Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Family poultry farming is widely promoted as a nutrition-sensitive agricultural intervention, yet rigorous causal evidence on its dietary and food security impacts remains limited. Using three rounds of panel data from the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on Agriculture for Ethiopia (2011/12-2015/16), we follow a household fixed-effects strategy to examine the effect of poultry farming on egg consumption, dietary diversity, consumption expenditure, and food security. Despite 53% of households owning poultry in 2015/16, only 9% consumed eggs and 2% consumed chicken meat in the preceding seven days, revealing a stark production-consumption gap. Fixed-effects estimates show that poultry ownership increases the probability of egg consumption by 4 percentage points at the extensive margin, while each additional egg-laying chicken per capita raises it by 8 percentage points. Controlling for household income leaves these estimates unchanged, confirming that nutritional gains operate through direct access to own-produced eggs rather than income effects. Placebo tests find no significant association with milk or non-poultry meat consumption, further supporting this hypothesis. Poultry ownership is associated with higher household dietary diversity scores, but has no significant effect on food security, suggesting improvements in dietary quality without broader food quantity gains. Gender-disaggregated analysis shows that, despite lower ownership rates, female-headed households manage flocks more intensively and channel benefits more effectively into household food consumption. We also find a significant positive association between poultry ownership and diarrhea among children under five, underscoring the need to integrate hygiene and sanitation measures into poultry promotion programs.

Family poultry farming is widely promoted as a nutrition-sensitive agricultural intervention, yet rigorous causal evidence on its dietary and food security impacts remains limited. Using three rounds of panel data from the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on Agriculture for Ethiopia (2011/12-2015/16), we follow a household fixed-effects strategy to examine the effect of poultry farming on egg consumption, dietary diversity, consumption expenditure, and food security. Despite 53% of households owning poultry in 2015/16, only 9% consumed eggs and 2% consumed chicken meat in the preceding seven days, revealing a stark production-consumption gap. Fixed-effects estimates show that poultry ownership increases the probability of egg consumption by 4 percentage points at the extensive margin, while each additional egg-laying chicken per capita raises it by 8 percentage points. Controlling for household income leaves these estimates unchanged, confirming that nutritional gains operate through direct access to own-produced eggs rather than income effects. Placebo tests find no significant association with milk or non-poultry meat consumption, further supporting this hypothesis. Poultry ownership is associated with higher household dietary diversity scores, but has no significant effect on food security, suggesting improvements in dietary quality without broader food quantity gains. Gender-disaggregated analysis shows that, despite lower ownership rates, female-headed households manage flocks more intensively and channel benefits more effectively into household food consumption. We also find a significant positive association between poultry ownership and diarrhea among children under five, underscoring the need to integrate hygiene and sanitation measures into poultry promotion programs.

Export bans are frequently used as trade policy instruments to stabilise domestic prices, but they often generate unintended consequences. This study examines the effects of Indonesia's palm oil export ban, introduced in April 2022 and lifted in May 2022, on the performance of the global agricultural sector and the stock markets of palm oil–producing countries. Drawing on a conceptual framework, we develop hypotheses regarding how stock indices with different industrial compositions respond to such trade policy interventions. Using an event study methodology, we analyse daily stock market data from palm oil–producing countries as well as a global agriculture-specific MSCI index. The analysis encompasses both nationally diversified stock indices and a global sector–specific index. The results reveal statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal returns for the global agricultural index following the introduction of the export ban, whereas national cross-industry indices show statistically insignificant reactions. Following the lifting of the ban, the global agricultural index experienced statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns, whereas national indices exhibited mixed and statistically insignificant responses. These findings are consistent with the conceptual framework, suggesting that the policy primarily affected the global agricultural sector while leaving diversified national stock markets largely unaffected. Importantly, the effects associated with the introduction and subsequent lifting of the ban did not fully offset each other, resulting in an overall negative net effect on the global agricultural index.

