Az egész világot meglepte, sőt sokkolta a pénteken Törökországban végrehajtott puccskísérlet. Ezzel nincs másképpen a Törökországot belülről, jól ismerő elemző sem, sőt az elmúlt napokban török forrásaimmal folytatott beszélgetéseim alapján kijelenthetem: váratlanul érte mindez a török társadalmat is.
Néhány pontban szeretném összefoglalni mindazt, amit fontosnak tartok megjegyezni a pénteki történésekről és következményeiről. Igyekszem rávilágítani az ügy olyan aspektusaira, amelyekkel eddig a média kevesebbet foglalkozott.
A török államcsíny-kísérlet megrázta mind a nemzetközi, mind természetesen a török közvéleményt. Következményeinek még csak az első hullámával szembesültünk, kihatása mindenképpen érzékelhető lesz az elkövetkező hónapokban, években, nem kizárt, hogy évtizedekben. Az amerikai-török kapcsolatokra való hatásaira hamarosan visszatérünk az Atlantista blogon. Az eseményeket a továbbiakban is figyelemmel követjük.
Üdvözlöm az Atlantista blogon, amelynek alcíme: Külpolitika magyar szemmel Amerikából.
Engedje meg, hogy röviden bemutatkozzam. A nevem dr. Fehér Zoltán és idestova 20 éve foglalkozom külpolitikával.
Egyetemi éveim alatt az ELTE Bölcsészkarán Magyarics Tamás és Frank Tibor professzoroktól az amerikai történelem és külpolitika, Bayer Józseftől a politikatudomány és a nemzetközi kapcsolatok elmélete, a Pázmány jogi karán pedig Szabó Marceltől a nemzetközi jog legfontosabb ismereteit sajátítottam el. 2001-2002-ben a New York állambeli Bard College-ban a legendás James Chace professzor (nemzetközi kapcsolatok) tanítványa lehettem.
2002-től 12 éven át diplomataként dolgoztam. Magyarországot először Washingtonban képviseltem, ahol külpolitikai elemzőként és sajtóattaséként is szolgáltam. Törökországban nagykövet-helyettes, majd ideiglenes ügyvivő voltam 2014-ig.
Az elmúlt évben a Harvard Kennedy Schoolban posztgraduális tanulmányokat folytattam. Lehetőségem volt az amerikai külpolitikai szakma olyan sztárjaitól tanulni, mint a „soft power” koncepció megalkotója, Joseph Nye, a korábbi külügyminiszter-helyettes Nicholas Burns, a brit történész és Kissinger-életrajzíró Niall Ferguson, vagy a Washington Postban is publikáló elemző, Daniel Drezner. Két hónapja vehettem át „Master in Public Administration” diplomámat.
Jelenleg Bostonban élek, a Harvard Kennedy Schoolban Joseph Nye professzor mellett dolgozom és szeptembertől doktori tanulmányokat folytatok a Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy-ban nemzetközi kapcsolatokból.
Vendégelőadóként tanítottam az ELTÉ-n, a Pázmányon és a Zsigmond Király Főiskolán, de tartottam előadásokat a budapesti Andrássy Egyetemen és a CEU-n, az ankarai Bilkent Egyetemen, a prágai Károly Egyetemen, Berlinben a Német Külkapcsolati Tanácsnál (DGAP), az Iowa-i Egyetemen, a Bard College-ban és a Harvardon is. Írásaim megjelentek a Politikatudományi Szemlében, a Kül-Világban, a Társadalom & Politikában és a Bard Journal of Social Studiesban, a Washington Times pedig diplomáciai munkámat méltatta.
Blogomban az olvasó tájékozódhat az amerikai bel- és külpolitika, valamint a világpolitika legfrissebb fejleményeiről, trendjeiről. Az első időszakban az amerikai elnökválasztásra, valamint a Törökországban zajló történésekre fókuszálok majd.
Bízom benne, hogy az Atlantista blog a nemzetközi politikáról szóló hazai diskurzus meghatározó fórumává válhat, ehhez azonban szükségem van olvasóim visszajelzéseire. Tekintettel arra, hogy a témával foglalkozó magyar kutatók közül sokan régi barátaim-kollégáim, időről-időre az ő gondolataikat is szívesen megosztom majd, vitáknak is helyet szeretnék adni.
Jó olvasást kívánva és megtisztelő figyelmét megköszönve,
Fehér Zoltán („Atlantista”)
Today (16 July 2016), the EU training mission of the Central African Army (EUTM RCA) was launched, with a two-year mandate.
The mission is to provide advice and training but also to bring its military expertise to the EU Delegation, in particular to set up more general projects. Its role is defined according to three priorities:
1.) strategic advice to the Ministry of Defense, military personnel and the armed forces of the CAR;
2.) Lessons for FACA officers and non-commissioned officers and FACA training.
3.) It also brings "expertise in the military field, in the field of security and the rule of law" to the EU delegation in the Central African Republic "within the limits of its means and capabilities".
... unfortunately it`s true...
‘The Triumph of democracy’ as Brexit supporters inside and outside of the UK have explained the historic results of whether the UK should remain or leave the EU. referendum. The Leave campaign has successfully mobilized anger of large parts of British society on immigration, the influence of bankers of the City, and the overreach of Brussels bureaucracy. On the other hand the case for Remain was weak in the run up to the referendum, the advantages of the EU were barely present in the debates, all the while fear mongering was dominating on both sides.
Although the pro-Brexit campaign not give any clear picture of how a UK outside the EU would look like, their point that there is life outside of the EU - bringing up Switzerland and Norway as examples – did have some truth in it. They enjoy the benefits of the single market while opting out of the political integration. Those who opposed the Brexit are quick to rebuff this line by saying that these non-member countries basically have to accommodate to EU rules – including on free movement – without having a say in the relevant decisions.
But the problem goes much deeper than that. Switzerland and Norway can have the luxury of opting out because of their size and geography. Although they are rich and well functioning democracies, their overall influence on Europe is limited. It sounds evident , but it’s worth giving it prominence: they can enjoy the benefits of the single European market because there is a single European market, with all its foundational pillars. European peace and welfare isn’t just based on trade, let alone economic cooperation, but shared institutions, procedures and norms created by painful work and compromise. And yes, on the military power and deep political engagement of the United States in Europe. If trade were only to it, then Europe would not have ran into the first World War. Without a certain level of sharing sovereignty with the leadership of Germany and France the peace and prosperity Europe enjoyed in the past sixty years would not have been possible.
However, shared institutions, norms and interdependence by themselves do not bring legitimacy to the European project in the eyes of today’s European citizens. Delivering results in the welfare and security is what might achieve that. And nothing more would bring that closer than results against the negative effects of globalization: uncontrolled immigration, growing inequality within countries, growing masses felt left behind. It’s true that European integration would – in theory - be a useful tool to more effectively tackle these challenges. The challenges of globalization by their nature cannot be tackled successfully alone by nation states.
