L'instruction n°1478/DEF/SGA/DRH-MD, du 30 juin dernier, mérite peut-être d'être lue/relue par les soldats (et ex-militaires) qui ont servi au Mali et en RCA.
Cette instruction est "relative à l’attribution du bénéfice de la campagne double aux militaires en opération sur les territoires de la République du Mali et de la République Centrafricaine". Attribution annoncée à l'été 2015 (lire mon post ici).
Elle définit et explicite les modalités d'obtention de la campagne double "accordé aux militaires ayant été exposés à des situations de combat sur le territoire de la République du Mali du 10 janvier 2013 au 9 janvier 2015 ou sur le territoire de la République Centrafricaine du 5 décembre 2013 au 4 décembre 2014".
Pour les néophytes. Les bénéfices de campagne sont des bonifications du temps d'activité, au titre des services militaires, prévues par le code des pensions civiles et militaires de retraite. Ces bénéfices varient selon les territoires et les circonstances d'exercice desdits services.
Ce sont :
- la demi-campagne, soit 18 mois retenus dans la liquidation de la pension pour un an de services militaires effectifs ;
- la campagne simple, soit 2 ans retenus pour un an de services militaires effectifs ;
- la campagne double, soit 3 ans retenus pour un an de services militaires effectifs, octroyée "pour le service accompli en opérations de guerre".
C’est à la fin de cette année que le gouvernement belge devrait lancer un appel d’offres pour acquérir 34 nouveaux avions de combat afin de remplacer les 54 F-16 de sa force aérienne pour un coût d’achat évalué à peu plus de 3 milliards d’euros. Parmi les industriels sollicités, certains ont déjà fait connaître l’offre […]
Cet article Le consortium Eurofighter détaille son offre concernant le Typhoon pour la Belgique est apparu en premier sur Zone Militaire.
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with U.S. President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in China (ALEXEI DRUZHININ | AFP | Getty Images)
Russia has announced the suspension of an agreement it had with the U.S. to convert weapons-grade plutonium into nuclear fuel. It did this as a result of the collapse of the Syrian ceasefire deal involving both the U.S. and Russia. As a result, both powers have allowed yet another regional proxy conflict, post-Ukraine, to undermine the longer-term foundations of global security.
It Doesn’t Matter Who’s At FaultRecriminations have been exchanged between the U.S. and Russia regarding the actual commitment of the other to sustain and implement the recent Syrian ceasefire agreement. While some may attempt to point out how one party or the other is actually more at fault for this failure, this misses the point entirely. The point is that the disagreement between Russia and the U.S over Syria has actually increased global insecurity for all parties.
One would think that any headline or topic involving the three words “U.S.”, “Russia”, and “nuclear” would immediately command worldwide attention and foster a policy of more restraint with respect to resolving conflict between the two powers. Unfortunately, this hasn’t been the case. On the one hand, the failure of the plutonium deal mirrors the Russian cancellation of its rocketry usage to launch U.S. satellites into space several years ago. The failure of the continued rocketry deal has long-term implications, potentially involving joint space exploration, something which affects all of humanity.
Conversely, the failure of the plutonium deal is much worse in that its aftereffects are more likely to be felt sooner rather than later. While nuclear deals between Russia and the U.S. may not necessarily be considered as “sexy” as they once were during the Cold War in terms of garnering frontpage headlines, they are no less critical in fostering global security than resolving any myriad number of regional conflicts.
To emphasize this point, Russia has also simultaneously suspended the 2010 Implementing Agreement concerning cooperation on feasibility studies of the conversion of Russian research reactors to use low-enriched uranium fuel. Additionally, Russia has suspended the 2013 Russian-US Agreement on Cooperation in Nuclear- and Energy-Related Scientific Research and Development. All three of the suspensions were announced within the span of a few days, perfectly illustrating the unforeseen, magnified consequences continued U.S.-Russian hostilities will have for the “foreseeable” future.
The failure of the plutonium deal not only will have ramifications with respect to non-state actors like terrorists, but longer-term strategic relations between the U.S and Russia directly. This is because the failure will not only potentially impact both states’ efforts at nonproliferation globally, but will actually increase the U.S.-Russian security dilemma itself. Though the agreement, known as the Plutonium Disposition and Management Agreement (PDMA), is not as crucial as the INF or New START treaties, its abrogation has dissolved the perceived boundary between the “nuclear” and “conventional” compartments in Russia-U.S. relations.
Patience and Maturity Win in Chess, Not RecklessnessEven though some in the U.S. may indeed consider China to be a longer-term threat to U.S. interests, the sharp decline and rapid pace of deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations threatens to overshadow even the importance of U.S.-China relations. China’s primary instrument of its “comprehensive national power” is its economic base. Russia’s is its nuclear component, something even China doesn’t have (yet). Because of this, U.S. options for resolving conflict with Russia in general are getting ever smaller in number.
