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Russian Buk M2E Air Defense Missile System

A l'instar du Burkinabé Blaise Compaoré il y a un an, le général Denis Sassou Nguesso abat ses cartes pour faire sauter le verrou constitutionnel supposé l'empêcher de rester au pouvoir. La mascarade préélectorale suit son cours. L'indéboulonnable dictateur du Congo­-Brazzaville doit céder la place au terme de la présidentielle de 2016 à laquelle, selon la Constitution pourtant sur mesure qu'il a imposée au pays en 2002 (qui prévoit la limitation du nombre de mandats à deux et un âge maximum de 70 ans), il (...) - 249 septembre 2015 / Congo Brazzaville, Denis Sassou Nguesso, Salves, Élections, Une

Des enseignements politiques sont probablement à tirer de la sortie médiatique estivale du dictateur tchadien sur le franc CFA, que l'on imagine mûrement réfléchie. Déby est probablement conscient que les revendications contre le franc CFA ne sont plus seulement l'affaire d'économistes indépendants et de rares militants ou dirigeants africains ayant à cœur de défendre l'intérêt public et la souveraineté. En effet, un nombre croissant de relais d'opinion africains posent de plus en plus ouvertement la (...) - 249 septembre 2015 / Tchad, Idriss Déby, Franc CFA, Brèves d'Afrique et d'ailleurs

Provocation ? Menace en direction d'autorités françaises qui ne le soutiendraient pas suffisamment diplomatiquement dans la perspective de la présidentielle tchadienne de 2016 ? Sentiment de puissance lié à son nouveau statut régional, qui l'autoriserait à ne plus s'embarrasser de langue de bois ? On peut se demander quelle mouche a piqué Idriss Déby le 11 août dernier à N'Djamena à la cérémonie commémorant le 55 ème anniversaire de l'indépendance du Tchad, au cours de laquelle il a prononcé un discours sur (...) - 249 septembre 2015 / Tchad, Idriss Déby, Franc CFA, Brèves d'Afrique et d'ailleurs

Tout le monde sait que l'armée française a volé au secours de la paix en Centrafrique, avec l'opération Sangaris. Tout le monde ne sait pas l'écrasante responsabilité de la France dans la déstabilisation permanente du pays depuis plusieurs décennies. Dans un rapport publié cet été, (« Bois de sang, comment l'Europe a aidé à financer la guerre en République centrafricaine », juillet 2015), l'ONG Global Witness éclaire un pan méconnu de cette histoire : « des entreprises aidées financièrement par l'Agence (...) - 249 septembre 2015 / Centrafrique, Brèves d'Afrique et d'ailleurs, AFD

L'ancien intermédiaire d'Areva en RDC et dans la sulfureuse affaire Uramin en Centrafrique, le Belge (mais consul honoraire de France – ou de la Françafrique ? ) à Lubumbashi, Georges Forrest, a reconnu devant la justice avoir versé une commission de 5 millions de dollars à Balkany, officiellement pour une affaire en Namibie. Placé sous le statut de témoin assisté, c'est peu dire qu'il suscite la curiosité des enquêteurs. Coïncidence, la fondation de Georges Forrest vient d'acheter pour 60 000 euros de (...) - 249 septembre 2015 / Édito, Georges Forrest

Vingt ans après le dépôt de la première plainte pour crime de génocide et complicité de génocide visant le prêtre rwandais Wenceslas Munyeshyaka installé en France, pour laquelle le juge s'était déclaré incompétent en 1995, le droit français a évolué et reconnaît aux juges une compétence universelle. Condamné « par contumace » au Rwanda à la prison à perpétuité, Munyeshyaka avait également été formellement accusé par le TPIR et visé par un mandat d'arrêt de celui­ci en 2007. Néanmoins, à leur demande expresse, le (...) - 249 septembre 2015 / Complicité de la France dans le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda, Présumés génocidaires en France, Justice, Brèves d'Afrique et d'ailleurs

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On September 12, the International Peace Institute (IPI) convened a meeting on “Preparing for Pandemics” to facilitate a discussion on lessons learned from past experiences with dealing with pandemics, and ways of preparing more effectively for future outbreaks.

The meeting, which took place at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, brought together a diverse group of relevant experts including public health specialists, medical doctors, philanthropists, historians, as well as representatives of civil society, the military, UN Member States, and multi-lateral institutions.

In his opening remarks, IPI President Terje Rød-Larsen stressed the link between security and health. Pointing to how polio persists in a few unstable regions of the world—like parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia and Syria—he said that “where there is instability, there is a greater risk of disease.” Therefore, the challenge is to reduce risk and increase resilience.

