A refugee woman from the minority Yazidi sect, who fled the violence in the Iraqi town of Sinjar, sits with a child inside a tent at Nowruz refugee camp in Qamishli, northeastern Syria August 17, 2014. Photo Credit: Rodi Said / Reuters
In the last week there have been mass graves discovered in Iraq. There is little detail on who the 400 people found buried are, why they were executed or what group they belonged to, but just that they were victims of ISIS and their location. This story and many linked to the atrocities in Iraq and Syria did not receive as much coverage as they should have considering how similar events in history have scarred the psyche of all democratic nations. The civilian targets of ISIS have often been minority groups in the region that were seen as less than human in ISIS philosophy and that did not have a strong militia protecting their communities. If you were born into such a group by no choice of your own, the worst punishments were applied to you and your family. Memories of those victims of religious fervor that suffered in the Spanish Inquisition have shaped human rights norms and codes along with other historic events in Western history. In these recent cases that can be argued as some of the worst treatment girls and women have faced in human history, there has been a passive approach to protecting their lives.
No one should be burned alive because they would not convert to a religion, but it occurred frequently under ISIS and little was said in Western media in most cases. Sexual assaults against minors daily and the execution of relatives in front of them was standard practice, occurring on a massive scale, in many cases resulting in those girls being burned alive themselves. Every violation of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was committed using the most extreme methods, and in most cases these atrocities were given a page twelve storyline, if published at all. Their protection was treated as a page twelve storyline as well, with the protectors of many of those minorities, the Peshmerga, now being attacked from all of its neighbours as a reward for attempting to be the only militia that tried to protect minorities from human rights abuses.
Rwanda was a tipping point in how we handle genocide in modern times. Rwanda was almost completely ignored, but awareness of the atrocities was well known as UN representatives were on the ground during the genocide and were communicating with their respective governments, and nothing was done to stop it. Many of these same leaders that ignored the genocide in Rwanda are active in governments around the world today, or advise modern governments on policy and are key contributors in developing legislation and UN actions. These same leaders also impressed their shame on their lack of actions in stopping the Rwandan Genocide, but also have done little to help Yazidis and other minorities in Iraq and Syria. They are well aware of what is going on as video and photos of atrocities are broadcast on social media frequently. Their passive attention post-Rwanda to genocide is passively permitting another Inquisition. The policy approach to do nothing about returning citizens who committed these acts against minorities in the Middle East has also fallen on deaf ears. Allowing those who have orchestrated the worst human rights abuses in human history to pass between borders without trial and with complete freedom is an insult to every victim of genocide since the Spanish Inquisition as well.
One of the shameful events that shaped human rights globally, the Inquisition, was occurring yet again, but we are blinded to it in modern society. Perhaps future generations will learn from our mistakes, but there is no doubt that modern society have failed the minorities in Iraq and Syria as regret replaces action, and shame is assured on us by future generations.
The post We Should Have Never Permitted Another Inquisition appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Saudi Iranian Flags BIN
On Saturday afternoon November 4th from the Saudi capital of Riyadh, now former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri declared he resigned due to threat of assassination, saying, “I have sensed what is being plotted covertly to target my life.” The BBC reported that Hariri made multiple trips to Saudi Arabia (KSA) over the couple of days prior to his announcement, and Hariri attacked Iran and the Shia movement Hezbollah in the Riyadh broadcast. The location of the surprising revelation and Hariri’s depiction of Iran as determined to “destroy the Arab world” hints that the Saudi-Iranian proxy war may have returned to Beirut.
Lebanon’s elections were scheduled for May 2018, but last weekend’s developments call that into question and may have destroyed any semblance of détente that existed in Lebanese politics between the regional heavyweights. Lebanon’s delicate political arrangement assembled Sunni, Shia, and Christian representatives after two years without a complete government. Yet, the role of Hezbollah (due to its designation as a terrorist organization by the U.S. and Arab Gulf States) constituted a legitimate excuse for outside intervention. So far, Lebanon’s government has not collapsed, many suspect Hariri is just a mouth for Riyadh, and Hezbollah may be the hero if they can maintain stability in Lebanon.
