Agrégateur de flux

To address the question of whether Federica Mogherini can shape a smarter foreign and security policy for the EU than Catherine Ashton did, the answer, assuming there is one, must come in several parts.

The first concerns the nature of the position itself. When Ashton was appointed EU High Representative (HR) in 2009, many commentators, reacting to the widespread feeling that several other higher-profile candidates would have been preferable, argued that the personality of the incumbent was irrelevant because all decision-making power lies in the hands of the member states. Whoever is in post, it was argued, will simply have to toe whatever line member states collectively think appropriate or desirable. This line of reasoning has also greeted the appointment of Mogherini, though it is at best a half-truth, as most member states are actually looking for guidance in defining and promoting their interests. Institutionally, the HR indeed has to work within clear political constraints. But she also enjoys a considerable margin of manoeuvre and, given creativity and imagination, can succeed in influencing, if not actually setting, the agenda to a meaningful extent. Commentators agree that Javier Solana, with far fewer resources than Ashton, succeeded far better in making a real difference.

As a result of Ashton’s tenure, there are those who suggest that the position of HR has been weakened or even undermined – precisely because of her relative failure to deliver on the undoubtedly exaggerated expectations of the security community. But that view overlooks the extent to which the new post-holder has succeeded in avoiding the many early mistakes for which Ashton was constantly pilloried. It also ignores the new geopolitical context in which Mogherini is operating, with the specific remit given to the HR by the December 2013 Council. That remit confers on the new HR a clear mandate to develop, not a new institution as in the case of Ashton (the EEAS), but a new strategy and new policy preferences for the EU as a whole.

“A smart policy is one that is clear, appropriate to the objective being pursued and achievable”

The second issue is the respective candidates’ qualifications for the job. Here, Mogherini scores heavily, with her previous experience as Italian Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Italian Parliament’s Defence Committee. Whereas Ashton had to start from scratch and learn on the job, Mogherini hit the road running. During her October 2014 audition hearings before the European Parliament, all observers were as impressed by her solid mastery of the issues as they had been disconcerted five years earlier by Ashton’s apparent amateurishness. Mogherini is also solidly advised and assisted by her chef de cabinet, Stefano Manservisi, one of Italy’s most distinguished European officials. Whereas Ashton appeared constrained by ambivalent signals from the UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron, Mogherini benefits from the enthusiastic Euro-credentials of Matteo Renzi.

The third issue is the political content of the word “smart” as applied to European foreign policy. A smart policy is one that is clear, appropriate to the objective being pursued and achievable. Ashton put more time and effort into the Middle East than any other geographical area. But it was not clear what she hoped to achieve, and her actual achievements were extremely modest. Her main diplomatic successes – Kosovo and Iran – stemmed from her personal human qualities rather than from diplomatic finesse. Whereas Ashton toed the British line of ambivalence towards the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and appeared to consider it with indifference, expressing a clear preference for NATO, Mogherini strongly believes in and attaches genuine importance to European defence and security co-operation, which she perceives as necessarily operating in harmony with NATO.

It is in the area of the respective post-holders’ main priority remits that the biggest difference can be detected. Ashton was charged with creating the EEAS and she is rightly credited with achieving this – and within a year of taking office. Yet the mid-term reviews of the EEAS were generally critical, and in her own observations of the service, she seemed far more concerned about its internal workings than about its diplomatic reach or objectives. Mogherini has been charged with developing an EU “grand strategy”. The Council remit specifically asked her to “assess the impact of changes in the global environment” and to report to the Council on “challenges and opportunities” for the EU arising from that shifting global context. The way she has gone about this offers considerable reason for optimism. The most important element is that she is asking the correct questions. Not, ‘how do we export our values to the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods?’ But, ‘what can the EU realistically hope to achieve in these neighbourhoods given the massive changes they have recently undergone?’