Dr. Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization, and Dr. Elhadj As Sy, Secretary-General of the International Federation of the Red Cross also gave remarks, and both stressed how Ebola had tested the international community, and that more effective multilateral responses are essential for the future.

The first session recalled pandemics of the past like cholera, the Spanish flu, H1N1, polio and Ebola. It was observed that international cooperation and standardized procedures originated in efforts to control an outbreak of cholera in the mid-nineteenth century. The impact of war on the spread of diseases was also explained. Speakers identified factors that contribute to vulnerability and the spread of pandemics. The interface between humans and animals was given particular attention: an appeal was made for an international treaty on reporting viruses in animals that could have an impact on humans. The importance of early detection, increased surveillance and early action were highlighted, although it was noted that states are often hesitant to acknowledge the detection of a disease on their territory for fear of the economic and reputational costs. It was therefore discussed how to incentivize sharing information on pandemics at an early stage, and how to avoid states oscillating between denial and over-reaction. The issue was also raised on how to respect sovereignty while minimizing the transnational spread of diseases from countries that refuse international assistance. The importance of building trust at the community level was also emphasized.

The second session focused on lessons learned from dealing with Ebola and polio. Representatives from the (WHO) Polio Eradication Initiative, the armed forces of Pakistan and National Ebola Emergency Operations Center in Nigeria shared their first-hand experiences. Among the lessons learned were: pre-planning of an outbreak response plan; the need for a whole-of-government emergency response; appointment of a coordinator; establishment of an emergency planning and crisis response cell; sufficient human resources; innovative use of technology; the engagement of local actors; as well as a communications strategy. As demonstrated by the case of Pakistan, there may also be times when the military can play a key role in mobilizing its assets for emergency response.

The third session focused on actionable solutions. Discussants stressed the need for political commitment, capacity building in a way that encourages “brain gain” rather than “brain drain”, greater investment in healthcare systems, more research and development on effective vaccines (i.e., against influenza), and enhanced compliance with the WHO’s International Health Regulations. There was wide appreciation for the work of front line health workers.

The last session discussed policy recommendations for a more robust response to future pandemics. Speakers, including Dr. Chan and Mr. Sy, stressed the importance of transparency, leadership, coherence in policy, more effective use of technology, more open data sharing, well-trained front-line health workers, a culture of prevention, and the mainstreaming of health into development strategies. Participants also stressed the challenge of mobilizing an international emergency response when national capacities are overwhelmed. It was also suggested to formalize the relationship between the WHO and other parts of the UN system.

The meeting builds on IPI’s work on peace and health, particularly its cooperation with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, to overcome the final barriers to the global eradication of polio. Recommendations from the meeting will also feed into the work of the Independent Commission on Multilateralism (ICM).

« J'ai décidé que ma part d'héritage sera partagée avec toute la jeunesse gabonaise, car à mes yeux, nous sommes tous les héritiers d'Omar Bongo. » Cette déclaration d'Ali Bongo à l'occasion de la Fête nationale gabonaise a créé la stupeur. Ali Bongo cède sa part d'héritage ont aussitôt compris – et titré – la plupart des journalistes, les plus critiques proposant leur interprétation : diversion dans la guerre des héritiers qui fait rage au sein du clan Bongo ? Moyen d'éviter d'avoir à prouver sa filiation ? (...) - 249 septembre 2015 / Gabon, Brèves d'Afrique et d'ailleurs

Sa reprise en main brutale de Canal Plus a fait connaître au grand public qui était Bolloré ; plus exactement celle des fameux Guignols de l'Info, car le bonhomme s'était déjà signalé par une intervention aussi directe dans les programmes de la chaîne : la censure d'un reportage consacré à l'évasion fiscale et mettant en cause le Crédit Mutuel, une des banques historiques du groupe Bolloré. C'est que le bonhomme n'aime pas qu'on tente de percer l'opacité de ses affaires bancaires et africaines. On se (...) - 249 septembre 2015 / Médias / Communication, Bolloré, Édito

Özönlenek a menekültek a „balkáni úton”, tízezrek vállalják az embert próbáló menetelést, a küzdelmet katonákkal, rendőrökkel, hivatalokkal, az időjárással, mindennel, egy jobb, biztonságos élet reményében. Nem célom most minősíteni, hogy egyes országok – köztük mi is – hogyan viszonyulnak ehhez a hatalmas embertömeghez. Ki mit és mennyi tesz értük. Ki kit és miért okol ezért a szinte példátlan menekült áradatért.

De erősödnek a kritikai hangok, miszerint az arab országok miért nem fogadják be a kultúrájukban hozzájuk közelebb álló menekülteket? A célkeresztben Szaud-Arábia is benne van, mint olyan ország, amelyik kivonná magát a menekültek megsegítéséből.