The problem is that a lot of the major decisions taken by the EU in recent years – that is the Commission and some major European nation states - have exaggerated the challenges, not decreased them. Take the handling of the economic crisis with the disastrous effects of endless austerity imposed on Southern Europe or the migration crisis in which Brussels has simply stepped behind Berlin’s open door – obligatory quota policy. And all these in such an environment where the European publics were already skeptical of the federalist tendencies even before these recent major crisis erupted, as the French and Dutch referendums on the EU Constitution a decade ago have demonstrated.
So with the EU going south on the substance, but – or at least some form of - integration structure still much needed, what next?
First of all, focus should be on the substance. Fostering growth, accelerating innovation, tackling inequality, stopping mass illegal immigration and fighting terrorism with additional resources and proper regulation – but without more integration. The nation states of the EU have to come to terms with each other on these issues foremost. Otherwise any attempt by Brussels or a powerful member to impose its will through the back door on others concerning these critical substantial questions will only hasten the demise of the whole European Union.
Secondly, discussions about the crucial challenges of Europe and the options available should be much more honest and more transparent – the issues on migration and the TTIP are good places to start with. This doesn’t mean that Brussels doesn’t have valid considerations as it is dealing with these issues, but it has to be much more responsive to the concerns of the majority of EU citizens. Any double talk, circumlocution, arrogance and disregard of the fears of many Europeans will only hasten the demise of the whole European Union.
Thirdly, acknowledge that European integration is not a bicycle, which would either go further or fall down. It is rather a huge but slow moving truck on many wheels which at times can even stop to rest to take stock and alter its direction if necessary. It’s a unique and valuable instrument which helps bring us Europeans closer together, and it has become an essential feature of our greater European family, but it cannot replace our homes, the nation states of Europe.Language Undefined Tag: NATOBREXITEUVarga Gergely
Welcome to my blog.
My name is Gergely Varga, I’m an international relations and security policy expert, with a PhD from Budapest Corvinus University. Currently I’m working as a non-resident fellow of the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies (CSDS) at the National University of Public Service.
I launched this blog to share my take on international security issues effecting Europe and the wider transatlantic region. As for what to expect balanced approach in understanding competing perspectives, favoring realism in an age of ideologues and extremists, a cherish for traditional values and support transatlantic cooperation in a rapidly transforming world.
I bring extensive research experience from the area of international security studies to this blog: I joined CSDS in 2008 after finishing my law and history studies at ELTE University. In 2012 I was a visiting fellow in Washington D.C. at the Center for Transatlantic Relations Johns Hopkins University. I have written numerous publications, most of the focusing on my primary research areas, US foreign and security policy, NATO, transatlantic relations and European security challenges.
Üdvözlöm a blogomon.
Dr. Varga Gergely vagyok, biztonságpolitikai szakértő. Jelenleg a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem Stratégiai Védelmi Kutató Intézetének külső munkatársa vagyok, doktori címemet a Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem nemzetközi kapcsolatok szakán szereztem meg.
A blogon Európát és a tágabb transzatlanti térséget érintő nemzetközi biztonsági kérdések kerülnek előtérbe. A blog szellemisége a felmerülő versengő perspektívák megértése tekintetében kiegyensúlyozottságot, az ideológikus és szélsőséges megközelítésekkel szemben a realizmus előtérbe helyezését, a hagyomásos értékek iránti elkötelezettséget és a transzatlanti együttműködés támogatását fogja tükrözni.
Az itt megjejelő cikkek írásakor széleskörű kutatási tapasztalatokra hagyatkozom: 2008-ban kerültem a Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpontba miután befejeztem jogi és történészi tanulmányaimat az ELTE-n. 2012-ben 10 hónapig a washingtoni Johns Hopkins Egyetem Transzatlanti Kapcsolatok Központja vendégkutatója voltam. Számos publikációm jelent meg a fő kutatási területemet, amerikai kül és biztonságpolitikát, transzatalnti kapcsolatokat, NATO-t és az Európai biztonsági kihívásokat érintő kérdésekről.Language Undefined Tag: StrategoNATOUSA
Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe
A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy
The UK then joined France and Italy in the Horizon-class class of air-defence destroyers frigate program; however, differing national requirements, workshare arguments and delays led to the UK withdrawing on 26 April 1999 and starting its own national project Type 45 destroyer. The class is primarily designed for anti-aircraft and anti-missile warfare and is built around the PAAMS (Sea Viper) air-defence system utilizing the SAMPSON AESA and the S1850M long-range radars. The Type 45 destroyers were built to replace the Type 42 (Sheffield class) destroyers that had served during the Falklands War, with the last Type 42 being decommissioned in 2013.
The six Type 45 Daring Class destroyers, which cost the taxpayer £1bn each, are the backbone of Britain’s combat force at sea and are among the most advanced missile destroyers in the world. They are the Royal Navy’s first all-electric ships and are driven by two Rolls-Royce WR21 gas turbines and two Wartsila diesel engines. The WR21 is designed to deliver significantly improved operating costs by using an intercooler recuperator, which recovers exhaust and recycles the gas into the engine. But, as a rule, power turbines slowed down in warm temperatures.
But the engines powering the Royal Navy’s cutting-edge fleet are unable to operate continuously in the warm waters of the Gulf. Responding to questions about why the power systems failed in warmer waters than the UK, John Hudson, managing director of BAE Systems maritime, said the original specifications for the vessel had not required it to sustain extremes. “The operating profile at the time was that there would not be repeated or continuous operations in the Gulf,” he said.
Tomas Leahy, of Rolls-Royce naval programmes, said the destroyer was now operating in “far more arduous conditions than envisaged in the specifications”. “This is not the fault of the WR21,” said Mr Leahy. “It is the laws of physics.”
But the Type 45 was designed for worldwide operations from sub-Arctic to extreme tropical environments and continues to operate effectively in the Gulf and South Atlantic all year round. It also emerged that some of the difficulties were rooted in late-stage design changes demanded by the US Navy, when it was leading development of the electric propulsion system. However, the US Navy pulled out of the programme in 2000, when it was taken over by the UK’s MoD. Mr Leahy said that only 1,900 hours of testing had been carried out on the system after the design change, while the problems only emerged after 4,000-5,000 hours of operation.
“With hindsight it would have been good to do another 4,000-5,000 hours of testing on it,” he said. The MoD is having to set aside tens of millions of pounds to fix the destroyers. The plan is to install two extra diesel engines which will require cutting a hole in the hull of the brand new destroyers. The costs of repairing the Type 45 were forcing a delay in the Type 26 frigate programme. Original plans were for the first steel to be cut on the frigates by the end of this year, but this is now not likely before December 2017. The government had already weakened the Royal Navy’s capabilities by cutting the number of frigates that would be ordered from 13 to eight in last year’s strategic defence and security review.