On October 10, the U.S. offered two multi-million dollar rewards for Hezbollah leaders which may correlate with Saudi State Minister for Arab Gulf Affairs Thamer Sabhan’s tweet two days prior that an international coalition to confront Hezbollah is needed. Following the KSA’s interception of a missile fired from Yemen, Mr. Sabhan described Hezbollah’s role in assembling the missile and stated, “We will treat the government of Lebanon as a government declaring a war because of Hezbollah militias.” This came as Saudi Foreign Minister, Adel al-Jubeir, labeled the same missile attack an “act of war” by Iran. Iran has supplied Hezbollah with as much as $200 million each year, so Hezbollah may find themselves at the center of a power struggle with few options to extract themselves.
Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Daniel Shapiro immediately assessed that an Israeli-Hezbollah conflict was inevitable, arguing Israel has been prepping since 2006. Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman contributed to this prospect on Saturday saying, “In Practice Lebanon has been occupied by Hezbollah and the Iranians,” and “This axis is operating inside Lebanon, inside Syria and is extending its patronage into the Gaza Strip.” The U.S. and KSA have lead the fight to coordinate international opinion against Hezbollah and have operated in cohesion with their terrorist designations. Congress even introduced a bill to encourage Europe to see Hezbollah as one movement and not to differentiate between the political and military wings of Hezbollah.
Lebanon’s political future and security may unfortunately be dictated by the interests and strategic moves of foreign powers. The U.S. and Russia have coordinated with Hezbollah at different times to combat Daesh in Syria, and Iran has backed them nearly since their 1979 revolution. Russian and Iranian security interests aligned in Syria and have blossomed into a much deeper relationship, whereas President Trump most recently proved his support for the Saudi Crown Prince’s consolidation of power, tweeting, “I have great confidence in King Salman and Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, they know exactly what they are doing… Some of those they are harshly treating have been “milking” their country for years!”
In an effort to alienate the militaristic efforts of Hezbollah and Hamas from the greater Arab community and contain Iranian influence, the KSA is moving quickly to build alliances and present a new image as moderate or progressive (like granting women the freedom to drive). The detention of the Saudi “untouchable” Princes may assist in legitimizing the Monarchy’s governing mandate, but the timing of these moves encourages speculation of a Saudi-U.S. plot for the region. Riyadh, by some accounts, is committing war crimes in Yemen, and has not effectively shown off its military competency. What was supposed to be a quick victory is now a disaster with a record-breaking cholera epidemic, the worst famine in decades, and no clear path out.
During the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006, many Arab Gulf States were rattled by public support for Hezbollah which, by default, shed warmer light on Iran. In March 2016, all six GCC States designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization, but their unanimity is still a hard sell to their citizens.
Sectarian identity fluctuates with time and by situation, which makes for insecure politics. Sectarian identity is not only driven through polemics, but institutionalized via access to public sector jobs, opportunity in the armed forces, and cemented by wealth distribution. Generalizing Arab Gulf state economies may, by nature, predispose some flavor of Orientalism, but the rentier economic model has granted the government the necessary incentives to impose sectarian identity on its people by correlating profits and stability with the Monarchy.
However, questions of legitimacy arise quickly when funds run dry and as Saudi economic woes become more urgent, social unrest could threaten the Monarchy. Much has been written on the Saudi-Iranian struggle for regional supremacy and their shadow looms heavily over Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, Qatar, and now Lebanon. The dense collection of alliances and informal dealings with States and non-state actors encourages rumors and conspiracy theories to bounce around the Arab Streets, and the presence of foreign powers (like the U.S. and Russia) inspires speculation about their end game and further obscures the truth.
If we accept that a new Middle Eastern Cold War has settled in, as argued by F. Gregory Gauss III of Brookings, between the KSA & Iran, then have the rapprochement efforts by the KSA with former foes inspired any allegiance following last week’s barrage of developments?
Rapprochement Coverage & A New Order
Since November 2013, reports have surfaced over Saudi-Israeli rapprochement and speculation has accelerated since the summer of 2016 due to fears of the U.S. abandoning the MENA region. Saudi officials went so far as to state, “Israel is not an enemy” that summer to a scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; a drastic divergence from the 2007 condemnation of Israeli excavations near al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem as “a provocation to Muslims around the world.”
Private rapprochement efforts along military and business interests are widely documented, but public statements frequently contradict such evidence. On October 21, the Forward reported in an interview with Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former ambassador to Washington and onetime head of the KSA’s intelligence agency, that such rapprochement with Israel was an illusion of Prime Minister Netanyahu; yet, “two hours after the interview,” Prince Turki, the former Head of Mossad, and a Pentagon official sat on the same stage for a security seminar. Due to the political consequences, official confirmation of such rapprochement is highly unlikely for now.
