlled the centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear fuel enrichment plant were not connected to the Internet either, and the United States found that it could get the Stuxnet worm into them if it really wanted to.

So, just what did Obama do? In addition to public announcements that we knew what Moscow was up to, private warnings not to go further, bolstering of the election infrastructure against cyber threats, and postelection diplomatic and economic sanctions, Obama had an additional trick up his sleeve. This is what the Post called “a previously undisclosed covert measure that authorized planting cyber weapons in Russia’s infrastructure.” This is something the Russians were intended to find and presumably would be unable to counteract. The idea is to warn them that, if they should interfere in an election again (or engage in some other unacceptable aggressive action), the United States will already be in a position to disrupt Russia’s most vital infrastructures. If the Post has described the situation accurately (and if Trump does not order it removed, which he apparently has not done to date), this may be just the deterrent threat needed to avoid a return of Russia’s electoral interference. In a few years, we shall see.

*Some specify that Obama should have imposed December’s sanctions before the election (and simply assume that this would have elicited neither adverse reactions from the Trump campaign and Republican voters nor escalation by the Russians). In cases such as these, doing what I recommend but not doing it the moment I recommend it (or when I determine after the fact that I would have recommended it if I had recommended it at the time) is often considered the equivalent of not doing anything. The ubiquitous phrase “too little, too late” can be made to fit nearly every situation.

**Similarly, Trump claims that former FBI director James Comey lied to Congress about their conversations while simultaneously asserting that his threat to reveal nonexistent audio recordings compelled Comey to tell the truth.

The post Obama, the Russian Hacking, and the Folks Who Write about Them appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). Matthieu Cimino propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Erminia Chiara Calabrese , Militer au Hezbollah. Ethnographie d’un engagement dans la banlieue sud de Beyrouth (Khartala/Ifpo, 2016, 296 pages).

Depuis plusieurs années, le Hezbollah catalyse une inflation de travaux de qualités inégales. Le sujet est rendu très attractif par sa centralité (le parti étant depuis 2011 lourdement impliqué en Syrie) ainsi que par le développement massif et éclaté des security studies, engagées autour des problématiques de terrorisme. L’autre raison tient à la difficulté d’accès aux sources : le Hezbollah, comme toute organisation militaire ou paramilitaire, assure sa pérennité par la protection de sa structure opérationnelle et militante, pour l’essentiel par le silence. Seul un nombre limité de chercheurs (à l’instar de Norton, Mervin ou Daher) a donc pu produire des ouvrages de qualité, issus de travaux de terrain, appuyés par une méthodologie rigoureuse et la maîtrise de l’arabe.

Apport considérable au corpus académique sur le parti chiite, la saisis­sante monographie de Calabrese s’inscrit dans cette filiation. Le livre est construit à partir de sources primaires, issues de multiples entretiens semi-directifs menés depuis 2005 avec des militants et sympathisants du Hezbollah ; un tel accès à l’épine dorsale activiste du parti, exceptionnel en soi, atteste d’une recherche de fond, menée sur le temps long, dans un environnement hermétique. À travers ces entretiens, l’auteur explore les modalités de l’engagement, tout en proposant une sociohistoire passionnante du Hezbollah, approchée à travers les représentations de ceux qui en constituent l’avant-garde. Par cette somme prosopographique, Calabrese déconstruit par ailleurs l’imaginaire politique entourant ces affiliés, invariablement présentés comme pauvres, très religieux et marqués par une expérience radicale du chiisme.

En sus, ce travail s’appuie sur un corpus théorique très récent, dont les réflexions d’Olivier Fillieule sur les processus d’engagement et d’action militante « par le bas », privilégiant l’approche individuelle et évitant l’écueil d’une perspective monoscalaire centrée sur les collectifs – bien que le livre veille à ne pas exagérer la centralité du premier ni à négliger l’influence des seconds. La méthodologie employée assure une infrastructure solide à cette monographie, organisée en six chapitres qui explorent la construction du réseau militant du Hezbollah, les modes différentiels de socialisation des jeunes du parti, la formation militante per se, les registres de mobilisation employés par le parti, le rôle et la charge symbolique du leader, Hassan Nasrallah, et enfin la symbo­logie de la résistance.