The Type 45 uses a pioneering system called Integrated Electric Propulsion (IEP). There are many advantages associated with IEP, fuel efficiency, flexibility in locating the engines and a supposedly reduced maintenance and manning requirement. In basic terms, two WR-21 gas turbines (GTs) and two Wartsila 2MW diesel generators provide AC power for the motors that propel the ship as well as the power for the ships systems – weapons, sensors lighting etc. The WR-21 GTs were designed in an international partnership with Rolls Royce and Northrop Grumman Marine Systems. The turbines are of a sound design but have an intercooler-recuperator that recovers heat from the exhaust and recycles it into the engine, making it more fuel-efficient and reducing the ship’s thermal signature. Unfortunately the intercooler unit has a major design flaw and causes the GTs to fail occasionally. When this happens, the electrical load on the diesel generators can become too great and they ‘trip out’, leaving the ship with no source of power or propulsion.
The MoD has not revealed how frequently these blackouts have occurred but the first 2 ships, HMS Daring and HMS Dauntless seem to have suffered the most. The first indication of problems was as far back as 2010 when it was admitted HMS Daring lost all power in mid-Atlantic and had to be repaired in Canada. Although the Type 45s have been active, some significant commitments have been missed. An indication that all is not well could be seen by the number of Type 45s alongside in Portsmouth at any given time during the last few years. Historically the RN has never been a fleet of ‘harbour queens’ and today’s over-worked navy can ill-afford unreliable ships. HMS Daring entered service in 2009, it has taken more than 6 years to agree to deal with the problem and it will probably be well after 2020 before the work is completed. It is obviously dangerous from a seamanship and navigational point of view to suddenly lose propulsion at any time. It is even more serious when operating in a high threat environment as the ship would be a sitting duck.
Replacement of the WR-21 GTs is not a practical option. Instead additional or more powerful diesel generators will provide long-term redundancy and assurance that electrical supplies can be maintained in the event of GT failure. The good news is that the large Type 45 design has the space and reserve buoyancy to cope with larger or additional diesels. The rectification work on the six ships will be done one by one as part of the normal major refit cycle. This will extend the length of the refits but should not have an especially dramatic effect on frontline availability.
It is ironic that the RN is suffering with propulsion problems, having had a great history of propulsion innovation and success. The steam turbine was a British invention and in HMS Dreadnought (1906) was the first capital ship to use this leap in propulsive power. The steam turbine drove the majority of major warships for the next 60 years. HMS Amazon (1974) was the first all-GT warship and British engines were subsequently exported to many foreign navies. Much of the world-renowned expertise in naval GT design was derived from an obscure and secretive facility, the Pyestock National Gas Turbine Establishment at Farnborough which tested & developed marine and aero engines until it was closed in 2000. One of Pyestock’s last projects was some of the initial development of the WR-21 done in partnership with Rolls Royce and Northrop Grumman. Reliance on computer modelling signalled the end for Pyestock but with hindsight perhaps there is no substitute for ‘real world’ testing. It is interesting to note that recently Rolls Royce opened a brand new testing facility for the WR-21 and the MT-30 GTs (Which will power the QE aircraft carriers and Type 26 frigate).
There are growing signs that frustration with industry in the MoD has reached breaking point. The Type 45 propulsion problems are just one of many expensive problems with major defence contacts. The cost over-runs of the Astute class submarine have led to Whitehall creating a special project office to manage the Trident Successor submarines and failures will be met with harsher financial penalties. The surprise emergence of the alternative frigate programme, in addition to the Type 26, is also a sign of disillusionment with late, expensive and flawed offerings from BAE Systems.Royal NavyType 45
1/ Schutz der Schengen Außengrenzen
Gewährleistung der Kontrolle der grünen Außengrenze gemäß des Schengen Borders Code und der Frontex-Verordnung (HU-SRB, HU-CRO): ca. 270 Mio. € im Jahr 2015, das entspricht 0,2 % des ungarischen BIP. Nur 1 % dieser Summe wurde von der EU kofinanziert, hier die im Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt vorgesehenen Flexibilität anzuwenden war nicht möglich)
Grenzpolizisten: 102 in Slowenien, 31 in Mazedonien und 30 in Serbien, Angebot für Bulgarien
Angebot über 85 Grenzpolizisten für Frontex in Griechenland und 3 Beamte (einschl. Fahrzeugen) für das EASO
fast 1.000 Soldaten dienen in NATO-, UN- und EU-Missionen, mehrheitlich in Krisenregionen oder an Transportrouten
125 Soldaten sind im Irak im Einsatz (globale Koalition gegen ISIS) * 106 Soldaten sind im Einsatz in Afghanistan (NATO Resolute Support)
Teilnahme an anderen Missionen mit 2 bis 10 Soldaten und Beamten: EUNAVFORMED Sophia; EUTM Mali etc.
3/ Humanitäre Hilfe
Beteiligung am EU-Türkei Paket I bis 2019: 14,6 Mio. € frontloading, davon 2016 bereits 10 Mio. € (statt der vorgesehenen 4,3 Mio.)
Syria Recovery Trust Fund: bilaterales Angebot 3.000.000 € + 200.000 €
Africa Emergency Trust Fund: 700.000 €
Krankenhausprojekt in der Kriegszone: 5.000.000 € (Syria Pledging Conference) * World Food Programme: 377.000 € (eingezahlt)
andere UN und internationale Programme: ca. 1.200.000 € (z.B.: Peace Oasis youth center in Jordanien);
1.000 Betten für Griechenland
bilaterale Sachleistungen für Serbien, Mazedonien und Slowenien: 1.906.500 €
(+ 350.000 € humanitäre Hilfe für die Ukraine)
BOTSCHAFT VON UNGARN IN BERLIN·MARDI 24 MAI 2016
Stand: 24. Mai 2016
Trump used a major speech on Thursday to lay out an “America first” foreign policy that would see Nato allies contribute more to their own defence. Castigating the “reckless and rudderless” policies of President Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton that he said “blazed a path of destruction” in the world, Mr Trump said he would return the US to a more self-interested approach.
“America first will be the major and overriding theme of my administration,” the Republican front-runner said in Washington, emphasising the need to view every decision “through the clear lens of American interest”. Mr Trump said he would return the US to the peace through strength philosophy of the Cold War by redoubling America’s investments in its military and only taking on fights it can win, but would simultaneously reduce military support for key allies.
“We’re rebuilding other countries while weakening our own,” he said, insisting that America’s foreign policy had been “a complete and overriding disaster” over the past two decades. “I’m the only one - believe me, I know them all, - I’m the only one that knows how to fix it,” he said.