A leaked cable by Israel’s Channel 10 on November 6, shows that the Israeli MFA ordered its embassies to support the Saudi & Hariri line about the destabilizing effect Hezbollah has had on the Lebanese government. Publicly, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has tweeted, “The resignation of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Hariri and his remarks are a wake-up call to the international community to take action against the Iranian aggression, which is turning Syria into a second Lebanon.”
This leak will likely play as a smoking gun, implicating Israel and the KSA in an effort to upend the regional structure and severely damage Riyadh’s legitimacy amongst Arabs skeptical of Israel. This revelation may make Riyadh’s relationship with Cairo that much more significant because the KSA is in desperate need to save face in the Arab Streets. Riyadh invested heavily in Egypt following the removal of the Egyptian Brotherhood in 2013 with not only economic funds, but political capital; Riyadh’s relationship with Cairo is complicated but as Egypt makes up a quarter of all Arabs, they remain a key source of legitimacy.
The Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement effort has made great strides over the past month including: the first flights between Riyadh and Baghdad in 27 years, a newly appointed Saudi Ambassador to Iraq, and the establishment of a Coordination Council in the presence of U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson. Riyadh’s diplomatic blitz also comes as Russia is championed the de facto winner in Syria, and classic U.S. allies are seeking assurances that their Iranian-foe will not topple the regional status quo.
Iraq has not shown any public allegiance to Riyadh since last week’s developments and has avoided comment on the subject. This is fairly easy to do because their security situation can still consume local headlines and Baghdad has been clear about balancing its relationship with the U.S., Russia, the KSA, and Iran. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi just two weeks ago returned from a trip to Riyadh, Cairo, Amman, Ankara, and Tehran without declaring any allegiance to one over the other. This flood of developments comes amidst the steady drip of information hinting at possible negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, facilitated by Cairo whose most ardent backer is Riyadh.
Cairo’s Role in Riyadh’s Scheme
Cairo’s relationship with Riyadh is complicated as Sisi seeks to reform his relationship with the Palestinians, by pushing Qatar out of Gaza, but does not view Hezbollah as a serious threat. The summer of 2017 was characterized by the cutting of diplomatic relations and a financial boycott of Qatar by the KSA, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt that has upset GCC coherence. A unique condition that was not explicitly stated in the 13 demands circulated by the Saudi-led bloc was for Qatar to quit funding Hamas.
Qatar hosts the previous leader of Hamas, Khaled Meshaal, who has ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; the current Egyptian government rose following a coup perpetrated by the military against the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani of Qatar was the first world leader to visit Gaza under Hamas control in 2012 (bringing $400 million in aid) and Qatar is the only Gulf state to maintain close ties with Hamas. For its part, Hamas has felt that many Middle Eastern governments have used the Palestinian cause for their own ends, which makes their relationship with Qatar that much more significant.
In early October, representatives of Hamas and Fatah signed a reconciliation agreement which would grant the Palestinian Authority (PA) greater control over Hamas controlled territories in the Gaza Strip (like the Rafah border crossing with Egypt). Two weeks prior, Hamas called for the PA to replace it as the governing body in Gaza, which would in effect remove restrictions on Gazans access to electricity. While Israeli analysts caution against the longevity of this agreement, the PA assumed control over the Rafah border crossing on November 1.
On October 29, Al-Monitor quoted an Egyptian diplomat on the contents of a Cairo initiative for multilateral negotiations towards an Arab-Israeli peace accord. The main tenants of this initiative include:
Netanyahu stated he was willing to discuss the Arab Peace initiative in May 2016, but even the alignment of all Arab States does not preclude sabotage from non-state actors. Acts of terrorism by individuals or movements force comment from Arab leaders, and their allegiance to their ethnicity can be called into question (often a great source of their legitimacy and power).
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has urged caution and for the de-escalation of tensions between Riyadh and Tehran, while also affirming his support for Riyadh stating, “We support our (Saudi) brothers.” Riyadh’s backing of Cairo presents an opportunity to elevate Cairo’s status as a leader of Arabs, and as the lead negotiator of peace and stability for the region. Yet, Sisi’s caution is warranted because Egypt has struggled to control the Sinai Peninsula with terrorist attacks occurring frequently, and they do not need to incur the wrath of Tehran. Cairo is avoiding greater sanctions on Hezbollah, amidst Saudi urging, which reduces the odds they would take part in any sort of military confrontation.
