Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

There is no consensus about the benefits and drawbacks in foreign direct investments. In the aggregate, is there an economic logic to attracting it? Kasper Vrolijk studies the case of Uganda and finds both positive technology spillovers and negative market competition, with the latter occurring mostly through domestic buyer-supplier linkages. The Ugandan case shows that policies that curb some of the negative effects may be needed.

There is no consensus about the benefits and drawbacks in foreign direct investments. In the aggregate, is there an economic logic to attracting it? Kasper Vrolijk studies the case of Uganda and finds both positive technology spillovers and negative market competition, with the latter occurring mostly through domestic buyer-supplier linkages. The Ugandan case shows that policies that curb some of the negative effects may be needed.

There is no consensus about the benefits and drawbacks in foreign direct investments. In the aggregate, is there an economic logic to attracting it? Kasper Vrolijk studies the case of Uganda and finds both positive technology spillovers and negative market competition, with the latter occurring mostly through domestic buyer-supplier linkages. The Ugandan case shows that policies that curb some of the negative effects may be needed.

Polen im Wahlkampf: Schlammschlacht in einem gespaltenen Land

The South Caucasus has long been a theatre of Turkish and Iranian cooperation and rivalry. While these two regional powers have historically balanced their inter­ests, there are signs that rivalry is taking precedence. Turkey’s unwavering backing of Azer­baijan during the 2020 Karabakh War consolidated Ankara’s footprint in the region. Azerbaijan’s retaking of the rest of Karabakh in the latest military strikes on 19 September 2023 makes a peace accord between Azerbaijan and Armenia more likely, furthering Turkey’s interests, and potentially limiting Russia’s role in the region. However, the prospect of a “less Russia, more Turkey” dynamic heightens Tehran’s apprehensions towards Ankara. Particularly concerning for Iran is the clause with­in the Moscow-brokered ceasefire of November 2020 that mandates the rebuild­ing of a road and rail link connecting Turkey to mainland Azerbaijan via Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave and Armenia’s south-eastern Syunik province; this risks marginal­ising Iran. In addition, Tehran is anxiously observing the deepening of ties between Turkey’s close ally, Azerbaijan, and Iran’s key adversary, Israel.

Après le premier tome l’an dernier, « Géostratégix II » vient de paraître ! Cette fois-ci, avec le dessinateur Tommy, nous nous penchons sur les grands enjeux du monde contemporain. Quels sont les enjeux des changements climatiques ? La démocratie est-elle universelle ? Quels sont le poids, l’influence et le rôle respectifs de l’Europe, des États-Unis, de la Chine, de la Russie, de l’Afrique, de l’Amérique latine et de l’Asie ? Autant de questions auxquelles nous tentons de répondre dans cette nouvelle bande dessinée.

 

La guerre en Ukraine a accentué la dépendance de Bruxelles à l’égard de Washington. Alors que celle-ci tendait à s’émanciper de Washington et à établir une autonomie stratégique européenne, l’Union européenne (UE) n’effectue-t-elle pas un retour à la case départ ? Quel rôle reste-il à jouer à l’UE dans ce panorama stratégique ?

Federico Santopinto, directeur de recherche à l’IRIS et responsable du programme Europe, stratégie et sécurité de l’IRIS, répond à nos questions dans le cadre de son chapitre publié dans « L’Année stratégique 2024 ».

Cooperation, financial aid, trade compensation, but no sanctions: According to media reports, these are the demands of the Mercosur countries Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. They are responding to the EU’s request this spring to amend the forest and climate protection provisions of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement within a supplementary declaration. Simultaneously, rules on deforestation-free sales into the EU have already been established in parallel.

Hard struggle for conclusion

After more than 20 years, the two major regional markets actually agreed on a joint trade agreement in June 2019. But then the Brazilian government under Jair Bolsonaro abandoned the prior climate protection pledges and allowed large-scale slash-and-burn agricultural practices. Under these changed circumstances, the EU was not willing to conclude the agreement. After his election in 2022, President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva announced that he would return to his previous climate-conscious policies. However, this did not satisfy the EU, which had become aware of the critical importance of deforestation, leading to a much tougher stance: The EU Regulation on deforestation-free supply chains, which came into force in May, requires European importers of certain products such as soy, beef, and cocoa to ensure a deforestation-free supply chain and, in practice, to buy only appropriately certified goods. This will impact production methods and their documentation, and thus will also affect costs for supplier countries such as Brazil. In addition, the EU sought to make the negotiated agreement more sustainable: A supplementary declaration was intended to address corresponding weaknesses in the text, and also allow EU member states that had previously objected, such as France and Austria, to approve of the agreement.

The Mercosur countries have become increasingly critical of the unilateral EU initiatives developed in parallel, which they perceive as being intrusive and contradicting the idea of bilateral – and thus joint – negotiations on the agreement. The EU Regulation on deforestation-free supply chains, as a unilateral instrument, does indeed provide for cooperation, for example in developing tools for implementation. In this context, it also offers room for a more favourable risk classification for exporting countries, which reduces administrative burdens and costs. It is unknown whether these possibilities were taken into account in the agreements’ negotiations. The supplementary EU declaration proposed in February – prior to the regulation entering into force – does not yet address this issue.