Nato allies would be forced to step-up their efforts
Mr Trump said that as president he would call a Nato summit to pressure allies who had failed to hit spending targets and move the focus of the bloc away from Russia and onto terrorism and migration. Calling both the mission and structure of Nato “out-dated”, the property mogul noted that just four of 28 countries were spending the required two per cent of GDP on defence. “Our allies are not paying their fair share,” he said. “Our allies must contribute toward the financial, political and human costs of our tremendous security burden, but many of them are simply not doing so.”
"...When the United States was hit on 9/11, our allies treated that attack against one as an attack against all. Now, it’s our turn to stand in solidarity with France and all of our friends. We cherish the same values. We face the same adversaries. We must share the same determination. After a major terrorist attack, every society faces a choice between fear and resolve. The world’s great democracies can’t sacrifice our values or turn our backs on those in need. Therefore, we must choose resolve. And we must lead the world to meet this threat.
Now, let’s be clear about what we’re facing. Beyond Paris in recent days, we’ve seen deadly terrorist attacks in Nigeria, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey, and a Russian civilian airline destroyed over the Sinai. At the heart of today’s new landscape of terror is ISIS. They persecute religious and ethnic minorities; kidnap and behead civilians; murder children. They systematically enslave, torture and rape women and girls.ISIS operates across three mutually reinforcing dimensions: a physical enclave in Iraq and Syria; an international terrorist network that includes affiliates across the region and beyond; and an ideological movement of radical jihadism. We have to target and defeat all three, and time is of the essence.
ISIS is demonstrating new ambition, reach and capabilities. We have to break the group’s momentum and then its back. Our goal is not to deter or contain ISIS, but to defeat and destroy ISIS.
But we have learned that we can score victories over terrorist leaders and networks, only to face metastasizing threats down the road, so we also have to play and win the long game. We should pursue a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, one that embeds our mission against ISIS within a broader struggle against radical jihadism that is bigger than any one group, whether it’s Al Qaida or ISIS or some other network.An immediate war against an urgent enemy and a generational struggle against an ideology with deep roots will not be easily torn out. It will require sustained commitment in every pillar of American power. This is a worldwide fight, and American must lead it.
Our strategy should have three main elements. One, defeat ISIS in Syria, Iraq and across the Middle East; two, disrupt and dismantle the growing terrorist infrastructure that facilitates the flow of fighters, financing arms and propaganda around the world; three, harden our defenses and those of our allies against external and homegrown threats.
Let me start with the campaign to defeat ISIS across the region. The United States and our international coalition has been conducting this fight for more than a year. It’s time to begin a new phase and intensify and broaden our efforts to smash the would-be caliphate and deny ISIS control of territory in Iraq and Syria. That starts with a more effective coalition air campaign, with more allied planes, more strikes and a broader target set.
A key obstacle standing in the way is a shortage of good intelligence about ISIS and its operations, so we need an immediate intelligence surge in the region, including technical assets, Arabic speakers with deep expertise in the Middle East and even closer partnership with regional intelligence services. Our goal should be to achieve the kind of penetration we accomplished with Al Qaida in the past. This would help us identify and eliminate ISIS’ command and control and its economic lifelines.
A more effective coalition air campaign is necessary, but not sufficient, and we should be honest about the fact that to be successful, airstrikes will have to be combined with ground forces actually taking back more territory from ISIS. Like President Obama, I do not believe that we should again have 100,000 American troops in combat in the Middle East. That is just not the smart move to make here. If we have learned anything from 15 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s that local people and nations have to secure their own communities. We can help them, and we should, but we cannot substitute for them. But we can and should support local and regional ground forces in carrying out this mission.
Now, the obstacles to achieving this are significant. On the Iraqi side of the border, Kurdish forces have fought bravely to defend their own lands and to re-take towns from ISIS, but the Iraqi national army has struggled, and it’s going to take more work to get it up to fighting shape. As part of that process, we may have to give our own troops advising and training the Iraqis greater freedom of movement and flexibility, including embedding in local units and helping target airstrikes.
Ultimately, however, a ground campaign in Iraq will only succeed if more Iraqi Sunnis join the fight. But that won’t happen so long as they do not feel they have a stake in their country or confidence in their own security and capacity to confront ISIS. Now, we’ve been in a similar place before in Iraq. In the first Sunni awakening in 2007, we were able to provide sufficient support and assurances to the Sunni tribes to persuade them to join us in rooting out Al Qaida. Unfortunately, under Prime Minister Maliki’s rule, those tribes were betrayed and forgotten.So the task of bringing Sunnis off the sidelines into this new fight will be considerably more difficult. But nonetheless, we need to lay the foundation for a second Sunni awakening. We need to put sustained pressure on the government in Baghdad to get its political house in order, move forward with national reconciliation, and finally stand up a national guard. Baghdad needs to accept, even embrace, arming Sunni and Kurdish forces in the war against ISIS. But if Baghdad won’t do that, the coalition should do so directly.
On the Syrian side, the big obstacle to getting more ground forces to engage ISIS, beyond the Syrian Kurds who are already deep in the fight, is that the viable Sunni opposition groups remain understandably preoccupied with fighting Assad who, let us remember, has killed many more Syrians than the terrorists have. But they are increasingly under threat from ISIS as well. So we need to move simultaneously toward a political solution to the civil war that paves the way for a new government with new leadership, and to encourage more Syrians to take on ISIS as well. To support them, we should immediately deploy the special operations force President Obama has already authorized, and be prepared to deploy more as more Syrians get into the fight. And we should retool and ramp up our efforts to support and equip viable Syrian opposition units.
Our increased support should go hand in hand with increased support from our Arab and European partners, including special forces who can contribute to the fight on the ground. We should also work with the coalition and the neighbors to impose no-fly zones that will stop Assad from slaughtering civilians and the opposition from the air. Opposition forces on the ground, with material support from the coalition, could then help create safe areas where Syrians could remain in the country, rather than fleeing toward Europe.
This combined approach would help enable the opposition to retake the remaining stretch of the Turkish border from ISIS, choking off its supply lines. It would also give us new leverage in the diplomatic process that Secretary Kerry is pursuing.
Of course, we’ve been down plenty of diplomatic dead- ends before in this conflict. But we have models for how seemingly intractable multi-sectarian civil wars do eventually end. We can learn lessons from Lebanon and Bosnia about what it will take. And Russia and Iran have to face the fact that continuing to prop up a vicious dictator will not bring stability.
Right now, I’m afraid, President Putin is actually making things somewhat worse.Now, to be clear, though, there is an important role for Russia to help in resolving the conflict in Syria. And we have indicated a willingness to work with them toward an outcome that preserves Syria as a unitary, nonsectarian state, with protections for the rights of all Syrians and to keep key state institutions intact.