Szaud-Arábia ma közzé tette, hogy kb. 2,5 millió szíriai menekültet fogadott be 2011, a polgárháború kezdete óta. A rijadi hatóságok ma első ízben jelentettek meg közleményt a kérdéssel kapcsolatban, miután az utóbbi időben számos kritika jelent meg, hogy a gazdag öböl-menti országok nem fordítanak kellő figyelmet a szíriai menekültekre. 

A szaudi külügyminisztérium kijelentette, hogy nem zárt táborokban őrzik a menekülteket, minden Szíriából érkezett menekültnek szabad mozgása van az országban.

A minisztérium tisztségviselője elmondta, hogy sokan már megkapták a tartózkodási engedélyt, ami lehetővé teszi számukra a munkavállalást és az ingyenes oktatás és egészségügyi ellátás igénybe vételét.

Szaud-Arábia korábban soha nem jelentette meg a befogadott menekültek számát, mert nem kér érte „köszönetet és nincs szüksége a média figyelmére.”

Kuwait jóváhagyta hosszútávú tartózkodásra jogosító vízum megadását az országban dolgozó és élő több mint 120 ezer szíriainak, így nekik a jelenlegi vízumuk lejártával nem kell elhagyniuk az országot.

 

 (beta/AP)

Nyikolaj Malomuzs, Ukrajna külső felderítői szolgálatának korábbi vezetője szerint, Ukrajnát darabokra fogják osztani – írja a Rusnext.

Voici un livre prometteur sur la présence de l'aviation en Nouvelle-Calédonie, faite, aujourd'hui,
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The post-Lisbon reality : the EU political system as one

One of the most important novelties of the Lisbon Treaty is the abolition of the pillar structure which used to 'stigmatise' EU activities based on the supranational vs. intergovernmental operating mode. With the new treaty in place, the Union becomes a united construct which brings about serious systemic challenges. As of now on, different EU policies as well as its operating modes shall interfere with each other to an even greater extent. Granting new important competences to the EP (broadening the scope of the ordinary legislative procedure) and the European Council (now an official EU institution) [1] will change the hitherto division of labour amongst Union's institutions. New systemic challenges for the EU and its functioning will also arise as a consequence of the economic crisis. International agreements brought into life to address it, such as the Fiscal Compact Treaty (FCT), overlap with the EU political system (e.g. it benefits from its institutional capabilities) but are not part of the acquis communautaire, therefore causing interpretation problems. [2] All this will inevitably lead to functional clashes, some of which will have to be resolved by the ECJ. Consequently, one of its tasks in the post-Lisbon reality will be to contribute to finding a new balance within the EU political system by increasing the latter's effectiveness (attainment of predefined policy objectives - policy outcomes) as opposed to efficiency (focus on internal procedural arrangements - policy outputs). [3]

The ECJ as the system's moderator

What purpose should this revamped EU political system serve ? It shall enable further European integration based on stability and predictability. It is important to realise that the current crisis is not only of the economic nature but it concerns the whole political set-up of the Union. Although the EU efficiently put in place measures - policy outputs - aimed to prevent the member states from breaking the Maastricht criteria, i.e. excessive deficit procedure ; it fell short of effectiveness as the expected policy outcomes (stable and predictable integration in the economic field) were not achieved. It is worth highlighting that the division of tasks amongst different EU institutions with regards to their monetary union responsibilities, which had been established long before Lisbon, was clear : the EC and the Council were made decision-makers and the EP together with the European Council mostly deliberative bodies. Under the new conditions (power more dispersed as new competences granted to the EP and the European Council, merger of the EU pillars), the ECJ shall more often be required to give its views on complexities regarding relations between different institutions, procedures governing the EU political system and their applicability. Its role shall therefore evolve more towards the system moderator bringing back stability and predictability which is an intermediate stage between the system interpreter and its regulator. Such a transformation shall be within reasonable limits : the ECJ cannot overregulate the system which currently provides for different means of dispute resolution (political bargaining) nor shall it try to 'capture' the process of European integration by getting involved in political quarrels between different EU institutions. This would result in a situation whereby the Court, through its rulings, could shape (skew ?) teleological dimension of the Union, i.e. its objectives, which shall be done through political cooperation conducted in good faith and not by judicial bodies. In short, 'yes' to smarter involvement of the EU's judiciary (rule of law), 'no' to raising its political profile (rule of lawyers). A good example of the ECJ taking up a new role of the EU political system's moderator can be observed in its recent ruling in the Pringle case. [4] In it, the Court decided that the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was contested by some parties in the EU, was in accordance with Union law. By arguing that, the Court confirmed that the member states had been right in pursuing extraordinary measures with the aim of safeguarding the eurozone. By answering a simple yes-or-no question (was the creation of the ESM in conformity with EU law ?) the ECJ interpreted the decision taken by the national governments to be legally sound. The Court had been mainly required to produce such interpretations in the past but the post-Lisbon reality, with all its complexities, brings about new circumstances in which the ECJ will have to give much better quality advice as to where the EU should be headed. This is exactly what the Court did in the Pringle judgement when it decided to have its say on how the ESM should operate which resulted in going beyond a simple interpretation of the legality of the measure in question. Its view, clearly expressed in the ruling, was that any financial aid under the ESM should be subject to strict conditions to be met by future beneficiaries. Therefore, the Court confirmed the validity of the principle set out by the national governments in article 136 (3) TFEU that no financial aid should be granted to a member state in need unless it commits itself to major structural reforms. It should be highlighted that in its judgement the Court successfully restrained itself from crossing the line separating moderation of the political system from its regulation. Had the ECJ decided to do the latter and list a number of specific criteria to be met by future EMS aid receivers, it would have failed to recognise the need for institutional adaptations necessary when dealing with different EU member states. By keeping this factor in mind together with recognising that some countries had found themselves in a difficult economic position, each for a different reason ; the ECJ acted in a way which does not threaten the flexibility of the EU political system necessary to help those in need out of trouble. Consequently, the Court indicated it did not intend to influence policy choices which were to be made by relevant EU institutions. What it did, however, was to support a general conditionality principle concerning future bail-outs.