More cooperation required for the trade agreement

The Mercosur countries’ response to the EU’s supplementary declaration now addresses this cooperation consistently: They demand EU support in implementing the necessary standards, including financial resources, the exclusion of trade sanctions regarding commitments and, above all, the introduction of a compensation mechanism, which is intended to be triggered if the unilateral EU legislation nullifies the trade benefits of the agreement. The latter did not appear out of the blue, given the large number of new unilateral sustainability commitments: In addition to the EU Regulation on deforestation-free supply chains, the European Supply Chain Directive, which is similar but covers all products, is well advanced in the Brussels legislative process, and a ban on imports of products from forced labour is being prepared. All of these new unilateral approaches impose partially different requirements on sales within the EU regarding deforestation, climate protection, labour standards, and human rights.

The recent demands of the Mercosur countries touch upon the fundamental question of how sustainability and fair trade are achieved. European legislation can prevent the EU and its consumers from unintentionally contributing to deforestation, environmental degradation, inhumane working conditions, and human rights abuses. However, in the case of global sustainability goals such as climate protection by preventing deforestation, strict rules can lead to trade being diverted to other, less strictly regulated markets. The sustainability goal will thus be undermined, albeit not by European consumers. Sustainability goals can therefore only be fully achieved with the acceptance and support of trading partners. Trade agreements can assist with this, if they are judiciously coordinated with the aforementioned unilateral instruments. In return, however, partners will expect clarity from the EU on what commitments they have to make and what the EU and its member states can contribute towards their implementation. Moreover, partners will demand more trade and competitive advantages in return for greater sustainability commitments.

The Mercosur proposal now offers opportunities to link unilateral actions with trade agreements. This is exactly what the EU itself envisaged in its review of the sustainability chapters in trade agreements in summer 2022. The Mercosur proposal should therefore be used constructively as a template, even if the design of individual elements still requires further discussion: For example, the EU should – for reasons of synergy and even more as a sign of appreciation – make greater efforts to utilise and at the same time support existing sustainability approaches on the Mercosur side, such as own certification. The proposed compensation mechanism could also increase the much-needed acceptance of sustainability goals. It fits into a well-known logic of trade agreements and Mercosur could conceivably impose protective tariffs, or the EU could offer increased market access, provided that unilateral sustainability targets are met.

The EU can now play a key role in linking sustainability and trade as well as promoting fair trade, also from the perspective of its partners. A failure of the agreement would benefit China in particular, which has already offered a trade agreement to individual Mercosur countries. Last but not least, the EU should seize the opportunity to design a forward-looking model for linking sustainability and trade to overcome the impasse on geo-strategically important agreements with other partners.

Die französische Regierung hat einen umfangreichen Plan für mehr Klimaschutz vorgestellt. Die Wärmepumpenproduktion soll in den kommenden vier Jahren verdreifacht werden, die beiden letzten Kohlekraftwerke vom Netz gehen und E-Autos gefördert werden. Energieexpertin Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin, kommentiert die Pläne wie folgt:

Frankreichs Plan, mit gezielten politischen Maßnahmen eine Reindustrialisierung Frankreichs durch die Elektrifizierung von Verkehr und Industrie anzustreben, ist grundsätzlich lobenswert. Der Einsatz von Wärmepumpen und Elektro-Fahrzeugen ist durchaus effizient und sinnvoll. Allerdings hat Frankreich ohnehin schon ein Strom-Problem, weil viele Atomkraftwerke marode sind. Strom muss aber effizient genutzt und darf nicht verschwendet werden. Es wäre daher sinnvoll, wenn Frankreich die Subventionierung der Stromproduktion einstellt und die Strompreise nicht mehr künstlich niedrig hält. Nur wenn diese die Kostenwahrheit widerspiegeln, kann Strom gespart und effizient genutzt werden.

Frankreich kann es gelingen, mit der Förderung von Wärmepumpen und E-Fahrzeugen die Wirtschaft beziehungsweise die Industrieproduktion anzukurbeln, sofern das Energiesystem effizient ist. Deutschland kann ebenfalls von diesen Programmen profitieren, da zahlreiche Wärmepumpen-Anbieter die Produktion hochfahren und auch die deutschen Autohersteller mehr auf Elektromobilität umstellen werden. Daher sollte in Deutschland der Einsatz von Wärmepumpen nicht zerredet werden.

Recent anti-UN protests have fueled concerns that some UN peacekeeping operations are facing a “crisis of legitimacy” among host-state populations. Without local legitimacy, there are questions about whether peacekeepers should be present. Peacekeeping operations also depend on local legitimacy to effectively implement their mandates. It is therefore important to understand how local populations perceive UN peacekeepers.

While researchers have studied local perceptions within specific peacekeeping contexts and compared historical data on local perceptions in past peacekeeping operations, few have compared recent data on local perceptions of current missions. This article therefore explores existing data on local perceptions of the four current multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations: the missions in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and South Sudan. This data points to several cross-cutting insights that could help inform conversations around local perceptions of UN peacekeeping.

The paper concludes that there is wide variation in perceptions of peacekeepers, both between and within peacekeeping contexts and across time. This means that it rarely makes sense to talk about UN peacekeeping operations having or lacking “legitimacy.” Instead, they have multiple “legitimacies.” Understanding the factors behind these legitimacies requires better data on and nuanced analysis of local perceptions.