There is no alternative to a political transition that allows Syrians to end Assad’s rule. Now, much of this strategy on both sides of the border hinges on the roles of our Arab and Turkish partners. And we must get them to carry their share of the burden, with military intelligence and financial contributions, as well as using their influence with fighters and tribes in Iraq and Syria. Countries like Jordan have offered more, and we should take them up on it, because ultimately our efforts will only succeed if the Arabs and Turks step up in a much bigger way. This is their fight and they need to act like it.So far, however, Turkey has been more focused on the Kurds than on countering ISIS. And to be fair, Turkey has a long and painful history with Kurdish terrorist groups. But the threat from ISIS cannot wait. As difficult as it may be, we need to get Turkey to stop bombing Kurdish fighters in Syria who are battling ISIS, and become a full partner in our coalition efforts against ISIS.
The United States should also work with our Arab partners to get them more invested in the fight against ISIS. At the moment, they’re focused in other areas because of their concerns in the region, especially the threat from Iran. That’s why the Saudis, for example, shifted attention from Syria to Yemen. So we have to work out a common approach.
In September, I laid out a comprehensive plan to counter Iranian influence across the region and its support for terrorist proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas. We cannot view Iran and ISIS as separate challenges. Regional politics are too interwoven. Raising the confidence of our Arab partners and raising the costs to Iran for bad behavior will contribute to a more effective fight against ISIS.
And as we work out a broader regional approach, we should, of course, be closely consulting with Israel, our strongest ally in the Middle East. Israel increasingly shares with our Arab partners and has the opportunity to do more in intelligence and joint efforts as well. Now, we should have no illusions about how difficult the mission before us really is. We have to fit a lot of pieces together, bring along a lot of partners, move on multiple fronts at once. But if we press forward on both sides of the border, in the air and on the ground, as well as diplomatically, I do believe we can crush ISIS’s enclave of terror. And to support this campaign, Congress should swiftly pass an updated authorization to use military force. That will send a message to friend and foe alike that the United States is committed to this fight. The time for delay is over. We should get this done.
Now, the second element of our strategy looks beyond the immediate battlefield of Iraq and Syria, to disrupt and dismantle global terrorist infrastructure on the ground and online.
A terror pipeline that facilitates the flow of fighters, financing, arms and propaganda around the world has allowed ISIS to strike at the heart of Paris last week and an Al Qaida affiliate to do the same at Charlie Hebdo earlier this year. ISIS is working hard to extend its reach, establish affiliates and cells far from its home base, and despite the significant setbacks it has encountered, not just with ISIS and its ambitious plans, but even Al Qaida, including the death of Osama bin Laden, they are still posing great threats to so many.
Let’s take one example. We’ve had a lot of conversation about ISIS in the last week, let’s not forget Al Qaida. They still have the most sophisticated bombmakers, ambitious plotters and active affiliates in places like Yemen and North Africa, so we can’t just focus on Iraq and Syria, we need to intensify our counter — our counterterrorism efforts on a wider scope.
Most urgent is stopping the flow of foreign fighters to and from the war zones of the Middle East. Thousands — thousands of young recruits have flocked to Syria from France, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom and, yes, even the United States. Their western passports make it easier for them to cross borders and eventually return home radicalized and battle hardened. Stemming this tide will require much better coordination and information-sharing among countries every step of the way. We should not stop pressing until Turkey, where most foreign fighters cross into Syria, finally locks down its border.
The United States and our allies need to know and share the identities of every fighter who has traveled to Syria. We also have to be smart and target interventions that will have the greatest impact. For example, we need a greater focus on shutting down key enablers who arrange transportation, documents and more.When it comes to terrorist financing, we have to go after the nodes that facilitate illicit trade and transactions. The U.N. Security Council should update its terrorism sanctions. They have a resolution that does try to block terrorist financing and other enabling activities, but we have to place more obligations on countries to police their own banks, and the United States, which has quite a record of success in this area, can share more intelligence to help other countries. And once and for all, the Saudis, the Qataris and others need to stop their citizens from directly funding extremist organizations as well as the schools and mosques around the world that have set too many young people on a path to radicalization. When it comes to blocking terrorist recruitment, we have to identify the hotspots, the specific neighborhoods and villages, the prisons and schools where recruitment happens in clusters, like the neighborhood in Brussels where the Paris attacks were planned. Through partnerships with local law enforcement and civil society, especially with Muslim community leaders, we have to work to tip the balance away from extremism in these hotspots.
Radicalization and recruitment also is happening online. There’s no doubt we have to do a better job contesting online space, including websites and chat rooms where jihadists communicate with followers. We must deny them virtual territory just as we deny them actual territory. At the State Department, I built up a unit of communication specialists fluent in Urdu, Arabic, Somali and other languages to battle with extremists online. We need more of that, including from the private sector. Social media companies can also do their part by swiftly shutting down terrorist accounts, so they’re not used to plan, provoke or celebrate violence. Online or off-line, the bottom line is that we are in a contest of ideas against an ideology of hate, and we have to win. Let’s be clear, though, Islam is not our adversary. Muslims are peaceful and tolerant people, and have nothing whatsoever to do with terrorism. The obsession in some quarters with a clash of civilization, or repeating the specific words radical Islamic terrorism isn’t just a distraction, it gives these criminals, these murderers more standing than they deserve. It actually plays into their hands by alienating partners we need by our side.
Our priority should be how to fight the enemy. In the end, it didn’t matter what kind of terrorist we call bin Laden, it mattered that we killed bin Laden. But we still can’t close our eyes to the fact that there is a distorted and dangerous stream of extremism within the Muslim world that continues to spread. Its adherents are relatively few in number, but capable of causing profound damage, most especially to their own communities throughout an arc of instability that stretches from North and West Africa to Asia.
Overlapping conflicts, collapsing state structures, widespread corruption, poverty and repression have created openings for extremists to exploit.
Before the Arab Spring, I warned that the region’s foundations would sink into the sand without immediate reforms. Well, the need has only grown more urgent. We have to join with our partners to do the patient’s steady work of empowering moderates and marginalizing extremists; supporting democratic institutions and the rule of law; creating economic growth that supports stability; working to curb corruption, helping training effective and accountable law enforcement, intelligence and counterterrorism services. As we do this, we must be building up a global counterterrorism infrastructure that is more active and adaptable than the terror networks we’re trying to defeat.When I became secretary of State, I was surprised to find that nearly a decade after 9/11, there was still no dedicated international vehicle to regularly convene key countries to deal with terrorist threats.
So, we created the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which now brings together nearly 30 countries, many from the Muslim world. It should be a clearing house for directing assistance to countries that need it, for mobilizing common action against threats.
And let’s not lose sight of the global cooperation needed to lock down loose nuclear material and chemical and biological weapons, and keep them out of the hands of terrorists.
At the end of the day, we still must be prepared to go after terrorists wherever they plot using all the tools at our disposal, that includes targeted strikes by U.S. military aircraft and drones, with proper safeguards when there are any other viable options to deal with continuing imminent threats.