Riyadh Might Fight Iran Without the Arabs
The most dependable alliance the Saudi’s have cultivated is with Israel and the drastic developments of the past week should be considered an experiment, testing the regional structure and allegiances. Baghdad seeks stability and wants nothing to do with any future conflict. Cairo see’s room for growth with Saudi backing but is not ready to sign up for armed conflict because Iran is not an immediate threat. Israel see’s Iran and Hezbollah as an immediate threat and is ready to adjust the regional structure before stability settles in.
This is the state of affairs, and Riyadh must decide if they are willing to go forward with Tel Aviv as their staunchest ally in the region. Such a move would likely all but eliminate Riyadh’s hopes of becoming the leader of the Arabs, but might ensure the survival of the Monarchy with allies like the U.S. and Israel.
The post The Middle East’s Cold War Is Not Going Well for the Saudi’s appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Deux ans après les attentats du 13 novembre 2015, nous vous invitons à relire cette recension de l’ouvrage de Gérôme Truc, Sidérations. Une sociologie des attentats (PUF, 2016), écrite par Marc Hecker et publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère n° 4/2016.
Cet ouvrage est tiré d’une thèse de doctorat soutenue à l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales en 2014. Gérôme Truc a cherché à comprendre pourquoi des individus se sentent touchés par des attentats qui ne les ont pourtant pas directement visés. Pour ce faire, il se penche plus spécifiquement sur trois attaques terroristes dont les dates ont marqué le début du XXIe siècle : 11 septembre 2001, 11 mars 2004 et 7 juillet 2005. Il analyse les réactions politiques, la couverture médiatique et les témoignages de milliers d’anonymes. L’effet de sidération, explique-t-il, varie en fonction d’un « entrelacs complexe de sentiments impersonnels et personnels ».
On retiendra plus spécifiquement trois points de ce livre. Le premier a trait au poids de la culture politique et historique du pays touché. Les événements du 11 septembre 2001 sont intervenus l’année des commémorations du soixantième anniversaire de Pearl Harbor. Un blockbuster commémoratif était diffusé depuis le mois de mai à travers tous les États-Unis. Ainsi l’effondrement des tours du World Trade Center a-t-il immédiatement été interprété par la population américaine, mais aussi par de nombreux responsables dont George W. Bush, comme un « nouveau Pearl Harbor ». Dès lors, comme en 1941, l’entrée en guerre paraissait inéluctable.
Le deuxième point concerne la résilience des populations face à une attaque. Là encore, la culture nationale a son importance. Au Royaume-Uni, la résistance de la population britannique au moment du Blitz s’est imposée comme une référence après le 7 juillet 2005. Toutefois, la résilience n’est pas seulement affaire de culture et de comparaisons historiques. Elle se travaille et se construit. Depuis l’attentat de Madrid – présenté par de nombreux responsables politiques de pays membres de l’Union européenne comme un « 11 Septembre européen » – les dirigeants britanniques expliquaient que le Royaume-Uni serait visé. Le maire de Londres, notamment, s’évertuait à préparer la population à un attentat perçu comme inéluctable. Et une fois l’attaque survenue, une campagne d’affichage fut entreprise pour tenter de souder les Londoniens dans l’adversité.
Le troisième point relève de la couverture médiatique, qui diffère sensiblement d’une rive à l’autre de l’Atlantique. Cette différence se remarque particulièrement pour ce qui est des images de victimes. Alors que les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont été les plus meurtriers de l’histoire, leurs aspects visuels les plus crus ont été occultés. Et pour cause : la police a empêché la presse de circuler librement sur les lieux des attentats, dans les hôpitaux ou les morgues. À l’inverse, les journalistes ont eu accès à la gare d’Atocha après les attentats de Madrid, et des photographies de cadavres – non floutées – ont été publiées en une des principaux journaux espagnols. Occulter par pudeur ou montrer pour dénoncer : le dilemme se pose aux médias au lendemain de chaque attentat.