Si l’ensemble est dense et innovant, on retient d’abord la précision empirique avec laquelle sont décrits les mécanismes de recrutement du parti, ses procédures de sécurité opérationnelle ainsi que le cycle de façonnage de l’« identité partisane » de ses membres. Fort peu critiquable, cet ouvrage trouve peut-être une limite : ne pas questionner l’hubris comme mécanisme d’engagement des combattants. Au-delà des éléments constitutifs du milieu sociopolitique des interviewés (héritage familial, environnement éducatif…), on s’étonne de ne pas trouver chez eux de références à la quête d’un idéal de soi, ou au besoin de recherche personnelle et collective d’un ennemi. Cet élément mis à part, Militer au Hezbollah s’inscrit en référence des rares travaux monumentaux écrits sur le parti libanais.

Matthieu Cimino

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Only by working to heal the ideological, political, and military rifts in its own Arab ranks can Saudi Arabia feel secure of its position relative to Iran.

 
(article publié dans The Conversation)

En janvier 2017, nous nous interrogions sur le fait de savoir si le Président américain pouvait devenir l’ennemi pour ses alliés, européens notamment. Entre-temps, la présidence Trump a confirmé de nombreuses craintes : amateurisme, repli, provocations, tensions avec les partenaires… Dépeint tour à tour comme le porte-parole des faucons les plus durs, ou – ce qui n’est pas exclusif – comme un personnage en mal de reconnaissance, détruisant tout autour de lui faute de pouvoir briller autrement, Donald Trump a sérieusement altéré la relation transatlantique.
Sa première sortie internationale, qui après le Proche-Orient passait par l’OTAN et le G7, a produit au moins trois résultats. Elle a collectivement inquiété les Européens sur l’avenir de l’Alliance, rendu à la fois pessimiste et déterminée une Angela Merkel exaspérée, et intronisé le nouveau Président français, Emmanuel Macron, comme le contradicteur occidental le plus assumé du « trumpisme ».
Naissance d’un duoL’annonce, le 1e juin, du retrait américain de l’accord de Paris sur le climat, a intensifié ce face-à-face que l’on pressentait déjà : l’opposition de style entre le libéralisme, le multilatéralisme et le combat contre le repli nationaliste, prônés par Emmanuel Macron pendant sa campagne électorale, tranchaient avec les valeurs qui ont porté Donald Trump à la Maison Blanche. Dans son discours de sortie de l’accord climatique, Donald Trump a ainsi cité explicitement Paris, qui ne devait plus être « placé avant » un intérêt américain incarné pour l’occasion par « Youngstown, Ohio, Detroit, Michigan, et Pittsburgh, Pennsylvanie ». Dans les minutes qui ont suivi cette annonce, Emmanuel Macron a répliqué avec force sur le fond, et de manière inédite sur la forme.
Délivrant des messages en anglais qui depuis font florès sur les réseaux sociaux, il a invité les chercheurs américains à venir en France (osant un « la France est votre nation », et leur donnant du « you guys »). Il a rappelé que leur Président avait décidé de « mettre en péril » leurs budgets et leurs initiatives. Regrettant une décision américaine qualifiée de « véritable erreur pour les États-Unis et pour la planète », sa formule « Make the planet great again », détournant le slogan de campagne de Trump, a fait le tour du monde journalistique et numérique, comme un défi direct et personnel à celui qui annonce ses décisions présidentielles sur Twitter.
Deux récits, deux conceptions de la politique, deux hommes, deux générations, ont entamé un dialogue musclé, et seront systématiquement (et avec délice) présentés comme rivaux par les médias. La tension du dialogue dépasse désormais l’anecdote de la poignée de main, pour toucher à des questions de fond.
Une recomposition globale ?Lire La suite dans The Conversation

Authorities in Damascus withhold critical evidence that could help identify perpetrators of the April 4 sarin attack on Khan Sheikhoun.

Trump joins a long list of presidents who wanted to improve U.S.-Russia ties and damaged American interests in the process. Here’s how he can stop the slide.

Amid a new “Red Scare,” officials fear any contact with Moscow.

By lending support to the Three Seas Initiative, Trump wades into a complicated European fight over energy, access, and who calls the shots.

The legalization of same-sex marriage is quickly spreading throughout the globe.

The history of failed attempts on the lives of Pyongyang’s leaders shows if you come for the Kims, you better not miss.

According to reports, U.S President Donald Trump is “eager to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin with full diplomatic bells and whistles” at the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit in Hamburg, Germany on July 7. In fact Trump is “so excited about meeting Vladimir Putin that U.S. officials are worried.” U.S. allies in Europe are also worried. They probably should be worried.

