Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

China is willing to stand with non-Western partners firmly, but remains determined to avoid Cold War-style alliances.

After evacuating thousands of Thais from Israel in 2023, the Thai military is thinking more about how it could get citizens out of other hotspots.

Die Bundeswirtschaftsministerin hat das lange erwartet Energiewende-Monitoring vorgelegt. Steht die Energiewende am Scheideweg – und braucht sie eine Neuausrichtung? Das besprechen wir ausführlich mit Prof. Dr. Andreas Löschel, der selbst eine Art Chef-Monitorer der Energiewende ist. Wo steht die ...

Wer eine App entwickeln möchte, muss früh entscheiden: nativ, hybrid oder Progressive Web App (PWA)? Die richtige Wahl der Plattform mag auf den ersten Blick zwar anspruchsvoll wirken, lässt sich aber mit Blick auf einige Metriken wie Zielgruppe, Budget, Time-to-Market oder gewünschte Funktionen schnell eingrenzen.

Dieser Ratgeber zeigt Ihnen die technischen Kerneigenschaften der einzelnen App-Typen auf und erklärt anhand typischer Projektsituationen, welche Wahl am besten zu Ihrem Projekt passen könnte.

Native, Hybrid, PWA – die Grundlagen

Um eine gemeinsame Wissensgrundlage zu schaffen, stecken wir zunächst die technischen Grundlagen der einzelnen App-Typen ab.

Native App

Native Apps werden speziell für eine Plattform entwickelt (z. B. für iOS auf Swift/SwiftUI und für Android auf Kotlin oder Jetpack Compose).

＋ Die Vorteile: Aufgrund der gezielten Programmierung erzielen sie sehr hohe Performance, fühlen sich durchgängig „systemtypisch“ an (bessere UX) und besitzen meist den vollen Zugriff auf Gerätefunktionen, Hintergrundprozesse und UI-Paradigmen.

－ Die Kehrseite: Möchten Sie eine native App für iOS und Android herausbringen, benötigen Sie zwei Codebasen, zwei Build- und Release-Pipelines, zwei Kompetenzprofile im Team. Wartung und Feature-Parität erfordern Disziplin und Budget.

Hybride Apps

Hybrid-Entwicklung bündelt Web-Technologien in einem nativen Container. Moderne Frameworks erlauben plattformübergreifende Entwicklung mit einer Codebasis, die auf iOS und Android läuft, und optional gezielten nativen Modulen für Spezialfälle.

＋ Die Vorteile: Beschleunigte MVPs und reduzierte initiale Kosten, da Sie keine zwei separaten Entwicklungen aufsetzen müssen. Außerdem können Sie mit geringerem Budget eine breitere Zielgruppe abdecken.

－ Die Kehrseite: Trade-offs bei Performance in stark interaktiven Flächen, komplexere Brücken zu manchen OS-Features und ein zusätzlicher Layer, der gepflegt werden will.

Progressive Web Apps (PWA)

PWAs sind Webanwendungen mit App-Feeling: auf dem Homescreen installierbar, offlinefähig (Service Worker), mit schnellen Updates ohne Store-Review und unmittelbarer Reichweite per URL.

＋ Die Vorteile: Geräteunabhängige Nutzung, Möglichkeit auf SEO (Suchmaschinenoptimierung) und geringe Installationshürden.

－ Die Kehrseite: Grenzen ergeben sich dort, wo intensive Hintergrundprozesse oder spezielle Hardware-Zugriffe notwendig sind. Zudem variieren die Plattformfähigkeiten je nach Betriebssystem und Browser.

Native, Hybrid, PWA – Vergleich der Funktionen

Um die Stärken und Schwächen nativer, hybrider und von Progressive Web Apps besser einordnen zu können, sehen Sie nun einen Vergleich wichtiger Kriterien, um eine App entwickeln zu lassen. So können Sie sich anhand Ihrer Möglichkeiten, Wünsche und Ziele ein besseres Bild Ihrer Go-to-Plattform bilden.

KriteriumNativeHybridPWAPerformance und UXGerätefunktionen, Offline-Nutzung und PushEntwicklungsaufwand, Wartung und Skalierung Performance und UX

→ Wenn jedes Frame zählt, etwa bei aufwendigen Animationen, Games oder hochfrequenten Interaktionen, sind native Apps klar der Spitzenreiter.

