SWP

Russland hat noch bis zum Mai 2023 den Vorsitz im Arktischen Rat. Aufgrund der russischen Kriegspolitik haben aber sieben der acht Arktisstaaten ihre Mitwirkung im Rat vorläufig eingestellt. Moskau ist davon in mehrfacher Hinsicht betroffen: Politisch wird damit ein Politikfeld beschädigt, in dem die internationale Bedeutung Russlands noch ungebrochen war. Wirtschaftlich steht die Zukunft wichtiger Industrieprojekte und Absatzmärkte Russlands auf dem Spiel. Außerdem tangiert die Unterbrechung der Rats­arbeit auch Interessen anderer Staaten wie China und wirkt sich nachteilig auf die russische Position in der Arktis aus. In Wissenschaft und Forschung haben alle west­lichen Part­ner ihre Kooperation ausgesetzt. Zwar leidet Russland in besonderem Maße unter den Folgen des Klimawandels in der Arktis, doch schadet der zeitweilige Stopp klima­relevanter Forschung letztlich der ganzen Welt. Militärisch suchen Finn­land und Schweden ihren Schutz in der Nato. Das konter­kariert die ursprüngliche Absicht des Kremls, den Einflussbereich der transatlantischen Allianz zurückzudrängen. Zudem wäre Russlands Grenze mit Nato-Staaten dann doppelt so lang wie zuvor.

»Russland darf nicht gewinnen«, sagt Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz. Doch die Ziele der Bundesregierung in diesem Krieg sind unklar. Was will Deutschland für die Ukraine – und wie will es in Zukunft mit Russland umgehen?

There are currently a significant number of protracted armed conflicts worldwide. Illicit economies and their links to violent actors are frequently cited as reasons for their persistence. Drug cultivation, production, and trafficking in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Colombia, and Myanmar have been garnering attention recently since they can undermine peace processes and contribute toward rising levels of insecurity. Nevertheless, it is particularly difficult to grasp the situation in conflict zones and understand the networks of internal and external actors linked to illicit economies due to the limited information base. This also holds true for the violent conflicts in Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR) that have been going on for extended periods of time. However, since United Nations (UN) sanctions apply in all three contexts, there are extensive and regularly available sources of information provided by the reports of the UN Panels of Experts that moni­tor sanctions implementation. These investigative teams provide valuable insights into illicit economies in conflict zones and their links to peace and security. Looking at the reports for Mali, the DRC, and CAR from the last five years helps to identify some common patterns that defy simple solutions, but that can also show entry points for action.

Could China be an alternative to Turkey's trade relations with the European Union?

The war in Ukraine is set to increase the pressure on Turkey’s balancing policy, shed light on the role of anti-Westernism in Ankara-Moscow relations, and reshape Tur­key’s relations with Russia and the West. The balancing policy will face a less permissive environment. However, a rupture in Turkey-Russia relations is not to be expected. Given the prohibitive cost of a breakdown, Ankara will strive to maintain functional bilateral relations with Moscow. More broadly, despite the changed con­text, Turkey will continue to seek autonomy in its foreign and security policy. This quest precedes the balancing policy and was not driven solely by discontent with the West. It was also informed by Turkey’s reading of the global order becoming more multipolar and less Western-centric. In spite of similarities in their narratives, the Turkish and Russian anti-Westernisms manifest themselves differently in policy terms. Finally, Russia’s geopolitical revisionism is set to drive Turkey and the West relatively closer together in matters geopolitical and strategic, provided that Turkey’s current blockage of Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership bid is resolved in the not too distant future.

Dieses Buch stellt detailliert die alle sieben Jahre stattfindenden Verhandlungen über das Budget der Europäischen Union vor und erörtert die zentralen Elemente des europäischen Haushaltssystems. Der Band wurde nach Abschluss der Verhandlungen über den EU-Haushalt 2021-27 grundlegend überarbeitet, aktualisiert und erweitert.