All of this — stopping foreign fighters, blocking terrorist financing, doing battle in cyberspace — is vital to the war against ISIS, but it also lays the foundation for defusing and defeating the next threat and the one after that.
Now, the third element of our strategy has to be hardening our defenses at home and helping our partners do the same against both external and home-grown threats. After 9/11, the United States made a lot of progress breaking down bureaucratic barriers to allow for more and better information sharing among agencies responsible for keeping us safe.
We still have work to do on this front, but by comparison, Europe is way behind. Today, European nations don’t even always alert each other when they turn away a suspected jihadist at the border, or when a passport is stolen. It seems like after most terrorist attacks, we find out that the perpetrators were known to some security service or another, but too often the dots never get connected.
I appreciate how hard this is, especially given the sheer number of suspects and threats, but this has to change. The United States must work with Europe to dramatically and immediately improve intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination. European countries also should have the flexibility to enhance their border controls when circumstances warrant.And here at home, we face a number of our own challenges. The threat to airline security is evolving as terrorists develop new devices like nonmetallic bombs. So our defenses have to stay at least one step ahead. We know that intelligence gathered and shared by local law enforcement officers is absolutely critical to breaking up plots and preventing attacks. So they need all the resources and support we can give them.
Law enforcement also needs the trust of residents and communities, including in our own country Muslim Americans. Now, this should go without saying, but in the current climate, it bears repeating. Muslim Americans are working every day on the front lines of the fight against radicalization.Another challenge is how to strike the right balance of protecting privacy and security. Encryption of mobile communications presents a particularly tough problem. We should take the concerns of law enforcement and counterterrorism professionals seriously. They have warned that impenetrable encryption may prevent them from accessing terrorist communications and preventing a future attack. On the other hand, we know there are legitimate concerns about government intrusion, network security, and creating new vulnerabilities that bad actors can and would exploit. So we need Silicon Valley not to view government as its adversary. We need to challenge our best minds in the private sector to work with our best minds in the public sector to develop solutions that will both keep us safe and protect our privacy.
Now is the time to solve this problem, not after the next attack. Since Paris, no homeland security challenge is being more hotly debated than how to handle Syrian refugees seeking safety in the United States. Our highest priority, of course, must always be protecting the American people. So yes, we do need to be vigilant in screening and vetting any refugees from Syria, guided by the best judgment of our security professionals, in close coordination with our allies and partners.
And Congress need to make sure the necessary resources are provided for comprehensive background checks, drawing on the best intelligence we can get. And we should be taking a close look at the safeguards in the visa programs as well, but we cannot allow terrorists to intimidate us into abandoning our values and our humanitarian obligations. Turning away orphans, applying a religious test, discriminating against Muslims, slamming the door on every Syrian refugee, that is just not who we are. We are better than that.
And remember, many of these refugees are fleeing the same terrorists who threaten us. It would be a cruel irony indeed if ISIS can force families from their homes and then also prevent them from ever finding new ones. We should be doing more to ease this humanitarian crisis, not less. We should lead the international community in organizing a donor conference and supporting countries like Jordan who are sheltering the majority of refugees fleeing Syria.
And we can get this right. America’s open, free, tolerant society is described by some as a vulnerability in the struggle against terrorism, but I actually believe it’s one of our strengths. It reduces the appeal of radicalism and enhances the richness and resilience of our communities. This is not a time for scoring political points.
When New York was attacked on 9/11, we had a Republican president, a Republican governor and a Republican mayor, and I worked with all of them. We pulled together and put partisanship aside to rebuild our city and protect our country. This is a time for American leadership. No other country can rally the world to defeat ISIS and win the generational struggle against radical jihadism. Only the United States can mobilize common action on a global scale, and that’s exactly what we need. The entire world must be part of this fight, but we must lead it.
There’s been a lot of talk lately about coalitions. Everyone seems to want one, but there’s not nearly as much talk about what it actually takes to make a coalition work in the heat and pressure of an international crisis. I know how hard this is because we’ve done it before. To impose the toughest sanctions in history on Iran, to stop a dictator from slaughtering his people in Libya, to support a fledgling democracy in Afghanistan, we have to use every pillar of American power — military and diplomacy, development and economic and cultural influence, technology and maybe most importantly our values. That is smart power. We have to work with institutions and partners like NATO, the E.U., the Arab League and the U.N., strengthen our alliances and never get tired of old-fashioned shoe leather diplomacy, and if necessary be prepared to act decisively on our own, just as we did it to bring Osama bin Laden to justice.
CLINTON: The United States and our allies must demonstrate that free people and free markets are still the hope of humanity. This past week, as I watched the tragic scenes from France, I kept thinking back to a young man in the world met in January after the last attack in Paris. His name was Lassana, a Muslim immigrant from Mali who worked at a kosher market. He said the market had become a new home and his colleagues and customers a second family. When the terrorist arrived and the gunfire began, Lassana risked his life to protect his Jewish customers. He moved quickly, hiding as many people as he could in the cold storage room, and then slipping out to help the police. “I didn’t know or care, he said, if they were Jews or Christians or Muslims. We’re all in the same boat.” What a rebuke to the extremists’ hatred. The French government announced it would grant Lassana full citizenship. But when it mattered most, he proved he was a citizen already. That’s the power of free people. That’s what the jihadis will never understand and never defeat. And as we meet here today, let us resolve that we will go forward together, and we will do all we can to lead the world against this threat that threatens people everywhere...."
(Hillary Clinton called on Congress to authorize a new military action against ISIS in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations Thursday, Nov. 19. 2015.)
Under an U.S. Army airborne exercise in Germany (Hohenfels) a Humvee broke free of its rigging and plummeting to the ground, followed by another — and another. The scene starts serenely as equipment is dropped by parachute April 11 from planes with the 173rd Airborne Brigade flying across blue skies until the first Humvee breaks free and crashes to the ground.
It's followed by a second and then a third Humvee crashing to the ground and increasing laughter on the video. The Army says nobody was hurt, and it's investigating what went wrong — and who shot the video.
Voir la version française en bas
The propagande, the "Counter Migrant Group", and the reality are noticeably different about the Hungarian patrols of 600 soldiers and 400 policemen at the border between Hungary and Serbia (175 km). At about the same number at the Croatian border. The basical units of the border security are the duos of a soldier and a police officer, deployed by 2-3 border stone.
They work 18-20 hours a day for 1-2 weeks and live in pits dug by themselves. They also tinker tents with garbage bags that they also wear against rain because their jacket can not stand the rain for an hour. They often undergo super-controls forcing their for example to extinguish the fire which serves as the only way to warm up. On paper they are eating 5000 calories but in fact they have 2 sandwich, 1 apple and 1 chocolate per day.
In addition the policemen do not see why they work, because they lack the equipment needed to see at night when they have a few meters of visibility and so they are almost incapable of intercepting migrants who cut the fence.