→ In produktivitätsorientierten Oberflächen mit viel Formularlogik, Listen und Standardinteraktionen können bei geringerem Budget auch Hybrid-Apps genutzt werden, solange Sie konsequent auf UI-Performance (Render-Pfade, Bildoptimierung, asynchrone Datenflüsse etc.) achten.

→ PWAs können häufig auch eine gute Leistung aufzeigen, stechen jedoch besonders durch ihre solide Web-Performance-Disziplin und schlanke UI hervor.

Gerätefunktionen, Offline-Nutzung und Push

→ Zugriffe auf Kamera, Sensoren, lokale Verschlüsselung, sichere Keychains oder Hintergrund-Synchronisation sind mit Native-Apps am breitesten und stabilsten.

→ Hybrid-Apps können vieles davon via Plugins oder sogenannten „native Modules“ abdecken. Das funktioniert in den meisten Fällen sehr gut, ist jedoch mit zusätzlicher Integrationsarbeit verbunden.

→ PWAs beherrschen die wichtigsten Fälle im Web-Kontext, doch bei tiefen OS-Integrationen und verlässlichen Hintergrundjobs stoßen sie je nach Plattform schneller an Grenzen.

Offline-Szenarien können unabhängig vom gewählten Ansatz bei allen drei Varianten implementiert werden. Sie müssen hier vor allem auf Sync-Strategien, Konfliktauflösung und Telemetrie achten.

Zum Thema Push-Mitteilungen: Native Apps nutzen die offiziellen Push-Dienste der Plattform (Apple Push Notification service (APNs) bei iOS oder Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) bei Android), Hybrid-Frameworks können sich ebenfalls an diese nativen Kanäle anbinden.

Info: Push-Notifications bei Progressive Web Apps Bei PWAs ist „Web Push“ der neueste Weg: Seit iOS 16.4 unterstützt Apple Web Push für als Home‑Screen‑Web‑Apps installierte PWAs. Voraussetzung sind die Installation im Standalone‑Modus und eine erteilte Benachrichtigungsberechtigung. Entwicklungsaufwand, Wartung und Skalierung

→ Eine Codebasis für alle Plattformen senkt initiale Kosten und beschleunigt Releases – ein Vorteil des hybriden Ansatzes und von PWAs, insbesondere in den frühen Phasen. Mit wachsender Komplexität steigen aber die Anforderungen an Architektur, Testing und Release-Management, was Ihre späteren Kosten ungeplant in die Höhe treiben kann.

→ Native Entwicklung bedeutet doppelten Entwicklungsstrom, dafür weniger Kompromisse und klare Nutzung der offiziellen Plattform-Patterns.

→ PWAs punkten mit sofortigen Web-Updates und geringerer Release-Reibung, erfordern aber sauberes Caching- und Offline-Design.

Native, Hybrid, PWA – geläufige Use Cases

Nachdem wir die Grundlagen und Vorteile der einzelnen Entwicklungsvarianten geklärt haben, zeigen wir Ihnen, in welchen Szenarien native, hybride oder Progressive Web Apps ihre beste Anwendung finden.

Performance-kritische Produkte → Native Apps

Wer 60 fps in komplexen Animationen, AR-Funktionen, rechenintensive Visualisierungen oder Gaming-Mechaniken benötigt, fährt mit Native am sichersten. Die enge Verzahnung mit den nativen APIs und Rendering-Pipelines bietet Reserven, wenn das Frontend an Grenzen stößt.

Produktiv-Apps im Feld -> Native oder hybride Apps

Außendienst, Bau, Logistik oder Lager benötigen in der Regel stabile Offline-Fähigkeiten, verlässliche Hintergründe und Gerätezugriffe (Scanner, Sensoren, sichere Datenspeicher). Hier liegt die Tendenz zu Native oder einer Hybrid-Lösung mit gezielt nativen Modulen, um kritische Pfade kompromisslos abzusichern.

