Europäische Union

Az új uniós jogszabály egyszerűsíti a fizetésképtelenségi eljárásokat, megkönnyítve a befektetők számára, hogy a befektetési lehetőségek mérlegelése során figyelembe vegyék a fizetésképtelenségi szabályokat.

A Tanács François-Louis Michaud-t nevezte ki az Európai Bankhatóság (EBH) elnökévé, aki 2026. április 16-án lép majd hivatalba. Hivatali ideje öt évre szól, és egy alkalommal meghosszabbítható.

Weekly schedule of President António Costa, 30 March - 12 April 2026.

Remarks by Eurogroup President Kyriakos Pierrakakis on the economic impact of the situation in the Middle East, the energy transition, development of the Savings and Investments Union and preparation ahead of the IMF and G7 international meetings.

A Tanács és a Parlament megállapodott az uniós vámügyi keret gyökeres átalakításáról, az általános tendenciák kezelésére szolgáló korszerűbb eszköztárat biztosítva az Unió számára.

Az EU képviseletében António Costa, az Európai Tanács elnöke Ursula von der Leyennel, az Európai Bizottság elnökével együtt fog részt venni az EU és Örményország közötti csúcstalálkozón, amelynek 2026. május 4–5-én Jereván ad majd otthont. Örményországot annak miniszterelnöke, Nikol Pasinján képviseli majd.

The Council adopted a set of conclusions at the start of the 14th WTO ministerial conference, outlining the EU's expectations and position for the conference, including on WTO reform.

Az EU és Nigéria közös közleményt adott ki a 2026. március 23-án, hétfőn a nigériai Abujában tartott nyolcadik EU–Nigéria miniszteri találkozót követően.

This chapter examines China’s engagement with the United Nations (UN) development work through a comparison with Sweden. Both countries are UN member states, but differ on most indicators, including development experiences and trajectories as development cooperation providers. The chapter provides an overview of China’s and Sweden’s general profiles and compares funding practices, strategic priorities and approaches to multilateral cooperation. From a Swedish perspective, the features of China’s approach relative to Sweden’s engagement point to areas of concern, particularly regarding China’s challenge to the relative autonomy of UN bureaucracies and the human rights agenda. At the same time, there might be potential opportunities for closer coordination – notably with regard to the two countries’ complementary funding practices – in a moment of extraordinary upheaval at the UN.

Nach der Festnahme von vier Mitgliedern eines kriminellen Netzwerks standen die Bündner Behörden in der Kritik. Das kantonale Justizdepartement hat den Fall untersucht. Das Ergebnis wirft ein schiefes Licht auf die Personenfreizügigkeit.

An Employment and Social Affairs Committee delegation went to San Patrignano, Foggia and Caserta to look into the working and living conditions of various groups.
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Der Bundesrat will die Reform der Wohneigentumsbesteuerung ein Jahr später in Kraft setzen als von vielen erwartet. Das Baugewerbe freut’s – die betroffenen Kantone ebenfalls, aber nur halb.

Wegen der verzögerten Lieferung des Patriot-Flugabwehrsystems will das VBS erst wieder Geld an die USA überweisen, wenn diese verbindliche Angaben zu Lieferterminen und Kosten gemacht haben.

Wie wird ein Brief digital verschickt? Und wie teuer ist der Dienst? Die wichtigsten Fragen und Antworten zum digitalen Brief der Post.

From 30 March to 1 April, a Housing Committee delegation visited Lisbon in Portugal to review measures tackling the housing crisis with national authorities and stakeholders.
Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the European Union

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Der neue Babs-Chef kommt aus dem VBS-Generalsekretariat. Marc Siegenthaler übernimmt das Bundesamt nach einer Phase massiver Kritik.

By CIVICUS
Apr 1 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses the presidential election in the Republic of the Congo with Ivan Kibangou Ngoy, executive director of Global Participe, a civil society action-research organisation focused on democratic governance based in Pointe-Noire.

Ivan Kibangou Ngoy

On 15 March, President Denis Sassou Nguesso, aged 82, won the election with around 95 per cent of the vote, extending his 42-year rule. The result came as no surprise: two major opposition parties boycotted the poll, key opposition figures were jailed or in exile and independent observers were denied accreditation. On polling day, borders were closed and the internet cut off. The non-competitive election produced the result it was designed to.

How can the 94.8 per cent result be explained?

The outcome of this election was predictable from the outset, and for one fundamental reason: the legal framework gives free rein to electoral fraud. The electoral law lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent manipulation. The ruling party has systematically rigged the electoral process, excluding its opponents and independent civil society from any meaningful participation.

Accreditation for observers was refused to independent civil society organisations (CSOs), evidence of a total lack of transparency. Without independent observers, there’s no external oversight of the conduct of the vote or the counting of votes.