Despite any “diplomatic bells and whistles,” Trump and Putin are also almost certain to meet behind closed doors, with U.S. representation limited to Trump and a small number of close aides in an administration that is under federal investigation for possible collusion with Russia to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and possible obstruction of justice. Trump’s last meeting with Russian officials – foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and ambassador Sergey Kislyak – included Trump revealing “highly classified information” to his Russian guests behind closed doors in the Oval Office. This shouldn’t inspire confidence in anyone.

Among concerns regarding his meeting with Putin is that “fanboy” Trump will be “too eager to please” the Russian president. According to reports, Trump “has told White House aides to come up with possible concessions to offer as bargaining chips” in his meeting with Putin, though it remains unclear what if anything Putin would be asked to give in return. Among the concessions Trump may offer is rolling back U.S. sanctions against Russia or agreeing to Russian demands for the return of two diplomatic compounds in the United States seized by the Obama administration in retaliation for Russian meddling in the 2016 election.

Foreign policy experts also fear that Trump will be “played” or “outfoxed” by his far more experienced and better-prepared Russian counterpart. Other than offering up concessions to Russia, Trump appears to have no clear agenda for the meeting. Putin, on the other hand, will almost certainly have a list of specific demands or requests to make of Trump. Chief among Russia’s current public demands is the return of the aforementioned diplomatic compounds. What Putin will privately ask of Trump is anyone’s guess.

Among the methods Putin might use to manipulate Trump is to bond with him over supposed “fake news” and the “deep state,” which Trump and his supporters have blamed for Trump’s ongoing Russia problems. To help avoid such pitfalls and improve the optics of the meeting, some administration officials have pressed for the National Security Council’s best known critic of Putin, Fiona Hill, to be included in the meeting. “The idea,” one senior administration official said, “is to get as many adults in the room as humanly possible.” Whether Hill will be included in the meeting remains in question.

A further concern is that Trump appears to have no plans to bring up Russia’s interference in the 2016 election. This is not surprising, given Trump’s mixed signals on whether he believes or wishes to admit that such interference even occurred. Trump is, after all, the apparent beneficiary of Russia’s actions, and to acknowledge such is to bring the legitimacy of his presidency into question. To avoid the topic with Putin would seem to invite further Russian interference in future U.S. elections, which raises obvious questions regarding the motives behind Trump’s refusal to discuss the matter.

At no previous time in America’s history has a U.S. president had as suspect a relationship with a hostile foreign power as Donald Trump has with Russia. At no previous time has a U.S. president displayed such open admiration as Trump has displayed for authoritarian leaders like Putin. The almost daily revelations on Trump’s Russian ties, Russia’s interference in the 2016 election, and possible collusion with Russia by the Trump campaign are more than ample cause for discomfort at the prospect of a private meeting between Trump and Putin.

Trump’s meeting with Putin is preceded by a visit to increasingly authoritarian Poland, where Trump has been promised a “fawning reception” with cheering crowds. To flatter Trump in a country where he is actually quite unpopular, Poland’s right-wing government is reportedly busing “rent-a-crowds” into Warsaw from across the country. Trump’s visit to Poland is seen as a “snub to the European Union” and an opportunity for Trump to use Poland as a “springboard for another attack on the EU.”

Such is the strange new reality of U.S. foreign relations under President Donald Trump.

The post Can Trump Be Trusted in a Room Alone with Putin? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

But without a significant turnaround, elephants could be on their way to extinction.

The administration is putting money toward a border wall, but giving short shrift to America’s other borders.

Moroccans gather to protest mistreatment by government and ruling monarchy authorities in late May 2017. Protests, and anger at the ruling class, has continued to grow. Photo: Fadel Senna/AFP

Morocco has long been viewed as a center of stability, with development potential and openness to reform. It has also been a beacon for foreign investment for these regions, considered in many respects an oasis surrounded by a volatile region. Yet in the last month, unusually fervent protests have shaken things, exposed vast inequality and drawn attention the country’s economically depressed northern region. Many see parallels between Morocco’s burgeoning unrest now and the Arab Spring revolts of 2011.