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To address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade relations it is imperative to update the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Plurilateral agreements are a viable option for responding to trade issues on which multilateral consensus is difficult. They should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation.
– In their current form, WTO rules do not adequately address pressing global challenges such as food security, pandemic responses, and climate change. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for reform.
– Effective plurilateral agreements feature a layered architecture of rights and obligations – similar to that of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) – and encompass capacity-building measures.
– WTO Members should initiate plurilaterals on topics that are of particular concern to developing countries and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and that can help achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

To address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade relations it is imperative to update the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Plurilateral agreements are a viable option for responding to trade issues on which multilateral consensus is difficult. They should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation.
– In their current form, WTO rules do not adequately address pressing global challenges such as food security, pandemic responses, and climate change. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for reform.
– Effective plurilateral agreements feature a layered architecture of rights and obligations – similar to that of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) – and encompass capacity-building measures.
– WTO Members should initiate plurilaterals on topics that are of particular concern to developing countries and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and that can help achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

To address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade relations it is imperative to update the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Plurilateral agreements are a viable option for responding to trade issues on which multilateral consensus is difficult. They should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation.
– In their current form, WTO rules do not adequately address pressing global challenges such as food security, pandemic responses, and climate change. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for reform.
– Effective plurilateral agreements feature a layered architecture of rights and obligations – similar to that of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) – and encompass capacity-building measures.
– WTO Members should initiate plurilaterals on topics that are of particular concern to developing countries and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and that can help achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

This chapter investigates whether China assumes the role of a rule-taker, acts as a rule-maker or even breaks with the system governing foreign investment. Given its significant foreign investment flows and economic and political clout, a better understanding of China’s ideas for and potential role in the ongoing reform of global investment governance is highly relevant. An analysis of China’s international investment agreements shows that China acted as a rule-taker by broadly accepting the templates of its treaty partners, while clinging to a number of defensive positions. The most recent and significant international investment agreement negotiated by China, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, signed in principle with the EU, seems to be following a template that largely reflects the preferences of the EU. China is also a supporter of the World Trade Organization negotiations on investment facilitation. China’s role in the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement negotiations should be characterized not so much as a thought-leader but as a key promoter of dialogue and negotiations.

This chapter investigates whether China assumes the role of a rule-taker, acts as a rule-maker or even breaks with the system governing foreign investment. Given its significant foreign investment flows and economic and political clout, a better understanding of China’s ideas for and potential role in the ongoing reform of global investment governance is highly relevant. An analysis of China’s international investment agreements shows that China acted as a rule-taker by broadly accepting the templates of its treaty partners, while clinging to a number of defensive positions. The most recent and significant international investment agreement negotiated by China, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, signed in principle with the EU, seems to be following a template that largely reflects the preferences of the EU. China is also a supporter of the World Trade Organization negotiations on investment facilitation. China’s role in the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement negotiations should be characterized not so much as a thought-leader but as a key promoter of dialogue and negotiations.

This chapter investigates whether China assumes the role of a rule-taker, acts as a rule-maker or even breaks with the system governing foreign investment. Given its significant foreign investment flows and economic and political clout, a better understanding of China’s ideas for and potential role in the ongoing reform of global investment governance is highly relevant. An analysis of China’s international investment agreements shows that China acted as a rule-taker by broadly accepting the templates of its treaty partners, while clinging to a number of defensive positions. The most recent and significant international investment agreement negotiated by China, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, signed in principle with the EU, seems to be following a template that largely reflects the preferences of the EU. China is also a supporter of the World Trade Organization negotiations on investment facilitation. China’s role in the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement negotiations should be characterized not so much as a thought-leader but as a key promoter of dialogue and negotiations.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a decisive rupture in international affairs, sparking heightened global geopolitical tensions among major powers not seen in the post–Cold War era. Although many Western countries swiftly and universally condemned Russia’s aggression as a clear violation of the international rules-based order, as enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter, the responses of African states have been far more divided and ambiguous. In fact, the region represented by the African voting group in the UN General Assembly has consistently been the most divided globally regarding support for the adoption of resolutions seeking to condemn Russia’s aggression, upholding Ukraine’s territorial integrity or addressing the fallout of the conflict in terms of human rights violations and the humanitarian consequences.

The collective positions of African states on the ongoing conflict sharply contrast with those of countries such as Germany, whose leaders have characterised it as a watershed moment – famously captured by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s “Zeitenwende” address to the Bundestag on 27 February 2022. This speech marked a decisive shift in German foreign and defence policy, signalling increased budgetary allocations for defence spending and a more pronounced stance on military deterrence than has been seen since the country’s reunification. This has certainly resonated with many countries that do indeed view the brazenness of Russia’s invasion as the effective end of the post–Cold War international system, and the beginning of a new form of European security order.

For many African states, however, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has barely registered as a blip on their respective foreign policy agendas, with Africa consistently accounting for the largest number of abstentions in the UN General Assembly’s 11th Emergency Special Session on Ukraine. For many of these countries, the conflict in Ukraine is seen in terms similar to most other conflicts that have been raging across the continent for many years. Accordingly, the framing of the Russian invasion as some form of “epochal change” for the entire global order is viewed as puzzling at best, or disingenuous at worst.