Content, Commerce und Reichweite → PWAs

Bei Katalogen, Medien, Lead-Gen und Shopping mit schnellem Iterationstempo führt die PWA das Ranking an: die geringste Installationshürde, organische Sichtbarkeit (SEO) und sofortige Updates sind hier ideal. Wenn Push-Mitteilungen, App-Store-Präsenz oder gerätespezifische Features im Marketing-Mix wichtig sind, kann auch eine Hybrid-App die Brücke schlagen, ohne gleich zwei native Entwicklerteams zu beanspruchen.

MVPs und validierungsgetriebene Roadmaps → Hybrid oder PWAs

Wenn Hypothesen getestet und Produkt-Market-Fit gesucht wird, zählen Time-to-Market und Lernzyklen zu den wichtigsten Metriken. Hybride Apps oder PWAs erleichtern schnelle Releases und Budgetfokus auf Nutzwert statt Infrastruktur. Kommt mit der Zeit etwas mehr Traktion, können Sie schrittweise auf native Module oder in besonders anspruchsvollen Bereichen auf voll native Implementierungen erweitern.

Fazit

Für die richtige Wahl des App-Typs sollten Sie sich im Vorhinein sauber priorisierte Ziele stecken. Native, hybride und Progressive Web Apps kommen alle mit ihren eigenen Vor- und Nachteilen, die Sie in Ihre Entscheidung einfließen lassen müssen. Hier sehen Sie noch einmal die wichtigsten Punkte zusammengefasst:

→ Native maximiert Performance, UX und Funktionstiefe, jedoch auf Kosten des Aufwands und Budgets.

→ Hybrid balanciert Tempo und Funktionsbreite und kann mit moderaten Kosten und Aufwand realisiert werden.

→ PWAs liefern Reichweite und Entwicklungseffizienz, können spezifische Anforderungen an Funktionen jedoch nicht immer erfüllen.

Treffen Sie die Entscheidung entlang Ihrer Top-Prioritäten, nicht entlang von Framework-Trends. Wenn Sie schnelle Klarheit wollen, priorisieren Sie die Anforderungen, mappen Sie sie auf die drei Optionen und planen Sie ein schlankes MVP. Aus den ersten echten Nutzersignalen ergibt sich der nächste Schritt – ob ein kompletter nativer Track, ein hybrider Ansatz mit gezielten nativen Modulen oder die bewusste Konzentration auf eine PWA für maximale Geschwindigkeit und Reichweite.

Der Beitrag Native, Hybrid, PWA: die richtige Wahl erschien zuerst auf Neurope.eu - News aus Europa.

ELIAMEP and the Institute of Global Affairs of The American College of Greece (ACG) organised the 5th Summer Academy titled “Leadership Beyond Boundaries: Empowering the Next Generation of Mediterranean Leaders”, which took place at the premises of the International Olympic Academy from Monday, July 14 2025, to Saturday, July 19 2025. In total, the 5th ELIAMEP-ACG Summer Academy brought together 29 participants (emerging leaders from various fields) and 21 distinguished speakers from 19 countries across the Mediterranean, Europe, and Asia, to discuss critical issues concerning the Mediterranean. The Summer Academy included lectures, discussions as well as trainings in negotiations and public speaking & media. The report of the 5th Summer Academy is available here. The agenda and the list of speakers and staff members who contributed to the 5th Summer Academy are available here.

Emmanuella Doussis, Professor, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head of the Climate and Sustainability Programme and Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP

Guterres’ recent report and speech to the General Assembly present clean energy as a reality, and one which must not and cannot be held back. It is already creating growth, jobs and energy security, and billions of dollars are being channelled into the green transition. Renewable energy sources are now more cost-effective than fossil fuels, and new renewable energy capacity is outstripping conventional fuels on every continent. However, progress is not fast enough and, still more crucially, not fair enough. Africa and developing countries receive only a small share of the global funding, while fossil fuel subsidies continue.