Recently I covered the emergence of these protests, borne from a fisherman in the town of Al-Hoceima killed while trying to reclaim his haul which had been confiscated by police. An opposition group turned this tragedy into a rallying cry, using it as evidence of the government’s disregard for the people’s welfare. They demanded economic support, infrastructure improvements, better hospitals and schools, and an end to ruling regime corruption. In a country not known for political activism, protests spread and grew in terms of participation and frequency; some of the lead organizers were arrested.

It didn’t take long for the protests to grow beyond the isolated northern region of Rif, where Al-Hoceima is located. On June 11, at least 10,000 Moroccans (according to police; march leaders claim the total was much higher) took to the streets of the capital Rabat to show solidarity with the northern protesters. Notably, the Rabat movement was led by the Justice and Spirituality group; an Islamist movement, it played a lead role in Arab Spring-inspired protests in 2011 which resulted in Morocco’s king initiating some democratic reforms. However, these reform have proved mostly hollow and ineffective. Morocco’s king and royal representatives retain a tight grip of control on all aspects of running the country (Morocco has the Arab world’s longest-ruling monarchy). As a perfect example of this, the Moroccan ruling authorities have banned Justice and Spirituality from organizing a political party or being represented in government.

As of June 15, about 100 members of the opposition movement had been arrested. There were calls for King Mohamed VI to intervene to diffuse the growing unrest. After meeting with the Moroccan monarch, newly elected French President Emmanuel Macron commented that King Mohamed is interested in “calm[ing] the situation in the Rif region by responding to the demands of this movement.” Silya Ziani, an opposition leader, called for the king’s involvement saying “We hear about the king investing in major projects abroad. What about us?” Yet the king has not responded or engaged these requests in any way.

Arrests continued on a daily basis over the next week, with no indication the protesters’ grievances would be addressed. In fact, the ministry of justice reported to parliament that it felt the government acted with “maturity, responsibility, wisdom, and in accordance with legal provisions” in breaking up gatherings, some of which featured violent clashes with police. A second major protest in Rabat, planned for June 19, was quickly shut down.

A New York Times op-ed on June 28 by Ursula Lindsey focused on the Moroccans’ plight. As she writes, the monarchy’s promises of democratic reform and giving the people more say in their government and more control over their lives have been largely empty. What’s more, the scale has instead tipped more in the opposite direction: more power and influence by the ruling class. “The king is the country’s highest religious authority, its pre-eminent political actor and its largest fortune. Everyone defers to him and knows that the only decisions that truly count are his.” Plus, according to Lindsey the fisherman’s death in Al-Hoceima just exemplified what many Moroccans knew all too well: “arbitrary and humiliating treatment by the state.”

The more international attention drawn to the Morocco unrest, the better. More world leaders and international organizations need to be aware of it, and (as Macron did) encourage the ruling regime to address the people’s concerns in genuine, meaningful, and non-violent ways. The government may be satisfied with how it handled the resistance this spring. But if they continue to use their authority to oppress and imprison those who disagree with them, Morocco may see a turbulent summer.

 

The post Unrest, uncertainty continues in Morocco appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Photo: Vijay Soneji, The Hindu

China has become widely known for its breakneck pace of trade and investment across Africa and ubiquitous presence in cities and far flung areas alike. Africa-China trade reached $188 billion in 2015, according to McKinsey, and averaged a 20 percent increase since 2000. As the rapid expansion continues, other countries trading and partnering with African nations are more ‘under the radar’ and not appearing in headlines. India’s external trade has grown significantly with the continent across the Indian Ocean. There are many similarities the regions share in both challenges and opportunities, and plans are evolving to strengthen partnerships.

The African Development Bank (AfDB) hosted its 52nd Annual General Meeting in Mahatma Mandir in Gandhinagar, India. At the meeting, Dr Akinwumi A. Adesina, President of AfDB emphasized the point stating “in 2005-06 the total bilateral trade between India and Africa stood at $11.7 billion, which has reached to $56.9 billion by 2015-16. Now we expect the bilateral trade to exceed $100 billion in the next two years, helped by the (Indian) Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s push for India-Africa partnership.”

According to data from the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS), however, 84 percent of exports from Africa to India were natural resources in 2014. On the other end of the spectrum, exports from India to sub-Saharan Africa consist of consumer goods such as automobiles, telecom and pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, a portion of foreign investment into Africa currently is through Mauritius, a tax haven for investors. Africa’s consumer goods economy is growing but has a ways to go.