The strategic review process will not be rushed. In the first phase, it has sought to understand shifts in the global environment, assess internal changes within the Union and their foreign policy implications, and review EU foreign policy instruments across the board (CSDP, cyber, energy, trade, development, counter-terrorism). In a second phase, starting immediately after the June Council, it will address the real questions required behind a genuine strategy: what are the EU’s interests, what are its realistic goals and how does it link these to appropriate means?

Mogherini has established a clear set of priorities, has developed a good working relationship with the policy community, with national and European officials and above all with the media. Whereas Ashton, for the overwhelming majority of commentators, got off to a decidedly rocky start, Mogherini’s performance to date has been virtually flawless. Whether this eventually delivers a “smarter” policy than that of her predecessor, of course, is largely in her own hands.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – european external action service

 

The post Is Federica Mogherini to make a real difference? appeared first on Europe’s World.

Only four years after the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) underwent its first major review at the time of what was over-enthusiastically being called the ‘Arab Spring’, the ENP is once again in flux. The adoption of a consultation paper in March earlier this year called ‘Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy’ so soon after the previous review was supposed to have made the ENP fit for purpose says much of the Barroso Commission’s shortcomings. Certainly, a genuine overhaul is now timely and much needed.

The EU’s eastern and southern neighbours have been going from crisis to crisis, with 12 out of 16 of them now directly exposed to unresolved conflicts, territorial occupation or even war. Bad governance, untransparent and ineffective state institutions, corruption and frequent violations of civil and political liberties are the rule rather than the exception in most of the partner countries in Europe’s neighbourhood. The European Union’s policymakers, whether in the Commission, the Parliament, the External Action Service or in EU member states’ capitals have all pointed to the ENP’s failure to respond adequately to these challenges.

Europe’s domestic problems are obviously an important factor. These times of austerity, rising nationalism and xenophobia, of growing concerns over illicit immigration, together with the looming threat of a Grexit and a disintegrating eurozone make costly and unpredictable foreign policy initiatives unattractive to public opinion. The latest ENP review is therefore faced with considerable constraints and seemingly bleak prospects. Yet meaningful reform of the ENP can be achieved, and it doesn’t necessarily have to come with a high price tag. For this to happen, though, decision-makers in the EU institutions and in member states’ capitals need to take five points into account.

In the first place, they must resist the ‘back to basics’ logic that some say should be put at the centre of the ENP review. Much as this sounds sensible, it is flawed. Not only did the basics of 2002 and early 2003, when the concept of a ‘wider Europe’ was agreed, relate to a neighbourhood very different to today’s, but also these basics were rooted in a false belief that the recipe for enlargement – conditionality and incentives for lasting reform – could be replicated without the carrot of EU membership.

“Playing for time is no longer an option now that the neighbourhood is in reality a ‘ring of fire’”

The second point to be emphasised is that although all concerned on the EU side underline the central importance to the ENP of Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), they have all stayed tellingly silent as to whether full implementation of these stipulations is a means to an end or the end itself. The absence of a clear end-goal is hugely problematic on the EU side in terms of foreign policy planning and the appropriation of targeted funds, and for EU neighbours it saps their efforts to generate domestic support for the approximation, implementation and enforcement of EU rules and norms.

Third, although the revised ENP of 2011 spoke of a ‘new response to a changing neighbourhood’, in practice its marked lack of innovation led to a gradual erosion of its credibility and therefore its effectiveness. This resulted from the de facto perversion of its ‘less-for-less’ principle into a ‘less-for-more’ practice which rewarded instead of sanctioning reform laggards in the neighbourhood. Also, it was the consequence of an overly-ambitious incorporation of issue-areas and policy fields the ‘new response’ was suddenly supposed to address, lacking, however, the means to do so.    

Fourth, ENP partners are shown by various EU Neighbourhood Barometers to have very different views of the EU. Last year, 56% of respondents in the eastern neighbourhood had a negative or neutral image of the EU, while in its southern neighbourhood only 38% held a positive view of the EU. This looks like being a major constraint on governments’ room for manoeuvre on ENP-related reforms.