The General Assembly can serve as a key forum for cooperation, even amidst geopolitical antagonisms, as environmental and climate issues are, and must increasingly be, perceived as peace and security issues. Multilateral alliances (G77, LDCs, AOSIS), as well as regional blocs like the EU, often play an active role in helping build majorities, making concerted demands, and putting pressure on major powers that often act unilaterally (e.g. China, the US, Russia), as well as on other polluting states. The General Assembly’s unanimous decision to consult the International Court of Justice on states’ obligations with regard to climate change has recently led to a landmark opinion relating to the international law governing the response to the phenomenon. Although non-binding, the opinion could shape practice and open the way for appeals, in particular from the countries most affected by climate change. So, while the General Assembly does not produce legally-binding texts directly, its actions can produce important results indirectly. Which is to say the General Assembly can keep the debate around the green transition in the spotlight and act as a catalyst for multilateral cooperation, especially in areas where convergences and potential partnerships (should) transcend geopolitical divisions.

Maria Gavouneli, Professor, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Member of the Board, ELIAMEP

There is a short answer: none at all! The General Assembly has always been a forum for big words and little action. Over the decades, we have had a series of declarations and statements that rarely translate into binding obligations for UN member states, and then only after their content has been transposed in treaties or monitoring and accountability mechanisms as a result of difficult and often lengthy negotiations. Lately, even texts that formerly would have been adopted by consensus have been subject to complicated and lengthy voting processes.
The longer answer is, of course, different and more involved. It is on the sidelines of the General Assembly, in the UN’s corridors of power, that the big issues are discussed and often decided. While world leaders read their prepared monologues in turn, it is the organized meetings in smaller chambers—and ad hoc huddles—that can make the difference. This is especially true in times like the present, when simply setting-up a session is problematic, even before one considers the agenda and items ranging from the Middle East ceasefire and the peace plan in Ukraine to energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the resolution of bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey. Truth be told, this has always been where the General Assembly, and the UN in general, has made its most important contributions.

Mihalis Kritikos, Adjunct Professor, School of Governance, University of Brussels; Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

The UN is back: the example of artificial intelligence

Amidst a frantic and ever-escalating geopolitical rivalry in the sphere of technology, artificial intelligence is redefining the dynamics of global power while its governance has become the subject of hundreds of separate initiatives. Given this somewhat fragmented landscape, the recent decision by the UN General Assembly to create two new mechanisms to promote international cooperation in AI governance—the UN Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and the Global Dialogue on AI Governance—is especially important. There are three reasons for this:

First, because the UN is setting out to create a global platform for dialogue that will give developing countries an equal voice in shaping the future of AI, while aligning the discourse with the ambitions of the Global South. Second, because the resolution seeks to put in place a framework based on a human-centred approach to AI that promotes the transparency and social utility of the technology. And third, because it sends a powerful signal to the world that the UN remains capable of achieving convergence and laying the foundations for a common framework to address the challenges of a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

If the scientific independence of the committee and the multilateralism of the global dialogue are safeguarded, then the future global governance of this influential technology will be in safe hands.

Panayotis Tsakonas, Professor, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head, Foreign Policy & Security Programme, ELIAMEP

The retreat of multilateralism, the systematic erosion and/or removal of international norms/rules, and the ascendancy of the logic of power in inter-state relations that followed Trump’s election and have largely been imposed by the United States is expected to detract markedly from the Great Powers’ ability to cooperate in a meaningful and effective way at the upcoming 85th General Assembly of the United Nations. There, the United States (the strongest but least legitimate part of a divided—if not fragmented—West), an ever-stronger China, which is already working towards building an enlarged anti-Western coalition, the dynamically “anti-Western” Russia, and India, the most populous nation in the world, are expected to reaffirm their positions and roles in the new and continually evolving “post-Western” world.

In this world, however, several “non-aligned” countries will, for reasons of pragmatism and self-interest, may choose not to place themselves under the “protection” or control of the US, China or Russia. These non-aligned nations, which include most of the almost forty that did not condemn Russia’s invasion at the UN General Assembly in March 2022 and February 2023, not only do not form a distinct bloc (a “Global South”), they are often in conflict with one another.

The scope for cooperation between the Great Powers within the framework of the UN General Assembly will therefore be curtailed, with the few areas of potential cooperation limited to “global goods” such as the climate, health and/or development, and global security problems such as international terrorism, organized crime, unregulated AI development, and the uncontrolled militarization of space. The Great Powers may find themselves cooperating on these issues, either because they recognize the cost of non-cooperation, or because their interests largely converge. Moreover, the prospect of China, Russia, India, and a number of other medium- and small-sized states forging alliances in one or more of these domains cannot be discounted. Formed under an “anti-Western banner” at the forthcoming UN General Assembly, they may seek to create and promote new international principles and norms.