The AfDB developed ‘High 5’ priorities to strengthen domestic economies to unleash the continent’s potential: energy, agriculture, industrialization, integration and improving Africans’ quality of life. Prime Minister Modi expressed India’s commitment to partner with African nations to grow technical capabilities in those areas by harnessing India’s expertise and experience to provide value added. Mr. Modi, as well, expressed hope that more African nations join the International Solar Alliance, which framework agreement was announced at the Paris climate conference.

For example of collaboration, Africa is blessed with vast amounts of arable land but much of it goes unused or is inefficiently developed. Dr. Adesina said Africa has nearly 65 percent of the uncultivated arable land in the world. India developed a successful agriculture sector and technologies under challenging headwinds, thus a partnership with Indian companies would be a natural fit and could double as capacity building. Such areas as drip irrigation, mechanization and export supply chain could prove quite beneficial. Of course, if an efficient agriculture industry is developed, that can provide a thrust away from poverty.

Union finance Minister Arun Jaitley emphasized the point at the meeting, “there is a significant scope for the agricultural sector in Africa to benefit from the Indian experience. With the changing global landscape for agriculture India can be a partner in this area.”

In addition to trade, an article in the Indian newspaper, The Hindu, totaled that 152 lines of credit have been extended by the Exim Bank of India to 44 countries for a total amount of nearly $8 billion, $10 billion has been offered for development projects over the next five years and a grant assistance of $600 million at the last India-Africa summit in 2015.

Not One Brick, One Road

Mr. Modi also announced his support to developing an “Asian-Africa Growth Corridor,” also supported by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Within that model, one potential partnership could be port development in East and Southern Africa and connecting with landlocked countries for two-way trade which can connect with Indian or Japanese ports and Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor. It has been called a ‘cooperation model.’ The leaders seek to further engage African nations to flush out the current outline vision document. Relevant infrastructure projects have  previously, and are currently, been developed by the AfDB and African nations, but Dr. Adesina mentioned utilizing Indian expertise would be beneficial as a wide array of projects are needed.

These efforts can also be viewed as an alternate to China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road record setting infrastructure project plan with a staggering estimated price tag of around $1 trillion. The range of OBOR stretches to across Asia, Europe and Africa. Chinese President Xi Jinping further described China is ready to invest $123 billion in roads, ports, energy, and other areas. China has potential to engage 65 nations with potential projects. The program is also widely suspected to drum up increased global influence and leadership, and trade ties are a strong economic method to achieve this goal. However, other nations are not simply going to cede their influence. As noted, India has increased its inroads in Africa, but not on the same scale.

The U.S. is Not Withdrawing

The United States was the top trading partner with Africa, but the rapid ascension of China and other partners has left it falling into the pack. Africa provides great opportunities, but is often viewed at as too risky to do business, thus a myriad of companies have not taken the plunge. The U.S. has, though, been investigating the potential of establishing free trade agreements with Kenya and Mauritius. Africa-U.S. trade reached $33.7 billion in 2016, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce.

The Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), designed to provide markets for African goods and stimulate trade, was initiated under President Clinton in 2000 and last renewed in 2015 by Congress. Thirty-eight nations are eligible according to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). African exports under AGOA totaled $9.3 billion in 2016 with petroleum over the years continuously being the largest export product, 55.6 percent of the total, however down from years prior due to lower prices and increased U.S. production, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. Non-petroleum exports have increased from $1.4 billion in 2001 to $4.1 billion in 2016. Some of the industries are autos and parts, apparel, fruits and nuts, cocoa, and cut flowers. In sum, the amount of the petroleum decrease led to a decrease in overall trade.

Further Road to Economic Growth

The newer economic engagement and development paradigm has shifted to include trade and not just aid. China has stimulated this model while other nations have increased trade and foreign direct investment; official development assistance (ODA) is a significant factor for improving the lives of African citizens at the last mile, but a portfolio of approaches is necessary to reach the goals of the AfDB and everyday African citizens. Trade and investment are front and center.

 

The post India Continues Building Trade Ties With Africa appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). Isabelle Saint-Mézard propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Rohan Mukherjee et Anthony Yazaki, Poised for Partnership: Deepening India-Japan Relations in the Asian Century (Oxford University Press, 2016, 304 pages).