In light of these contrasting positions, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) undertook a study of Russia-Africa relations in 2022. One of the aims was to analyse why concepts such as “Zeitenwende” have gained little traction among African governments. The study was based on an analysis of recent political and economic developments between Russia and African states, primary source interviews as well as a statistical analysis of the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly voting patterns of Russia and African states. We came up with three main findings.

What it is not: Russian influence in Africa

The general reluctance of many African states to explicitly condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has very little to do with Russian influence on the continent (beyond a handful of states that have clearly benefited from Russian military and financial support in recent years). For many countries, Russia has remained a marginal player across the African continent when compared to other traditional and emerging powers. From trade and development assistance to investment in infrastructure, mining, energy and other key economic sectors, Moscow lags far behind the continent’s major partners, such as China, the United States, the European Union, and even India and Turkey.

Accordingly, Moscow maintains very little political leverage over African states, despite a strategic pivot back to the African continent in recent years – particularly following the inaugural Africa-Russia Summit in 2019. In sum, Moscow is still largely attempting to catch up with other global powers that capitalized on its disengagement from Africa throughout much of the 1990s and 2000s. The only major exception, however, is the arms trade, where Russia has remained either a top or leading exporter.

Despite this limited economic investment, Moscow is nonetheless seen as having achieved an outsized degree of political influence in a handful of African states, building upon its relatively frugal investments. This may be explained by longstanding historical ties, or, more likely, by the shared worldviews of African states, which see their marginal place in the international system as a consequence of its unjust, unfair and unrepresentative structure. Against this backdrop, Moscow plays on these deep-seated grievances, framing its partnership with the continent as an attractive alternative to the West, which remains burdened by a history of abuse and exploitation in its engagements with Africa.

What it could be: Shared historical links

Longstanding historical and interpersonal ties between Soviet-era officials and former liberation struggle stalwarts in Africa are one important factor for understanding contemporary relations between Russia and African states. Many African leaders currently in power received considerable material and financial support from the former Soviet Union, including military training, arms and education (often centred around trainings in the Marxist-Leninist school of thought). Extensive Soviet support for African liberation movements ranged from the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa to the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), among others.

This shared history has been wholly claimed by Russia (to the exclusion of other former Soviet Socialist Republics), given its position as the official legal successor to the Soviet Union. Consequently, the modern Russian state and the former Soviet Union continue to be viewed in fairly analogous terms across Africa, despite glaring substantive differences that are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. As Moscow has more recently sought to rekindle these old ties, it has specifically honed in on these deep, historical, ideological and emotive relationships that were defined through a common struggle against the ongoing abuses of colonial and imperial powers across the world. This has afforded Moscow a particularly privileged position, in contrast to many of the continent’s Western partners.

What it is: Shared worldviews of African states

ISS research suggests that one of the main reasons for Africa’s ambiguous response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not so much the engagements or relations of African states with Russia. Instead, it is due to the frustrations of African states and growing disillusionment with the nature of the current global order. Whereas Germany’s “Zeitenwende” seeks to develop a response to a significant turning point in the international system based on the brazenness with which global laws and norms have been violated, for many African states, on the other hand, this invasion simply parallels many other instances in which the international rules-based order was disregarded by a major power – in pursuit of their own narrow interests. Accordingly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine does not represent any significant deviation from the standard behaviour of any major power, let alone an “epochal change”.

The ongoing conflict has simply reinforced the need for the meaningful reform of an international system that has consistently failed the African continent, namely by failing to constrain the aggression and abuses of power by dominant states, and to address the continent’s persistent marginalisation in world affairs. Of course, not all 54 African states share such a dim view of the international system, but the broad contours of a shared worldview can indeed be found based on common historical experiences in overcoming colonialism, and the hard lessons learnt during the Cold War. Accordingly, the divided response across the continent’s 54 states is not so much an indictment of their commitment (or lack thereof) to a rules-based global order, but rather a sign of growing mistrust in a flawed system that does not treat all conflicts or countries equally.

What it means for Germany’s Africa Policy

Germany and other Western partners’ engagement with African countries needs to be grounded in a realistic and pragmatic framework that clearly acknowledges the divergent worldviews of African states. Although the “Zeitenwende” may carry a lot of weight in Germany, and across Europe, this framing of the international system’s future does not align with contemporary international relations of African states. Accordingly, German policymakers should seek to broaden and nuance their conception of a “Zeitenwende” by attempting to understand the utility of this term from a “Southern” perspective – beyond the conceptual or policy confines of the immediate European security environment. In doing so, policymakers could better recognise that the foreign policy perspectives of many African states are primarily informed by their continued marginal position in an international system that is perceived as flawed, inequitable and unjust. In the absence of major changes, African states will remain naturally poised as revisionist actors on the world stage, pushing them into a closer orbit with other states in the Global South, as was recently illustrated by the expansion of the BRICS group. This could result in a greater pursuit of a more multipolar international order at the expense of the liberal normative bedrock underpinning the current system.

Priyal Singh ist Senior Researcher für Africa in the World am Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, Südafrika.

Die Verantwortung für die in den Beiträgen und Interviews vorgetragenen Inhalte, Meinungen und Quellen liegt bei den jeweiligen Autor*innen.