La propagande, le "Groupe Anti-Migrants" et la réalité sont visiblement différents quant aux patrouilles des 600 soldats et 400 policiers hongrois à la frontière serbo-hongroise (180 km). A peu près le même effectif à la frontière croate. Les bases de la sécurité frontalière sont les duos composés d`un soldat et d`un policier, ils sont déployés par 2-3 pierres de frontière.
Ils travaillent 18-20 heures par jour durant 1-2 semaines et habitent dans les fosses creusées par eux-mêmes. Ils bricolent également des tentes à l`aide des sacs de poubelle qu`ils portent également contre la pluie, car leur veste ne supporte la pluie que pendant une heure. Ils subissent souvent des super-controls qui leur oblige par exemple d`éteindre le feu qui leur est le seul moyen de se réchauffer. Sur papier ils mangent 5000 calories mais en réalité ils n`ont que 2 sandwich, 1 pomme et 1 chocolat par jour.
De plus les policiers ne voient pas la raison de leur travaille car ils ne disposent pas d`équipements nécessaires pour voir pendant la nuit lorsqu`ils ont une visibilité de quelques mètres et ainsi ils sont presque incapables d`intercepter les migrants qui coupent la clôture.Tag: Hungarymigration
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU concerning the political situation in the Republic of the Congo following the presidential election
07/04/2016 14:05 Press release 170/16 Foreign affairs & international relations
On 4 April the Constitutional Court confirmed the result of the presidential election in Congo.
The fact that many opposition candidates stood for election, and the large voter turnout, testify to the democratic aspirations of the Congolese people, despite the serious flaws in electoral governance highlighted in the declaration by the European Union on 19 February. The post-electoral process has been marked by human rights violations, arrests and intimidation of the opposition and the media. This calls into question the credibility of the results.
The violent events which took place in Brazzaville on 4 April put Congo’s stability at risk. The EU calls on all stakeholders to show restraint and refrain from any act of violence or manipulation.
Democratic debate and respect for civil liberties are the best guarantee of the country’s stability and development. With a view to the forthcoming general election, the Congolese Government and all stakeholders must ensure that fundamental freedoms are respected and that a transparent electoral process, which reflects the will of the people, can actually be conducted. In this context, the EU reaffirms its willingness to continue its dialogue with Congo.
The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and Montenegro*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova, align themselves with this Declaration.
* - The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.Congo
The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the European Union and Kosovo enters into force today, 1 April 2016. The SAA establishes a contractual relationship which entails mutual rights and obligations and large number of sectors. It will support the implementation of the reforms and give Kosovo an opportunity to move closer to Europe.
The SAA was signed on 27 October 2015 by Ms Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, and Mr Johannes Hahn, Member of the Commission responsible for the European Neighborhood Enlargement negotiations, for the European Union, and by MM. Isa Mustafa, Prime Minister, and Bekim Çollaku, Minister for European Integration, for Kosovo. Negotiated between October 2013 and May 2014, the SAA was signed on October 27, 2015 and formally concluded on 12 February 2016.
In order to support the necessary reforms, the EU provides pre-accession aid to the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey amounting to some € 11.7 billion for the period 2014-2020, 645.5 million are destined for Kosovo.Tag: SAAKosovo
Azali Nord Sud Hotel accomodationg the European Union Training Mission in Mali was shot Monday night by an attack, whose perpetrators were pushed back, killing one among the attackers. The hotel is located in the ACI 2000 quarter, close to the luxury Radisson Blu hotel which was hit on November 20 by a jihadist attack that killed 20 people besides the two assailants. Shooting, followed by exchanges of automatic weapons, broke out in the early evening in the exclusive area of the capital of Mali. Military EUTM and guards that provide protection building immediately returned fire. One of the attackers was shot. The attack against the Radisson was claimed by Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in coordination with the jihadist group of Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar, al-mourabitoun, who had sealed this occasion his support for AQIM.
EUTM, which has some 600 personnel, brings together European soldiers from 25 countries, currently under German command. It was launched in February 2013, in the wake of the military operation at the initiative of France to drive the jihadists who controlled northern Mali. It aims to rebuild a Malian army under-trained and under-equipped in providing expertise in operational readiness, logistics support, intelligence and training of combat units on the Koulikoro camp (60 km north east of Bamako).
Olvassuk az MNO-n a magyar helyzetet : "A tények azt mutatják – mondta Pogátsa –, azzal együtt sem sikerült dinamikus növekedést elérni, hogy az elmúlt időszakban az uniós források 5-6, majd tavaly már hét százalékát juttattuk a gazdaságba. Súlyos gond, hogy miközben az uniós források hajtották a növekedést, mindössze 80 ezer munkahely jött létre 2010 óta úgy, hogy közben 150 ezren elhagyták az országot. Pedig arról volt szó, hogy egymillió új munkahelyet hoznak létre. Vagyis ezek az uniós támogatások nem hasznosultak igazán jól."
Svájcban, Fribourg kantonban - mely egyben az Europa Varietas Intézet új székhelye is - a legnagyobb a mezőgazdasági termelés aránya. Az ország éléstárának is nevezik (Vaud/Wallis kanton mellett, mely utóbbi a gyümölcs és bortermelésért felelős elsősorban). Úgy, hogy közben az ipari termelés is kiugróan sikeres. Európa 3. legdinamikusabban fejlődő városa (Bulle) is itt található. (Bulle még arról is nevezetes, hogy világrekorder az adott városterületre jutó egységnyi körforgalom számában.)
Természetesen itt sincs kolbászból a kerítés, a hivatalok itt is lassúak és bürokratikusak. A telefon, internet gyakran nem működik, a sváciak - nagy meglepetésünkre - nagyon slendriánok, vagy inkább úgy pontosabb, hogy "könnyen veszik" a munkát. E téren egy magyar igazán otthon érezheti magát.
Ugyanakkor az ország eleve bízik benned, nem úgy állnak hozzád mintha potenciális csaló lennél. Épp ezért csalók is vannak, de ha lebuknak - és előbb-utóbb lebuknak - van következménye, kemény a büntetés, legyen az piti csaló vagy politikus.
Szociális háló szinte nincs, így a szociális háló potyautasai, a gazdasági migránsok kevesen vannak. Politikai migráns - főleg Genf környékén, az ENSZ szerveknek köszönhetően viszont épp elég van - de ez más lapra tartozik. Svájc üzenete : ha nem "ingyenélni" akarsz nálunk, a hiányszakmákat veszed célba és keményen tudsz dolgozni, akkor van itt helyed.