Fifth, the original 2003 ENP and its 2011 successor fell victim to ill-informed and misleading interpretations of the underlying dynamics of the wider neighbourhood. The consequence has been that many in Brussels and in EU member states misinterpreted as signs of stability the stagnating politics of the countries in the neighbourhood and in some the re-emergence or even consolidation of authoritarianism.

Provided the consultation process now underway takes these points into account, a number of recommendations are in place.

The first is that further reform of the ENP will be bound to fail unless all 28 EU member states increase their involvement in both the review process and the implementation of a new policy framework. Developments like Russia’s unlawful actions in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s rivalry in the EU’s southern backyard compel all EU governments to incorporate the ENP into their foreign policy DNA. That also means the EU will need to abandon the ENP’s open-endedness because playing for time is no longer an option now that the neighbourhood is in reality a ‘ring of fire’. Europe’s neighbours need to be given a clear-cut roadmap; only an end-goal – not necessarily EU membership – will allow them to glimpse light at the end of a long reform tunnel and help justify costly and painful reforms.

Increased financial assistance and a wide-ranging liberalisation of trade, services and public procurement would undoubtedly benefit any neighbour implementing DCFTA stipulations. But because they remain confined by EU commercial policy, future ‘more-for-more’ formulae should envisage the more far-reaching integration of successful neighbours into some parts of the EU’s single market providing they approximate to EU rules and norms, and even adopt and enforce them.

To be taken seriously by reform-reluctant neighbours, the EU must start to use its leverage on trade. It should suspend trade preferences in the event of non-compliance with mutually agreed commitments. Other than Algeria, none of the 16 neighbours ranks among the EU’s top-20 trade partners. What the neighbours have in common is that they are more dependent on preferential EU market access than vice versa. This applies even to energy suppliers like Algeria and Azerbaijan, whose downstream networks are directed towards Europe and which desperately need the oil and gas sales if their governing regimes are to survive.

“The absence of a clear end-goal is hugely problematic”

The EU is present in all 16 neighbours through its delegations and representative offices or through the embassies of member states. To benefit more from this presence and enhance the ENP’s visibility, greater coordination and cooperation, as well as a reduction of overlaps should be a priority. Hand-in-hand with this streamlining, the EU should engage more in political coordination, and perhaps joint programming, with external actors and donors particularly on economic, technical and infrastructure.

The EU’s search for harmony and security in its neighbourhood has forced it to rethink its policies vis-à-vis the near abroad once more. This offers a unique opportunity for stakeholders to show they have learned the lessons of past failures. But that demands the new ENP policy framework generates results so that the populations of the 16 neighbours feel that responding to EU-induced reforms pays off. Only then will the EU truly be able to help reform-minded neighbours to increase and sustain the legitimacy of their domestic reform efforts. However, this requires consistency on the part of the EU and greater coherence between the policies of the 28 EU member states and EU institutions.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Andrew Smith

The post How to make the European Neighbourhood Policy fit for purpose appeared first on Europe’s World.

Magyarországnak pedig döntenie kell, melyikbe igyekszik. David Cameron csütörtök délután tárgyal a reformterveiről az EU-s vezetőkkel. Itt a lista, hogy mit szeretnének elérni a britek.

A nemzetközileg elismert líbiai kormány közölte, hogy küldöttséget meneszt Brüsszelbe az embercsempészet megfékezését célzó javaslataival.

Újabb területeken hirdette ki fennhatóságát az ISIS. A terrorszervezet egyik szóvivője, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani közlése szerint Oroszország észak-kaukázusi területein, Dagesztánban, Csecsenföldön, Ingusétiában, Kabard-Balkárföldön és Cserkeszföldön hoztak létre új “kormányzóságot”.

A területek ténylegesen nincsenek az uralmuk alatt, de jelzi, hogy a kaukázusi régió iszlamista szélsőségesei csatlakoztak az ISIS-hez, vagy legalábbis elismerték annak fennhatóságát.