 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a decisive rupture in international affairs, sparking heightened global geopolitical tensions among major powers not seen in the post–Cold War era. Although many Western countries swiftly and universally condemned Russia’s aggression as a clear violation of the international rules-based order, as enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter, the responses of African states have been far more divided and ambiguous. In fact, the region represented by the African voting group in the UN General Assembly has consistently been the most divided globally regarding support for the adoption of resolutions seeking to condemn Russia’s aggression, upholding Ukraine’s territorial integrity or addressing the fallout of the conflict in terms of human rights violations and the humanitarian consequences.

The collective positions of African states on the ongoing conflict sharply contrast with those of countries such as Germany, whose leaders have characterised it as a watershed moment – famously captured by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s “Zeitenwende” address to the Bundestag on 27 February 2022. This speech marked a decisive shift in German foreign and defence policy, signalling increased budgetary allocations for defence spending and a more pronounced stance on military deterrence than has been seen since the country’s reunification. This has certainly resonated with many countries that do indeed view the brazenness of Russia’s invasion as the effective end of the post–Cold War international system, and the beginning of a new form of European security order.

For many African states, however, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has barely registered as a blip on their respective foreign policy agendas, with Africa consistently accounting for the largest number of abstentions in the UN General Assembly’s 11th Emergency Special Session on Ukraine. For many of these countries, the conflict in Ukraine is seen in terms similar to most other conflicts that have been raging across the continent for many years. Accordingly, the framing of the Russian invasion as some form of “epochal change” for the entire global order is viewed as puzzling at best, or disingenuous at worst.

In light of these contrasting positions, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) undertook a study of Russia-Africa relations in 2022. One of the aims was to analyse why concepts such as “Zeitenwende” have gained little traction among African governments. The study was based on an analysis of recent political and economic developments between Russia and African states, primary source interviews as well as a statistical analysis of the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly voting patterns of Russia and African states. We came up with three main findings.

What it is not: Russian influence in Africa

The general reluctance of many African states to explicitly condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has very little to do with Russian influence on the continent (beyond a handful of states that have clearly benefited from Russian military and financial support in recent years). For many countries, Russia has remained a marginal player across the African continent when compared to other traditional and emerging powers. From trade and development assistance to investment in infrastructure, mining, energy and other key economic sectors, Moscow lags far behind the continent’s major partners, such as China, the United States, the European Union, and even India and Turkey.

Accordingly, Moscow maintains very little political leverage over African states, despite a strategic pivot back to the African continent in recent years – particularly following the inaugural Africa-Russia Summit in 2019. In sum, Moscow is still largely attempting to catch up with other global powers that capitalized on its disengagement from Africa throughout much of the 1990s and 2000s. The only major exception, however, is the arms trade, where Russia has remained either a top or leading exporter.

Despite this limited economic investment, Moscow is nonetheless seen as having achieved an outsized degree of political influence in a handful of African states, building upon its relatively frugal investments. This may be explained by longstanding historical ties, or, more likely, by the shared worldviews of African states, which see their marginal place in the international system as a consequence of its unjust, unfair and unrepresentative structure. Against this backdrop, Moscow plays on these deep-seated grievances, framing its partnership with the continent as an attractive alternative to the West, which remains burdened by a history of abuse and exploitation in its engagements with Africa.

What it could be: Shared historical links

Longstanding historical and interpersonal ties between Soviet-era officials and former liberation struggle stalwarts in Africa are one important factor for understanding contemporary relations between Russia and African states. Many African leaders currently in power received considerable material and financial support from the former Soviet Union, including military training, arms and education (often centred around trainings in the Marxist-Leninist school of thought). Extensive Soviet support for African liberation movements ranged from the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa to the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), among others.

This shared history has been wholly claimed by Russia (to the exclusion of other former Soviet Socialist Republics), given its position as the official legal successor to the Soviet Union. Consequently, the modern Russian state and the former Soviet Union continue to be viewed in fairly analogous terms across Africa, despite glaring substantive differences that are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. As Moscow has more recently sought to rekindle these old ties, it has specifically honed in on these deep, historical, ideological and emotive relationships that were defined through a common struggle against the ongoing abuses of colonial and imperial powers across the world. This has afforded Moscow a particularly privileged position, in contrast to many of the continent’s Western partners.

What it is: Shared worldviews of African states

ISS research suggests that one of the main reasons for Africa’s ambiguous response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not so much the engagements or relations of African states with Russia. Instead, it is due to the frustrations of African states and growing disillusionment with the nature of the current global order. Whereas Germany’s “Zeitenwende” seeks to develop a response to a significant turning point in the international system based on the brazenness with which global laws and norms have been violated, for many African states, on the other hand, this invasion simply parallels many other instances in which the international rules-based order was disregarded by a major power – in pursuit of their own narrow interests. Accordingly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine does not represent any significant deviation from the standard behaviour of any major power, let alone an “epochal change”.

The ongoing conflict has simply reinforced the need for the meaningful reform of an international system that has consistently failed the African continent, namely by failing to constrain the aggression and abuses of power by dominant states, and to address the continent’s persistent marginalisation in world affairs. Of course, not all 54 African states share such a dim view of the international system, but the broad contours of a shared worldview can indeed be found based on common historical experiences in overcoming colonialism, and the hard lessons learnt during the Cold War. Accordingly, the divided response across the continent’s 54 states is not so much an indictment of their commitment (or lack thereof) to a rules-based global order, but rather a sign of growing mistrust in a flawed system that does not treat all conflicts or countries equally.