Dimitris Tsarouhas, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University; Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

To mark the UN’s annual assembly, the organization released a shocking report that accurately describes the state of the international community 80 years on from its founding. In 2024, military spending soared to 2.7 trillion dollars, an amount more than 13 times higher (!) than the official development aid provided by wealthy nations, and 750 times the UN’s regular budget.

Many member states are either actively engaged in, or preparing for, military conflict. The window for saving the UN mission is closing, even though its good offices are needed now more than at any other time since the end of the Cold War.

 

 

 

Si nos sociétés pouvaient se résumer à un grand corps numérique, les data centers en seraient le cœur. Véritables « usines à données », ils assurent le stockage, le traitement et la distribution des informations qui irriguent notre quotidien. Sans eux, pas de cloud, pas d’intelligence artificielle, pas de services publics numériques performants. Mais ces […]

African states and regional organizations have increasingly turned to new forms of African-led security arrangements that differ in mandate, composition, and structure from African Union (AU)–led peace support operations. These ad hoc security initiatives (ASIs) and enterprise security arrangements (ESAs) have provided flexible and rapid responses to complex security threats. However, they are heavily militarized and poorly aligned with evolving frameworks for the protection of civilians (POC).  

This issue brief examines how ASIs and ESAs, while offering speed and adaptability, often lack civilian components, rely on external support, and do not consistently draw on a coherent normative framework for POC. As a result, protection frequently becomes secondary to counterinsurgency objectives, creating logistical weaknesses, alienating local populations, and reinforcing perceptions that protection is transactional or secondary to other interests. The brief highlights emerging practices—such as Rwanda’s deployment in Mozambique and the Multinational Joint Task Force’s Civil-Military Cooperation Cell—that suggest the potential for more protection-conscious approaches, though these remain uneven and underdeveloped.  

The brief concludes that ASIs and ESAs are likely to remain features of Africa’s security landscape, but their effectiveness will remain limited unless they systematically integrate AU and UN POC frameworks. Stronger pre-deployment planning, the inclusion of AU civilian cells in the field, and alignment with broader political strategies are essential to ensure that these mechanisms contribute not only to counterinsurgency but also to the protection of civilians. 

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The post The Role of Ad Hoc Security Initiatives and Enterprise Security Arrangements in the Protection of Civilians in Africa appeared first on International Peace Institute.

With UN peacekeepers increasingly deployed in areas experiencing local-level conflicts that do not involve state forces, responding to communal violence has become an acute challenge for missions. Such contexts require peace operations to adopt a dialogue-based approach to the protection of civilians (POC), focused specifically on local political solutions. 

This issue brief examines the engagement of the UN mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in the town of Batangafo, where communal violence between Christian and Muslim communities has been pervasive. It highlights how MINUSCA’s dialogue-based engagement helped reduce violence and strengthen local peace agreements. It identifies four lessons: 

• Protecting civilians in the context of communal conflict requires political solutions—not just military ones.
• Continuous and proactive dialogue helps to prevent escalation and reinforce peace agreements. 
• Economic incentives can be leveraged to encourage armed groups to commit to peace. 
• Sustainable protection depends on aligning local and national peace processes. 

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The post Political Solutions to Political Problems: UN Peacekeeping Operations and Dialogue-Based Protection of Civilians in Communal Conflicts appeared first on International Peace Institute.

UN peacekeeping missions are often criticized for failing to act when civilians are under threat. Yet recent empirical evidence suggests that peacekeepers can and do respond to violence by adjusting where and how they deploy forces in the field. This issue brief examines patterns of subnational deployment across African missions from 2012 to 2022, focusing on whether and how missions with protection of civilians (POC) mandates adjust their military presence in response to attacks on civilians. The findings indicate that peacekeeping missions are more likely to strengthen their presence in areas experiencing recent violence—especially violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups—but also respond to state-led violence, albeit less consistently. This responsiveness highlights the operational flexibility some missions can exercise and challenges the assumption that host-state consent fully constrains the implementation of POC mandates. The brief also underscores the need to assess peacekeepers’ behavior not only in terms of mandate design but also in terms of how missions adapt on the ground. 