Export bans are frequently used as trade policy instruments to stabilise domestic prices, but they often generate unintended consequences. This study examines the effects of Indonesia's palm oil export ban, introduced in April 2022 and lifted in May 2022, on the performance of the global agricultural sector and the stock markets of palm oil–producing countries. Drawing on a conceptual framework, we develop hypotheses regarding how stock indices with different industrial compositions respond to such trade policy interventions. Using an event study methodology, we analyse daily stock market data from palm oil–producing countries as well as a global agriculture-specific MSCI index. The analysis encompasses both nationally diversified stock indices and a global sector–specific index. The results reveal statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal returns for the global agricultural index following the introduction of the export ban, whereas national cross-industry indices show statistically insignificant reactions. Following the lifting of the ban, the global agricultural index experienced statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns, whereas national indices exhibited mixed and statistically insignificant responses. These findings are consistent with the conceptual framework, suggesting that the policy primarily affected the global agricultural sector while leaving diversified national stock markets largely unaffected. Importantly, the effects associated with the introduction and subsequent lifting of the ban did not fully offset each other, resulting in an overall negative net effect on the global agricultural index.

Export bans are frequently used as trade policy instruments to stabilise domestic prices, but they often generate unintended consequences. This study examines the effects of Indonesia's palm oil export ban, introduced in April 2022 and lifted in May 2022, on the performance of the global agricultural sector and the stock markets of palm oil–producing countries. Drawing on a conceptual framework, we develop hypotheses regarding how stock indices with different industrial compositions respond to such trade policy interventions. Using an event study methodology, we analyse daily stock market data from palm oil–producing countries as well as a global agriculture-specific MSCI index. The analysis encompasses both nationally diversified stock indices and a global sector–specific index. The results reveal statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal returns for the global agricultural index following the introduction of the export ban, whereas national cross-industry indices show statistically insignificant reactions. Following the lifting of the ban, the global agricultural index experienced statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns, whereas national indices exhibited mixed and statistically insignificant responses. These findings are consistent with the conceptual framework, suggesting that the policy primarily affected the global agricultural sector while leaving diversified national stock markets largely unaffected. Importantly, the effects associated with the introduction and subsequent lifting of the ban did not fully offset each other, resulting in an overall negative net effect on the global agricultural index.

Ein Team der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt hat bei der europäischen Jahrestagung der International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE) zwischen dem 6. und 9. September 2026 in München aktuelle Forschung vorgestellt. Dabei hat Lukas Barner, Doktorand im DIW Graduate Center seit 2024, den ...

Il y a 25 ans aujourd’hui, les États-Unis étaient frappés par une attaque terroriste qui allait durablement marquer les esprits : les attentats du World Trade Center et du Pentagone, organisés par l’organisation Al-Qaida, qui ont fait environ 3 000 morts. Cet événement a poussé Washington à multiplier les interventions à l’étranger dans le cadre d’une « guerre contre le terrorisme ».

Peut-on pour autant affirmer que cet évènement a changé l’ordre du monde ?

Aussi marquants et tragiques qu’ils aient été, les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 n’ont pas fondamentalement bouleversé les rapports de force ni les grandes tendances géopolitiques. Ils ont plutôt amplifié et accéléré des phénomènes qui étaient déjà à l’œuvre. L’année 2001 reste néanmoins une année charnière, marquée par un choc structurel, moins médiatisé : l’adhésion de la Chine à l’Organisation mondiale du commerce.

Mon analyse dans cette vidéo.

L’article Le 11 septembre a-t-il changé le monde ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Die Terroranschläge vom 11. September 2001 waren ein fundamentaler historischer Einschnitt, der die Weltpolitik tiefgreifend veränderte. Dr. Guido Steinberg hatte damals gerade seine Doktorarbeit über "Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien" abgeschlossen und wurde rasch zum gefragten Gesprächspartner in den Medien, weil er sich auch mit Osama Bin Laden beschäftigt hatte. 25 Jahre danach wollen wir mit dem Islamwissenschaftler und Nahostexperten Dr. Guido Steinberg von der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin auf die Folgen dieser Zäsur blicken.

The Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) 2026 convened around 1,600 participants from 112 countries at a moment of profound disruption and redistribution of power. The HSC confirmed sustainability as the organizing framework linking peace and stability, economic
resilience and competitiveness, planetary boundaries and international cooperation. The rules-based international order is under pressure, fiscal space is shrinking and conflicts are multiplying, while climate change, biodiversity loss and resource depletion are compounding
these pressures on economies and societies already stretched thin. Yet the world has never possessed greater technological capabilities, financial wealth and scientific knowledge. What matters now is how we use these resources to deliver shared prosperity and resilience.
The discussions at HSC 2026 can be summarized along three narrative arcs. The first asks why cooperation remains essential in a more multipolar world. Legitimacy depends on changing the terms of North–South relations, broadening representation and building a cooperative multipolar order in which a wider group of actors can shape and defend common rules. The launch of the South–North Commission on Development offers a structured process for rethinking international cooperation toward fairer partnerships and a  sustainability Agenda beyond 2030. The second narrative arc examines what needs to change. Sustainability transformation pays
off economically, but only where investment can flow, risks are shared and governance is predictable. Nature and human capital are systematically undervalued. The bottleneck is the institutional and financing structures needed to unlock them at scale. The third narrative arc addresses how cooperation can deliver. It shows that partnerships accelerate sustainable development when they move from one-off initiatives to systems that mobilize finance, create markets and build local capabilities. Scaling Capital for Sustainable Development (SCALED), Innovative Capital Mobilization in Africa (ICAMA), critical-mineral and hydrogen partnerships, and urban examples from Mombasa and eThekwini show how tangible forms of cooperation can turn commitments into sustainable investment, deeper value chains and locally owned action. This shift is especially visible in Africa, where partnerships are increasingly framed around opportunity, value creation and agency. The road ahead runs through the Triple COP+ year, the G20 under UK chairmanship, and the SDG Summit in September 2027. HSC 2026 demonstrated that navigating the new - disruptive - normal is possible. The task now is to prove it at scale. […]

The Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) 2026 convened around 1,600 participants from 112 countries at a moment of profound disruption and redistribution of power. The HSC confirmed sustainability as the organizing framework linking peace and stability, economic
resilience and competitiveness, planetary boundaries and international cooperation. The rules-based international order is under pressure, fiscal space is shrinking and conflicts are multiplying, while climate change, biodiversity loss and resource depletion are compounding
these pressures on economies and societies already stretched thin. Yet the world has never possessed greater technological capabilities, financial wealth and scientific knowledge. What matters now is how we use these resources to deliver shared prosperity and resilience.
The discussions at HSC 2026 can be summarized along three narrative arcs. The first asks why cooperation remains essential in a more multipolar world. Legitimacy depends on changing the terms of North–South relations, broadening representation and building a cooperative multipolar order in which a wider group of actors can shape and defend common rules. The launch of the South–North Commission on Development offers a structured process for rethinking international cooperation toward fairer partnerships and a  sustainability Agenda beyond 2030. The second narrative arc examines what needs to change. Sustainability transformation pays
off economically, but only where investment can flow, risks are shared and governance is predictable. Nature and human capital are systematically undervalued. The bottleneck is the institutional and financing structures needed to unlock them at scale. The third narrative arc addresses how cooperation can deliver. It shows that partnerships accelerate sustainable development when they move from one-off initiatives to systems that mobilize finance, create markets and build local capabilities. Scaling Capital for Sustainable Development (SCALED), Innovative Capital Mobilization in Africa (ICAMA), critical-mineral and hydrogen partnerships, and urban examples from Mombasa and eThekwini show how tangible forms of cooperation can turn commitments into sustainable investment, deeper value chains and locally owned action. This shift is especially visible in Africa, where partnerships are increasingly framed around opportunity, value creation and agency. The road ahead runs through the Triple COP+ year, the G20 under UK chairmanship, and the SDG Summit in September 2027. HSC 2026 demonstrated that navigating the new - disruptive - normal is possible. The task now is to prove it at scale. […]

The Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) 2026 convened around 1,600 participants from 112 countries at a moment of profound disruption and redistribution of power. The HSC confirmed sustainability as the organizing framework linking peace and stability, economic
resilience and competitiveness, planetary boundaries and international cooperation. The rules-based international order is under pressure, fiscal space is shrinking and conflicts are multiplying, while climate change, biodiversity loss and resource depletion are compounding
these pressures on economies and societies already stretched thin. Yet the world has never possessed greater technological capabilities, financial wealth and scientific knowledge. What matters now is how we use these resources to deliver shared prosperity and resilience.
The discussions at HSC 2026 can be summarized along three narrative arcs. The first asks why cooperation remains essential in a more multipolar world. Legitimacy depends on changing the terms of North–South relations, broadening representation and building a cooperative multipolar order in which a wider group of actors can shape and defend common rules. The launch of the South–North Commission on Development offers a structured process for rethinking international cooperation toward fairer partnerships and a  sustainability Agenda beyond 2030. The second narrative arc examines what needs to change. Sustainability transformation pays
off economically, but only where investment can flow, risks are shared and governance is predictable. Nature and human capital are systematically undervalued. The bottleneck is the institutional and financing structures needed to unlock them at scale. The third narrative arc addresses how cooperation can deliver. It shows that partnerships accelerate sustainable development when they move from one-off initiatives to systems that mobilize finance, create markets and build local capabilities. Scaling Capital for Sustainable Development (SCALED), Innovative Capital Mobilization in Africa (ICAMA), critical-mineral and hydrogen partnerships, and urban examples from Mombasa and eThekwini show how tangible forms of cooperation can turn commitments into sustainable investment, deeper value chains and locally owned action. This shift is especially visible in Africa, where partnerships are increasingly framed around opportunity, value creation and agency. The road ahead runs through the Triple COP+ year, the G20 under UK chairmanship, and the SDG Summit in September 2027. HSC 2026 demonstrated that navigating the new - disruptive - normal is possible. The task now is to prove it at scale. […]

Over the previous two months, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted a NATO summit in Ankara and attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek. On his way back, Erdoğan presented the latter as part of Turkey’s “commitment to diversifying its economic, political, and strategic options”. This is not far removed from the usual analytical vocabulary. Ankara’s ability to straddle East and West is variously described as balancing, hedging or seeking strategic autonomy.

There are important differences between these concepts. Yet they often direct attention towards the same question: Where does Turkey stand in relation to the great powers? Turkish practices become evidence of the country’s position. The risk is that position then becomes a shortcut for assessing agency.

This can distort assessments in both directions. A focus on positioning can overestimate agency when the practice, purpose and effects of balancing are collapsed into one another. Maintaining relationships with competing powers may be intended to preserve flexibility and may, in turn, expand Ankara’s diplomatic repertoire. But such effects do not by themselves establish what Turkey can achieve through the options that these relationships create. At the same time, viewing Turkish foreign policy primarily through alignment can underestimate agency when practices that do not alter Turkey’s geopolitical position are overlooked, despite altering what Ankara can do.

The appeal of a balancing lens is understandable. It makes seemingly contradictory practices intelligible as part of a broader strategy. But explaining their strategic logic is not the same as assessing their effects. 

What becomes visible if we set aside balancing as the primary lens?

The test in the Black Sea 

Turkey’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has commonly been read as a balancing act. Ankara has not joined Western sanctions against Russia and has maintained political and economic ties with Moscow. At the same time, it has provided military support to Ukraine and applied the Montreux Convention to the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits, with consequences for Black Sea and non-Black Sea states alike. Read in this way, these policies appear to place Ankara somewhere between Russia and its Western allies. But a practice can matter without moving Turkey anywhere geopolitically.

More than four years later, Turkey continues to regulate naval access to the Straits. Together with Romania and Bulgaria, it operates the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group, whose mandate has expanded from mine clearance to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure following the Ankara NATO summit in July. Amid renewed attacks on commercial shipping, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has announced a proposal for the safe passage of grain, which Turkey is discussing with both Russia and Ukraine.

The basis of Turkish capacity is different in each case. Montreux gives Ankara authority over naval access within rules that also limit its discretion. Mine countermeasures are conducted through operational cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria. Relations with both Moscow and Kyiv create an opportunity for Ankara to broker an arrangement over commercial navigation, but not the conditions for agreement. Ankara’s agency is thus more specific, conditional and relational than the balancing vocabulary allows us to see.

What follows from where Turkey stands?