What it means for Germany’s Africa Policy

Germany and other Western partners’ engagement with African countries needs to be grounded in a realistic and pragmatic framework that clearly acknowledges the divergent worldviews of African states. Although the “Zeitenwende” may carry a lot of weight in Germany, and across Europe, this framing of the international system’s future does not align with contemporary international relations of African states. Accordingly, German policymakers should seek to broaden and nuance their conception of a “Zeitenwende” by attempting to understand the utility of this term from a “Southern” perspective – beyond the conceptual or policy confines of the immediate European security environment. In doing so, policymakers could better recognise that the foreign policy perspectives of many African states are primarily informed by their continued marginal position in an international system that is perceived as flawed, inequitable and unjust. In the absence of major changes, African states will remain naturally poised as revisionist actors on the world stage, pushing them into a closer orbit with other states in the Global South, as was recently illustrated by the expansion of the BRICS group. This could result in a greater pursuit of a more multipolar international order at the expense of the liberal normative bedrock underpinning the current system.

Priyal Singh is Senior Researcher for Africa in the World at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, South Africa.

Responsibility for content, opinions expressed and sources used in the articles and interviews lies with the respective authors.

 

Megatrends Afrika (MTA): Warum braucht Deutschland neue Afrikapolitische Leitlinien? Warum überarbeitet die Bundesregierung sie und warum gerade jetzt?

Christoph Retzlaff (CR): Es ist offensichtlich, dass sich die Welt und auch Afrika seit der letzten Auflage der Afrikapolitischen Leitlinien 2019 und dem erstmaligen Erscheinen im Jahr 2014 verändert haben: die COVID-19-Pandemie, der russische Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine, die zunehmende Systemkonkurrenz mit China und die Umwälzungen in der Sahel-Region waren hier einschneidende Entwicklungen. Neu ist auch das gestiegene Bewusstsein für die gewachsene Bedeutung des afrikanischen Kontinents – nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern in vielen Teilen der Welt. Ich würde gerne eine Zahl nennen: Seit Dezember 2021 gab es über 50 Besuche von deutschen Ressortvertretern auf politischer Ebene in Afrika – Staatssekretärin, Staatssekretär, Ministerin, Minister oder Bundeskanzler. Diese Dichte an Austausch mit unseren afrikanischen Partnern haben wir so noch nicht gehabt und das liegt natürlich an der Bedeutungszunahme Afrikas. Denn weltweit wächst die Erkenntnis, dass wir globale Probleme – Stichworte Klimakrise, Migration und Pandemiebekämpfung – nur mit Partnern aus dem globalen Süden, einschließlich mit afrikanischen Staaten, lösen können.

Seit dem russischen Überfall auf die Ukraine sehen wir auch verstärkt einen globalen Systemwettbewerb, vor allem zwischen Russland und China auf der einen Seite und dem Westen auf der anderen Seite. Diesen Systemwettbewerb müssen wir ernst nehmen. Wir werden ihn nur dann erfolgreich bestehen, wenn wir durch Zusammenarbeit russische und chinesische Narrative widerlegen, die nach dem Motto “the West against the rest“ funktionieren. Stattdessen müssen wir unseren Austausch mit dem sogenannten globalen Süden und insbesondere mit afrikanischen Partnern verstärken, um globale Partnerschaften zu schließen – zur Verteidigung unserer gemeinsamen internationalen Ordnung auf Basis der VN-Charta, der Demokratie, beim Kampf gegen die Klimakrise, aber auch um solche Themen anzugehen, die unseren Partnern im Süden besonders auf dem Herzen brennen. Das ist aus meiner Sicht ganz zentral.

Hinzu kommt, dass Afrika der „jüngste Kontinent“ ist, und im Jahre 2050 40 Prozent der unter 18-Jährigen dort leben werden. Welche Bedeutung das für Wertschöpfung und Märkte hat, brauche ich nicht zu erklären. Dies ist auch vor dem Hintergrund des gebotenen wirtschaftlichen De-Riskings gerade mit Blick auf China und der wirtschaftlichen Chancen, die Afrika bietet, sehr wichtig. Wir müssen maßgeschneiderte und überzeugende Angebote an die afrikanischen Partner für eine zukunftsgerichtete Zusammenarbeit machen. Wir haben viel anzubieten, mehr als andere. Kurzum: Wir werden erfolgreich sein, wenn wir das bessere Angebot machen: „Make the better offer!“ ist der Schlüssel!

Vor diesem Hintergrund haben die Afrikapolitischen Leitlinien zwei wesentliche Funktionen: Zum einen geben sie der Afrikapolitik der Bundesregierung einen strategischen und kohärenten Rahmen, um sicherzustellen, dass alle Ressorts an einem Strang ziehen. Zum anderen haben sie natürlich auch eine kommunikative Funktion nach außen, weil sie in die afrikanische und die deutsche Öffentlichkeit hineinwirken und das afrikapolitische Handeln der Bundesregierung und Deutschlands erklären sollen. Dafür müssen sie die Welt abbilden, wie sie jetzt ist.