The brief concludes with important considerations for peacekeeping stakeholders committed to POC: 

• Missions are often actively protecting civilians, with operational flexibility as a key ingredient.
• Host-state consent can constrain action, but missions can still act decisively; sustaining political consensus on POC is crucial. 
• Mandates and planning frameworks must allow dynamic deployments so missions can adapt to evolving threats. 

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The post Being Present Where It Counts: Peacekeeping Responsiveness to Violence against Civilians appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Den Eskalationen eines "existenziellen Konflikts" begegnen.

This paper applies the concepts and theories of “policy norms” to the disruptive effects of the second Trump administration on global development cooperation. We argue that recent US actions represent more than a domestic political shift. They signal a tipping point to longstanding norms of the development cooperation system and specifically multilateralism as well as notions of global solidarity. This paper’s objective is to explain how, why and through which political and institutional mechanisms policy norms break down or are reconstituted in global development cooperation. It uses the current moment as a case study of “norm antipreneurship”, potentially even “norm imperialism” illustrating the political and institutional strategies through which policy norms are currently been contested, dismantled or displaced. This paper addresses a set of questions: (i) What are the core mechanisms through which development cooperation norms are formed, contested and fragmented? (ii) How is the second Trump administration seeking to reshape normative regimes in development cooperation? (iii) What research agenda is needed to understand norm change in a multipolar and contested development cooperation landscape?

Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College in London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

This paper applies the concepts and theories of “policy norms” to the disruptive effects of the second Trump administration on global development cooperation. We argue that recent US actions represent more than a domestic political shift. They signal a tipping point to longstanding norms of the development cooperation system and specifically multilateralism as well as notions of global solidarity. This paper’s objective is to explain how, why and through which political and institutional mechanisms policy norms break down or are reconstituted in global development cooperation. It uses the current moment as a case study of “norm antipreneurship”, potentially even “norm imperialism” illustrating the political and institutional strategies through which policy norms are currently been contested, dismantled or displaced. This paper addresses a set of questions: (i) What are the core mechanisms through which development cooperation norms are formed, contested and fragmented? (ii) How is the second Trump administration seeking to reshape normative regimes in development cooperation? (iii) What research agenda is needed to understand norm change in a multipolar and contested development cooperation landscape?

Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College in London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

This paper applies the concepts and theories of “policy norms” to the disruptive effects of the second Trump administration on global development cooperation. We argue that recent US actions represent more than a domestic political shift. They signal a tipping point to longstanding norms of the development cooperation system and specifically multilateralism as well as notions of global solidarity. This paper’s objective is to explain how, why and through which political and institutional mechanisms policy norms break down or are reconstituted in global development cooperation. It uses the current moment as a case study of “norm antipreneurship”, potentially even “norm imperialism” illustrating the political and institutional strategies through which policy norms are currently been contested, dismantled or displaced. This paper addresses a set of questions: (i) What are the core mechanisms through which development cooperation norms are formed, contested and fragmented? (ii) How is the second Trump administration seeking to reshape normative regimes in development cooperation? (iii) What research agenda is needed to understand norm change in a multipolar and contested development cooperation landscape?

Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College in London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

Gemeinsam mit Italien und Griechenland versucht die EU-Kommission, irreguläre Ankünfte von Migranten über Libyen zu reduzieren. Diese Bemühungen kommen zu einem Zeitpunkt, an dem mehrere Komponenten der EU-Migrationspolitik in Libyen als gescheitert gelten müssen. Das gilt besonders für Versuche, die Zustände in den Internierungszentren zu mildern sowie die Lage von Arbeitsmigranten und Geflüch­te­ten im Land insgesamt zu verbessern. Welche Widerstände die europäische Migra­tionspolitik hervorruft, zeigte zuletzt eine Kampagne der libyschen Behörden gegen vermeintliche Bestrebungen der EU, Migranten auf Dauer im Land anzusiedeln. Was bleibt, ist der harte Kern europäischer Politik: Vereinbarungen mit Gewalt­akteuren, um Überfahrten zu verhindern, sowie die Unterstützung für Abfangoperationen auf See und Rückführungen in Herkunftsländer. Diese EU-Politik ist untrennbar mit dem libyschen System willkürlicher Internierung verknüpft, das kriminellen Interessen dient. Europäische Versuche, sich von diesem System zu distanzieren, sind unglaubwürdig und stehen einer Bewertung der politischen Kosten im Wege.