Raising the ECJ's profile and potential benefits

The major systemic constraint of the ECJ is that it has to be called upon to act by other actors. However, most of them, especially the member states, consider the Court as the 'nuclear option' and prefer to find a suitable consensus while keeping it at a distance. The problem starts when such a deal hampers system's balance as was the case with eurozone integration where the member states made themselves the sole responsible for punishing a country failing to meet the convergence criteria. Going against the nemo iudex in causa sua principle led to a situation where an EU member could get away with not complying with the rules. Had there been a way to take member states to Court for violating the EMU provisions, discussions on its condition and areas where it possibly fell short of could have started years ago. One cannot be sure that it would have prevented the crisis but surely would have reduced its scale. There is no formal way to make EU actors refer to the ECJ more often. They will surely have problems accepting the Court's new role. However, it is important to show responsibility in this respect and to keep in mind that the ECJ has largely contributed to advancement of European integration in areas where it has been called upon to act (e.g. the common market as opposed to the CFSP). While reaching out to the ECJ might look burdensome it pays off in the long-term perspective as such regulatory check-up increases the effectiveness of these parts of the EU political system where it was performed. The choice is therefore between short-term pain vs. long-term gain. Balancing the post-Lisbon political system of the EU will streamline its effectiveness. This in consequence shall reassure the member states that it is still possible to address serious systemic challenges through the Union. Closer ECJ's scrutiny shall ensure that a number of integrationist spin-offs (not to be confused with spill-overs) such as the FCT, or in fact the ESM which also largely operates outside the EU framework, is largely reduced. It is true that both the UK and the Czech Republic blocked the former's inclusion in EU law. However, had the ECJ been given a chance to 'beef up' the monetary union, would there have been a need for their veto in the first place ?

Bartłomiej Telejko is a policy adviser to the ECR Group at the European Parliament (EU energy, digital and trade policies), a former researcher at Centre Thucydide in Paris, a former trainee at the European Commission and German Marshall Fund of the U.S. in Brussels. He graduated from the College of Europe and holds a PhD in EU trade policy from the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland. Views expressed in the essay are his own and do not reflect the position of the ECR Group.

[1] See more : J. Monar, "The European Union's institutional balance of power after the Treaty of Lisbon," in : Vv. Aa., The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon : visions of leading policy-makers, academics and journalists, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2011, pp. 60-89.

[2] See e.g. R. Dehousse, "The 'Fiscal Compact' : legal uncertainty and political ambiguity", Notre Europe Policy Brief, no. 33, February, 2013.

[3] J. Neyer, ''Explaining the unexpected : efficiency and effectiveness in European decision-making'', Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, pp. 19-38.

[4] C-370/12, Pringle vs. Ireland, 2012, E.C.R.

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Samedi 12 septembre 2015, dans le port de Pozzallo en Italie, le patrouilleur de haute mer (PHM) COMMANDANT BOUAN procède au débarquement des personnes secourues la veille. Sur place, les naufragés sont pris en charge par les secours et l'administration italienne.