MTA: Die Bundesregierung hat eine Reihe von Strategieprozessen angestoßen und neue Schwerpunkte gesetzt: feministische Außenpolitik, China-Strategie, Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie. Weitere Strategievorhaben wurden angekündigt. Wie sehen Sie die deutsche Afrikapolitik und die neuen Leitlinien im Lichte dieser Prozesse?

CR: Die Vielzahl von Strategieprozessen, die zum Teil abgeschlossen, zum Teil noch nicht abgeschlossen sind, sind Ausdruck einer Welt, die tiefgreifende Veränderungen durchläuft. Diese Veränderungen müssen wir in unserem außenpolitischen Handeln berücksichtigen, wenn wir den Wandel mitgestalten wollen – und das ist natürlich unser Anspruch. Die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie ist das gemeinsame Dach aller anderen Strategien und Leitlinien, die sich ebenfalls aufeinander beziehen und Hand in Hand greifen.

MTA: Richten wir den Blick nochmal nach innen: Das Auswärtige Amt hat die Federführung in diesem Prozess und doch sind es die Leitlinien für die gesamte Bundesregierung. Welchen Stellenwert hat die Ressortabstimmung, insbesondere mit dem BMVg, dem BMWK und dem BMZ? Wie bewerten Sie die afrikapolitische Kohärenz deutscher Außenpolitik und welche Herausforderungen sehen Sie in der praktischen Umsetzung?

CR: Der Titel „Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung“ sagt es ja schon: Es ist ausdrücklich kein Ressortpapier. Die Leitlinien haben den Anspruch, die afrikapolitischen Grundsätze und Prioritäten der Bundesregierung zu formulieren. Sie geben also den strategischen Rahmen vor. Hauptziel des Konzepts ist dabei, die Kohärenz zwischen den Ressorts herzustellen. Durch die intensive deutsche Reisediplomatie ist unser gestiegenes Engagement in Afrika sichtbar geworden. Umso wichtiger ist es, mit diesem Engagement auf gemeinsame strategische Ziele hinzuarbeiten, Synergieeffekte zu schaffen und sich gut abzustimmen. Die Herausforderung liegt in der konkreten Umsetzung und Ausgestaltung dieser Politik. Diese Frage können natürlich nicht alleine die Leitlinien lösen. Dafür braucht es dann auch andere Instrumente, zum Beispiel gute Koordinierung durch regelmäßige Ressortabstimmungen, die wir als AA leiten. Gute Abstimmung ist wichtig, insbesondere dann, wenn man es – wie in der deutschen Afrikapolitik – mit vielen motivierten Akteurinnen und Akteuren zu tun hat.

MTA: Inwieweit ist bei diesem Leitlinienprozess auch die Einbeziehung von Stimmen aus der Wissenschaft, Zivilgesellschaft und Wirtschaft geplant?

CR: Sehr wichtig. Wir wollen ganz bewusst auch Stimmen jenseits der Bundesregierung einholen, auch von afrikanischen Partnern. Dieser Blog ist ein Beispiel: Er soll eine Plattform für eine Vielzahl an Akteurinnen und Akteuren bieten, Beiträge zu liefern und sich darüber kritisch auszutauschen. Wir wollen uns und unserer Afrikapolitik auch den Spiegel vorhalten. Dazu brauchen wir Ideen, Anregungen und eine Debatte, die alte Weisheiten in Frage stellt. Uns ist es ein ganz besonderes Anliegen, dass wir viele unterschiedliche Stimmen hören.

MTA: Welche Bedeutung haben die Leitlinien für die ganz konkrete Zusammenarbeit mit afrikanischen Partner*innen?

CR: Das Wesentliche ist, dass die Leitlinien unsere gemeinsamen Ziele und Grundsätze formulieren, priorisieren und Transparenz nach außen schaffen, damit unsere afrikanischen Partnerinnen und Partner wissen, woran sie sind. Dabei ist es uns zum einen wichtig, mit der Welt zu arbeiten, wie sie ist und nicht, wie wir sie uns gerne wünschen würden. Zum anderen wollen wir afrikanische Interessen sehr viel konkreter und noch besser berücksichtigen, als wir das in der Vergangenheit getan haben. Dabei wollen wir nicht bloß auf Staaten und Regierungen schauen. Deshalb beziehen wir zum Beispiel auch afrikanische Partnerinnen und Partner aus der Zivilgesellschaft mit ein. So wird es uns noch besser gelingen, maßgeschneiderte Angebote zu machen. Wir sind sehr gespannt und freuen uns auf den Prozess.

MTA: Einerseits sprechen wir immer wieder über die Diversität der Entwicklungen auf dem Kontinent, andererseits erstellt die Bundesregierung nun ein Schlüsseldokument mit den Afrikapolitischen Leitlinien gegenüber einem ganzen Kontinent. Ist dies kein Widerspruch?

CR: Das ist ein berechtigter Punkt. Afrikapolitische Leitlinien auf 20 oder 25 Seiten können natürlich nicht die Diversität des afrikanischen Kontinents abbilden. Ich selber war in den letzten zwölf Monaten, wenn ich richtig mitgezählt habe, in 16 afrikanischen Ländern unterwegs und habe mir da ein gutes Bild machen können von den Unterschieden. Wir geben mit den Leitlinien den strategischen Rahmen und die übergeordneten Ziele für unsere Afrikapolitik vor. Es ist dann Aufgabe der bilateralen, konkreten Afrikapolitik, diesen Unterschieden und unterschiedlichen Ausgangslagen und Interessen gerecht zu werden.