At the G7 summit in June 2022, the German government intends to promote inter­national climate cooperation by establishing a climate club. This club is envisioned to foster implementation of the Paris climate goals and, ideally, grow into a global alliance of ambitious countries. In light of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, energy policy cooperation is now one of the most pressing issues at the G7 summit. Energy security as a short-term priority must be reconciled with accelerated decarbonisation and the international climate agenda. A climate club can certainly provide an impetus for this through agreements on joint regulatory approaches and climate action projects. In terms of the international political process, however, it is important to prevent the initiative from being perceived as a rich countries’ club. The German government should carefully manage expectations: Strong signals are needed for COP27 in Egypt in autumn, first and foremost by way of increasing climate finance commitments. Moreover, it will be crucial to shape the G7 club as an ambitious but inclusive initiative.

Almost 10 years after its creation, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with its lending capacity of up to €500 billion is looking to reorient itself. In a discussion paper from early May, ESM economists proposed creating a “Stability Fund” that would operate within the framework of the ESM. The intention is to enable euro countries to obtain cheap loans more quickly in the event of asymmetric shocks, such as environmental disasters. Also known as the EU bailout fund, the ESM was established during the euro crisis to ensure that struggling countries had access to the financial markets. Since then, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, and Portugal have received ESM loans. Due to the strict conditions for financial assistance, which among other things require politically damaging austerity policies, the ESM has recently fallen into disrepute. No new financial support has been requested from the rescue fund since 2015. All member states even avoided the special credit line with softened conditionality set up at the beginning of the pandemic. In early 2021, the euro countries signed a treaty amendment under which the ESM mandate was extended to strengthen the banking union. If the capital of the Single Resolution Fund is not sufficient to resolve failing banks, the ESM can step in by providing loans, and thus stabilise the financial markets. However, the institution’s core function remains to be a backstop for euro countries that experience financial difficulties. The current ESM director, Klaus Regling, is retiring in October. His successor could bring a new momentum and give the fund, which is searching for its purpose, a new direction.

Bailout fund for crises

Indeed, the proposal of the ESM economists hits a blind spot in the European financial architecture. There is general consensus that a fiscal policy instrument is needed for macroeconomic stabilisation in the Eurozone, as it is clear – especially in the current inflationary environment – that the European Central Bank’s monetary policy alone cannot guarantee favourable financing conditions for the euro countries. Furthermore, the gloomy outlook for the European economy also gives cause for pessimism. The existing SURE programme for short-time work schemes as part of the Covid-19 recovery fund “Next Generation EU” does provide an opportunity to obtain funds in order to combat unemployment. However, it is only a temporary instrument. The proposed ESM Stability Fund is expected to comprise about €250 billion. The sum is equivalent to about 2 per cent of the euro area’s economic output and is more than twice the size of the SURE short-time work instrument. This equips the crisis rescue fund with greater macroeconomic firepower. Moreover, the funds could be raised from already available ESM lending capacities, thus relying on existing institutional structures and not imposing additional costs on euro area countries. Moreover, a fiscal stabilisation capacity – which is based on loans that have to be repaid – limits moral hazard. This can be helpful in gaining political support of the so-called frugal states during implementation. Also included in the proposal are strict conditions for a euro country to access the Stability Fund. While this too is likely to be welcomed by the northern Eurozone states, it raises doubts as to whether the ESM can repair its current politically toxic image.