« Le temps », écrivait Jean Cocteau, « est de l'éternité pliée ». Formule séduisante mais inexacte puisque l'éternité nie le temps et ne l'allonge ni ne le plie. Il n'en demeure pas moins qu'il existe des plis du temps, non pas tant ceux de la chronologie ou de la mesure du temps que ceux de l'historien ou simplement de ceux qui le vivent. Ces plis ajoutent une dimension qualitative, un sens de la période et du moment au parcours monocorde de la flèche du temps. C'est en quelque sorte une variante subjective, sociale, politique et intellectuelle de la relativité – la théorie scientifique qui domine le XXe siècle – que cette approche différentielle de phases, de moments et de rythmes, vécus aussi bien collectivement qu'individuellement – à l'instar d'un rythme musical, qui pour respecter la rigueur plate du métronome n'en construit pas moins un drame, avec son début, sa péripétie, sa conclusion. (...)

« J 'ai tué beaucoup de gens avec la kalachnikov (ou kalach) et me suis bien camé avec kanif et les autres drogues dures » . Voici comment débute le récit de Birahima, jeune garçon d'une dizaine d'années qui conte sa vie d'enfant-soldat à travers les guerres civiles en Afrique dans les années 1990. Au cours de son périple, il traversera ainsi le Libéria et la Sierra Leone. Le parcours de Komona, jeune fille de douze ans enlevée par un groupe rebelle en Afrique, est similaire. Elle raconte l'histoire d'une ancienne enfant-soldat sur le point de donner la vie. A son futur enfant, elle murmure : « Ecoute bien quand je te raconte mon histoire parce que c'est important que tu comprennes c'est quoi la vie de ta maman avant que tu sortes de mon ventre. Parce que quand tu vas sortir, je ne sais pas si le Bon Dieu va me donner assez la force pour t'aimer ». Ces quelques mots révèlent, dès le début, l'une des réalités des conflits armés concernant le traitement réservé aux filles. (...)

Le long des ruelles pavées de La Havane, un touriste court derrière une mélodie. Tierno, alias El Palenque, natif de Guinée, installé à Paris, mais dont les racines maternelles sont cubaines, espère qu'en retrouvant l'origine de la chanson qui lui trotte entre les oreilles depuis l'enfance, il (...) / Afrique, Caraïbes, Culture, Histoire, Littérature, Cuba, Guinée - 2015/09

Good afternoon and welcome to this press conference. We briefly discussed the economic situation in the Eurozone, I will let Commissioner Moscovici say more about that. We had a follow-up discussion on the issue of structural reforms, in particular on the tax wedge on labour, which is becoming a test case for us on how we can strengthen our cooperation in the field of structural reforms, how can we push the reform agenda jointly in the Eurozone.

Today we discussed and have decided to develop the instrument of benchmarking for the tax burden on labour to follow and stimulate developments in countries of the Eurozone on this issue.

It has to do with competitiveness and the functioning of the labour market, and there is a lot of potential there for us to improve. We will both benchmark on the EU average and also closely follow how we do in relation to the OECD average. There is a statement which will be distributed to you on the issue of benchmarking structural reforms and specifically on the tax wedge on labour, so I will refer for time's sake to that statement.

On Greece, we took stock of latest developments, we were informed by our Greek colleague, who is of course part of the caretaker government. He confirmed that preparatory work of the caretaker government is thus continuing and that implementation, for as far as it does not require further parliamentary decisions, will continue. All of that, of course, in order to lose as little time as possible. From our perspective we can of course only respect the democratic process and will await the election results. Timely implementation of reforms and next steps to take, after the election, is of course crucial and time is limited.

Then on Cyprus, the institutions briefed us on the positive outcome of the seventh review. We all welcomed the progress. Economic recovery is under way in Cyprus and it's actually stronger than was expected at the beginning of the year, picking up quite strong fiscal outturns also above forecast, and the determined reform implementation by the Cypriot government is bearing its fruit.

We endorsed in principle an updated MoU and the eighth ESM disbursement, perhaps Klaus can say more on that. National procedures can be launched on this and hopefully we will have formal approval early in October.

Finally on the Banking Union, the Commission very sternly spoked to us on the implementation process of both BRRD and the IGA. Luckily, all ministers could report progress on this. Progress is being made in different countries; only last week in the Netherlands, parliament agreed to the BRRD, and the IGA was also ratified in the senate, so we are also doing our part. This is also the case in other member states and it's crucial of course because these elements need to be fully operational on the 1st of January 2016.

Those were the key issues for me for now. Thanks for your attention and I pass the floor to Commissioner Moscovici and MD Regling.

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