While many may be frustrated with Russian actions in Syria, the position taken by some that the U.S. needs to try military means to stop Russian moves in Aleppo brings to mind the word “Armaggedon”. There is no way to possibly foresee the afteraffects of direct U.S. military action against Russian forces in Syria, especially coming in the wake of the recent U.S. bombing of Syrian government forces. A power that is explicitly bent on using its nuclear parity with the U.S. as a key element in its great power resurgence campaign would probably not respond too well to being attacked, especially after its ally has already been attacked, accidentally or not.
Russia has used the plutonium deal impasse as an avenue to demanding not only decreased NATO military levels in Eastern Europe to year 2000-levels and repeal of the Magnitsky Act, but also to demand an end to (as well as compensation for) all sanctions imposed on Russia post-Ukraine. This countermove has, in one fell swoop, annihilated the justification for continued sanctions against Russia by some, namely that they will somehow miraculously affect Russia’s calculus and bring it more into compliance with Western wishes. Needless to say, while Russia’s maneuvering may indeed seem contemptible to some, it has nevertheless caught Western leaders off-balance, yet again.
Exasperated, many will ask, “How then to best “manage” Russia if both military and economic means are off the table?” A clue may be found in many proponents’ views towards U.S.-China relations. At the risk of sounding simplistic, both Russia and the U.S. will need to adopt a more realistic, sober, and patient approach to the other based on cooperation where possible, while also recognizing that competition in other areas will inevitably exist. This also forms the crux of the “great power pragmatism” school of thought which Putin originally came into office believing in and adhering to.
This competition exists because of the inalterable nature of great powers’ national interests which, unsurprisingly, remain intact despite threats from other great powers. Patience then, above all else, will be required from both parties when playing this long-term chess game, while simultaneously recognizing their shared roles and responsibility for upholding regional and global security.
Conversation: The State of U.S.-Russia Relations (courtesy of STRATFORvideo)
The post The Snowball Effect of Continued U.S.-Russia Strategic Mistrust appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
On 11 October 2016, the Council approved the conclusion of an agreement with Monaco that will improve tax compliance by private savers.
The agreement will require EU member states and Monaco to exchange information automatically as a means of helping to prevent tax evasion.
It will give their tax administrations improved cross-border access to information on the financial accounts of each other's residents.
The agreement upgrades a 2004 agreement that obliged Monaco to apply measures equivalent to those in an EU directive on the taxation of savings income.
The new agreement was signed on 12 July 2016. It was concluded (on 11 October) at a meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council, without discussion.
Après avoir annoncé au printemps dernier la construction d'une nouvelle cimenterie à Abidjan d'une capacité d'un million de tonnes, Ciments de l'Afrique (Cimaf) s'apprête à lancer une autre unité à Bouaké, au centre nord du pays, selon les informations de Jeune Afrique.
Cet article Côte d’Ivoire : le marocain Ciments de l’Afrique investit 20 millions d’euros à Bouaké est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.
Argent, médias, lobbys, découpage des circonscriptions : les biais de l'élection présidentielle américaine au regard des précédentes… Depuis quand le Maroc attend-il le grand changement ? Quel fil relie l'univers du « catch-as-catch-can » français, le « wrestling » nord-américain et la « lucha libre » mexicaine ? Les investisseurs chinois rachètent-ils la France, comme naguère les Belges ? Sélection d'archives en rapport avec le numéro du mois.
Budapest – Il s’agit de la première riposte parlementaire d’un parti d’opposition suite à la suspension brutale du plus grand quotidien hongrois, Népszabadság, par son propriétaire la société Mediaworks. Les quatre députés de la Coalition démocratique (DK), élus en 2014 à la faveur d’une alliance progressiste avec le MSzP, PM, Együtt 2014, MLP et MoMa, ont décidé ce lundi de ne plus siéger jusqu’à nouvel ordre à l’Assemblée hongroise et de ne plus participer au travail parlementaire. Le boycott ne s’appliquera pas aux votes requérant les deux tiers de la représentation nationale, de façon à bloquer notamment des modifications de la Loi fondamentale, comme l’envisage notamment Viktor Orbán au sujet des quotas européens de réfugiés.
Le boycott de l’Assemblée peut être sanctionné par des mesures de rétorsion financière à l’encontre des députés «absentéistes». Plus risqué encore, la possibilité d’une exclusion pure et simple du Parlement en cas d’absentéisme prolongé, excédent un an. Les députés DK ont déclaré à ce sujet prévoir participer à au moins un vote sans grand intérêt à intervalle régulier de façon à ne pas perdre leur siège.
Les députés DK sont Ágnes Vadai, László Varjú, Lajos Oláh et l’ancien Premier ministre socialiste Ferenc Gyurcsány. Ce dernier a appelé tous les partis d’opposition au boycott de l’Assemblée lors de la manifestation de samedi soir sur Kossuth tér.
(source : Index)
Hongrie : des journalistes dénoncent un «putsch» à Népszabadság