A régió szélsőségesei 2007-ben még az al-Kaida szövetségeseként kiáltották ki a Kaukázusi Emirátust – ennek több vezetője esküdött most hűséget az ISIS-nek.

 Le 5 juin, Mme Socorro Ramirez (auditrice de la SIAL) a livré  dans le cadre de sa tribune bimensuelle dans le grand quotidien El Tiempo, un article couvrant certains des sujets abordés lors de la session internationale Amérique latine (SIAL) de l’IHEDN : ...

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Through centuries, military and political inscriptions of statehood and sovereignty into the landscape of geographic maps have become stagnant strongholds of factual history, fixtures which are never oppugned, in spite of perpetual shifts in the dominant positions of power commissioning their production. Lana Čmajčanin applies the methods of distillation, overlapping and reduction of (...)

/ Bosnie-Herzégovine, Dans les Balkans

T : +387 (0) 66 488 832
http://www.duplex100m2.com
[duplex100m2@gmail.com-mailto:duplex100m2@gmail.com]
Through centuries, military and political inscriptions of statehood and sovereignty into the landscape of geographic maps have become stagnant strongholds of factual history, fixtures which are never oppugned, in spite of perpetual shifts in the dominant positions of power commissioning their production. Lana Čmajčanin applies the methods of distillation, overlapping and reduction of (...)

/ Bosnie-Herzégovine, Dans les Balkans

The UN Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July 2015 will pave the way for the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. The Briefing Paper series “Financing Global Development” analyses key financial and non-financial means of implementation for the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and discusses building blocks of a new framework for development finance.
Although international trade is an integral component of the conference in Addis Ababa, trade finance itself has not been taken into consideration. This omission represents a serious shortcoming because trade finance is essential to international trade, especially for developing countries with less developed national financial markets and limited access to international financial markets. Every trade transaction must be financed. The non-availability of trade finance may therefore become an obstacle to international trade that impedes sustainable development.
As international trade is one of the most important driving forces for economic development in developing countries and emerging markets, the availability of trade financing is extremely important for sustainable development. In particular, the integration of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) into international trade is essential for emerging markets and developing countries and promotes economic development in an especially effective and sustainable manner. Trading in intermediate products has now become more important than end product trading, since goods are primarily produced within global value chains; two thirds of international trade is based on trade with intermediary products.
Participation in global value chains is therefore an important objective for developing countries. Empirical literature shows that countries which are strongly integrated into global value chains experience, on average, higher economic growth; however, frictions in finance represent one of the greatest obstacles to participation in global value chains. According to estimates from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for 2013, the annual global gap in trade finance amounts to USD 1.6 billion. Increasing the availability of trade finance by 5% could raise production and the number of jobs by 2%. According to surveys of market participants, the financial crisis led to a huge decline in the supply of trade finance. And yet even after the crisis was resolved, the availability of trade finance remains a significant problem in emerging markets and developing countries. Surveys show that this is especially the case in Africa and Asia. The lack of development within the financial sector can pose a significant hurdle to international trade and prevent emerging markets and developing countries from integrating into the global trade system more effectively and taking advantage of trade benefits.
For this reason trade financing should be an important building block of the future framework for development finance. For developing countries, it is particularly important to put the focus on strengthening both local and regional banking sectors as well as their international interlinkages and on improving the connection between trade finance and value chains in order to promote the integration of SMEs into the global economy, for example by strengthening the respective support programmes for Supply Chain Finance.