Are climate treaties, like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the Paris Agreement, the only way forward for intergovernmental climate cooperation? By now, there are hundreds of multilateral treaties governing a wide range of environmental issues, including energy, freshwater, oceans, air pollution, biodiversity conservation, hazardous waste, agriculture and fisheries. This policy brief examines whether the 379 multilateral environmental treaties that do not primarily address climate change can nevertheless contribute to advancing climate commitments.
We find that decisions adopted under environmental treaties have increasingly mainstreamed climate considerations since 1990. Today, climate-related decisions account for around 10% of regulatory decisions adopted under environmental treaties across different issue areas. Some treaty regimes are particularly active in addressing climate change, such as those focused on energy, freshwater and habitats, with up to 60% of their decisions addressing climate change. In contrast, treaties regulating agriculture and fisheries demonstrate a notably lower level of engagement in climate mainstreaming.
These findings demonstrate that environmental treaties that do not specifically focus on climate change can still contribute to shaping climate governance, albeit to varying degrees. This policy brief concludes with a set of recommendations for researchers, treaty negotiators, secretariats, governments and climate activists seeking to advance intergovernmental cooperation on climate change through means other than climate treaties.
Key policy messages:
Non-climate-focused treaties can serve as a means for developing climate mitigation and adaptation commitments, notably through decisions adopted by their respective bodies. Yet, there is room for increased climate mainstreaming in those decisions. Various actors can contribute to such mainstreaming:
• Researchers could further investigate why some conferences of the parties (COPs) are more receptive to climate concerns than others and what potential trade-offs are associated with climate mainstreaming in environmental treaties.
• Treaty negotiators can favour cross-cutting mandates that enhance policy coherence across interconnected environmental challenges, enabling a more integrated approach to environmental decision-making. They can also design dynamic collective bodies, able to adopt decisions swiftly when new issues or information arise.
• Governments can appoint climate experts in non-climate COPs and advisory committees and report climate-related aspects of their implementation of non-climate treaties.
• Treaty secretariats can coordinate joint initiatives and promote knowledge exchange across climate and other environmental regimes.
• Climate activists can intensify their engagement with non-climate COPs by participating in consultations, submitting position papers, and collaborating with sympathetic delegates to amplify the climate relevance of treaty decisions.

Annabelle Olivier is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of British Columbia.
Jean-Frédéric Morin is Full Professor at the Political Science Department of Université Laval, Canada

Are climate treaties, like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the Paris Agreement, the only way forward for intergovernmental climate cooperation? By now, there are hundreds of multilateral treaties governing a wide range of environmental issues, including energy, freshwater, oceans, air pollution, biodiversity conservation, hazardous waste, agriculture and fisheries. This policy brief examines whether the 379 multilateral environmental treaties that do not primarily address climate change can nevertheless contribute to advancing climate commitments.
We find that decisions adopted under environmental treaties have increasingly mainstreamed climate considerations since 1990. Today, climate-related decisions account for around 10% of regulatory decisions adopted under environmental treaties across different issue areas. Some treaty regimes are particularly active in addressing climate change, such as those focused on energy, freshwater and habitats, with up to 60% of their decisions addressing climate change. In contrast, treaties regulating agriculture and fisheries demonstrate a notably lower level of engagement in climate mainstreaming.
These findings demonstrate that environmental treaties that do not specifically focus on climate change can still contribute to shaping climate governance, albeit to varying degrees. This policy brief concludes with a set of recommendations for researchers, treaty negotiators, secretariats, governments and climate activists seeking to advance intergovernmental cooperation on climate change through means other than climate treaties.
Key policy messages:
Non-climate-focused treaties can serve as a means for developing climate mitigation and adaptation commitments, notably through decisions adopted by their respective bodies. Yet, there is room for increased climate mainstreaming in those decisions. Various actors can contribute to such mainstreaming:
• Researchers could further investigate why some conferences of the parties (COPs) are more receptive to climate concerns than others and what potential trade-offs are associated with climate mainstreaming in environmental treaties.
• Treaty negotiators can favour cross-cutting mandates that enhance policy coherence across interconnected environmental challenges, enabling a more integrated approach to environmental decision-making. They can also design dynamic collective bodies, able to adopt decisions swiftly when new issues or information arise.
• Governments can appoint climate experts in non-climate COPs and advisory committees and report climate-related aspects of their implementation of non-climate treaties.
• Treaty secretariats can coordinate joint initiatives and promote knowledge exchange across climate and other environmental regimes.
• Climate activists can intensify their engagement with non-climate COPs by participating in consultations, submitting position papers, and collaborating with sympathetic delegates to amplify the climate relevance of treaty decisions.