MTA: In den vergangenen ein, zwei Jahren, ist es deutlicher geworden, dass in Afrika viele Veränderungen stattfinden, auch gegenüber dem internationalen System und externen Partnern. Manchmal wird westlichen Partnern Doppelmoral vorgeworfen, etwa im Zuge der Covid-Krise und in der Migrationsfrage. Wird das in den Leitlinien einen Niederschlag finden? Werden bestimmte Zielkonflikte in irgendeiner Form zumindest transparent gemacht? Oder ist das zu viel verlangt für solch ein Dokument?

CR: Es ist wichtig, auf diese tatsächlichen oder vermeintlichen Widersprüche einzugehen und auch Vorhaltungen zu vermeintlichen Doppelstandards, die Sie erwähnt haben, aktiv aufzugreifen. Wir haben die Afrikapolitischen Leitlinien ja noch nicht geschrieben. Ich habe sie hier nicht als Entwurf in der Schublade liegen, sondern wir wollen sie in einem inklusiven Prozess erarbeiten. Ich finde, das sind Punkte, die wir ernst nehmen müssen. Wir sehen ja auch ein ganz neues afrikanisches Selbstbewusstsein in der internationalen Politik. Ein Beispiel: die afrikanische Friedensinitiative zum russischen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine. Dass afrikanische Präsidenten und Staats- und Regierungschefs sich zu einem Krieg in Europa positionieren und in die Ukraine und anschließend nach Russland reisen, ist neu und unterstreicht, dass die internationale Architektur, sprich VN-Sicherheitsrat, G20 und so weiter, nicht mehr die Kräfteverhältnisse im 21. Jahrhundert widerspiegelt. Daraus leitet sich der Vorwurf der Doppelmoral ja auch teilweise ab. Als Bundesregierung haben wir uns dazu klar positioniert: Wir unterstützen die Mitgliedschaft der Afrikanischen Union in G20 und auch zwei ständige Sitze afrikanischer Staaten im VN-Sicherheitsrat.

MTA: Wo liegen denn aus Ihrer Sicht derzeit die Stärken des deutschen Engagements auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent? Was macht Deutschland schon richtig gut und wo bestehen Herausforderungen?

CR: Unsere Stärke ist zunächst einmal, dass wir sehr viel in Afrika machen. Ich habe die zahlreichen Reisen auf politischer Ebene seit September 2021 erwähnt. Aber wir machen schon seit Jahrzehnten viel, in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sogar sehr viel mehr, als die meisten anderen, aber auch darüber hinaus. Auch in den Bereichen Stabilisierung und humanitäre Hilfe sind wir sehr aktiv. Ich glaube, dass das deutsche Engagement in Afrika besonders geschätzt wird, weil man unsere Verlässlichkeit schätzt und uns oft gesagt wird, Deutschland habe keine „versteckte Agenda“ in Afrika. Das sind auf jeden Fall schon zwei Punkte, mit denen wir sehr gut arbeiten können. Gemeinsam mit unseren Partnern in der EU, „like minded“ wie die USA und Kanada und vielleicht auch anderen können wir unseren afrikanischen Partnern starke Angebote machen, die unseren Werten und Interessen entsprechen und gegenüber anderen Wettbewerbern überzeugen. Aber klar ist auch: Wir stehen unseren afrikanischen Partnern nur zur Seite. Sie sitzen im Führerhaus bei der Überwindung der vielen Herausforderungen, die es in Afrika gibt, sozial, humanitär, politisch, wirtschaftlich und so weiter. Unsere Leitlinien müssen daher anschlussfähig sein für unsere Partner. Deswegen werden wir natürlich auch mit diesen reden im kommenden Schreibprozess.

MTA: Gibt es Aspekte, die Ihnen auf dem Herzen liegen?

CR: Was mir sehr wichtig ist, dass wir uns noch klarer über die gestiegene Bedeutung Afrikas und über das gestiegene Selbstbewusstsein der afrikanischen Partnerinnen und Partner werden, was ich übrigens beides sehr richtig und positiv finde. Wir würden die Diskussion darüber gerne in eine Richtung bringen, dass sie die Afrikapolitik und das Afrikabild in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit auf den neuesten Stand bringt. Für mich heißt das insbesondere: weg von einer „Wir müssen Afrika helfen“-Agenda hin zu einer Agenda, die lautet: Afrika wird eines der Gravitationszentren in der multipolaren Weltordnung des 21. Jahrhundert und wir brauchen die afrikanischen Staaten als Partner, um globale Probleme gemeinsam zu lösen. Also: weg von einer Hilfe-Agenda, hin zu einer aktiven, global politisch gestaltenden Partnerschaft.

Christoph Retzlaff sprach am 14. August 2023 mit Dr. Denis Tull und Julia Fath von Megatrends Afrika.

Die Verantwortung für die in den Beiträgen und Interviews vorgetragenen Inhalte, Meinungen und Quellen liegt bei den jeweiligen Autor*innen.