The UN Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July 2015 will pave the way for the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. The Briefing Paper series “Financing Global Development” analyses key financial and non-financial means of implementation for the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and discusses building blocks of a new framework for development finance.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is hailed as an important source of external financing for many developing countries. Improving developing countries’ access to global FDI flows is thus a central aim of the international community, as documented by the past two United Nations Conferences on Financing for Development, in Monterrey in 2002 and Doha in 2008. The need to set up a “stable and predictable investment climate” as a precondition to attract FDI was emphasised in the outcome documents of the Monterrey and Doha conferences. International investment agreements (IIAs) are mentioned as effective policy instruments to promote FDI flows. In fact, many developing countries signed IIAs to attract FDI and, in turn, promote economic development.
This standard justification is increasingly being questioned by critics of IIAs. An increasing number of policy-makers, scholars and non-governmental organisations argue that IIAs, by and large, have not resulted in increased FDI flows and, worse still, they fear that IIAs excessively restrict host countries’ ability to adopt public policies aimed at promoting sustainable development. Incidentally, this scepticism has also set the tone of the draft for the accord to be adopted at the Addis Ababa conference. It emphasises that FDI can have a positive impact on development, but only if foreign investors adhere to social and environmental standards, and if IIAs do not constrain domestic policy space to implement development-oriented policies.
The overview of the empirical evidence on the effects of IIAs on FDI flows suggests that this scepticism is well-justified. Although various studies find a positive impact of IIAs on FDI, in light of methodological challenges to actually measure this impact and alternative evidence, these results should be interpreted with great caution. Furthermore, researchers have only recently tried to account for different treaty designs. They find that treaty content matters and not all IIAs have the same effect on FDI flows. For example, treaties with market-access provisions have a positive effect on FDI, in particular if they are included in preferential trade and investment agreements (PTIAs). The hotly debated investor-state dispute-settlement (ISDS) clauses, on the other hand, have no effect on FDI.
Policy-makers in developing countries hoping to attract FDI should therefore pay closer attention to the actual design of IIAs. The empirical evidence suggests that they have some room to improve the compatibility of IIAs and national policy objectives by reformulating the standards of investment protection. In Addis Ababa, the international community should come up with proposals for how developing countries can be supported in order to reform their IIAs.

The UN Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July 2015 will pave the way for the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. The Briefing Paper series “Financing Global Development“ analyses key financial and non-financial means of implementation for the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and discusses building blocks of a new framework for development finance.
In many developing and emerging economies, central banks have begun over the past decade to place renewed emphasis on the promotion of economic development and structural transformation, looking beyond narrow mandates for macroeconomic stability. Developmental central bank policies have included policies directed at financial sector development, the promotion of financial inclusion and aligning the financial system with sustainable development.
This marks a shift from the orthodoxy that has dominated central banking since the 1980s and that has been promoted in developing countries by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and multilateral development banks. The orthodox approach to central banking – according to which central banks should primarily focus on price stability – has been severely undermined by the global financial crisis. It has become clear that central banks also ought to take responsibility for safeguarding financial stability. Moreover, in the aftermath of the crisis, many central banks have adopted unconventional policies to address problems of debt, stagnation and deflation. This has opened up a new discussion on the scope of – and limits to – the mandate of central banks. In practice, many central banks in developing countries nowadays proactively seek to promote sustainable economic development. Specifically, an increasing number of central banks and financial regulators have become active in promoting financial inclusion and in greening financial systems, rendering them important – albeit in international policy discussions often underrated – actors in development financing.
Widening the mandate of central banks can help to promote sustainable economic development by improving the framework conditions for financing the post-2015 development agenda. However, a wider mandate undoubtedly complicates matters, as developmental objectives may at times conflict with stability objectives. As central bank mandates widen, it will therefore be important to reform central bank policy frameworks with a view towards addressing the risks arising from a wider central bank mandate. The reform of central bank policy frameworks may help to ensure that central banks promote economic development and stability in a balanced manner, and thus be an important building block of a new framework for development finance.

Réparations / Constructions navales Le croiseur Maréchal Oustinov (Projet 1164 Atlant, flotte du Nord) entamera au troisième trimestre 2015 une série d'essais à quai à l'usine de réparation navale Zvezdotchka (Severodvinsk) où le bâtiment subit des réparations...

Jeroen Dijsselbloem, eurogroup chief, confers with Mario Draghi, ECB president, on Wednesday

Eurozone finance ministers have begun to gather for their fourth meeting in a week, attempting yet again to strike a deal on a package of Greek economic reforms to release a desperately-needed €7.2bn in bailout funds to Athens.