Jusqu’à ce jour, le rapprochement indo-japonais a intéressé le monde des think tanks et des médias, mais guère celui de l’université. L’intérêt de cet ouvrage d’une dizaine de contributions d’auteurs indiens et japonais est de présenter une analyse approfondie des liens qui se nouent actuellement entre les deux États. À ce titre, un thème récurrent le parcourt : rattraper le temps perdu et les occasions de coopération manquées. La plupart des chapitres rappellent que les liens bilatéraux, très cordiaux durant les années 1950, se sont distendus pendant la guerre froide et sont restés entravés jusqu’aux années 1990 en raison du désaccord sur le programme nucléaire militaire indien. Le rapprochement entre les deux États n’a commencé qu’en 2000, lors de la visite à New Delhi du Premier ministre Mori, mais la relation bilatérale demeure aujourd’hui en deçà de son potentiel.

Pour expliquer le renforcement des relations entre Tokyo et New Delhi, les auteurs évoquent le contexte géo­politique, marqué par l’intransigeance de la Chine dans les disputes territoriales qui l’opposent à ses voisins. Ils notent aussi l’influence favorable du rapprochement indo-américain sur les dirigeants à Tokyo. Mais Mukherjee et Yazaki affirment que ce sont avant tout les « idéaux démocratiques partagés » qui fondent la nouvelle entente. Plus encore, ce sont les changements sur la scène politique intérieure nippone et l’arrivée de dirigeants « néoconservateurs » tels Junichiro Koizumi et surtout Shinzo Abe, qui ont le plus œuvré en faveur du rapprochement avec l’Inde. De fait, ces dirigeants se caractérisent par leur désir « de voir le Japon jouer un rôle plus actif en faveur de la sécurité en Asie », et la conviction qu’« en vertu de leurs idéaux démocratiques partagés, l’Inde et le Japon pourraient être de proches partenaires ».

Cohérentes, les contributions suivent une même approche méthodologique : analyser les intérêts et stratégies de chaque pays dans un secteur donné, pour ensuite évaluer le potentiel de coopération bilatérale. L’analyse suit quatre grands secteurs : économie, énergie, sécurité et gouvernance mondiale. Les points de vue japonais et indien sont à chaque fois présentés avec diverses recommandations. Par ailleurs, l’ouvrage se démarque par sa tonalité réaliste, voire sceptique, sur le rapprochement en cours, et insiste sur les multiples contraintes qui continuent d’entraver l’approfondissement de la relation. Il rappelle à diverses reprises que les facteurs de malentendus et d’incompréhension demeurent nombreux entre Inde et Japon, tant leurs systèmes socioculturels sont différents, les interactions entre leurs sociétés limitées et leurs modes de fonctionnement bureaucratique spécifiques.

Il est un peu frustrant que l’ouvrage s’arrête au seuil d’une phase qu’il qualifie lui-même de très prometteuse, marquée par l’arrivée au pouvoir de Narendra Modi, personnalité très proche de Shinzo Abe. L’ouvrage n’évoque donc pas l’accord de coopération nucléaire de la fin 2016. Or ce développement ne signale pas seulement la levée de l’un des obstacles les plus importants de la relation, il montre aussi que par leur poigne et leur volonté politique, les dirigeants aujourd’hui au pouvoir à Tokyo et à New Delhi entendent surmonter les facteurs structurels les plus contraignants pour forcer la construction d’une relation stratégique.

Isabelle Saint-Mézard

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(Own report) - The modernization of nuclear weapons - already possessed by nine countries, and affecting Germany through "nuclear sharing" - is rapidly progressing, according to a current analysis of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The overall number of nuclear weapons in the world has slightly decreased SIPRI notes. However, new US-bombs (B61-12), for example, are much more precise than their predecessor models. Experts warn that this development could lower the threshold for their possible use. The B61-12 bombs are likely to be stationed also at the German Air Base in Büchel in the hills of the Eifel. Germany's "nuclear sharing" status has already prompted discussions in the arms industry. Airbus has begun to design a successor model to the tornado jet fighter, which is currently certified for the B61. If this next generation jet fighter is to be certified also for the US bomb, all its construction details would have to be revealed to the USA, a prospect being met with misgivings in the Berlin establishment. It has recently been reported that the URENCO nuclear fuel company, which also has a plant in Gronau (North Rhine-Westphalia) has agreed to supply enriched uranium to a US power plant that produces tritium for US nuclear weapons.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). Dominique David, rédacteur en chef de Politique étrangère, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Pascal Lamy et Nicole Gnesotto, Où va le monde ? Le marché ou la force ? (Odile Jacob, 2017, 240 pages).