Turkey may well balance. The problem begins when balancing becomes the primary lens through which everything else is seen. It places great-power relations at the centre of the analysis, even where the capacity in question is produced elsewhere. Shifting the focus away from position raises a different set of questions: What can Ankara do? What enables it to do so? And which other actors does it depend on?

A practice that barely registers on an East–West axis may nevertheless alter what Turkey is able to do. For policy analysis, the relevant question is therefore not only where Ankara stands but also what it can affect, through which relationships and under what conditions.

The old establishment elites have opposed Namal’s arrest. They want to preserve a system where one of their own is not jailed for corruption.

Der Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) hat heute beschlossen, den Leitzins auf nun 2,5 Prozent zu erhöhen. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die EZB hat mit der Zinserhöhung einen notwendigen Schritt getan, um die Inflationserwartungen zu stabilisieren und ihre Glaubwürdigkeit zu schützen. Allerdings dürfte die Zinserhöhung nichts Substanzielles an der derzeit hohen Inflation ändern – auch nicht über das kommende Jahr. Denn die Inflation ist fast ausschließlich durch den Energiepreisschock infolge des Krieges im Nahen Osten verursacht worden. Gegen solch einen externen Schock hat die EZB nicht wirklich etwas in der Hand.

Die Inflationserwartungen im Euroraum sind zwar noch gut verankert, aber die EZB verschafft sich mit dem heutigen Schritt eine bessere Absicherung gegen mögliche Zweitrundeneffekte durch Unternehmen und Gewerkschaften. Sie sendet ein Signal an alle wirtschaftlichen Akteure, dass sie ihr Ziel der Preisstabilität ernst nimmt und dafür auch gewillt ist, die Wirtschaft im Euroraum zu bremsen.

Die EZB hält sich völlig zu Recht alle Optionen für die Zukunft offen, denn die Unsicherheit ist enorm hoch. Eine erneute Eskalation des Konflikts im Nahen Osten könnte die Energiepreise und damit die Inflation noch deutlich weiter erhöhen.

Allerdings ist Vorsicht geboten, den Bogen nicht zu überspannen. Denn die langfristigen Zinsen sind vor allem wegen der Zweifel von Wirtschaft und Märkten an der Handlungsfähigkeit der Politik – nicht nur, aber vor allem in den USA – deutlich gestiegen. Das reduziert den Druck auf die EZB, die Zinsen noch deutlich weiter zu erhöhen.

Climate-induced planned relocation is becoming an unavoidable policy issue for some highly exposed communities. Although relocation should remain a last resort after other realistic options for adaptation in place have been assessed, ensuring that the money is available when needed to support relocation is critical. The challenge is that funding is insufficient, drawn from diverse sources and often arrives too late and in fragmented forms: for example, one project for housing, another for infrastructure, and little predictable support for consultation, land negotiations, safeguards, livelihoods, host communities or long-term maintenance. The financing problem is therefore not only the scale of the costs, but the difficulty of organising money over time and across institutions and safeguards. This can leave governments reacting after crises rather than planning before risks become unmanageable.
Sovereign trust funds offer one practical way to address this gap. They do not create finance by themselves, but they can provide a country-owned platform for receiving, sequencing and reporting domestic revenue, bilateral support, multilateral development bank (MDB) finance, climate funds, disaster risk finance, and loss and damage resources. They present an alternative to predominantly loan- and grant-based financing for planned relocation. Fiji’s Climate Relocation of
Communities Trust Fund shows both the promise and limits of this approach: It provides a legal and institutional basis for relocation finance within government and links international funding to procedures, but it still requires capitalisation, administrative capacity and long-term technical support. The model presents an opportunity to support sovereign, rights-based financing systems rather than relying solely on donor-funded, often piecemeal relocation projects. It can also make funding available at the appropriate time and without undue time pressure.
Key policy messages:
• Finance planned relocation before a crisis, especially assessment, consent, land, safeguards and project preparation.
• Treat relocation as a long-term investment in the collective good, rather than solely as a construction or emergency response measure.
• Support sovereign trust funds where they are legally mandated at the national level, budget-linked, transparent and capitalised.
• Use finance to uphold quality and rights, including community-led processes, support for host communities and support for long-term livelihoods.