D’autres passages de cet ouvrage mériteraient d’être évoqués, notamment ceux qui concernent les manifestations post-attentats ou encore les débats suscités par les minutes de silence. Alors que la France est touchée par une vague de terrorisme sans précédent, la lecture de Sidérations se révèle des plus utiles.
Marc Hecker
S’abonner à Politique étrangère
À l’occasion de l’anniversaire de l’armistice de 1918, nous vous invitons à relire le numéro spécial de Politique étrangère « 1914-2014. La Grande guerre et le monde de demain » publié en 2014 pour célébrer le 100e anniversaire de la Grande guerre.
« Nous avons vécu avec elle 100 ans durant. Qu’en faire maintenant ? La Première Guerre mondiale a créé son siècle, et elle nous parle toujours : de ce que nous sommes, de ce que nous serons.
Fondatrice d’un siècle : l’affaire est claire. Le débat sur les causes de la guerre reste ouvert aux polémiques et les publications récentes n’échappent pas au choc des arguments : facteurs politiques internes, dialectique des alliances et des appareils militaires, affrontement de géopolitiques organicistes voyant la vie des États comme expansion de puissance continue, etc. Mais l’analyse de la mécanique du passage de la paix au conflit armé est vite dépassée. Le premier conflit industriel et total du champ international a modelé notre vision de la guerre, de la mobilisation intégrale des sociétés, de la dynamique technique au service de la guerre. Il a créé un « système de guerre » nouveau, des formes opérationnelles et tactiques, des appareils armés qui fonctionnent jusqu’à nos jours. Il a ouvert une réflexion de long terme sur les rapports entre le politique et le militaire, non seulement en termes d’autorité, mais dans la définition même de la stratégie : est-elle manière de gagner la guerre ou de gérer un affrontement global – politique – qui la dépasse de beaucoup ?
Le premier conflit mondial pèse lourd dans l’affirmation des nations. Il dissout trois empires et porte au sommet le choc de visions nationales mises au service d’une révision des rapports de puissance, entre Royaume-Uni, Allemagne émergente, France… Il fait appel aux contingents de peuples colonisés qui, bientôt, mettront l’expérience au service de leur propre émancipation. Portant les nationalismes à incandescence – voir les débats sur l’« art allemand », l’« art français »… –, il manque faire disparaître l’idée même de nation dans l’opprobre de la guerre, en même temps qu’il amorce par ses ravages le déclin historique de toutes les nations européennes. Et pourtant, l’occasion de la guerre, de ses mobilisations économiques, sociales, morales, permet un renforcement des structures de chacun de ces États. Responsable de la conduite de la guerre, l’État moderne l’est aussi de la construction de la paix à l’extérieur des frontières, et il étend son contrôle interne à des champs de plus en plus larges de la société civile : le Welfare State européen naît de l’économie de guerre, puis de la nécessité de relever l’économie de la paix.
Les échanges économiques n’ont certes pas attendu le premier conflit mondial pour s’internationaliser. D’une certaine manière, le conflit est lui-même produit de la mondialisation de la fin du XIXe siècle qui met en cause les anciens rapports de puissance. Mais la Première Guerre mondiale débouche sur une redéfinition de l’ouverture des économies (voir les fameux « Quatorze Points » du président Wilson) qui campe au cœur du système international, où elle sera réinstallée, sous des apprêts neufs mais toujours très américains, à l’issue de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.
Pour que l’atroce conflit puisse être réputé « der des ders », il doit accoucher d’un nouveau système international et de références, de règles, permettant de le stabiliser. Pour dépasser le simple rapport des forces, l’idée d’organismes étatiques en développement et en compétition naturelle, ou un dialogue réduit aux plus puissants, il faut fonder le système sur la responsabilité des acteurs et sur le droit. C’est à l’issue de la Grande Guerre que l’on envisage, pour la première fois, de traduire en justice ceux qu’on accuse d’être responsables du massacre – projets concrétisés 30 ans plus tard à Nuremberg et à Tokyo. Et c’est ce même conflit qui pose les bases d’un système universel gérable, à travers les complexes montages des traités de la fin de la guerre et le beau nom de Société des nations. La SDN ne sera ni universelle ni efficace, mais l’idée de créer de la sécurité à travers des accords et des forums pérennes, le tout dans un système organisant une coexistence permanente, est née. […]
Lisez la suite de l’éditorial ici.
Découvrez le numéro complet ici.