Nemrég kijött egy felmérés, mely a szociális rendszerek fejlettségét tekintve osztályozta a nők helyzetét, és Svájc a sor végén kullog nem egy afrikai ország után. Erre azt mondhatjuk, itt felnőtt a társadalom, fejlett az öngondoskodás szintje (v.ö. hány féle nyugdíjalap létezik) és nem állambácsi-szindrómás a társadalom. Mert lehet, hogy egy svájci nő terhessége alatt semmit nem kap az államtól, de előtte keresetéből jóval többet tud félre tenni erre az időszakra - mint mondjuk egy magyarországon dolgozó hölgy. Lehet választani...
Mindennek keményen megkérik az árát - mert tudják mennyit érnek. Fogukhoz verik a garast - nincs mutyi, meg okosba`. Ugyanakkor a farmer, a tanár, az autókereskedő, az orvos mind-mind megbecsült és megfizetett tagjai a társadalomnak. Egy társadalomnak, ami összetart. Ha éjszaka egyedül bandukol az ember az út mellett, a távolsági busz sofőrje vagy vadidegen emberek is megállnak, megkérdezik, elvigyék-e valameddig, nincs-e segítségre szüksége.
Egész Svájcban a VW Golf a legnépszerűbb autótípus - és nem azért, mert nem lenne pénzük jobb kocsira. Az életszínvonalhoz képest elenyésző mértékű a kivagyiság mértéke. Da ha egy svájci BMW-t vesz, az nem arról szól, hogy felvág vele, az ára az itteni bérszínvonalhoz képest nem kiugró. (Még akkor sem, ha az autóárak itt majd 25%-al magasabbak a vámok miatt, mint az EU-ban.) Azért vesz ilyet, mert hosszú távra keres megbízható járművet (még akkor is, ha az utóbbi 2-3 évtized autógyártása elfelejtette ezeket a fogalmakat). Feltűnően sokan járnak szalonállapotú, 8-10 éves vagy még régebbi gépkocsikkal. Nem tagadhatjuk azért sok a Ferrari, Porsche (a TESLA még viszonylag kevés), de aki igazán fel akar vágni az legalább ízlésesen csinálja : oldtimer autóval jár, illetve virágzik az oldtimer-fílingű autók (pl. Morgan) piaca.
A hadsereg itt is operett-jellegű. De díszegyenruhás parádézgatás helyett inkább nevetnek egy nagyot saját magukon az állami tévében.
A MIGROS áruházláncban szinte csak svájci termékeket lehet kapni. Az új lakások pincétől a padlásig helyi gyártású anyagokból készülnek. A nyílászárók, a háztartási gépek, a bútorok, egytől egyig magas színvonalú helyi gyártmány (adott esetben európai konzorciumban, ld. Bauknecht) és nem kínai. Ha elkezd esni a hó a legeldugottabb hegyi úton is 15 perc alatt ott a hókotró.
Így is lehetne, csak társadalmi és politikai akarat szövetsége kellene hozzá a nemzeti szócséplés helyett...Language Undefined Tag: FribourgSvájc
Read the Restricted report about EUNAVFOR MED (Wikileaks), Brussels, 28 January 2016
Dear Dr. Turke good morning,
according to your request I need to underlined that the number are not fixed but changeable due to the situation. We can normally count on around 160 people in the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) in Rome and around 60 personnel acting for the staff of the Force Commander on board ITS CAVOUR (the flagship).
The total of EUNAVFOR MED personnel is around 1460, depending on the assets involved.
On the occasion I invite you to follow us on our website (www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-med)and the related social media.
Antonello de Renzis Sonnino
(EUNAVFOR Med logo)
CAPTAIN Antonello de Renzis Sonnino
Spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell
Les 181 essais nucléaires menés en Polynésie française entre 1966-1996 ont eu un « impact environnemental » et « provoqué des conséquences sanitaires », a admis le président François Hollande, lors de son déplacement à Papeete, lundi 22 février. Cette reconnaissance était une revendication ancienne des associations de défense des victimes et des élus locaux. Le chef de l’Etat a annoncé une révision du traitement des demandes d’indemnisation des victimes des tests. La loi du 5 janvier 2010, dite loi Morin, du nom de l’ancien ministre de la défense, a apporté des « avancées », mais seule « une vingtaine » de dossiers − sur un millier − ont abouti, a-t-il justifié.
Les Polynésiens considèrent que les essais sont la cause de nombreux cancers dans l’archipel. François Hollande s’est engagé à ce que l’Etat accompagne le développement du service d’oncologie au centre hospitalier de Tahiti.
« Tourner la page »
La « dette nucléaire » ou « milliard Chirac » (en francs, soit l’équivalent de 150 millions d’euros aujourd’hui), une dotation annuelle qui visait à compenser la perte d’activité économique engendrée par la cessation des tests en 1996, « sera sanctuarisée ». « Son niveau sera dès 2017 rétabli à plus de 90 millions d’euros », a aussi promis M. Hollande, répondant, là encore, à une demande pressante des élus locaux.
« Les conséquences environnementales devront également être traitées » sur les atolls qui accueillaient les installations nucléaires, a-t-il poursuivi. L’Etat achèvera notamment « le démantèlement des [infrastructures] et la dépollution de l’atoll de Hao ». Ceux de Moruroa et Fangataufa feront l’objet d’une « vigilance méticuleuse ».
Plus généralement, le chef de l’Etat a reconnu « solennellement » la contribution de la Polynésie à la force de dissuasion nucléaire du pays.
Parmi les 181 essais qui ont donné lieu à une explosion, deux en 1968 ont eu pour but de tester des bombes soixante fois plus puissantes que celle larguée sur Hiroshima le 6 août 1945 : plus de 1 000 kilotonnes, contre environ 15 kilotonnes pour la bombe américaine « Little Boy ». Jusqu’en 1974, les essais étaient « aériens », autrement dit menés à l’air libre : ainsi, quarante et un ont été effectués soit d’une barge, soit d’un ballon, ou largués des avions. Passé 1975, ils n’ont plus été que « souterrains », d’un puit creusé dans l’atoll, ou directement sous le lagon. L’armée a reconnu qu’au moins un tir, celui du 17 juillet 1974, avait produit des retombées sur l’île de Tahiti. Mais il n’est pas impossible que les quarante précédents aient fait pareil, d’autant que ce tir en particulier n’était « que » de 20 kilotonnes (pour équivalent en kilotonnes de TNT). Pourtant, à ce jour, seules dix-neuf victimes ont été indemnisées par le ministère de la défense ou le Comité d’indemnisation des victimes des essais nucléaires (Civen) sur 1 024 dossiers déposés.
La loi Morin adoptée en 2010, qui encadre les indemnisations, était très attendue en Polynésie, mais n’a pas atteint ses objectifs : « La loi ne fonctionne pas », écrivaient les sénateurs dans un rapport en 2013. Les projections sur les indemnisations réalisées faisaient « état de dizaines de milliers de demandes », et « de 2 000 à 5 000 dossiers indemnisables », selon les sénateurs. Elles sont loin d’être atteintes.