The result was not the outcome of electoral competition; it was the logical result of a system designed to guarantee precisely this outcome. When the legal framework allows for fraud, the opposition cannot campaign, observers are excluded and the government controls all administrative mechanisms, including the electoral administration, the result becomes inevitable. This is not an anomaly but the product of a system designed to produce it and to give it the appearance of democratic legitimacy. So the result was already decided even before polling stations opened.

How was competition restricted?

Opposition parties and independent CSOs were not allowed to organise public meetings or campaign openly among voters. They were denied access to public media, preventing them communicating with people.

The country still operates under a prior authorisation regime: the government must approve all public political activity. This system creates a fundamental imbalance: the ruling party can organise its rallies freely, while the opposition is blocked at every turn. There is an urgent need to move to a simple notification system, in which CSOs and parties would inform the authorities of their activities without needing their consent. Without this change, the opposition has no legal mechanism to participate fairly in an election.

The imprisonment and exile of major opposition figures send a clear message: challenging Sassou Nguesso’s regime is criminalised. Two of the country’s best-known opposition figures have been in prison for nearly a decade. When opponents cannot stand for election, campaign or move about freely, the result is predetermined both by fraud and the physical elimination of alternatives. The election is merely an administrative charade designed to legitimise the retention of power. It’s not a genuine choice but a demonstration of state power over a population reduced to silence.

Why is the internet cut off during elections?

Since the advent of social media, every election has been accompanied by an internet blackout, a deliberate measure the authorities take to control the information circulating during the vote. Internet shutdowns directly reinforce the system of electoral fraud by preventing the spread of information on fraud, irregularities or violations of voters’ rights. Without the internet, people cannot share photos or videos from polling stations, observers cannot report anomalies in real time and citizen movements cannot coordinate monitoring efforts.

The internet blackout effectively transforms the country into an information-controlled zone where only government messages can circulate. This reveals that the regime understands the power of social media as a tool for accountability and mobilisation. It’s an implicit acknowledgement that, without control over information, the regime could not maintain its official narrative. This systematic practice ultimately reveals the fragility of the regime’s legitimacy.

How has civil society mobilised despite restrictions?

Despite systematic restrictions, civil society organised itself by holding press conferences and workshops in private spaces, where the authorities could not intervene directly. These meetings enabled civil society to coordinate strategies and strengthen cohesion between organisations, even with a limited number of participants. Press conferences enabled direct engagement with the media despite restrictions on access to public media. Civil society also used social media to document rights violations, mobilise people and maintain a public conversation on electoral issues.

However, these strategies reveal the limits of resistance in a heavily controlled environment. Meetings in private spaces reach only a limited audience and social media can be shut down at any moment, as happened on election day. We must continue mapping independent CSOs to identify and connect all those working outside the regime’s control. We must also train CSO leaders in techniques for raising awareness and mobilising people.

People must understand the nature of the regime governing Congo-Brazzaville. The current regime is embodied by the Congolese Labour Party, a former Soviet-style party-state ousted from power at the ballot box in 1992, in the only truly free and transparent election the country has ever held. The party returned to power by force of arms after overthrowing the democratically elected government. Understanding this history is crucial: it proves that democratic change is possible. When people understand the mechanisms of power seizure and refuse to accept them, the regime loses its legitimacy even if it retains formal control of the state.

What’s the future for democracy in Congo after 42 years of rule?

Four decades under the same regime amount to the systematic denial of democratic change, of citizens’ fundamental right to choose a different government through the ballot box. Sassou Nguesso’s fifth term consolidates an institutional framework designed to ensure no one else ever comes to power through democratic means.

This framework operates through the systematic contradiction between constitutional promises and practice. The constitution proclaims a multi-party system, but a law recognises only those parties that pledge allegiance to the ruling power. The constitution creates the post of leader of the opposition, but this leader is the head of a party affiliated with the ruling power. The constitution establishes an advisory council of associations, but this institution is attached to the office of the head of state to muzzle civil society. The country is run like a barracks.

We must expose and discredit this regime internationally, by publicly denouncing its supporters, notably the French government and oil multinationals. Independent civil society must step up awareness-raising campaigns, both in person and online. The international community must exert sustained pressure, including diplomatic pressure, sanctions and support for organisations in exile. Without this combination of internal action and international pressure, democratic change will remain impossible. But it is possible. It happened in 1992, and it can happen again.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Democracy: an enduring aspiration CIVICUS | 2026 State of Civil Society Report
‘Gabon remains at a crossroads between democratic change and authoritarian continuity’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Sentiment Ondo 21.Nov.2025
‘Media and social networks are battlegrounds where rumours and disinformation circulate widely’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Kaberu Tairu 11.Oct.2025

 

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ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 1 - 402 - Entwurf eines Berichts Bericht 2025 der Kommission über die Türkei
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Nacho Sánchez Amor

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Les deux grands partis traditionnels du pays sont sur le banc des accusés

The post L’élite politique espagnole devant les tribunaux appeared first on Euractiv FR.