Climate-induced planned relocation is becoming an unavoidable policy issue for some highly exposed communities. Although relocation should remain a last resort after other realistic options for adaptation in place have been assessed, ensuring that the money is available when needed to support relocation is critical. The challenge is that funding is insufficient, drawn from diverse sources and often arrives too late and in fragmented forms: for example, one project for housing, another for infrastructure, and little predictable support for consultation, land negotiations, safeguards, livelihoods, host communities or long-term maintenance. The financing problem is therefore not only the scale of the costs, but the difficulty of organising money over time and across institutions and safeguards. This can leave governments reacting after crises rather than planning before risks become unmanageable.
Sovereign trust funds offer one practical way to address this gap. They do not create finance by themselves, but they can provide a country-owned platform for receiving, sequencing and reporting domestic revenue, bilateral support, multilateral development bank (MDB) finance, climate funds, disaster risk finance, and loss and damage resources. They present an alternative to predominantly loan- and grant-based financing for planned relocation. Fiji’s Climate Relocation of
Communities Trust Fund shows both the promise and limits of this approach: It provides a legal and institutional basis for relocation finance within government and links international funding to procedures, but it still requires capitalisation, administrative capacity and long-term technical support. The model presents an opportunity to support sovereign, rights-based financing systems rather than relying solely on donor-funded, often piecemeal relocation projects. It can also make funding available at the appropriate time and without undue time pressure.
Key policy messages:
• Finance planned relocation before a crisis, especially assessment, consent, land, safeguards and project preparation.
• Treat relocation as a long-term investment in the collective good, rather than solely as a construction or emergency response measure.
• Support sovereign trust funds where they are legally mandated at the national level, budget-linked, transparent and capitalised.
• Use finance to uphold quality and rights, including community-led processes, support for host communities and support for long-term livelihoods.

Climate-induced planned relocation is becoming an unavoidable policy issue for some highly exposed communities. Although relocation should remain a last resort after other realistic options for adaptation in place have been assessed, ensuring that the money is available when needed to support relocation is critical. The challenge is that funding is insufficient, drawn from diverse sources and often arrives too late and in fragmented forms: for example, one project for housing, another for infrastructure, and little predictable support for consultation, land negotiations, safeguards, livelihoods, host communities or long-term maintenance. The financing problem is therefore not only the scale of the costs, but the difficulty of organising money over time and across institutions and safeguards. This can leave governments reacting after crises rather than planning before risks become unmanageable.
Sovereign trust funds offer one practical way to address this gap. They do not create finance by themselves, but they can provide a country-owned platform for receiving, sequencing and reporting domestic revenue, bilateral support, multilateral development bank (MDB) finance, climate funds, disaster risk finance, and loss and damage resources. They present an alternative to predominantly loan- and grant-based financing for planned relocation. Fiji’s Climate Relocation of
Communities Trust Fund shows both the promise and limits of this approach: It provides a legal and institutional basis for relocation finance within government and links international funding to procedures, but it still requires capitalisation, administrative capacity and long-term technical support. The model presents an opportunity to support sovereign, rights-based financing systems rather than relying solely on donor-funded, often piecemeal relocation projects. It can also make funding available at the appropriate time and without undue time pressure.
Key policy messages:
• Finance planned relocation before a crisis, especially assessment, consent, land, safeguards and project preparation.
• Treat relocation as a long-term investment in the collective good, rather than solely as a construction or emergency response measure.
• Support sovereign trust funds where they are legally mandated at the national level, budget-linked, transparent and capitalised.
• Use finance to uphold quality and rights, including community-led processes, support for host communities and support for long-term livelihoods.

The AU–EU partnership should embrace the plurality within both unions, make interests transparent, and enable pragmatic cooperation between coalitions of willing countries, helping to bring proclaimed ambitions closer to actual practice, explain Benedikt Erforth and Lena Gutheil.

The AU–EU partnership should embrace the plurality within both unions, make interests transparent, and enable pragmatic cooperation between coalitions of willing countries, helping to bring proclaimed ambitions closer to actual practice, explain Benedikt Erforth and Lena Gutheil.