Integration into the EU

Overall, this is an economically sensible proposal to make the Eurozone more crisis-proof. However, the main problem lies at a more fundamental level of the ESM and its role in the European financial architecture. As an intergovernmental institution of the euro area members, the Eurozone rescue fund is presently outside the legal framework of the European Union. It is worth considering integrating the ESM into the EU. Through governance by the Commission and accountability to the EU Parliament, it would be possible to externalise the political pressure of short-term national interests and overcome the political crisis of confidence. In addition, this would simplify the institutional structure as well as provide the opportunity to integrate other credit lines and financial support programmes such as “Next Generation EU” under one roof. This would create synergies in the management of the various financial assistance programmes and contribute to a greater understanding among citizens. Nevertheless, there are still some areas that would need to be clarified if the ESM were to be integrated into EU law. For example, only Eurozone countries have paid capital into the ESM, on the basis of which the ESM can sell bonds on the financial markets and provide financial support to states as needed. However, EU countries outside the Eurozone are also represented in the Commission and the Parliament. Taking this discussion forward and providing impetus will become the main tasks of the new ESM leadership.

Adopting the slogan “Progress towards an equitable world”, Germany had intended to use the G7 presidency to push for collective action on important global issues such as climate change, healthy lives, sustainable development, inequality, and the defence of democracy. But this transformative agenda was suddenly confronted with Vladimir Putin’s war. The meticulously planned G7 programme had to be adjusted to a new political reality. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion in February 2022, the German presidency has closely cooperated with the EU and NATO to coordinate numerous measures to support Ukraine. These include extensive financial and economic sanctions against Moscow as well as arms shipments to and humanitarian aid for Kyiv.

Not all governments are following suit

However, beyond the circle of like-minded states represented in the G7, the EU, and NATO, international solidarity with Ukraine has remained limited. Therefore, the selection of guest countries to be invited to join the G7 for its June summit at Schloss Elmau proved to be challenging. Only after extensive deliberations and, reportedly, some diplomatic hiccups, India, Indonesia, Senegal, and South Africa were finally officially named as invitees.

The delay has a lot to do with the public positioning of these countries with regard to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Since the start of the war, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted three major resolutions condemning Moscow. None of the four invitees has consistently closed ranks with the G7 by approving all three resolutions. According to the reasoning of German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock in her speech to support the first resolution, this is tantamount to a toleration of Russian aggression. Baerbock quoted the South African Archbishop and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Desmond Tutu, who, in referring to the Apartheid regime, maintained that “if you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor”. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a flagrant violation of international law, neutrality constitutes an alignment with the aggressor. However, India, Indonesia, Senegal, and South Africa are hardly alone with their preference for neutrality. Governments representing roughly half of the world population either explicitly voted against all three UNGA resolutions, abstained, or were absent.

Shadows cast over the G20

Putin’s war has also cast a shadow over the G20, which includes Russia. Up to now, the G7 have only been joined by three other G20 members – Australia, the EU, and South Korea – in imposing sanctions against Moscow. This further complicated the invitation process: When the UK presided over the G7 in 2021, India and South Africa attended the summit, joining in on a statement about open societies that included a reference to an “open and inclusive rules-based international order”. Both countries are members of the G20 as well as BRICS, a group that also includes Brazil, China, and Russia. They thus provide an important link to the governments in Beijing and Moscow. Given their self-proclaimed neutrality, inviting them to the G7 summit this year has understandably raised concerns – but it also provides an opportunity. Russia’s war of aggression will definitely play a central role in Elmau. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been present at various meetings of the G7 in the last few months. The summit could thus include a facilitated exchange between the guest countries and Ukraine – preferably in close coordination with a parliamentary track. It would be a major achievement if the guest countries were to be convinced that Kyiv needs their active support.

This would also send a strong message for the G20 summit in Indonesia, where Putin’s attendance is very likely. China has already signalled that the G20 process should be kept free from political differences about the Russian invasion. Of course, the G7 should remain committed to political dialogue, especially since Australia, South Korea, and the EU share its position towards Russia. But there can hardly be “business as usual”: A “family photo” with Putin cordially joining the heads of state and governments is hard to fathom. In Elmau, the G7 and the guest countries should therefore also discuss the G20 summit. The aim should be to increase support for Ukraine. That Indonesia – the G20 host and G7 guest country – invited Zelenskyy to participate in Bali is a positive step in this direction.