The ministers have been sent what one official termed a “feasibility blueprint” – but the Financial Times has obtained a copy and it looks very much like the version creditors annotated and sent back to Athens on Tuesday. We’ve posted a copy of the document here.

The first place to look is page three of the nine-page document, where the section on pension reforms begins. This has become the major sticking point between the two sides and, while it makes some concessions to the Greek government, it is very much in keeping with creditor demands that early retirement schemes be curtailed and the effective retirement age be raised very quickly.

Under the plan sent to finance ministers, Athens would ensure the retirement age is moved to 67 by 2022, significantly faster that Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, had sought. Originally, Athens was pushing for 2036, but Mr Tsipras’ compromise plan submitted on Monday moved that to 2025.

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A „Telephelyfejlesztés és ipartelepítés a területi kohézióért” című konstrukció keretében 49,81 millió forint vissza nem térítendő uniós támogatást nyert el a siroki vállalkozás. A 71 millió forint összköltségű projekt során a cég a korszerű termelési feltételeinek hosszú távú megteremtése és hatékonyságának javítása érdekében, két szintes ipari csarnokot alakított ki megújuló energiával történő ellátással.

Az L.HF Fémmegmunkáló Kft. alumínium és réz alkatrészek hidegfolyatására specializálódott vállalkozás. A hidegfolyatást kiegészítve a cég foglalkozik különböző anyagminőségű alumínium, réz, acél, savállóacél, viton, teflon alkatrészek mélyhúzásával és stancolásával is. Megrendelés állományuk és gépparkjuk folyamatos fejlesztéseként a korábbi gyártó csarnokukat kinőtték, a korábbi üzemi épületben már nem volt biztosítható az egymásra épülő munkafolyamatok futószalag rendszerű egymásra épülése, a félkész termékek üzemen belüli gazdaságos mozgatása.

A vállalkozás tulajdonában lévő, eddig raktárként használt 2 szintes ipari épület átalakításával lehetőség nyílt az üzemeken belüli alapanyag és félkész termékek szállítási útvonalak optimalizálására, termelékenységük növelésére, gazdaságosabbá tételére.

A projekt keretében a vállalkozás tulajdonában lévő telephelyükhöz csatolt 20 évig nem használt 2 szintes ipari épület tevékenységüknek megfelelő átalakítását végezték el oly módon, hogy az maximálisan kielégíti a cég igényeit. Az átalakított épületben az építészeti és gépészeti átalakításokat követően a hidegfolyató csarnok, lemezalakító csarnok, lakatos üzem, szerszám üzem és szerelde, valamint, az ezekhez kapcsolódó minőségellenőrzési funkciók ellátására alkalmas iroda és mérőhelyiség került elhelyezésre. Az üzem működéséhez szükséges kazánházat és elektromos kapcsoló helyiséget is korszerűsítették. Az új válaszfalak, belső nyílások, az új épület gépészeti és elektromos rendszer a technológiai igényeik szerint készült. Ezzel egyidejűleg az épületet a korszerű hőtechnikai követelményeknek megfelelő B kategóriás minősítésűvé fejlesztették.

Az L.HF Fémmegmunkáló Kft. felismerte, és elkötelezett követőjévé vált a megújuló energiaforrások hasznosításának, ezért napelemek beépítésével energiaigényük egy részét is fedezni tudják mostantól.

Az új üzem további lehetőséget teremt az eszközpark bővítésére is, és hosszú távon biztosítja a cég további fejlődését.

A „Telephelyfejlesztés és ipartelepítés a területi kohézióért” című konstrukció keretében 49 815 578 forintos támogatást elnyert, 71 165 112 forint összköltségvetésű projekt 2014. április 28-án indult és 2015. június 30-án zárul.

A Gazeta Wyborcza című lengyel lap kommentárt szentelt a lengyel püspöki kar legutóbbi dokumentumának.