Dialogue structuré, ce livre fait entendre, et se mêler, deux voix qui auraient pu, a priori, paraître divergentes. L’une, suspecte de privilégier le développement, l’organisation du monde et l’accouchement de la paix par l’échange et l’ouverture, bref le « doux commerce » ; l’autre, plus proche du réalisme des « sécuri­taires », soucieuse de ne pas gommer les hiérarchies de puissances politiques et étatiques. Pascal Lamy et Nicole Gnesotto montrent que le chant à deux voix permet à la fois l’affirmation et le dialogue.

Une première partie rappelle les bases des deux approches. L’une, plus géopolitique, dessine un monde où les rapports de forces sont de retour, un monde sans puissance organisatrice, dominante, et destructuré. L’autre relève que les principaux conflits se développent dans les zones les moins intégrées à l’économie mondiale des échanges : ce n’est donc pas l’ouverture qu’il faut repenser, mais la production de la justice sociale.

La deuxième partie se présente comme un panorama synthétique des acteurs et des enjeux du monde actuel. Dans cette partie très riche, on notera les développements sur la Russie (à la fois faible et forte), sur les Afriques (ô combien diverses), sur le Moyen-Orient (juxta­position d’acteurs faits d’États trop forts et de nations trop faibles), ou sur l’importance des espaces maritimes (enjeux majeurs trop délaissés par la France). Sur le problème de la gouvernance globale, le constat est lucide : les structures n’ont pas suivi les bouleversements du monde ; et quand les Occidentaux souhaitent associer « les autres » à l’action internationale, ils les veulent dans leurs institutions, suivant leurs logiques et leurs normes.

On attendait bien sûr les auteurs sur le thème de leur troisième et dernière partie : où est, que fait, l’Europe dans ce monde-là ? La conjoncture actuelle suggère de distinguer l’adhésion à l’idée européenne de la plupart des opinions du Vieux Continent, de leur critique, de plus en plus large, de la manière dont elle est gouvernée. Pour récupérer une adhésion pleine et entière, il faut sans doute rappeler sans cesse les acquis, les bienfaits de la construction européenne (trop souvent pris en otage par les caricatures électoralistes), et remettre l’Union européenne sur de bons rails idéologiques, l’emmenant vers de bonnes décisions politiques. Réaffirmer le sens de la construction européenne, c’est aujourd’hui dire qu’elle peut être à la manœuvre pour « civiliser » la mondialisation – un objectif quelque peu oublié ces deux dernières décennies. C’est aussi, sans doute, repenser cette Europe dans le monde réel, un monde où manœuvrent et s’entrechoquent de vraies forces, pas seulement à la recherche de l’influence douce, post-nationale (post-machiavélienne serait-on tenté de dire…) qu’a privilégiée l’idéologie européiste.

Le mirage d’une Europe-puissance régentant le monde ressemble trop à un fantasme français pour séduire au-delà de l’Hexagone. Mais l’illusion d’une Europe-modèle entraînant le monde vers la paix par sa seule influence (et des chèques de moins en moins approvisionnés) doit être dépassée.

On est heureux d’acquiescer aux pers­pectives, à la fois généreuses et réalistes, des deux auteurs qui laissent pourtant ouvert le thème d’un possible second tome : quel accord est possible entre Européens – ou entre quels Européens – sur ces options éminemment politiques ?

Dominique David

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(Own report) - Since 1990, the German Navy is more than ever focusing its activities on the power struggle with Russia in the Baltic Sea. It is "conceivable" that "the eastern area of the Baltic Sea could become the venue for conflicts of interests and provocations," the head of a department in the German Navy Command wrote in an article published in the current edition of MarineForum. This necessitates preparations for "the regular and permanent presence of operational forces" and a resolute military buildup, and Berlin's announcement to procure five new corvettes is a signal in the right direction. At the same time, large scale maneuvers are regularly being held in the Baltic Sea. The most recent "BALTOPS 2017" exercise was focused around the scenario of naval combat against an enemy advancing "from the North." Strategic B-52 bombers - among others - we e training so close to the Russian border that Moscow saw itself forced to chase them off with fighter jets. B-52s can be equipped with nuclear arms. Moscow has announced Russian-Chinese naval exercises to be held this month - for the first time in the Baltic Sea.

Secretary-General António Guterres has met with the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and their backers at the Conference on Cyprus in Switzerland, saying there is now an understanding of what is needed for a possible settlement on the Mediterranean island.