Annabelle Olivier is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of British Columbia.
Jean-Frédéric Morin is Full Professor at the Political Science Department of Université Laval, Canada

Are climate treaties, like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the Paris Agreement, the only way forward for intergovernmental climate cooperation? By now, there are hundreds of multilateral treaties governing a wide range of environmental issues, including energy, freshwater, oceans, air pollution, biodiversity conservation, hazardous waste, agriculture and fisheries. This policy brief examines whether the 379 multilateral environmental treaties that do not primarily address climate change can nevertheless contribute to advancing climate commitments.
We find that decisions adopted under environmental treaties have increasingly mainstreamed climate considerations since 1990. Today, climate-related decisions account for around 10% of regulatory decisions adopted under environmental treaties across different issue areas. Some treaty regimes are particularly active in addressing climate change, such as those focused on energy, freshwater and habitats, with up to 60% of their decisions addressing climate change. In contrast, treaties regulating agriculture and fisheries demonstrate a notably lower level of engagement in climate mainstreaming.
These findings demonstrate that environmental treaties that do not specifically focus on climate change can still contribute to shaping climate governance, albeit to varying degrees. This policy brief concludes with a set of recommendations for researchers, treaty negotiators, secretariats, governments and climate activists seeking to advance intergovernmental cooperation on climate change through means other than climate treaties.
Key policy messages:
Non-climate-focused treaties can serve as a means for developing climate mitigation and adaptation commitments, notably through decisions adopted by their respective bodies. Yet, there is room for increased climate mainstreaming in those decisions. Various actors can contribute to such mainstreaming:
• Researchers could further investigate why some conferences of the parties (COPs) are more receptive to climate concerns than others and what potential trade-offs are associated with climate mainstreaming in environmental treaties.
• Treaty negotiators can favour cross-cutting mandates that enhance policy coherence across interconnected environmental challenges, enabling a more integrated approach to environmental decision-making. They can also design dynamic collective bodies, able to adopt decisions swiftly when new issues or information arise.
• Governments can appoint climate experts in non-climate COPs and advisory committees and report climate-related aspects of their implementation of non-climate treaties.
• Treaty secretariats can coordinate joint initiatives and promote knowledge exchange across climate and other environmental regimes.
• Climate activists can intensify their engagement with non-climate COPs by participating in consultations, submitting position papers, and collaborating with sympathetic delegates to amplify the climate relevance of treaty decisions.

Annabelle Olivier is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of British Columbia.
Jean-Frédéric Morin is Full Professor at the Political Science Department of Université Laval, Canada

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On September 16th, IPI in partnership with the Asia Society, hosted a reception to open the exhibit of the global WISH TREE project by Yoko Ono.

Since 1996, Yoko Ono has invited people from around the world to write their personal wishes and tie them to a tree branch as WISH TREE.

WISH TREE is an interactive art installation by the artist Yoko Ono where participants write wishes for peace on tags and tie them to a tree’s branches. These wishes become a visual testament to collective hope and continue on in connection with Ono’s IMAGINE PEACE TOWER in Reykjavík, Iceland.

The project invites people to reflect on peace and unity, transforming the tree into a symbol of global aspiration.

Welcoming Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute (IPI)
Debra Eisenman, Executive Vice President & COO, of The Asia Society; Founding Director & Senior Fellow, Asia Society Policy Institute

Opening Remarks:
Katia Mead, Representative of IPI’s Art for Peace Committee; and Director of the US Nominating Committee, Praemium Imperiale

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